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V I E W  
O F  
LORD BOLINGBROKE'S  
PHILOSOPHY,  
COMPLEAT,  
In Four LETTERS to a FRIEND.

In which his whole SYSTEM  
Of INFIDELITY and NATURALISM  
IS  
EXPOSED AND CONFUTED.  
With the APOLOGY prefixed.

THE THIRD EDITION.

L O N D O N,

Printed for A. MILLAR, and J. and R. TONSON  
and S. DRAPER, in the *Strand*.

MDCCLVI.



A N  
A P O L O G Y

F O R

*The Two First Letters :*

Which may now serve for

A V I N D I C A T I O N  
O F T H E W H O L E.

**S** O O N after the publication of the two first of these Letters I had the honour of an anonymous advertisement, in the warmest terms of friendship lamenting the displeasure, which my treatment of Lord Bolingbroke had given to that part of the *Public*, where the Advertiser had an opportunity of making his observations.

There was in this friendly notice so many sure marks of the Writer's regard to the Author of the *View*; so much good sense, elegance, and weight of Authority in the composition; and the whole so superior to every thing, but the force of plain and simple truth, that I had as much pleasure in the honour of the admonition as I had real pain for the occasion.

He assures me I shall never know from what hand it came : so that when such a Writer will remain unknown, it is foolish as well as indecent to presume to guess.

Yet I am very confident that a Friend so generous could never intend, by keeping himself out of sight, to deprive me of the means of vindicating my conduct to him. I am rather inclined to think, that, he took this method to oblige me to convey my Apology to *him*, which he had a right to expect, thro' the hands of *that Public*, which appear to have none : and which yet, I am persuaded, it was his principal concern, I should first satisfy. For I must inform my Reader, that the severe reflexions, I am about to quote, are not his proper sentiments, but the sentiments of those whom he is pleased to honour with the name of the *Public*.

They are introduced in this manner: *I am grieved to the heart to find the reception your two Letters meet with from the World.*—I am very sure he is ; and so, I think, must every good man be ; and more for the sake of *that* World than for mine. For what must an indifferent person think of a World, by profession, Christian, of so exceeding delicate a feeling as to be less scandalized at three or four bulky volumes of red hot Impiety, because they come from a  
LORD,

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LORD, than at the cool contempt of such an insult, in a Defender of the Religion of his Country, because he may be a poor Priest or an ignoble Layman? Will not every impartial man lament with me so abject a state of things, as that must be, where atheistic principles give less offence to our politeness, than ill manners; and where, in *good Company* you may be better received with the plague-fore upon you, than the itch?

*It vexes me* (says the anonymous writer) *to hear so many positively deciding that the Writer must be — by the SCURRILITY and abuse. —* The term is a little strong. But the best of it is, that it is one of those words the *Public* think themselves at liberty to apply indifferently, either to *scandalous abuse* or to *honest reproof*, just as they happen to be disposed to the Author, or the Subject. The equity of this kind of judgment, so readily passed upon Authors, had been sufficiently apparent in the case of one much more considerable than the Author of the *View*. The Author of the *Divine Legation of Moses* composed a book in support of Revelation; and sensible that the novelty of his Argument would give the alarm, and bring down whole bands of Answerers upon him, he did all he could to invite fair quarter. He publickly engaged that a candid,



and ingenuous Adversary should never repent him of his civility. Answerers, as he foresaw, came down in abundance: but it was not his hap to meet with one who treated him with common good manners. Of about a hundred of these writers, One or two, and no more, he thought fit to answer; and, (who can wonder?) without much ceremony. This was in the heat of controversy, when his resentments were fresh; and the injury aggravated by every circumstance of the lowest malice and most bare-faced misrepresentation. Since that time to the present, a course of many years, he has seen these miserable railers, some with names, and some without, go on in all the nonsense and billingsgate with which they set out. Yet tho' he has seen all this, and without any other marks of resentment than a contemptuous silence, he could not escape the character of a *scurrilous and abusive* Writer. It was in vain to appeal to his provocations then, or to his forbearance ever since.

But to return to the Author of the *View*. He was detected, it seems, by his *scurrility and abuse*. Surely there must be some mistake, and my Lord's own dirt imputed to his Answerer. The Author of the *View* seems to be in the case of a  
Sca-

Scavenger, (his enemies, I hope, will take no offence at the comparifon) who may not indeed be overclean while at fuch fort of work ; but it would be hard to impute that ftink to him, which is not of his making, but of his removing.

*The Letters are univerfally read ; and it is almoft univerfally agreed that Lord Bolingbroke deferved any treatment from You, both as a man perfonally ill ufed by him, and a member of that ORDER, WHICH HE HAS TREATED IN THE LIKE MANNER :—*In a Law of Vefpafian, we read, *Non oportere maledici Senatoribus ; remaledici, civile fasque eft.* And the equity of it feems here to be allowed. But I will claim no benefit from the Authority of Vefpafian, nor even from that which I more reverence, my anonymous Friend's. The truth is, that nothing perfonal ever once entered into my thoughts while I was writing thofe two Letters. Had that been the cafe, it would rather have been the fubject of my vanity, than my refentment. For nothing could be more glorious for an obfcure writer of thefe dark and cold days, than to find himfelf treated in the fame manner with the greateft and moft famous of the golden Ages of antient and modern Literature.

—But (says the anonymous letter) *it may dishonour a Gentleman and a Clergyman to give him that treatment he deserved, especially after his death. It is falling into the VERY FAULT so justly objected to him : every body would have applauded your selecting those instances of his railing, arrogance, and abuse, had not you followed his example.*—This Public then takes it for granted, that treating a licentious Writer as HE DESERVES, *may dishonour a Gentleman and a Clergyman.* Here, I think, we should distinguish. When the thing concerns only the civil interests of Particulars, a *Gentleman* has but little provocation for unusual severity of language, and less right to personal reflexion, especially on one of superior Quality. But when the highest of our religious interests are attacked, the interests not of this man, nor of that ; not of this Community, nor the other ; but of our common Nature itself ; and where the People are appealed to, and invited to be Judges, there, I think, all poultry distinctions of Title cease, they vanish before so great an object, and every *Gentleman* who loves his Religion and his Country should take the quarrel on himself, and repel the insult with all his vigour.

“ When

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“ When TRUTH OR VIRTUE an affront endures,  
“ Th’ affront is mine, my Friend, and should be yours.  
POPE.

The manners of a *Clergyman*, if they are to be distinguished from the manners of a *Gentleman*, consist in Zeal for God, and Charity towards Man. The occasion will sometimes call out one, sometimes the other : they may be exerted separately, but never at one another’s expence ; for they are disposed by Nature to be joint promoters of the common good : as in the case before us, I presume to say, a zeal for God is the greatest Charity to Man.

Now when Opinions of that kind, which the *View of L. Bolingbroke’s Philosophy* exposes, proceed to their extreme, not to confute them in terms either of horror or ridicule, for fear of transgressing the civil maxims of politeness, would be like that Preacher, the Poet speaks of, who scrupled to mention *Hell* before his audience at Court.

If then, amongst the Christian duties, there be a force to be exerted against Deceivers, as well as a patience to be observed in compassion to those who are misled ; and that the occasion before us was not a time for vigor-

ous measures ; I desire to know when this time comes ?

When men are sincere in their mistakes, after a diligent and candid search ; when the subject is of small moment, such as the mode of discipline, the measure of conformity, or a distinction in Metaphysics ; the mistaken, and even the perverse should be treated with tenderness. But when the avowed end of a Writer is the destruction of Religion in all its forms ; when the means he employs, are every trick of prevarication and ill faith ; and every term of scurrility and abuse ; when, to use the expression of Cicero, *est inter nos non de terminis, sed de tota possessione contentio*, Then, a practised calmness and an affected management look like betraying the Cause we are intrusted to defend ; or, what is almost as ill, like defending it in that way only which may turn most to our private advantage : As where, in questions of the greatest moment, we comply with this *fashionable indifference* ; or flatter it into a Virtue ; when we should have striven to rekindle the dying sparks of Religion by a vigorous collision with its professed Enemies, *whose faces* (to use the unpolite lan-



language of the Prophet) *are harder than a Rock* [1].

Men who have had Christianity indeed at heart have never been disposed, in capital cases like the present, to spare or manage the Offender. When the incomparable STILLINGFLEET undertook to expose the enormity of the Court of Rome, in turning the *dispensation of the word* into a lucrative trade, he prosecuted the controversy with so much vigour of style and sentiment, as to be reviled by those who found themselves affected by it, with the names of *Buffoon* and *Comedian*. *The servant of the Lord* (said they) *must not strive, but be gentle unto all men; in meekness instructing those who oppose themselves*. An answer equally apt and satisfactory. Without doubt, offenders would find themselves much at their ease, when secure from the resentment of the *Laws*, they understand they have nothing to fear from the animadversion of the *Learned*.

But this leads me to another consideration; which may further justify the Author of the *View*, in the account he has given of this relentless Enemy of RELIGION and SOCIETY.

[1] Jer. v. 3.



The English Government, secure in the divinity of that Religion which it hath established, and jealous of that Liberty which at so much expence it hath procured, doth now, with a becoming consciousness of the superiority of Truth and Reason think fit to suffer this, and many other writings, (tho' none so criminal in the form and manner, to pass thro' the Press, into the hands of the People ; writings, in which not only the Institutions of positive and national Worship have been insulted, but even those very **FOUNDATIONS OF NATURAL RELIGION**, which hitherto have been esteemed the bond of civil Society, as they enforce obedience on the principle of Conscience. A bond, which no Nation under heaven but our own have ever suffered to be brought in question : because no Nation but our own, has a perfect confidence in Truth, or is in perpetual alarm for Liberty.

But do flagitious Writers therefore become more privileged or respectable ? Or rather, Is there not the greater need that those evils, which the Public cannot redress, should at least be checked and opposed by a private hand ? Why do the civil Laws of all other Nations interfere to punish these offenders, but to prevent

vent the mischiefs of their writings? Why are not the same Laws put in execution here, but from the experience, or, at least, from a foresight, that recourse to them has been, or may prove, injurious to public Liberty? However, the *end* is confessed to be of the utmost importance, tho' *these means* may be thought incommodious. What is left then, but to use others of a private nature, where no ill consequences are derived to any but to the Instrument employed in the correction of these evils? Now the mischief done by licentious Writers is from their credit with the People. If their credit be undeserved, the way lies open for the Defender of Religion, to lessen it, either by Ridicule or serious expostulation. The Author of the *View* preferred the first. He thought it more effectual; for now-a-days, Folly discredits more than Impiety: He thought it more generous; for he had no design of bringing in the Magistrate to second his arguments. Nor is he one of those impertinents who are for directing Authority, or who think there is any need of such as him,

“ To virtue's work, to urge the tardy Hall,

“ Or goad the Prelate slumb'ring in his Stall.

He rather thinks it becomes him to follow their example. The CONVOCATION, in their late address to his MAJESTY, *lament the depravity*

*pravity of our times, evidenced beyond all former examples, by the publication of writings which strike at the very vitals of all Religion and shake the foundations of civil Government.* Yet they are so far from throwing the scandal on the State, or calling out upon the civil Magistrate for redress, that, as if they even respected the slander of their Enemies, *they engage themselves to his Majesty to exert themselves to the utmost, to maintain the honour of our most holy faith.* Let no one therefore take offence, that a private man has adventured to lend his hand to that work which the whole body of the Clergy hath, with so much glory to themselves, engaged to undertake.

But his Lordship's *death* is a further objection to the manner in which his writings are treated.

—Cuperem ipse Parens spectator adesset !

Had these *Essays* been published during his life, and had the Author of the *View* deferred his remarks upon them, in expectation of this good time, the censure might appear to have its weight. But what shall we say if his Lordship was publicly invited to give *his Philosophy* to the world, by the promise of a speedy answer ?  
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If a Writer's death may skreen his Works from the treatment they would deserve in his life, he has a very effectual way to secure both his Person and his Principles, from disgrace. Yet, where this is mentioned as an aggravation, it is confessed that in these posthumous Works published by his Lordship's direction, the Author of the *View* is abused in the grossest manner. Now, what is said in discredit of a living Writer, and by one of his Lordship's Authority in politics and letters, may prove a real injury: The harm to a dead Writer is but imaginary. This is only said to shew, that had the Author of the *View* retaliated, as he never had it in his thoughts, the return had been still short of the provocation.

But He commits the VERY FAULT *objected to Lord Bolingbroke—and in selecting the instances of his railing and arrogance he follows his Lordship's* EXAMPLE. — This would be weighed. Lord Bolingbroke has, in the most contemptuous manner, reviled almost all the Wise and Virtuous of antient and modern times. He has railed at the primitive Saints; the modern Doctors, the whole body of the Christian Clergy; and, in a word, the whole race of Mankind; which, ever since Religion came amongst us, deserves,

deserves, he says, to be considered in no other light than as one great aggregate of Lunatics. He has abused *Moses* and *Paul*; he has ridiculed the SON, and blasphemed the FATHER. Here is another Writer, *who by his scurrility and abuse is judged no other than*—and what has he done? *He has fallen into the same fault, and followed his example.* What, Has he likewise *railed* at all the Good, the Virtuous, and the Pious? Has he likewise had the *arrogance* to say, that the World was one great Bedlam? Has he likewise blasphemed his Creator and Redeemer? Alas! no. Two such Writers would be too much for one age! And yet, what less can justify *this* Public in saying, that the Author of the *View* has *fallen into the same fault with Lord Bolingbroke, and followed his example?* All he has done is occasionally telling the World, That his Lordship, once in his life, was for bringing in *Popery* and the *Pretender*; and is now for introducing *Naturalism*, a more specious form of Atheism: that he is overrun with passion and prejudice: that he understands little or nothing of the subjects he handles, which yet he treats with sovereign contempt: that his learning is superficial, his reasoning sophistical, and his declamation



tion inflated : and that, if ever Religion should happen to regain its hold on the People, his *Philosophic* works will run the hazard of being applied to the lowest and vilest uses. This is the substance of what he has said. And if this be falling into the *same fault*, and following his *Lordship's example*, the Author of the *View*, for aught I can perceive, must be content to plead guilty.

But we will suppose, the *manner* of writing only, as separated from the *subject*, is here to be understood. Is the railing at all Mankind ; at all Religion ; at God Almighty himself, but of the same species of writing with His, who shall tell the world, that this Railer was once as much an Enemy to the *Civil*, as now to the *Religious* Constitution of his Country ; that he reasons ill, and that he declaims worse ? Did the politeness of a *Clergyman* or a *Gentleman* require, under pain of being matched with his Lordship in *railing* and *arrogance*, that, after the Author of the *View* had quoted all his Lordship's horrors in principle and expression, he should have added, “ This, good  
“ People, is the FIRST PHILOSOPHY, which  
“ is to be substituted amongst you, in the place  
“ of RELIGION. But take me along with  
“ you ;



“ you ; Tho’ this, indeed, be the bane and  
 “ poison of your HOPES ; tho’ it reduce Hu-  
 “ manity to the most disconsolate and forlorn  
 “ condition, by depriving it of the MORAL  
 “ Ruler of the World, and by dissolving all  
 “ the ties of CIVIL Government ; Yet, Cou-  
 “ rage ! The Author was a man of distinguished  
 “ Quality, of uncommon abilities, and of infi-  
 “ nite politeness. His great talents for *Business*  
 “ enabled him to see what was best for Society ;  
 “ his penetration into *Philosophic* matters, what  
 “ was best for human Nature ; and his profound  
 “ knowledge of *Divinity*, what was best for  
 “ Both. He had governed States ; he had in-  
 “ structed Kings ; and this last great Book of  
 “ Wisdom was the result of all his skill and  
 “ experience.”

All this indeed I might have said : and, it is  
 probable, a good deal of it I should have said,  
 had the aim of my *View* been to recommend  
 Myself ; and to raise a reputation from the de-  
 feat of this mighty Man. Had this, I say, been  
 my aim, the raising the character of an Adversary  
 who was presently to fall by my hand, would  
 hardly have been amongst the last of my Con-  
 trivances. But as I had another purpose, the  
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preventing the mischiefs of his Book, I took the different method of reducing his Authority to its just value; which, by having been over-rated, had prepared the way for the easy reception of his Opinions amongst a corrupt People.

*The Letters*, says *this* Public, (whose sentiments have been, with so much real kindness, conveyed unto me) *purport to be a View of Lord Bolingbroke's Philosophy. They are a view of his life, morals, politics, and conversation. It may be true and just. But that is not the question. Whether he made a good treaty, or wrote the Craftsman, neither concludes for nor against the divinity of the Christian Religion.*

I readily confess, that, had Lord Bolingbroke's *Morals* and *Politics* nothing to do with his *religious Principles*, I had acted both an invidious and an idle part to bring in his *Treaties* and his *Craftsmen* into a *View of his Philosophy*. But I held all these to be the various parts of the same System, which had contributed in support of one another to produce a Whole.—I can believe he found it for his ease in *retirement*, to adhere still closer to a set of Principles, which having forwarded his Practice, enabled him to bear the retrospect of it's effects: but I am much mistaken

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ken if he did not *begin the World* with his notions of GOD and the SOUL; hence his rounds of business and amusements.

“ Now all for Pleasure; now for Church and State.  
POPE.

The rest followed in course. For, as Cicero well observes, *Cum enim DECRETUM proditur, Lex veri rectique proditur: quo a vitio et AMICITIARUM proditioes, et RERUM PUBLICARUM, nasci solent.*

But this is not all. I beg leave to say, there was not only a close connexion between his Principles and his Practice, but that it was necessary to a just defence of Religion against him, to take notice of that connexion.

One of his Lordship's pretended purposes, in his Philosophic *Essays*, was to detect the abuses brought into the Christian Religion by a CORRUPT CLERGY: My aim in this *View* was to expose a species of Atheism, inculcated on the ruin of all Religion by an IMPIOUS LAYMAN.

Consider, how his Lordship proceeded. — Not that I place my justification on his example: that, indeed, would be confirming the charge I am endeavouring to refute; neither would  
I in-

I insist upon the right of retaliation; for, tho' that be something a better plea, it is the last which a Writer for Truth would willingly have recourse to. I quote his Lordship's method with perfect approbation, as that which right reason prescribes to all who propose the detection of error and imposture. His Lordship's point, as we said, was to shew, that the Clergy had corrupted the purity and simplicity of Religion. It is not my design to inquire with what ingenuity he has represented the Fact, or how justly he has deduced the Consequences, which he pretends have risen from it. He has shewn some corruptions; he has imagined more; and dressed up the rest of his catalogue out of his own invention; all which, he most unreasonably offers as a legitimate prejudice against Religion itself.--- Well, be it so, that the Clergy are convicted of abuse and imposture. The question, which every one is ready to ask, who thinks himself concerned to enquire into the truth of the fact, is, CUI BONO? What END had the Clergy to serve by these corruptions? His Lordship thinks the question reasonable, and is ready to reply, That they had a wicked antichristian Yoke to impose upon the necks of Mankind: in order to which, they contrived to introduce such kind of corruptions into Religion.

Religion as best tended to pervert men's understandings, to intimidate their wills, and to impress upon their consciences, an awe and reverence for their spiritual Tyrants. The answer is satisfactory, and shews the use of this method of detecting error. With his rhetorical exaggerations, with the extension of his list of corruptions, with his ridiculous inferences, I have, at present, no concern.

As the Author of the *Essays* had, what he called, a tyrannical Hierarchy to unmask ; so, the Author of the *View* had, what he called, a declared, an impious, an outrageous Enemy of all Religion to expose. I believe they are both rightly named. Now, as errors to be detected, we must trace them to their source ; and as errors influencing practice, we shall find their original to be in VICE.

His Lordship had publickly and openly, in his respectable Character of a NOBLEMAN, a STATESMAN, and a PHILOSOPHER, declared Religion to be all a Cheat, supported only by Knaves and Madmen ; which indeed was a large Party, since, by his own account, it takes in the whole body of Mankind. His Lordship had been  
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held



held up to the People [2] as an ALL ACCOMPLISHED Personage, full and complete in every endowment of civil and moral Wisdom : And the enchanting vehicle in which his triumphant Character was conveyed, had made it received, even against the information of our senses. A PUBLIC thus prejudiced, would, on such a representation of his Lordship's religious principles as his *Essays* contain, and the *View* collects together, be ready to ask "could so sublime a Genius be disposed to deprive himself, and us, of all those blessings which Religion promises, had he not discovered, and been perfectly assured, that the whole was a delusion ; and therefore in pity to Mankind, had broke the Charm, which kept them from seeing their present good, in fond expectation of a recompence in the shadowy regions of futurity ?" We say, *deprive himself*, for he seems sufficiently vexed, and sensible of his disappointment, when awaked from the pleasing dream of a life to come. *There is no one thought* (says his Lordship) *which soothes my mind like this : I encourage my IMAGINATION to pursue it, and am heartily afflicted when ANOTHER FACULTY of the intellect comes boisterously*

[2] See the fourth Ep. of the *Essay on Man*, and the great Poet's other Works.



*in, and WAKES me from so pleasing a dream, if it be a dream* [3].”---In this manner I supposed, that they, for whose use the *View* was intended, were disposed to argue ; I mean that part of them who yet retain any concern for another life ; and who have not thrown off, together with their Guides, all thoughts of their journey thither. Now, against this dangerous prejudice, the Defender of Religion was to provide. He was first to remove their delusion concerning Lord Bolingbroke’s Philosophic Character ; and to shew, that he had none of those talents of Reasoning, of Learning, or Philosophy which are necessary to qualify a man to decide on so important a Question. But this opposed only one half of their prejudice. They could by no means be brought to think that so good a Man, so benevolent a Citizen, so warm a friend to Mankind, as his Lordship’s *Essays* represent him, could be lightly willing to forego that great bond of Society, that great support of Humanity, RELIGION. The Advocate of Religion therefore, unless he would betray his cause, was obliged to shew, that the Social light, in which his Lordship puts himself, and in which he had been placed by his poetical Friend, was a false one ; that his moral virtues

[3] xliii Letter to Swift in Pope’s Works, Vol. ix.

were the counterpart of his religious principles ; And public virtue (according to his favourite Cicero) embracing and comprehending all the private [4], it was to the purpose of such a defence, to shew, that his Lordship had been a **BAD CITIZEN.**

“ Proditā laxabat portarum claustra Tyrannis  
 “ Exfulibus —

Now tho' Religion has the strongest allurements for the Good and Virtuous, it abounds with objects of affright and terror to the profligate and abandoned ; who, in such circumstances, have but this for their relief, Either to part with their Vices, or their Religion. All the world knows his Lordship's choice. He himself tells us, it was made on the conviction of Reason ; others think, by the delusion of his Passions. The World is to determine ; and that they might judge with knowledge of the case, the Author of the *View* attempted to obviate the latter part of this popular prejudice ; which would not suffer them to conceive any reason short of demonstration, that could induce a man in his senses to part with the *soothing* consolation of futurity, as his Lordship so justly calls it.

[4] *Omnes omnium Charitates PATRIA una complexa est.*

And now, I suppose, every candid Reader will allow, at least I am sure the candid Writer of the anonymous Letter will allow, that his Lordship's *Morals* and *Politics* come within the *view* of his *Philosophy*; where the question is of the TRUTH or FALSHOOD of Religion; and of his Lordship's AUTHORITY to decide in it.

To sum up this Argument: His Lordship descants on *Romish superstition*; the Author of the *View*, on his Lordship's *Philosophy*: Not to shew for what *end* the one was established, or by what *means* the other was produced, is relating Facts without *their Causes*; which the Writer on *the use of history* justly throws into the class of unprofitable things: and therefore his Lordship, speaking of the corruptions brought by the Clergy, into Religion, accounts for them by a SPIRIT OF DOMINION; and the Author of the *View* speaking of his Lordship's religious principles, reminds the Reader of his MORAL PRACTICE; but so far only as served that purpose, and was, besides, notorious to all mankind.

*Lord Bolingbroke* (says this Public) *deserved every thing of you; but who are those friends and admirers of his, whom you represent applauding all he wrote; whom you bring in unnecessarily up-*

*on many occasions. I dare say they are very few. You had better have named them.*

As unexceptionable perhaps as that liberty might have been thought, I should certainly have ventured on it, had I conceived it possible for the Reader to understand, by such *friends and admirers*, any of those few illustrious Persons, whom Lord Bolingbroke's politeness, his distance from business, his knowledge of the world, and, above all, his ambition to be admired, occasionally brought into his acquaintance; and who gave dignity and reputation to his retirement. The Chief of these I have the honour to know, and the pleasure of being able to inform those who do not, that they were so far from being in the principles of his *Philosophy*, that some of them did not so much as know what those Principles were; and those who did, gave him to understand, how much they detested them. Indeed, nothing but this Fact, which I here assert on my own knowledge, can account for the disposition in his Will, concerning his *Philosophic* papers. And were it only for the sake of this fair occasion, of explaining myself, I could readily excuse all the hard thoughts *this Public* seems to have entertained of me. As to



*the friends and admirers who applauded all he wrote, I meant those who persuaded him to change his mind, and give those Essays to the Public, which he had over and over declared were only for the inspection of a Few; and which those Few had given him to understand, were fit for no body's inspection at all. Nay he seems willing the World should know to whom it was indebted for this benefit, by his letting those places in his Essays stand, where he declares his own opinion of their unfitness for general communication.*

*But what grieves and hurts your friends most (says this Public) is still behind. Poor Pope did not deserve to be treated by you with so much cruelty, contempt, and injustice. In a work where Lord Bolingbroke is represented as a Monster, hated both of God and Man, Why is Pope always and unnecessarily brought in, only as his friend and admirer? Why as approving of, and privy to all that was addressed to him? Why should he, who had many great talents, and amiable qualities, be described only by the slighting Epithets of tuneful and poetical. You say, Pope announced the glad tidings of all these things. In what work can he be said to have done it, except in his Essay on Man?*

Man? *This is throwing a reflexion on the excellent Commentary on that Essay.*

The Editor of Pope's Works certainly thought with this generous Animadverter, that the great Poet *deserved* every thing of his Friends. For he tells us "That to have been one of the greatest Poets in the World was but his second praise: that Pope was in a higher Class. He was one of the noblest works of God: He was an honest Man. A man who alone possessed more real virtue than, in very corrupt times, needing a Satyrist like him, will sometimes fall to the share of multitudes. His filial piety, his disinterested friendships, his reverence for the constitution of his Country, his love and admiration of Virtue, and (what was the necessary consequence) his hatred and contempt of Vice, his extensive Charity to the indigent, his warm benevolence to Mankind, his supreme veneration of the Deity, and above all, his sincere belief of Revelation, (the Editor tells us) shall, amongst other things, be the subject of the history of his Life. NOR (says he) SHALL HIS FAULTS BE CONCEALED. It is not for the interests of his Virtues that they should. Nor indeed could they be concealed if we



“ were so minded, for they *shine thro’* his virtues ; *no man being more a dupe to the specious appearance of Virtue in others* [5].”

But then, who it was that *treated poor Pope with cruelty, contempt, and injustice*, Lord Bolingbroke, or the Author of the *View*, let this *Public* themselves judge ; and, by their freedom from passion and resentment, at a time when a *friend* would be most *hurt*, they appear well qualified to judge impartially.

When, on the publication of the *Patriot King*, Lord Bolingbroke did indeed use the memory of poor Pope with exceeding *contempt, cruelty, and injustice*, by representing him, in the *Advertisement* to the Public, as a busy ignorant interpolator of his works ; a mercenary betrayer of his trust ; a Miserable, who bartered all the friendship of his Philosopher and Guide, for a little paltry gain. Who was it then that manifested his *hurt and grief for poor Pope* ? Was it *this Public* ! Or was it the *Author of the Letter to Lord Bolingbroke*, on that occasion ?

But in what consists the *contempt, cruelty, and injustice* of the *View* ? The *contempt* is in the *slighting epithets of tuneful and poetical* : the *Cruelty* in giving instances of Pope’s unbounded ad-

[5] See the Editor’s *Advertisement* to his works.

miration of Lord Bolingbroke; and the *injustice* in saying that he denounced the *glad tidings of the first Philosophy*, and that he approved and was *privy to all that was addressed to him*.

My using the epithets of *tuneful and poetical*, in speaking of a man who had many superior qualities, was, I humbly conceive, well suited to the occasion. It is where I speak of Pope as an idolatrous admirer of Lord Bolingbroke: and they aptly insinuate what I would have them mean, that, *Judgment* had there nothing to do; but all was to be placed to the friendly extravagance of a poetical *Imagination*. Who could fairly gather more from it, than that my intention was to place his Lordship's *ingratitude*, and Mr. Pope's *idolatry* side by side, in order to their setting off one another?

But *cruelty* is added to contempt, in the instances I give of Pope's unbounded admiration. I am verily persuaded, had Pope lived to see Lord Bolingbroke's returns of friendship, as well in his Lordship's usual conversation, [6] as in the *advertisement to the Patriot King*, he would have been amongst the first to have laughed at his own delusions, when this treatment of him had

[6] See the conclusion of the fourth Letter.

once broken and dissolved the Charm; at least, he would have been ready to laugh with a Friend, who should chuse to turn them into ridicule. For he held this to be amongst the offices of friendship, to laugh at your friend's foibles till you brought him to laugh with you;

“ Laugh at your Friends; and if your Friends be sore,  
 “ So much the better, you may laugh the more.”

as implying, that, while they continued *sore*, they continued to stand in need of this friendly operation.

My *injustice* consists in supposing *Pope* was privy to all that was addressed to him. An injustice indeed, had I supposed any such thing; I, who with greater certainty than most men, can affirm, that he was privy to nothing of the secret, but the design of the Address, and the preliminary Discourses. So little did Pope know of the Principles of the *first Philosophy*, that when a common Acquaintance, in his last illness, chanced to tell him of a late conversation with Lord Bolingbroke, in which his Lordship took occasion to deny God's *moral attributes* as they are commonly understood, he was so shocked that he did not rest till he had asked Lord Bolingbroke

ngbroke whether his informer was not mistaken? His Lordship assured him, he was; of which, Pope with great satisfaction informed his Friend. Under this ignorance of his Lordship's real sentiments it was, that Pope gave easy credit to him, when he vapoured that *he would demonstrate all the common Metaphysics to be wicked and abominable* [7]. And this leads me to that part of the charge, where it is said, I could only mean the ESSAY ON MAN, by the *glad tidings of the first Philosophy*. I meant a very different thing; and alluded to the following passages in his LETTERS. *Do not laugh at my Gravity, but permit me to wear the beard of a Philosopher, till I pull it off, and make a jest of it myself. 'Tis just what my Lord Bolingbroke is doing with METAPHYSICS. I hope you will live to see, and stare at the learned figure he will make on the same shelf with Locke and Malebranche* [8]. And again, *Lord Bolingbroke is voluminous, but he is voluminous only to destroy volumes. I shall not live, I fear, to see that work printed* [9]. Where, by the way, his fancy that this METAPHYSICS was de-

[7] *Bolingbroke to Swift*, Letter xlviii. Vol. ix.

[8] Letter lxxi. Vol. ix.

[9] Letter lxxiii.

signed for the public, shews he knew nothing of the contents. This then was what I meant. The *Essay on Man* I could not mean. For in the 55th page of the *View*, I make the fundamental doctrines of that *Poem* and of his Lordship's *Essays* to be directly opposite to one another. The one, a real Vindication of Providence against Libertines and Bigots: the other a pretended Vindication of it against an imaginary Confederacy between Divines and Atheists.

Thus I have explained, in the best manner I am able, my reasons for speaking of this great Poet in terms which give offence. But what shall we say, if this air of negligence to his memory was assumed, the better to conceal the Author of an anonymous Epistle? The motive sure was excusable; tho' the project was without effect: for *this Public* have positively decided, that *the Author must be* —— *by the scurrility and abuse.*

But, *Had you pursued* (say they) *the advantage you have ingeniously taken from an expression in one of Pope's Letters, to have shewn that Pope differed from Bolingbroke where he was in the wrong; that he not only condemned but despised the futility of his reasoning against Revelation; that*



*that where he was right Pope improved but never servilely copied his Ideas, you would have done honour to your Friend and Yourself: you would have served the cause of Religion: you would have discredited Lord Bolingbroke the more by the contrast——*

Now all this, the Reader will see in the *fourth Letter*, I had actually done; and (as it was in its place) fully and largely too. In the mean time, every body might see, it was what I was ready, on a fit occasion, to do, by the passage referred to just above from the *second*; where *Pope is honoured, and Lord Bolingbroke the more discredited by the contrast.*

But I must not leave this head without taking notice of one expression in the censure. It is said, that the *View* REPRESENTS *L. Bolingbroke as a Monster hated both of God and Man.* The expression had been juster, had it been — *from the View it may be COLLECTED*; because, whatever ideas Men may form of his Lordship from a perusal of the *View*, they arise from his Lordship's own words, which are faithfully quoted: What the Author of the *View* adds, is only a little harmless raillery, which can present the Reader with no idea but what (in the opinion

of *Pope*) arises from every fruitless attempt of Impiety.

“Heav’n still with LAUGHTER the vain toil surveys,  
“And buries madmen in the heaps they raise.

That the Author of the *View* assisted in the dressing up so strange a sight, as a *Monster hated both by God and Man*, was very far from his intention. He made a scruple of accompanying his Lordship’s quotations with those reflexions of serious indignation which such a Scene of horrors naturally suggests, lest he should be thought to aim at something more than private animadversion. He therefore generously endeavoured to turn the public attention from the *horror*, to the *ridicule*, of the *first Philosophy*, and to get his Lordship well laughed at; as being persuaded, that when the Public is brought to that temper, its resentment seldom rises to any considerable height.

Men had better speak out, and say, the Author of the *View* ought to have represented L. Bolingbroke as neither *detestable*, nor *ridiculous*. He could have wished, that his sense of honour and duty would have permitted him to have done so. He is neither a Fanatic, nor an Enthusiast,

thusiaſt, and perhaps ſtill leſs of a Bigot. Yet there are occasions when the moſt ſober, and candid thinker will confeſs, that the intereſts of Particulars ſhould give way to thoſe of the Public. It is true, there are others, when politeneſs, civil prudence, and the private motives of Friendſhip, ought to determine a man, who is to live in the world, to comply with the ſtate and condition of the times ; and even to chuſe the worſe, inſtead of the better method of doing good. But his miſfortune was that this did not appear to him to be one of thoſe occasions, in which, when he had explained the Doctrines and Opinions of an erroneous Writer, he could leave them with this reflexion : “ Theſe are the  
 “ Writer’s notions on the moſt important points  
 “ with regard to human happineſs. They are  
 “ indeed very ſingular and novel. But then  
 “ conſider; the Writer was a great man, and  
 “ high in all the attainments of Wiſdom; there-  
 “ fore weigh well and reverendly before you  
 “ condemn what I have here expoſed to your  
 “ Judgment.”—But had I, with a view to prudence, ſaid this, Would it have ſecured me from OFFENCE, the very thing that PRUDENCE would moſt avoid ? Would it not rather have furniſhed out another handle, a handle for the making me  
 a con-

a. Confederate in his guilt, only a little better disguised? Had this happened, it would not have been the first time I had been so served, when endeavouring to *avoid offence*.

And yet there was but one of these three ways; Either to laugh, to declaim, or to say nothing. I chose the first, as what I fancied least obnoxious; in which, however, I was mistaken; and as most likely to do good; in which, I still hope, I was not mistaken.

The only harm L. Bolingbroke, whose reputation of parts and wisdom had been raised so high, can possibly do, is amongst the PEOPLE. His objections against Religion are altogether of the popular kind, as we feel by the effects they have had, when used by their original Authors, long before his Lordship honored them with a place in his *Essays*. What then was that Man to aim at, who had made it his business (indeed without being set on work) to put a speedy stop to the mischief, and neither to palliate the doctrines, nor to compliment the Author of them, but to give a true and succinct representation of his *System*, in a popular way; to make a right use of that abundance, which the ESSAYS and FRGMENTS afforded, to shew that his Lordship's *Principles* were as foolish

foolish as they were wicked; and that the *Arguments* used in support of them were as weak as they were bold and overbearing: that he was a pretender in matters of Learning and Philosophy; and knew no more of the genius of the Gospel, than of that supposed corruption of it, which he calls, *artificial Theology*. This I imagined to be the only way to reach his Lordship's AUTHORITY, on which all depended; and then, the very weakest effort of ridicule would be able to do the rest. These were my motives for the method I laid down; and whatever impropriety there may be in divulging them in a way that tends to defeat their end, it should, I think, be laid to the account of those who make this explanation necessary.

I have been the longer on this matter as it will serve for an answer to what follows.

*Lord Bolingbroke* (says this Public) is so universally and so justly obnoxious to all sorts and ranks of people, that from regard to him, nobody cares how he is treated, but be assured your MANNER has destroyed all the merit of the work. — Tho' with regard to the *manner* I have said enough; yet the candid Reader, I am sure, will allow me to add a word or two Concerning the effect of an unacceptable manner, in a work of public



*public service.* It had, till of late, been always deemed desert to do a general good, tho' in a way not perfectly acceptable. But we are now become so delicate and fastidious, that it is the *manner of doing*, even in things of highest importance, which carries away all the merit. And yet, this false delicacy on a question of no less moment than *Whether we shall have any Religion or none at all*, seems as absurd as it would be in a Great man to take offence at an officious neighbour for saving his falling Palace, by a few homely props near at hand, when he should have considered of a support more conformable to the general taste and style of Architecture in his Lordship's superb piece ; or to find him disconcerted by that charitable hand, which should venture to pull his Grandeur by head and shoulders out of a flaming apartment.

But in these suppositions I grant much more than in reason I ought. I suppose the PUBLIC TASTE, which the *manner* in question has offended, is a reality, founded in Nature ; whereas 'tis the fantastic creature of Fashion, and as shifting and capricious as its Parent. TRUTH, which makes the *matter* of every honest man's enquiry, is eternal ; but the *manner suited to the public taste*, is nothing else than conformity to

OUR

our present passions, or sentiments ; our prejudices, or dispositions. When the truths or the practices of Religion have got possession of a People, then a warmth for its interests, and an abhorrence of its Enemies, become the public taste ; and men expect to find the zeal of an Apostle in every defender of Religion : But when this awful Power has lost its hold, when, at best, it floats but in the brain, and comes not near the heart, then, if you expect to be read with approbation, you must conform your *manner* to that polite indifference, and easy unconcern, with which we see every other trial of skill plaid before us.

But now I am advanced thus far, I will venture a step further. When Infidelity first made its appearance amongst us in set Discourses addressed to the Public, our ecclesiastical Watchmen instantly took the alarm ; and communicated it to their Brethren with a warmth and vigour that gave lustre to their high Trust. No Writer escaped unnoticed ; no argument remained unanswered ; and a learned Critic received public honours, as the deliverer of his Country, in rescuing common sense from the very filliest rhapsody [4] that ever disgraced

[4] *Discourse of Freethinking.*

human Reason. But since the danger is become imminent, or, to speak more properly, since the mischief so much dreaded has done its work, and one would naturally expect to see this vigilance increased, and the Body up in arms, we find a perfect peace and tranquillity reign amongst them. Which, were it not attended with equal unconcern, one might mistake for a well grounded confidence in vigorous measures. As if it were our unhappy fate to be still mistaken, as well when we thought the *Church in danger*, as now when we appear to believe it *triumphant*!

*Indeed (says this Public) it, [your manner] has furnished your enemies with a handle to do you infinite mischief. Your COLD friends lament and make the worst sort of excuse, by imputing it to a temper contracted from the long habit of drawing blood in controversy; Your WARM friends are out of countenance, and forced to be silent, or turn the discourse.*

Would not any one by this, imagine, that the Author of the *View*, after much pretended opposition to Infidelity, was at last detected of being in confederacy with it, and all along artfully advancing its interests; that the Mask had  
unwarily

unwarily dropt off, and that he stood confessed, what Lord Bolingbroke has been pleased to call him, *an Advocate for civil and ecclesiastical Tyranny*. At least, no one would imagine, that this *handle afforded to his enemies of doing him mischief*, was no other than the treating the Author of the most impious and insulting book that ever affronted public justice, as a bad Reasoner and a worse Philosopher, whose VANITY led him to abuse every *Name* of Learning, and his FEAR to discredit every *Mode* of Religion.

These *cold Friends* however acted in Character; the great secret of whose address is the well poisoning an Apology, or, as the excellent writer better expresses it, *making the very worst excuse they can find*. But here, methinks, we want their usual caution, which rarely suffers an ambiguous expression to admit of a favourable meaning: For, the compliment *of drawing blood in controversy*, the Author of the *View* may fairly take to himself with great complacency. As his *Controversy* has always lain in a quarter very remote from political altercation; neither with Ministers nor Factions; and on no less a question than the truth and honour of Religion, against Infidels and Bigots; the *drawing blood* shews him to have been *in earnest*, which.

which is no vulgar praise. It would be but poor commendation, I ween, of a brave English Veteran, who had seen many a well-fought field for Liberty and his Country, to say, he never *drew blood*; tho' such a compliment might recommend the humanity of a Champion at Hockley-hole. When the situation of the times have engaged two learned Men, at the head of opposite factions in a Church, to engage in a party-quarrel, and play a prize of disputation, with the reward placed, and often divided, between them, it is no wonder if there should be much ceremony, and little *blood shed*. But the Author of the *View* writes for no Party, nor party-Opinions; he writes for what he thinks the TRUTH; and, in the point in question, for the CLERGY, its Ministers; (they will *forgive him this wrong*) and as Both of them are yet by good fortune of public authority, he thinks himself at liberty to support them, tho' it be by *drawing blood* from premeditated impiety, from low envy, or malicious bigotry; which, he apprehends, are not to be subdued by management or a mock-fight. Yet as much *in earnest* as he is, he should be ashamed to turn the same arms against simple error; against a naked adversary; or against the man who had thrown away his weapons; or, indeed, against any but him,



him, who stands up boldly to defy Religion; or, what is almost as bad, to dishonour it, by false and hypocritic zeal for the errors and corruptions which have crept into it. In a word; had I written with any oblique views, and not from a sense of duty, I should have suited the entertainment to the taste of my Superiors. For a man must be of a strange complexion indeed, who when he has *conformed to Religion* for his convenience, will yet scruple to go on, and reap the benefit of his compliance, by *conforming to the Fashion*:

So far as to the Author's *cold Friends*. With respect to his *warm* ones, They have not plaid their parts so well; they seem to have given up their Cause too soon. They might have said with truth, and a full knowledge of what they said, “That no man was more disposed than the Author of the *View*, to comply with the temper of the times; and especially with the Inclinations of his Friends; to whose *satisfaction* he has been ever ready to sacrifice his own inclinations; but, to their *services*, every thing—except his duty and his honour: Was he capable of doing this he would not deserve a virtuous Friend: That probably, he considered the matter in ques-  
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tion as one of those excepted cases, where he could hearken to nothing but the dictates of honour, and the duties of his station: That he saw *Religion* insulted, a *moral Governor* defied; *Naturalism*, a species of *Atheism*, openly, and with all the arts of sophistry and declamation, inculcated; and the opposing World insolently branded as a cabal of fools, knaves, and madmen." They might have said, "That where errors of small consequence are in question, or even great ones, when delivered with modesty and candour, suitable measures are to be observed: but that here the impiety and the insult were both in the extreme." To which, in the last place, they might have added most of those other considerations, which have been urged in the course of this Apology. And had they been so pleased, the Defence had not only been better made, but with much more dignity and advantage to their Client.

However the Author of the *View* has yet the vanity, amidst all this mortification, to reflect, that there is a very wide difference between *displeasing*, and *the being disapproved*: and that *this very Public*, who complain by the pen of my anonymous Friend, feel that difference. The decencies of Acquaintance, the impressions  
of

of habit, and even the most innocent partialities, might make them uneasy to see Lord BOLINGBROKE exposed to contempt: But their love of the Public, their reverence both for its Civil and Religious interests, will make them see with Pleasure his PRINCIPLES confuted and exposed. When a noble Roman had in public Senate accused one of the greatest Pests of his age and country, he observed that the vigour with which he pursued this Enemy of the Republic, made many worthy men uneasy; but he satisfied himself with this reflexion, *tantum ad fiduciam vel metum differt, nolint homines facias, an non probent.*

In a word, my duty to God, to my Country, to Mankind at large, had, as I fancied, called upon me to do what I did, and in the *manner* I have done it. If I have offended any good Man, any Friend to my person, or my Cause, it is a sacrifice to Duty; which yet I must never repent of having made, tho' the displeasure of a Friend be the severest trial of it. I know what that man has to expect, both from *Infidelity* and *Bigotry*, who engages WITHOUT RESERVE in the service of Religion.

“ Ah! let not VIRTUE too, commence his Foe!

How-

However I have long since taken my party:  
 “ Omnia praecepi; atque animo mecum ante peregi.  
 “ Nec recuso, si ita casus attulerit, luere  
 “ poenas ob honestissima facta, dum FLA-  
 “ GITIOSISSIMA ULCISCOR.”

*Jan. 4, 1755.*

# L E T T R E

D U

Feu Prefident MONTESQUIEU

À

## L' A U T E U R.

*J'AY reçu, Monsieur, avec une reconnoissance tres grande, les deux magnifiques ouvrages que vous avés eû la bonté de m' envoyer, et la lettre que vous m' avez fait l' honneur de m' écrire sur les œuvres posthumes de My Lord Bolingbroke : et comme cette Lettre me paroît être plus à moi que les deux ouvrages qui l' accompagnent, auxquels tous ceux qui ont de la raison ont part, il me semble que cette Lettre m' a fait un plaisir particulier. J' ay lu quelques ouvrages de My Lord Bolingbroke, et s' il m' est*

\* a

*permis*



pernis de dire comment j'en ai été affecté, certainement il a beaucoup de chaleur : mais il me semble qu'il l'emploie ordinairement contre les choses, et il ne faudroit l'employer qu'à peindre les choses. Or, Monsieur, dans cet ouvrage posthume, dont vous me donnez une idée, il me semble qu'il vous prépare une matière continuelle de triomphe. Celui qui attaque la Religion révélée n'attaque que la Religion révélée ; mais celui qui attaque la Religion naturelle attaque toutes les Religions du monde. Si l'on enseigne aux hommes qu'ils n'ont pas ce frein ci, ils peuvent penser qu'ils en ont un autre : Mais il est bien plus pernicieux de leur enseigner qu'ils n'en ont pas du tout. Il n'est pas impossible d'attaquer une Religion révélée, parce qu'elle existe par des faits particuliers, et que les faits, par leur nature, peuvent être une matière de dispute : mais il n'en est pas de même de la Religion naturelle ; elle est tirée de la nature de l'homme, dont on ne peut pas disputer, et du sentiment intérieur de l'homme, dont on ne peut pas disputer encore. J'ajoute à ceci, Quel peut être le motif d'attaquer la Religion révélée en Angleterre ? on l'y a tellement purgé de tout préjugé destructeur qu'elle n'y peut faire de mal, et qu'elle

*qu'elle y peut faire, au contraire, une infinité de biens. Je sais, qu'un homme en Espagne ou en Portugal que l'on va brûler, ou qui craint d'être brûlé, parce qu'il ne croit point de certains articles dependans ou non de la Religion revelée, a une juste sujet de l'attaquer, parce qu'il peut avoir quelque esperance de pourvoir à sa defence naturelle : Mais il n'en est pas de même en Angleterre, où tout homme qui attaque la Religion revelée l'attaque sans interest, et où cet homme quand il reussiroit, quand même il auroit raison dans le fond, ne feroit que détruire une infinité de biens pratiques pour établir une verité purement speculative.*

*J'ay été ravi, &c.*

*A Paris ce 26 May*

*1754.*

**MONTESQUIEU.**

A  
L E T T E R  
FROM THE  
Late President MONTESQUIEU  
TO THE  
A U T H O R.

S I R,

I Am exceedingly obliged to you for the magnificent Present you have been pleased to make me of your Books, and for the Letter you did me the honour to write me on Lord *Bolingbroke's* posthumous Works. As that Letter seems to be rather more my own than the two Books which accompany it, every reasonable creature being interested therein as well as myself, I enjoy it with particular delight. I have dipped into some of my Lord *Bolingbroke's* Discourses; and, if I may be allowed to say in what manner they affected me, I must own that he writes with a good deal of warmth; but methinks he generally employs

ploys it against things, whereas it ought to be employed only in painting them. Now it appears to me that, in the posthumous work of which you have given me an account, he hath prepared for you, Sir, continual matter of triumph. He who attacks revealed Religion, attacks revealed Religion only; but, he who attacks natural Religion, attacks all the Religions in the World. Though men should be taught to disbelieve the Obligations of revealed Religion, they may still think themselves bound by some other; but it is most pernicious to endeavour to persuade them that they are bound by none at all. It is not impossible to attack a revealed Religion, seeing it depends on particular facts, and facts are, in their own nature, liable to be controverted: but that is not the case with Natural Religion; for it is drawn from the Nature of man, which cannot be disputed, and from the internal Sentiments of mankind, which are equally indisputable. Besides, what motive can there be for attacking revealed Religion in *England*? In that country, it is so purged of all destructive prejudices, that it can do no harm; but, on the contrary,

trary, is capable of producing numberless good effects. I am sensible that, in *Spain* or *Portugal*, a man who is going to be burnt, or afraid of being burnt, because he does not believe certain articles, whether depending or not depending on revealed Religion, hath very good reason to attack it, because he may thereby hope to provide for his natural defence. But the case is very different in *England*, where a man that attacks revealed Religion does it without the least personal motive; and where this champion, if he should succeed, nay, should be in the right too, would only deprive his country of numberless real benefits, for the sake of establishing a merely speculative truth.

I was charmed, &c.

*Paris, 26th May*

1754.

MONTESQUIEU.



T O

\* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* Esq.

D E A R S I R,

L ORD BOLINGBROKE'S PHILOSOPHY, so much and so long talked of, is now come, and very fairly, into the hands of the public. For I think it would be injustice to the editor to suppose his Lordship did not design us this LEGACY. His last Will sufficiently declares his kindness to us. But, you will say, he speaks of his Philosophy as a thing composed only for the solace of a few friends in a corner [1]. What then? might not his Lordship change his mind, and extend his benefits? Hardly, you think, without *contradicting* his professed principles. So much the better. The publication then will be of a piece with the rest. And never trouble your head with one *contradiction*, where you may meet with a thousand.

*Quid te exempta levat spinis de pluribus una?*

[1] "Let us seek truth, but seek it quietly as well as freely. Let us not imagine, like some who are called FREE-THINKERS, that every man who can think and judge for himself (as he has a right to do) has therefore a right of SPEAKING, any more than of *acting*, according to the full freedom of his thoughts. The freedom belongs to him as a rational creature. He lies under the restraint as a *member of Society*. — As we think for ourselves, we may keep our thoughts to ourselves or communicate them with a DUE RESERVE, and in such manner ONLY, as it may be done without *offending the Laws of our Country, and disturbing the public peace.*" — *Introductory Letter to Mr. Pope*, Vol. iii, p. 343. Quarto Edition.

B

Now

Now tho' I know You have as little Curiosity to hear what a Freethinker can object to the FAITH which has got possession of your heart, as what a pick-pocket can chicane to the Property in your purse: yet the name of L. BOLINGBROKE'S METAPHYSICS, (which, I think, were become as famous, and hitherto as little understood, as his POLITICS) cannot sure but incline you to some slight acquaintance at least with this FIRST PHILOSOPHY, as he calls it; and which, in the manner of other Conquerors, he erects on a general desolation.

The only part of his Lordship's Character, that yet remained equivocal, was his *literary*. How this will fare by the publication of his *Philosophy*, I will not pretend to say; perhaps not altogether so well as his Friends might give him the pleasure to expect. He frequently tells his reader, that the Doctrine of his ESSAYS and FRAGMENTS had been occasionally thrown out amongst them, and made the subject of many free conversations. And while he harangued in that circle, I will suppose he met with the applause he sought after. But had he chose himself to bring them to the bar of the Publick, he might have seen strange revolutions. "Illic, et Judex tacet, et  
 " Adversarius obstrepat, et nihil TEMERE DICTUM  
 " perit: et, siquid TIBI IPSE SUMAS, PROBANDUM  
 " est: et, omisso MAGNA SEMPER FLANDITUMORE,  
 " loquendum est [i]." Indeed his Lordship could hardly expect to escape the severity of this Tribunal but by the superior evidence of his principles: since his meditations on divine matters are so extensive, that scarce any one, who has written in defence of Virtue,

[i] Quint.

or

or Religion, but will find himself either insulted in his person or misrepresented in his opinions; and this, merely for being in the great man's way.

But surely, when a person of his Lordship's polite manners had condescended to enter into learned altercation, the world might expect, at least for the *courtly management of Controversy*, a most consummate Model, which should either reform, or should for ever discredit, the grosser Polemics of the Schools. So that tho' the DIVINE might expect no great *matter* from these oracles of reason, yet he should readily accept his amends in the *manner* of so elegant a pen. And perhaps You, who have observed their commerce with the world, and their conduct to one another, might be apt to think they would have been no losers by the bargain. Indeed, Divines have been generally thought wanting in forms; whether their pride prompts them to appeal to the Authority of reason; or their prudence teaches them to submit to the Wisdom of their Betters. And the management of their Controversies in the Schools, and their interests in Courts, have, on different accounts, been equally obnoxious both to the dealers in Truth and Falsehood. I would willingly avoid both their extremes. For I would, if possible, preserve and support that love and reverence to an useful body, which the noble Writer, relying not on his own politics but on other men's, has in his *fourth Essay* devoted to Destruction. He, indeed, may call for aid on the *Secular arm*; he has the old reason for so doing; but I dare say, the *Clergy* never will. Things are now come to that pass, that the State seems to be in more need of their

Support, than They, of the State's. For, tho' the cavils of licentious men always *end* in the Confirmation of Truth and Virtue, yet they generally *set out* in loosening the hold, which Religion had got upon the PEOPLE. And when that is gone, what other Engine the Magistrate will invent, to keep the Multitude in order, They, whose principal concern it is, would do well to consider.

As I said, then, I had taken it for granted, that our noble Adversary, for an Adversary he has condescended to be, would be principally anxious to teach us in his writings, what was his wont in conversation, that studied politeness, which is so well fitted to keep inferiors at a distance: And that, when he had declared mortal war against every thing the world hath hitherto called RELIGION; and against every Order of PRIESTS, or MINISTERS, which civil Government has thought proper to establish, for the support of it, we should see his attack carried on by the fairest as well as strongest reasoning, the gentlest as well as firmest address, and the politest as well as keenest raillery.

But how were we disappointed, to find this Conservator of States, this Legislator in Philosophy and Religion, utterly unable to raise his head above the rank contagion of the Schools: to see Polemics go their usual train; and this Sun of our new System, whirled along the turbid vortex of Controversy, like any the most *ignoble* of the earthly Bodies! But his POET, or rather his *Prophet*, (who so magnificently announced to us the glad tidings of all these good things) had prepared us for it. He had contemplated



plated this strange phenomenon : not, indeed, without surprize. Is it not, says he,

—— “ mighty odd ?

“ A fit of vapours clouds this DEMI-GOD ! ”

To be plain, I met with nothing in these big volumes, but the rankness of SOUTH without his force ; and the malignity of MARVEL without his wit. You shall not take it on my word : the evidence lies before us. Give me leave then to present you with a SPECIMEN, under his own hand, of his candour, his temper, and infinite politeness. And tho’ one can but ill judge of the *harvest* by a sample of the field-flowers, yet we may form a pretty good guess of the *soil*.

Nor is this intemperance of language, of which I propose to give you a taste, the mere escape of fancy or humour, which it would be candid to overlook : It is a sort of *formula dicendi*, without which, all his Lordship’s authentic acts of Legislation would be invalid : It is the very *Spirit* of his *new Religion*, without which, the whole would be indeed but a *dead letter*.

It was with the less reluctance I entered upon this part of my design, that I might have to justify myself to the world for the plainness and freedom with which I may hereafter chance to treat his Lordship’s REASONING ; for, as Quintilian well observes, “ Præ-  
“ statur hoc aliquando etiam DIGNITATIBUS ut li-  
“ bertatis nostræ ratio reddatur, ne quis nos aut petu-  
“ lantes in lædendis his, aut etiam ambitiosos putet.”

Without any further prologue, then, let the Shew begin : Only premising, that as his Lordship had a FIRST PHILOSOPHY to erect, he had an immense



deal of rubbish to remove: The authority of every great Name, and of every sacred Order, standing directly in his way.

With CUDWORTH he begins: and of CUDWORTH he says, *The heads of many reverend persons have been turned by a preternatural fermentation of the brain, or a philosophical delirium. None hath been more so than this Divine* [3]. Again, CUDWORTH [in his INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM] gives you little less than a nonsensical paraphrase of nonsense. It was not his fault. The good man passed his life in the study of an unmeaning jargon; and as he learned, he taught [4].

To talk, like CUMBERLAND, of promoting the good of the whole System of rational Agents, amongst whom God is included, and of human benevolence towards him, is to talk metaphysical jargon and theological blasphemy [5].

CLARKE triumphs in this foolish and wicked rhodomontade, &c. [6]. — All CLARKE says about the discovery of God's will, is a rhapsody of presumptuous reasoning and of prophane absurdities [7]. — Audacious and vain Saphist! His terms have a solemn air, that may impose on the unwary, and confirm the habitual prejudices of others; but more absurdity cannot be stuffed into so few words [8].

Of WOLLASTON, he says, *But I will detain you no longer about such discourse as would convince you, if you heard it at MONROE'S, that the Philosopher who held it was a patient of the Doctor's not yet perfectly restored to his senses* [9]. Again, of the same excellent Person, *We have here an example of the second sort of Madness men-*

[3] Vol. iii. p. 353. of his Works, in Quarto.

[4] Vol. iv. p. 92.

[6] Vol. v. p. 252.

[8] Vol. v. p. 395.

[5] Vol. v. p. 82.

[7] Vol. v. p. 292.

[9] Vol. iii. p. 518.

tioned above. The man who writ all this nonsense was a man of parts. — But when these learned Lunatics, &c. [10].

CLARKE and WOLLASTON soon grow outrageous; and ready to be chained together. Indeed from henceforth they are rarely shewn asunder. We sometimes find them in the *height of a metaphysical frenzy* [11]: And, by what one can perceive, without much provocation. They had proved the Soul to be a thinking substance distinct from Matter: We may allow them to be jealous of the glory of this achievement. But who contested it with them? No body, that I know of, before his Lordship. And he very civilly let them enjoy the honour of it for life.

The President FORBES is *really mad*; but it is only *quoad hoc*. For observe, he was *no Divine by profession, but something better* [12]. Indeed, not much. He was a LAWYER. Of which UNLEARNED Profession, as he calls it, *ninety nine in a hundred at least, (he says) are Petty-foggers, Sharpers, Brawlers, and Cavillers* [13].

But, to give the better edge to his well-tempered language, he sometimes dips it in irony: and then it is, *The good Earl of Nottingham*; and the *righteous Bishop Sherlock*. They deserved his anger. The First publicly defended, and ably too, that *Faith* which stands so much in his way: and the Other ventured to oppose that *Party*, whose patronage he had condescended to assume [14].

[10] Vol. v. p. 374.

[11] Vol. iii. p. 514.

[12] Vol. v. p. 523.

[13] Vol. ii. p. 353.

[14] See *the Craftsman*.

He comes next to the whole BODY of the Christian Clergy. And now the *first Philosophy* begins to work, and the task to grow serious. The PRIMITIVE SAINTS and DOCTORS have the precedence, as is fitting. “The list of MARTYRS consisted, I believe, of those who suffered for BREAKING THE PEACE[15]. The PRIMITIVE CLERGY were, under pretence of Religion, a very LAWLESS TRIBE [16].” ALL the Christian FATHERS using a DELIRIOUS STYLE, it became that of Christian Theology [17].” It would scarce be possible to believe that the greatest Saints and Doctors of the Church had talked so much BLASPHEMOUS NONSENSE, and employed so much *artifice* about it, if their writings were not extant [18].” — “Of all this *absurdity, profaneness, and ridicule*, they who built up Christian theology were guilty.” — You ask, with surprise and impatience, What this *absurdity* was? He was going to tell you; for he never minces matters. “They ADDED (says he) the EPISTLES to the GOSPELS; the doctrines of PAUL to those of CHRIST; till the APOCALYPSE became a part of our holy Scriptures [19].” And now, I hope, you are satisfied. If not, take what follows, “Christian Divines and Philosophers have done more to DEBASE our notions of the supreme Being, than all the Doctors of Polytheism [20].”

This was reasonably well, for new-beginners: But nothing like the exploits of MODERN DIVINES.

[15]. Vol. iv. p. 434.

[17] Vol. iv. p. 612.

[19] Vol. iv. p. 371.

[16] Id. ib.

[18] Vol. iv. p. 303.

[20] Vol. iii. p. 541.

“ It is MADNESS, or *something worse than mad-*  
 “ *ness*, for Divines to imagine themselves able to  
 “ comprehend a whole Oeconomy of divine Wisdom  
 “ from *Adam* down to *Christ*. And yet this is so cus-  
 “ tomary, that not only the learned and ingenious,  
 “ but every dabbler in Theology, who must pass for  
 “ a *fool* or a *knave* whenever he grows extravagant,  
 “ affects to reason in the same manner [1].”

— “ Would Divines insist chiefly on the external  
 “ proofs of the authenticity of Scripture — they  
 “ would avoid *a great deal of* BLASPHEMY [2].” —  
 “ They are absurd and licentious in urging both the  
 “ external and internal evidence of Revelation [3].”

— “ Our Divines turn themselves to declaim on  
 “ certain and undoubted marks of divine Authority  
 “ of the Scriptures of the Israelites — Let us com-  
 “ pare some of these supposed marks with those of  
 “ human original, and they will stare us in the face,  
 “ and point out plainly the FRAUD and IMPO-  
 “ STURE [4].

— “ It is common and yet astonishing to observe,  
 “ with how much solemnity and confidence almost  
 “ all those who teach and defend Christianity, pre-  
 “ sume to AFFIRM ANY THING, tho’ never so evi-  
 “ dently FALSE [5].”

— “ The best, and even such as pass for the fairest  
 “ controversial Writers, improve by artifice the na-  
 “ tural infirmity of the human mind: They do, on  
 “ purpose, confound ideas and perplex the signifi-

[1] Vol. iv. p. 274.

[2] Vol. iii. p. 272.

[3] Vol. iv. p. 273.

[4] Vol. iii. p. 288.

[5] Vol. iv. p. 295.



“tion of signs — the most scandalous frauds are ap-  
 “plauded under the name of subtilities. This I call  
 “theological fraud [6].” Hence, in another place,  
 he says, that *folly and knavery prevail most amongst Di-*  
*vines* [7], and again, that They are THE PLAGUES  
 AND SCOURGES OF THE WORLD [8].

“The doctrine of Clarke and other Christian Di-  
 “vines about our obligation to imitate God is FALSE  
 “and PROFANE [9].”

“Divines have IMPUDENTLY and WICKEDLY as-  
 “sumed, that there is a law of right reason common  
 “to God and man [10].”

“What I have advanced will be treated as an im-  
 “pious paradox by some of the trifling solemn dog-  
 “matists in Criticism and Theology, who have ad-  
 “vanced so many *absurd and impious* paradoxes of  
 “their own [11].”

We now come to what the noble Author calls the  
 DELIRIUM OF METAPHYSICAL THEOLOGY [12]. —

“The man who walked soberly about in the Bedlam  
 “of Paris, and believed himself God the Father,  
 “was mad. Thus the Philosopher, who takes a  
 “bold leap from a few clear and distinct ideas to the  
 “first principles of things, is *mad* [13].”

“The *reasoners à priori* resemble very much one  
 “fort of MADMEN. Some of these are so VERY  
 “MAD that they lose all use of their reason. Others  
 “again deduce consequences, and argue very justly,

[6] Vol. iii. p. 424--5.

[8] Vol. iv. p. 435.

[10] Vol. v. p. 77.

[12] Vol. iii. p. 356.

[7] Vol. v. p. 6.

[9] Vol. v. p. 65.

[11] Vol. v. p. 190.

[13] Vol. iv. p. 139.



“ but are STILL MAD : because they reason from  
 “ principles that have no appearance of reality out  
 “ of their own overheated and disordered imagina-  
 “ tions. You will find instances of this kind, with-  
 “ out the trouble of going to *Bedlam* ; but you will  
 “ find them principally in *Colleges* and *Schools* [14].”

— “ They deserve to be treated like patients pro-  
 “ per for Dr. MONROE, and to be put under his care.  
 “ Nothing less than *Metaphysics* could have turned so  
 “ many good heads [15].”

Well then, Divines are all MAD ; and, for fear of mischief, in safe custody. Sometimes, indeed, his Lordship lets them out to cool, and air themselves ; nay, he is so good to give them their lucid intervals ; but it is only to *play the rogue*, and to *cant in the pulpit* ; and then, back again to their kennel, to *Monroe*, and his discipline ; or, what is much worse, to his Lordship’s ; to hear themselves called *Fools*, *Knaves*, *Cheats*, *Madmen*, *Impostors*, and *Blasphemers*. And, for these hasty changes of the Scene, he has contrived a most ingenious expedient. He has divided the Clergy into the two classes of *Theologians* and *Metaphysicians* : in the first of which, the KNAVE is predominant ; in the second, the MADMAN. So that he has of either sort always ready and at hand, just as he wants them. But as *Madmen* are much easier dealt with than *Knaves*, he has prepared one common BEDLAM for them all. *For God forbid* (he says) *he should be as uncharitable as Divines*, to think they deserved a worse place, *as blaspheming in their senses* [16]. Good man ! How kind.

[14] Vol. v. p. 396.

[15] Vol. v. p. 417.

[16] Vol. iv. p. 464.

now is all this! How humane! What shall the Clergy do for him in return? Alas! he thinks not of it: his *modesty* is still greater than his *charity*: and he is only anxious not to be misunderstood. He is even ready to fear that Divines should take his honest freedom in dudgeon; and that it may possibly *procure him, in return, some ecclesiastical BILLINGSGATE; to be called infidel, deist, and perhaps atheist.* My reply (says he) to SO ANGRY Disputants should be CALM, AND SUCH AS MIGHT TEACH CHARITY to those who preach it so much, and practise it so little [17]. To say the truth, his Lordship seems, like JUSTICE SHALLOW in the Play, to be suspicious of those he had so well entertained. Davy, (says the Justice, of his Court-Guests) *be civil to these Knaves, for they will BACK-BITE.* Not worse than they are BITTEN (replies Davy) *for they have marvelous foul linen.* Whether his Lordship found the Priest's Surplice in the like condition, or whether he has left it so, is not material. No marvel at it's evil plight, when it has been so long over-run with Vermin; such as Toland, Chub, Morgan, and those who have been since bred out of them.

The BILLINGSGATE, however, if we give but equal credit to what we see of his Lordship, and to what we hear of the Clergy from their Enemies, lies pretty nearly between them. Yet I agree with him it becomes the Ministers of Religions, much less than it does his Lordship. They are *Disputants*; he is an *Orator*. Their business is to *reason*; his is to *rail*. While each confines himself to his province, all goes well. But should they change weapons; should the Orator attempt to reason, and the Disputant be pro-

voked to rail, every thing would be out of order. I venture, on the authority of Quintilian, to reckon *railing* amongst the ARTS of Eloquence. “CONVI-  
“TUIS implere VACUA caufarum,” fays this able Rhetor. It is true he holds it to be of the lefs perfect kind — “est enim prorfus CANINA ELOQUENTIA.” But his Lordship might naturally think, that his *Dog-Eloquence*, was well enough fitted to their *Dog-Logic*. However, Quintilian would not overload this species of Eloquence, nor would I; tho’ neither of us be difpofed to extol it; he confefles there is yet a ranker kind. “Sed hæc minora funt ILLO VITIO  
“ANIMI, QUO MALEDICUS a MALEFICO non diftat,  
“nifi OCCASIONE.” ” In which, fays he, nothing  
“but *opportunity* is wanting to make the *evil-speaker*  
“an *evil-doer*.” But the *Minifter of State* muft join the *Orator* before this compound excellence can difplay itfelf; juft as the *Divine* and *Atheift* muft *conspire* to make that ARTIFICIAL BLASPHEMY, which gives his Lordship fo much concern.

But the mention of this CONSPIRACY reminds me that it is now high time to give you fome account of it.

Hitherto we have only the out-lines, or, at moft the general air of this *Clerical Portrait*; all he could catch at the firft fitting. A horrid combination finishes the Picture: a CONFEDERACY BETWEEN DIVINES AND ATHEISTS, TO DISHONOUR AND DEGRADE THE GOD OF THE UNIVERSE. This is the ftriking feature; and fo artificially difpofed, that, turn the Portrait which way you will, it has ftill a *plotting*, which, in his Lordship’s juftice, is little better than a *hanging look*.

A Con-

A Confederacy so mad, so monstrous, may perhaps startle you at first. But don't be frightened. Take my word for it, it will come to nothing. It is a Treaty of his own making. And you have heard enough of his talents for Treaty-making. It is true, you say, he could reconcile the most unnatural alliances to the delicacy of his *morals*; and the most ridiculous miscarriages to the superiority of his *Politics*; but a *confederacy between Divines and Atheists*! Was any thing so odious! What think you, my Friend, of that blind bargain he once drove between certain of King George's Protestant Subjects, and a Popish Pretender? How *that* came to nothing, he has not thought fit to tell us, in his curious account of that transaction [18]. But, as to *this* confederacy, I may have an opportunity of shewing you, that, after all his pains to form it, he betrayed and dissolved it, himself. At present, my business is only to shew you what he *says* of it.

“ After pleading the cause of natural and revealed  
 “ Religion, I am to plead the cause of God himself,  
 “ against DIVINES AND ATHEISTS IN CONFEDERA-  
 “ CY [19].

“ The conduct of Christian Divines has been so far  
 “ from defending the Providence of God, that they  
 “ have joined in the clamour against it. Nothing has  
 “ hindered, even those who pretend to be his Mes-  
 “ sengers, his Embassadors, his *Plenipotentiaries*, from  
 “ renouncing their allegiance to him, as they them-  
 “ selves have the FRONT TO AVOW, but the hypo-

[18] See the whole Letter to Sir W. Windham.

[19] Vol. v. p. 305.



“ thesis of a future state. On this hypothesis alone  
 “ they insist ; and therefore if this will not serve their  
 “ turn, God is disowned by them, as effectually as if  
 “ he was so, in terms [20].” “ Divines, if not  
 “ Atheists, yet are ABETTERS of Atheism [1].”

“ That there were some men, who knew not God  
 “ in all ages may be true : but the scandalous task of  
 “ COMBATING HIS EXISTENCE under the mask of  
 “ Theism, was reserved for Metaphysicians and  
 “ Theologians [2].”

— “ Divines are still more to be blamed. A CON-  
 “ FEDERACY WITH ATHEISTS becomes ill the pro-  
 “ fessors of Theism. No matter. They PERSIST,  
 “ and have done their best, in concert with their  
 “ allies, to DESTROY the belief of the goodness of  
 “ God : — They endeavour to DESTROY that of his  
 “ goodness, which is a farther article of their Al-  
 “ liance [3].”

“ The CONFEDERACY between Atheists and Di-  
 “ vines appears to have been carried VERY FAR —  
 “ Nay the Atheist will appear, to that reason, to  
 “ which they both appeal, more consistent in his ab-  
 “ surdity than the Divine [4].” “ Divines UP-  
 “ BRAID God’s goodness, and CENSURE his Jus-  
 “ tice [5].” — “ INJUSTICE is, in this life, ascribed  
 “ to God, by Divines [6].”

“ The whole Tribe of Divines, like Wollaston  
 “ and Clarke, do, in effect RENOUNCE the God  
 “ whom you and I adore, as much as the rankest of

[20] Vol. v. p. 487--8.

[1] Vol. v. p. 485.

[2] Vol. v. p. 307.

[3] Vol. v. p. 393.

[4] Vol. v. p. 348--9.

[5] Vol. v. p. 417.

[6] Vol. v. p. 541.



“ the Atheistical Tribe. Your Priests and our Par-  
 “ sons will exclaim most pathetically, and RAIL OUT-  
 “ RAGEOUSLY at this assertion. But have a little  
 “ patience, and I will prove it to their shame to be  
 “ true [7].”

Give me leave, Sir, for once, to go a little out of my way to vindicate the whole body of Divines from the horrid calumny of this imaginary Confederacy. To say the truth, the charge is too serious to be passed over with the same lightness I am disposed to treat the rest of his Lordship's Extravagances.

Be pleased then to understand, that ATHEISM has ever endeavoured to support it self, on a FACT, which has indeed all the certainty that the evidence of sense can give it; namely *the unequal distribution of moral good and evil.*

— “ Cum res hominum tanta caligine volvi.

“ Adspicerem, lætosque diu florere nocentes,

“ Vexarique pios — LABEFACTA CADEBAT.

“ RELIGIO,” —

was the common language of the impatient sufferer. From hence the Atheist inferred, that the Universe was without an intelligent Ruler; and all things driven about by that Fate or Fortune, which first produced them. DIVINES opposed this *conclusion*: for they did not venture to be so paradoxical as, with his Lordship, to call in question *the premisses*, a phenomenon which objected itself to all their Senses. They demonstrated, strictly demonstrated, the Being of a God, and his MORAL attributes: And then shewed, that if the whole of man's existence were

[7] Vol. v. p. 485.

included

included in this life, the present distribution of moral good and evil would contradict that Demonstration. They, therefore, inferred, on their part, that the whole was not included in this life: but that man was reserved for an after reckoning; in which, an *equal distribution of rewards and punishments* would amply vindicate the providence of a righteous Governor.

But *Atheists* were not the only enemies that *Divines* had to deal with. There was a set of men, who allowed an intelligent first Cause, endowed with those moral attributes, which *Divines* had demonstrated: and, on that account, called themselves *Deists*. Yet they agreed so far with *Atheism*, as to confine the whole of man's existence to the present life. These, the *Divines* combated, in their turn; and with the same arms; but in an inverted order. In disputing with the *Atheist*, the principle held in common, was *the present unequal distribution of Good and Evil*. So that to cut off their conclusion from it, of NO GOD, they demonstrated his Being and Attributes: and from that proof inferred that the inequality would be set right. With the *Deist*, the common principle was *the Being and Attributes of God*. Therefore, to bring them to the allowance of a FUTURE STATE, they appealed to the present *unequal distribution* of good and evil (which these Men, as well as his Lordship, were very backward to allow and very industrious not to see) and from that inequality inferred, that there must be such a State.

This is a short and true account of their contest with *ATHEISTS* and *DEISTS*, so far as the subject of *a future state* came in question: In either controversy; that State is deduced from *the moral attributes*: only  
with,

18 A VIEW of LORD BOLINGBROKE'S  
 with this difference. In the dispute with Atheists, the demonstration of those attributes is *made*; in the dispute with Deists it is *allowed*. The final purpose against Atheism is to prove the BEING AND ATTRIBUTES of God; the final purpose against Deism is to prove a FUTURE STATE: For neither *natural* nor *revealed* Religion can subsist without *believing that God is, and that he is a REWARDER of them that seek him* [8]. Thus, we see, the *question*, in either controversy, being different; the *premisses*, by which each was to be proved, must needs be different. The difference is here explained; the premisses, in the argument with Atheists, were the *moral attributes*; the premisses, in the argument with Deists, the *unequal distribution* of good and evil.

What Enemy to Religion now, could ever hope to see a Calumny either thrive or rise on so unpromising a ground? or flatter himself with the expectation of an advocate bold enough to tell the World, that this conduct of the DIVINES was a CONFEDERACY *with ATHEISTS, to decry God's providence; to blot out his attributes of goodness and justice; to combat his Government; and to deny his very existence?* The RIGHT HONOURABLE Author does all this: And more; — he expects to be believed. It is true, this is a fine believing age: Yet I hardly think he would have carried his confidence in our credulity so far, had he seen his way clear before him. — His Lordship is always sublime, and therefore often cloudy; commonly, at too great a distance to look into the detail of things, or to enter into their *minuteness*: (for which, indeed, he is perpetually felicitating his Genius.) So that, in his *general view* of Theologic matters, he has jumbled

[8] St. Paul,

these

these two Controversies into one; and, in the confusion, commodiously slipped in one Fact for another. He, all the way, represents Divines as making *a future State* THE PROOF of God's moral attributes: Whereas, we now see, on the very face of the controversy, that they make *the moral attributes* A PROOF of a future State. Let us consider how the dispute stands with *Atheists*. These men draw their argument against a God, from the condition of the moral world: The Divine answers, by demonstrating God's Being and Attributes: and, on that demonstration, satisfies the objection. Consider how it stands with the *Deist*. Here, God's Being and Attributes is a common principle: And on this ground the Divine stands, to deduce a *future state* from the unequal distribution of things.—But this was to support his slander of a CONFEDERACY. There was no room to pretend that God's Being was made precarious, by proving a *future state*, from his attributes; but could he get it believed, that Divines proved the Attributes from a *future state*, he would easily find credit with his kind Readers, for the rest.

Well then, the whole amount of his CHIMERICAL CONFEDERACY comes to this, That *Divines and Atheists hold a principle in common*; but in common too with all the rest of mankind; namely, that there are irregularities in the distribution of moral good and evil. His Lordship has been angry with all POLITICAL, as well as all RELIGIOUS Parties in their turns. Suppose he had taken it into his head to ornament a CRAFTSMAN with the detection of a *political confederacy*, between the WHIGGS and JACOBITES, to dethrone KING GEORGE; because both denied that he reigned



reigned *jure divino*: *Mother Osborne* would have smiled at this, in spite of all her gravity; and told him, that the *Whiggs* only urged a common principle to support their Monarch's title against *indefeasible hereditary right*, the nonsensical claim of his Adversary. And is it not as evident that, in this pretended *anti-theological conspiracy*, *Divines* employed the other common principle, to support Religion against *Atheism and Deism*? But whatever his Lordship might think proper to disguise in this reasoning, there is one thing the most careless Reader will never overlook; which is, that, under all this pomp of words and solemnity of accusation, you see lurking that poor species of a Bigot's calumny, which, from *one* principle held in common with an obnoxious party, charges his Adversary, with *all* the follies or impieties that have rendered it odious. This miserable artifice of imposture, had now been long hissed out of learned controversy, when the noble Lord took it up; and, with true political skill, worked it into a SHAM PLOT; to make RELIGION distrust it's best Friends, and take refuge in the FIRST PHILOSOPHY.

TINDAL and COLLINS were manly Adversaries. They knew how to invent, to push, and to pursue an Argument. But what does this noble Writer know — His Followers will tell you. They admire him for his Wit and Eloquence. But They admire, where You and I see nothing but an inflamed spirit, and an inflated style. For (to use the words of a great Master [9] of expression) TRUE ELOQUENCE I find to be none but the serious and hearty love of TRUTH: And that, whose mind soever is fully possessed with a fer-

[9] Milton.



gent desire to know good things, and with the dearest CHARITY to infuse the knowledge of them into others; when such a man would speak, his words, like so many nimble and airy Servitors, trip about him at command, and in well-ordered files; as he would wish, fall aptly into their own places.

He has not yet done with the CHRISTIAN CLERGY. What remained behind was to collect together his scattered abuse; and to pour it all at once on that venerable Body, with an unfeeling hand, and unrelenting heart.

“ Nothing more (says he) will be wanting to answer all the ends of *artificial Theology*, than to assume that they who minister in holy things are the *Omrahs*, the *Vizirs*, and the *Bassas* of THIS MIGHTY KING, whose commands they publish, interpret, and execute, or cause to be executed, rather than his EMBASSADORS: by assuming which latter characters, they seem to lessen, over modestly, the dignity of their own order, and to raise that of the Laity too high: BUT I AM ASHAMED TO HAVE SAID SO MUCH ON THIS SUBJECT [10].”

He may pretend what he pleases. But whoever it was that brought him to *shame*, it certainly was not the Clergy. They are ready to assure him, in the words of the Poet,

“ Let SHAME come when it will, we do not call it.”

Besides, after what has passed, I see nothing he has to be *ashamed* of; unless it be for stealing the paultry joke of *Embassadors* and *Plenipotentiaries* [11] from Lord Shaftsbury:

[10] Vol. v. p. 540 -- 1. [11] See p. 14. of this Letter.

“ Far be it from me (pursues this Right Honour-  
 “ able Person) and from every lover of Truth and  
 “ common sense, to wish that the race of Metaphy-  
 “ sicians and Casuists should increase, or so much as  
 “ continue. But since there are, have been, and will  
 “ be such men in all ages, it is very reasonable to  
 “ wish that they may serve to the same good purpose  
 “ that the HELOTES, the DRUNKEN SLAVES did at  
 “ Sparta; and that their DELIRIUM, instead of im-  
 “ posing on others, and even infecting many, may  
 “ be at length LAUGHED OUT of the world [12].”

What pity is it his Lordship himself had not tried this expedient; (whose efficacy, other Lords of better temper, so kindly recommend and practise,) and employed the pleasantry of his *wit* to laugh the Clergy out of the world, rather than the sublimity of his *eloquence* to scold them out of it. He may rail thro’ all his figures, at *the impertinence of Logic, the futility of Metaphysics, the fraud of Disputation, and the blasphemy of Divinity* [13]: These are the arms of impotent hysterical Women when they want to have their will. After the long labours of a HOOKER, a STILLINGFLEET, a CUDWORTH, a SPENCER, a TILLOTSON, and a CLARKE, the English Clergy may answer his Lordship, in the words of *De Rosny*, as I think the story goes, to some old Ladies of the *Guisian League*; who, when HENRY IV. had got possession of Paris; were one day very eloquent in their invectives against him: “ Good ancient Gentlewomen, said this rough old Soldier, spare your breath, and set your hearts at rest, for OUR MASTER is not a man to be scratched and scolded out of his KINGDOM.”—But when, be-

[12] Vol. v. p. 446.

[13] Vol. iv. p. 353.

tween his malice and his magic, he had transformed the CLERGY into *drunken slaves*; you must not think he would neglect so good an occasion of exposing them to his NOBLE SPARTANS. Indeed the Entertainment is at hand: and no cost is spared of lavish expression to set out these drunken revels. “ The Choirs  
 “ of birds (says he) who whistle and sing, or scream  
 “ at one another, or herds of beasts who bleat and  
 “ low, or chatter and roar, at one another, have just as  
 “ much meaning and communicate it as well — Such  
 “ is the common conversation — Such, too, for the  
 “ most part, are all the public discourses that are  
 “ held, and the SOLEMN HARANGUES OF THE PUL-  
 “ PIT [14].”

After so large a gleaning from his Lordship’s abundance, you will dispense with me from gathering up his looser flowers of speech; such as, *absurdity, effronderie, knavery, folly, nonsense, delirium, frenzy, lunacy, downright madness, impiety, prophaneness, blasphemy, and atheism*: which, like seed-pearl, are every where scattered over the embroidery of his eloquence.

Tho’ our indignation at this torrent of ribaldry, makes us prompt enough to ask,

— “ An quæ

“ Turpia cerdoni, Volesos Brutumque decebunt?” yet I am ready, in charity to suspect, that his Lordship may be abused. Who knows, but just as his Lordship gave BOWNCE, (his friend’s dog) the sentiments of his Master [15], so his Lordship’s Secretary,

[14] Vol. iii. P. 422—3.

[15] *The world* (says his Lordship to Pope) is as well fitted for BOWNCE as for YOU, with respect to physical nature; and with respect to MORAL nature, BOWNCE has little to do beyond bark’n-  
 attending

attending to two at once, his Lord and his Lord's PARROT, might unaware put down to the great man, what indeed belonged to the Favorite: who, however *eloquent* he might be, yet, we are told, was *no Philosopher*.

“ The Coxcomb bird, so talkative and grave,  
 “ That from his cage cries *cuckold, whore, and knave*,  
 “ Tho' many a passenger he rightly call,  
 “ We hold him NO PHILOSOPHER at all.”

And I the rather suppose the Secretary to be here in fault, since his Lordship, in one place, seems to think, that ribaldry and ill language disgrace the *animal implume, bipes, the two leg'd, unfeather'd Philosopher*. For, speaking of SPINOZA and HOBBS, he says, *Let it not be said, they are men of DEPRAVED UNDERSTANDINGS, AND DEPRAVED MORALS; THIS IS TO RAIL NOT TO ARGUE. To rail*, then, when we should *argue* is, in his Lordship's opinion, unbecoming a Philosopher: unless you will suppose, that these two *Atheists* were especially favoured, for not being found in bad company, or taken in the fact, wickedly CONFEDERATING with *Divines and Metaphysicians*.

Seriously, as good men may be scandalized to find their best and ablest Pastors accused of *blasphemy* and *prophaneness*, it will be right to tell the plain truth: which is no more than this, that his Lordship is apt

*ing to the STILL WHISPERS, the SECRET SUGGESTIONS, and the SUDDEN INFLUENCES of insinuat.* Vol. v. p. 467. This, the Reader sees, is intended for a compliment on the following stanza of his Friend's *Universal Prayer*.

“ Where I am right, THY GRACE IMPART,  
 “ Still in the right to stay;  
 “ Where I am wrong, O TEACH MY HEART  
 “ To find that better way.”



to annex *new ideas*, to *old words*; and not very careful to give us notice of his handy-work. So, in the case before us, Who would suspect, that teaching a *law of right reason, common to God and man*; and enforcing *man's obligation to imitate God*, were BLASPHEMY and PROFANENESS? Yet such they are; or we must renounce the *first Philosophy* [16].

So then, as what has hitherto been *Piety* is become *Blasphemy*; we need not wonder that his Lordship turns the garb of old threadbare blasphemy; and gives it the new gloss of piety.

But now comes a scene indeed. The two REVELATIONS and their two FOUNDERS are brought upon the stage. And here, his *piety* pretends so much to the impulse of conscience, that you would suspect he thought himself, like St. PAUL, under the malediction of a woe if he *preached not his new Gospel*.

Of MOSES, he says, “It is impossible to excuse all  
“ the puerile, romantic, and absurd circumstances in  
“ the author of the Book of Genesis, which nothing  
“ could produce but the habit of dealing in trifling  
“ traditions, and a most profound ignorance. It is  
“ impossible to read what he has writ on this subject  
“ without feeling contempt for him as a philosopher,  
“ and horror as a Divine [17].”

“The PENTATEUCH has such evident marks of  
“ falsehood, as can be objected to no other writings

[16] DIVINES HAVE IMPUDENTLY AND WICKEDLY ASSUMED THAT THERE IS A LAW OF RIGHT REASON COMMON TO GOD AND MAN. Vol. v. p. 77. — And again, TO PREACH UP THE OBLIGATION OF IMITATING GOD IS FALSE AND PROFANE. Vol. v. p. 65.

[17] Vol. iii. p. 233.

C

“except



“ except to professed Romances, nor even always to  
 “ them [18].”

“ We may laugh at Don Quixote, for reading  
 “ Romances till he believed them to be true histo-  
 “ ries, and for quoting Archbishop Turpin with  
 “ great solemnity ; but when Divines speak of the  
 “ PENTATEUCH as of an Authentic History, and  
 “ quote Moses as solemnly as he did Turpin, are they  
 “ much less mad than he was [19] ?” *Don Quixote* is  
 his Lordship's favorite simile ; and comes as often  
 over as the *Ass* and *Lion* in Homer. But *mocking* (as the  
 proverb says) *is catching*. Whoever attentively consi-  
 ders his Lordship's ESSAYS, will, I dare say, be of my  
 mind, That the much reading *his master* LOCKE, who  
 was deeply engaged with School-divines and Meta-  
 physicians, had the same effect on his Lordship's  
 temper, in an advanced age, and under a bilious ha-  
 bit, that the reading books of Chivalry had on the  
 prudent Gentleman of La Mancha. And, by his  
 own confession, *a man's head is soon turned by complex  
 and abstract ideas*. From henceforth the enchant-  
 ments of *Schoolmen* and the gigantic Forms of *Meta-  
 physical Divines* got entire possession of his understand-  
 ing. Consider what you can make of the following  
 remark, without supposing with me, that these fan-  
 cies had made very deep havoc in his brain. “ *That*  
 “ THEOLOGY, says he, which pretends to deduce  
 “ the duties of a man from speculations concerning  
 “ the *moral attributes of God*, is to be reckoned in the  
 “ class with NATURAL MAGIC [20].” Now, if you

[18] Vol. iii. p. 271.

[19] Vol. iii. p. 280.

[20] Vol. iv. p. 621.

seek, I do not say for the *elegance*, but for the *common propriety* of this observation, any where out of his Lordship's hurt and wounded imagination, you will seek for it in vain. Yet, allow him but his *Theological Magicians*, and you see, their *Theology* could be nothing else than *natural Magic*.

So again, — *Clarke shall not force me into Atheism; no nor Wollaston neither*; What is this, but *Don Quixote*, up and down? dreadfully afraid that these Necromancers would, at last, force him into their ENCHANTED CASTLE of a *future state*; for so he calls it in a letter to Lord Bathurst [1], where he threatens to demolish it, as built upon unholy ground, by *Divines and Atheists in confederacy*.

No doubt, every Reader must have observed this unaccountable rage and horror whenever a DIVINE comes cross his Lordship's fancy. One would think, they had served him the same trick the Enchanters plaid Don Quixote; that they had run away with his *Library*, and walled up his *Study-door*. Most true it is, that not long before this immense Treasure of the *first Philosophy* was given to the world, certain of these wicked Magicians had turned it all into *fairie-favours*: And the Public, on it's first appearance, found nothing in it better proved than the truth of the old Adage, *Pro Thesauro, Carbones*. And indeed, if I was not perfectly satisfied that no man in his senses could mistake the value of this *new Money*, I should make a scruple of laying so much of it before him; espe-

[1] "To discover error in axioms, says he, or in first principles grounded on facts, is like breaking of a charm. The ENCHANTED CASTLE, the steepy rock, and the *burning lake* disappear." *On retirement and study*, Vol. II. p. 525.

28      A VIEW OF LORD BOLINGBROKE'S  
cially the following pieces, which have an uncommon glow, as if they came hot from the place where they were minted.

“ THE WHOLE SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF MOSES,  
“ like the whole system of his conduct, WAS FOUND-  
“ ED ON MURDER [2].”

“ The *Jews* blended together, at once, in the  
“ moral character of God, injustice, cruelty, and  
“ partiality. — They made him an object of terror  
“ more than of awe and reverence; and their Reli-  
“ gion was a System of the RANKEST SUPERSTI-  
“ TION [3].”

“ The Jews with more inconsistency, and not less  
“ profanation, than the Pagans, dressed up the one  
“ supreme Being in all the rags of humanity; which  
“ composed a kind of motley Character, such as  
“ foolish Superstition, and mad Enthusiasm alone  
“ could ascribe to him, and such as no man who be-  
“ lieves him an all perfect being can hear without  
“ horror [4].”

“ The Jews give such notions of the supreme  
“ Being as no People on earth, but this, would have  
“ ascribed, I do not say to God, but to the worst of  
“ of those monsters, who are suffered or sent by God,  
“ for a short time, to punish the iniquity of men [5].”

From MOSES and JUDAISM, his Lordship descends  
to PAUL and CHRISTIANITY. Let us see whether  
he gives Them better quarter.

“ CHRISTIANITY abrogated the *Law*, and con-  
“ firmed the *history of Moses*; from the times, at least,

[2] Vol. v. p. 183.

[3] Vol. v. p. 531.

[4] Vol. v. p. 529.

[5] Vol. v. p. 515.

“ when

“ when St. PAUL undertook, like a true cabalistical  
 “ Architect, with the help of type, and figure, to  
 “ raise a new System of religion on the old founda-  
 “ tions [6].” “ The Gospel of CHRIST is one  
 “ thing; the Gospel of St. PAUL another [7].”  
 “ He preached a Gospel in contradiction to CHRIST’s,  
 “ and directly repugnant to it [8].”

On this account, I suppose, it was, that he digni-  
 fies PAUL, with the elegant appellation of the LEA-  
 THER-DRESSING PONTIFF. But the immediate oc-  
 casion of giving him this new title of honour, was  
 particularly happy. His Lordship was on a favorite  
 topic, he was abusing the first Messengers of the Go-  
 spel, for their claim to maintenance. He was con-  
 scious, PAUL came not within his censure. So that,  
 lest this should give the Apostle too much credit; he  
 informs the reader, in his polite way [9], that he had  
 a *trade*, and could shift for himself. For it seems,  
 nothing but downright starving will acquit the Apo-  
 stles of theft and extortion, at his Lordship’s Tri-  
 bunal.

“ JESUS (in his opinion) had no intention of  
 “ spreading his Religion further than amongst the  
 “ *Jews*; but PAUL, bred at the feet of Gamaliel,  
 “ saw further than that poor ignorant fisherman  
 “ Peter.” — The sense requires you should read,  
*that poor ignorant Carpenter Jesus*: and so without  
 doubt his Lordship designed his compliment. Well,  
 but what did PAUL see further? It was this, “ That  
 the contempt and aversion in which both the nation

[6] Vol. iii. p. 288.

[7] Vol. iv. p. 313.

[8] Vol. iv. p. 326--7.

[9] Vol. iv. p. 423.



“ and the Religion of the Jews were held by the  
 “ rest of mankind, would make it much more easy  
 “ to convert the Gentiles at once to Christianity,  
 “ than to make them Jews first, in order to make  
 “ them Christians afterwards [10].”

For it seems — “ TO DISSEMBLE was a funda-  
 “ mental principle of apostolical conduct. PAUL  
 “ practised it. We have his own word for this; and  
 “ he boasts of it [11].” His Lordship lets us know,  
 that *Paul* had assurance enough to do any thing. For  
 speaking of the Apostle's famous argument *ad mode-*  
*stiam* — *Nay, but, O man, who art thou that repliest*  
*against God?* &c. [12]. He says, “ There is some-  
 “ thing so IMPUDENT, as well as absurd in this pro-  
 “ ceeding; that, common as it is, one can see no  
 “ example of it without surprise [13].”

“ CAN he be less than mad, says his Lordship,  
 “ who boasts a revelation super-added to reason, to  
 “ supply the defects of it, and who super-adds rea-  
 “ son to revelation to supply the defects of this too,  
 “ at the same time? This is madness or there  
 “ is no such thing incident to our nature. And  
 “ into this kind of madness, ST. PAUL, profound in  
 “ cabalistical learning, hath fallen [14].” And yet,  
 as mad as it is, all Governments have matched it,  
 when they *super-added* civil Laws, to natural con-  
 science or Religion, *to supply the defects of it; and super-*  
*added* natural conscience or Religion to Civil Laws,  
*to supply the defects of those too, at the same time.* But  
 more of this in it's place.

[10] Vol. iv. p. 306.

[11] Vol. iv. p. 306--7.

[12] Rom. ix. 20.

[13] Vol. iii. p. 307.

[14] Vol. iv. p. 172.



“ St. PAUL carried into the Apostleship a great  
 “ deal of that ASSUMING AIR, which is apt to ac-  
 “ company much learning, *or the opinion of it* — a  
 “ great profusion of words, and of involved and un-  
 “ connected discourse, even on those subjects which  
 “ required to be most clearly and distinctly deve-  
 “ loped. — He was a *loose paraphraser, a Cabalistical*  
 “ *Commentator*, as much, *at least*, as any ancient or  
 “ modern Rabbin [15].” “ St. PAUL’s system of  
 “ Religion, is an *intricate and dark System, with, here*  
 “ *and there, an intelligible phrase, that casts no light on*  
 “ *the rest, but is rather lost in the gloom of the whole* [16].”  
 — “ Having said so much of the *intelligibility of*  
 “ *Paul’s Gospel*, TRUTH authorises me to add, that  
 “ where it is intelligible, it is often ABSURD, or  
 “ PROPHANE, or TRIFLING [17].” — “ PAUL  
 “ taught *predestination* and UNLIMITED PASSIVE OBE-  
 “ DIENCE: the one absurd, the other both absurd  
 “ and IMPIOUS [18].”

Was it allowable to laugh, amidst all these horrors, what mortal could forbear? *Unlimited passive obedience*, quoth he! The noble Lord had been so long accustomed to the cant of his Faction, which made St. Paul the preacher of I cannot tell what nonsense under that name, that he seems now in good earnest to believe he was so. A just judgment on the Politician; to come at last, to give credit to his own Flams. However, in this instance, at least, one would hope St. Paul might have been spared, if it were only for old acquaintance-sake; and the hard

[15] Vol. iv. p. 326--7.

[16] Vol. iv. p. 328.

[17] Id. ib.

[18] Vol. iv. p. 510.

service they had put the LEATHER-DRESSING PONTIFF upon. But it is bad trusting, we see, to the gratitude of Statesmen. Happy for us, PAUL has yet an able Defender; who will never be wanting in what he owes to gratitude and honour. I only take the liberty to drop a hint. It is well known to those who were in the secret of his Lordship's passions and his party, that *Clarke* and *Wollaston* found the worse treatment for being the favorite Philosophers of Q. C. who knows whether *St. Paul*, fared the better for being patronized by his learned Friend?

“CHRISTIANITY (says his Lordship) became FANATICISM in the FIRST professors of it. Men corrupted it by ARTIFICIAL THEOLOGY. And some will be apt to think, that the first of these men was PAUL — Divines will be FURIOUS to hear SUCH LANGUAGE [19].” Alas! No. He guessed ill of the mood, in which his Works were to find them. They laugh at his vanity; and pity the *fury* that inspired *such language*. Indeed he gives them ample exercise for all their pity: for having done with PAUL, he now directs the poison of his tongue against JESUS CHRIST himself.

“The truth is, CHRISTIANITY preserved, in many respects, a strong taint of the spirit of Judaism. The supreme Being took a milder appearance; his favour was confined no longer to one people. The MESSIAH came and redeemed fallen Man. CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY discovers in this mysterious proceeding the love of God to Man; his infinite justice and goodness. But

[19] Vol. v. p. 275.

“REASON

“ REASON will discover the fantastical, confused, and  
 “ inconsistent notions of Jewish Theology, latent in  
 “ it; and applied to another system of Religion.  
 “ *This love will appear partiality; this justice will ap-*  
 “ *pear injustice; this goodness will appear cruelty.* On  
 “ the whole, the moral character imputed to the su-  
 “ preme Being by Christian Theology differs little  
 “ from that imputed to him by the Jewish. The  
 “ difference is rather apparent than real [20].”  
 “ The scene of Christianity has been ALWAYS a scene  
 “ of dissention, of hatred, of persecution, and of  
 “ BLOOD [1].”

Speaking of CHRIST’S *Sermon on the Mount*, he  
 says, — “ Some [of the precepts] are directed to the  
 “ *Jews* only, and some more immediately to the Dis-  
 “ ciples of Christ. The second sort seem fit enough  
 “ for a *religious Sect*; but are by no means practica-  
 “ ble in the general Society of Mankind. *Considered*  
 “ *as general duties they are impracticable, inconsistent*  
 “ *with NATURAL INSTINCT, as well as LAW, and*  
 “ QUITE DESTRUCTIVE OF SOCIETY [2].”

“ The CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY has derived from  
 “ the *Jewish*, a prophane licence, which *makes men*  
 “ *blaspheme without knowing they blaspheme, and makes*  
 “ *their very devotion impious* [3].”

“ I would sooner be reputed, nay I would sooner  
 “ be, a Pagan than a Christian, or an Atheist than  
 “ a Theist, if to be one or the other it was necessary  
 “ to believe such ABSURDITIES as these; which,

[20] Vol. v. p. 532.

[1] Vol. iv. p. 511.

[2] Vol. iv. p. 299, 300.

[3] Vol. v. p. 519.

“ however disguised and softened by a *certain cant of*  
 “ *expression*, are directly PROPHANE ; and indirectly,  
 “ or by consequence at least, *blasphemous* [4].”

“ ALL THE BEDLAMS OF THE WORLD cannot  
 “ match the absurdities that have been propagated  
 “ by Christians, whether heretics or orthodox, con-  
 “ cerning the *making and governing of the world by the*  
 “ *ministration of inferior Beings* : Beings not eternal,  
 “ but produced in time by *emanation, or some other*  
 “ *inconceivable manner of generation* [5].”

“ We cannot believe the SCRIPTURES to be  
 “ God's *word*, tho' we know the physical and moral  
 “ System are his *Work*, while we find in them such  
 “ repugnancies to the Nature of an all-perfect Being ;  
 “ not mysteries, but absurdities ; not things incom-  
 “ prehensible, but things that imply manifestly con-  
 “ tradiction with his Nature [6].”

In a word, he tells us, that “ THE RELIGION OF  
 “ NATURE HAS BEEN TURNED ALMOST INTO BLAS-  
 “ PHEMY BY REVELATION [7].” “ To believe  
 “ (says he) that *Jesus was the Messiah* is said by some  
 “ [meaning his *Master Locke*] to be the *unum necessa-*  
 “ *rium* of FAITH but TO OBSERVE THE LAW OF  
 “ NATURE IS THE UNUM NECESSARIUM OF DU-  
 “ TY [8].”

But now having exposed MOSES, CHRIST, and  
 PAUL ; having decried the falshood of the TWO RE-  
 VELATIONS, and ridiculed the absurdity of sacred  
 SCRIPTURE ; he shews us, in mere charity, after the  
 example of the wise ALPHONSUS, how either System

[4] Vol. iv. p. 34.

[5] Vol. iv. p. 72.

[6] Vol. iii. p. 306, 7.

[7] Vol. iii. p. 498.

[8] Vol. iv. p. 410.



might have been mended, had his lordship been consulted ; while, like the wise ALPHONSUS, he believes just as much of God's *Word*, as the Other did of his *Works*.

First, he hints, how the LAW might have been better planned. “ God purchased the obedience of  
 “ the *Jewish* People by a mercenary bargain. It was  
 “ ill kept on their part. And the Law, with all it's  
 “ sanctions, was continually violated ; sometimes re-  
 “ jected ; and had, in no degree, a force sufficient to  
 “ maintain itself in observation and reverence. Now,  
 “ one of the most conceivable perfections of a Law  
 “ is, that it be made with such a foresight of all  
 “ possible accidents, and with such provisions for the  
 “ due execution of it, in all cases, that the *Law* may  
 “ be effectual to govern and direct these accidents,  
 “ instead of lying at the mercy of them. — Another  
 “ the most conceivable perfection of a *Law* consists  
 “ in the clearness and precision of its terms.—These  
 “ will be found, no doubt, and ought to be expected,  
 “ when God is the Legislator [9].”

He next shews us, how he could have improved the GOSPEL, had he been of God's privy-counsel.  
 “ Had the doctrine of future rewards and punish-  
 “ ments been taught by CHRISTIANITY in terms  
 “ *more general and less descriptive* ; had the punish-  
 “ ments been represented, for instance, like the re-  
 “ wards, to be, simply, such as *eye never saw, nor ear*  
 “ *heard, nor the heart of man could conceive*, it might  
 “ have been maintained in credit, and had an uni-  
 “ versal and real influence perhaps, to the great ad-  
 “ vantage of religion [10].”

[9] Vol. iii. p. 292,3.

[10] Vol. v. p. 542.

An inattentive reader may be surprized perhaps, at this wantonness of his Lordship's pen, That when he had given it as his fixed decree, that all which the world hath hitherto called *Religion*, is a public mischief, and a *future state*, an absurd fable; he should with great formality deliver in a plan which would have given *credit* and *real efficacy* to nonsense and impiety. But we must consider, He had been so long playing the PHILOSOPHER, that he had reason to apprehend we might forget the other part of his sublime Character, the LEGISLATOR. He therefore deemed it expedient to give us a slight cast of his office, in rectifying the blunders of MOSES and JESUS CHRIST.

With regard to MOSES and his *Law*, I have so much to say to his Lordship, that I shall reserve it for an after-reckoning. The other is but a small matter, and may be settled here.

I suspect then, our LEGISLATOR, in this remark concerning the manner in which JESUS revealed a *future state*, did not sufficiently attend either to the nature of the human mind, or to the genius of the Gospel. He would have, we see, the account of *future punishments* as general, and as little descriptive, as that of *future rewards*. He seems to think the latter well managed, and with propriety: which yet he measures on the imaginary impropriety of the other: He appears to have no idea of any positive excellency it has in itself. I shall endeavour therefore to explain why this method of representing *future rewards* was right: By which it will appear, that the other, of representing *future punishments*, was by no means wrong.

To

To grow *particular* and *descriptive*, whether of future rewards, or future punishments, the Speaker must borrow his images from *material and corporeal* things ; because the Hearer has no faculties of sensation proper to comprehend ideas taken from things *Spiritual*. Now when a follower of Christ is so far advanced as to have his Faith work by *hope*, his sentiments grow refined, his ideas purify, and he is rising apace towards that perfection which the Gospel encourages him to aspire after. But while *fear of punishment* chiefly operates upon him, he is yet in the lowest state of probation ; his imagination is gross, and his appetites sensual. Is it not evident, then, that a *descriptive* Heaven of delights would be ill suited to that purity and elevation of mind, solely fixed by *hope*, on happiness ; and as evident that a *general undefined* denunciation of Hell would not have force enough to make the necessary impression on a sensual fancy agitated by *fear* ? Let not his Lordship's admirers, therefore, be offended, if we believe that, in this point, the Author of our Salvation went at least one step beyond their Master, in *true Politics*.

At length, for a concluding stroke, his Lordship comes from vilifying BOTH RELIGIONS, and their FOUNDERS, to rail against the GOD of *both Religions*. And with this I shall close the horrid Scene.

“ IF WE BELIEVE IN MOSES, AND HIS GOD, WE  
 “ CANNOT BELIEVE IN THAT GOD WHOM OUR REA-  
 “ SON SHEWS US [11].

“ CAN ANY MAN PRESUME TO SAY THAT THE  
 “ GOD OF MOSES, OR THE GOD OF PAUL, IS THE

[11] Vol. iii. p. 307.

“ TRUE,

“ TRUE GOD? The God of MOSES is partial, un-  
 “ just, and cruel; delights in blood, commands as-  
 “ sassinations, massacres, and even exterminations of  
 “ people. The God of PAUL elects some of his  
 “ creatures to salvation, and predestinates others to  
 “ destruction, even in the womb of their mothers.  
 “ And, indeed, if there was not a Being INFINITELY  
 “ MORE PERFECT than these, there would be no God  
 “ at all, nor any true Religion in the world [12].”

Who, that hears this dreadful language, without knowing from what quarter it comes, but will strait call to mind the words of the Satyrist?

“ Not Danté, dreaming all th’ infernal State,  
 “ Beheld such scenes of envy, sin, and hate.

But when we understand them to be the ejaculations of this Noble Philosopher, the Confessor of Truth, the Advocate of Virtue, and the Restorer of banished Nature; employed, as he himself tells us, or rather *set apart*, TO PLEAD THE CAUSE OF GOD HIMSELF AGAINST DIVINES AND ATHEISTS IN CONFEDERACY [13]; when we consider, I say, all this, What are we to think, but that they are the pious breathings of an over-heated zeal: and tho’ expressed in no consecrated terms; (indeed such as had been much worn in the service of the CRAFTSMAN) yet when new-set in his Lordship’s immortal Panoply of the FIRST PHILOSOPHY, they may now prove as useful, to advance the *fear of God*, as before, to promote the *honour of the King*.

It is in HATE as in LOVE; hard to distinguish the *divine* from the *carnal* species; or rather to separate

[12] Vol. v, p. 567.

[13] Vol. v, p. 305.



the different ebullitions of what is but one and the same species. Hence it is, that the melting strains of the *Mystic*, the *Methodist*, and the *Moravian*, so often smell of the STREWS; and hence, by parity of reason, the thunder of his Lordship's eloquence may naturally re-echo, as it were, from BILLINGSGATE.

But these things make You serious: and You ask, "Who, that hath ever heard Lord Bolingbroke's Story, would have suspected, that his GOD and his COUNTRY lay so near his heart? And yet his *Political* and *Philosophic* Writings, say you, are full of *Lamentations*; where, like another Jeremy, he bewails the dishonours which wicked PRIESTS, and wicked POLITICIANS, have brought upon the Church and State: Nay, in his extreme fondness for these his favourite Objects, he suffers himself to be alarmed with something less than panic terrors. He is afraid the *Whigs* will bring in the *Pretender*; and apprehends, the *English Clergy* have made large steps towards *Atheism*."

I know what you drive at. You would insinuate, that those who have nothing to fear, and a great deal to hope from Religion, are not wont to give it up so easily. For HOPE encourages men to *search* into the grounds of what Religion promises; though FEAR often hinders them from giving proper attention to what it threatens. You are ready to say to his Lordship,

"Si VIRTUTIS eras avidus, RECTIQUE BONIQUE

"Tam sitiens, quid RELIGIO tibi sancta nocebat?

"Aspera quippe nimis visa est? Asperrima certe

"GAUDENTI VITIIS, sed non virtutis amanti.

*Card. Polig.*

You

You are for applying to his right honourable Person, the old trite aphorism, *That wicked principles spring out of a wicked life.* But what says another noble Peer to this? "Fain would the Bigot, in consequence  
 " of his *moral maxims*, and *political establishments*, con-  
 " found *licentiousness in morals* with *liberty of thought*,  
 " and make the *libertine*, who has the LEAST MASTE-  
 " RY OF HIMSELF, resemble his direct opposite [14]."

It may be so, you will say. But Lord Bolingbroke sure, could never object to the imputation which *bad morals* cast upon a *Teacher of Truth*: He, who sees it so clearly, and presses it so charitably, upon the whole body of the *Christian Clergy*. "How (says his Lord-  
 " ship) can the CLERGY of your Church, or of ours,  
 " pretend that they contribute now, or EVER DID  
 " CONTRIBUTE, to the reformation of mankind?  
 " No age can be pointed out, wherein ALL THE  
 " VICES, that Tully imputes to most of the heathen  
 " Philosophers, did not prevail AMONGST MOST of  
 " the Christian Divines with great circumstances of  
 " aggravation. They have not only ALL THE VICES  
 " incident to human nature in common with other  
 " men, but they have had the peculiar Vices of their  
 " Order. I WILL SAY BOLDLY, they are, in gene-  
 " ral, much fitter to hinder, by their EXAMPLE, than  
 " to promote by their DOCTRINE, the Advancement  
 " of Religion, natural or revealed."

We have, it is true, been favoured with very ample accounts of the immoral conduct both of antient Philosophers and Modern Churchmen; and these, even by some of the more charitable of their own

[14] *Characteristicks*, Vol. iii. Misc. 5, Chap. 3.

respective Bodies. FREE-THINKERS have been bashful, and more on the reserve: nay they might have been thought Saints, for any thing their modesty would have suffered, had it not been for the *Confessions* of one of them, the famous CARDAN; who, like another St. *Austin*, seems sworn to leave nothing behind him in the inkhorn. The account he gives of himself deserves transcribing.—

“ In diem viventem, nugacem, religionis contemptorem, illatae injuriae memorem, invidum, tristem, infidiatorem, proditorem, suorum osorem, turpi libidini deditum, solitarium, inamœnum, austerum, obscœnum, lascivum, maledicum, varium, ancipitem, impurum, calumniatorem [15], &c.” This was fair dealing: and he who was so *free* with himself, might be excused if he spared no body else. But men do not use to be wanton on so nice a subject; and *Freethinkers* have generally more MASTERY OF THEMSELVES, says the noble Author of the *Characteristics*: Whenever therefore we see it done, we must conclude it to be done for some good purpose; such as, emulation of the Christian Confessors; who, to display the powers of *Grace*, did not scruple to tell the world, with great simplicity, what they were by *Nature*: And thus, Cardan to shew us, that the FIRST PHILOSOPHY is as efficacious in all great changes, has fairly told us how well befriended he had been by his *Stars*. However, let his design, in presenting us with this picture of his amiable turn of mind, be what it would, we are much beholden to him for setting the Example. Though, like all other good Examples, it may possibly end where it set

[15] *De vita sua.*

out;

out; and the *first Philosophy* wait with patience for some less incommodious way of recommending itself. And indeed, while Infidelity, which is the *cure*, is unjustly supposed the *cause* of these Peccadillos, we need not wonder our Philosophers should soon think themselves at liberty, and be as soon disposed, to turn their view from their own morals to those of the Clergy: and affirm *boldly*, with his Lordship, that *the order in general is much fitter to hinder by their EXAMPLE, than to promote by their DOCTRINE, the advancement of Religion.*

What shall we say then? May it not be better to leave the *Examples* of both to shift for themselves; and to consider only their *Doctrines*? I think it would; and will therefore proceed from his Lordship's TEMPER, to his PRINCIPLES. But this must be the subject of another Letter.

I am, &c.

L E T.



## L E T T E R II.

IT has been observed, that uncommon blessings, whether civil or religious, seldom happen till hope grows desperate, and long expectation has wearied out itself in vain. Then it is the crisis approaches, the superiour Genius bestirs himself, and the *admiring* world is taken in by surprise.

—Quod optanti Divûm, promittere nemo  
Auderet, volvenda dies en! attulit ultro.

Never was this observation so well verified: for never was mankind in so deplorable a way as when his Lordship arrived from — what other System is not yet discovered; tho' his tuneful Friend was very positive he belonged not to this: Infomuch, that when the last Comet appeared, and came pretty near the Earth, he used to tell his acquaintance, he should not be surprized if in the event it proved, that it was sent only to convey his Lordship home again; just as a Stage-coach stops at your door to take up a Passenger. Be this as it will: Bad indeed was our condition when Lord BOLINGBROKE arrived, — what shall I say, *to be a light to those who sat in darkness?* No, this is the work of meaner missionaries; but, to RESTORE MANKIND TO THEIR SENSES.

For his Lordship, in his account of the general DELIRIUM which had seized the *Clergy*, had given us but a *specimen* of our condition: the MADNESS was

UNI-

UNIVERSAL. Infomuch, that (as he well expresses it) ALL THE BEDLAMs OF THE WORLD [1] were not sufficient for these things. And indeed how should they ! For, to confess the truth, these visions of what he calls an *over-heated imagination*, such as, belief in the *moral Attributes of God*, the *immortality of the Soul*, a *particular Providence*, and a *future state*, had infected all times and places.

“ ALL EUROPE (says his Lordship) GREW DELIRIOUS [2]. Christianity was left to shift for itself in the midst of a FRANTIC WORLD [3].” And again, “ OUR WORLD seems to be, in many respects, THE “ BEDLAM OF EVERY OTHER SYSTEM OF INTEL- “ LIGENT CREATURES : and, with this unlucky cir- “ cumstance, that they who are *most mad* govern, in “ things of the greatest moment, them who are *least* “ so [4].” By what is here dropt in the concluding words you understand, why his Lordship chose to make the *Clergy* lead up the *Brawls* in this mad dance ; and the *Leather-dressing Pontiff* himself to preside as Master of the Revels.

But to find all Mankind mad, is perhaps more than you expected. What then ? Is the madness less real for being universal ? — I think not : but, surely, more desperate. Tell us, therefore, what strange disaster occasioned this general insanity. Was it some evil disposition of the Stars ? — So, indeed, it is reported [5]. The WORLD, it seems, like the men of *Abdera* [6],

[1] Vol. iv. p. 72.

[2] Vol. iv. p. 377.

[3] Vol. iv. p. 353.

[4] Vol. iv. p. 316.

[5] Vid. *D. N. J. C. genesios thema*, inter Cardani opera.[6] See *Lucian de conscr. Hist.*

had seen a Tragedy in a very hot day : which left so strong an impression on their fancies, that they all thought themselves concerned in the subject. Some ran about from Country to Country, to tell their story ; and the rest have been ever since rehearsing and celebrating those affecting Scenes, at home ! till LORD BOLINGBROKE, like another HIPPOCRATES, came to their relief : and, having first well physicked them of their Faith and their Fancies, brought them to themselves, by applying to their hurt imaginations, the sovereign Restorative of his FIRST PHILOSOPHY. Of which, I am now, as I promised, to give you some account.

But to see this extraordinary Man in a just light, it will be proper to shew what *Man* was before him. A RELIGIOUS ANIMAL he is allowed to be, on all hands : And, till the coming of this FIRST PHILOSOPHY, *Religion* was understood to rise on that wide basis, on which the *fanatical Knave*, PAUL, had the art to place it ; that “ He who cometh to God must “ believe that he is : and that he is a REWARDER of “ them who diligently seek him [7].” For, men who supposed the infinite *goodness and justice* of God to be as demonstrable as his infinite *power and wisdom*, could not but conclude from his *moral attributes*, that he REWARDED ; as well as from his *natural attributes*, that he CREATED.

On the more complex notion, therefore, of a MORAL GOVERNOR, all mankind supposed RELIGION to arise ; while NATURALISM, the Ape of Religion, was seen to spring from the simpler notion of a PHY-

[7] Hebr. xi. 6.

SICAL PRESERVER : which, however, they were ready to distinguish, on the other hand, from the *Unnaturalism* (if one may so call it) of *ranker Atheism*.

RELIGION, therefore, stands, and must, I think, for ever stand, on those two immoveable Principles of PRESERVER and REWARDER, in conjunction.

The *length* or *shortness* of human existence was not primarily in the idea of Religion, not even in the complete idea of it, as delivered in ST. PAUL'S general definition. "The Religionist, says he, must believe that God *is*, and that he *rewards*."

But when it came to be seen, that he was not always a *Rewarder* here, men concluded this life not to be the whole of their existence. And thus a FUTURE STATE was brought into Religion ; and from thenceforth became a necessary part of it.

To explain my meaning, if so clear a thing needs further explanation. GOD, under the *physical* idea of *Preserver* and Creator appears uniform, regular, and instant to his *Creatures* : Under the *moral* idea of *Rewarder* and Governor, he seems frequently to be withdrawn from his *Servants*. For tho', in the moral dispensations of things here, good and evil be often proportioned to desert ; yet often, too, they are otherwise adjusted. The Antient Religionist, therefore, confiding in his Demonstration of the *moral* as well as the *natural* attributes of the Deity, concluded, That the *present* was not the only state ordained for man ; but that in some other life, these irregularities would be set right. Hence a FUTURE STATE became in all ages and countries (except one, where the moral administration of providence was different) inseparable



able from, and essential to, the various Religions of mankind. Even the mere Vulgar, who did not reach the force of this Demonstration, yet seeing the marks of moral Government, amidst the frequent interruptions of it, embraced the doctrine of a *future State* as confidently as the Learned. For plain Nature had instructed them to reason thus, — If all were *regular*, nothing needed to be set right : and if all were *irregular*, there was no One to set them right.

Such was the ANTIENT RELIGION OF NATURE : To which, modern Divines have generally agreed to give the name of THEISM, when professed by those who never heard of *Revelation* ; and the name of DEISM, when professed by those who would never give credit to it.

In this State our noble Philosopher found the *religious World* ; or, more properly, this was the language he heard re-echoed from one end of the Globe to the other ; But it was a language, he tells us, he did not understand. It was to his ears, *like the choirs of birds, who whistle and sing, or scream, at one another : or the herds of beasts, who bleat and low, or chatter and roar, at one another.* He rejects it, therefore in the lump, as the inarticulate din of ENTHUSIASM and ABSURDITY ; the brutal issue of *pride* and *ignorance* ; and so, but with much greater of his own, erects the FIRST PHILOSOPHY on it's ruins.

1. He permits us to believe, that an intelligent Cause made the world ; and, by his *physical* and *general* Laws still governs it ; but not by *moral* or *particular*.

2. He bids us to understand, that this World was no more made for man than for every animal besides :

nor was man made for any other World, nor consequently, (as Divines have dreamt) for happiness.

3. That, by the *arbitrary constitution* of things in the human system (which may have a contrary disposition in other systems) Virtue promotes happiness and Vice brings on misery.

4. That THIS CONSTITUTION, together with the coactivity of CIVIL LAWS, contain all the rewards and punishments attendant on Virtue and on Vice.

5. That prayer, supplication, and every other office of Religion in use amongst men, to implore good, and to deprecate evil, are foolish and fanatical: for that all religious duty is comprized in *submission to the established order of things*.

He sums up his whole System in these words. "A  
 " self-existent Being the first cause of all things, in-  
 " finitely POWERFUL and infinitely WISE, is the God  
 " of natural Theology. And the whole system of  
 " natural Religion rests on it, and requires NO BROAD-  
 " ER FOUNDATION [8]." That is, it is enough for  
 him *who cometh* to this new Religion, *to believe that*  
 God is; and not that he is a REWARDER of *them who*  
*seek him*. And again, "When men have proved the  
 " existence of an all-perfect Being, the Creator and  
 " Governor of the Universe, and demonstrated his  
 " infinite POWER and wisdom, from his works,  
 " when they have done this, THEY HAVE DONE  
 " ALL; *this includes the whole of natural Theology, and*  
 " *serves abundantly to all the ends of natural Reli-*  
 " *gion* [9]."

[8] Vol. v. p. 316.

[9] p. 453.

What these *ends of natural Religion* are he tells us very plainly. They are, to fit us for *our station here, and to supply our real wants in it.* — “ In like manner [that is, as he expresses it, *for the necessary uses of human life and no more*] “ the knowledge of the Creator is on many accounts necessary to such a creature as man : and therefore we are able to arrive, “ by a proper exercise of our mental faculties, from “ the knowledge of God’s works, to a knowledge “ of his EXISTENCE, and of that infinite POWER “ and WISDOM which are demonstrated to us in them. “ OUR KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING GOD GOES NO “ FURTHER [10]. ”

Now tho’ we should be so complaisant to these *Principles* as not to call them ATHEISTIC, yet I am afraid the Professor of them, whoever he be, must be content with no better a name. For tho’ the *Principles* may be called NATURALISM, yet if *Scripture* has defined an ATHEIST right, to be one who HAS NO HOPE, and is WITHOUT GOD IN THE WORLD [11], our Professor of Naturalism comes within the description. For tho’ he acknowledges the being of a God, yet as he is *without a God in the world*, that is, a Being who presides over it, as the moral Governor of it, which is the foundation on which all Religion stands, Religionists will think of no other title for him. And surely he will be properly defined. For tho’ the abstract term *Atheism* carries, as it’s principal idea, a relation to God’s BEING : yet, *Atheist*, in the concrete, seems to have it’s chief relation to God’s

[10] Vol. iv. p. 86.

[11] Ephes. ii. 12.

56 A VIEW OF LORD BOLINGBROKE'S  
GOVERNMENT. This is not observed for any kind of  
consequence it is to Religion, in what class the Pub-  
lic shall be pleased to rank his Lordship; but merely  
to set in a true light the honourable Person's inge-  
nuity, in assuming the character of an *Advocate for*  
*Religion*, at the very time he is labouring to root it  
out of human Society.

Old NATURALISM, thus travestied in the garb of  
new *Religion*, his Lordship bestows, as his last and  
most precious Legacy, on his own dear Country: if  
you will believe him, the only *reformed Religion* that  
can be called *pure*, and the only *revealed Religion* that  
has the mark of *truth*. What the World hath  
hitherto called by those names being, as he assures us,  
an evil in itself; and mischievous to man in it's essen-  
tial constitution. And he proves it, as they say, in  
mood and figure. — “To keep up the sense of  
“ it [*i. e.* of *Religion*] in the minds of men, there  
“ seem to be but two ways. To STRIKE THE SEN-  
“ ses frequently, by public and solemn acts of reli-  
“ gious worship; and to HEAT THE BRAIN by no-  
“ tions of an inward operation of the Spirit, and of  
“ a sort of mystical devotion, independent of out-  
“ ward forms, and even INCONSISTENT with them.  
“ One of these leads to SUPERSTITION, the other  
“ to ENTHUSIASM. Both are silly——Superstition  
“ is folly: Enthusiasm is madness. It is good to be  
“ on our guard against both [12].”

Without doubt. But how shall it be done? *Reli-*  
*gion* is an evil in itself, and so admits of no qualifi-  
cation. It necessarily requires, as his Lordship tells

[12] Vol. iv. p. 310-11.



us, on man's part, public acts of worship; and on God's, the private operation of the Spirit: But these lead to *superstition* and *enthusiasm*; that is, to *folly* and *madness*; to the depravation, nay to the destruction of our reasonable Nature. This is not all: these *necessary means* are not only hurtful but impracticable. You could not use them, was you foolish or mad enough to venture on them; for they are, he says, *INCONSISTENT*, and destroy one another. What then is to be done? To *be upon our guard*; to keep *Religion* at arms length, till his Lordship brings up his reserve of *Naturalism*, to our relief. Let this be our Shield of Brass. Under this we may repose in peace, undisturbed by any frightful dreams of Hell and the Devil.

This, Sir, is the Enchiridion of his Lordship's FIRST PHILOSOPHY. How simple, you will say, how close, how round, how full, is this *new Dispensation*? A dispensation of *Religion* shall we call it? No matter. The times are ripe for it under any name. Yet I can hardly agree to those fancies, I told you of, which had possessed his poetical Friend; who, misled perhaps by that obscure hint, that *our World was only the Bedlam of every other system of intelligent Creatures* [13], supposed, in good earnest, his *Philosopher and Guide* to be sent down from some superior orb, as Physician to the Hospital. Without question he was made for the Age, and the Age for him. And they may well congratulate one another on their happy meeting. Yet, if we must be doctinated by a Poet, (and, now-a-days, Milton is much oftener quoted

[13] Vol. iv. p. 353.

by Divines, than Hooker) I should be rather disposed to give credit to the man who told me, that he heard the evil Genius of Britain address his Lordship on his first setting out, in strains like these,

“ Be as a planetary plague, when Jove  
 “ Will o'er some high-vic'd City hang his poison  
 “ In the sick air.” —

But to return to his System. It rises on these four principles.

*First*, That we have no adequate ideas of the MORAL ATTRIBUTES of God, his *goodness* and his *justice*, as we have of his NATURAL, to wit, his *power* and his *wisdom*.

*Secondly*, That a FUTURE STATE is a Fable.

*Thirdly*, That the JEWISH and the CHRISTIAN Revelations are false. And

*Fourthly*, That REVELATION ITSELF is impossible.

Indulge me with a few remarks on his Lordship's management, under each of these heads.

I. Divines, in their proof of the *moral attributes*, having of late much insisted on the arguments *a priori*, as they are called, his Lordship suspected, and what he suspects of ill he always takes for granted, that these attributes could not be proved *a posteriori*, or from God's *works*; the way by which, he owns, his *natural attributes* may be demonstrated. So that having pronounced the arguments *a priori* to be jargon, nonsense, impiety and blasphemy; the *moral attributes* of God are fairly erased at once out of the *intellectual system*. And he had no farther trouble on this head than to decorate CLARKE, who was chiefly con-

conversant in the reasoning *a priori*, with variety of abusive names. As to the reasoning itself, our great Man's respect for that is so profound and so distant, that I defy any one unacquainted with metaphysical arguments, even to guess what kind of things they are for which the famous Minister of St. *James's* is so severely handled. For while the *Divine* suffers, the *Reasoner*, as we say, always escapes. Now indeed you see him seized upon, and ready, as you would think, to be cut up alive, and immolated to the *first Philosophy*; when a *fit of railing* shakes his Lordship; and the Storm falls upon the whole Body of *modern Schoolmen*: And so the Doctor escapes for that time. He is again laid hold on, and every thing ready for execution; when a *fit of learning* comes upon his Lordship; and *Pythagoras, Plato, Socrates*, and the whole band of *ancient Metaphysicians* pass in review, and each receives a lash as he passes: And so the Doctor escapes for the second time. After all these victories without blood-shed, his Lordship, as is sitting, takes his ease, intent only on his future Triumphs: in the mean time, amidst much self-applause, his *Essays* end, and the *subtile* Doctor remains unhurt.

But when need requires, I would have you know, that nothing can keep him from his Logic. Marry, then, on some great occasion indeed, as when the *novelty* of the subject invites him, or the true state of it is *little understood*, you shall have no reason to complain of brevity: then you shall see him employ one half of his Volumes to prove the corrup-

54      A VIEW OF LORD BOLINGBROKE'S  
tions of the CHURCH OF ROME, and near another  
half; to expose the jargon of the SCHOOLMEN.

2. We come to the second point, the doctrine of  
a FUTURE STATE ; which being supported by the  
great moral argument of “ the unequal distribution  
“ of good and evil amongst men,” his Lordship is as  
large in confuting this as he was sparing in his answer  
to the metaphysical proofs of the *moral attributes*.

He first endeavours to shew the argument to be  
founded on a mistaken fact, and that there is no  
such *unequal* distribution : He is almost tempted to  
tell you, that every thing is exactly regular and in  
order. But this is a paradox too unmanageable even  
for his Lordship. He therefore comes down some-  
what lower ; and appears to be tolerably contented,  
if you will but take his word that the inequality is  
not near so great as *pulpit-Declaimers* would make you  
believe : that the disorders which follow the abuse  
of man's free-will are not to be placed to the ac-  
count of that dispensation, which our ignorance and  
presumption make us fancy God is obliged to alter  
and reform. However, *equal* or *unequal*, his capital  
maxim clears up all. WHATSOEVER IS, IS RIGHT :  
and therefore the argument of these *confederated* Di-  
vines, which goes upon a supposed WRONG, is *ab-*  
*surd and blasphemous*. Whatever *answer* this reason-  
ing may deserve, I believe no man who understands  
the world will expect that a well-bred man should  
give it.

But I cannot omit, on this occasion, to do justice  
to his poetical Friend ; by shewing the difference be-  
tween Mr. POPE'S Philosophy and his Lordship's.  
They both employ the maxim of *Whatever is, is*  
*right.*



*right*. But to know, with what propriety and judgment, we must consider against whom they write. Mr. Pope's *Essay on man* is a *real* vindication of Providence against *Libertines* and *Atheists*; who quarrel with the present constitution of things, and deny a future State. To these he answers that *whatever is, is right*: and the reason he gives, is, that *we see only a part of the moral system, and not the whole*; therefore these irregularities serving to great purposes, such as the fuller manifestation of God's goodness and justice, they are *right*. Lord Bolingbroke's *Essays* are a *pretended* vindication of Providence against an *imaginary confederacy between Divines and Atheists*; who use a common principle, namely, the *inequalities in God's moral government here*, for different ends and purposes; the One to establish a *future State*; the Other to discredit the *Being of a God*. His Lordship, who opposes their different conclusions, endeavours to overthrow their common principle, by his Friend's maxim, that *whatever is, is right*; not because the present state of our *moral world* (which is part only of a more general system) is necessary for the greater perfection of the whole, but because our *moral world* is an entire system of itself. His Lordship *applies* the maxim no better than he understands it. Mr. Pope urges it against *Atheists* and *Libertines*, who say the constitution of things is *faulty*: so that the reply, *whatever is, is right*, is pertinent. His Lordship directs it, against *Divines*, who say, indeed, that this constitution is *imperfect*, if considered separately, because it is a part only of a whole, but are as far as his Lordship from calling it *faulty*: therefore the reply, *whatever is, is right*, is

impertinent. In a word, the Poet directs it against Atheists and Libertines, in support of Religion properly so called; The Philosopher, against Divines, in support of Religion improperly so called, namely NATURALISM: and the success is answerable. Mr. Pope's argument is manly, systematical, and convincing. Lord Bolingbroke's, confused, prevaricating, and inconsistent. Thus, his Lordship will have nothing irregular or amiss in the *moral world*; for this is impiety, the very bond of that *confederacy* sealed between Divines and Atheists. In vain you tell him of a *future state*, to vindicate the providence of God; this is visionary nonsense. But, if you talk of *physical evil*, he has his answer ready, *This world is but one wheel of a vast machine*. You will ask, then, why Pope's solution is not to be admitted, who says the same of *moral evil* which his Lordship does of *physical*? For a plain reason; his Lordship can allow our *physical* system to be only a part, without any hazard of his *first Philosophy*. But when once you allow as much to the *moral*, you are in danger of bringing in *Religion*.

But why, you will ask again, would his Lordship thus run himself a-ground; sometimes by discrediting his reasoning with a silly paradox; sometimes by betraying it with an unwilling confession; and, at best, by only giving it the poor support of a misunderstood and misapplied maxim; when his great and noble principle of NO MORAL ATTRIBUTES dissolves the CONFEDERACY at once. For if we have no ideas of God's moral attributes, the issue of our reasoning on his ways will be the same as if he had none. And if he has none, they need not, sure, be vindicated:  
which

which is the sole purpose of his reasoning on the state of the moral world. All I can say to this is, that his Lordship appears to have been so harrassed with this phantom of a FUTURE STATE, that no Charm, no Security was to be neglected that could contribute to his ease or protection. Hence it is he will depend on neither of his arguments, of — *no inequality* or — *but a little*: and therefore, to make all sure, casts about for a third of more acknowledged efficacy.

This he finds in the SOUL'S MATERIALITY. From whence, he contrives to persuade himself that it can be no *substance* (which he calls *pneumatical madness*) but a mere *quality* of body, produced by the configuration of it's parts, and perishing with that disposition of them. I say, he contrives to persuade *himself*; and I mean no more. Had his point been to persuade his Reader, we must suppose he would have ventured, at least, to confute the arguments of CLARKE and BAXTER: who, on the principles of the Newtonian Philosophy, have demonstrated *that the soul is a substance*, distinct from the body, and different from matter. Instead of this, he flies to his usual consolation, ABUSE. He calls them *impious* and *blasphemers* for presuming to limit the Omnipotent: when the highest of their Presumption amounts but to this, the supposing *God can exert no power, which implies a contradiction*; since this imaginary power is indeed impotency. Nay, he would willingly persuade himself there were no such arguments in being. For, speaking of the reasoning, which induced men to conclude, the soul to be a substance distinct from the body, he represents it thus, “Men



“ taking it for granted that they knew all the per-  
 “ ceivable properties of matter, they concluded that  
 “ such things as could not be accounted for by  
 “ these, were to be accounted for by the properties  
 “ of some other substance [14].” And again, “ Va-  
 “ nity and presumption determine Philosophers to  
 “ conclude, that because they cannot account for the  
 “ phænomena of the mind by what they know very  
 “ superficially of solid extended substance, this mind  
 “ must be some other substance [15].” Such, in-  
 deed, was the state of the controversy when LOCKE  
 skimmed over the argument. But CLARKE and BAX-  
 TER went deeper. They draw their conclusion,  
 not on the presumption that they knew all the  
 knowable qualities of matter, and that between these  
 and *Thought*, there was no perceivable connexion ;  
 but from this clear and solid truth, that from the  
 little we do know of body, we see a contradiction in  
 supposing *intelligence* to be a quality of matter. For  
 thus they reasoned, tho’ we know not all the powers  
 of matter, yet we know certainly it cannot have *in-*  
*consistent* and *contradictory* powers. It is allowed to  
 have essentially, a vis inertiae, or that it *resists a change*  
*of it’s state* ; it is impossible, therefore, that it should,  
 at the same time, have spontaneous motion, or *effect*  
*a change of its state*. If this be the case (and to  
 deny that it is the case, is confounding all the princi-  
 ples of human knowledge) then it is *impossible the soul*  
*should be material* — But his Lordship feasts us with the  
 same fine argument on the *motion of body*. “ They are  
 “ unable, ( says he ) to conceive how body can act

[14] Vol. iii. p. 502.

[15] Vol. iii. p. 508-9.



“ at all, and therefore they suppose the immediate  
 “ presence and action of an incorporeal agent in  
 “ every operation of corporeal nature [16].”  
 Whereas the truth is, they fully conceive from the  
 vis inertię of *body* or its resistance to a change of its  
 state, the absolute impossibility that it should act at  
 all: and, from thence see the necessity of an *incor-*  
*poreal agent in every operation of corporeal nature.* You  
 will think, perhaps, his Lordship knew no more of  
 this question than as it stood in his *Master Locke*; and  
 that he had never heard of *Baxter*, who has carried  
 it furthest, and treated it the most profoundly. I  
 should have thought so too, but that I find his Lord-  
 ship, in one place, speaking with that contempt of  
*Baxter’s* reasoning which is his wont, whenever any-  
 thing he cannot answer bears hard upon the *first Phi-*  
*losophy.* It is where he honours us with his own  
 thoughts concerning ATTRACTION. “ Attraction,  
 “ (saith his Lordship) may be, notwithstanding all  
 “ the *silly abstract reasoning* to the contrary, a REAL  
 “ PROPERTY OF MATTER [17].” Now you are  
 to understand that *Baxter*, when he has evinced the  
 truth of NEWTON’s idea of *attraction* (who makes  
 it no *real*, or essential, *property of matter*) employs  
 this idea to prove, that it implies a *contradiction* to  
 suppose, the soul may be a quality of matter. This  
 great truth, deep reflection and a thorough compre-  
 hension of the Newtonian Philosophy enabled *Bax-*  
*ter* to demonstrate. On the other hand, no reflection,  
 no Philosophy, nothing but mere *intuition* made his  
 Lordship conclude that it is so far from being a *con-*

[16] Vol. iv. p. 108.

[17] Vol. iii. p. 547.

*tradition*, that the *soul is a quality of matter*; that it is a self-evident fact. But, you shall hear his own marvelous words : “ I am persuaded that God can  
 “ make material systems capable of thought, be-  
 “ cause I must renounce one of the kinds of know-  
 “ ledge that he has given me, and the first, tho’ not  
 “ the principal in the order of knowing, or admit  
 “ that HE HATH DONE SO [18].” Locke only contended for a bare *possibility* : His Lordship sees the *necessity* : so much wiser is the Disciple than his Master.

3. But let us now go on with his Lordship’s system. His third great principle is the FALSHOOD of the *Jewish* and *Christian* REVELATIONS. And here you will find no argument omitted that bears with the least force against either of them. It is true, they are none of his own. They are borrowed from the *Minute Philosophers* that went before him : of whom it must be owned his Lordship is a very close and humble imitator.

His attack on revealed Religion is in two parts. The *first* is a confutation of it’s truth, as it lies in it’s purity, in sacred Scripture : the *second*, an insinuation of it’s falshood, as it is seen in it’s corrupt state amongst modern churches.

*Judaism* is attacked more fully and avowedly in the first way : and *Christianity*, in the latter.

1. All the arguments against Revelation, as represented in the Bible, are taken from BLOUNT, TOLAND, COLLINS, CHUBB, MORGAN, and their fellows. I must except, indeed, the atrocious terms

[18] Vol. iii. p. 531.

in which they are always inforced. For the iniquity of the times would not suffer those Confessors of truth *to put forth more than half their strength*, as his Lordship assures us [19]. When I observe, his reasoning here is taken from these men, it is not spoken in disparagement of it : for to say the truth, it is the best in all his *Essays*.

One thing, indeed, falls out unluckily. All his Lordship's great Originals, in common with the rest of Mankind, professed to believe the MORAL ATTRIBUTES of the Deity. And, on this principle, inforced their arguments against the truth of revealed Religion : indeed, what other principle is there that will afford any ground for an objection against it ? It is doubted, whether a moral dispensation come from the Author to whom it is ascribed. The doubt arises from our knowledge of his moral character ; between which and the dispensation there is a supposed discordancy : But take away the moral character and the doubt ceases with it. Yet his Lordship professes to have no idea of these *moral attributes*. No matter. They were necessary to be taken into service here, for the sake of carrying on his schemes : and a Philosopher can drop his principle, as a Politician does his friend, when he is of no use, and renew his acquaintance again when he is. These discarded *Attributes* therefore are on this occasion taken into favour ; soon indeed, to be dismissed again, and his OLD PRINCIPLE of *no morality* in the Godhead, reassumed, when he wants to guard against the terrors of a FUTURE STATE ; in which, to do it justice, it performs true Knights-service.

Much indeed is it to be lamented, that his *old principle* should ever grow capricious; and that when it had so effectually excluded God's moral Government, as recommended by *natural Religion*, it should oppose itself to those arguments which are for excluding God's moral government as recommended by *Revelation*. But after all, what if his Lordship played booty, and was for bringing in a *political Religion* by a side wind; just as Father Harduin established *Church Tradition*. The Jesuit, when he had destroyed all the monuments of antiquity, concluded we should be glad to take refuge in an *infallible guide*: and the noble Politician could not but see that when he had taken away God's moral attributes, he had removed all grounds for doubting of the divine origine of the *Magistrate's Religion*, from *Amasis* and *Mneves*, to *Thor* and *Odin*.

2. An historical deduction of the abuses and corruptions of Christianity in the CHURCH OF ROME, to advance superstition, fanaticism, and spiritual tyranny, makes the second part of his Lordship's reasoning against REVELATION; and the subject of the largest of his *four Essays*.

On this head he expatiates in all the forms of Piety, Patriotism, and Humanity. He bewails the dishonours done to Religion; he resents the violations of civil Liberty; and he vindicates the common sense of mankind from the scholastic jargon of an ignorant, debauched, and avaricious Clergy.

“ Felicia tempora, quæ te

“ Moribus opponunt: habeat jam ROMA pudorem.



On so trite a topic, the triumph of every true Protestant from Fox to Mr. Chandler, that is, from the first to the last good writer upon the subject, his Lordship may be well excused for unloading his Common-place. Whatever there is of a better taste, he has taken from Hooker, Stillingfleet, Barrow, and such other of the English Clergy who have most successfully detected the errors, and set bounds to the usurpations of Popery. But as the object of our Divines in this detection was to recommend the Gospel-truth; and of his Lordship, to discredit it; he had need of other helps: And these, too, were at hand; such as Hobbes, Toland, Tindal, and Gordon; whom he faithfully copies, both in exaggerating the abuses, and in drawing false consequences from the reform of them. Thus, according to those Divines who wrote *for truth*, SCHOOL PHILOSOPHY was modestly complained of as hindering the advancement of real knowledge; as keeping men busied in trifling controversies; and as making them often mistake words for things. But with my Lord, and these his better guides, who wrote *against Revelation*, SCHOOL PHILOSOPHY is boldly accused to have blotted out all knowledge, and to have left nothing in its stead but *madness, frenzy, and delirium*. So again, The end of those Divines in opposing Church-Tyranny was to introduce a RELIGIOUS SOCIETY on the principles of Gospel-liberty: but the end of these Philosophers in decrying Popery is to establish a *civil*, in the place of a *religious* usurpation, and to make the CHURCH A CREATURE OF THE STATE. In the mean time, he says *boldly* and well, “ That some men are IMPU-

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“ DENT enough to *pretend*, others SILLY enough to  
 “ *believe*, that they adhere to the Gospel, and main-  
 “ tain the cause of God against infidels and heretics  
 “ when they do nothing better nor more than expose  
 “ the conceits of men [20]. ” But while he is thus  
 busy in observing what happens at one end of this  
 common fallacy, where the *conceits of men* are mis-  
 taken for the cause of God, he suffers himself to slip  
 in, at the other: and does just the same *against* the  
 Gospel, which these *impudent* and *silly* men do *for*  
 it. He exposes the knavery of powerful Church-  
 men, and the folly of profound Divines; and then  
*pretends*, or *believes*, that he hath discredited Revela-  
 tion itself.

However, to part friends with the DIVINES, after  
 so many hard words, he teaches them how to prop  
 up, in some *plausible way*, their bungling systems of  
 ARTIFICIAL THEOLOGY, just as he had before  
 taught God Almighty himself to mend his *two Dis-*  
*pensations*. “ Let us (says he) suppose a Theist objec-  
 “ ting—the believer might reply—he might add—he  
 “ might add—and all this with great *plausibility* at  
 “ least [1]. ” You will say now, I envy my Lord  
 the glory of his instructions, so well calculated to de-  
 fend *artificial theology*, or otherwise I, who am not  
 sparing of my quotations, would have given them at  
 large. To tell you the truth, I suppressed them with  
 design; and in order to excite the Reader's curio-  
 sity. I am told there is need of it; and that this *first*  
*Philosophy*, this *physic of the soul*, is not swallowed  
 with that eagerness which might be expected or hoped

[20] Vol. iv. p. 385.

[1] Vol. v. p. 279.

for, on the first appearance of so great a blessing. You will suspect, by what you have observed in my former Letter, that the Public may possibly be overdosed. But what if they be? It is only making it a little more palatable, and his Followers will soon reconcile them to their Physic.

4. His Lordship's fourth and last great Principle is the IMPOSSIBILITY of REVELATION in general.

He has refused no arms, we see, to combat the Revelations God hath *actually* given. He would seem to relax a little of his hostility, as to those which God may *possibly* give: for in one place he says, *he will not absolutely pronounce against the possibility of God's revealing his will to man.* But whether he equivocates, whether he altered his mind, or whether he simply forgot himself (a matter of little consequence) most true it is, that he hath formally laid down, and largely insisted upon, certain Principles, which make revealed Religion a thing UTTERLY IMPOSSIBLE.

*First*, As to INSPIRATION, He not only denies all reality in the Thing, but will not allow so much as any meaning in the Word. And a MIRACLE, he holds amongst matters impossible; what never did, nor ever can exist.—But now, Without the first, no divine Messenger could be sent; for he must receive his Orders from God: and, without the second, no divine Messenger would be believed; for he must have his Credentials to Man: and these credentials, on his Lordship's own principles, can be no other than *miracles*.

But here again you are to observe, that on this subject likewise, Infidelity is no more indebted to him  
than

than for his good will. All he urges against *Inspiration* and *Miracles* having been first urged by HOBBS and SPINOZA: by the one, with more subtilty and exactness; by the other, with infinite more elegance.

*Secondly*, As to NATURAL RELIGION, His Lordship holds it to be full, perfect, and well understood. He holds, likewise, that the only conceivable purpose of *Revelation* must be to *republick* this *natural Religion*. The consequence is, and this his Lordship gives us to understand, that the use of *Revelation* is superseded. For if it teaches *more* than natural Religion taught, or *different* from what it taught, the Revelation is evidently false; If only the *same*, it is evidently superfluous.

*Thirdly*, As to a PARTICULAR PROVIDENCE, This, his Lordship utterly rejects. But *revealed Religion* is nothing else than the exercise of that very Providence, to some declared end and purpose in the moral System.

On all these accounts, he concludes, and consequentially enough, that REASON HAS NOTHING FURTHER TO DO, WHEN REVELATION BEGINS [2.]

You have now, Sir, the whole of HIS LORDSHIP'S SYSTEM, together with his principal topics for the support of it; both indeed very succinctly delivered: enough however to shew you that these famous ESSAYS, which you have so often heard cried up as the very Mine, and Treasury of all divine and human

[2] Vol. v. p. 274.



truths, are indeed little other than a Magazine or Warehouse of other men's lumber : or (not to dishonour his Lordship by a low comparison) like the mouth of your neighbouring SEVERN, turbulent and dirty : which, let fabling *Poets* say what they please, we are sure never derived it's source from the pure and perennial Urn of a *Demi-God* : but, if one may guess by the taste and colour, became thus considerable from the confluence of shallow brooks and babbling rivulets, of stagnant ditches, common-sewers, and yet stranger mixtures, scoured off and put into a ferment by the hasty rage of some peevish land-torrent.

THE main pillar of his System, you see, is this extravagant paradox, *That we have NO ADEQUATE ideas of God's moral attributes, his GOODNESS and JUSTICE, as we have of his natural, his Wisdom and Power.* And here, let me observe once for all, that his Lordship uses the words, *inadequate ideas*, and, *no ideas*, as terms of the same import. And I think, not improperly. I have therefore followed him in the indifferent use of either expression. For the reason of his calling our ideas of God's *moral attributes*, INADEQUATE, is, because he denies that goodness and justice in God, and goodness and justice amongst Men, are the same IN KIND. But if not the *same in kind*, we can have *no* idea of them ; because we have no idea of any *other kind* of goodness and justice.

As the reasoning on this head, contrary to his usual wont, is intirely his own ; and extremely curious in itself, I will once more go a little out of my way to set it in a true light ; that it may neither impose by it's novelty ; nor too much shock You and all good men by it's unchecked atrocity.

His three Positions are,

1. That, by *metaphysics*, or the reasoning *a priori*, we can gain no knowledge of God at all.

2. That our knowledge of his *attributes* are to be acquired only by a contemplation on his *Works*, or by the reasoning *a posteriori*.

3. That in this way, we can only arrive at the knowledge of his *natural* attributes, not of his *moral*.

“ It is from the constitution of the world ALONE  
 “ (says his Lordship) and from the state of mankind  
 “ in it, that we can *acquire any ideas* of the divine  
 “ attributes, or a *right to affirm any thing about*  
 “ *them* [3].”

“ The knowledge of the Creator is on many ac-  
 “ counts necessary to such a creature as man : and  
 “ therefore we are made able to arrive by a proper  
 “ exercise of our mental faculties, *from a knowledge*  
 “ *of God's works to a knowledge of his existence*, and of  
 “ that infinite POWER and WISDOM which are de-  
 “ monstrated to us in them. OUR KNOWLEDGE  
 “ CONCERNING GOD GOES NO FURTHER [4].”

“ Artificial Theology connects by very problemat-  
 “ ical reasoning *a priori*, MORAL attributes, such as  
 “ we conceive them, and such as they are relatively  
 “ to us, with the *physical* attributes of God ; tho’

[3] Vol. v. p. 331.

[4] Vol. iv. p. 8.

“ there be no sufficient foundation for this proceeding, nay, tho’ *the phænomena are in several cases repugnant* [5].”

Having thus assured us that the ideas of God’s *moral attributes* are to be got by no consequential reasoning at all, either *a priori* or *a posteriori*, the only two ways we have to knowledge; He rightly concludes, that if Man hath such ideas, they were not found but invented by him. And therefore, that nothing might be wanting to the full dilucidation of this curious point, he acquaints us who were the authors of the *FICITION*, and how strangely the thing came about.

“ Some of the Philosophers (says his Lordship) having been led by a more full and accurate contemplation of Nature to the knowledge of a supreme self-existent Being of infinite *power and wisdom*, and the first Cause of all things, were not contented with this degree of knowledge. They MADE A SYSTEM of God’s MORAL as well as *physical* attributes, BY WHICH TO ACCOUNT FOR THE PROCEEDINGS OF HIS PROVIDENCE [6].”

These Philosophers then, it seems, invented the system of God’s *moral attributes*, in order to account for the difficulties arising from the view of God’s *moral government*. If the World till now had been so dull as to have no conception of these Attributes; his Lordship’s Philosophers, we see, made amends; who were so quick witted to conceive, and so sharp sighted to find out, the obliquities of a *crooked* line before they had got any idea of a *straight* one. For

[5] Vol. v. p. 316,

[6] Vol. iv. p. 48.

just to this, neither more nor less, does his Lordship's observation amount, that—*they made a System of God's moral attributes, by which to account for the proceedings of his Providence.* 'Till now, no man could conceive how any doubts concerning *moral Government* could arise but on the previous ideas of the *moral attributes* of the *Governor*. This invention of his Lordship's old Philosophers puts us in mind of an ingenious Modern, the curious SANCHO PANCHÁ; who, as his historian tells us, was very inquisitive to discover the author of that very useful invention we call SLEEP: for, with this worthy Magistrate, Sleep and good Cheer were the *First Philosophy*. Now the things sought after by Sancho and his Lordship were at no great distance: for if *Sleeping* began when men first shut their eyes, it is certain the *idea of God's Goodness* appeared as soon as ever they opened them.

Dr. Clarke's Demonstration of the moral attributes *a priori*, I shall leave, as his Lordship is pleased to do, in all its force. If the Doctor's followers think their Master's honour concerned, where his arguments are not, they have a large field and a safe to shew their prowess. I rather chuse to undertake the noble Philosopher on his own terms, without any other arms than the arguments *a posteriori*. For he is such a Champion for the good Cause, that he not only appoints his Adversaries the Field, but prescribes to them the use of their weapons.

But his Lordship, like other great men, is not easily approached; and when he is, not always fit to be seen. You catch his FIRST PHILOSOPHY, as Butler's Hero did Aristotle's FIRST MATTER, *undressed, and without a rag of form,*—however flaunting and fluttering  
ing



ing in FRAGMENTS. To speak plainly, his Lordship's entire neglect of method betrays him into endless REPETITIONS: and in these, whether for want of precision in his ideas, propriety in his terms, or art in his composition, the question is perpetually changing; and rarely without being new-covered by an equivocal expression. If you add to this, the perpetual CONTRADICTIONS into which he falls, either by defect of memory, excess of passion, or distress of argument, you will allow it to be no easy matter to take him fairly, to know him fully, and to represent him to the best advantage: in none of which offices would I be willingly defective. Indeed, when you have done this, the business is over; and his Lordship's reasoning generally confutes itself.

When I reflect upon what this has cost me, the reading over two or three bulky volumes to get possession of a single argument; which now you think you hold, and then again you lose; which meets you full when you least expect it; and slips away from you the very moment it promises to do most: when, I say, I reflect upon all this, I cannot but lament the hard luck of the *English* CLERGY, who, tho' apparently least fit, as being made Parties; certainly least affected, as there is nothing that can impose on a Scholar, and a great deal that may mislead the People, are likely to be the men most engaged with his Lordship in this controversy. Time was, when if a Writer had a disposition to seek objections against Religion, tho' he found them hardly, and urged them heavily, yet he would digest his thoughts, and methodize his reasoning. The Clergy had then nothing to do but to answer him, if they found themselves

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able.

able. But since this slovenly custom (as Lord SHAFTSBURY calls it) has got amongst our Free-thinkers, of *taking their physic in public*, of throwing about their loose and crude indigestions under the name of FRAGMENTS, things which in their very name imply not so much the *want*, as the *exclusion* of all *form*, the Advocate of Religion has had a fine time of it: he must work them into consistence, he must mould them into shape, before he can safely lay hold of them himself, or present them handsomely to the Public. But these Gentlemen have provided that a Clergyman should never be idle. All, he had of old to attend, was the saving the souls of those committed to his care. He must now begin his work a great deal higher; he must first convince his flock that they have souls to be saved. And the spite of all is, that at the same time his kind Masters have doubled his task, they appear very well disposed to lessen his wages.

WE have observed, that the DENIAL of God's *moral attributes* is the great barrier against Religion in general: but it is more especially serviceable in his Lordship's idiosyncratic terrors; the terrors of a *future State*. To these we owe his famous book of FRAGMENTS, composed occasionally, and taken as an extemporaneous cordial, each stronger than the other, to support himself under his frequent paroxysms. For, set the *moral attributes* aside, and we can neither form any judgment of the *end* of man, nor of the nature of God's moral government. All our knowledge will be confined to our *present* state and condition [7]. It is by these Attributes, we learn,

[7] One of his Lordship's Corollaries therefore from the Proposition of *no moral attributes*, is this, " Our Knowledge  
that

that man was made for *happiness*; and that God's dispensation to us *here* is but *part* of our moral system: This naturally extends our views to, and terminates our knowledge in, *Futurity*.

The fate of all Religion therefore being included in the question of God's *moral attributes*, I hold it of much importance to prove against his Lordship, that MEN MAY ACQUIRE ADEQUATE IDEAS OF THEM in the same way, and with equal certainty, in which they acquire the knowledge of God's *natural attributes*. And the knowledge of *these*, his Lordship deduces from its original in the following words.

“ All our knowledge of God (says he) is derived  
 “ from his works. Every part of the immense Uni-  
 “ verse, and the order and harmony of the Whole,  
 “ are not only conformable to our ideas or notions  
 “ of WISDOM and POWER, but these ideas and no-  
 “ tions were impressed originally and principally by  
 “ them, on every attentive mind; and men were led  
 “ to conclude, with the utmost certainty, that a Being  
 “ of infinite *wisdom* and *power* made, preserved, and  
 “ governed the system. As far as we can discover,  
 “ we discern these in all his works; and where we  
 “ cannot discern them, it is manifestly due to our  
 “ imperfection, not to his. This now is real  
 “ knowledge, or there is no such thing as know-  
 “ ledge. We acquire it immediately in the objects  
 “ themselves, in God, and in Nature, the work of  
 “ God. We know what *wisdom* and *power* are: we  
 “ know both intuitively, and by the help of our  
 “ senses, that such as we conceive them to be, such  
 “ concerning God goes no further than for the necessary use  
 “ of human life.” Vol. iv. p. 486.

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“ they

“ they appear in the Work : and therefore we  
 “ know demonstratively that such they are in the  
 “ Worker [8].”

All this is mighty well : and on these very grounds  
 I undertake to prove that men may get as clear and  
 precise ideas of God's GOODNESS and JUSTICE.

But, to prevent, or, indeed, now things are gone  
 thus far, rather to *redress* all ambiguity in the terms,  
 and equivocation in the use of them ; it will be pro-  
 per to explain what true PHILOSOPHY means by  
 GOD'S WORKS, whether *physical* or *moral*.

Now, it means, if I am not mistaken, that CON-  
 STITUTION OF THINGS which God hath established,  
 and directed to a plain and obvious end : no regard  
 being had to those impediments or obstructions in it's  
 course, which the Author of nature hath permitted to  
 arise from any part of the *material*, or *intellectual*  
 Creation.

Thus, when we consider his *physical* works, in order  
 to make our estimate of his *wisdom* and *power*, we  
 conceive them as they are in themselves ; and in the  
 perfection of their constitution ; tho' the greater por-  
 tions of the *physical* system may, from the intractabi-  
 lity of Matter, be subject to some *inconsiderable irre-*  
*regularities* ; which, as the true PHILOSOPHER [9] ob-  
 serves, *will be apt to increase till this System wants a*  
*reformation* : and tho' the smaller Portions, such as the  
 bodies of animals, may, from various accidents in  
 their conception and birth, often want that convenient  
 formation and adaption of their parts, from the won-

[8] Vol. v. p. 524.

[9] Newton,



derful contrivance of which, in the various bodies of animals in general, arises so illustrious an evidence of the *wisdom* and *power* of the Workman.

Surely, then, common sense and all equitable measure require us to estimate God's *moral Works* upon the same standard : to consider what the *moral constitution is in itself* : and (when the question is of God's *goodness* and *justice*) to keep that view distinct : and not suffer it to be disturbed or broken by any interruptions occasioned by the perverse influence either of the passion or action of material or immaterial Beings. For, here, Both concur to violate the Constitution : In the *natural system*, man's *Free-will* has no place : in the *moral*, the abuse of *Free-will* occasions the greatest of it's disorders.

In prosecuting this question, therefore, As, in order to acquire and confirm our ideas of God's *wisdom* and *power*, we consider the *natural system* so far forth only as it's order and harmony is supported by the *general Laws* of matter and motion : so, in order to acquire and confirm our ideas of his *goodness* and *justice*, we should regard the *moral system* so far forth only as it's order and harmony is supported by that GENERAL LAW, which annexes *happiness* to *virtue*, and to *vice*, *misery*.

Thus much, and only thus much, is *God's work*, in either system : and it is from *God's work* we are to demonstrate his *Attributes*. The rest, (where disorders real or apparent obtrude themselves to obstruct our views in these discoveries) proceeds from *Matter* and the *human Mind*.

And it is not to be forgotten, that the conclusion we draw from hence, in support of our *adequate* ideas

of God's *moral* attributes, has the greater strength upon his Lordship's own principles; who holds, that this Constitution arises *solely from the WILL* of God: For then we are sure that the WILL, which annexes happiness to virtue, and misery to vice, must arise from God's *moral* rather than from his first *physical* nature.

Having premised thus much; no more, indeed, than necessary to obviate one continued SOPHISM, that runs thro' all his Lordship's reasonings, against the *moral attributes* (where, the course and operation of that *moral* Constitution, as it appears under the disturbances occasioned by man's *free-will*, is perpetually put for the *Constitution itself*) I now proceed to shew, from GOD'S WORKS, that we have as precise ideas of his GOODNESS and JUSTICE as of his *power* and *wisdom*.

His Lordship observes, that *from every part of the immense universe, and from the harmony of the whole, men are led to conclude, with the utmost certainty, that a Being of infinite wisdom and power made, preserved, and governed the system.* This, he observes in favour of the *natural* attributes. And what should hinder men from making the same observation in favour of the *moral*, viz. That the happiness and misery, by the very constitution of nature, attendant on Virtue and on Vice, lead men to conclude, with equal certainty, that a Being of infinite *goodness* and *justice* made, preserves, and governs the system?

The existence of this *moral Constitution* his Lordship acknowledges. Let us consider it, therefore, both as it respects BODIES of men, and INDIVIDUALS.

That *Communities* are always happy or miserable in proportion as their Manners are virtuous or vicious,  
his

His Lordship himself is the readiest to demonstrate. If such a Constitution of things does not bespeak the Author of it *good* and *just*, how is it possible to conclude any thing of the character of the Creator from his Works? His Lordship thinks, that from the marks of wisdom and power in the *physical system* we learn with the utmost certainty that God is *wise* and *powerful*; and he says, that we acquire this knowledge immediately, as it were, by our senses. Are there not the self-same marks of goodness and justice in this part at least of the *moral system* that respects Communities? And do not we come to know as immediately by our senses, and as certainly by our reason, that God is *good* and *just*?

If we consider the *moral Constitution*, as it respects *Particulars*, we see virtue and vice have the same influence on our happiness and misery. Here, indeed, we find more interruptions in the means to the end than in the other part. Our material and our intellectual Natures have here more power to disorder the harmony of the System. In *Communities*, it can rarely be disturbed, but by a Pestilence, or that other moral Plague, a Hero or a Conqueror: Amongst *Particulars*, indeed, physical evil and the abuse of free-will operate more strongly. But when once the demonstration of the *moral attributes* is clearly made from that part of the Constitution which regards *Communities*, it can never be shaken by the disorders in that, which regards *Particulars*. The established truth is now a Principle for further discoveries; and all we can fairly deduce from these disorders is the CERTAINTY of a *future State*. But this by the way.

What I insist upon at present is, that, to decide the question concerning God's *Attributes*, we are to consider the Constitution of things, as it is in itself, simply. This is, properly, *God's work*. The disorders in it, occasioned by the abuse of man's *free-will*, is not *his* work, but *man's*. This, his Lordship too, upon another occasion, namely, when he combats the argument of a *future state*, from an unequal Providence, is perpetually repeating. So that these disorders must, even on his Lordship's own principles, be excluded from the account, when we estimate God's Nature and *Attributes* from his *Works*.

“ But we see not those disorders in the *natural* world, which we both see and feel in the *moral*.” This would be some objection did God in the *moral*, as in the *natural* system, direct *immediately*, or constitute things *mechanically*; or had Free-will the same influence on the *natural* as on the *moral* system.—Did God direct in both Constitutions, *immediately* or *mechanically*; or did he direct immediately and mechanically in neither, and that yet the *moral* remained more subject to disorder than the *natural*, it might indeed follow that we had not so clear ideas of God's *goodness* and *justice* as of his *wisdom* and *power*: But since he has thought fit to leave man, FREE; and has been pleased to suffer the abuse of free-will to affect the *moral* system, and not the *natural*; as this, I say, is the case, the superiour irregularities in the *one* do not take off from the equal clearness of the demonstration, which results from the nature of *both* Constitutions. “ This difference (to speak in the words of a late writer) is not to be ascribed to a contrary conduct in the Governor of the two Systems, but to the contrary natures of the Subjects.”



jects. Passive matter being totally inert, it's resistance to the Laws impressed upon it, must be extremely weak : and consequently the disorders arising from that resistance proportionably flow and unheeded : while that active self-moving principle, the Mind, flies out at once from the centre of its direction, and can every moment deflect from the line of truth and reason. Hence moral disorders began early, became excessive, and have continued, through all ages, to disturb the harmony of the System [10]."

What is here said will, I suppose, be sufficient to confute the following assertions ; and to detect the mistake on which they arise.

" Every thing (says his Lordship) shews the wisdom and power of God conformably to our ideas of wisdom and power in the *physical* world and in the *moral*. But every thing does not shew in like manner the justice and goodness conformably to our ideas of these attributes in either. The *physical* attributes are in their nature more glaring and less equivocal [11]."

And again, " There is *no sufficient foundation* in the phænomena of nature to connect the moral attributes with the physical attributes of God. Nay, the phænomena are in several cases repugnant [12]."

But since he goes so far as to talk of the want of a foundation, and even a repugnancy ; Before I proceed with the main branch of my reasoning, I will just urge one single argument for the reality and full evi-

[10] *The principles of natural and revealed Religion, in a course of Sermons at Lincoln's-Inn.* Vol. i. p. 66.

[11] Vol. v. p. 524.

[12] Vol. v. p. 316.

dence of the *moral attributes*: and it shall be taken from himself, and shall conclude on his own principles.

He tells us, that such as he, “ who apply themselves to the *first Philosophy*, apply themselves to the noblest objects that can demand the attention of the mind — To the signification of GOD'S WILL, concerning the duties we owe to him, and to one another [13].”

And again, “ It is sufficient to establish our *moral obligations* that we consider them relatively to our own system. From thence they arise: and since they arise from thence, it must be the WILL of that Being who made the system, that we should observe and practise them [14].”

Let me ask then, How it is that we collect this WILL from the objects which his Lordship allows us to contemplate, namely, his WORKS *in this system*? He will say from certain *qualities* in those objects. — What are those qualities? He will reply, the *fitnesses* of means to ends. — Who was the Author of these fitnesses? He hath told us, the *God of nature* — It was God's *will* then, that we should use the *means*, in order to obtain the *ends*. Now, in the *moral System*, the means are virtuous practice; the end, happiness. Virtue therefore must needs be pleasing to him; and Vice, as it's contrary, displeasing. Well, but then, as to this *like* and *dislike*; it must be either capricious, or it must be regulated on the nature of things. *Wisdom*, which his Lordship condescends to give his Maker, will not allow us to suppose it capricious. It is regulated therefore on the nature of things. But if the nature of things be, as his Lordship holds it is, the constitution of God, and *depend on his will*, then he who is pleased with

[13] Vol. v. p. 447.

[14] Vol. v. p. 452.

virtue, and displeased with vice, must needs be himself *good* and *just*.

To proceed now with the principal branch of our reasoning. His Lordship goes on thus. *But men not only might collect God's natural attributes from the physical system, but in effect they did: and all men, at all times, had these notions so strongly impressed on them, that they were led to conclude with the utmost certainty for a Being of infinite power and wisdom.*

I desire to know in what time or place it ever happened, before his Lordship philosophised at *Battersea*, and could find no foundation, in the *phænomena* of nature, to connect the moral with the physical attributes of God, that a Man, who believed God's infinite wisdom and power, did not with equal confidence believe his infinite goodness and justice? In truth, these two sets of ideas, the *physical* and *moral* attributes of the Deity, were equally extensive, they were equally steady, and, till now, they were always inseparable.

He says, that *as far as we can discover, we discern infinite wisdom and power in all God's works: and where we cannot discern them, it is manifestly due to our imperfection, not to his.*

What his Lordship here says will deserve to be considered. A comparison is insinuated between our discovery of infinite power and wisdom from the *physical* works of God; and our discovery of infinite goodness and justice from his *moral* works; in which, the advantage is given to the former. Now, in order to come to a just decision in this point (omitting at present the notice of his general Sophism which operates in this observation, as in the rest) we must

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distinguish between the *means of acquiring* the know-  
ledge of God's Attributes, and that *knowledge when*  
*acquired.*

As to the first, (the *means of acquiring,*) there seems to be some advantage on the side of God's PHYSICAL works. For, as his Lordship rightly observes, *where we cannot discern wisdom and power in the physical works it is due to our imperfection, not to his: for as men advance in the knowledge of nature we see more and more of wisdom and power.* And he insinuates, we cannot say the same concerning the difficulties in the *moral* system. It is true, we cannot. But then let us tell him, neither can we say the contrary. The reason is, The physical system lies open to our enquiries; and by the right application of our senses to well tried experiments, we are able to make considerable advances in the knowledge of Nature. It is not so in the *moral* system; all we know here are a few general principles concerning its Constitution; and further than this, human wit or industry is unable to penetrate. These general principles are, indeed, amply sufficient to deduce and establish the *moral attributes* from the *moral system*; but not sufficient to remove all difficulties that arise from what we see of the actual administration of that system. So that, tho' we cannot say, that *as we advance in the knowledge of the moral system we see more and more of goodness and justice*; So neither can his Lordship say (tho' his words seem to insinuate he could) that as we advance, we see *less and less*. Whereas the truth is, beyond those general principles, we cannot advance at all.

But



But then, as to the second part in the distinction, (the *knowledge of the attributes, when acquired.*) I hold the advantage, and a great one it is; lies altogether on the side of the MORAL. And this, I cannot better explain to you than in the words of the writer, quoted just before: “ Tho’ the idea (says  
 “ this Divine) of God’s *natural* attributes be as clear  
 “ in the abstract, as that of his *moral*, yet the idea  
 “ of his moral attributes is, in the concrete, more  
 “ adequate than that of his natural. The reason  
 “ seems convincing. The moral relation in which  
 “ we stand to God, as free agents, is just the same  
 “ whether man exists alone, or whether he be but a  
 “ link in the chain of innumerable orders of intelli-  
 “ gences surrounding the whole Creation. Hence  
 “ we must needs have a full knowledge of our duty  
 “ to him, and of his disposition towards us: on  
 “ which knowledge is founded the exactness of our  
 “ conceptions of his moral attributes, his *justice* and  
 “ *goodness*. But the natural relation in which we, or  
 “ any of God’s creatures, stand towards him, as  
 “ material Beings, is not the same when considered  
 “ simply, as when a portion of a dependent and  
 “ connected whole. Because whenever such a whole  
 “ exists, the harmony and perfection of it must first  
 “ of all be consulted. This harmony ariseth from  
 “ the mutual subserviency and union of its parts.  
 “ But this subserviency may require a ministra-  
 “ tion of government, with regard to certain por-  
 “ tions of matter thus allied, different from what  
 “ might have followed had those portions stood  
 “ alone, because that precise disposition, which might  
 “ be fit in one case might be unfit in the other.

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“ Hence we, who know there is a Whole, of which  
 “ our material system is a Part ; and yet are totally  
 “ ignorant both of it's nature and extent, can have  
 “ but a very confused idea of that physical relation  
 “ in which we stand towards God : so that our con-  
 “ ceptions of his *natural* attributes, his *power* and  
 “ *wisdom*, which are founded on that idea, must in  
 “ the concrete be proportionably vague and inade-  
 “ quate [15].”

But you will ask, perhaps, whence arises this reciprocal advantage which the *moral* and the *natural* attributes have over one another, in the *means of acquiring* the knowledge of them, and the precision of *that knowledge when acquired* ? I will tell you in two words. Of *our own physical* system, we know many particulars, (that is, we discover much of the *means*, but nothing of the *end*) and of the *universal* physical system we are entirely ignorant. On the other hand, we know but few particulars of *our own moral* system, (that is, we discover only the *end*, and not the *means*) and of the *universal* moral system we understand the general principles.

His Lordship proceeds. *This now* [the knowledge of God's *natural* attributes] *is real knowledge ; or there is no such thing as knowledge. We acquire it immediately in the objects themselves, IN GOD, and in nature the work of God.*

What his Lordship means by, *in God*, in distinction from the *work of God*, I confess I do not understand : Perhaps it may be intended to insinuate, in honour of the *natural attributes*, that they may be even proved

[15] *The principles of natural and revealed Religion, in a course of Sermons at Lincoln's Inn, Vol. i. p. 58, & seq.*

*a priori* :

*a priori* ; for this is not the first time by many, when after having heartily abused a person or thing, he has been reduced to support himself on the authority, or the reasoning they afford him. Or perhaps, it was only used to round the period, and set off his eloquence. However, I agree with him, that this is *real knowledge*. And so too, I think, is the knowledge of the *moral* attributes, so gained. Why truly, says his Lordship, *I do allow just so much goodness and justice in God as we see in that CONSTITUTION, which annexes happiness to virtue and misery to vice. But this,* says he, *I think, had better be called WISDOM.* I think so too ; if by *so much*, he means no more than what concerns God's *natural government* : and that he means no more is plain from his making the *natural* consequence of vice and virtue the only sanction of the moral Law. But I will venture to go further, and say, that, from what we see in this *Constitution*, we may collect PERFECT goodness and justice. Matter and man's *Free-will* disturb the System : But if the *Constitution* be the effect of God's *Will*, as his Lordship holds it is ; and the mark of his *Wisdom*, as all mankind hold with him ; Does not that *Wisdom* require that his *Will* should not be defeated ? Would it not be defeated, if the disorders occasioned by the perversity of his Creatures were not remedied and set right ? And is not A REMEDY the clearest mark of PERFECT *goodness and justice* ?

Take it in another light. Free-will crosses the *Constitution*, which God, by establishing, shews he intended should take place. This *present* disturbance could not have been prevented, because, according to my Lord and his Poet, it was necessary to the schemes

86      A VIEW OF LORD BOLINGBROKE'S  
schemes of divine wisdom, that there should be such  
a creature as MAN :

“ For in the scale of reasoning life, 'tis plain  
“ There must be, somewhere, such a rank as man.”

The consequence is, that the disorder will be *hereafter*  
rectified.

Had Man indeed been made *unnecessarily* ; and this  
Man had broke in upon God's general System, his  
Lordship might have had some pretence to say, as he  
does, that GOD MEANT THE SYSTEM SHOULD NOT  
BE FURTHER PURSUED ; that is, that the scheme  
which annexes happiness to virtue and misery to  
vice, should remain in it's present condition of an  
incomplete dispensation, to all eternity. But since  
Man is acknowledged to be a *necessary* part of a  
general System, complete in all it's members, it is  
nonsense to talk of God's *not meaning the particular*  
*System should be further pursued*, when that *further*  
*pursuit* is only to bring it to it's natural period ; short  
of which, it would remain unfinished nay, un-  
formed.

He goes on. *We know what WISDOM and POWER*  
*are. We know both intuitively, and by the help of our*  
*senses, that such as we conceive them to be, such they*  
*appear in the WORK ; and therefore we know demonstra-*  
*tively that such they are in the WORKER.*

And do we not know what GOODNESS and JUSTICE  
are ? Do we not *intuitively*, and by the *help of our*  
*senses know*, that such as we conceive them to be, such  
they appear in the WORK, namely, in that *constitu-*  
*tion of things*, which, his Lordship tells us, annexes  
happiness to virtue, and misery to vice ? And may  
- we



we not *demonstratively* collect from thence that such they are in the WORKER ? since this Constitution, his Lordship tells us again, is the effect of God's WILL. On his own principles, therefore, applied to his own state of the reasoning *a posteriori*, it appears, that God is of *infinite goodness and justice*, as well as of *infinite wisdom and power*.

But to give AUTHORITY to his partial reasoning, (the usual support of all partialities,) He, in one place, puts it into the mouth of *Anaxagoras*. “Should you  
 “ask *Anaxagoras* (says he) what *goodness* is, or *jus-*  
 “*tice* ? He might bid you, perhaps, turn your eyes  
 “inward, first ; then, survey mankind ; observe the  
 “wants of individuals, the benefits of society, and,  
 “from these particulars, frame the general notions  
 “of *goodness* and *justice*. He might go a step fur-  
 “ther : and add, this is *human* goodness and *human*  
 “justice, such as we can comprehend, such as we  
 “can exercise, and such as the supreme mind has  
 “made it both our duty and interest to exercise, by  
 “the constitution of the human system, and by the  
 “relations which arise in it : from all which our no-  
 “tions of *goodness* and *justice* result, and are com-  
 “pounded.”

*We know* then, what *goodness* and *justice* are, as well as what *wisdom* and *power* are ; *we know both intuitively and by the help of our senses, that such as we conceive them to be, such they appear in the work*. For he bids us *turn our eyes inward* ; then *survey mankind* ; and lastly, observe how *reason*, from the *constitution of human nature*, confirms our *intuitive knowledge*, and that which we gain by the *help of our senses*. But what does all this signify, if *Anaxa-*  
*goras*

goras or his Lordship be in an humour of concluding against their own premisses? Hear then how the speech ends. —“Of *divine goodness* and *divine justice* might this Philosopher conclude, I AM UNABLE TO FRAME ANY ADEQUATE NOTIONS [17]. What? Unable to *frame* those notions which God, by his *moral* Constitution, has put into our hands; and by the declaration of his WILL has taught us to *apply*? —This old *Philosopher*, I suppose, was not brought in to be laughed at, like his drunken Church-HELOTES [18]; yet he plays the fool to admiration. —We DO KNOW, says Anaxagoras, *what Goodness and Justice are: we know both intuitively, and by the help of our senses, that such as we conceive them to be, such they appear in the WORK; and THEREFORE we DO NOT KNOW that such they are in the WORKER.*

Might I be permitted to address myself to this Renegado Sophist, I would say, —Your brethren, the antient Philosophers, reasoned *a posteriori* in this manner, “Can you think there is *wisdom* and *power* in you, and none in your Maker?” —By no means. They reasoned well. —Let me ask you then, is there *goodness* and *justice* in you, and none in your Maker?” His answer, I suppose, would be the same. But, prompted by his Lordship, into whose service he is now entered, he perhaps might add, That, from *human goodness* and *justice* we cannot come to the NATURE of the *divine*. What hinders us, I pray you? Is it not from our *intuitive conception* of our own *wisdom* and *power* that we gain an adequate idea of

[17] Vol. iv. p. 116, 17.

[18] Vol. v. p. 446.

God's? Are *wisdom* and *power* MORE PERFECT, as they are found in man, than *goodness* and *justice*? If therefore the IMPERFECTION of these attributes in Man hinder our acquiring an adequate idea of those in God, we can have no adequate idea of his *wisdom* and *power*: If the IMPERFECTION does not hinder, then we may have an adequate idea of his *goodness* and *justice*.

But, the inference to God's *power* and *wisdom*, his Lordship says, is supported by what men see of the effects of them, in his Works; the order and harmony of the physical System. Do we not see likewise the effects of God's *goodness* and *justice*, in the order and harmony of the *moral*, in the happiness that naturally attends virtue and the misery consequent on vice? And is not the *moral* System as much God's *Work*, as the *physical*?

Thus, Sir, you see, that by the *very reasoning*, his Lordship EMPLOYS to prove the *natural* attributes, and by the *very method* he PRESCRIBES to us for proving the *moral*, we have demonstrated *these* with a precision and a certainty, at least equal to the *other*. His Lordship seems to have been aware of the event; and therefore when he had set us at defiance, he tried to put the change upon us, under pretence of reminding us, that the *moral attributes* should be examined by, or *applied to*, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD AND THE STATE OF MANKIND IN IT [18]. I had full as much reason to be aware of his Lordship. And therefore, in stating the question, at my entrance on the subject, I obviated this miserable Sophism. I call it by no better name, because it is not *the constitution of the world or the state of mankind*:

[18] Vol. v. p. 331.

*in.*

*in it*, but the CONSTITUTION OF THE MORAL SYSTEM, or the nature of Virtue and Vice, as they essentially operate to produce happiness and misery, by which God's *moral attributes* are to be tried and ascertained. But this, which is a steady, uniform view, he would have us turn from; to contemplate that obscure, disturbed, and shifting Scene, the actual state of vice and virtue, of misery and happiness; amongst men. That is, he would have us conclude concerning God's nature, not from his VOLUNTARY CONSTITUTION of things, but from the BREACHES in that constitution made by the abuse of man's free-will: which yet, (when he is arguing *for an equal providence*) he again and again confesses ought not to be charged upon God; and declaims violently against the folly of those who impute the effects of that abuse to him. Tho' here, (in his various attempts to blot out *the idea of God's moral attributes*) he be full of the disorders of the moral System considered as part of God's design.

But since I have mentioned his arguments for an equal providence, I should be unjust to You, who expect a fair *view* of his Lordship's Philosophy from me, if I concealed another of his contradictions.—He had both Man's *future State* and God's *moral attributes* to throw out of the religious world; or, to speak more properly, he had RELIGION to overturn, by taking away it's very ESSENCE: and as the *irregularities* in the present administration of Providence stood in the way of his first attempt; and the *consistency* of the moral System, in the way of the other; when he argues against a future State, You would think there were no *irregularities*; and when he argues



gues against the moral attributes, You would think there was no *consistency*.

We now come to his Lordship's particular objections against the *moral attributes*. One of them is that they are BOUNDED.

“ They [the Divine:] go further. As God is  
 “ perfect and man very imperfect, they talk of his  
 “ *infinite goodness* and *justice*, as of his infinite wisdom  
 “ and power ; tho' the latter may preserve their nature  
 “ without any conceivable bounds, and the former  
 “ must cease to be what they are, unless we conceive  
 “ them BOUNDED. Their nature implies necessarily  
 “ a limitation in the exercise of them. Thus then  
 “ the *moral attributes*, according to this Theology,  
 “ requires infinitely more of God to man than men  
 “ are able, or would be obliged if they were able,  
 “ to exercise to one another : greater profusion in  
 “ bestowing benefits and rewards, greater vigour in  
 “ punishing offences [19].”

You have here his Lordship's own words ; and nothing less could induce any one to think so disadvantageously of this Righter of wrongs and Redresser of grievances, as they necessarily imply. Let us consider the *premisses* and examine the *inferences* both *implied* and *expressed*.

He says, 1. That the *moral attributes* are bounded ; 2. That the *natural* are not bounded. Let us see to what the first proposition amounts ; and how much truth there is in the second.

1. The *moral attributes* are considered by us as relative to *intelligent* creatures : The *natural* are not

so considered. Thus the goodness and justice, when relative to man, are greatly *bounded*; a certain low degree of reward suffices for his *good*; a certain low degree of punishment for his *evil* actions. Let God's goodness and justice respect a higher rank of intelligent Beings, and they will be then *less bounded*; for greater rewards and punishments will be required: and so on, to the highest rank of intelligent creatures. Yet as the highest is at infinite distance from the Creator, the exercise of the moral attributes, as they bear relation to his intelligent creatures, must be still *bounded*.

2. His second proposition is, that *the natural attributes are not bounded*. It is true, these cannot be considered as relative to God's *intelligent* creatures; yet since, in their exercise, they must be considered as relative to his Creation at large; and since Creation, however immense, is not infinite, the natural attributes so considered are not infinite: but if not infinite, they are *bounded*. There is no difference therefore, in *the exercise* of God's attributes, between the *moral* and the *natural*, save only in the degree.

But if we consider God's *moral* and *natural* attributes more abstractedly, not as they are *in the exercise*, and relative to intelligent Beings, and to actual Creation, but as they are in his nature, then they are both *unbounded*. Thus we see his Lordship's notable distinction is both imaginary and useless.

However, let us give him all he asks; and then see what he will be able to *infer* from it.

1. His first inference seems to be this: As the *moral* attributes are bounded, and not infinite like the *natural*, our idea of them must be obscure and inadequate.

What!

What! because they are better adapted, as things *bounded* certainly are than things *infinite*, to human contemplation? Our idea of such of God's attributes as bear relation to a Being, whose nature and properties we know, namely MAN, must needs be more adequate and better defined than the idea of such attributes as bear relation to Beings, whose nature and properties we know not, namely the UNIVERSE.

2. His other *inference*, is expressed in these words: *Thus then the moral attributes, according to this Theology, requires infinitely more of God to man than men are able, or would be obliged if they were able, to exercise to one another.* To say, the moral attributes, according to Christian Theology, or, as he is pleased to call it, *artificial Theology*, requires INFINITELY more, is a wretched calumny. To say, it *requires more*, is true. And for this plain reason: the relation between Creator and Creature is very different from that, between Fellow-creatures; therefore the *goodness* is more abundant: The relation between Lord and Servant is very different from that between Fellow-servants; therefore the *justice* is more severe. And if it would not be deemed too IMPUDENT to refer his Lordship to Scripture, for instruction (especially in a matter where the abuse of Scripture was chiefly intended) he might there have found a *Parable* which would have set him right: and has always kept *artificial Theology*, whatever he might think, from going wrong. But *infinite*, when applied to the *exercise* of a moral attribute in reference to man, is his Lordship's nonsense, with due reverence be it spoken, not the *nonsense of artificial Divines*. They were not ignorant that the rule, *infr-*

*miorem*

*miorem vel deteriorem partem sequitur consequentia*, held as well in *Morals* as in *Logic*. Tho' God be infinite, man is finite ; and therefore, with respect to him, the exertion of a *moral* attribute is finite, not infinite. His Lordship himself saw something of this, as appears by his own words. *The nature of the moral attributes implies necessarily a limitation in the use of them*. And why would he suppose Divines could not see as far into this matter as himself ?

But if there be an error in *artificial Theology* he is as sure, at one time or other, to espouse it ; as he is, at all times ready to calumniate the Divine who holds it. Men, in their ill advised zeal to defend the Scripture-doctrine of the Son's divinity, were not always sufficiently careful in selecting their arguments. Amongst such as had perhaps been better let alone, they employed this ; That as man's offence was against an infinite Being, it required an infinite satisfaction ; which none but such a Being could give. Now his Lordship, we see, espouses this very principle, to discredit God's moral attributes, and the *artificial Theology* of Jesus Christ ; which speaks, indeed, of infinite rewards ; but not as matter of *due*, but of *grace*.

As the being *bounded* is one of his Lordship's objections against the *moral attributes*, so the being merely HUMAN, is another.

“ After Dr. CLARKE (says he) has repeated over  
 “ and over that all the *moral attributes* are the same  
 “ in God as in our ideas ; and that he who denies  
 “ them to be so may as well deny the divine *physical*  
 “ *attributes*, the Doctor insists only on two of the  
 “ former, on those of *justice* and *goodness*. He was  
 “ much in the right to contract the generality of his  
 “ after-



“ assertion. The absurdity of ascribing TEMPER-  
 “ RANCE, for instance, or FORTITUDE, to God,  
 “ would have been too gross, and too visible even to  
 “ eyes that prejudice had blinded the most. But  
 “ that, of ascribing *justice* and *goodness* to him, ac-  
 “ cording to our notions of them, might be better  
 “ covered, and was enough for his purpose, tho’  
 “ NOT LESS REALLY ABSURD [20].”

Which shall we most admire: His *Knowledge* or  
 his *Ingenuity*? Or shall we follow the advise of his  
 Motto, and *Wonder at nothing* [1].

When men contemplate what they call moral vir-  
 tue, or the attributes of Humanity, they divide them  
 into two classes, perfectly distinct from one another.  
 In the first are comprized those which belong to man  
 under the idea of a free intelligent Being, such as  
*goodness* and *justice*: in the second, those which be-  
 long to him under the idea of a creature of his own  
 imperfect species, such as *temperance* and *fortitude*.  
 The first belong to all free intelligent Beings; the  
 latter, only to such a Being as man: *Those* arise out  
 of the nature of free intelligence, and so are com-  
 mon to all: *These*, from the imperfections of a very  
 inferior creature, and so are peculiar to Humanity;  
 for we easily conceive a higher Order of free in-  
 telligences, in which the moral virtues of the second  
 class have no place. They are superior to the im-  
 pressions of fear, and so have no occasion to exert  
*fortitude*: They are removed from the temptation of  
 excess, and so have no room for the exercise of  
*temperance*. Now when CLARKE, or any other Di-

[20] Vol. v. p. 311.

[1] *Nil admirari*.

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[1] *Nil admirari*.

vine, had said, that *the moral attributes are the same in God as in our ideas*, What attributes could they possibly mean but those of the *first class*; those which belong to Beings under the idea of free intelligences? STUPID as his Lordship is pleased to make Divines, they could never *blunder* at such a rate as to conceive, that those virtues or *moral attributes*, which proceed from the *imperfection* of the Creature, might belong in any manner to the Creator, whom they supposed to be *all perfect*. They held, with his Lordship, and they will hold without him, that the great God is *infinitely* wise and powerful. Were they then in any danger to give him *temperance*, which implied his being obnoxious to *folly*; or *fortitude*, which argued *impotence*? Infinite wisdom, therefore, and infinite power, exclude from God the very ideas of *temperance* and *fortitude*. But do infinite wisdom and infinite power exclude from God the ideas of *goodness* and *justice*? On the contrary, his Lordship, as we shall see presently, is reduced to the poor shift of owning *goodness* and *justice* to be contained in infinite *wisdom* and *power*.

At present I leave His Lordship's Admirers to their own meditations on their Master's IPSE DIXIT, *That the inscribing goodness and justice to God is NO LESS REALLY ABSURD than the ascribing temperance and fortitude to him?*

—But CLARKE contracted the generality of the assertion to serve a purpose. I think he did: and for one of the best purposes in the world, that of COMMON SENSE? Had his Lordship been pleased to contract himself on the same principle, he had passed,  
per.



perhaps, for a greater Philosopher; tho' he had certainly been a less Writer.

But then, if you ask, *What purpose* his Lordship had *to serve*, when he used the equivocal word ALL, (which may signify either *all* of one kind, or *all* of every kind) where he observes, Clarke holds, *that ALL the moral attributes are the same in God, &c?* I answer, it was to give himself the poor pretence to say, that Clarke afterwards *contracted his generality*, or, in other words, contradicted himself.

A third objection against the *moral attributes* is, "That PASSIONS and AFFECTIONS mix with our goodness and justice; which therefore cannot be supposed to be *the same in kind* with God's; tho' our wisdom and power, with which no passions or affections mix, must be the *same in kind* with his."

Were passion and affection *inseparable* from human goodness and justice, the objection might seem to have some force; indeed, not much even then. But how miserable must the objection appear to those who see, as all men may, that they are *separable*? Separable, I mean, in practice as well as speculation. The true idea of human goodness and justice excludes all passion and affection. What hinders then our rising, from that idea, to divine goodness and justice, any more than our rising, from the idea of human wisdom and power, to the divine wisdom and power; and from perceiving, that as well the *moral*, as the *natural* attributes, are the same in kind, both in God and man?

But, this is not all that may be said in favour of our adequate idea of God's *moral attributes*, when compared with the *natural*. For tho' passion mixes not with the human attributes of wisdom and power,

yet something else does, much more difficult to be separated than PASSION, from the human attributes of goodness and justice, I mean the INSTRUMENTALITY OF MATTER. We can conceive nothing of human POWER without the use of such an instrument: yet this, by his Lordship's own confession, does not hinder us from rising from the idea of our own wisdom and power, to the wisdom and power of God; and from seeing that they are the same in kind. Why then should the other foreign combination hinder us from seeing that goodness and justice are the same in kind?

Still, further. The MANNER of *knowing* in God, on which depends his natural attribute of wisdom, is confessedly different from what it is in man; and, at the same time, is a thing of which we have no conception: yet this, according to his Lordship's account, does not hinder our attaining to an adequate idea of *divine wisdom*, tho' it rises from what we see of the *human*.

How happens it then, that, in both these cases, notwithstanding the foreign mixture of the *instrumentality of matter*, and the *manner of knowing*, we attain an adequate idea of God's wisdom and power? His Lordship will tell you, it is by separating what is foreign, from what is native to the ideas of wisdom and power. And shall not I have as much credit with You, when I tell you we acquire an adequate idea of God's goodness and justice, by separating from the idea of human goodness and justice the foreign mixture of *passion* and *affection*?

But his Lordship has a greater quarrel than all this, with the *moral attributes*. They give rise to embarrassed questions, dishonourable to God, and mischievous to Religion.

“ As

“ As they [the Divines] modeled God’s govern-  
 “ ment on a human plan, so they conceived his per-  
 “ fections, *moral* as well as *physical*, by human ideas.  
 “ — Thus God was said to be the FIRST GOOD :  
 “ but then the general notion or abstract idea of this  
 “ *good* was not only taken from human goodness,  
 “ but was considered too with little or no other re-  
 “ lation than to man — A question arose therefore  
 “ on these hypotheses, *How could evil come into a sy-*  
 “ *stem of which God was the author ?* — this question  
 “ made a further hypothesis necessary ; another first  
 “ God, another coeternal and coequal principle was  
 “ introduced to solve it ; *a first cause of all evil*, as  
 “ the other was *of all good* [3].”

The false representation of this fact I reserve for another occasion : the false inference from it is what I now propose to consider.

His Lordship supposes, that the notion of God’s *moral attributes* gave birth to an insoluble question concerning *the origin of evil* ; and that this occasioned the invention of the mischievous hypothesis of the *two Principles*. Who would have suspected all this evil to arise from the FIRST GOOD ! Yet so it was : And therefore the notion of such a GOOD must be *false* ; or at least, very *hurtful*.

1. As to the first, if his Lordship’s inference be right, it will unsettle all useful knowledge ; because there is no great principle, either in *physics*, or in *natural Theology*, but which, if we be not on our guard, and wise enough to stop at the extent of our ideas, will lead us into inextricable embarrass : As one might instance in a point that arises out of both these sciences, — *The agreement between free-will and prescience*.

[3] Vol. iv. p. 88.

This is a well-known case : And as one of the principal designs of this VIEW is to illustrate his Lordship's great talents, I chose it before any other, because he pretends to untie this knot, which hath so long kept the learned world intangled. " Our ideas (says he) of divine intelligence and wisdom may be neither *fantastical* nor *false*, and yet God's MANNER of knowing may be so different from ours, that fore-knowledge, as we call it *improperly in him*, may be consistent with the contingency of events ; altho' that which we call *properly* fore-knowledge *in ourselves*, be not so [4]."

I have two or three remarks to make on these words.

Our ideas of God's *moral* attributes, his goodness and justice, he makes *fantastical* and *false*, on account of difficulties arising from them : yet God's *natural* attributes, his intelligence and wisdom, *may*, he says, *be neither fantastical nor false*, tho' a difficulty as great arises from them ; namely, the apparent discordancy between free-will and prescience.

My second remark is, that his solution is more *fantastic* and *false* than the wildest chimera of School-metaphysics. The difficulty in reconciling God's prescience to man's free-will does not arise from our ignorance in God's MANNER OF KNOWING, but from God's ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE.

My third remark is, that his Lordship, who is here so penetrating, that he can easily reconcile *prescience* and *free-will*, is yet, in another place, so cloudy, that he cannot see how an *equal providence* and *free agency* may stand together [5]."

[4] Vol. v. p. 525.

[5] See Letter iv.



My last remark is (and it rises out of the foregoing) that where Religion is not concerned, his Lordship sees no difficulties in any part of the system of Creation : But as soon as ever Religion appears, then difficulties start up by dozens.

Of this, take an instance from the case in hand. Our ideas of God's *moral attributes*, he says, must needs be false, because the conceiving of them by human goodness and justice leads to the question of the *origin of evil*, considered *morally*. Well. And does not the conceiving of God's *physical attributes*, by human wisdom and power lead to the question of the *origin of evil*, considered *naturally* ? Yet our ideas of the physical attributes are neither *false nor fantastical*. But to this, his Lordship replies, Evil, considered *naturally*, is not real, but apparent only. Why so ? Because it contributes to the greater good of the whole. May not the same thing be said of Evil, considered *morally* ? Nay, hath it not been actually said, and proved too, on the same principles ? It follows then, that they are either both *real*, or both *fantastic*.

In a word, the truth is no more than this, Presumptuous man knows not where to stop. He would penetrate even to the Arcana of the Godhead.

“ For Fools rush in, where Angels fear to tread.”

And this impious humour it was which gave birth to the absurd hypothesis of TWO PRINCIPLES. But is the folly to be charged upon our idea of the *moral attributes* ? Ridiculous ! We see it's cause is in vanity and self-conceit ; passions that operate alike on all principles.

2. As to his Lordship's second inference, that *this* idea is at least productive of much *mischief*, and therefore it would be better to have none at all; Let me observe, that the idea of God's very existence is productive of mischief, even all the mischiefs of Superstition. Is it therefore better to be without a God? Who, besides his Lordship, would say so [6]? Why then should we think it better to be without the idea of the *moral attributes*, even tho' the evils it produced were *necessary*? But that is not the case. They are *casual* only: the issue of pride and presumption; which this idea does not at all influence.

3. HOWEVER, these *moral attributes*, if not hurtful, are USELESS; and this is his next cavil. "Infinite *wisdom* and *power* (says his Lordship) have made things as they are: how *goodness* and *justice* required they should be made is neither *coram judice*, nor to any rational purpose to enquire [7]." To inquire how the *universe of things should be made*, serves indeed to *no reasonable purpose*. But to inquire concerning our own state and condition in this Universe, is either *coram judice*, or we were sent into the world to stare about us, and pass judgment upon nothing. His Lordship's sophistry seems to confound two things that common sense has always distinguished; *our own business from other men's*. When the King holds a bed of justice, 'tis not for every Particular to inquire into all his measures: But every Particular who is summoned to attend the Court, is much

[6] He indeed says, *he had rather be an Atheist than acknowledge the Christian Theology*, and we may believe him. See Vol. iv. p. 34.

[7] Vol. v. p. 363.

concerned to know how he himself shall be dealt with. His Lordship, indeed, is ready to say, We are not summoned; that is, we are not *accountable creatures*. But this is begging the question.

Again, to *inquire*, much more to prescribe *how things should be made*, in any particular system, has all the folly, presumption, and impiety, which his Lordship charges upon it: Because the Parts having a relation to the Whole, an all-wise Architect makes them in conformity to that Whole, of which, we know nothing; and therefore our only conclusion should be, that the Part we do know, is constituted for the best. But it is another thing to say (which is all that Divines have said, how differently soever his Lordship is pleased to represent the matter) that God will act equitably with his rational Creation, by distributing good and evil to them according to their deserts; because this does not depend upon any Whole, of which we know nothing, but on his attributes of goodness and justice, of which, we know enough to determine with certainty concerning his final dealing with men. To pass our judgment here is so far from folly or impiety, that not to do it would be stupidity or hypocrisy. To call this proceeding, as his Lordship does, the patching or botching up one System with another, is a gross misrepresentation. It is fairly taking in the *Whole*, to determine concerning the destination of the *Parts*.

AT LENGTH, he ends just where he set out, That we have NO IDEAS of the moral attributes at all. " Upon  
 " the whole matter (says he) we may conclude safely  
 " from error, and in direct opposition to CLARKE,  
 " that *goodness and justice in God cannot be conceived,*

“ without manifest presumption and impiety, to be the same  
 “ as in the ideas we frame of these perfections when we  
 “ consider them in men, or when we reason about them  
 “ abstractedly in themselves; but that in the supreme  
 “ Governor of the World they are something TRAN-  
 “ SCENDENT, and of which we cannot make any  
 “ true judgment, nor argue with any certainty about  
 “ them [8].” And in this, his Lordship tells us he  
 is justified by the authority of St. PAUL and Dr.  
 BARROW. *These two great Divines* (says he) *are on*  
*my side* [9]. Who would have thought of two such  
 honourable Supporters for his Lordship's Atchieve-  
 ments? One thing I have observed, which may be  
 worth reflecting on? A strange propensity in Free-  
 thinkers to mistake their enemies for their friends;  
 and as strange a propensity in the Clergy to mistake  
 their friends for their enemies. The turn is odd e-  
 nough on both sides; and, at first view, seems a little  
 mysterious; when, perhaps, there may be no more in  
 it than this,—Free-thinkers have invented this trick,  
 to amuse the Clergy, in order to kindle their su-  
 spicions, and inflame their jealousy against their best  
 friends: And, unhappily, the Clergy have, now and  
 then, fallen into the snare.

But, after what has passed, who would expect that  
*the leather-dressing Pontiff* of all men should have been  
 thought worthy to support the *first Philosophy*! What  
 has St. PAUL done at last to deserve this honour?  
 Why, in answer to the objections against God's dis-  
 pensations in the religious World, the Apostle refers  
 us, “ for entire satisfaction, to the incomprehensible

[8] Vol. v. p. 359.

[9] Vol. v. p. 362.

“ wisdom



“ wisdom of God, who frequently in the course of his  
 “ providence ordereth things in methods transcend-  
 “ ing our abilities to discover or trace [10].” This  
 solution, which is here extolled for it’s great *modesty*,  
 is referred to, in another place, for it’s greater IMPU-  
 DENCE [11]. It may be either, just as his Lordship  
 is in humour; who, notwithstanding his long study  
 of LOCKE, seems totally to have lost all ideas of *moral*  
*modes*. How else was it possible, after having treated the  
 whole body of Mankind in the manner he has done, he  
 should gravely tell his Friend, “ That few men, he be-  
 “ lieves, have CONSULTED others both *living* and the  
 “ *dead*, with LESS PRESUMPTION, and in a GREAT-  
 “ ER SPIRIT OF DOCILITY, than he has done [12].”  
 I sometimes thought a word was wrong printed; and  
 that for *consulted*, we should read, *insulted*; for in a  
 great man, there is no *presumption*, whatever meanness  
 there may be, in *insulting* his inferiors. And as for  
 his *docility*, that will hardly be disputed, it being cer-  
 tain that from the Author, whom he has *insulted* most,  
 he has condescended to steal more.

But St. PAUL says, *we must have recourse to the in-  
 comprehensible wisdom of God*. In good time. But  
 how does this prove that, in Paul’s opinion, we have  
 no adequate idea of the *moral attributes*? Unless the  
*quality* of an Agent, and his *action*, be one and the  
 same thing. You, Sir, have an *adequate* conception,  
 I am sure, of our gracious Monarch’s *goodness* and  
*justice*; but you have a very imperfect comprehension  
 of several of his State-measures. I frequently at-

[10] Vol. v. p. 360.

[11] Vol. iii. p. 307.

[12] *Introductory Letter to Mr. Pope*, Vol. iii. p. 320.

tempted to illustrate my reasoning on divine matters from examples in human Rulers. This is a ticklish point. And therefore I have been very careful that those *regal* acts by which I would illustrate the *divine*, be not such as proceed from the weakness and imperfections of humanity. If they be, the instance is impertinent, and serves for nothing but to mislead us. This was the more carefully to be observed, because Writers have carried these illustrations into much abuse. And no body more than this Noble Lord, so famous as he is likely to become with Posterity, for every species of false reasoning.

Dr. BARROW, I presume, will stand his Lordship in no better stead than St. Paul. “ As the dealings  
 “ of every wise man (says the Doctor) are sometimes  
 “ founded upon maxims, and admit justifications not  
 “ obvious or penetrable by vulgar conceit, so may  
 “ God act according to rules of wisdom and justice,  
 “ which it may be quite impossible by our faculties  
 “ to apprehend, or with our means to descry. As  
 “ there are natural modes of Being and operation, so  
 “ there may be prudential and moral modes of pro-  
 “ ceeding, far above our reach, peculiar objects of  
 “ divine wisdom not to be understood by any crea-  
 “ ture, especially by creatures who stand in the low-  
 “ est form of intelligence; one remove from beasts.  
 “ In fine, those rules of equity and experience which  
 “ we in our transactions with one another do use, if  
 “ they be applied to the dealings of God will be  
 “ found very incongruous or deficient, the case be-  
 “ ing vastly altered from that infinite distance in na-  
 “ ture and state between God and us, and from the  
 “ immense difference which his relations towards us  
 “ have

“ have from our relations to one another [13].” What now has all this, (which relates only to the *incomprehensible nature of God's providence*) to do with our *inadequate ideas of his moral attributes*? At least, if his Lordship will contend, that the man who thinks God's providence *incomprehensible*, must needs think our ideas of his moral attributes *inadequate*; he must go a step further; and confess, that Barrow supposed our ideas of the *natural* attributes to be *inadequate* likewise; for he puts both on the same footing. *As there are NATURAL modes of Being and operation*, (says the Doctor) *so there may be prudential and MORAL modes of proceeding far above our reach*. But as this would be going too far, farther than the *first Philosophy* will allow of, I suppose he would be content to give up this quotation from Barrow, as nothing to the purpose.

AT LAST, and when you would least expect it, Common-sense and Common-sentiments return. And God's *moral attributes*, after much ado, are allowed to be in Nature. “ Where Religions (says his Lordship) which pretend to be revealed, prevail, a new character of God's *goodness* arises — an *artificial* goodness which stands often in the place of the *NATURAL* [14].” And this, after he had so often told us, that we have no adequate idea of any goodness at all. Well, but as awkwardly as God's *natural goodness* comes, and, in every sense, *a posteriori*, yet it comes, and deserves to be made welcome. “ All the knowledge (says he) that God has given us the means to acquire, and therefore all he designed we should have of his physical and MORAL

[13] Vol. v. p. 361, 2.

[14] Vol. v. p. 431.

“ nature and attributes, is derived from *his works*,  
 “ and from the TENOUR OF THAT PROVIDENCE by  
 “ which he governs them [15].” You will observe  
 the words — *the tenour of that Providence* — I have  
 detected the sophistry of them before, where I have  
 stated the meaning of the terms, *God's works*. I bid  
 you observe them now, to judge of the following cli-  
 max, (if I may so call it) or walk down stairs. “ The  
 “ wisdom is not so often discernible by us [in God's  
 “ works] as the power of God, nor the goodness as the  
 “ wisdom [16].” As scanty and slender as the  
 knowledge is of God's moral attributes, which his  
 Lordship here allows us to collect from his works, yet  
 it flatly contradicts what his System had obliged him  
 over and over to maintain; particularly in the fol-  
 lowing words --- *Of divine goodness and divine justice*  
 (says his Lordship in the person of Anaxagoras) *I am*  
*unable to frame any adequate notions [17], from God's*  
*works.*

This Mock-concession is again repeated, and as  
 carefully guarded. “ By natural Theology (says his  
 “ Lordship) we are taught to acknowledge and adore  
 “ the infinite *wisdom* and *power* of God, which he  
 “ has manifested to us in some degree or other in  
 “ every part, even the most minute, of his Creation.  
 “ By that too, we are taught to ascribe goodness and justice  
 “ to him, wherever he intended we should so ascribe  
 “ them, that is, wherever either his works, or the  
 “ dispensations of his providence do as NECESSARI-  
 “ LY communicate these notions to our minds, as

[15] Vol. v. p. 523, 4.

[16] Vol. v. p. 335.

[17] Vol. iv. p. 116, 17.

“ those



“ those of wisdom and power are communicated to  
 “ us, in the whole extent of both [18].”

What his Lordship would have you infer from this is, that we are NO WHERE taught to ascribe *goodness* and *justice* to God; since the *dispensations of his providence* do NO WHERE, in his Lordship's opinion, NECESSARILY *communicate these notions*. But allow him his premises, that neither God's Works nor Dispensations do NECESSARILY communicate to us the notions of God's goodness and justice; Would his conclusion follow, that therefore we are no where taught in these works and dispensations to ascribe those attributes unto him? Suppose these works and dispensations did only PROBABLY communicate these notions to our minds; will not this probability teach us to ascribe goodness and justice to him? God hath so framed the constitution of things, that man, throughout his whole conduct in life should be necessarily induced to form his judgment on appearances and probable arguments. Why then not in this, as well as the rest? or rather, why not in this, above the rest? if so be that indeed God had not (as I have shewn he hath) necessarily communicated these notions. — But still, what is this to our *adequate* idea of the moral attributes, the point in question? God's not *necessarily communicating* affects only the *reality*, not the *precision* of the idea. All therefore we learn by the observation, which would thus put the charge upon us, is, that his Lordship has a very strong inclination, that God should have neither *goodness* nor *justice*; so far as they carry with them any DISPOSITION to *reward* or

[18] Vol. v. p. 527.

*punish.*

*punish*. For as to the Attributes *themselves*, divested of their consequences; and undisturbed by our IMPIOUS IMITATION [19], he has little or no quarrel with them. His Lordship certainly never intended to *teach* the common Reader more of the secrets of his Philosophy than what NECESSARILY arises from his professions. But to make God treat Mankind in this manner, communicate to their minds the appearance of Attributes which he has not, is drawing an image of the Deity from his Lordship's own likeness; the very fault he so much censures in Divines. But if it must needs be that God is to be represented either after Them, or after his Lordship, I should chuse to have the Clergy's God, tho' made out of no better stuff than ARTIFICIAL THEOLOGY, because this gives him *goodness* and *justice*, rather than his Lordship's God, which has neither, altho' composed of the more refined materials of the FIRST PHILOSOPHY. In the mean time, I will not deny but He may be right in what he says, That men conceive of the Deity, more humano; and that his Lordship's God and the Clergy's God, are equally faithful copies of themselves.

In a word, if God teaches, whether clearly or obscurely, he certainly intended we should learn. And what we get even by appearances, is real knowledge, upon his Lordship's own principles. For if Truth be, as he assures us it is, of so precarious a nature as to take it's Being from our own System, it must be *real* as far as it *appears*. "Our knowledge (says this

[20] OUR OBLIGATION TO IMITATE GOD IS A FALSE AND PROFANE DOCTRINE. Vol. v. p 65.

“ great Philosopher) is so dependent on our own  
 “ system that a great part of it would not be *know-*  
 “ *ledge* perhaps, but *error* in any other [20].”

It is thus he involves himself in perpetual contradictions : And it is always thus, when men dispute (for believe they cannot [1],) against common notions; and the most obvious truths ; such as liberty of will ; the certainty of knowledge ; and this, which, I reckon, obtrudes itself upon us as forcibly as either, the MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE DEITY.

But the game is now on foot. Let us follow closely. We have unravelled him through all his windings ; and we may soon expect to see him take shelter in the thick cover of God’s incomprehensible Nature ; and rather than allow, more than in jest, the *moral attributes* of the Deity, ready to resolve all his Attributes, both *natural* and *moral*, into one INDEFINITE PERFECTION.

But soft. Not yet. We must come to it by degrees and regular advances. First, the *moral attributes* are to be *resolved* into the *natural*.

— “ If they [the *natural* and *moral* attributes]  
 “ may be considered separately, as we are apt to  
 “ consider them ; and if the LATTER and every  
 “ thing we ascribe to these, are not to be RESOLVED  
 “ *rather into the former* ; into his infinite intelligence,  
 “ wisdom, and power [2].” It is yet, we see, but

[20] Vol. iii. p. 356.

[1] Hear what he himself says of FREE-WILL. *The free-will of man no one can deny he has, without LYING, or renouncing his intuitive knowledge.* Vol. v. p. 406.

[2] Vol. v. p. 523, 4.

a ques-

a question ; and that only, whether the *moral* attributes are not to be resolved into the *natural*. In the next passage the matter is determined. “ I think  
 “ (and what he thinks, he holds it but reasonable  
 “ we should all think) “ that the *moral* attributes of  
 “ the supreme Being are *absorbed in his wisdom* ; that  
 “ we should consider them only as different modifi-  
 “ cations of this *physical* attribute [3].”

We are not yet near the top. However, before we go any higher, let us set together his INCONSISTENCIES, as they appear in this situation. Sometimes *the ideas of divine wisdom are better determined than those of divine goodness* [4] : Sometimes *we have no ideas at all of divine goodness* [5] : And sometimes again, (as in the place before us), the *divine goodness is the same as wisdom*, and therefore, doubtless, the idea of it as well defined. Now, of all these assertions, to which will his Lordship stick ? To which, do you ask ? To none of them, longer than they will stick to him : And straggling, undisciplined Principles, picked up at adventures, are not apt to stick long to any side : As soon as they begin to incline towards the enemy, he has done with them. — Come, if you will needs have it, you shall. The secret is this. The attributes are mere NAMES ; and there is an end of them. All that remains, worth speaking of, is one undefined ETERNAL REASON : and so the Farce concludes.

“ The moral ATTRIBUTES (says he) are *barely*  
 “ NAMES that we give to various manifestations

[3] Vol. v. p. 335.

[4] Vol. v. p. 341, 526.

[5] Vol. iv. p. 116, 17.



“ of the infinite wisdom of one *simple uncompounded*  
 “ *being* [6].”

“ Of divine goodness and divine justice I am un-  
 “ able to frame any adequate notions ; and instead  
 “ of conceiving such distinct moral attributes in the  
 “ supreme Being, *we ought, perhaps, to conceive no-*  
 “ *thing more than this,* that THERE ARE VARIOUS  
 “ APPLICATIONS OF ONE ETERNAL REASON, WHICH  
 “ IT BECOMES US LITTLE TO ANALYZE INTO  
 “ ATTRIBUTES [7].”

To this miserable refuge is his Lordship reduced to avoid divine justice. But why, you say, did he not speak out at first, and end his quarrel with the *moral attributes* at once ? Your humble servant for that. Barefaced NATURALISM has not such charms as to make her received when and wherever she appears. There is need of much preparation, and not a little disguise, before you can get her admitted even to what is called *good company*.— But then, after he had resolved to speak out, Why, you ask, does he stop again in his career ; and, when his premisses are general against *all* attributes, his conclusion is particular, against the *moral* only ? Not without reason, I assure you. He had need of the *natural* attributes, to set up against the *moral* : and therefore had himself *analyzed* this *eternal reason* into the specific attributes of *wisdom* and *power*. But when he saw his Adversaries might, by the same way, analyze it into *goodness and justice*, he then thought fit to pick a quarrel with his own method : But it was to be done obliquely : and hence arises all this embarrass and tergiversation.

[6] Vol. v. p. 453.

[7] Vol. iv. p. 117.

He would willingly, if his Reader be so pleased, analyze the *eternal reason* into *wisdom* and *power* : but there he would stop : and leave the other side of the *eternal reason*, unanalyzed : and if *goodness* and *justice* should chance to start out, he has a trick to *resolve* and *absorb* them into wisdom and power, as only *different modifications of the physical attributes*. But if this revolts his Readers, and they expect equal measure ; then, rather than give them back the *goodness* and *justice* which he has been at all this pains to proscribe, he will throw *wisdom* and *power* after them, and *resolve* all into the ONE ETERNAL REASON.

Bashful NATURALISM has now thrown aside her Veil ; and is, we see, ready to face down and defy her Rival ; whom till now she was content to counterfeit. Give me leave, therefore, to repress this last effort of her insolence by another passage from the *Sermons* quoted once or twice already.

— “ We have been told, and with airs of superior knowledge, that these pretended attributes, as they are commonly specified, and distinguished into *natural* and *moral*, are a mere human fiction ; invented, by aid of analogy from the actions, passions, and qualities observable in man : and that the simple nature of Deity is one uniform perfection ; of which, Infinity being the base, we can have no distinct idea or conception.

“ To this it will be sufficient to reply, that it is indeed true, that these specific attributes, from which we deduce all our knowledge of the nature and will of God, are formed on analogy, and bear relation to ourselves. But then we say  
“ such

“ such attributes are not, on that account, the less  
 “ real or essential. The light of the SUN is not, in  
 “ the orb itself, what we see it in the RAINBOW.  
 “ There it is one candid, uniform, perfect blaze of  
 “ glory : here, we separate it’s Perfection into the va-  
 “ rious attributes of red, yellow, blue, purple and  
 “ what else the subtle optician so nicely distin-  
 “ guishes. But still the *solar* light is not less real in  
 “ the Rainbow, where it’s rays become thus un-  
 “ twisted, and each differing thread distinctly seen in  
 “ its effect, than while they remained united and  
 “ incorporated with one another in the Sun. Just  
 “ so it is with the divine Nature : it is one simple  
 “ individual Perfection in the Godhead himself :  
 “ but when refracted and divaricated, in passing  
 “ through the medium of the human mind, it be-  
 “ comes power, justice, mercy ; which are all se-  
 “ parately and ADEQUATELY represented to the  
 “ understanding [8].” But that his Lordship so fre-  
 quently discards his own principles, I should hope he  
 would submit to this illustration, since he owns *that*  
*we see the Deity in a reflected, not in a direct light* [9].

It is a true light then and not a false : and the  
 knowledge it conveys is real, not fantastic : For mir-  
 rors are not wont to reflect the species of the mind’s  
 visions, but things exterior and substantial. To turn  
 us, therefore, from God’s *attributes*, (tho’ the in-  
 direct, yet the well-defined, Image of him) because  
 they discover something to us we may not like, a  
 HELL and a FUTURE JUDGMENT, to turn us, I say,

[8] *The principles of natural and revealed Religion, in a course*  
*of Sermons at Lincoln’s Inn,* Vol. i. p. 57, 58.

[9] Vol. v. p. 524.

from these, to the *undefined eternal reason*, is doing like certain french Philosophers, who, when they quarrelled with Newton's Theory of light and colours, contrived to break the Prism by which it was demonstrated.

And now, Sir, to conclude my long Letter. Who is there that deserves the name of MAN, and will not own, that they are the MORAL ATTRIBUTES of the Deity which make him AMIABLE ; just as the *natural attributes* make him revered and adorable ? — What is his Lordship's quarrel with the God of MOSES and PAUL, but that he is made *unamiable*, and represented without *goodness* or *justice* ? *Their God*, therefore, he expressly tells us, *shall not be his God*. Well then : He has his God to make. And who would not expect to find him, when made by such a Workman, a God of infinite goodness and justice. No such matter : These qualities come not out of his Lordship's hands ; so, cannot enter into the composition of his God : They are *barely NAMES that men give to various manifestations of the infinite wisdom of one simple uncompounded Being*. The pretended want of them in the God of the Jews afforded his Lordship a commodious cavil ; for he had RELIGION to remove out of his way : But when he came to erect NATURALISM in it's stead, it had been very inconvenient to give them to his own Idol.

Honest Plutarch, tho' a Priest, was as warm an enemy to PRIEST-CRAFT as his Lordship. He derives all the evils of Superstition from men's not acquiring the idea of a God *infinitely good and just*. And proposes this knowledge as the only cure for Superstition. This is consistent. But what would the



ancient' World have thought of their Philosopher, had his remedy, after hunting for it through a hundred volumes, been a God without any goodness and justice at all.

NATURE tells us, that the thing most desirable is the knowledge of a God whose goodness and justice gives to every man according to his works. His LORDSHIP tells us, that REASON OR NATURAL RELIGION discovers to us no such God. Now, if both speak truth, How much are we indebted to REVELATION ! Which, when *natural Religion* failed us, brings us to the knowledge of a God infinitely good and just ; and gives us an adequate idea of those attributes ! I say no more than his Lordship has confessed. — *Christianity*, says he, DISCOVERS *the love of God to man ; his infinite JUSTICE and GOODNESS* [10].

Is this a blessing to be rejected ? His Lordship has no room to say so, since the discovery is made in that very way, in which, upon his own Principles, it only could be made. He pretends, “ We have no other natural way of coming to the knowledge of God but from his *works*. By these, *he says*, we gain the idea of his *physical attributes* ; and if there be any thing in his *works* which seems to contradict those attributes, 'tis only seeming. For as men advance in the knowledge of nature, the difficulties vanish. It is not so, he says, with regard to the *moral attributes*. There are so many *phænomena* which contradict these, and occasion difficulties never to be cleared up, that they hinder us from acquiring an *adequate* idea of the *moral attributes*.” Now admitting all this to be true, (for generally, his Lordship's assertions are so extra-

[10] Vol. v. p. 532.

vagant,

vagant, that they will not even admit a supposition of their truth, tho' it be only for argument's sake,) What does it effect but this, *additional credit to Revelation*? The *physical difficulties* clear up as we advance in our knowledge of *Nature*, and we advance in proportion to our diligence and application. But the *moral difficulties* never clear up, because they rise out of the *Whole System* of God's moral dispensation; which is involved in clouds and darkness, impenetrable to mortal sight: and all the force of human wit alone will never be able to draw the veil. The assistance must come from another quarter. It must come, if it comes at all, from the Author of the Dispensation. Well; *Revelation* hath drawn this veil, and so, removed the darkness which obstructed our attaining an *adequate* idea of the *moral* attributes. Shall we yet stand out? And, when we are brought hither upon his Lordship's own principles, still withhold our assent? Undoubtedly you must. Beware, (says he) of a pretended Revelation. Why so? "Because the Religion of nature is perfect and absolute: "and therefore Revelation can teach nothing but what "Religion hath already taught [11]." Strange! Why, *Revelation* teaches those *moral* attributes; which you, my Lord, own, *natural Religion* does not teach—Here the dialogue breaks off.

"Dic aliquem fodes, dic, Quintiliane, colorem:

"Hæremus —

And here, we are like to stick. His Lordship leaves us in a Riddle. Will you have the solution? It is foolish enough; as such kind of things generally are. But if you have kept your good humour, which,

I confess is difficult amidst all these provocations of impiety, it is enough to make you laugh. I told you before, that his Lordship borrowed all his reasoning against Revelation, from such as Tindal, Toland, Collins, Chubb, and Morgan. This solemn argument particularly, of the PERFECTION OF NATURAL RELIGION, and the superseded use of Revelation, he delivers to us just as he found it in Tindal. Now Tindal, who held, that natural Religion taught both the *moral attributes* and a *future state*, had some pretence for saying that *it was perfect and absolute*. But what pretence has his Lordship to say it after him, who holds that natural Religion taught neither one nor the other? The truth is, he refused no arms against REVELATION; and the too eager pursuit of this his old enemy thro' thick and thin has led him into many of these scrapes.

I have now considered all I could find urged by the Noble Writer in support of his great principle of NO ADEQUATE IDEAS OF GOD'S MORAL ATTRIBUTES; on which the whole system of NATURALISM is, and must be, founded; and you see to what this *all*, amounts: If I should say to just nothing, I shall speak more favourably of it than it deserves; for it tends, as I have shewn you, in many instances, to confirm the great TRUTH it is brought to overthrow. And now what I proposed for the subject of this second Letter is pretty well exhausted. My first was employed in giving you a specimen of his TEMPER; This undertakes to explain his SYSTEM; and I reserve the two next for a display of his marvellous TALENTS; tho', it is true, I have a little anticipated the Subject. For you cannot but have conceived

ceived already a very uncommon idea of his abilities, on seeing him use TINDAL'S ARGUMENTS *against Revelation*, and *for the perfection of Natural Religion*, along with his OWN PRINCIPLES of *no moral attributes* and *no future State*. The first of which principles makes one entire absurdity of all he borrows from Tindal against Revelation; and the second takes away the very pretense for perfection in natural Religion.

His Lordship's friend, SWIFT, has somewhere or other observed, that no subject in all nature but Religion could have advanced Toland and Apgill into the class of reputable Authors. Another of his friends seems to think that no subject but Religion could have sunk his Lordship so far below it: IF EVER LORD BOLINGBROKE TRIFLES, (says Pope) IT WILL BE WHEN HE WRITES ON DIVINITY [12]. But this is the strange fate of Authors, whether with wit, or without, when they chuse to write on certain subjects. For it is with Authors, as with Men: Who can guess *which Vessel was made for honour, and which for dishonour?* when sometimes, one and the same is made for both. Even this choice Vessel of the FIRST PHILOSOPHY, his Lordship's sacred pages, may be put to very different uses, according to the different tempers in which they chance to find his few Admirers and the Public; like the *China Jordan* in the DUNCIAD, which one Hero pissed into, and another carried home for his Head-piece.

I am, &c.

[12] *Pope's works*, Vol. ix, Letter xiv.

L E T



## L E T T E R III.

LET me first claim your thanks for sparing You so long on the chapter of Lord BOLINGBROKE; and then ask, what You now think of this Paper-Meteor, which so flames and sparkles, and, while it kept at distance, (like a Comet, traversing the celestial Orbs, and domineering over the established System) drew after it the admiring Croud; divided in their opinions between the presage of superstitious Divines who saw it threaten pestilence and ruin to the world beneath, and the more philosophic determination of his Followers who judged it, was to recreate and revive the dryness and sterility of exhausted Nature.

But your love of Mankind makes you view this strange Phænomenon with horror. Is it for this, you say, that such a torrent of abuse has been poured out upon every private Character, upon every public Order, upon every branch of Learning, and upon every Institution of Religion?—They were not poured out at hazard, for all these Things stood in his way: they were not poured out in vain, for they are given for *Arguments*, and will, I make no doubt, be so received.

The wise Quintilian, it is true, has observed, *Propriam MODERATIONEM QUÆDAM CAUSÆ desiderant*. And it must be confessed, that if ever *Mod-*  
G
*eration,*

*ration*, or temperance of expression, became an Author, or was well suited to his Discourse, it was when the purpose of his Work, like that of his Lordship's, was to overturn all ESTABLISHED RELIGION, founded in the belief of a Sovereign Master, supremely *just and good* ; and all AUTHENTIC LEARNING, employed for the defence of such Religion : and, on their ruins, to erect NATURALISM, instead of real Theism, and a FIRST PHILOSOPHY, instead of real Science. When, I say, a Writer had thought fit to insult the common sentiments of Mankind on points esteemed so essential to their well-being, common policy as well as common decency required that it should be done by the most winning insinuation and address ; and not by calling MADMAN, KNAVE, FOOL, and BLASPHEMER, every man who would not take his System upon trust.

But superior Genius's have always thought themselves above the restraint of rules. *Tully* observes that ARCESILAS, fitted by a turbulence of temper to confound the peace and overturn the established order of things, had done that mischief in PHILOSOPHY which TIBERIUS GRACCHUS had projected in the REPUBLIC [1]. But his Lordship, prompted by a nobler ambition, would play both parts in their turns, and shine an *Arcefilas* and a *Gracchus* too.

His ill success in business made him turn his great talents from POLITICS to PHILOSOPHY. But he had

[1] Tum exortus est, ut in Optima Rep. Ti. Gracchus qui etiam perturbaret, sic Arcefilas, qui *constitutam* Philosophiam everteret.

not yet mortified that Ambition which was always prompting him to aspire at Superiority : and he carried with him that sufficiency and those resentments which had proved so ill suited to the Cabinets of Princes, into the Closet of the Philosopher. We may add, that he entered upon *Letters* in an advanced age ; and this still further viciated his natural temper by an acquired infirmity, to which, as Tully observes, these untimely Adventurers are extremely subject. CŒMACEIE autem homines scis QUAM INSOLENTES sint : “ You know, says he, how INSOLENT “ those men generally are, who come late to their “ book.”

But now having given you *my* thoughts of his Lordship's assuming temper, it would be unfair not to give you *his own*. He had kept, it seems, ill company ; and his natural candor and modesty had been hurt by it. But let him tell his own story : “ I grow “ VERY APT TO ASSUME, by conversing so much “ with ECCLESIASTICAL WRITERS, who assume “ much oftener than they prove [2].”

But whatever causes concurred to form this overbearing humour, certain it is, that his contempt of others was become so habitual to him, that it operates where no reasonable provocation can be assigned. I have shewn you, in my first Letter, at what a rate, his disgust to the Morals and his aversion to the Sanctions of the GOSPEL disposed him to treat all who had contributed to propagate or to support *Revelation*. But how the honest PAGANS of antiquity had offended, who, many of them, believed no more of a *future state* than himself, is a little hard to conceive.

[2] Vol. iv. p. 504.

Yet PYTHAGORAS, he tells you, was a turbulent Fellow, and a fanatical subverter of States.

Nor did PLATO'S *delirious brains* [3] secure him from becoming, on occasion, a poultry Cheat, and a mercenary Flatterer. For almost all his *Madmen* are *Knaves* into the bargain. But Plato had made himself obnoxious to his Lordship, by the *blasphemous* title he had given to the *first Cause*; in which his *delirious brains* could find nothing but a FIRST GOOD: so that he was to be stigmatized as the Ring-leader of that wicked Sect who ascribe *moral attributes* to the Deity.

Even SOCRATES, whose glory it was, as Tully assures us, to take PHILOSOPHY out of the Clouds, and bring it down to dwell amongst Cities and Men, *substituted* (in his Lordship's opinion) *fantastic, for real knowledge* [4] — and entertained and propagated THEOLOGICAL and METAPHYSICAL notions which are not, most certainly, parts of NATURAL THEOLOGY [5]. We understand his Lordship very well. He means a *particular Providence* and a *future State*, the *moral attributes* of the Deity and the *substantiality* of the Soul. This apparently is *the fantastic knowledge which makes no part of natural Theology*.

Nor could his own SENECA, tho' so servicable [6] to him in his *Exile*, escape the nick-name of THE STOICAL FOP: A character indeed, which, in the discourse referred to at the bottom, Seneca has enabled his Follower most admirably to sustain.

[3] Vol. iv. p. 88.

[4] Vol. iv. p. 112.

[5] Vol. iv. p. 122.  
titled *Reflections on Exile*.

[6] See his Lordship's tract, en-



When these Pagan Heroes fare no better, who would be concerned for Church-men? or think much to hear CYPRIAN called a *Liar and a Mad-man* [7]; JEROM, a *surly foul-mouthed Bully*; and EPIPHANIUS, an *Idiot*?

But now comes on a difficulty indeed.—PAUL and PLATO bear their crimes in their countenance: The *Gospel of peace*, he tells us, disclosed nothing but *Murders*; and the idea of a *first Good* occasioned all our complaints of *evil*. But what had SCIPIO done, or REGULUS, to incur his displeasure? They were neither *artificial Theologers*, nor yet *crazy Metaphysicians*; but plain, sober, Statesmen. His Lordship's quarrel, we know, is with DIVINITY in all its forms; but he professes to admire the *moral Virtues*. And if there be any of higher dignity than the rest, and in which his Lordship would be more desirous to shine, they must needs be CHASTITY and GOOD FAITH,

“ CUI, *Pudor*, &c, *Justitiæ foror*,

“ INCORRUPTA *Fides*, &c. &c.

Yet he wrests all his reading to deprive those two brave Romans of their Glory; so nobly earned, and so generously paid, by the universal voice of all ages. I am not ignorant of that childish infirmity of our nature, the fondness of ingrossing to ourselves those shining qualities, with which we happen to be dazzled; but every one will acquit his Lordship of so impotent a project: Much less would I suppose him capable of thinking, that SCIPIO and REGULUS may be still the great men they have been accounted, though stained all over with *lust* and *perfidy*.

[7] Vol. iv. p. 407.

It is true, indeed, the new Historian of Great Britain, another of these *first philosophy-men* (for the essence of the Sect consisting in paradox, it doth as well in *History* as *Divinity*) he, I say, tells us, that it will admit of a doubt, whether *severity of manners alone, and abstinence from pleasure, can deserve the name of Virtue* [8]. But then he is as singular in his notions of *Religion*. He holds but two species of it in all Nature, *Superstition* and *Fanaticism*: And under one or other of them, he gives you to understand [9], the whole of *Christian profession* is, and ever was, included. On the Church of *England*, indeed, he is so indulgent, to bestow *all* that Religion has to give: for when he sets it against *Popery*, it is *Fanaticism*: but as often as it faces about, and is opposed to the *Puritans*, it then becomes *Superstition*; and this as constantly as the occasions return.

You will say I grow partial to his Lordship, in appearing so anxious for his reputation, while Your two favorite characters lye expiring under his pen. Never fear it. They have not lived so long to die of a fright. When his Lordship blusters we know how to take him down. It is only leading him back to that *Antiquity* he has been abusing.

Half the work is done to my hands; and I shall have only the trouble of transcribing the defence of *Scipio* against his Lordship's suspicions, as I find it in an expostulatory Letter to him, on his recent treatment of a deceased friend. —

[8] *The History of Great Britain*, Vol. i. p. 200, 4to, printed at Edinb. 1754.

[9] See his History throughout.

“ *The reputation of the first Scipio* (says his Lord-  
 “ ship) *was not so clear and uncontroverted in PRI-*  
 “ *VATE, as in public life ; nor was he allowed by all to*  
 “ *be a man of such severe virtue as he affected, and as*  
 “ *that age required. Nævius was thought to mean him,*  
 “ *in some verses Gellius has preserved ; and VALERIUS*  
 “ *ANTIAs made no scruple to assert, that far from re-*  
 “ *storing the fair Spaniard to her family, he debauched and*  
 “ *kept her* [10]. One would have hoped so mean a  
 “ slander might have slept forgotten in the dirty  
 “ corner of a Pedant’s [11] Common-place. And  
 “ yet we see it quoted as a fact by an Instructor of  
 “ Kings. Who knows but at some happy time or  
 “ other, when a writer wants to prove that *real*  
 “ FRIENDSHIP becomes a great man as little as *real*  
 “ *chastity*, [12] this advertisement [13] of yours may  
 “ be advanced to the same dignity of credit with the  
 “ calumny of *Valerius Antias*. If it should, I would  
 “ not undertake to dispute the fact on which such an  
 “ inference might be made ; for, I remember, Tul-  
 “ ly, a great Statesman himself, long ago observed,  
 “ VERÆ AMICITIÆ difficillime reperiuntur in iis, qui  
 “ in Republica versantur.—But the words of Nævius  
 “ were these,

“ *Etiam qui res magnas manus sæpe gessit gloriöse,*  
 “ *Cujus facta viva nunc vigent ; qui apud gentes solus*  
 “ *Præstat : eum suus pater cum pallio uno ab amica abduxit.*

[10] P. 204, of the *Idea of a Patriot King*.

[11] A. Gellius. [12] See p. 201, of the *Patriot King*.

[13] Advertisement concerning Mr. Pope, prefixed to the *Patriot King*.

“ These obscure verses were, in *Gellius's* opinion, the  
 “ sole foundation of *Antias's* calumny, against the  
 “ universal concurrence of Historians [14]. And what  
 “ *Gellius* thought of this historian's modesty and  
 “ truth, we may collect from what he says of him in  
 “ another place. Where having quoted two tribuni-  
 “ tial Decrees, which, he tells us, he transcribed  
 “ from Records [*ex annalium monumentis*] he adds,  
 “ that *Valerius Antias* made no scruple to give them  
 “ the lye in public [15]. And *Livy* quoting this *An-*  
 “ *tias*, for the particulars of a victory, subjoins  
 “ concerning the number slain [16], — *but there is*  
 “ *little credit to be afforded this writer, who, of all His-*  
 “ *torians, is the most given to amplify.* And he who  
 “ will enlarge on one occasion will diminish on an-  
 “ other; for it is the same impotence of temper which  
 “ carries him indifferently to either [17].”

REGULUS's virtue falls next under his Lordship's  
 censure: “ I know not (says he) whether *Balbus*  
 “ would have called in question the story of RE-  
 “ GULUS. Vid. *Au. Gellium*. It was probably fa-  
 “ bulous, in many circumstances at least, and there  
 “ were those amongst the Romans who thought it to  
 “ be so [18].” Would not any one now imagine, by  
 his bringing *Au. Gellius* again upon the stage, that

[14] *His ego versibus credo adductum Valerium Antiatem AD-*  
*VERSUM CETEROS OMNES scriptores de SCIPIONIS moribus sensisse.*

[15] *Valerius autem Antias, contra hanc decretorum memoriam*  
*contraque auctoritates veterum annalium—dixit, &c. L. vii. c. 19.*

[16] *Scriptori parum fidei sit, quia in augendo non. alius in-*  
*temperantior est. Lib. xxxvi.*

[17] *A Letter to the Editor of the Letters on the Spirit of*  
*Patriotism, the idea of a Patriot King, and the state of Parties, &c.*

[18] Vol. v. p. 406.

there



there was another *Valerius Antias* in reserve, to depose against *REGULUS* likewise ? Just the contrary. The Grammarian, in the iv<sup>th</sup> chapter of his v<sup>th</sup> book, confirms the common story, with an addition of the testimonies of the Historians *Tubero* and *Tuditamus*. The truth however is, that his Lordship had his Voucher, though he was shy of producing him. It was the respectable Mr. *TOLAND* ; to whom his Lordship is much indebted for better things. Amongst the posthumous tracts of that virtuous writer, there is a *Dissertation*, intitled, *The fabulous death of Atilius Regulus* : in which, from a fragment of *Diodorus Siculus*, preserved by *Constantinus Porphyrogenitus*, he endeavours to prove, against all the Roman writers, with *Cicero* at their head, that *Regulus* did not die in torments, but of mere chagrin. Toland only denied that his virtue was put to so severe a trial ; but this was enough for his Lordship, to call in question the whole story ; and to add, that *there were those amongst the ROMANS who thought it to be fabulous*. Unluckily, the *Roman* writers are unanimous for the truth of the story. How then shall we account for his Lordship's assertion ? Did he take *Diodorus Siculus* for a Latin writer, because he had not seen him in Greek ? Or did he understand *A. Gellius* as quoting *Tubero* and *Tuditamus* for doubters of the common story ?

As we see little reason therefore to dissent from the general opinion, and much less, to join his Lordship against it, let *SCIPIO* and *REGULUS* still preserve their rank in our esteem and admiration. For as an excellent french writer, in a Letter to his Lordship, well observes, C'est être vertueux que de rendre à la

130      A VIEW OF LORD BOLINGBROKE'S  
beauté des mœurs l'hommage d'amour et de respect,  
qui lui est dû.

His Lordship's ambition was uniform and simple : it was only, as we said, *to be at the head of things*. As he comes nearer home, therefore, he is more and more alarmed. He found his place already occupied by certain Counterfeits and Pretenders, who had, some how or other, got into the throne of Science, and had actually received homage from the literary world. But these, as it was fitting, he unmask and depose.

“ SELDEN, GROTIUS, PUFFENDORF, and CUMBERLAND (says his Lordship) seem to be great writers, by much the same right as he might be called a great traveller, who should go from London to Paris by the Cape of Good Hope [19].” I can hardly think they took so large a compass. But let us trust to the Proverb : They and his Lordship will prove it between them : He shews us a ready road indeed, but it leads to ATHEISM ; whereas, if they take us a little *about*, they bring us the *nearest way home* to RELIGION.

He professes “ a thorough contempt for the whole business of the learned lives of SCALIGER, BOCHART, PETAVIUS, Usher and MARSHAM [20].” This was natural. He owed them nothing. But those to whom he is most indebted have no better quarter.

MARCILIUS FICINUS, he calls the *best Interpreter of Plato* ; but, at the same time assures us, he was *perfectly delirious*. But why, you ask, is *Ficinus the best Interpreter of Plato*, since *J. Scaliger*, who knew

[19] Vol. v. p. 68.

[20] Vol. ii. p. 261--2,  
some-

something of the matter, says, that *he stript his Master of his purple, and put him on his own beggarly rags?* For a good reason; *Ficinus* taught his Lordship all he knew of Platonism. But why is he then *perfectly delirious*? For a better still: he holds opinions already condemned by his Lordship.

His very favorite BARROW, he tells us, “ goes on “ a long while begging the question, and talking in “ a theological cant MORE WORTHY OF PAUL than “ of a man like him [1] — flimzy stuff, which a man “ is obliged to vend, when he puts on a black gown “ and band [2].”

LOCKE and NEWTON, he insinuates, were the Men: Nay, such is his humility, that he puts himself to school to *Locke*. Yet this does not secure his Master from being mighty liable to a PHILOSOPHICAL DELIRIUM [3]. And as for NEWTON, the APPLICATION of his *Philosophy* is grown, or growing into some abuse [4]. Would you know how? By affording CLARKE and BAXTER the principles whereby to demonstrate, *that the Soul is an immaterial substance*. An abuse indeed!

But as for his Master, — and BACON too, *as much as he admires them, he is not blind to their errors; but can, without being dazzled, discern SPOTS IN THESE SUNS.* —

Before I go any further, I dare venture a wager that I know what those spots are. They are, or I am much mistaken, the stains of *Faith* and the impurities of *Revelation*. But let us hear him. “ I can

[1] Vol. iv. p. 278.

[2] Vol. iii. p. 442.

[3] Vol. v. p. 361.

[4] Vol. iii. p. 374.

“ discern a tincture, and sometimes more than a tincture,  
 “ ture, in BACON, of those false notions, which we  
 “ are APT TO IMBIBE AS MEN, AS INDIVIDUALS, AS  
 “ MEMBERS OF SOCIETY,, and as SCHOLARS. I can  
 “ discern in LOCKE sometimes ill-abstracted and ill-  
 “ determined ideas, from which a wrong application  
 “ of words proceeds ; and propositions to which I  
 “ can, *by no means, assent* I confess further, that I  
 “ have been, and still am at a loss, to find any ap-  
 “ pearance of CONSISTENCY in an author, who pub-  
 “ lished a COMMENTARY ON THE EPISTLES OF ST.  
 “ PAUL, and a treatise on the REASONABLENESS OF  
 “ CHRISTIANITY (which he endeavours to prove by  
 “ fact and by argument) AFTER having stated clearly  
 “ as he has done, the conditions and measures of his-  
 “ torical probability ; AND AFTER having written  
 “ as strongly as he has done against the abuse of  
 “ words [5].” Did not I tell you so !

— “ This SUN’s sick too ;

“ Shortly he’ll be an EARTH ;

as the Poet has it, in his description of the pestilence  
 at Thebes ; not more fatal to great Cities than this  
 bloated Vapour of a *first Philosophy*, which mimics,  
 and, as it reflects, defiles this SUN of Science, and  
 turns Nature into Prodigy ;

Et SOLEM geminum et duplices se ostendere THEBAS  
 &c.

But his Lordship’s account of his other *Luminary*,  
 BACON, is still more extraordinary—He *thinks* he dis-

[5] Vol. iv, p. 166.



*cerns in him a tincture, and more than a tincture of those false notions, which we are apt to imbibe as MEN, as INDIVIDUALS, as MEMBERS OF SOCIETY, and as SCHOLARS.*—That is, as *Men*, we are apt to think we have a SOUL; as *Individuals*, we are in expectation of a FUTURE STATE; as *Members of Society*, we are inclined to reverence the ESTABLISHED RELIGION; and as *Scholars*, we are taught to *reason*, and not to HARANGUE. If any of his Lordship's Followers can give a better account of this Oracular passage, I am very ready to resign the office of his Commentator.

In truth, his Lordship deals by RELIGION, and it's Advocates, as a certain french Author, I have read, does by ALCHEMY and the hermetic Philosophers; he brings almost every great name into the number; and after having entertained his reader much at their expence, concludes each various eulogy, alike, — “Now his folly was in hoping to “extract GOLD from *baser metals* :” just as the folly of all his Lordship's *Alchemists* is the hope of bettering *human nature* by GRACE.

You now, Sir, may understand, how well the disposition of his mind and temper was fitted to his System. It often happens, that men who arraign Religion, have been first arraigned by it; and their defiance of Truth is only a reprisal upon Conscience. Under these circumstances it is no wonder they should go to work much out of humour; tho' it be in an affair which requires perfect tranquillity, and freedom from all perturbations. But his Lordship has the miserable advantage of being the first who has written under one unintermitting fit of rage and resentment.

In

In this state, like a man in a fever whom no posture can ease, whom no situation can accommodate, he is angry at PHILOSOPHERS for explaining what they cannot comprehend; he is angry at DIVINES for believing without explaining: Well then, they change hands; the *Philosopher* believes, and the *Divine* explains. No matter. He is angry still. In this temper then we leave him, and turn to the proper subject of my Letter.

You would know, you say, with what abilities he supports his System.

The attacks upon Religion have been always carried on like War, by *stratagem* and *force*. I shall therefore first speak of his *Arts*, and then of his *Powers* of controversy.

It has been observed how closely, and how humbly too, he copies the FREE-THINKERS who went before him, even to the stalest of their poultry stratagems.

When FREE-THINKING first went upon it's Mission, the PUBLIC were not disposed to understand raillery on a subject of such importance: so that it is possible there might be found, amongst the more early of these our Anti-Apostles, a Confessor or two to the glorious cause of Infidelity. This put their Successors on their guard; or, what was better, gave them a pretence to affect it. From henceforth you hardly saw an Infidel-book which was not introduced with a mysterious reserve; with the obligations the Reader had to these servants of truth, for venturing so far in his service, while the Secular arm hung so fearfully over them; with the disadvantages their cause now lay under, while it could be but half explained and half supported; and with the wonders they would do by

by Powers they had in reserve, when a little more *Christian Liberty* should suffer them to be drawn out. This miserable Crambe made so constant a part of our diet, and had been dislied out from time to time with so little variety, that it grew both offensive and ridiculous; for what could more provoke our spleen or our laughter than to feign an apprehension of the Magistrate's resentment, after they had written at their ease for almost a whole century together, with the most uncontrolled and unbridled licence?

In such a state of things, would you easily believe his Lordship could pride himself in cooking up this cold kitchen-stuff, and serving it again and again, amidst so elegant an entertainment. "GASSENDI  
 " (says he) apprehended enemies much more formidable than mere Philosophers, because armed with  
 " ecclesiastical and civil power. It is this fear which  
 " has hindered those who have combated ERROR in  
 " all ages; and who COMBAT IT STILL, from taking  
 " all the ADVANTAGES which a FULL EXPOSITION  
 " OF THE TRUTH would give them. Their adversaries triumph as if the goodness of their cause had  
 " given them the Victory, when nothing has prevented their ENTIRE DEFEAT, or reduced their  
 " contest to a drawn battle, except this, that they  
 " have employed Arms of every kind, fair and foul,  
 " without any reserve; while the others have employed their offensive weapons with MUCH RESERVE, and have even BLUNTED THEIR EDGE  
 " when they used them [7]."

[7] Vol. iv. p. 163.

" The

“ The adversaries [of Religion] (says he again)  
 “ seldom speak out, or push the instances and argu-  
 “ ments they bring, so far as THEY MIGHT BE CAR-  
 “ RIED. Instead of which these ORTHODOX BUL-  
 “ LIES affect to triumph over men who employ but  
 “ part of their strength, &c. [8].”

What it is, which his Lordship, who affects to tread in the steps of these cautious men, keeps thus hid and is so shy of producing, is not easy to guess. But

“ Sous cet air capable où l'on ne comprend rien,  
 “ S'il cache un honnête homme, il se cache tres-bien.

However, having (after his Masters) thus feigned a fear, he feigns all the obliquity and doubling, which fear produces. He professes to believe the Mission of Christ, tho' founded on the Dispensation of Moses, a Dispensation he ridicules and execrates: He professes to believe the doctrines of Christ, tho' he rejects his gift of life and immortality; He professes to believe him the Saviour of the World, tho' he laughs at the doctrine of Redemption which constitutes the essence of that character.

Well fare the *New Historian of Great Britain*; who having writ without controul against Miracles, and even the very Being of a God, gratefully acknowledges the blessing; and owns that *We now enjoy TO THE FULL that liberty of the Press which is so NECESSARY in every Monarchy confined by legal limitations* [9]. Nor is it, let me tell you. the worst part of the observation, that tho' the *Monarch* should be *confined by legal limitations*, yet the *Writer for the Press* should not.

[8] Vol. iii. p. 273.

[9] *The History of Great Britain*, Vol. i. p. 213.



It would be endless to enter into his Lordship's small Arts of controversy ; yet it may not be amiss to touch upon one or two of them, such I mean as are of more general use and best disposed for service.

The first is, *To honour the name when you have taken away the thing* : As thus, To express the highest devotion to God, when you have deprived him of his moral attributes :— the greatest zeal for RELIGION, while you are undermining a future state ; — and the utmost reverence for REVELATION, when you have stripped it of Miracles and Prophecies.

2. A second is, *To dishonour Persons and Opinions the most respectable, by putting them into ill Company, or by joining them with discredited follies*. Thus, Divines and Atheists ; Clarkians and Malebranchians, are well paired, and always shewn together : In like manner, The Propositions, *that the world was made for man, and that man was made for happiness*, are to be boldly represented as inseparable parts of the same System. From whence, these advantages follow, that if an Atheist be odious, a Malebranchian mad, and the proposition of the World's being made for man, absurd ; the odium, the madness, and the absurdity fall equally on the Divines, on Dr. Clarke, and on the proposition, that man was made for happiness.

3. A third is, *To bring the abuse of a thing in discredit of the thing itself*. Thus the visions of the Rabbins are made to confute JUDAISM ; Popery and School-learning, to decry the discipline and doctrine of CHRISTIANITY ; and the dreams of Malebranche, Leibnitz, and Berkeley, to confute the waking thoughts of CUDWORTH, CLARKE, WOLLASTON, and BAXTER : For his Lordship is just such a Confuter of *Metaphysics*, as  
that

that Man would be of *Ethics* or *Chemistry*, who should content himself with exposing the absurdities of the Stoics, and the whimsies of the Alchemists, and yet fraudulently forget that there are such Authors, as CICERO and BOERHAAVE. — To overturn a FUTURE STATE, he employs all the superstitious fables of the Poets and the People, concerning it: To discredit REVELATION, he enumerates all the Impostors, and Pretenders to revelation in all ages: And to dishonour DIVINE WORSHIP, he is very particular in describing the Rites and Ceremonies of the antient Church of Egypt, and the modern Church of Rome. In a word, you are sure to find, on these occasions, every sort of topic, but what a sober and intelligent Reader would require; *Considerations drawn from the nature of the thing itself.*

You expect, however, that when the ABUSES of things have done him this service, so as to stand, where he has placed them, for the *things themselves*, He would for once, at least, spare the AUTHORS of the abuse, if it were only for the sake of carrying on the fraud. But you expect more than you will find. His Lordship can, in the same breath, call the abuses of Revelation and the Gospel, by the names of Revelation and the Gospel, and rail at that Divine, or at that Church, which has introduced those abuses.

Thus far, for a specimen of his Lordship's *Arts of Controversy*. But as a good Mimic is commonly a bad Actor, and a good Juggler a bad Mechanic; so an artful Caviller is as often a very poor Reasoner.

You will not be surprized therefore, if, in examining his Lordship's Philosophic Character, under the several heads of his INGENUITY, his TRUTH, his  
CON-

CONSISTENCY, his LEARNING, and his REASONING, you find him not to make so good a figure, as in the *professed arts* of Controversy.

I. Of his INGENUITY, which comes first, I shall be very short: For his *Arts of Controversy*, of which you have had a taste, are one continued example of it.

1. Speaking of the Christians of the Apostolic age, he thus represents their character and manners. “Notwithstanding the *sanctity* of their *profession*, the  
“GREATEST CRIMES, even that of INCEST, were  
“practised amongst them [10].” Is it possible, (you ask) that his Lordship should give credit to the exploded calumnies of the Pagans and Apostates here alluded to? Think better of his sense: he alludes to no such matter. St. PAUL is his Authority: and on the Apostle’s accusation he grounds his Charge. This surprises you the more. It may be so: for philosophers, as well as Poets, of a certain rank, aim at nothing but (as *Bays* expresses it) to *elevate and surprise*. Who would not conclude from this account that the first Christians began their *profession* in a total corruption of manners; and, like the Magi of old, intermarried with their Mothers and Daughters? It would never be imagined, that the simple fact, as St. Paul states it, in his first and second Epistles to the Corinthians, was but barely this, That a certain man (whether before or after his conversion, we know not) had married his Father’s wife; and, on the Apostle’s reprehension, convinced and ashamed of his folly, had repented and made satisfaction to the Church for the scandal he had occasioned.

[10] Vol. iv. p. 513.

2. Again,

2. Again, this *First Philosophy* tells us, that when Jesus speaks of *legions of Angels*, it is the language of *Paganism*; but when Lord BOLINGBROKE speaks of *numberless created intelligences superior to man*, it is the language of *Nature*: for, this doctrine of INTELLIGENCIES, his Lordship assures us, is *founded on what we know of actual existence*. We are led to it by plain, direct, unforced ANALOGY. But the doctrine of ANGELIC LEGIONS, if you will believe him, *stands on no other foundation, philosophically speaking, than of a MERE POSSIBLE existence of such spirits, as are admitted for divers THEOLOGICAL USES* [11]. But why this different measure for himself and his friends? The last words may let us into the secret. His *Philosophical Intelligencies* are a very harmless race; but the *Gospel Legions* are much given to *theological mischief*. *Ministring Angels* bring in, what he can by no means away with, a particular, and *moral* providence. God's *physical* Providence, and the *civil* Providence of the Magistrate, make the only Government he can relish. Now his *Intelligencies*, like Epicurus's Gods, are still, as they should be, at an idle end; but *Angels* are busy and meddling; indeed, too head-strong to be trusted under his Lordship's Philosophic Administration.

You cannot, however, but be pleased to find, that the method of reasoning by *Analogy*, which you had cause to believe his Lordship had totally discarded, from the hard language he has so often bestowed upon it, is brought again into favour, and now does wonders. For, it not only opens the door to his Lordship's *Intelligencies*, by a *plain, direct, and unforced ap-*



plication, but, as you will see under the next head, it shuts it against Jesus Christ's.

3. "I only intend to shew (says his Lordship) that since men have not admitted, in favour of Revelation, a System of PHYSICS that is inconsistent with philosophic truth, there is no reason for admitting, in favour of the same revelation, a System of PNEUMATICS that is so, too [12]."

Now the Friends of Revelation say, this is a mere begging the question. The reasoning, when fairly represented, stands thus,—“Divines reject the Scripture System of PHYSICS, which THEY hold to be false, therefore, they should reject the Scripture-System of PNEUMATICS, which HIS LORDSHIP holds to be false.”—Indeed, they conceive the argument to be no better than if one should say——because Politicians, in speaking of the first source of civil regimen, have called it the *primum mobile*, alluding to the old erroneous System of *Astronomy*; and because they have talked too of a *balance of Power*, alluding to the true principles of *Mechanics*; therefore, if we reject their System of *Astronomy*, we should reject their System of *Mechanics* likewise.

II. Thus much for this noble Philosopher's *Ingenuity*. Give me leave to lead you next and bring you to a place where you may have an advantageous view of his TRUTH, the very Soul of Philosophy.

1. "The Christian Theology (says he) has derived a prophane licence from the Jewish, which Divines have rendered so familiar and so habitual, that Men BLASPHEME without knowing they blas-

[12] Vol. iv. p. 181.

pheme,

“ pheme, and that their very devotion is IMPIOUS.  
 “ The licence I mean is that of reasoning and of  
 “ speaking of the divine, as of the human, nature,  
 “ operations, and proceedings ; sometimes with, and  
 “ sometimes without the salvo of those distinguishing  
 “ epithets and forms of speech, which can, in very  
 “ few instances, distinguish enough. The Jewish  
 “ Scriptures ascribe to God, not only corporeal ap-  
 “ pearance, but corporeal action, and all the instru-  
 “ ments of it ; eyes to see, ears to hear, mouth and  
 “ tongue to articulate, hands to handle, and feet to  
 “ walk. DIVINES TELL US INDEED that we are  
 “ not to understand all this according to the LITERAL  
 “ signification. The meaning is, they say, that God  
 “ has a power to execute all those acts, to the effect-  
 “ ing of which, these parts, in us, are instrumental.  
 “ The literal signification is, indeed, abominable,  
 “ and the FLIMSY ANALOGICAL VEIL, thrown over  
 “ it, is stolen from the wardrobe of EPICURUS ; for  
 “ he taught, that the Gods had not literally bodies,  
 “ but something like to bodies, *quasi corpus* : not  
 “ blood, but something like to blood, *quasi sangui-*  
 “ *nem* [13].”

“ DIVINES say, that God has no body nor any thing  
 like to body, but is IMMATERIAL. EPICURUS said, that  
 his God had not a gross earthly body, but something  
 like to that body, and was MATERIAL. Yet “ Divines  
 have stolen their *flimsy analogical veil* from the ward-  
 robe of *Epicurus*.” Truly a very subtle theft ;  
 which extracts MATTER from *figurative expression* !  
 and well suited to his Lordship's leger-de-main, which

draws an *analogical veil* out of a *metaphor*. Indeed, to fit it the better to *Epicurus's wardrobe*, he makes it but a *flimsy one*.

But, let us now observe, the various shifts he was reduced to, in order to support his principal calumny, that *Divines stole from Epicurus the method of explaining the nature of the Godhead*. He says, when the Jewish Scriptures had given God a Body, the Divines found out that it was not to be understood literally. They had been strange Divines had they not found it out, when these Scriptures declare that God is a SPIRIT, or *immaterial*; in contradistinction to *body* or MATTER. And the best of it is, that in other places, (as we have seen just before) his Lordship quarrels with the Scriptures on this very account, for their System of PNEUMATICS. Now what could these Divines conclude, but that where the Scriptures describe God's actions, in accommodation to the gross conceptions of men, they are to be understood figuratively. But this would not serve his Lordship's purpose; which was, to convict the Divines of nonsense and prevarication. He, therefore, turns, what every body else calls METAPHOR, which is a figure of speech, into ANALOGY, which is a mode of reasoning, — a *flimsy analogical veil*: and Epicurus's ANALOGY, (that the Gods had not earthly bodies but something like them, that is to say, *material*) he turns into a METAPHOR. *Epicurus* (says he) *taught that the Gods had not LITERALLY bodies*. Epicurus's question was not about literal or figurative expression; but about similar and dissimilar things. — But You have enough, You say, of this great Restorer of TRUTH, and Reformer of REA-

344 A VIEW of LORD BOLINGBROKE'S  
REASON. I will therefore be as short as possibly I  
can, on this head.

2. THE JEWS (his Lordship tells us) SUPPOSED  
CRUELTY TO BE ONE OF THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE  
DEITY [14]. — These very JEWS themselves say,  
*That the Lord is gracious and full of compassion; slow to  
anger and of great mercy: That he is good to all; and  
his tender mercies are over ALL HIS WORKS [15]: That  
his mercy endureth for EVER [16]: That the EARTH is  
full of the goodness and mercy of the Lord [17]: That  
his mercy is from EVERLASTING TO EVERLASTING*  
[18]. --- Now, which of them will You believe?

3. “ Superstition (says his Lordship) impersonated  
“ *Chance* under the name of FORTUNE: and this chime-  
“ rical Divinity was supposed to direct arbitrarily all  
“ the events, whose causes were not apparent, or  
“ which exceeded in good or ill, the expectations of  
“ men. The Heathens accounted, by it, for past  
“ events; consulted it about future; and referred  
“ themselves to it in doubtful cases. It is strange  
“ that such SUPERSTITIONS, instead of being confined  
“ to the Heathen world, should have been as PRE-  
“ VALENT amongst God’s chosen People, both Jews  
“ and Christians; and should be scarce exploded at  
“ this hour. It is stranger still, that a RECOURSE TO  
“ THE DECISION OF CHANCE should be expressly  
“ commanded in the Old Testament, and occasionally  
“ countenanced in the New, even on so important an  
“ occasion as the election of an Apostle in the place  
“ of Judas Iscariot [19]”.

[14] Vol. v. p. 507.

[15] Ps. cxlv. ver. 8, 9.

[16] Chron. Jer. Esra, Psalms, &c.

[17] Ps. xxxiii. ver. 5. cxix. ver. 64.

[18] Ps. c. ver. 5. --- ciii. ver. 17. [19] Vol. iii. p. 477.



The assertion, you see, is, 1st, that the *Jews* and *Christians*, as well as the *Heathens*, impersonated *Chance* under the name of *Fortune*: and 2dly, that their having recourse to *Lots* was having recourse to the decision of *Fortune*.

As to the first, it is so remote from all truth, That the custom of the Jewish People, in referring all events to *God* and to him only and immediately, has given a handle to *Spinoza*, *Toland*, and others, to bring in question the very existence of an *extraordinary* providence in the mosaic Dispensation; in which, to observe it, by the way, and with the abhorrence it ought to excite, they have had too many Followers amongst the Divines who have written against the *Divine Legation*.

As to the second, we must consider that *Lots* are of three distinct kinds.

One sort is a civil balloting; of general use in States to prevent intrigues and partialities. *SORTEM posuissent*, says *Tacitus*, *ne ambitioni aut inimicitii locus foret*.

Another, is a superstitious appeal to the imaginary Deity, *Chance* or *Fortune*.

And there is yet another, which is a reference of the event to Heaven; and this, by God's own direction and appointment.

Of the second, and only reprehensible sort, Revelation, as we have just now shewn, is entirely innocent.

Of the first, his Lordship, as a Politician, will not disallow the use.

His quarrel, as a Philosopher, is with the third. And he has no way to support his charge, but by sophistically reducing it into the second; that is, representing it as having all the superstition of the second. Now in this he begs the question. — Are the Jewish and Christian Revelations true or false? False,

says his Lordship, for several reasons; and, amongst the rest, for this, they authorize the *Pagan superstition* of Lots. — What made the Pagan superstition of Lots? Their being the inventions of men, while they pretended to be of divine appointment. --- Very well: but the Jewish and Christian Lots were of divine appointment. Pretended to be so, if you please, says his Lordship; and this puts them into the condition of Pagan lots. --- Softly, my Lord; Your argument must not take that for granted, which your argument is employed to prove.

But his Lordship had his head full of that Master Sophism of the FIRST PHILOSOPHY, which concludes against the reason or justice of a DIVINE COMMISSION from the *abuse* of it; and because subsequent Impostors pretended to the like Authority. For, according to the Logic and Theology of these Gentlemen, GOD must not cast out DEVILS, because it afterwards gave a handle for Popish Priests to juggle with their *Exorcisms*. He must not direct a thing to be decided by LOTS, because a village-conjurer would afterwards employ the *sieve and shears*. He must not make use of HUMAN INSTRUMENTS in punishing a People abandoned to unnatural crimes, because an *Arabian Impostor* would afterwards pretend to the like Commission. He must not institute a multifarious RITUAL, tho' it was to keep a People separate, and to secure them from the contagion of Idolatry, because wicked Priests or Politicians would establish *superstitious ceremonies* to keep Communities enslaved to civil or religious Tyrants. These scrupulous Gentlemen, when their hand was in, had done well to tell us, that GOD should not have given men Riches, Knowledge, and Power, because there have been

such as CHARTRES, SPINOZA, and MULY MOLECH.

But to go on with his Lordship's *veracity*.

4. He asserts, that *they* [the Jews] *made beasts ACCOUNTABLE LIKE MORAL AGENTS* [19]. He is aware that *to mitigate this absurdity*, as he expresses it, both the Jewish and Christian Commentators say, that the pain inflicted on beasts was to shew the heinousness of human crimes---to blot out the memory of a great scandal---to punish the owner for his negligence. But he despises all these solutions, as so many pitiful evasions. Would you believe now that in the same breath, and merely to shew his reading, he should confute his own false assertion? *I know nothing more absurd* (says he) *than this, except a custom or law at ATHENS. The WEAPONS by which a murder had been committed were brought into Court; as if they, too, were liable to punishment; and the STATUE that had killed a man by it's fall, was, by a solemn sentence of that wise people, the Thasii, founded on a Law of DRACO, cast into the sea.* Now what was his Lordship to prove? That Moses was so ignorant a Law-giver, and the Jews so stupid a people, that *they made beasts accountable like moral agents*. And he illustrates it by a law of the most celebrated Legislator and of the politest People upon Earth, Draco and the Athenians; who, just in the same manner, made even *weapons and statues, moral agents*. The Athenians and Draco perhaps would have said, that they enacted these laws to shew their abhorrence of murder, and to punish the careless erecter of a statue. Mere SHIFTS AND EVASIONS, says his Lordship.

[19] Vol. v. p. 7.



But what I chiefly wonder at is, that when his Lordship was in so good a train, he had not told us, that the Stupidity of these *Jews* went still further, even to imagine *Walls* and *Garments* [1] subject to human Diseases. Here he would have had a little truth on his side, and a much better subject for his contempt. This is only a word to the Wise, and for his Followers to improve upon. Let them try what they can make of it, and then they may hear further of this matter.

5. Again, "God (says his Lordship) was FORCED "to indulge the Jews in several SUPERSTITIOUS "prejudices [2], as learned Divines *scruple not* to "affirm." Had *learned Divines* no more *scruples* in *affirming*, than his Lordship, I should hardly have thought them worth a defence.

What they *scruple not* to say is this— That IDOLATROUS WORSHIP was never so entirely corrupt, but that some of it's Rites were still rational, or, at least, continued innocent; and might be used in the service of the true God *without superstition*: That the Israelites being fond of Egyptian ceremonies, God indulged them in the use of such as were harmless; and of no other. For this, his Lordship calls them, *bold Judges of the principles and views of God's proceedings* [3]. But in what does their temerity consist? In teaching that God always chuses to take the ordinary means, before the extraordinary, when either may be made indifferently to serve his purpose. And that, therefore, he saw fit to indulge the Jews in their fondness for old habits; and to turn their propensities for the Egyptian Rites, upon such only as were innocent; rather than to

[1] Levit. chap. xiv.

[2] Vol. iv. p. 30.

[3] P. 32.



give them new habits, and new propensities, by a miraculous impression on their minds, which should over-rule their wills and affections.

6. WE KNOW (says his Lordship) THAT ALL THEIR [the Jews] SACRED WRITINGS WERE COMPILED AFTER THEIR CAPTIVITY [4]. Balzac speaks of a certain Critic who used to boast, that no body, besides God and himself, knew the meaning of such or such a verse in Persius. His Lordship's [WE KNOW] is just such another revelation. Only the Critic's meaning might be true; but the Philosopher's knowledge is certainly false. A falsehood so notorious, that I am in some doubt whether this stricture belong properly to his dogmatic or to his laconic style. For *we know*, may signify--*We know that the* SPURIOUS ESDRAS *says so.* And then he gets the two things he most wanted; a very useful Truth, and a very noble Authority.

7. "The Justice, [of the great day] (says his Lordship) IF IT MAY BE CALLED JUSTICE, most certainly requires that rewards and punishments should be measured out, in every particular case, in proportion to the merit and demerit of each individual. But instead of this, it is assumed, conformably to the doctrine of PLATO, that the righteous are set on the *right hand* of the Judge, and the wicked, on the *left*; from whence, they are transported into Heaven, or plunged into Hell. They are tried *individually*, they SEEM to be rewarded or punished *collectively*, without any distinction of the particular cases, which have been so solemnly determined, and without any proportion observed be-

[4] Vol. iv. p. 339.

“tween the various degrees of merit and demerit, of  
 “innocence and guilt, in the application of these re-  
 “wards and punishments [5].”

*If it may be called Justice---* Marry, well thought of. For who knows but as this is the general day of reckoning, and that men see, such a day will be wanted, rather than be without any, they might be foolish enough to take up with this? --- *They seem to be rewarded or punished collectively.* Should I seriously quote the Words of Jesus, --- *The servant which knew his Lord's will, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes. But he, that knew not, and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes* [6]; Should I seriously, I say, quote these words, to confute the noble Writer's observation, that men at the great Tribunal *seem to be rewarded or punished collectively*, he would, I suppose, have been amongst the first to laugh at my simplicity; at least, the intelligent Reader would not thank me for my diligence.

III. I proceed now to his Lordship's CONSISTENCY; the next feature in his philosophic Countenance. You have seen with what bravery he contradicts all others; you shall now see with what greater bravery, he contradicts himself.

There be two things which characterise the reasoning part of his Lordship's writings, (if any part of so declamatory a work can be called *reasoning*) and distinguish them from all other men's; His incessant REPETITIONS, and his incessant CONTRA-

[5] Vol. v. p. 495.

[6] Luke xii. 47, 48.

**DICTIONS.** Indeed, these beauties beget one another. For when a Writer can furnish out no better an entertainment than a parcel of groundless fables, he will be much subject to repetition; and every repetition as likely to be graced with a variation; for his Tales having neither foundation in Fact, nor measure in Truth, what is produced for admiration; will be always new modeling for convenience, as best suits his present passions and purposes.

His **REPETITIONS** I leave for the refreshment of those who are disposed to read him through: This short specimen of his **CONTRADICTIONS** I propose for the amusement of more cursory readers.

But as *professed Answerers* never abuse our patience and understandings more than in this kind of discoveries; it may not be amiss, to say a word or two of a species of confutation, which such men are always ready to urge, on the very slightest grounds, for the convenience which attends it; the convenience of making an Author confute himself, when the Answerer is unable so to do.

Sometimes the imaginary inconsistency arises out of the slow conception or cloudy apprehension, of the Answerer, when the Author is too brief or too refined: sometimes from the less accurate expression of the Author, when the Answerer is too subtle or too captious. It sometimes arises from the Answerer's prejudices; and sometimes again from the Author's prevarication.

Nay, which is stranger still, the very exactness of the distinctions, and correctness of the terms, (and the correcter and exacter they will be in proportion to the Author's knowledge of words and things) the

more shall the discourse abound with these fancied contradictions. For a heavy or a precipitate Answerer will never be able to distinguish things SIMILAR from things IDENTICAL.

Prejudice for a set of Opinions may make an Answerer mistake some things to be in Nature, what they are only in the combinations of the Schools; and finding them considered differently, that is, under other associations, by his Adversary, who may have no prejudices, or prejudices of another kind, he will be extreme ready to call these differences, by the more commodious name of *contradictions*.

Lastly, the Author, if he be a FREETHINKER, has a right by ancient custom [7] to two or three, or indeed, to two or three dozen of Characters, as may best suit his purpose, or errand: A practice, which, being begun amongst us Moderns, under a want of Liberty, was continued out of Licentiousness, and is still kept up for the sake of it's Conveniencies. Now if such a One be too lazy to assume a personated Character in form, then, (as Lord Shaftsbury observes) *a dull kind of IRONY which amuses all alike*, becomes his favorite figure of speech. But with such a Writer, an inattentive or plain-dealing Answerer may give himself much trouble, to collect his contradictions, and all, to be well laughed at for his pains.

I have honestly marked out these various delusions, that You may have it in your power to detect me, should I be tempted to impose upon You, myself. Not that I claim much merit from this fair dealing; for his Lordship's contradictions are so gross and

[7] See CELSUS and PORPHYRY.



substantial, so frequent and obvious, that I was under no temptation to make out my specimen by any thing doubtful or ambiguous.

1. “ I could not (says his Lordship) have discovered, as NEWTON did, that *universal law* of corporeal Nature, which he has demonstrated. But further than that, he could go no more than I; nor discover the ACTION OF THE FIRST CAUSE, BY WHICH THIS LAW WAS IMPOSED ON ALL BODIES, AND IS MAINTAINED IN THEM [8].” Here he owns ATTRACTION not to be a REAL or essential, PROPERTY OF MATTER, but *the action of the first cause* upon it. Yet in another place he observes, that ATTRACTION MAY BE, notwithstanding all the SILLY abstract reasoning to the contrary, A REAL PROPERTY OF MATTER [9].” The truth is that, for any thing his Lordship knew of this *universal Law*, Attraction might be Action, Passion, Magic, or the Man in the Moon. He only followed his Leaders. Mr. COLLINS displayed the same Philosophic spirit in speaking of *gravity*, the effect of Attraction: And CLARKE’S animadversion on him will exactly suit his Lordship.—“ Not content to have erred so very grossly in the first foundation of all natural Philosophy; you could not forbear professing further, that *you have often admired that GRAVITATION should be esteemed a matter of such difficulty amongst Philosophers; and that you think it to be so evident and necessary an effect of matter in constant motion perpetually striking one part against another, that you wonder every body should not see it.* I

[8] Vol. iv. p. 8.

[9] Vol. iii. p. 547.

“suppose the rest of the world will no less *admire* at  
 “*you*, for imagining that, by so slight an admiration  
 “you could at once set aside all the propositions in  
 “that most excellent book [the *Principia* of New-  
 “ton] wherein it is made appear by strictly mathe-  
 “cal demonstrations, drawn from the Laws of mo-  
 “tion, now agreed on by Mathematicians, and  
 “established by experiments, and from the Phæno-  
 “mena of the heavenly bodies; that the present  
 “operations of nature, depending upon gravitation,  
 “cannot possibly be mechanical effects of *matter in*  
 “*constant motion perpetually striking one part against an-*  
 “*other.* — Upon the whole, all that you have ad-  
 “vanced about *gravitation* is such marvellous reason-  
 “ing, to be made use of in the present age, after so  
 “many great discoveries, founded upon experience,  
 “and even mathematical demonstration; that tho’ I  
 “have no cause at all to be displeased with you for  
 “arguing in such a manner; yet, I believe, your  
 “readers cannot but think you might very well have  
 “forborn going out of your way, to give so very  
 “disadvantageous a representation of *your own Phi-*  
 “*losophy* [10].”

2. In one place, his Lordship tells us, *that the*  
*right of the Israelites to the Land of Canaan was found-*  
*ed on the PROPHECY of Noah:* in another, that it  
*was founded on the PROMISE to Abraham,* Second  
 thoughts are best. He seems to come a little nearer  
 the truth here. For tho’ a *Promise* may intitle to a  
 possession, I do not see how a *Prophecy* can do more

[10] Clarke’s third defence of the immateriality and natural immortality of the Soul, against Collins.

than

than foretel one : Unless his Lordship has some ethical engine of a new invention, to extend the grounds of *Obligation*, unknown to GROTIUS, SELDEN, and CUMBERLAND ; yet they travelled for it ; and, if we may believe his Lordship's account of their famous *Journey to Paris*, spared for no room in laying foundations. But, in this affair of the PROMISE, his Lordship *insinuates* an untruth ; which is a great deal meaner than to *tell* one : For he represents the favour as capricious, arbitrary, and without any reason assigned.

3. “ The Jews (says his Lordship) as often as “ they made God descend from Heaven, and as much “ as they made him reside on earth, were *far from* “ *cloathing him with corporeity*, and imputing corporeal vices to him [11].” Yet two or three pages forward, so prevalent is his lust of abuse, that he expressly says, *they DID cloath him with CORPOREITY*. These are his words : “ The Jewish Scriptures ascribe “ to God not only corporeal appearance, but corporeal action, and all the instruments of it ; eyes to “ see, ears to hear, mouth and tongue to articulate, “ hands to handle, and feet to walk [12].” You will say, perhaps, that his Lordship meant, the Scriptures indeed ascribed all this to God ; but in a figurative, not in a literal, sense. I would have said so too, but that his Lordship goes on rating the Divines for understanding this scripture-representation in a figurative sense. Which, too, he shews does not mend the matter ; for this figurative sense, it seems, was stolen from Epicurus. Now we know that Epicurus

[11] Vol. v. p. 515.

[12] P. 519.

certainly believed the Gods to be CORPOREAL, if he believed any, tho' made of somewhat a finer stuff than mere mortal bodies. "Divines (says his Lordship) tell us indeed, that we are not to understand all this according to the literal signification, &c. But this *flimsy theological veil* thrown over the literal signification is stolen from the wardrobe of Epicurus [13]." His Lordship's wardrobe seems to be as rich as Epicurus's, in VEILS: a little after, we have a very curious one, *a thin and trite VEIL of analogy*: and he is ready to lend them to Divines, as Lucullus did his Cloaks to the Players, by the dozen.

But whenever his Lordship speaks of CHRISTIANITY, a kind of fatality attends him; and then his contradictions have neither stop nor measure.

4. Speaking of the *last Supper*, he says, "The person by whom it was instituted is represented sometimes under images, that render it impossible to frame any, of the EFFICACY, or even of the INSTITUTION of this Sacrament. Christ is a *vine*, he is a *rock*, nay he is a *coat*, according to St. Paul," &c. [14]. And yet no further off than four pages, he says, "There is no one [figurative expression] perhaps in the whole Gospel, less liable to any equivocal sense than that which Christ employed when he said, *This is my body*, and *This is my blood*, in the very act of giving bread and wine to his Disciples, who were at supper with him, just before his death, for a remembrance of which, this ceremony of a supper was then instituted by

[13] P. 519.

[14] Vol. iv. p. 592.

"him.



“ him. The figure was easy, the application natural, and they could not understand the expression literally [15].”

His Lordship, as you may well think, has often different purposes to serve by his contradictions. Here his purpose is one and the same; to discredit a Gospel-Institution: which is equally done by shewing it to be mysterious, obscure, and incomprehensible, where it pretends to clearness and precision; and low, trite, and mean, where it pretends to something august, peculiar, and in the highest degree efficacious. All the fault in this case, except his Lordship's most profound ignorance of the nature of the Rite, [16], is his bringing these two curious observations so near to one another.

5. “ Christianity [says his Lordship] as the Saviour published it, was full and sufficient to all the purposes of it. It's simplicity and plainness shewed that it was designed to be the religion of mankind, and manifested likewise the divinity of it's original [17].” This is very gracious. Yet the Scene changes with his Lordship's humour: and the *simplicity* and *plainness* now become *dark*, *ambiguous* and *incomprehensible*. “ That there are many ambiguous expressions, many dark sayings, in the Gospel; MANY DOCTRINES, which reason could never have taught, nor is able to comprehend, now they are taught, cannot be denied [18].”

[15] P. 596.

[16] See what is said of it, in the xth discourse, *on the principles of Nat. and Rev. Religion*, preached at Lincoln's Inn.

[17] Vol. iv. p. 450.

[18] Vol. iv. p. 318.

But

But let him recover his temper, and Christianity brightens up with it, and we once again see it restored to his good graces. “The system of Religion” (says he) which Christ published, and his Evangelists recorded, is a compleat system to all the purposes of true Religion, natural and revealed. It contains all the duties of the former, it enforces them by asserting the *divine* Mission of the Publisher, who proved his assertion at the same time by his *miracles* [19].” But it is only restored to be as suddenly deposed. Its birth is so far from being *divine*, that he insinuates it to be *spurious*, and neither better nor worse than a kind of Bastard-Platonism. “It is astonishing to observe the strange conformity between PLATONISM and GENUINE CHRISTIANITY itself, such as it is taught in the original Gospel. We need not stand to compare them here: Particular instances of conformity will occur often enough. In general, the *Platonic* and *Christian* Systems have a very near resemblance, *QUALIS DECET ESSE SORORUM* [20].” He then goes on to shew, that the common Parent of both was not REASON but ENTHUSIASM.

Enthusiasm, you will say, is now fairly brought to bed of twins, PLATONISM and CHRISTIANITY. No such matter. *Genuine Christianity was taught of God* [1]. — “As it stands in the Gospel it contains a compleat system of Religion: it is in truth the system of natural Religion [2].” Well then, we shall hear no more of this *sisterly resemblance to Platonism*. Perhaps not. But you shall hear, and

[19] Vol. iv. p. 314.

[20] Vol. iv. p. 340.

[1] Vol. iv. p. 348-9.

[2] Vol. iv. p. 316.

that soon too, of as good a thing. This Christianity is at last found to be derived from JUDAISM; that very JUDAISM, which, he had told us, was it self raised on THEFT and MURDER — “On the Religion of the Jews, and on the Authority of their Scriptures, Christianity was founded [2].” Again, “They who prefer the example and doctrine of CHRIST to those of PAUL, will find reason to think that the Messiah intended rather to reform and to graft upon Judaism, than to abolish it [3].” And again; He accuses PAUL for preaching a *new Gospel*, called by the Apostle, *my Gospel*: And this new, or peculiar Gospel, his Lordship tells us *was the Mystery of God’s purpose to TAKE IN THE GENTILES, so INCONSISTENT with the declarations and practice of JESUS* [4]. Yet for all this, had Christ’s Gospel been propagated with the same simplicity with which it was originally taught by CHRIST, it would (he tells us) have been to the unspeakable benefit of MANKIND [5].”

Let us now sum up his Lordship’s Instructions to his Disciples, concerning the GOSPEL OF JESUS. “It is simple, clear, and of divine original:” But it is, at the same time, “dark, ambiguous, incomprehensible; and like it’s Sister Platonism, the Issue of Enthusiasm.”—As Jesus published it, the Gospel is a *complete System of Natural Religion*, and tends to the *unspeakable benefit of mankind*: But as Jesus published it, the Gospel was only a *reform* of that Imposture *Judaism*, on which it was *founded*, and was intended

[2] Vol. iv. p. 317.

[3] Vol. iv. p. 350.

[4] Vol. iv. p. 323.

[5] Vol. iv. p. 316.

by Jesus to be *confined to the Jewish People*; it being PAUL, who, in direct contradiction to the declarations and the practises of Jesus, turned it into a compleat System of Natural Religion, and made it tend to the *unspeakable benefit of mankind*, by extending it to the Gentiles." And thus he goes on contradicting his own assertions, as fast as he advances them, from one end of his ESSAYS to the other.

The same self-contradictions, which confute his calumnies against Christianity itself, still follow him when he comes to speak of the PROPAGATORS of Christianity.

6. "He [says this noble Lord] who compares  
 " the Epistles of JAMES, of PETER, and JOHN, such  
 " as we have them, with those of PAUL, and all  
 " these with the doctrines of the GOSPEL, will be  
 " perhaps of my opinion; at least he will have no  
 " ground to say of the THREE FIRST, that they  
 " were authors of NEW GOSPELS, as he will have  
 " grounds to say of the last, and as the last does in  
 " effect say of himself [6]." What was this *new Gospel*? It was, as we have seen just before, *the Mystery of God's purpose to take in the Gentiles*. JAMES, PETER, and JOHN, therefore, according to his Lordship, taught not this Mystery; so inconsistent, as he says, with the declarations and practice of Jesus. Yet soon after he confesses, that JAMES, PETER and JOHN, did teach this Mystery, and forsook CHRIST'S for PAUL'S NEW GOSPEL. For, speaking of the Council of Jerusalem, he says, *The APOSTLES had given no directions to insist that the GENTILES should or*

[6] Vol. iv. p. 320.

*should*



*should not, submit to circumcision, and to the yokes of the Law* [7]: Which necessarily implies a concession that THEY too were Authors of this new Gospel, the *Mystery of God's purpose to take in the Gentiles*. The taking in the Gentiles, we see, he supposes a thing agreed on by all the Apostles: and that, what was yet undone, was the settling the precise *terms* of their admission.

Our Unbelievers look so monstrously askint upon Religion, that prejudice with opposite rays is always disturbing and confounding it's own malignant aims. Yet, in general, it requires pains to fix the contradictions which spring out of these fugitive cross-lights. Commend me therefore to his Lordship, who brings his contradictions to a point; and requires nothing of you but eye-sight to see them in their full glare.

His *pro* and *con* then, being so near neighbours, we shall not be surprized to find them at last incorporated, as it were, into one another! as in the following instances.

7. "I much DOUBT [says his Lordship] whether  
 " the EVANGELISTS would understand the Epistles  
 " of St. PAUL, THO' ONE OF THEM WAS HIS  
 " SCRIBE [8]."—It was said of somebody, that he *believed against hope*: a matter of much mirth to our *first Philosophy-Men*. But what is that, to his Lordship's greater strength of mind, who can doubt against certainty! PAUL and LUKE agreed to preach the Gospel together: and not only so, but that LUKE's pen should be employed to convey their common sen-

[7] Vol. iv. p. 324.

[8] Vol. iv. p. 202.

timents,

162 A VIEW of LORD BOLINGBROKE'S  
timents, and adventures, to Posterity. And yet he  
questions whether LUKE understood PAUL'S EPI-  
STLES. Some body, I suppose, when he had pened  
this *doubt*, might tell him, that one of these Evan-  
gelists was Paul's Companion, his Amanuensis and  
Historian. But the observation was too good to be  
thrown away ; he therefore adds, with infinite dex-  
terity and address——*tho' one of them was his Scribe.*

8. Again, Speaking of the MORAL ATTRIBUTES,  
he observes, “ We make God so much a copy of  
“ man, that we design the worst, as well as the best  
“ of our own features, if I may so say, in our re-  
“ presentations of him : and, as common as it is,  
“ no unprejudiced thinking man can hear, without  
“ astonishment, our *perfections* and our *imperfections*  
“ imputed to the divine Being in the same breath,  
“ and by the same men ; with this difference at most,  
“ that the former are imputed directly, and the lat-  
“ ter sometimes under the THIN AND TRITE VEIL  
“ OF ANALOGY. In a Being thus constituted, they  
“ may well imagine that the moral virtues are the  
“ same as they are in our ideas : and Theology may  
“ easily deduce, from his attributes, the characters  
“ Theology has given them [9].”

*We cannot*, says his Lordship, *without astonishment*  
*see our perfections and our imperfections imputed to the di-*  
*vine Being.* His astonishment is all a sham. His  
very words prove that he well knew *imperfec-*  
*tions are not imputed.* For when he thus boldly  
affirms, *they are*, he was so twitched in conscience,  
that he was forced to add, *under the thin and trite veil*  
*of analogy* : That is, *not imputed.* For when Scripture

[9] Vol. v. p. 89.

speaks

speaks of *the out-stretched arm of God, and his all-seeing eye*, does it impute *arms and eyes* to God, in the sense it imputes *justice and goodness* to him? Yes, says he—*under the thin and trite veil of analogy*: i. e. Not in the same sense. As if we should say, His Lordship AFFIRMS under the *thin and trite veil of a DENIAL*.

This, Sir, is a very scanty specimen of his Lordship's CONTRADICTIONS. Yet no man appears to be more sensible of the disgrace which contradictions bring upon a Writer. For, speaking of the whole COLLEGE OF APOSTLES, he says, *These inconsistent Writers talk often a different language on the same subject; and CONTRADICT in one place what they have said in another* [10].

IV. His Lordship's profound LEARNING comes next to be considered.

1. The first instance I shall give is fetched from the very penetralia of the *first Philosophy*. "HUMAN knowledge is so entirely and solely derived from actual BEING, that, without actual Being, we should not have EVEN ONE of those simple ideas, whereof all the complex and abstract notions that TURN OUR HEADS are composed [11]."

Here, his Lordship cried *εὐγενεα*, and should have sacrificed a Bull for his discovery: which informs us of no less a truth than this, that *if Men had had no Being they would have had no sensation*: in other words, that *qualities cannot exist without a substance*: For if, by *actual Being* he did not take in the Thinker's own, the observation is false: a rational Being, tho' existing singly, will have yet the idea of his own existence.

[10] Vol. iv. p. 489.

[11] Vol. iii. p. 411.

But the observation is every way extraordinary. He supposes our *simple* ideas to be real ; he supposes our *complex* and *abstract* notions to be compounded of the *simple* ideas ; and yet he supposes that the composition has TURNED OUR HEADS. 'Till now, I understood it was *fantastic*, and not *real* knowledge, which *turned men's heads*. But I forget ; His Lordship found the *whole World in a frenzy* ; and then indeed it is hardly worth while to enquire what set them a going.

2. " The PAGANS [says his Lordship] do not appear to have interpolated the antient *Doctors* of Paganism ; nor is there any pretence to say that THEY have imposed any spurious books on the world, under the name of those *Doctors* [12]."

ORPHEUS and MERCURIUS TRISMEGISTUS were certainly *Pagan Doctors*, if ever there were any : And did his Lordship never hear, that the Books, Hymns, and Poems under their names, which are come down to us from times preceeding Christianity, were Pagan forgeries ? I will not insist upon the SYBLLINE ORACLES, which CICERO assures us had been interpolated, (for the Pagans interpolated their very forgeries) because I do not know to what conditions his Lordship confines the *Doctorate* in the pagan World ; or whether he admits the fair Sex to the honour of the Hood. However, let us not think him so unlearned as not to have heard of these forgeries. He had both heard of them, and considered them well : And as he is always for putting the saddle on the right horse ( as where he loads Divines with *atheism*) he charges all these iniquities on the CHRIS-

[12] Vol. iv. p. 195.



TIANS. “ It was, says he, to promote the Opinion,  
 “ that all the Mysteries of their [the Christian’s] Re-  
 “ ligion, had been revealed by the writings of *Pa-*  
 “ *gan Philosophers* many centuries before Christ, that  
 “ so many books were forged under the names of  
 “ *Mercurius Trismegistus*, of *Hystaspes*, of the SIBYLS,  
 “ and perhaps of others.” We are got a good way  
 towards Doctorating these old Women: They are  
 become *Philosophers*, we see.—But whether the Chris-  
 tians were the *only* forgers of *Sibylline Oracles* must be  
 left to be decided between Tully and his Lordship.  
 The truth is, and who, that understands Antiquity,  
 ever doubted of it! that some paganized Christians  
 learnt this trade of forging Books, under antient  
 names, from those whose Superstition they had left,  
 but not that Spirit of imposture which supported it.

3. “ The [greek] Historians, says his Lordship,  
 “ observing how fond their countrymen were of  
 “ those who writ Fables, turned History into Ro-  
 “ mance; and studied to make their relations mar-  
 “ vellous and agreeable, with little regard to truth,  
 “ in which they were encouraged, AFTER ALEX-  
 “ ANDER’S EXPEDITION INTO ASIA, by the DIF-  
 “ FICULTY of disproving any thing they said of  
 “ countries so remote [13].” A vulgar man, and  
 one of those his Lordship calls, Pedants, would have  
 said, — BEFORE ALEXANDER’S EXPEDITION: be-  
 cause the *difficulty* in a great measure ceased AFTER  
 that Conqueror had opened, and his Successors had  
 kept open, a communication with those *remote*  
*countries*.

[13] Vol. iv. p. 137--8.

4. He calls Aristotle's Logic, "the rules of a  
 " Dialectic that seemed to prove, and DID PROVE  
 " indifferently either in favor of truth or error [14]."  
 Exaggeration is his Lordship's favorite figure of  
 speech: but here it seems pushed a little too far;  
 for, not content with saying that Aristotle's *rules of*  
*sylogizing* (for that is what he means by the *rules of*  
*a dialectic*) *seemed to prove*, he will needs add, and  
 DID PROVE. Which shews such a knowledge of  
 Syllogism, as needed not the following words to set  
 it off. "It must not (says he) be imagined, that  
 " he who reasons, or seems, rather, to reason closely  
 " and consequentially, has therefore truth always  
 " on his side [15]." I desire to know who ever  
 thought he had, who did not mistake, as his Lord-  
 ship here seems to do, the art of *ranging* arguments,  
 for the Art of *finding* them? "No body, his *Master*  
 " *Locke* would tell him, can hinder, but that SYLLO-  
 " GISM, which was intended for the service of truth,  
 " will sometimes be made use of, against it. But it is  
 " NEVERTHELESS ON TRUTH'S SIDE, AND AL-  
 " WAYS TURNS UPON THE ADVERSARIES OF  
 " IT [16]."

5. Speaking of *Angels*, his Lordship thinks fit to  
 hazard this Observation: "There is another cause  
 " of this PNEUMATICAL MADNESS, [the belief of  
 " such Beings] the fondness of making *man* pass for  
 " one of those Beings that participated of the *divine*  
 " *Nature*. This had long possessed the heathen The-

[14] Vol. iv. p. 158.

[15] P. 159.

[16] Second Letter to the Bp. of Worcester, p. 31--2. 8vo.  
 Ed. 1697.

“ists; and IT POSSESSED THE CHRISTIANS WITH  
“MORE ADVANTAGE [17].”

This seems a demonstration that his Lordship either never read, or at least never understood, an antient Apologist. The truth is, there was not one extravagance in all Paganism, which afforded so much advantage to the primitive Christians, as this fond opinion of the antient Philosophers, that the human Soul was *a part or portion of the divine nature*; nor was there any, which they were more solicitous, and for a very important reason, [18] to expose: They laboured, indeed, with so much warmth, and sometimes with so little discretion, that it hath given a handle for some learned moderns to pretend, that all the antient Fathers believed the *natural mortality of the Soul* [19]. Well, but if the Christians were not *possessed with this fondness*, his Lordship will shew you, at least, they might have been possessed with it, and *to more advantage* too. But this part of his Lordship's philosophic Character, his *Argumentation*, I am not yet come to. However, as we are now upon the borders of it, you may not think it amiss to have it ushered in with this curious reason, which is to shew, that the impious notion of the human Soul's *participating of the divine nature, possessed, or at least might have possessed*, the Christians with *more advantage*, than it did the heathen Theists. Now, what do you think it is? You will hardly guess. It is, because *Christians are wont to ASSUME that man is compounded of body and soul* [20].

[17] Vol. iv. p. 478.

[18] See *Div. Leg.* Vol. i. part ii. p. 206, last Edit.

[19] See Dodwell on this Subject.

[20] Vol. iv. p. 478.

Well, it must needs be allowed, that till we *assume*, man has a *Soul*, we can never be *possessed* with an opinion that his *Soul* participates of the divine Nature. So much then is admitted, that since Christians hold, *man is composed of soul and body*, they may be *possessed with advantage*. But how it should be with *more advantage*, than the Heathens, I cannot comprehend. Did not the Heathens as well as Christians hold that man was composed of soul and body? We need not, I think, any other proof than this notion of *participation*, imputed to them: For they could not, sure, be so absurd to hold that *nothing might participate of something*. However, of this I will not be over-positive, since his Lordship tells us, they all laboured under an incurable PNEUMATICAL MADNESS.

V. Such an escape of his Lordship's Logic, must needs awaken us to expect great things from this last capital accomplishment of the *Philosopher*, his ART OF REASONING: to which, we are now arrived.

I. He will prove against LOCKE, that *the notion of Spirit involves more difficulty or obscurity in it than the notion of body*. Nay, he says *he will MAKE LOCKE PROVE THIS AGAINST HIMSELF, that we have more and clearer primary ideas belonging to body than we have of those belonging to immaterial spirit*. And thus he argues, "Primary ideas are the ideas of such qualities as exist always in the substance to which they belong, whether they are perceived or no. They are therefore essential to it, and productive, by their operations, of those secondary qualities which may be said only to exist in our perceptions of them. Of the first sort are solidity and extension, to mention



“ tion no others, the primary qualities, and, in our  
 “ ideas the essence of Matter, of which we can frame  
 “ no conception exclusively of them. THESE NOTIONS  
 “ I HAVE TAKEN FROM MR. LOCKE, and they lead  
 “ me to ask what the primary ideas are of spirit or  
 “ immaterial substance? The Primary idea, or the  
 “ essence of it, is THOUGHT; as body is the *extended*,  
 “ this is the thinking substance, SAYS DES CARTES.  
 “ THOUGHT then, ACTUAL THOUGHT, is the essence  
 “ of the soul or spirit, and, by consequence, so inse-  
 “ parable from it, that we cannot conceive the Soul  
 “ or Spirit to exist separately from, or exclusively of,  
 “ thought. But this I know to be untrue: and I may  
 “ well own, since Locke has owned the same, that I  
 “ have *one of those dull Souls that does not perceive itself*  
 “ *always to contemplate ideas* [1].”

You will naturally suspect him of foul play, when you find him employing the language of one Philosopher, to confute the sentiment of another. He is confuting LOCKE's assertion concerning the equal evidence of the primary qualities of *Body* and *Spirit*; and he takes DES CARTES's DEFINITION of the primary qualities of *Spirit*, to make good his point. In plain truth, he puts the change upon us: he uses *thought*, or *actual thinking*, for the *faculty of thinking*. It is this last, which is *essential* to the soul, and inseparable from it: It is this last, which being a *power*, is fitly predicated of an *Agent*; as *extension*, which is a *property*, is fitly predicated of a *Patient*. It is this last, which Locke understood to be the *primary idea of a spirit or immaterial substance*, when he said that *the no-*

[1] Vol. iii. p. 510. — 11.

*tion of Spirit involves no more difficulty nor obscurity in it than that of body: And it is this last, of which it may be truly said, that we cannot conceive the soul or spirit to exist separately from, or exclusively of it.*

2. His Lordship owns, that *it is above humanity to comprehend that virtue, whatever it be, whereby one Being acts upon another, and becomes a cause.* “Whatever knowledge (says he) we acquire of *apparent causes*, we can acquire none of *real casuality*: by which, I mean, that force, that power, that virtue, whatever it be, by which one Being acts on another, and becomes a cause. We may call this by different names, according to the different effects of it; but to know it in its first principles, to know the nature of it, would be *to know as God himself knows*, and therefore this will be always unknown to us *in causes that seem to be most under our inspection*, as well as in those that are the most remote from it [2].”

Would you believe, now, that it was but just before, in this very *Essay*, that for want of this knowledge, (which yet to affect even *in causes that seem to be most under our inspection*, would be to affect *knowing as God himself knows*) he denies the SOUL to be a substance distinct from body. “They (says he) who hold the hypothesis of two distinct substances MUST EXPLAIN in some tolerable manner, *which they have not yet done*, the union and MUTUAL ACTION ON ONE ANOTHER, of unextended and extended Beings, or else deny the absolute existence of any thing extrinsical to the mind [3].” That is, those who hold the hypothesis of two distinct Substances

[2] Vol. iii. p. 551.

[3] Vol. iii. p. 521, 2.

must either do that which he holds no Being but the Omniscient can do ; or they must run mad ; or (which I think is something worse) they must give themselves up to his Lordship's guidance.

He employs the same arms to combat INSPIRATION ; and with the same advantage. The Notion of *Inspiration* is idle and visionary, because “ He has “ *no more conception of this supposed ACTION of the divine,* “ *on the human mind,* than he has of the inspiration by “ which the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father “ and Son, according to the decision of the council “ of Florence.” That is, he rejects *Inspiration* because he does not comprehend that virtue *by which one Being acts upon another, and becomes a Cause* ; altho' he owns none but God can comprehend it.

But his argument against the *existence* of the SOUL, and the *reality* of INSPIRATION, is doubly faulty. For, as it is the height of extravagance to reject a *revealed truth*, because the proposition in which it is contained is unaccompanied with that explanation of the *cause*, of which our faculties are INCAPABLE ; so is it no small degree of unreasonableness and folly to reject such truth, because the proposition in which it is contained is unaccompanied with that explanation of which our faculties are CAPABLE.

3. His Lordship endeavours to shew, that a *future State was not the Sanction of the Law or Religion of Nature*. And thus he sets about it. “ Sanctions “ must be contained in the Law to which they be- “ long ; they must be a part of it. In their promul- “ gation, they must precede, as the Law does, neces- “ sarily, all acts of obedience, or disobedience to it “ — they must be as public — These conditions are  
I 2 “ essential,

“ essential, there can be no sanction without them.  
 “ And therefore the rewards of a *future State*, which  
 “ have not these conditions, are no sanctions of the  
 “ natural Law. Reason and experience, that taught  
 “ men this Law, shewed them the sanctions of it.  
 “ But neither of them pointed out *these*. Have we  
 “ any grounds to believe, that they were known to  
 “ the antediluvian World? Do they stand at the head  
 “ or tail of the SEVEN PRECEPTS GIVEN TO THE  
 “ SONS OF NOAH? Were they so much as mentioned  
 “ by MOSES [4] ?”

Can you forbear laughing? Had he found a *future state* in the *seven precepts* of *Noah*, or in the *books of Moses*, be assured he would have employed this lucky circumstance to prove, that a *future state* was not the Sanction of the *Law of Nature*, but of a *positive Law*, or of a *pretended Revelation*, only. For in the beginning of this very section, he has attempted to prove it was the sanction of positive Law, from its being found in the GOSPEL. “ God (says he) “ has given a Law, the *Law of Nature and Reason*, “ to all his human Creatures: the SANCTIONS of it are “ a NATURAL TENDENCY of virtue to the happiness, “ and vice to the misery, of mankind — They are “ imperfect — To supply the imperfection [Revelation pretends] that there must be necessarily some “ FURTHER SANCTIONS of this Law, and these are “ the rewards and punishments reserved to a FUTURE “ STATE. Here is ample room for *reflexions* [5].” — In truth there is: but as they would make so

[4] Vol. v. p. 512---13.

[5] Vol. v. p. 511---12.



little for the credit of his Lordship's *learning*, his followers will not be offended with me for not pursuing them.

4. He tells us, *that the worship of the one true God was not the first Religious Worship.* — The BIBLE says it was. No matter for that. The BIBLE is a farrago of inconsistencies [6]. “*Methusalem* saw both “*Adam* and *Noah*, to both of whom God revealed “himself in his Unity. *Shem*, the Son of *Noah*, “lived even to the days of *Abraham*. Need I stay “to shew HOW IMPOSSIBLE it is for any man in his “SENSES to believe that a tradition derived from God “himself, through so few generations, was lost amongst “the greatest part of mankind; or that Polytheism “and Idolatry were established on the ruins of it in “the days of *Serug*, before those of *Abraham*, and “so soon after the Deluge? I should think it “IMPOSSIBLE even for the Jews themselves to swallow so many fables and so many anacronisms. “Since the unity of God was not universally taught “in those early days, it was not so *revealed*, nor preserved in the manner assumed [7].” This account, therefore, he tells us, is INCONSISTENT with itself [8]. Now the utmost that Prejudice in its senses can make of it is an IMPROBABILITY: and this *improbability*, his Lordship himself, but two pages afterwards, is so good to remove. He delivers it as a general Truth, that “the Vulgar EASILY embrace Polytheism and “Idolatry, even AFTER the true doctrine of the divine unity has been taught and received; as we “may learn from the example of the *Israelites*: and

[6] Vol. iv. p. 19.

[7] Vol. iv. p. 20.

[8] Vol. iv. p. 19.

“superstitions GROW Apace, AND SPREAD WIDE,  
 “where *Christianity* has been established and is DAILY  
 “TAUGHT, as we may learn from the example of  
 “the Roman Churches [9].”

Now, Sir, I argue thus, If amongst the *Israelites*, Idolatry and Superstition so *easily*, so frequently, and so instantaneously *succeeded*, to the worship of the true God, and needed such severe punishments to bring men back again to reason, in a place where many extraordinary helps were provided to keep them in their duty; and if, amongst *Christians*, Idolatry and Superstition grow *apace and spread wide* where the *true doctrine of the unity* is *daily taught*, how can we wonder that, in the *few generations* from *Adam* to *Serug*, Polytheism and Idolatry should *establish themselves on the ruins* of the Unity; as this happened in an Age, where we hear of no other provision for the Truth than the *long lives* of the Patriarchs; and *Methusalem's seeing both Adam and Noah*? If You deny this to have been the case of *Jews* and *Christians*, his Lordship tells you, You are *out of your senses*: If you own this to have been the case of the *Antediluvians*, You are *out of your senses* still. What is to be done? There is but one way; which is, subscribing to his Lordship's unerring Wisdom.

But I have something more to say of this pretended INCONSISTENCY. — Can any man in his senses believe that a Tradition, derived from God himself, should be lost in so few generations, and so soon after the Deluge? — How few, and how soon, I beseech your Lordship? I am not captious: I have a special reason for asking. The Chronology of this period is not uni-

form or constant; there is a wide difference in the several bible-accounts: so that I suspect foul play as well as inaccuracy, in your thus putting us off with the vague reckoning of, *so few*, and, *so soon*.

To be plain, tho' the HEBREW Copy make it no more than *three hundred* years from the Deluge to Abraham; yet the SEPTUAGINT, and JOSEPHUS, reckon about a *thousand*: time more than sufficient to sink *the greatest part of Mankind into Idolatry and Polytheism, so early as the days of Serug*. And here lies the difficulty, the best Chronologers agree in preferring the *Septuagint* and *Josephus*, to the *Hebrew Copy*.—— But I forget myself: His Lordship has “a thorough contempt for the whole business of the Learned lives of SCALIGER, BOCHART, PETAVIUS, USHER, and MARSHAM [10]:” to whom (he says) *the whole tribe of scholars bow with reverence*, and consequently he must have the same contempt for CHRONOLOGY; which, indeed, he has shewn on more occasions than one; but never to so much advantage, as where he seems to have supposed that LIVY and TACITUS flourished before VIRGIL [11].

But this by the way only. My business with his Lordship at present lies in another quarter. For, having, in his attempt to shew that the worship of the one true God was not the first religious worship, thrown the BIBLE out of the account, he goes on in this manner: “If the *inconsistency* of this account makes us reject it, we shall find less reason to be-

[10] Vol. ii. p. 261, 2.

[11] See Dr. NEWTON's learned and judicious *Dissertations on the Prophecies*, p. 33.

“ lieve on the Authority of *prophane traditions* that  
 “ the UNITY OF GOD WAS THE PRIMITIVE  
 “ FAITH of mankind. Revelations to the Fa-  
 “ ther and to the Restorer of the whole human  
 “ race might have established this Faith universally :  
 “ but without Revelation it could not be that of any  
 “ one people, till observation and meditation, till a  
 “ full and vigorous exercise of Reason made it such  
 “ [12].” The reasoning is truly admirable. The  
 supposed Fact, as we find it in ANTIQUITY, stands  
 thus, The BIBLE tells us, that the worship of the  
 true God was the first religious worship : GENERAL  
 TRADITION says the same. Between these two Te-  
 stimonies there is a natural and strong connection ; the  
*Tradition* appearing to rise out of the truth of the  
*Written word* ; for, as his Lordship well observes, *no-*  
*thing but a Revelation could establish this Faith univer-*  
*sally, not even amongst one people, till observation and*  
*meditation had made it familiar to them.* Here you  
 have the Fact proved in the strongest manner a Fact  
 can be proved ; by the concurrence of two Witnesses,  
 coming from different quarters, and strangers to each  
 other's evidence ; which yet not only agree, but mu-  
 tually support one another. What would you more ?  
 — Hold a little, says his Lordship. This boasted  
 connection is not real but imaginary : *sacred History*  
 concerning a Revelation is not to be believed, be-  
 cause *inconsistent* : *prophane Tradition* is not to be be-  
 lieved, because without Revelation the unity of God  
 could not be the first faith of any one people. Thus  
 stands his Lordship's reasoning, or thus, at least, it

[12] Vol. iv. p. 20.



would stand, had he urged it to the best advantage. And to this, I reply, first, that his Lordship, in calling the Bible account *inconsistent*, is guilty of an abuse of words: that, all which his own premisses infer is only an *improbability*; and this *improbability* likewise, he himself fairly contradicts and confutes. Secondly, He begs the question, in taking it for granted that there was no *Revelation*. For the inconsistency of any History concerning it, is no proof that it was NOT; tho' an universal Tradition that the *primitive faith* was the doctrine of the *unity*, (which doctrine, in his Lordship's reckoning, could come in no other way than by *Revelation*) be a very good proof that IT WAS. But I go farther, and, in defence of the Bible-account, observe, That, if what he says be true, that *observation and meditation, and a full and vigorous exercise of reason*, are necessary for the gaining the knowledge of the UNITY in a *natural* way, and that these qualities are long a coming, then it is highly probable, that the want of this *observation and meditation*, when the *unity* was revealed to the *first Man*, might have been the occasion of the speedy loss of it. He expressly tells us; that this Truth has been subject to as sudden revolutions, in the times of *Judaism* and *Popery*, when men were in full possession of it, with all their *observation, meditation, and vigorous exercise of reason*, at the height; and twenty other advantages to boot.

BUT his Lordship's *general management* of this question, of the FIRST RELIGIOUS WORSHIP, should not be overlooked, tho' it belong properly to another Head. He discusses the point at large, in two several *Dissertations*: each of which is so well qualified; and

so fitly accommodated to the other, that the second is a complete confutation of the first. How this came about, is not unworthy the Reader's notice. His Lordship does things in order. He had it first of all in his purpose to discredit the Mosaic account of the Creation: And MOSES representing the *worship of the true God* as the *original Religion*, he set himself to prove that Moses was both a *fool* and a *liar*. Soon after, he had another Prophet to bring into contempt, the Prophet ISAIAH, who informs us, that the Jews were the only nation under heaven, which had the worship of the one God. A truth which EUSEBIUS has taken upon his word [13]. His Lordship will shew, they deserve no credit. And then he ransacks all the dark corners, not of Antiquity, but of those Moderns who have rendered Antiquity still darker: in which he succeeds so well, as to persuade himself that the World, many ages before the foundation of the Jewish Republic, had the knowledge of the one God; nay, that there was no time so early in which the one God was unknown. In a word, he overturns, as we said, and very completely too, every thing he had written on the same subject, in the other Dissertation, against MOSES. But as all this is directly levelled at the Author of the *Divine Legation*, I leave that Writer to do his own argument justice as he shall find himself able.

5. In the mean time, I proceed to give you one of his Lordship's *palmary* arguments against REVELATION.

[13] See *Div. Leg.* Vol. i. Part i. p. 165.

“ Can he be less than MAD who boasts a REVELA-  
 “ TION superadded to REASON, to supply the de-  
 “ fects of it, and who superadds REASON TO RE-  
 “ VELATION to supply the defects of this too, at the  
 “ same time? THIS IS MADNESS, OR THERE IS NO  
 “ SUCH THING INCIDENT TO OUR NATURE.[14].”

Now as every man, who believes REVELATION, was in these circumstances, his Lordship (and reason good) concluded the MADNESS to be *universal*; and none but himself in his senses: and standing thus alone he has thought proper to give us frequent notice of this extraordinary case [5], *Insanire me aiunt, ultro cum ipsi insaniant*. But if he will needs reduce us to this sad alternative, I shall make no scruple to vindicate our common nature, be it never so much at his Lordship's expence. For, as to the body of mankind, who “ hold that Revelation was superadded  
 “ to Reason, to supply the defects of Reason; and  
 “ that Reason was at the same time superadded to  
 “ Revelation to supply the defects of Revelation,” I am so far from seeing in them any of those unfavourable symptoms, his Lordship speaks of, that I think, whoever had done otherwise, had deserved, (at least, on the principles of his Lordship's rigid justice) to be sent to Bedlam. Indeed some, for so doing, have been actually sent thither. For what, for the most part, are the *religious* inhabitants of that place, but such, who, having superadded Revelation to supply the defects of Reason, WOULD NOT SUPERADD REASON to supply the defects of Revelation; but were for making the *Laws of the Gospel* the sole rule

[14] Vol. iv. p. 172.

[5] Vol. iv. p. 316--353--377.

180      A VIEW of LORD BOLINGBROKE'S  
of all *civil* as well as of all *religious* measures : in  
other words, such as were grown FANATICAL.

Let us consider how the case truly stands. The Religionist, his Lordship says, boasts, that *Revelation* was *superadded to Reason*, to *supply the defects* of Reason. Very well. Reason then is the foundation, and Revelation, the Superstructure. Revelation meddles not with the work of Reason, but supplies us with new Truths, where Reason stops short. And why was this done ?—For the sake of an ADEQUATE RULE OF LIFE. Is Reason *alone* this rule ?—Then the superstructure of Revelation was not wanted. Is Revelation *alone* the rule ?—Then Reason was built upon to no purpose. The ADEQUATE RULE therefore is composed of BOTH. But if so, When Revelation has been added to Reason to supply the wants of Reason, must not Reason be added to Revelation to supply the wants of Revelation ? Must not two things, thus related, be mutually applied to the aid of one another's insufficiencies ? Reason is the Base ; Revelation is the Upper-building. It is owned, the Upper-building is necessary to *perfect* the Base : Must it not be owned, that the Base is as necessary to *bear* the Upper-building ?

But, (what is more) it is the GOSPEL itself, and not *artificial Theology*, as his Lordship pretends, which gives us this direction. For the *Gospel* being to serve (as is confessed) for a superaddition to the first building of *Natural Religion*, it delivers no complete system of moral Law, (for which it is so often reproached by his Lordship) because the general parts of that system are to be found in *Natural Religion*. To supply this defect, if it be one, St. Paul has pointed out



an expedient ; the study of *natural Religion* ; from whence, together with the *Gospel*, such a complete system may be collected. “ Finally, Brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report ; If there be any virtue, if there be any praise, think on these things [16].” This then is the Scheme of TRUE CHRISTIANITY. It *superadds Revelation to Reason to supply the defects of it ; and superadds Reason to Revelation to supply the defects of this too at the same time*. And can any thing be more rational than such a scheme ?

Indeed, was REVELATION only a REPUBLICATION OF THE RELIGION OF NATURE, his Lordship’s charge, tho’ extravagantly urged, would appear to have some foundation. For then *Revelation* must be supposed to be the *Religion of Nature*, restored and perfected : and then to recur back to *Natural Religion* to rectify *Revelation*, after *Revelation* had been introduced to rectify *Natural Religion*, would have, tho’ none of the marks of *madness*, which consists in arguing consequentially from *false* principles, yet great symptoms of *folly*, which consists in arguing like his Lordship, from the *true*. But he owns Christianity to be founded on the Principle of REDEMPTION. Indeed he is as variable in this, as in most other points, and as often represents it to be a *republication of the Religion of Nature* : When he chuses to employ the gentler method of extirpation, the *explaining it away*, it is then a *republication* ; when,

[16] Phil. iv, 8.

the

the rougher and directer method of *exposing it to contempt*, it is then founded in the *doctrine of Redemption*. Therefore, as We have all along made the best of his *Contradictions*, e'en let Him do the same ; for it seems not fit, he should be deprived of any advantages of his own procuring.

Let us set his Lordship's argument in another light ; and turn from his *Philosophic* to his *Legislative Character* ; and suppose him to reason thus, (for change but the terms, and the reasoning will hold just as well in *civil* as in *theologic* matters.) “ Can he be  
“ less than mad who boasts a *system of civil Laws* su-  
“ peradded to the *natural*, to supply the defects of it ;  
“ and who superadds the *natural* to the *civil*, to sup-  
“ ply the defects of this too, at the same time ?” Now look, what figure the Politician would make, who should thus instruct his Pupils, even such does our noble Theologian make in dictating to all Mankind.

Amongst the numerous absurdities in this famous argument, I don't know if it be worth while to take notice of one in the *expression* ; for as it seems not to be committed with design, it hardly deserves the name of a sophism ; and that is, the repetition of the word SUPERADDS ; for tho', Revelation may be *superadded* to Reason, yet Reason can never be said to be *superadded* to Revelation, how closely soever it may be joined with it ; because the two systems can never become top and bottom in their turns, after it has been owned that One is the *foundation*, and the Other, the *superstructure*.

6. Another of his Lordship's *general* objections to *Revelation*, is as follows :

“ It

“ It is not, in any degree, so agreeable to the notions of infinite wisdom that God should deal out his Revelations BY PARCELS, instead of making a system of moral Law, when he created moral agents, that might answer his WHOLE purpose, in all circumstances of time, place, and persons; JUST AS HE MADE a physical system of Laws for the other part, the inanimate part of his Creation [17].”

Now with his Lordship's good leave, I am bold to think, the contrary the more probable; and that too, on those very principles of Analogy, which his Lordship employs, to prove it less so. He argues against the likelihood of God's giving the *moral Law*, IN PARCELS, because the *Physical Law* was given AT ONCE. This plainly proceeds on a supposition that the nature of the two systems is the same; and that there is the like constancy and regularity in the *Moral* as in the *Physical*; or the like irregularity in the *Physical* as in the *Moral*; For unless there be the same tendency to order, or to disorder, in two general systems, the means of governing them can hardly be the same. But in these two systems, obedience to their respective Laws is far unlike: *Passive* MATTER, (the subject of the *physical*) obeys, with small irregularities, the Laws impressed upon it by its Creator; but an *active* MIND, (the subject of the *moral*) is perpetually deviating from that rule of right which the Governor of the world, prescribed for its observance. The method therefore of governing in the two Systems must needs, according to all our ideas of wisdom, be

very different. And this difference, which our senses tell us *has* been observed, is that which natural reason teaches us to conclude, *should* be observed ; namely, to a *physical* system (whose subject would constantly and invariably obey) a Law given AT ONCE : and to a *moral* system (whose subject inclined it to frequent deviations) a Law given IN PARCELS ; which might, from time to time, reform the disorders as they arose.

But the folly, in thus embarrassing ourselves about the fit ordinance of God's dispensations, has its source in a MADNESS, that his Lordship perhaps least suspected, and which yet he was most concerned to guard against ; the madness of supposing, that eternal wisdom needed the aid of our contrivance to make things as they should be.

7. I shall conclude my specimen with some of his Lordship's *more particular* objections to the BIBLE.

Speaking of the civil punishment of Idolatry, under the Jewish Theocracy, he says, " God himself  
 " was the LEGISLATOR. The Citizens, therefore,  
 " of that commonwealth, who apostatized, were  
 " proceeded against as traytors and rebels, guilty of  
 " no less than high-treason. Let it be so. *The ob-*  
 " *jections of injustice and cruelty to those laws will re-*  
 " *main in their full force,* and be of more weight to  
 " prove them HUMAN, than all these hypotheses to  
 " prove them *divine*. God was KING, and idolatry was  
 " no less than high treason ; no objection therefore  
 " can lye against the Punishment of it. None cer-  
 " tainly, but every objection to the MANNER and  
 " DE-



“ DEGREE in which this punishment was to be inflicted, stands good [18].”

Here his Lordship to make amends, as it were, for his frequent *denial of the truth*, without understanding the question, has for once ventured to *agree to it*, upon the same terms. It had been said, “ that as God was KING of the Jews, idolatry was “ high treason.” To this, his Lordship condescends. But to shew us how well he understood the principle on which it stands, he affirms that God’s being their LEGISLATOR made Idolatry high treason. As if the bare giving Laws to a people conferred the MAGISTRACY on the Giver : or as if there could be *high treason* against any but the MAGISTRATE. But you shall see more of his talent for PHILOSOPHIC POLITICS, if it fall in my way (as perhaps it will) to speak of his abilities in his own trade. It is his *reasoning* on the subject, not his general *knowledge* of the case (things rarely to be found together in his Lordship’s *Essays*) that I now propose to examine.

You observe then, he owns Idolatry, in Judea, to be high Treason ; and the Punishment of it (which is every where *capital*) to be just. But the *manner* and *degree* of that punishment he pronounces, both *unjust* and *cruel*. Was this like a philosophic Legislator ! — When the question is of the *justice* or *injustice* of a public Law, every man of common sense, and endowed with the instinctive knowledge of *right and wrong*, may pass a true judgment on it ; because it stands on the unalterable nature of things ; in *human* Laws, on the relation between Magistrate and Subject ; in *divine* Laws, on the relation between God

[18] Vol. v. p. 193.

and

186 A VIEW OF LORD BOLINGBROKE'S  
and man; and in a System of Laws, like the Mosaic,  
both on one and the other, in conjunction. Now his  
Lordship, in passing judgment on the case upon these  
principles pronounces the Law against Idolatry to  
be right and equitable. What can be more honour-  
able for this part of the Jewish System? It is Lord  
Bolingbroke who decrees in favour of it; and is here  
aided, which he rarely is, by the plainest and clearest  
principles of common sense. Hold, says his Lord-  
ship; take this along with you, *Tho' no objection can  
lie against the PUNISHMENT, yet every objection lies  
against the MANNER and DEGREE of it.*

Let us see then whether this stands upon the same  
plain and clear principles with the other.

To judge truly of the *manner* and *degree* of a pu-  
nishment, I apprehend, more is required than to judge  
of the punishment itself. It requires an intimate ac-  
quaintance with the People to whom this Law against  
idolatry was given; a knowledge of their manners,  
tempers, dispositions, prejudices, and situation; in  
a word, of a thousand other circumstances, which  
none but the Lawgiver himself could perfectly under-  
stand; certainly, not this Politician of Yesterday. So  
that, it appears, the justice or injustice of the *manner*  
and *degree* of a punishment is not determinable on  
those simple and obvious Principles which shew the  
justice or injustice of the *punishment* itself, but on other  
considerations which determine of *right and wrong*  
from many shifting circumstances; from the degree  
of *temptation* in the Object; from the degree of *pre-  
judice* in the Subject; of *propensity* to the Crime; of  
*malignity* to the System; and from other various con-  
nexions, of which only Those who are perfect in the  
know.

knowledge of antient Manners in general, and of the Jewish People's in particular, can form any reasonable ideas.

This is enough to shew the folly of cavilling at the *manner* and *degree* of the punishment of Idolatry, after the punishment itself is allowed to be just and right. But this is not all; the very allowance of the *punishment* implies a presumption in favour of the *manner* and *degree*. The Punishment of Idolatry, a punishment which could take place in no system of Government but the Mosaic, is, when examined on plain and clear principles, found to be just: admit now, the *manner* and *degree* of it to be doubtful for want of knowledge sufficient to shew us the *necessity*, and consequently, the *justice* of them. Is it not fair to infer, that the Lawgiver, who so wisely and equitably observed the rule of justice in the punishment itself, observed it likewise in the *manner* and *degree* of the punishment?

This, as to the general meaning, of the *manner* and *degree* of a Punishment. But, if I be not mistaken, this *manner* and *degree* here insisted on, have a peculiar reference to his Lordship's own System of divinity and politics. I suppose, his principal objection to the *manner* might arise from the punishment's being inflicted by the civil justice of the state, and not by the immediate hand of God. But he should have considered, that the LAW, all along distinguishes between the crimes capable of legal conviction, and such as were inscrutable to all but Omniscience. The latter God reserves for his own Inquisition [19]: But the crime in question was an overt-act of idolatrous worship, and therefore

[19] See *Div. Leg.*

came reasonably and equitably before the Civil Tribunal. His cavil at the degree comes next to be considered. It's being simply CAPITAL was not, I believe, that for which his Lordship imputed *injustice and cruelty* to it. The being attended with CONFISCATION, as in the case of Naboth, was what seems principally to have incurred his displeasure. But in a case, where his Lordship was personally prejudiced, he should have mistrusted his own judgment; he should have examined the force of those arguments, by which a great Lawyer had lately evinced, that *forfeiture for high treason* is perfectly just and equitable.

8. The noble Lord, haranguing on the conditions of *Historical Authenticity*, delivers this, for one of the chief, "That the facts, the principal Facts at least, be confirmed by COLLATERAL TESTIMONY. By collateral testimony (says he) I mean the testimony of those who had no common interest of Country, of Religion; or of Profession, to disguise or falsify the truth [19]."

This condition of *historical Authenticity* will be easily agreed to; as well as his definition of *collateral testimony*: And the quotations of JOSEPHUS and EUSEBIUS, from *Egyptians, Phœnicians, Chaldeans* and *Greeks* will, without doubt, be urged by the defenders of Religion, as such *collateral testimony*, where the witnesses *had no common interest of Country, of Religion, or of Profession to disguise or falsify the truth*.—Pardon me, says his Lordship, "JOSEPHUS indeed attempts to support his history [the Bible] by collateral testimonies, those of *Egyptians, Phœnicians,*

[19] Vol. iii. p. 281.

"Chal-



“ *Chaldeans*, and even *Greeks*. But these testimonies,  
 “ were they never so full to his purpose, would  
 “ CEASE TO BE COLLATERAL testimonies, by COM-  
 “ ING THRO’ HIM, who had a common interest of  
 “ Country and Religion to disguise and to falsify the  
 “ truth [20].”

This seems a little hard, that, when our advantages of defence are, in his Lordship’s opinion, so rare, the few we have, should be lost the very moment they are gained. JOSEPHUS has no sooner seized this important mark of *historical authenticity*, but it slips thro’ his fingers as he is urging it : and, what is still more extraordinary, BECAUSE he urges it. The *Book of life* and the *Seat of life*, it seems, have this property in common —

“ Like following LIFE thro’ Creatures you dissect,  
 “ You lose it in the moment you detect.

For, as Tully well observes, all human things are given to change. “ *Corpora nostra non novimus.*  
 “ *Itaque Medici ipsi, quorum intererat ea nosse, ap-*  
 “ *ruerunt ut viderentur : nec eo tamen aiunt EMPI-*  
 “ *RICI notiora esse illa, quia possit fieri ut patefacta*  
 “ *et detecta, MUTENTUR.*”

But to canvas this wonderful reasoning a little closer ; Let us make a supposition, or rather, let us lay down a *fact*, that APION, like his Lordship, had insisted on this very *condition of historical authenticity* ; and that JOSEPHUS, who defended the Bible against his cavils, took him at his word, and agreed to put the issue of the debate on that circumstance ; and

[20] Vol. iii. p. 281.

there-

thereupon produced the testimony of *Egyptians, Phœnicians, Chaldeans*, and even *Greeks*, to support the sacred Story. Thus far, his Lordship will allow, matters went glibly on, and the argument had its proper efficacy. JOSEPHUS quoted from the Works of *Pagan* writers, transmitted to him thro' the hands of *Pagan* readers; and being engaged with a clear-sighted Adversary, without doubt, quoted fairly. The *historical authenticity* of the BIBLE therefore was established on the terms his Adversary required. How then comes it to pass, that an argument which was once conclusive, has now lost its force? What was truth in that Age must be allowed to be truth in this; or not only the *Authenticity*, but the very *being* of History will become precarious. Do these pagan testimonies, in running thro' the chanel of JOSEPHUS, become *polluted*, as soon as the original Books cease to exist? No, says his Lordship; but they may be *suspected*. On what account, I pray? Could he prove that JOSEPHUS burnt them; or was aiding in their destruction; or had a fore-knowledge of their loss, his Lordship might then indeed have some reason to *suspect*. But to talk of suspicion, merely because JOSEPHUS was *interested* that the quotations should be to his purpose, is so vague a cavil, as shews the objector will never be at a loss for an evasion. Were the Originals still in being, he would then *suspect* that these passages had been foisted in by some Jewish or Christian Impostor; at least, by some body or other, who *had a common interest of Country, of Religion, or of Profession, to disguise or falsify the truth*. In short, he would *suspect* all the World sooner than his own power to impose upon us.

To

To shew you, this is said neither at random nor in malice, consider his Lordship's conduct where this *collateral testimony* is circumstanced in the manner he himself requires. The defenders of Religion say that the PENTATEUCH, which represents MOSES as the Leader and Legislator of the Israelites, is supported by that *evidence* which his Lordship calls *collateral*. What says his good Lordship to this? "Be it so, that  
 " the Israelites had a Leader and Legislator called  
 " Moses is proved by the consent of *Foreign*, whom  
 " I call *collateral Evidences*. But surely it will not  
 " follow, that this man CONVERSED WITH THE  
 " SUPREME BEING FACE TO FACE, which these  
 " *collateral* Witnesses do not affirm [1]." Thus you see, these *collateral evidences* will always be rejected, whether they tell their story *viva voce*, or whether their depositions be taken down by such who avail themselves of their Testimony.——But, *they do not say that this man conversed with the supreme Being face to face*. Would his Lordship have believed them, if they did? Why, no, says he, my faith goes no further than to civil facts; and I must needs reckon such Tales amongst the Miracles of the Greek and Roman Historians. Very well, my Lord. And does not this shew, that if the *collateral evidence* speak but to Moses's Legislation and civil rule, they speak to every thing they are called for, in support of Scripture against such Writers as your Lordship. To illustrate the case; It is doubted, for instance, whether Livy gives us a true account of such or such a Campaign between Hannibal and the Roman Generals.

[1] Vol. iii, p. 282.

Polybius, Plutarch and Appian being Greeks are produced as *collateral evidences*, but they speak not a word of those *Prodigies* which the Roman Historian relates at large.

9. BUT his hate to MOSES is immortal : Notwithstanding all his Lordship's pretended contempt of him, as a Legislator, it looks as if, in his heart, he thought him a very formidable Rival. Archbishop TILLOTSON had attempted to defend the *Authenticity* of his writings, on this Postulatum, *that the Unbeliever would only give the same credit to them which he gives to every civil History*. His Lordship owns the demand to be reasonable ; and is willing to try his Brother Legislator, on these terms. In order to this, he observes, “ That one condition of the Authenticity of any human History, and such alone (says he) we are to consider in this place, is, that it contains nothing *repugnant to the experience of mankind*. Things repugnant to this experience are to be found in many that pass however for authentic ; in that of LIVY, for instance : but then these incredible anecdotes stand by themselves, as it were, and the history may go on without them. But this is not the case of the Pentateuch, *nor of the other Books of the Old Testament*. Incredible anecdotes are not mentioned seldom and occasionally in them : THE WHOLE HISTORY IS FOUNDED ON SUCH, it consists of little else, and IF IT WERE NOT A HISTORY OF THEM, IT WOULD BE A HISTORY OF NOTHING [2].”

The Unbeliever's objection to the *Authenticity* of the Bible as a *civil history*, is, that it is full of *Miracles* :

[2] Vol. iii. p. 279.



and, supposing the Defender of Revelation ready to reply, “ So likewise is the History of *Livy* ; and yet “ that does not destroy its credit ;” his Lordship obviates the reply extremely well. “ There is an essential difference, (says he) between *the incredible anecdotes* of MOSES and of LIVY. The Roman Historian’s Miracles are detached pieces ; they make no part of the subject, and are extraneous to it : But the Miracles of the Jewish Writer are intimately related to all the civil affairs, and make a necessary and inseparable part ; *the whole history is founded on them*. Take away LIVY’s miracles, and the train of civil events goes on just as well without them : Take away MOSES’s, and his history becomes a heap of confusion, or more properly, *it is a history of nothing*.”

I am proud of any opportunity to acknowledge the obligations which Learning or Religion have to his Lordship ; I only wish the occasions had been more frequent : As it is, I am unwilling to let the first that occurred to me pass by without my thanks, lest possibly the occasion should never return.

In a word, his Lordship’s observation on the *difference* between the MIRACLES in MOSES and in LIVY, is solid and masterly. And *this difference*, let me observe, is a certain mark, tho’ not of that *civil authenticity* which the good Archbishop’s argument requires, Yet of that *divine original* which the SCRIPTURES arrogate to themselves.

It is the specious, but trite, objection of Infidelity against the *Miracles* recorded in the Bible, that those remote ages were full of prodigies and portents. “ Why then, says the Freethinker, should we believe

the *incredible anecdotes* of MOSES, rather than those of LIVY?" For a very good reason, replies his Lordship, we find them in a history essentially different from that of *Livy*. Take away *his* miracles, together with all those of the other pagan Historians, and the Story stands just as it did. But take away the BIBLE-MIRACLES, and you reduce the civil part of the relation to a state of inexplicable confusion.

Again, one of the least hacknied, and indeed least futile, observations I have ever heard urged against the Bible, (and it has been urged to me) is the WANT OF A NECESSARY CONNEXION between the *civil* and the *miraculous* parts of that History. Here again his Lordship comes in, in support of Revelation, and says, that this *necessary connexion* is evident to all, for that nothing can be made of the *civil* part if you take away the *miraculous*. Which sure is a *connexion* of some strength.

Thus has his Lordship, before he was aware, in attempting to destroy the *civil authenticity* of the Bible, supported its *divine original*. And this good, tho' undesigned, ought however to be acknowledged. But you may think, perhaps, that a matter of this importance, is not here sufficiently developed. Without doubt, it is not. This is a long story; and as I pretend to have supplied this DESIDERATUM, *The want of a connexion between the miraculous and civil part of the sacred History*, I shall refer you to the proper place, where it is to be found.

In the mean time, give me leave to go on with his Lordship; and proceed to the proposition itself, That the *Miracles recorded* in the BIBLE, *destroy its credit as a civil history*. Now this I apprehend to be a pure piece  
of

of chicane. Let us see how the matter stands between the Archbishop and his Lordship.

BELIEVERS say, the Bible-History is the history of a Dispensation really divine : UNBELIEVERS say, it is the history of one only pretended ; and endeavour to support their assertion, by shewing it to have the *civil marks* of falsehood and imposture. Here the Archbishop steps forward and offers to try the authenticity of the Bible on the Standard of a CIVIL HISTORY. Agreed, replies his Lordship ; And what say you now to MIRACLES ? Say ? Why, that *Miracles* are out of the question ; and come not into consideration till the DIVINE authority be contended for. When we agreed to consider the Bible as a *civil history only*, it was not for truth's, but for argument's sake. If we held the Writers of it to be mere civil Historians, the miracles, recorded in it, might be fairly urged against us ; and urged with advantage, if indeed there be that difference between them and Livy's, which is pretended. But we hold the Writers were indeed inspired ; and You, my Lord, have shewn us, by that difference, to justify the *miraculous part*, whenever their inspiration becomes a question between us. In the mean time, stick to your point ; and never fancy you can make our Divines the dupes of so pitiful a Sophism. You have drawn us, (while we debate a particular question with you) to exclude for argument's sake one of our principles [3] ; and then urge against that question, a FACT [4], which stands, and is to be defended on the excluded principle ; and so, cannot be maintained while the principle remains ex-

[3] The divine authority of the Bible.

[4] Miracles.

cluded: Which is just as if, when you had persuaded us to tye our hands, on promise that the question should be only about the use of our feet, You should object to us our inability of laying fast hold upon you. Your own words, my Lord, where you push this imaginary advantage, best detect the fraud and imposture of your proceeding. “ The Old Testament (you say) is founded in incredibility. Almost every event contained in it, is incredible in its causes and consequences; and I must except or reject the whole, as I said just now. No one, EXCEPT HERE AND THERE A DIVINE, will presume to say, that the histories of the old Testament are *conformable to the experience of Mankind*, and the natural course of things.” — *Except here and there a Divine*, do you say? Nor they neither, I assure your Lordship. What they say is this, That every thing of a mere civil nature in the Old Testament has all the marks of civil authenticity. This is all they said, and all they meant to say. And, on what good grounds they said it, give me leave to shew your Lordship a little more at large.

The Bible tells us, the world was created in time; and that time at no immense distance, as several fabulous relations of pagan Antiquity had pretended. — And does not the late invention of Arts prove that the Bible says nothing but what appears very probable?

It says, the Earth was overflowed by a deluge of waters. — And do not the contents of its surface demonstrate that it has suffered this Catastrophe?

The Bible says, again, that the *Founders of Cities* were the *inventors of arts*; and that the first *civil Govern-*



vernments composed of small Monarchies arose from the *Domestic*. And do not experience and the natural course of things support so *credible* an *anecdote* ?

The Pentateuch informs us, that the Israelites, after a long abode in Egypt, went out as a great People, and in a hostile manner, to seek new habitations.—And of this, have we not both external and internal evidence ? The external in the Egyptian, Phœnician, Chaldee, and Greek Writers, quoted by Josephus and Eusebius : the internal in the whole Jewish RITUAL.

Scripture relates the defection of the ten tribes to Idolatry ; their transportation to a foreign land ; and the re-peopling that part of Judea with a new Colony of Idolaters —And of the truth of all this, we say, the Samaritan Pentateuch, yet existing, is a strong and amazing Testimony.

These, my Lord, are a very few of the numerous instances which might be produced to shew the *civil Authenticity* of the Bible. And on these and such as these, the Clergy's challenge stood, when they undertook to prove that Authenticity, on the common principles of historic credit. Further, or other than this, they neither said nor meant to say. They understood, as well as your Lordship, the difference between Moses's *incredible anecdotes* and those of Livy ; and that the Jewish History, unlike to all other, is *wholly founded on miracles*. But they distinguished better than your Lordship, of Moses' *civil History* : which consists of two parts ; the peculiar Dispensation to that People ; and the occasional story of the rest of Mankind.

It is the *peculiar Dispensation* only to which his Lordship's observation can be applied, *viz.* that the *civil* cannot be separated from the *miraculous* part : Nor did the clergy attempt to do it. It was the *occasional story* of the human race, we must needs suppose, to which the Archbishop's challenge referred : And I have shewn just above, that we are able to make his challenge good.

Thus would I have reasoned with his Lordship ; and thus, in fact was he reasoned with, (as I may have occasion to tell you in my next Letter) but he was deaf to all advice, tho' it was given in private, and to save his memory from the disgrace of these portentous ESSAYS. What remained was to expose them as they deserved to the laughter and contempt of Mankind.

And now, Sir, I think I have pretty well discharged my general promise to You. When one looks back upon this poor collection of meagre, disjointed reasoning, tacked together by his System, and swelled up to the semblance of a body by the tumor of his Rhetoric, one sees revived in these *Essays*, the old story of Prometheus ; his Lordship insulting the sanctity of the PUBLIC, just as that most antient of Freethinkers did the ALTAR OF JUPITER ; on which, as the Poets tell us, he offered up to the King of Gods and Men, A HEAP OF DRY BONES COVERED WITH FAT.

I am, &c.

L E T.

## L E T T E R IV.

**Y**OU will wonder to hear again from me on so trifling a subject as this FIRST PHILOSOPHY. And had not Lord Bolingbroke reduced us to this alternative, either to give up the BIBLE or his LORDSHIP to contempt, I should willingly have left him in possession of his Admirers.

My last Letter examined his Lordship's value in every point of *view*, in which a PHILOSOPHER would desire to shine. I shall now push my inquiry a little further, and venture into his own Province. I shall crave your patience while I try his talents in his POLITICAL capacity, as an Analyser of States, a Balancer of Power, and a Distributer of Civil and Religious Sanctions.

But now we must recede a little from the method hitherto observed, which was to defend against his Lordship's calumnies, not this or that body of Divines, but the general Principles of natural and revealed Religion. Here I shall have occasion to patronise a single Clergyman; and not such a one neither as I could have wished; a CUDWORTH, a CLARKE, a CUMBERLAND, or a TILLOPSON; (established Names! which the Public are ready to make their own quarrel) but a Writer of very ambiguous fame, the Author of the *Divine Legation of Moses*, and, of *The Alliance between Church and State*: Of whom,

I pretend to know little but from the talk of his Adversaries; his Friends possessing him, as they do a good Conscience, in silence and complacency; and from his Adversaries I learn—"But hold, you cry, let us drop both his Friends and his Enemies, and hear what the learned abroad say of him; for his works are well known, and have been frequently translated and criticised both in Germany and France; We may expect to hear truth from Strangers who are without selfish partialities or personal prejudices."—Indeed, the Author would owe you his thanks for referring him to that decision: Foreign Critics of the greatest name have spoken so differently of him from the Scriblers at home, that, was I to tell you what they have told the world, you would suspect their encomiums for the civilities of his most partial Friends. So to his Adversaries, I say again, I commit him: And, from them I learn that he abounds in Paradoxes, that he delights in Refinements, and would fain pass upon the World a heap of crude index-reading, for well-digested learning: that, on his first appearance, he was shrewdly suspected of infidelity; but that (no body knows how) he has worked men into an opinion, of his being a sort of friend to Religion; indeed, in his own way: I suppose he sees it for his Interest to stick to the established Church; for I know no other reason why there should have been different opinions concerning him. In a word, as I judge of him from the representation of his Enemies, I can allow him little other claim to literary merit, than that very doubtful one, *The Dances, of all denominations, being in Confederacy against him.*

In-



Indeed, since his Lordship's discovery of a *Confederacy* between *Divines* and *Atheists*, the word *confederacy* is likely to become as ridiculous as the word *Ode*, which our Laureate foretells, no body for the future will hear spoken of without laughing. However, it shall pass ; for were there no more in this *confederacy*, than in his Lordship's ; and that every individual Blockhead only followed the bent of his own natural bias, it would but make the wonder still more.

Such then is the Writer I am forced to take up with : In truth I could not find another, so proper for my purpose ; which was, as I said, to display Lord Bolingbroke's *political* talents. For tho' his Lordship be very profuse in his ill Language to All, who have undertaken the defence of *Religion* and *Church Government* ; yet the Author of *The Divine Legation of Moses* is the only one whom he does more than rail at and abuse on these accounts. For while he keeps at a respectful distance from the *Arguments* of others, he comes, boldly, up to this Writer's, and sits down before them in form. He Disputes with him, the Knowledge of the *Unity*—the sense and reason of a *select people*—of a *tutelary Deity*—of *compliance with human prejudices*, and, in a word, every leading principle of the Author's Book. This seems not greatly for his Lordship's honour after he had defied all the mighty Chieftains of Literature, to decline the combat, and think himself quit by accepting the Gauntlet from this puny Writer.

His Lordship begins his attack on that capital circumstance in the Jewish Oeconomy, THE OMISSION OF A FUTURE STATE : He pretends to account for it independently of the EXTRAORDINARY OR EQUAL

PROVIDENCE, which Moses assured his people was to be administered under a *Theocracy*; and which the Author of the *Divine Legation* attempts to prove, from this very circumstance of the *Omission*, was actually administered.

But to make this intelligible to the common Reader, it will be necessary to give a summary View of that famous Argument pursued at large thro' two volumes of the *Divine Legation*, and yet conceived by many of the Learned, to be left imperfect; marry, by some, if you were to judge from the knowledge they seem to have of it, hardly to be begun.

RELIGION has been always held necessary to the support of CIVIL SOCIETY; and (under the common dispensation of Providence) a FUTURE STATE, as necessary to RELIGION; because, nothing but a *future state* can remove the objections to God's moral Government, under such a Providence; whose phenomena are apt to disturb the serious Professors of Religion, as it is of the essence of religious profession, to believe that *God is a rewarder of those who diligently seek him*.

MOSES, who instituted a *Religion* and a *Republic*, and incorporated them together, stands single amongst ancient and modern Lawgivers, in teaching a *Religion* WITHOUT the sanction, or even the mention, of a *Future State of Rewards and Punishments*. The same MOSES, by uniting the Religion and the Republic of the Jews into one system, made God by consequence their supreme civil Magistrate, whereby the form of Government became truly and properly THEOCRATICAL.

The natural consequence of a *Theocratic* rule is an *extraordinary* or EQUAL PROVIDENCE. And such indeed, the Jewish Lawgiver has every where represented it to be.

Now, the question between Infidels and Believers is, whether this extraordinary Providence was REAL or only. PRETENDED ?

Here the Author of the *Divine Legation* interposes ; and undertakes to prove, from the circumstance of the *omission of a future state*, that it was REAL. His Argument stands thus :

If Religion be necessary to Civil Government, and if Religion cannot subsist, under the common dispensation of Providence, without a future state of rewards and punishments, so consummate a Lawgiver would never have omitted to inculcate the belief of such a State, unless he had been well assured that an *extraordinary Providence* was indeed to be administered over his People : or were it possible he had been so infatuated, the impotency of a Religion wanting a future state, must very soon have concluded in the destruction of his REPUBLIC ; But his Republic nevertheless continued flourishing and Sovereign, for many ages.

This is the plain and simple ARGUMENT of the *Divine Legation* ; which the first and the second Volumes of that Work are employed to explain and illustrate. And it must be owned, Lord Bolingbroke saw it in its force, as appears from his various contrivances to evade it. This praise it would be unjust to deny him, when others have understood so little of the *Argument*, as to imagine that the two first Volumes had left it unfinished ; and that the Third was

to compleat the *Syllogism* ; tho' the Author had told us, more than once, that the purpose of the last Volume was only to INFORCE the various parts of the foregoing ARGUMENT, by many new considerations.

To evade, as we say, this Argument, his Lordship casts about for a reason, independent of the EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE, to account for Moses's OMISSION of a future state. And his first solution is this, " MOSES DID NOT BELIEVE THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL, nor the rewards and punishments of another life, tho' it is possible he might have learnt these Doctrines from the Egyptians, WHO TAUGHT THEM VERY EARLY, perhaps as they taught that of the Unity of God. When I say, *that Moses did not believe the immortality of the soul*, nor future rewards and punishments, my reason is this, that he taught neither, when *he had to do with a people whom a Theocracy could not restrain* ; and on whom, therefore, terrors of Punishment, *future as well as present, eternal as well as temporary*, could never be too much multiplied, or too strongly inculcated [1]."

This reasoning is altogether worthy of his Lordship. Here we have a *Doctrine*, plausible in itself, and therefore of easy admittance ; Most alluring to human nature, and therefore embraced by all mankind ; Of highest account among the Egyptians, and therefore ready to be embraced by the Israelites, who were fond of Egyptian manners ; Of strongest efficacy on the minds of an unruly people, and therefore of indispensable use ; Yet, all this notwithstanding, *Moses*

[1] Vol. iii. p. 289.



*did not believe it, and, on that account, would not teach it.*—But then, had MOSES's integrity been so severe, How came he to write a History which, my Lord thinks, is, in part at least, a fiction of his own? Did he *believe* that? How came he to leave the Israelites, as my Lord assures us he did, in possession of many of the superstitious opinions of Egypt? *he believe* them too? No, but they served his purpose; which was, The better governing an unruly People. Well, but his Lordship tells us, the doctrine of a future state served this purpose best of all; for *having to do with a People whom a Theocracy could not restrain, terrors of punishment, FUTURE as well as present, ETERNAL as well as temporary, could never be too much multiplied, or too strongly inculcated.* No matter for that. MOSES, as other men may, on a sudden grows scrupulous; and so, together with the maxims of common politics, throws aside the principles of common sense; and when he had employed all the other inventions of fraud, he boggles at this, which best served his purpose; was most innocent in itself; and was most important in its general, as well as particular, use.

In his Lordship's next Volume, this *Omission* comes again upon the stage; and then we have *another* reason assigned for MOSES's conduct in this matter. "MOSES would not teach the Doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and of a future state, *on account of the many superstitions* which this Doctrine had begot in Egypt, as we must believe, or *believe that he knew nothing of it,* OR ASSIGN SOME WHIMSICAL REASON FOR HIS OMISSION [2]."

[2] Vol. iv. p. 470.

We have seen before, that MOSES omitted a future state, because he did not believe it. This reason is now out of date; and one or other of the three following is to be assigned; either because it *begot superstitions*; or because *he knew nothing of it*; or because HE COULD DO WITHOUT IT, as the Jews were under an *extraordinary* providence; that being what he means, by the *whimsical reason assigned*, [by the Author of the *Divine Legation*] *for its omission*.

Let us take him then, at his word, without expecting however that he will stand to it, and having shewn, his two first reasons not worth a rush, leave the last established even on his own concessions.

1. *Moses*, says he, *omitted a future state on account of the many superstitions, which this doctrine had begot in Egypt*. But if the *omission* stands upon this principle, MOSES must have omitted an infinite number of Rites and Doctrines, which, Lord Bolingbroke says, he borrowed from the Egyptians; part of which, in his Lordship's opinion, were those very superstitions, which this *Doctrine had begot*; such as the notion of *tutelary Deities*; and part, such as arose out of those; in which number were *distinction between things clean and unclean*; an *hereditary Priesthood*; *sacerdotal habits*; and *Rites of sacrifice*.

2. However, he has another reason for the omission: MOSES *might know nothing of it*. To which if I only opposed his Lordship's own words in another place, (where, giving us the reasons why MOSES did *know something* of a future state, he observes, there are *certain rites, which seem to allude or have a remote relation to this very doctrine* [3], it might be deemed

[3] Vol. v. p. 239.

sufficient. But I go further, and observe, that, from the very LAWS of MOSES themselves, we have an internal evidence of his knowledge of this doctrine. Amongst the Laws against Gentile Divinations, there is one concerning that species of them, called by the Greeks NECROMANCY, or *invocation of the dead*; which necessarily implies, in the Lawgiver who forbids it, as well as in the offender who uses it, the *knowledge of a future state*.

3. This being the fate of his Lordship's two reasons, we are now abandoned by him, and left to follow our own inventions, and to take up with SOME WHIMSICAL REASON FOR THE OMISSION; that is, to allow that, as the Jews were under an *extraordinary* Providence, MOSES in quality of Lawgiver had NO OCCASION for the doctrine of a *future state*.

However, his Lordship dissatisfied, as well he might, with the solutions hitherto proposed, returns again to the charge; And in his *Corona operis*, the book of FRAGMENTS, more openly opposes the doctrine of the *Divine Legation*; and enlarges and expatiates upon the reason, before given, for the *omission*; namely, *the many superstitions this doctrine had begotten in Egypt*.

“ ONE CANNOT SEE WITHOUT SURPRIZE (says  
 “ his Lordship) a doctrine so useful to ALL Religion,  
 “ and therefore incorporated into ALL the Systems of  
 “ Paganism, left wholly out of that of the JEWS. Ma-  
 “ ny probable reasons might be brought to shew, that  
 “ it was an Egyptian doctrine before the Exode, and  
 “ this particularly, that it was propagated from Egypt,  
 “ so soon, at least, afterwards, by all those who were  
 “ instructed like MOSES, in the wisdom of that people.  
 “ He

“ He transported much of his Wisdom into the  
 “ scheme of Religion and Government, which he  
 “ gave the Israelites; and, amongst other things,  
 “ certain Rites, which may seem to allude, or have  
 “ a remote relation to, this very doctrine. Tho’ this  
 “ doctrine therefore, had not been that of ABRAHAM,  
 “ ISAAC, and JACOB, He might have adopted it with  
 “ as little scruple, as he did many customs and insti-  
 “ tutions merely Egyptian. He had to do with a re-  
 “ bellious, but a superstitious, people. In the first  
 “ Character, they made it necessary that he should  
 “ neglect nothing which might add weight to his or-  
 “ dinances, and contribute to keep them in awe. In  
 “ the second, their disposition was extremely proper  
 “ to receive such a doctrine, and to be influenced by  
 “ it. *Shall we say that an hypothesis of future rewards*  
 “ *and punishments, was useless among a People who lived*  
 “ *under a Theocracy, and that the future Judge of other*  
 “ *People, was their immediate Judge and King,*  
 “ *who resided in the midst of them, and who dealt*  
 “ *out rewards and punishments on every occasion?*  
 “ Why then were so many precautions taken? Why  
 “ was a solemn Covenant made with God, as with a  
 “ temporal Prince? Why were so many promises and  
 “ threatnings of rewards and punishments, temporal  
 “ indeed, but future and contingent, as we find in the  
 “ book of Deuteronomy, most pathetically held out  
 “ by MOSES? Would there have been any more im-  
 “ propriety in holding out those of one kind than  
 “ those of another, because the supreme Being, who  
 “ disposed and ordered both, was in a particular man-  
 “ ner present amongst them? Would an addition to  
 “ the catalogue of rewards and punishments more  
 “ remote, but eternal, and in all respects far greater,  
 “ have



“ have had no effect ? I think neither of these things  
“ can be said.

“ What shall we say then ? How came it to pass,  
“ this addition was not made ? I will mention what  
“ occurs to me, and shall not be over solicitous about  
“ the weight that my reflexions may deserve. If the  
“ doctrines of the immortality of the soul and of a  
“ future state had been revealed to Moses, that he  
“ might teach them to the Israelites, he would have  
“ taught them most certainly. But he did not teach  
“ them. They were therefore not revealed to him.  
“ Why they were not so revealed some PERT DIVINE  
“ or other will be ready to tell you. For me, I dare  
“ not presume to guess. But this, I may presume to  
“ advance, that since these Doctrines were not re-  
“ vealed by God to his servant Moses, it is highly  
“ probable that this Legislator made a scruple of  
“ teaching them to the Israelites, how well soever  
“ instructed he might be in them himself, and how-  
“ soever useful to Government he might think them.  
“ The superstitious and idolatrous rites of the Egyp-  
“ tians, like those of other nations, were founded on  
“ the Polytheism, and the Mythology that prevailed,  
“ and were suffered to prevail, amongst the Vulgar,  
“ and that made the sum of their Religion. It seem-  
“ ed to be a point of policy to direct all these absurd  
“ opinions and practices to the service of Govern-  
“ ment, instead of attempting to root them out. But  
“ then the great difference between rude and ignorant  
“ nations and such as were civilized and learned,  
“ like the Egyptians, seems to have been this, that  
“ the former had no other system of Religion than  
“ these absurd opinions and practices, whereas the  
“ latter

“ latter had an inward as well as an outward Doc-  
 “ trine. There is reason to believe that natural  
 “ Theology and natural Religion had been taught  
 “ and practised in the ancient Theban Dynasty; and  
 “ it is probable that they continued to be an *inward*  
 “ doctrine in the rest of Egypt, while Polytheism,  
 “ Idolatry, and all the MYSTERIES, all the impieties,  
 “ and all the follies of Magic, were the *outward*  
 “ doctrine. MOSES might be let into a knowledge  
 “ of both; and under the patronage of the Princess,  
 “ whose Foundling he was, he might be initiated  
 “ into those *Mysteries*, where the secret doctrine alone  
 “ was taught, and the outward exploded. But we  
 “ cannot imagine that the Children of Israel, in ge-  
 “ neral, enjoyed the same privilege, nor that the  
 “ Masters were so lavish, to their Slaves, of a favour  
 “ so distinguished, and often so hard to obtain. No.  
 “ The Children of Israel knew nothing more than  
 “ the outside of the Religion of Egypt, and if the  
 “ doctrine, we speak of, was known to them, it was  
 “ known only in the superstitious rites, and with all  
 “ the fabulous circumstances in which it was dressed  
 “ up and presented to vulgar belief. It would have  
 “ been hard therefore to teach, or to renew this Doc-  
 “ trine in the minds of the Israelites, without giving  
 “ them an occasion the more, to recall the polythe-  
 “ istical fables, and practise the idolatrous Rites they  
 “ had learnt during their Captivity. Rites and Ce-  
 “ remonies are often so equivocal, that they may be  
 “ applied to very different doctrines. But when they  
 “ are so closely connected with one Doctrine that  
 “ they are not applicable to another, to teach the  
 “ Doctrine is, in some sort, to teach the Rites and Ce-  
 “ remonies,

“ remonies, and to authorize the fables on which  
 “ they are founded. MOSES therefore being at liberty  
 “ to teach this doctrine of rewards and punishments  
 “ in a future state, or not to teach it, might very well  
 “ choose the latter; tho’ he indulged the Israelites,  
 “ on account of the hardness of their hearts, and by  
 “ the divine permission, as it is presumed, in several  
 “ observances and customs which did not lead direct-  
 “ ly, tho’ even they did so perhaps in consequence,  
 “ to the Polytheism and Idolatry of Egypt [4].”

What a Babel of bad reasoning has his Lordship here accumulated out of the rubbish of false and inconsistent Principles ! And all, to insult the Temple of God and the Fortrefs of Mount Sion. Sometimes, he represents MOSES as a divine Messenger, and distinguishes between what was revealed, and what was not revealed, unto him ; and then, *a future state not being revealed to MOSES was the reason he did not teach it.* Sometimes again, he considers him as a mere human Lawgiver, acquiring all his knowledge of Religion and Politics from the Egyptians, in whose secret Learning he had been intimately instructed ; and then, the reason of the *omission* is, *lest the Doctrine of a future state should have drawn the Israelites into those Egyptian superstitions, from which, it was MOSES’s purpose to estrange them.* All these inconsistencies in *Fact* and *Reasoning*, his Lordship delivers in the same breath, and without the least intimation of any change in his Principles or Opinions.

But let us follow him step by step, without troubling our heads about his real sentiments ; which this

[4] Vol. v. p. 238—9—40—41.

*View* of his talents regards with indifference. It is enough, that we confute all he says, whether under his own, or any assumed Character.

He begins with confessing, that ONE CANNOT SEE WITHOUT SURPRIZE, *a doctrine so useful to ALL Religions, and therefore incorporated into ALL the Systems of Paganism, left wholly out of that of the Jews.*

It seems then, this OMISSION is no light or trivial matter, which may be accounted for by MOSES'S *disbelief* of the doctrine ; his *ignorance* of it ; or the *imaginary mischiefs* it might possibly produce. So that we may be allowed to think it deserved all the pains, the Author of the *Divine Legation of Moses* has bestowed upon it : whose *whimsical reasoning*, if it ended in a demonstration of Revealed Religion, sufficiently atoned for it's going a little out of the way.

His Lordship proceeds to shew, in direct opposition to what he said before, that MOSES could not be ignorant of the doctrine of a future state, because the Egyptians taught it : His knowledge of it, (my Lord tells us) further appears from an *internal* circumstance, *some of his rites seeming to allude, or to have a remote relation to, this very doctrine.* 'This I observe, to his Lordship's credit. The remark is just and accurate. But we are in no want of his *remote relation* ; I have shewn just above, that the jewish Laws against *Necromancy* necessarily imply Moses's knowledge of the Doctrine.

He then goes on to explain the advantages which, humanly speaking, the Israelites must have received from this Doctrine, in the temper and circumstances with which they left Egypt. MOSES, says he, *had to do with a rebellious and a superstitious People.* This  
likewise



likewise I observe to his credit : It has the same marks of sagacity and truth ; and brings us to the very verge of the *Solution*, proposed by the Author of the *Divine Legation* ; which is, that the Israelites were indeed under an *extraordinary Providence*, which supplied all the disadvantages of the *Omission*. Under a *common and unequal Providence*, RELIGION cannot subsist without the doctrine of a future state : for Religion implying a just retribution of reward and punishment, which under such a Providence is not dispensed, a future state must needs subvene, to prevent the whole Edifice from falling into ruin. And thus we account for the *fact*, which his Lordship so amply acknowledges, viz. *that the doctrine of a future state was most useful to ALL Religions, and therefore incorporated into ALL the Religions of Paganism*. But where an *extraordinary Providence* is administered, good and evil are exactly distributed ; and therefore, in this circumstance, a future state is not necessary for the support of Religion. It is not to be found in the Mosaic Oeconomy ; yet this Oeconomy subsisted for many ages : Religion therefore did not need it ; or, in other words, it was supported by an *extraordinary Providence*.

This is the argument of the *Divine Legation*. Let us now consider his Lordship's present attempts to evade it.

*Shall we say, that an Hypothesis of future rewards and punishments was useless amongst a people who lived under a THEOCRACY, and that the future Judge of other People was their immediate Judge and King, who resided in the midst of them, and who dealt out rewards and punishments*

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*nishments on every occasion? WHY THEN WERE SO  
MANY PRECAUTIONS taken? &c.*

First, let me observe, that the PRECAUTIONS here objected to are intended for an insinuation against the truth of Moses's Promise of an extraordinary Providence. A kind of SOPHISM which his Lordship advances and only holds in common with the rest who have written against the *Divine Legation*: and which I shall here, after much forbearance on the Author's part, expose as it deserves.

MOSES affirms again and again, that his People were under an extraordinary Providence. He affirms it indeed; but as it is not a self evident truth, it needs to be proved. Till then, the Unbeliever is at liberty to urge any circumstance in the jewish Law or History, which may seem to bring the reality of that Providence into question: The same liberty too, has the Believer; if, at least, he can persuade himself to make use of it; as many, so professing themselves, have done both in their Writings and Discoursings against the *Divine Legation*. Things were in this train, when the Author of that book undertook the defence of MOSES: And to obviate all objections to the Legislator's credit, arising from any doubtful or unfavourable circumstance in the Law or History of the Jews concerning this extraordinary Providence, he advanced the INTERNAL ARGUMENT of the OMISSION. An argument which necessarily inferred that an extraordinary Providence was in fact administered in the jewish Republic. What change did this make in the state of the case? A very great one. Unbelievers were now indeed at liberty, and Believers too, if so perversely inclined, to oppose, and, as they could, to confute  
the

the Argument of the *Divine Legation*: But by no rules of good Logic could they come over again with those scripture-difficulties to Moses's credit, which the argument of the *Divine Legation* had entirely obviated, and which it still continued to exclude so long as it remained unanswered. For while a demonstrated truth stands good, no difficulties arising from it, however inexplicable, can have any weight against that superior evidence. Not to admit this fundamental maxim of common sense, would be to unsettle many a *physical* and *mathematical* demonstration, as well as this *moral* one.

I say therefore, as things now stand, To oppose *difficulties* against the administration of an extraordinary Providence, after that providence has been *proved*, and before the *proof* has been confuted, is the most palpable and barefaced imposition on our understanding. In which however, his Lordship is but one of a hundred: and indeed, the least indecent and inconsistent of the hundred; as his declared purpose is to destroy the credit and authority of the Jewish Law-giver.

I shall not however decline to examine the weight of these objections, tho' they be so foolishly and sophistically obtruded.

If there was this EXTRAORDINARY Providence administered, says his Lordship, *Why so many Precautions taken? Why was a solemn covenant made with God as with a temporal Prince? Why were so many promises and threatnings of rewards and punishments, temporal indeed, but future and contingent, as we find, in the Book of Deuteronomy, most pathetically held out by Moses?* This difficulty is not hard to be resolved. We find throughout, what *we* Believers are wont to call the *History of Providence*,

*Providence*, but which *his Lordship* is pleased to intitle, *Tales more extravagant than those of Amadis de Gaule*, that God, in his moral Government of the World, always makes use of human means, as far as those means will go; and never interposes with his *extraordinary Providence*, but when they will go no further. To do otherwise, would be to make an unnecessary waste of Miracles; better fitted to confound our knowledge of NATURE, by obscuring the harmony of order, than to manifest it's Lord and Sovereign, by controlling its delegated Powers. This method in God's moral Government, all our ideas of Wisdom seem to support. Now when He, the great Master of the Universe, had decreed to rule the Jewish People in an extraordinary way, he did not propose to supersede any of the measures of civil regimen. And this, I hope, will be esteemed a sufficient answer to—WHY SO MANY PRECAUTIONS TAKEN, &c. But would you see it drawn out more at large, you may consult the Author's *remarks* on the same kind of Sophistry employed by Dr. SYKES against the *Divine Legation*.

But, (says his Lordship) *would the hypothesis of a future state have been useless, &c? Would there* (as his Lordship goes on) *have been any more impropriety in holding out those [sanctions] of one kind than those of another, because the supreme Being, who disposed and ordered both, was in a particular manner present amongst them? Would an addition of rewards and punishments, (more remote, but eternal, and in all respects far greater) to the catalogue, have had no effect? I think neither of these things can be said.* His Lordship totally mistakes the drift of the Author's Argument. The *Divine Legation*



*tion* infers no more from the fact of the *omission* than this, That the Jewish Oeconomy, administered by an extraordinary providence, could do without the service of the *omitted* Doctrine; not, that that Doctrine, even under such a Dispensation, was *of no use*, much less that it was IMPROPER. But then one of his Followers, or, what is as good, one of the Adversaries of the *Divine Legation*, will be ready to say, “If a *future state* was not *improper*, much more if it was of *use*, under an extraordinary dispensation, How came Moses not to give it? For great and wise ends of Providence vastly countervailing the use of that Doctrine, if you will believe the Author of the *Divine Legation*: Who, if he did not impose upon us, when he promised a third volume, (as his Lordship constantly believed he did) will there explain those ends at large.

Lord Bolingbroke proceeds next to tell us, what occurs to Him, concerning the REASONS of the *omission*; And previously assures us, he is *not over solicitous about their weight*. This, I suppose, is to make his Counters pass current: For then, as Hobbes expresses it, they become the *money of fools*, when we cease to be *sollicitous* about their worth; when we try them by their colour, not their weight; their Rhetoric, and not their Logic. But this must be said with exception to the first, which is altogether logical, and very entertaining.

*If* (says his Lordship) *the doctrine of the immortality of the soul and a future state had been revealed to Moses, that he might teach them to the Israelites, he would have taught them most certainly. But he did not teach them. They were, therefore, not revealed.* It is in mood and figure, you see; and, I warrant you, designed to supply what was wanting in the

*Divine Legation*: Tho' as the Author of that book certainly believed, *the doctrines were not revealed*, 'tis ten to one but he thought Moses was not at liberty to teach them; unless you can suppose that his Lordship, who believed nothing of Revelation, might believe Moses to be restrained from teaching what God had not revealed to him; and yet, that the Author of the *Divine Legation*, who held Moses's pretensions to be true, might think him at liberty to go beyond his Commission. Thus far, then, these two Writers may be said to agree: But this good understanding lasts not long. His Lordship's *modesty* and the other's *pertness* soon make the breach as wide as ever.—*Why they were not so revealed* (says his Lordship) *some PERT DIVINE or other will be ready to tell you. For me, I dare not pretend to guess.* The forwardness of the one and the backwardness of the other, are equally well suited to their respective principles. Should his Lordship have guessed, it might have brought him to what he most dreaded, the divine original of the Jewish Religion: Had his Adversary forborn to guess, he had betrayed his cause, and left those data enemployed, which enabled him, I do not say to guess, but to discover, and to *demonstrate the Divine Legation of Moses.*

However, *This*, his Lordship *will presume to advance, that since these doctrines were not revealed by God to his servant MOSES, it is highly probable, that the Legislator made a scruple of teaching them to the Israelites, howsoever well instructed he might be in them himself, and howsoever useful to Government he might think them.*

Here, you see, he personates a Believer, who holds MOSES to be an inspired Lawgiver: But observe how poorly he sustains his part! Either MOSES did indeed receive

receive the LAW from God, or he did not. If he did not, Why are we mocked with the distinction between what was revealed, and what was not revealed, when nothing was revealed? If MOSES did receive the *Law* from God, Why are we still worse mocked with the distinction between what was revealed, and what was not revealed, when every thing was revealed; as well, the direction for omitting *a future state*, as the direction to *inculcate the Unity of the Godhead*? Why was all this mockery, you say? For a very good purpose: it was to draw us from the TRUE object of our inquiry, which is, What GOD intended by the *omission*; to that FANTASTIC object, which only respects, what MOSES intended by it. For the intention of GOD supposes the mission and inspiration of a Prophet; but the intention of MOSES, when considered in contradistinction to GOD's, terminates in the human views of an ordinary Law-giver; which leads us back again to Infidelity.

But he soon strips Moses of his Mission, and invests him again with his civil Character: And here he considers, What it was, which, under this character, might induce Moses to *omit* a future state; and he finds it to be, lest this doctrine should have hurt the doctrine of the Unity, which it was his purpose to inculcate amongst his People, in opposition to the Egyptian Polytheism.

*Moses (says his Lordship) it is highly probable, made a scruple of teaching these Doctrines to the Israelites, howsoever well instructed he might be in them, himself, and howsoever useful to Government he might think them. The People of Egypt, like all other nations, were Polytheists, but different from all others: there was in Egypt an inward as well as outward Doctrine: Natural Theo-*



*logy and natural Religion were the inward Doctrine; while Polytheism, Idolatry, and ALL THE MYSTERIES, all the impieties and follies of magic, were the OUTWARD Doctrine. Moses was initiated into those Mysteries where the secret doctrine alone was taught, and the outward exploded —* For an accurate Divider commend me to his Lordship. In distinguishing between the *inward* and *outward* doctrines of the Egyptians, he puts *all the Mysteries* amongst the *outward*: tho' if they had an *inward*, it must necessarily be part of those *Mysteries*. But he makes amends presently, (tho' his amends to truth is as it should be, always at the expence of a contradiction) and says, that *Moses learnt the inward doctrine in the Mysteries*. Let this pass. He proceeds — *Moses had the knowledge of both outward and inward. Not so the Israelites in general. They knew nothing more than the outside of the Religion of Egypt. And if a future state was known to them, it was known only in the superstitious rites, and with all the fabulous circumstances, in which it was dressed up and presented to the vulgar belief. It would be hard therefore to teach or to renew this doctrine in the minds of the Israelites, without giving them an occasion the more to recal the Polytheistical fables, and practise the idolatrous rites they had learnt during their Captivity.*

The Children of Israel, it seems, *knew no more of a future state, than by the superstitious rites and fabulous circumstances with which it was dressed up and presented to the public belief.* What then? MOSES, he owns, *knew more.* And what hindered MOSES from communicating of his knowledge to the People, when he took them under his protection, and gave them a new Law and a new Religion? His Lordship lets us understand that this People knew as little of the Unity;  
for



for he tells us, it was amongst the inward Doctrines of the Egyptians: yet this did not hinder Moses from instructing his people in the doctrine of the Unity. What then should hinder his teaching them the inward doctrine of a future state, divested of its fabulous circumstances? He had divested *Religious worship* of the absurdities of Demi-Gods and Heroes; What should hinder him from divesting a *future state* of Charon's boat and the Elysian fields? But the notion of a future state would have recalled those fabulous circumstances which had been long connected with it. And was not Religious worship, under the idea of a *tutelar Deity*, and a *temporal King*, much more apt to recal the polytheism of Egypt? Yet Moses ventured upon this inconvenience, for the sake of great advantages: Why should he not venture on the other, for the sake of greater? for the doctrine of a future state, is, as his Lordship confesses, even necessary both to civil and religious Society. But what does he talk of the danger of giving entry to the fables and superstitions concerning the soul (superstitions, which, tho' learnt indeed in the Captivity, were common to all the nations of Polytheism) when in other places he assures us, that Moses indulged the Israelites in the most characteristic superstitions of Egypt?

However, let us see how he supports this wise observation. *Rites and Ceremonies* (says his Lordship) *are often so equivocal, that they may be applied to very different doctrines. But when they are so closely connected with a doctrine, that they are not applicable to another, to teach the doctrine, is, IN SOME SORT, to teach the rites and ceremonies.* — *In some sort*, is well put in, to soften

deformity of this inverted logic. His point is to shew that a superstitious Rite, relating to, and dependent on, a certain Doctrine, will obtrude itself whenever that Doctrine is taught: and his reasoning is only calculated to prove, that where the Rite is practised, the Doctrine will soon follow. This may indeed be true. But then it does not hold in the reverse, that the Rite follows the Doctrine: because a Principal may stand without its Dependent; but a Dependent can never subsist without its Principal.

Under cover of these grotesque shapes, into which his Lordship has travestied the Jewish Lawgiver, he concludes, that *MOSES being AT LIBERTY to teach this doctrine of rewards and punishments in a future state, or not to teach it, he might very well chuse the latter* — Yet it was but at the very beginning of this paragraph that he tells us, *Moses was NOT AT LIBERTY to teach or not to teach*. His words are these, *Since this doctrine was not revealed by God to his servant Moses, it is highly probable that this Legislator MADE A SCRUPLE of teaching it*. But his Lordship well knows that Statesmen soon get the better of their scruples; and then, by another fetch of political casuistry, find themselves more at liberty than ever.

I had observed above that our noble Discourser who makes *MOSES so scrupulous* that he would on no terms afford a handle for one single superstition of Egypt to get footing among his people; has, on other occasions, charged him with introducing them by wholesale. He was sensible, his Inconsistency was likely to be detected, and therefore he now attempts to obviate it. — *Tho' he [Moses] indulged the Israelites, on account of the hardness of their hearts, and by the di-*  
vine

*vine permission, as it is presumed, in several observations and customs, which did not LEAD directly, tho' even they did so perhaps IN CONSEQUENCE, to the Polytheism and Idolatry of Egypt.* And could the teaching the doctrine of a future state possibly do more than LEAD IN CONSEQUENCE, (as his Lordship elegantly expresses it) *to the Polytheism and Idolatry of Egypt*, by drawing after it those *superstitious Rites and fabulous circumstances* which, he tells us, then attended the popular notion of such a State? If, for the *hardness of their hearts*, they were indulged in *several observances and customs*, which only *led in consequence* to Polytheism and Idolatry, Why, for the *same* hardness of heart, were they not indulged with the doctrine of a future state, which did not lead, but by a very remote consequence, to Polytheism and Idolatry? Especially since this *hardness of heart* would less bear the denial of a DOCTRINE so alluring to the human mind, than the denial of a RITE, to which habit only and old custom had given an occasional propensity. Again, those Rites, indulged to the People, for the *hardness of their hearts*, had, in themselves, little use or tendency to advance the ends of the Jewish Dispensation; but rather retarded them: Whereas a future state, by his Lordship's own confession, is most useful to all Religions, and therefore incorporated into all the Systems of Paganism; and was particularly useful to the Israelites, who were, he says, both a *rebellious* and a *superstitious* people: dispositions, which not only made it necessary to omit nothing that might inforce obedience, but likewise facilitated the reception and supported the influence of the doctrine in question.



You have here the whole of his Lordship's boasted solution of this important Circumstance of the omission. And you see how vainly he strives to elude its force. Overwhelmed, as it were, with the weight of so irresistible a Power, after long wriggling to get free, he at length crawls forth; but so maimed and broken, so impotent and fretful, that all his remaining strength is in his venom. And this, he now sheds in abundance over the whole Mosaic Oeconomy. It is pronounced to be a gross imposture; and this very circumstance of the omission is given as an undoubted proof of the accusation.

—“ Can we be surpris'd then (says his Lordship)  
 “ that the Jews ascribed to the all-perfect Being, on  
 “ various occasions, such a conduct and such Laws  
 “ as are inconsistent with his most obvious per-  
 “ fections? Can we believe such a conduct and such  
 “ Laws to have been his, on the word of the proudest  
 “ and most lying Nation in the world? Many other  
 “ considerations might have their place here. But  
 “ I shall confine myself to one; *which I do not re-*  
 “ *member to have seen nor heard urged on one side, nor*  
 “ ANTICIPATED *on the other.* To shew then, the  
 “ more evidently, how ABSURD, as well as IMPIOUS  
 “ it is to ascribe these Mosaic Laws to God, let it  
 “ be considered, that NEITHER the people of Israel,  
 “ nor their Legislator perhaps, KNEW ANY THING  
 “ OF ANOTHER LIFE, wherein the crimes committed  
 “ in this life are to be punished. Altho' he might  
 “ have learned this Doctrine, which was not so much  
 “ a secret doctrine as it may be presumed that the  
 “ Unity of the supreme God was, amongst the Egyp-  
 “ tians. Whether he had learned both or either, or  
 “ neither



“ neither of them in those schools, cannot be deter-  
 “ mined: BUT THIS MAY BE ADVANCED WITH  
 “ ASSURANCE; If MOSES knew, that crimes, and  
 “ therefore Idolatry, one of the greatest, were to be  
 “ punished in another life, he deceived the people in  
 “ the Covenant they made, by his intervention, with  
 “ God. If he did not know it, I say it with horror,  
 “ the consequence, *according to the hypothesis I oppose*,  
 “ must be, that God deceived both him and them.  
 “ In either case, a covenant or bargain was made,  
 “ wherein, the conditions of obedience and disobe-  
 “ dience were not fully, nor by consequence, fairly  
 “ stated. The Israelites had better things to hope,  
 “ and worse to fear, than those which were expressed  
 “ in it: and their whole history seems to shew how  
 “ much need they had of these additional motives  
 “ to restrain them from Polytheism and Idolatry, and  
 “ to answer the assumed Purposes of divine Provi-  
 “ dence [2].”

This argument, *advanced with so much assurance*,  
 his Lordship says, he does *not remember to have seen,*  
*or heard urged on one side, nor anticipated on the other.*  
 A gentle reproof, as we are to understand it, of the  
 Author of the *Divine Legation*: for none but He, I  
 think, could *anticipate* an objection to an Argument  
 which none but He had employed. Give me leave  
 then to supply his defects: I am the first good natured  
 Animadverter on him that has done so; the rest have  
 contented themselves with their best endeavours to  
 expose them. And as his Lordship is so generous to  
 invite an answer to it, he shall not be disappointed.

[2] Vol. v. p. 194—5.

*Let it be considered* (says his Lordship) *that perhaps Moses KNEW NOTHING of another life, wherein the crimes committed in this life are to be punished.—Considered by whom? Not by his Lordship, or his kind Readers: for his reasoning has brought them to consider the contrary.* “Many probable reasons (says he) “might be brought to shew, that this was an Egyptian doctrine before the exode; and this particularly, “that it was propagated from Egypt, so soon at “least afterwards, by all those who were instructed “LIKE MOSES, in the wisdom of that People. He “transported much of this wisdom into the scheme of “Religion and Government which he gave the Israelites; and, among other things, certain Rites, which “SEEM TO ALLUDE, OR HAVE A REMOTE RELATION TO, THIS DOCTRINE [3].” This possibly might have recurred to his Lordship, while he was boasting of this new and *unanticipated* argument, and therefore, in the tricking it up amongst his *Fragments*, to his *perhaps*, he adds, by a very happy corrective, *altho’ Moses might have learnt this Doctrine, which WAS NOT SO MUCH A SECRET doctrine, as it may be presumed that the Unity of the supreme God was amongst the Egyptians.* But he had done better to have left his contradictions uncorrected, and have trusted to the rare sagacity of his Readers to find them out. He had ever an ill hand at reconciling matters; so in the case before us, in the very act of covering one contradiction, he commits another. He is here speaking of a future state, divested of its fabulous circumstances; *Perhaps,*

[3] Vol. v, p. 328—9.

says he, MOSES KNEW NOTHING OF ANOTHER LIFE. *Which, was NOT SO MUCH A SECRET doctrine as that of the Unity.* Now, Sir, turn back a moment, to the long quotation from his 239<sup>th</sup> page, and there you will find, that a future state, divested of its fabulous circumstances, WAS AS MUCH A SECRET *Doctrine, as that of the Unity.*—“There is reason to believe, “that natural Theology and natural Religion were “INWARD doctrines amongst the Egyptians. Mo- “SES might be let into a knowledge of BOTH by “being initiated into those *Mysteries* where the *secret* “doctrine alone was taught. But we cannot imagine, “that the Children of Israel in general enjoyed the “same privilege. No, *they knew nothing more than the* “*outside* of the Egyptian Religion: and if the *Doctrine* “*we speak of* [A FUTURE STATE] was known to them, “it was known only in the superstitious Rites, and with “all the fabulous circumstances, in which it was “dressed up and presented to vulgar belief.”—Is not this, now, a plain declaration, that a *future state*, divested of its fabulous circumstances, *was as much a secret Doctrine as the doctrine of the Unity?*

But his Lordship's contradictions are the least of my concern. It is his Argument I have now to do with. And this, he says, he *advances* WITH ASSURANCE. It is fit he should. *Modesty* would be very ill bestowed on such opinions.

He thinks he can reduce those who hold no future state in the Jewish Oeconomy, to the necessity of owning, that MOSES, or *that God himself*, acted *unfairly by the Israelites*. How so, You ask? Because One or Other of them concealed that *state*. And what if they did? Why then they concealed one of

the actual Sanctions of moral conduct, *future punishment*. But who told him, that this, which was no sanction of the *Jewish Law*, was a Sanction to the moral conduct of the *Jewish People*? Who, unless the *artificial Theologer*? the man he most despises and decries.

And, even in *artificial Theology*, there is nothing but the CALVINISTICAL tenet of *Original Sin*, which gives the least countenance to so monstrous an opinion; every thing in the GOSPEL, every thing in NATURAL THEOLOGY, exclaims against it.

JESUS, indeed, to prove that the departed Israelites still existed, quotes the title God was pleased to give himself, of *the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob*; and this, together with their *existence*, proves likewise the *happiness* of their condition: for the relation they are said to stand in with God, shews them to be of his Kingdom. But we must remember, that the question with his Lordship is, not of *reward*, but *punishment*. Again, Jesus speaks, (indeed in a parable) of the deceased *rich man*, as *in a place of torment*. But we must remember that the scene was laid at a time when the Doctrine of a *future state* was become national. To know his sentiments on the question of *subjection to an unknown Sanction*, we should do well to consider the following words, “ The servant which knew his Lord’s will, and prepared not  
“ himself, neither did according to his will, shall be  
“ beaten with many stripes; but he that knew not,  
“ and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be  
“ beaten with few stripes [4].” Now the will of a

[4] Luke xii, ver. 47—8.



Master or Sovereign, declared in his Laws, always includes in it, the *Sanctions* of those Laws. The Author of the Epistle to the *Hebrews* expressly distinguishes the sanction of the Jewish law from that of the Gospel; and makes the difference to consist in this, that the one was of *temporal* punishments, and the other of *future*. *He that despised Moses's Law died without mercy under two or three witnesses: Of how much sorer punishment, suppose ye, shall he be thought worthy who hath trodden under foot the Son of God [10]?* Which appeal is without common sense or honesty, on supposition that the apostle held the Jews to be subject to *future* punishments, before that Sanction was promulged unto them. From the GOSPEL therefore it cannot be inferred, that the Israelites, while only following the Law of Moses in which the sanction of a *future state* is not delivered, were liable or subject to the punishments of that state.

Let us see next, Whether NATURAL THEOLOGY, or *natural Religion* (as his Lordship is pleased, for some reason or other, to distinguish the terms) hath taught us, that a people, living under an *extraordinary providence* or the immediate government of God, to whom he had given a Law and revealed a Religion, both supported by *temporal* sanctions only, could be deemed subject to those *future* punishments, unknown to them, which *natural Religion* before, and *Revealed Religion* since, have discovered to be due to bad men living under a *common Providence*.

NATURAL RELIGION standeth, (as has been already shewn) on this Principle, “ that the Governor

[10] C. x. v. 28-9.

“ of the Universe REWARDS and PUNISHES moral  
 “ Agents.” The length or shortness of human existence come not primarily into the idea of Religion : not even into that compleat idea of Religion delivered by St. Paul, in his general definition of it. The Religionist, says he, *must believe that God is, and that he is a REWARDER of those who seek him.*

While God exactly distributed his rewards and punishments *here*, the light of Nature directed men to look no further for the Sanctions of his Laws. But when it came to be seen, that He was *not always* a rewarder and a punisher *here*, men necessarily concluded, from his moral attributes, that he would be so, *hereafter* : and consequently, that this life was but a small portion of human duration. They had not yet speculated on the permanent nature of the Soul ; And when they did so, that consideration, which, under an *ordinary* providence came strongly in aid of the *moral argument* for another life, had no tendency, under the *extraordinary*, to open to them the prospects of *futurity* : because, tho' they saw the Soul unaffected by those causes which brought the body to destruction, yet they held it to be equally dependent on the Creator's Will ; who, amongst the various means of its dissolution, of which they had no idea, had, for aught they knew, provided one or more than one for that purpose.

In this manner was a FUTURE STATE brought, by natural light, into Religion : and from thenceforth, became a necessary part of it. But, in the Jewish THEOCRACY, God was an exact rewarder and punisher, *here*. Natural light therefore shewed that under such an administration, the subjects of it did  
 not

not become liable to future Punishments till that sanction was known amongst them.

Thus both natural and revealed Religion shew, that his Lordship calumniated them, when he affirmed, that, *according to the hypothesis he opposed, Moses Deceived the people in the Covenant they made, by his intervention, with God: Or that, if Moses did not know the doctrine of a future state, then God deceived both him and them.*

Should it be asked, how God will deal with wicked men thus dying under the Mosaic Dispensation? give me leave to answer, in the words of Dr. CLARKE, on a like occasion. He had demonstrated a self-moving Substance to be immaterial, and so, not perishable like Bodies. But, as this included the Souls of irrational animals, it was asked “How these were to be disposed of, when they had left their respective habitations?” To which he very properly replies, “Certainly, the omnipotent and infinitely wise God “ may, without any great difficulty, be supposed to “ have more ways of disposing of his Creatures [I add, with perfect justice and equity, and with equal measure, to all] “ than we are, at present, let into “ the secret of [11].” — But if the Author of the *Divine Legation* has not promised more than he can perform (as his long delay gives us too much cause to suspect) this matter will be explained at large, in his account of the SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE OF THE REDEMPTION, which, he has told us, is to have a place in his last Volume.

[11] Octavo Tracts against Dodwell and Collins, p. 103.

Nothing

Nothing now remains of this objection but the sanction of *future rewards*: And I would by no means deprive the faithful Israelites of these. His Lordship therefore has this to make his best of: and, in his opinion, even an unclaimed *reward* is foul dealing; for he joins it with *punishment*, as if his consequence, against God's justice and goodness, might be equally deduced from either of them.—*A covenant*, says he, *was made, wherein the conditions of obedience and disobedience were not FULLY, nor, by consequence, FAIRLY stated. The Israelites had BETTER THINGS TO HOPE, and worse to fear than those which were expressed in it.* Tho' it be hard on a generous *Benefactor* to be denied the right of giving more than he had promised; it is still harder on the poor Debtor, that he is not at liberty to receive more. True it is, that, in this case, the *conditions* are not FULLY *stated*; and therefore, according to his Lordship's Logic, BY CONSEQUENCE NOT FAIRLY. To strengthen this *Consequence*, his Lordship concludes in these words—*And their whole History seems to shew how much need they had of these additional motives [future Rewards and Punishments] to restrain them from Polytheism and Idolatry, and to answer the ASSUMED purposes of Divine Providence.*

Whoever puts all these things together—"That Moses was himself of the race of Israel—was learned in all the wisdom of Egypt—and capable of freeing his People from their Yoke—that he brought them within sight of the promised Land; a fertile Country, which they were to conquer and inhabit—that he instituted a system of Laws, which has been the admiration of the wisest men of all ages—that he understood the doctrine of a FUTURE STATE: and



and by his experience gained in Egypt, knew the efficacy of it in general; and by his perfect knowledge of the rebellious and superstitious temper of his own People, could not but see how useful it was to them in particular"—Whoever, I say, puts all these things together (and all these things are amongst his Lordship's concessions) and at the same time considers, that MOSES, throughout his whole system of Law and Religion, is entirely silent concerning a *future state* of Rewards and Punishments, will, I believe, conclude, that there was something more in the OMISSION than Lord BOLINGBROKE could fathom, or, at least, was willing to discover.

But let us turn from MOSES's conduct, (which will be elsewhere considered at large) to his Lordship's, which is our present business.

1. First, he gives us his conjectures, to account for the *Omission*, exclusive of MOSES's *Divine Legation*: but, as if dissatisfied with them himself (which he well might be, for they destroy one another)

2. He next attempts, You see, to prove, that the *Legation* could not be *divine*, from this very circumstance of the *omission*.

3. But now he will go further, and demonstrate that an *extraordinary providence* in general, such a one as is represented by Moses, and which, the Author of the *Divine Legation* has proved, from the circumstance of the *omission*, was actually administered in the Jewish Republic, could not possibly be administered, without destroying free will; without making Virtue servile; and without relaxing universal benevolence.

4. And

4. And lastly, to make all sure, he shuts up the account by shewing, that an *extraordinary* providence could answer no reasonable end or purpose.

In his first and last order of evasions, he seems to be alone ; but in the second and third, he had the pleasure of seeing, many an orthodox Writer against the *Divine Legation*, (to use his Lordship's language) in *confederacy* with him.

I have examined his Lordship's first and second order. The third and fourth remain to be considered ; it is the last refuge of his infidelity ; and then, I think, I may return him back to the Author of the *Divine Legation*, to give us a fresh view of him ; if so be he think it worth his while to defend the other principles of his book against him.

1. His first objection to the administration of an extraordinary providence, such as MOSES promised to his people on the part of GOD, is, that it would DESTROY FREE-WILL. But here let me observe, that he affects to disguise the immediate Object of his attack ; and, in arguing against an extraordinary Providence, chuses to consider it in the general, as the Point arises out of an imaginary dispute between Him and the Divines ; who, he pretends, are dissatisfied with the present order of things, and require, as the terms of their acquiescence in God's government, the administration of an equal Providence, *here*. But, this obliquity in disguising the true object of his attack not being of itself sufficient to embarrass his adversaries, he further supports it by a prevarication : for it is not true, that Divines are dissatisfied with the present order of things, or that they require a better. All the ground they ever gave his Lordship for impu-  
ting

ring this scandal to them, being only this assertion,  
 “ That if the present state be the whole of Man’s  
 existence, then the Justice of God would have more  
 exactly dispensed good and evil *here*: but, as he has  
 not done so, it follows, that there will be a state of  
 rewards and punishments *hereafter*.”

This premised, I proceed to his first objection, —  
 “ In good earnest (says his Lordship) is a system of  
 “ particular providences, in which the supreme Be-  
 “ ing, or his Angels, like his Ministers to reward,  
 “ and his Executioners to punish, are constantly em-  
 “ ployed in the affairs of mankind, much more rea-  
 “ sonable ?” [than the *Gods* of EPICURUS or the *mo-*  
*vals* of POLEMO] “ Would the JUSTICE of God be  
 “ more MANIFEST in such a state of things than in  
 “ the present? I see no room for MERIT on the part  
 “ of Man, nor for JUSTICE on the part of God, in  
 “ such a state [12].”

His Lordship asks, *whether the Justice of God would be more manifest* in such a state of things, where good is constantly dispensed to the virtuous, and evil to the wicked, *than in the present*, where good and evil happen indifferently to all men? If his Lordship, by *the present state of things*, includes the rectification of them in a future state, I answer, that the *justice of God would not be more manifest*, but equally and fully manifest in either case. If his Lordship does not include this rectification in a future state, then I answer his question by another; Would the Justice of the Civil Magistrate be more manifest, where he exactly dispenses rewards to good men, and punishment to evil, than

[12] Vol. v. p. 425--6.

where he suffers the Cunning and the Powerful to carve for themselves ?

But *he sees no room for merit on the part of Man, nor Justice on the part of God.* If he does not see, it is his own fault. It is owing to his prevaricating both with himself and his Reader ; to the turning his view from the Scripture-representation of an equal Providence, to the iniquity of Calvinistical election, and to the partialities of Fanatics concerning the favoured workings of the Spirit ; and to his giving these to the reader, in its stead. How dextrously does he slide *Enthusiasm* and *Predestination* into the Scripture-doctrine of an equal Providence !—*If some men were DETERMINED TO GOODNESS by the secret workings of the spirit, &c.* Yes indeed, if you will be so kind to allow him, that under an equal providence, the will is over-ruled, he will be able to shew you, there is an end of all merit and demerit. But this substituting *artificial theology* (as he calls it) in the place of *bible-theology*, is his usual leger-de-main. So again,—*I can conceive still less, that individual Creatures before they have done either good or evil, nay, before their actual existence, can be the objects of predilection or aversion, of love or hatred, to God.* Who, of the Gospel-Divines, against whom he is here writing, would have him *conceive* any thing of this at all ? It is the *artificial Theologer*, the depraver, as he says, of the Gospel who would draw him into so absurd a system. But what has this exploded *Theology*, that abounds only in human inventions, to do with the extraordinary Providence, represented in holy Writ ! To say, that this Providence takes away man's merit and God's justice, is confounding all our ideas of right  
and



and wrong. Is it not the highest merit of a rational creature to comply with that motive which has most real weight? And is not God's justice then most manifest when the order of things present fewest difficulties and obscurities in our contemplation of it? His Lordship was plainly of these sentiments, when, arguing against God's compliance with the Jewish *hardness of heart*, he thought it more becoming the Master of the Universe, to bend the perverse stiffness of their Wills: and, when, arguing against a *future state* from the present good order of things, he pretends to shew, against Divines and Atheists in conjunction, that there is little or no irregularity in the present dispensations of Providence; at least, not so much as the World commonly imagine. And why was this paradox advanced, but from a consciousness that the more exact the present administration of God's providence appeared, the more manifest it made his Justice? But now his Lordship's followers may be apt to pretend, that their Master has here, done no more, indeed scarce so much, at least not in so express terms, as a celebrated Prelate, in one of his *discourses at the Temple*; who tells us, "That an  
 " immediate and visible interposition of Providence  
 " in Behalf of the righteous, and for the punish-  
 " ment of the wicked, would INTERFERE WITH  
 " THE FREEDOM OF MORAL AGENTS, AND NOT  
 " LEAVE ROOM FOR THEIR TRYAL [13]." But they who object this to us, have not considered the nature of moral differences. For, as another learned Prelate well observes, *A little experience may con-*

[13] Vol. ii. p. 258--9.

*vince us, that the same thing, at different times, is not the same* [14]. Now if *different times* may make such alterations in identity, what must *different men* do? The *thing said* being by all candid interpretation to be regulated on the *purpose of saying*.

2. Lord Bolingbroke's second objection against an equal Providence is, that it would MAKE VIRTUE, SERVILE.—“ If the Good, besides the enjoyment  
 “ of all that happiness which is inseparable from  
 “ Virtue, were exempted from all kinds of evil,  
 “ and if the wicked, besides all those evils which  
 “ are inseparable from Vice, and those which happen  
 “ to all men in the ordinary course of events, were  
 “ exposed to others that the hand of God inflicted on  
 “ them in an extraordinary manner, such Good men  
 “ would have VERY LITTLE MERIT; they would  
 “ have, while they continued to be good, no other  
 “ merit than that of children who are cajoled into  
 “ their duty; or than that of Galley-slaves who ply  
 “ at the oar, because they hear and see and fear the  
 “ lash of the boat-swain [15].”

If the perfection of a rational Creature consists in acting according to reason: and if his merit rises in proportion as he advances in perfection; How can that state which best secures him from acting irrationally, lessen or take away his merit? Are the actions of the Deity of less worth for his moral incapacity of being unjust or malignant? The motive which induces to right action is indeed more or less *excellent*

[14] *Scripture vindicated from the misrepresentations of the Bp. of Bangor*, p. 165.

[15] Vol. v. p. 428.

according to the dignity or nature of the Agent: But the question here is not concerning the *excellence*, but the *power* of the motive to turn action into passion; which is the only way I can conceive of destroying *merit* in the subject. Now I hold, that this fancy, That motives exterior to the Being on which they work, may be able to turn an Agent to a Patient, is one of the greatest of Physical absurdities; and therefore commonly goes about disguised, in the garb of *metaphysics*. For while agency remains, merit subsists: the degrees of which do not depend on the less or greater force the motives have on the affections, but on the more or less reason of the choice. In a word, there is no means of taking away the merit and demerit of human actions, but by taking away agency, and making man passive, or, in other terms, a Machine.

But, to expose in a more popular way the futility of this reasoning, it will be sufficient to observe that the objection holds equally against all religious Sanctions whatsoever. And so indeed it was fairly urged by Lord Shaftsbury: who pretended that every motive regarding SELF, tended to servilize Virtue. Without doubt, one sort, just as much as another; a *future state*, just as well as an *equal Providence*. Nay, if we were to appreciate matters very nicely, it would seem, that a *future state without an equal providence* (for they are alway to be considered separately, as they belong to different systems) would more strongly incline the Will, than an *equal providence without a future state*: as the value of *future* above *present* good is immensely great. But the human mind being so constituted, that the *distance* of a good takes off proportion-

portionably from its influence, this brings the force of the two sanctions nearer to an equality ; which at length proves but this, That the objection to the *merit of Virtue* holds against all religious sanctions whatsoever. In the use of which objection Lord Shaftsbury was not only more ingenuous, as he urged it against them *all*, but more consistent, as he urged it on his doctrine of a perfect *disinterestedness* in our nature ; whereas Lord Bolingbroke is amongst those who hold, that *self-love* and *social*, tho' coincident, are two essential principles in the human frame.

“ That two consistent motions act the Soul,

“ And one regards ITSELF, and one the WHOLE.

But we might go further, and retort upon both these noble Adversaries of Religion, that the charge of *making virtue servile* affects all *moral*, as well as all *religious* sanctions ; as well that, whose existence they allow, as those, which they would persuade us to be visionary ; both these illustrious Patrons of infidelity acknowledging that moral sanction which arises from *God's making the practice of virtue our INTEREST as well as duty* [16]. Now *interest* and *servility* is, it seems, the same thing, with these generous Spirits.

His Lordship's third cavil to an equal Providence is, that it would RELAX GENERAL BENEVOLENCE.

—— “ But would there not be, as the same time,  
 “ some further defects in this scheme ? I think there  
 “ would. It seems to me, that these good men being  
 “ thus distinguished by particular providences, in  
 “ their favour, from the rest of mankind, might be  
 “ apt either not to contract, or to LOSE THAT GE-

[16] Vol. v. p. 429.



“GENERAL BENEVOLENCE, which is a fundamental  
 “Principle of the Law of Nature, and that PUB-  
 “LIC SPIRIT, which is the life and soul of Society.  
 “God has made the practice of morality our inter-  
 “est, as well as our duty. But men who found  
 “themselves constantly protected from the evils that  
 “fell on others, might grow insensibly to think  
 “themselves unconcerned in the common fate : and  
 “if they relaxed in their zeal for the Public good,  
 “they would relax in their virtue ; for public good  
 “is the object of Virtue. They might do worse,  
 “spiritual pride might infect them. They might  
 “become in their own imaginations the little Flock,  
 “or the chosen Sheep. Others have been so by the  
 “mere force of Enthusiasm, without any such in-  
 “ducements as those which we assume, in the same  
 “case ; and experience has shewn, that there are  
 “no Wolves like these Sheep [17].”

The *case assumed*, to which his Lordship objects,  
 and against which he pretends to argue, is that of  
 an *equal Providence which exactly distributes good to Vir-  
 tue, and to Vice, evil*. Now the present objection to  
 such a state is, an’ please you, that this *favourable  
 distinction* of good, to the virtuous man, would be apt  
 to *destroy his general benevolence and public spirit*. These,  
 in his Lordship’s account, and so in mine too, are the  
 most sublime of all Virtues ; and therefore, it is agreed,  
 will be most highly rewarded : But the tendency of this  
*favourable distinction*, if you will believe him, may  
 prove *the loss of general benevolence and public spirit*.  
 As much as this shocks common sense, his Lordship

[17] Vol. v, p. 429.

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has

has his reasons. *God has made the practice of morality our INTEREST as well as duty. But men, who find themselves constantly protected from the evils that fall on others, might grow insensibly to think themselves unconcerned in the common fate.*

*God has made the practice of morality our INTEREST as well as duty. Without doubt he has. But does it not continue to be our interest, under an equal, as well as under an unequal Providence? Nay, is it not more evidently and invariably so, in the absence of those inequalities which hinder our seeing clearly, and feeling constantly, that the practice of morality is our INTEREST as well as duty.*

—*But men, who found themselves constantly protected from the evils that fall on others, might grow insensibly to think themselves unconcerned in the COMMON FATE. What are those evils, under an equal Providence, which fall on others, and from which the good man is protected? Are they not the punishments inflicted on the wicked? And how is the good man protected from them? Is it not by his perseverance in Virtue? It is therefore impossible he should grow unconcerned to those evils which his Lordship calls the common fate, when he sees his interest and his duty so closely connected, that there is no way of avoiding those evils but by persevering in virtue. But the name of common fate, which he gives unto them, detects his prevarication. He pretends to reason against an equal Providence, yet flurs in upon us, in it's stead, a Providence which only protects good men; or rather one certain species of good men; and leaves all other to their COMMON FATE. But admit it possible for the good man to relax in his benevolence, and to grow insensible*

*sensible to the common fate*: there is, in *the state here assumed*, a speedy means of bringing him to himself; and that is, his being no longer *protected from the evils that fall on others*: for when men *relax in their benevolence*, his Lordship tells you, *they relax in their virtue*: and, give me leave to tell his Lordship, that when men relax in their virtue, Providence relaxes in its protection; or, to speak more properly, the rewards of virtue are abated in proportion.

However, *spiritual pride* (he says) *might infect the virtuous, thus protected*: And this he will prove *a fortiori*, from the case of ENTHUSIASTS; who only imagine they have this protection, and have it not. Now, what if we should say, it is this very *enthusiastic spirit* itself, and not the visions of *Protection* it is apt to raise, which is the true cause of *spiritual pride*? ENTHUSIASM is that temper of mind, in which the imagination has got the better of the judgment. In this disordered state of things, Enthusiasm, when it happens to be turned upon religious matters, becomes FANATICISM: and this, in its extreme, begets the fancy of our being the peculiar favorites of Heaven. Now, every one sees, that SPIRITUAL PRIDE is the cause, and not the effect of the disorder. For what but spiritual pride springing out of presumptive holiness, could bring the Fanatic to fancy himself exalted above the common condition of the Faithful? It is true, when he was got thus far, the folly which brought him thither, might carry him further; and then, all to come would be indeed the effect of his disorder. But suppose it was not the enthusiastic Spirit, but the visions of protection it is apt to raise, which is the cause of spiritual pride; Is there no difference between a

vision and a reality ? Fancy may occasion those disorders which fact may remove. This, I persuade myself, is the case here : The real communication of Grace purifies those passions, and exalts them into virtues, which the strong delusion of such a state only renders more gross and violent. And here it may be worth while to take notice that his Lordship, in this objection to an extraordinary Providence, from the hurt it does to general benevolence, seems to have had the *Jewish People* in his eye ; who in the latter ages of their republic, were commonly charged, and perhaps truly, with want of benevolence to the rest of mankind : a fact, which tho' it makes nothing for his purpose, makes very much for mine, as it furnishes me with an example to support what is here said of Fanaticism ; an infirmity pretty general amongst the Jews of those Ages. They had outlived their extraordinary Providence ; but not the memory, nor even the effects of it ; Nay, the warmer tempers were hardly brought to think it had ceased. This filled them with spiritual pride, as the elect of God ; a disposition which, it is confessed, tends readily to destroy or to *relax* general benevolence. But what now are the natural consequences, which the actual administration of an equal Providence would have on the human mind ? In this case, as in the other, a warm temper, whose object was Religion, would be obnoxious to the common weakness of our nature, and too apt to disgrace itself by spiritual pride : but as this is one of the vices which an equal Providence is always at hand to punish, the cure would be direct and speedy. The recovered Votary, we will now suppose to be received again into the



number of the Good ; and to find himself in the *little flock and chosen sheep*, as they are nick-named by this noble Writer. Well, but his danger is not yet over ; the sense of this high prerogative of humanity might revive, in a warm temper, the still unmortified seeds of spiritual pride. Admit this to be the case ; what follows ? His pride revives indeed, but it is only to be again humbled : for punishment is still closely attendant on vice and folly. At length, this holy discipline, the necessary consequence of an equal Providence, effectually does its work ; it purifies the mind from low and selfish partialities, and adorns the Will with general benevolence, public spirit, and love of all its fellow creatures.

What then could support his Lordship in so perverse a judgment concerning the state and condition of good men under an equal Providence ? That which supports all his other insults on Religion ; his sophistical change of the question. He objects to an equal providence (which Religionists pretend has been administered during one period of the Dispensation of Grace) where good men are constantly rewarded, and wicked men as constantly punished ; and he takes the matter of his objection from the fanatical idea of a *favoured elect*, (which never existed but in over-heated brains) where reward and punishment are distributed, not on the proportions of merit and demerit, but on the diabolic dreams of certain eternal decrees of election and reprobation, unrelated to any human principle of justice.

But now, Sir, keep the question steadily in your eye, and his Lordship's reasoning in this paragraph will disclose such a complication of absurdities as will

astonish you. You will see an equal Providence, which, in and thro' the very act of rewarding benevolence, public spirit, and humility, becomes instrumental in producing, in those so rewarded, selfishness, neglect of the public, and spiritual pride.——

His Lordship's last objection to an extraordinary Providence is, that it would NOT ANSWER ITS END.

“ I will conclude this head (says he) by observing, that we have *example* as well as *reason* for us, when we reject the hypothesis of particular providences. God was the king of the Jewish People. His presence resided amongst them, and his justice was manifested daily in rewarding and punishing by unequivocal, signal, and miraculous interpositions of his power. The effect of all was this, the People rebelled at one time and repented at another. Particular providences, directed by God himself immediately, upon the spot, if I may say so, had particular temporal effects only, none general nor lasting : and the People were so little satisfied with this system of Government that they deposed the supreme Being, and insisted to have another King, and to be governed like their neighbours [18].”

In support of this last objection, you see his Lordship was forced to throw off the mask, and fairly tell us what he aimed at ; that is to say, to discredit the extraordinary Providence mentioned by Moses. An equal Providence, says he, will not answer its *end*. What is its end ? Here, his prevarications bring

us, as usual, to our distinctions.—When this Providence is administered for the sake of *Particulars*, its first end is to discipline us in virtue, and keep us in our duty: When administered for the sake of a *Community*, its first end is to support the Institution it had erected. Now his Lordship, proceeding from reason to example, gives us this of the Jewish Republic, to prove that an equal or extraordinary Providence does not answer one or other or both these ends.

But it is unlucky for him, that here, where he employs the example, he cannot forbear, any more than in numberless other places of his writings, to tell us that he believes nothing of the matter.—*How long this Theocracy may be said to have continued* (says he) *I am quite unconcerned to know, and should be sorry to mispend my time in inquiring:* The example then is only an argument *ad hominem*. But the misfortune is, that no laws of good reasoning will admit an argument *ad hominem* on this question, *Of the EFFECTS of a REAL extraordinary providence*; because the nature of the effects of REAL providence can never be discovered by the effects of a PRETENDED one. To say the truth, his Lordship is at present out of luck. For had he indeed believed the extraordinary providence of the Jews to be *real*, his own representation of the case would, on his own principles, have proved it but *pretended*. For 'tis a principle with him, that where the means do not produce the end, such means (all pretences notwithstanding) are but human inventions. It is thus he argues against the Divinity of the Christian Religion; which he concludes to be an imposture for its not having effected that lasting reforma-

tion of manners, which he supposes was its principal design to accomplish.

So far as to the CHOICE of his example. He manages no better in the APPLICATION of it.

We have distinguished, concerning the *ends* of an extraordinary providence. Let us suppose now, that his Lordship takes the principal end of the Jewish Theocracy to be the reformation of *Particulars*. He refers to their history, and pretends to shew they were not reformed. Now whatever other consequences may attend this supposed Fact, the most obvious and glaring is this, That his Lordship, in proceeding from reason to example, has given us such an example as overturns or supercedes all his reasoning. According to his reasoning, an extraordinary providence would tye virtue and good manners so fast down upon every Individual, that his very Will would be forced, and the merit of doing what he had it not in his power to forbear, absolutely destroyed. You would now perhaps expect his example should confirm this pretended fact? Just otherwise. His example shews his fact to be a fiction, and that men remained as bad as ever.

But I have no need of taking any artificial advantage of his Lordship's bad reasoning. For, when we see it so constantly opposed to truth, it is so far from being an additional discredit to it, that it is as constantly opposed to himself.

The truth indeed is, that the great and principal end of the JEWISH THEOCRACY, was to keep that People a separate nation, under their own Law and Religion, till the coming of the MESSIAH; and to prepare things for his reception by preserving amongst them the doctrine of the UNITY. Now, to judge whether the



the Theocracy or extraordinary Providence compassed it's end, we have only to consider, Whether this people, to the coming of Christ, did continue a distinct Nation separated from all the other tribes of Mankind, and distinguished from them by the worship of the one true God. And on inquiry, we shall find, they not only did continue thus distinct and distinguished, but have so continued ever since. A singularity which has had no example amongst any other People : And is sufficient to convince us, that there must have been some amazing power in that Theocracy, which could go on operating for so many ages after the extraordinary administration of it had ceased. Let us conclude therefore, that the having nothing to urge against the due efficacy of this extraordinary providence, but that, *the people rebelled at one time and repented at another, and that this providence had only temporary effects*, is the most ample confession of his defeat. And so much, for his Lordship's exploits in ANTIEN POLITICS.

LET us now come a little nearer to him, and consider him in his capacity for the MODERN.

Here his Lordship shines without a Rival.

“ Whether to *settle peace*, or to *unfold*

“ The drift of hollow States—besides to know

“ Both SPIRITUAL POWER AND CIVIL, what each

“ What severs each”—— [means,

as was said by a Poet [18] of the last age of *his* turbulent Friend ; who if he did not serve his country better

[18] Milton.

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than

than this Politician of later date, had much more to answer for, as by all accounts, his talents were vastly superior.

His Lordship however, with the best he has, proceeds to overturn the PRINCIPLES of the ALLIANCE BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE. But the pains he had taken, and the opposition he had found from the ARGUMENT of the DIVINE LEGATION, had, by the time he came upon this second Adventure, so ruffled his temper and discomposed his manners, that he now breaks out in all kinds of opprobrious language, not only against the System; but even against the person of the Author.

To understand the nature of his Lordship's provocation, if at least it arose from this treatise of the *Alliance*, it may not be improper to say a word or two of the occasion of that Book, and of the Principles on which it is composed.

After the many violent convulsions our Country had suffered since the REFORMATION by the rage of religious Parties (in which, at one time, liberty of Conscience was oppressed ; and at another, the established Church overturned and desolated) it pleased divine Providence to settle our religious Rights on such fundamental principles of justice and equity, and to secure the civil peace on such maxims of wisdom and true policy, as most effectually guarded both against the return of their respective violations : and the means made use of were the giving, on proper terms of security to the national Religion, a free toleration to all who dissented from the established Worship. This seemed to be going as far towards perfection in religious Communion as the long distracted state of  
the

the christian World would suffer us to indulge our hopes.

But men had not been long in possession of this blessing before they grew weary of it, and set on foot many inventions, to throw us back into our old disorders. For it is to be observed with sorrow, that this reform of the English Constitution happened not to be the good work of the CHURCH, begun in the conviction of Truth, and carried on upon the principles of Charity : but was rather owing to the vigilance of the STATE ; at one time, vainly perhaps, anxious for the established Religion [19], at another, wisely provident for the support of civil Liberty [20]. So that when succeeding dissensions in Church and State had made this newly reformed Constitution the subject of enquiry, the Parties who managed the debate being those who before had both persecuted and suffered in their turns, the principles and tempers they brought with them to the discussion of the question, were not such perhaps as were best fitted either to regulate their judgments, or to moderate their partialities. *One* side seemed to regard the TOLERATION as an evil in itself, and only a temporary expedient to prevent a worse ; while their conduct shewed, they lay at watch for the first occasion to break in upon it. This was enough to mislead the *Other* to consider the TEST LAW, which covered and secured the established Religion, as no better than a new species of persecution : and having now no real injury to complain of, they began to take umbrage at this shadow of a grievance ; “ To have

[19] *Cb.* II.[20] *Will.* III.

“vine Worship really free, they said, no religious  
 “profession should be attended with civil incapac-  
 “ties : a TEST had made that distinction amongst  
 “God’s Worshippers ; it was therefore to be set aside.”  
 But every man saw (and perhaps the enemies of the  
*Test* were not amongst the last who saw it) that to set  
 aside this Law, which, under a general *Toleration* was  
 the only security of the *established* Church, was expo-  
 sing the National worship, to all the inroads of a sec-  
 tarian rabble. This mischievous project, arising out  
 of abused liberty, was at first entertained, as we may  
 well suppose, by the tolerated Churches only. Some  
 of the more ingenuous of them adopted it out of  
 fear, on the discovery of that bigoted principle in  
 their Adversaries, which considered *Toleration* as only  
 a temporary expedient. And where was the wonder  
 if those who believed, they had no security for what  
 they had got, while such principles prevailed, should  
 endeavour to put it out of the power of their adver-  
 saries to do them harm ? Others of a more politic  
 turn cherished it from views of ambition, and in hopes  
 of sharing the emoluments of the established Church.  
 It was some time before any Member of the Church  
 of England joined with Dissenters in their clamours  
 against a *Test Law*, or, more properly speaking,  
 against *their own Establishment*. This monstrous coa-  
 lition did not happen till a warm dispute on certain  
 metaphysical questions [1], (if considered in one light,  
 too sublime to become the subject of human wit ; if  
 in another, too trifling to gain the attention of rea-  
 sonable men,) had started new scruples concerning  
 Church-Subscription. And to get rid of this neces-

[1] The Trinitarian controversy.



fary engagement to PEACE, and acquiescence in the established Religion, these wise and faithful Ministers of the National Worship were amongst the foremost to discredit it, and the busiest to trample down all its fences and securities.

BIGOTRY, you see, was at the bottom of the first set of principles ; and FANATICISM, at the top of the other. In their separate appeals to the experience of Mankind, there was this remarkable difference ; All ages had felt the mischiefs of religious restraint and persecution ; but there was no example, either in Pagan or in Christian times, of the evils attending the *WANT of an established Religion*. The Fanatics therefore, were perpetually urging their experience against persecution, secure in not having the argument retorted on them. But, in this imaginary triumph they deceived themselves ; and the very *want* of examples was the greatest Advantage the Bigots had over them : Who if they had no instance of the evils attending the *want* of an Establishment, to retort upon their adversaries, it was because such *want* was never known : The necessity of a national Religion for the support of Society, being so indispensable, that Men even in the wildest times, the sworn Enemies of religious Establishments, and *leagued* together for their destruction, were no sooner become able to effect their purpose, than they found, in beginning to new model the state, which they had subdued by the superiority of their arms, that there was even a necessity of supporting an established Church. Of this, we have a remarkable example in the *INDEPENDENT Republic*, and in the *Protectorship* of OLIVER ; both of which under their several Usurpations, were.

were forced to erect PRESBYTERY, the Religion they most hated, into a NATIONAL CHURCH.

To proceed; The distempers of the State, still further contributed to inflame those of the Church: And, on the Accession of the present royal Line to the Throne, a long, a famous, and a regular dispute concerning the powers, bounds, and limits of the two SOCIETIES, was begun and carried on by two parties of Church-men. But as the several disputants had reciprocally assigned too much, and allowed too little to the two Societies, and had erected their arguments on one common fallacy; the Maintainers of an Establishment supported a Test-law on such reasoning as destroyed a Toleration; and the Defenders of religious Liberty, argued against the justice of that security on such principles as concluded equally against a national Church.

In this ferment, and in this embroiled condition, the Author of the *Alliance between Church and State* found the sentiments of men concerning religious Liberty and Establishments when he proposed his *Theory* to their consideration: a Theory calculated to vindicate our present happy Constitution ON A PRINCIPLE OF RIGHT, by adjusting the precise bounds of either Society; by shewing how they come to act in conjunction; and by explaining the nature of their Union: and from thence, by natural and necessary consequence, inducing, on the one hand, an ESTABLISHED RELIGION, with all its rights and privileges, secured by a TEST LAW; and on the other, a full and free TOLERATION to all who dissented from the National Worship.

He first shewed the use of Religion to Society, from the experience and practice of all Ages: He inquired

from whence the use arose, and found it to be from certain original defects in the very essence and plan of Civil Society. He went on to the nature of Religion; and shewed how, and for what causes, it constituted a Society: And then, from the natures of the *two Societies*, he collected, that the object of the Civil, is only the *Body* and its interests; and the object of the Religious, only the *Soul*. Hence he concluded, that both Societies are Sovereign, and Independent; because they arise not out of one another; and because, as they are concerned in contrary provinces, they can never meet to clash; the sameness of *original*, or the sameness of *administration*, being the only causes which can bring one, of two distinct Societies, into natural subjection to the other.

To apply Religion therefore to the service of Civil Society, in the best manner it is capable of being applied, he shewed it was necessary that the two Societies should UNITE: For each being sovereign and independent, there was no other way of applying the service of Religion in any solid or effectual manner. But no such union could arise but from *free compact* and convention. And free convention is never likely to happen, unless each Society has its mutual motives, and mutual advantages. The Author therefore, from what he had laid down of the natures of the two Societies, explained what those motives and advantages were. Whence, it appeared that all the rights, privileges, and prerogatives of the two Societies, thus united, with the Civil Magistrate at their head, were indeed those very rights, privileges, and prerogatives, which we find established and enjoyed under our present happy Constitution in Church and State: The result of this was that an

ESTABLISHED CHURCH and a free TOLERATION, are made perfectly to agree by the medium of a TEST LAW. This Law therefore the Author in the last place, proceeded to vindicate, on the same general principles of the Law of Nature and Nations.

You have here, Sir, a true tho' short analyfis of the *Alliance between Church and State* ; with the Principles on which the Theory is conducted.

Let us now consider the account his Lordship has been pleased to give of it. I shall take him paragraph by paragraph, in his native disorder, as he lies : And for the same reason that I followed a different method in confuting his Arguments against the *moral attributes*, which I chose to methodize and digest. For when a disorderly writer is tolerably clear, you may make him still clearer, and shew his arguments to advantage, by bringing them into order. But when such a one is beyond remedy cloudy and confused, as our noble Writer is here where he reasons against the book of the *Alliance*, this assistance would be suspicious : for the Reader might come to fancy that as well the *obscurity* as the *order* were of the Answerer's making. Therefore the safest, as well as fairest way in this case is to take the Writer as you find him. The obscurities in thought and expression will be then seen to be his own ; and nothing can be objected to his Adversary, but a few repetitions, which, in this method of answering, can never be avoided.

His Lordship preludes his attack upon the Book and the Author with this curious Narrative.

“ I have heard of a Sermon preached by one  
 “ Doctor SENIOR, a Fellow of Trinity College, in  
 “ Cambridge, before King Charles the Second, at  
 New-



“ New-market, *in the days of passive obedience and*  
“ *non-resistance*, and afterwards printed. His text was  
“ taken from the 14<sup>th</sup>, 15<sup>th</sup>, and 16<sup>th</sup> verses of the  
“ fourth Ch. of Exodus, or some of them; wherein  
“ God directs MOSES to take AARON the Levite, be-  
“ cause he knew that AARON could speak well to  
“ the People, and joins them together in Commission,  
“ that they might assist one another mutually; that  
“ AARON might be instead of a mouth to MOSES,  
“ and that MOSES might be instead of God to AARON.  
“ What other applications the good Doctor made of  
“ these texts, I know not. But I am informed by  
“ Mr. LEWIS, who has read the Sermon, that he  
“ established on them a supposed *Alliance between the*  
“ *Church and the State*: or rather between the Church  
“ and the King. By this *Alliance* the well-spoken  
“ Levite was to instil passive obedience to the King,  
“ in the minds of the People, and to insist on it, as  
“ on a Law of God; The King, on the other hand,  
“ was to be the nursing Father of the Church, to  
“ support her Authority, to preserve, at least, if not  
“ increase, her immunities, and to keep her in the  
“ full possession of all the advantages she claimed.  
“ The Church performed her part, and had a right,  
“ by virtue of this alliance, if the King did not  
“ perform his, to teach this doctrine no longer, and to  
“ resume her independency on the State and on him.  
“ This was the purport of the sermon, at least: and  
“ WARBURTON took his hint, POSSIBLY, from it,  
“ and turned it to serve his purpose; that is, to lay  
“ down the same principles and TO BANTER MAN-  
“ KIND IF HE COULD, by NOT drawing directly, and  
“ avowedly, from them the same conclusion. Dr.

SENIOR'S

“ SENIOR’S authority is, no doubt, as good in this  
 “ case, as that of DE MARCA or even of BOSSUET.  
 “ The first, a time-serving Priest, interested, and a  
 “ great flatterer, if ever there was one, and who  
 “ made no scruple to explain away whatsoever he  
 “ had found himself obliged to say in favour of the  
 “ State. The latter was as wise, if not as cunning,  
 “ as learned, and a much better man, tho’ not so  
 “ much in the favour of Mr. WARBURTON, who  
 “ gave them Characters in his assuming style, with-  
 “ out knowing any thing of them; and who has the  
 “ *impertinence to pronounce* of the greatest Scholar, the  
 “ greatest Divine, and the greatest Orator of his age,  
 “ that *he was a good sensible man*. He was all I have  
 “ said of him: but he was an Ecclesiastic, and a  
 “ subject of France [1].”

As to this account of Dr. SENIOR, I scarce know what to make of it, or what credit it deserves: For he who will falsify a Book in every body’s hands, will hardly be very scrupulous of what he says of a Sermon, which nobody has heard of, but his Friend Mr. LEWIS. At least if Doctor SENIOR was ever a man of this world, I should fancy he must be later than where his Lordship, who is no great Chronologer, has placed him. He tells us it was *in the days of passive obedience and non-resistance*, and that the doctrine of his sermon was calculated for the service of popery and arbitrary power. May we not suppose then, that he flourished under his Lordship’s *Auspices*, when the Church was last in danger? If this were the case, his Lordship

uses Dr. SENIOR just as he used St. PAUL [2], first sets him upon preaching *passive Obedience*, and then abuses him for his pains.

But let Dr. SENIOR live when and where he will, he thinks it POSSIBLE that WARBURTON *might have taken the hint of the Alliance from him*. Yes, just as possible as that LOCKE took the hint of the *original compact* from FILMAR.

He assures us, however, that *the Authority of Dr. SENIOR is as good as that of DE MARCA, or even of BOSSUET*. The authority of Dr. SENIOR! For what?—To support Mr. WARBURTON's *doctrine of the Alliance*. But where is it to be had: Suppose this difficulty to be got over; and Dr. SENIOR as ready at hand as DE MARCA or BOSSUET, and as willing to declare against the incroachments of the Church; yet the Author of the *Alliance*, perhaps, would not think it altogether so fit for his purpose: For he tells us, that his purpose in so frequently quoting the acknowledgments of DE MARCA and BOSSUET, in favour of the State, was to shame those *Protestant Divines* who had contended for the *independency* of the Church, after it became established; and even for its *superiority*, before.

But, of these two famous Frenchmen, *The first* (he says) *was a time-serving Priest, interested, and a great flatterer—the latter was as wise if not as cunning, as learned and a much better Man, tho' not so much in the*

[2] “ By this *Alliance* of the Hierarchy and the Monarchy, “ Religion that should support good government alone, was employed to support good and bad government alike, AS IT HAS “ BEEN BY ST. PAUL.” Vol. iv. p. 516.

*favour of Mr. Warburton, who gave them Characters, in his assuming style, without knowing any thing of them, and who has the impertinence to pronounce, of the greatest Scholar, the greatest Divine, and the greatest Orator of his age, that HE WAS A GOOD SENSIBLE MAN.*

The Author of the *Alliance*, in the *Advertisement* to the last Edition of his Book, speaking of the French Translator, has these words—“ He supported  
 “ them [the conclusions] all along with quotations  
 “ from the two famous works of DE MARCA and  
 “ BOSSUET; the one the wisest, and the other the  
 “ MOST SENSIBLE DIVINE THAT NATION EVER  
 “ PRODUCED [3].”

From these words, I leave you, Sir, to reflect upon the truth and ingenuity of the noble Writer's representation, that BOSSUET is *not so much in Mr. Warburton's favour* as DE MARCA; and that Mr. Warburton has *the impertinence to pronounce* that BOSSUET WAS A GOOD SENSIBLE MAN. In the heavy distresses of Controversy, many a Writer has been found to misrepresent. But to do this out of mere wantonness and gayety of heart, and then, on the credit of his own false quotations, to abuse and call names, is altogether in his Lordship's manner.

But you will say, perhaps, that the IMPERTINENCE was not in the familiarity of the commendation, but in the choice of the topic. It may be so; and then we get another Rule of good writing from his Lordship, who has already supplied us with so many:  
 “ That when the authority of an Author is urged in a point concerning Civil and Religious Rights, his



learning, his divinity, and above all, his eloquence should be insisted on, rather than his GOOD SENSE."

All this is but a prelude to the Combat. "The  
 " notion (says this great Politician) of a FORMAL  
 " ALLIANCE between Church and State, as between  
 " two independent, distinct powers, is a very ground-  
 " less and WHIMSICAL notion. But a fraudulent or  
 " silent compact between princes and priests became  
 " very real, as soon as an ecclesiastical order was  
 " established [4]." The latter part of this period  
 is but too true; and the Theory of the *Alliance*,  
 (misrepresented in the former part,) was proposed  
 to remedy these mischiefs. It is this Theory only,  
 which I shall undertake to vindicate against his Lord-  
 ship's Objections.

If, by *formal*, he means (and what should he mean  
 else?) one actually executed in form; and supposes  
 that the Author of the *Alliance between Church and*  
*State*, asserted the actual execution of such a one, we  
 may, with more justice perhaps, apply to his Lordship  
 what he says of the Author, concerning DE MARCA  
 and BOSSUET, *That he gives a Character of the book*  
*called the Alliance, without knowing any thing of it.*  
 Give me leave to quote the Author's own words —  
 " From all this it appears, that our plan of Alliance  
 " is no precarious arbitrary Hypothesis, but a The-  
 " ory founded in reason, and the invariable nature of  
 " things. For having, from the essence, collected  
 " the necessity of allying, and the freedom of the com-  
 " pact; we have from the same necessity, fairly intro-  
 " duced it; and from its freedom, consequentially

[4] Vol. iv. p. 515—16.

" esta-

“ established every mutual term and condition of it.  
 “ So that now if the reader should ask, where this  
 “ Charter or treaty of convention for the union of  
 “ the two Societies, on the terms here delivered, is  
 “ to be met with? we are able to answer him. We  
 “ say, it may be found in the same Archive with the  
 “ famous ORIGINAL COMPACT between Magistrate  
 “ and People; so much insisted on, in vindication of  
 “ the common rights of Subjects. Now when a sight  
 “ of this *compact* is required of the Defenders of Ci-  
 “ vil liberty, they hold it sufficient to say, that it is  
 “ enough for all the purposes of fact and right, that  
 “ such original compact is the only legitimate foun-  
 “ dation of Civil Society: That if there were no  
 “ SUCH THING FORMALLY executed, there was,  
 “ *virtually*: That all differences between Magistrate  
 “ and People ought to be regulated on the supposi-  
 “ tion of such a Compact; and all Government re-  
 “ duced to the principles therein laid down; for  
 “ that the happiness of which Civil Society is pro-  
 “ ductive, can only be attained by it, when formed  
 “ on those principles. Now something like this we  
 “ say of our *Alliance between Church and State* [5].

Let this serve too, for an answer to his Lordship's  
 insulting question in another place—“ But where shall  
 “ we look for the conditions of that *original contract*  
 “ *which was made between the religious and the civil*  
 “ *Society*, I know not; unless we suppose them writ-  
 “ ten on the back of Constantine's grant to Sylve-  
 “ ster [6].” Does his Lordship know where to look

[5] *Alliance*, third Edition, p. 165—6—7.

[6] Vol. iv, p. 419.

for the *original contract* which was made between the prince and people, in any place of easier access? Or will he, when at a loss, send us to the *back of Constantine's grant to Sylvester*, for this contract likewise?

But to proceed. If by *formally*, through a perverse use of words, his Lordship means only *virtually*, like the *original compact* between King and People, This indeed, the Author of the *Alliance* does venture to say, and not only to say, but to prove likewise.

It is true, the foundation of the proof, in his Lordship's opinion, stands upon a WHIMSICAL principle: so did the argument of the Divine Legation of Moses, from the Omission of a future State [7]. Indeed his Lordship seems to have been as much distressed by WHIMSICAL *Divines*, when he turned Philosopher, as he was by WHIMSICAL *Politicians*, while he continued a Statesman [8]. However, the *whimsical* principle in question, is this, That THE CHURCH OF CHRIST COMPOSES A SOCIETY SOVEREIGN, AND INDEPENDENT OF THE CIVIL.

This principle, his Lordship rejects: and it must be confessed, not, as is his wont, altogether absurdly: For he who makes Religion itself a Fantom, can surely have little or no idea how it should become embodied.

“ Neither NATURE nor REASON (says his Lordship) could ever lead men to imagine TWO DISTINCT AND INDEPENDENT SOCIETIES IN THE SAME SOCIETY. This imagination was broached by ecclesiastical ambition [9].”

[7] See p. 204.

[8] See his Letter to Sir W. Windham.

[9] Vol. iv. p. 412.

A grave sentence! which to me seems equivalent to this, *That neither nature nor reason could ever lead men to imagine that ONE was TWO.* In this, I readily agree with him. But then the difficulty remains, how such a thing could ever come to be *broached*, (as his Lordship says it was) by any *imagination* not more disordered than it usually is by *Ecclesiastical Ambition*. School-Learning, indeed, might do much; for there, his Lordship has fixed his theological-Bedlam: But *Church Ambition*, he assures us, is of another mould; which, as it never failed, he says, to *aim at*, so, it never failed to *obtain, immoderate Wealth and exorbitant Power.* What then are we to think? That his Lordship meant, that *neither Nature nor Reason could ever lead men to imagine two distinct and independent Societies in the same COMMUNITY?* for *Community* being the genus, several *Societies*, as the species, may, indeed, be contained in it. This, I am ready to suppose, merely for my own ease; because when his Lordship is well understood he is always more than half confuted.

In this paragraph then are contained these two propositions:

1. That the Church does not compose a *Society*.
2. That it does not compose a *Society independent and sovereign.*

Let us examine his reasoning on these points as it lies in his works; for as disorderly as it lies, it is intended, I assure you, to overturn the whole Theory of the *Alliance*.

“ A RELIGIOUS SOCIETY. (says his Lordship) BY  
 “ WHICH IS MEANT, ON THIS OCCASION, A CLERGY,  
 “ is, or is not, a creature of the State. *If the first,*  
 “ it



“ it follows, that this Order no more than others,  
 “ which the State has instituted for the maintenance  
 “ of good government, can assume any rights, or ex-  
 “ ercise any powers, except such as the State has  
 “ thought fit to attribute to it, and that the State  
 “ may, and ought to keep a constant controul over  
 “ it, not only to prevent usurpations and abuses, but  
 “ to direct the public and private influence of the  
 “ Clergy, in a strict conformity to the letter and spi-  
 “ rit of the Constitution; the servants of which, in  
 “ a much truer sense, they are, than what they affect  
 “ sometimes to call themselves, the Ambassadors of  
 “ God to other men. *If the last* is said, if it be as-  
 “ serted, that the Church is in any sort independent  
 “ on the State, there arises from this pretension the  
 “ greatest absurdity imaginable, that, I mean, of  
 “ Imperium in Imperio; an Empire of divine, in an  
 “ Empire of human institution [9].”

Thus far his Lordship, who is here reasoning against the principles laid down in the book of the *Alliance*. He introduces his Dilemma with telling the Reader, that the Author of that Book has defined a *religious Society*, to be the *body of the Clergy*.—*A religious Society, by which* (says he) IS MEANT ON THIS OCCASION A CLERGY, *is, or is not, a Creature of the State* [10].

You cannot, I believe, see this assertion without some surprize, when you observe, that the Author of

[9] Vol. iv. p. 413.

[10] So again, *This order of men which we CALL the Religious Society*,—V. iv. p. 440. And again, *The Religious Society, as we have accustomed ourselves to CALL the Clergy*. V. iv. p. 561.

266 A VIEW of LORD BOLINGBROKE'S  
the *Alliance* has defined a religious Society to be A  
NUMBER OF RELIGIOUS CREATURES ASSOCIATED  
[11].—When you observe, that He makes it one of  
the principal cares of a religious Society, to provide an  
Order of men, to be set apart for ministring in holy  
things, or in other words, a CLERGY.—“ The  
“ greatest care is to be had, that the acts of religious  
“ worship be preserved simple, decent, and significa-  
“ tive. But this can be done only by providing persons  
“ set apart for this office; whose peculiar employ-  
“ ment it shall be to preside in, direct, and superintend  
“ the Acts and Services of Religion, &c. [12]” —  
When you observe, he makes the *end* of religious So-  
ciety to be, *salvation of souls*, and one of the *means*,  
the Order of the *Clergy*.— Lastly when you observe,  
he opposes the *Church* and the *Clergy* to each other.  
“ It is unjust in the CHURCH to aim at the Propaga-  
“ tion of Religion by force, and impertinent to aim  
“ at riches, honours, and powers. But what mo-  
“ tives the CLERGY OF A CHURCH might have, is  
“ nothing to the purpose of our inquiry. We have  
“ only to consider what the CHURCH had, WHICH,  
“ as a religious Society, consists of the whole body  
“ of the Community, BOTH LAITY AND CLER-  
“ GY [13].”

[11] *Alliance*, p. 55.

[12] *Alliance*, p. 61.

[13] *Alliance*, p. 112. The very popish Clergy, nay DE  
MARCA himself, that *time-serving Priest and great Flatterer*,  
was more honest (as his Lordship might have seen by the quo-  
tation at the bottom of this very page of the *Alliance* — EC-  
CLESIAE CORPUS, EX FIDELIUM OMNIUM COMPAGE CON-  
STITUITUR) than he chuses to represent the body of the English  
Clergy.

In

In a word, the Author of the *Alliance* was at much pains to prove that a religious Society or *Church* does not mean the *Clergy*, but the whole body of the faithful: and this for two reasons, for the sake of truth in general, and of his own system in particular.

1. It shocks common Sense to call one Order or rank in Society, by the name of the Society: it is little better than calling one of the qualities of a Substance, by the name of the Substance.

2. It subverted the Theory of the *Alliance* to make the *Clergy* constitute the *Church*: for then the Church could neither be a distinct Society, nor independent; both of which it must be to make it capable of an Alliance with the State. It could not be a distinct Society; for an Order of men, as I observed just before, is the same in politics, as a quality in physics; the one must inhere in a *Society*, the other in a *Substance*: and these being the substrata of the other, to talk of a distinct, much more, of the independent existence of an *order*, or of a *quality*, is the profoundest nonsense in Politics and Physics. But admitting that such a Church, which like *Trinculo's* kingdom, consists only of *Viceroy*s and *Viceroy*s over them, were capable of allying with the State, the Author has shewn, in the place quoted above, that its *motives* for allying would be such as the State could never comply with, either in justice or policy.

Extreme necessity (to do his Lordship all the right we can) forced him upon this bold and violent falsification of the doctrine of the *Alliance*. He saw no other way of discrediting the opinion of an *independent religious Society*, than by making it believed that such a Society would be an “*Imperium in Imperio, an Empire*

*of divine, in an Empire of human Institution ;*" a mischief, against which the State is always on its guard. And if a religious Society signified the Church, and the Church, only the CLERGY, the claim to Independency would imply such an Imperium. But the Author of the *Alliance* goes upon other principles ; he holds that the Church signifies the whole body of the Faithful ; that though this Society be independent, yet, from its independency, no such solecism in Politics can arise as an Imperium in Imperio. This argument, which the Author has drawn out at large, the noble person, in the following words, misrepresents, perverts, and attempts to overthrow.

" An Imperium in Imperio (says he) is in truth  
 " so expressly contained in the very terms of the as-  
 " sertion, that none of THE TEDIOUS SOPHISTICAL  
 " REASONINGS, which have been employed for the  
 " purpose, can evade or disguise it. One of these  
 " I will mention, because it has a CERTAIN AIR OF  
 " PLAUSIBILITY, that imposes on many ; and because,  
 " if it cannot stand a short and fair examination, as I  
 " think it cannot, the whole edifice of ecclesiastical in-  
 " dependency and grandeur, falls to the ground. It has  
 " been said then, that religious and civil societies are  
 " widely distinguished by the distinct ends of their  
 " institutions, which imply necessarily distinct powers  
 " and a mutual independency ; that the end of the one,  
 " is the Salvation of Souls, and that of the other the  
 " security of temporal interests ; that the state pu-  
 " nishes overt acts, and can punish nothing else, be-  
 " cause it can have cognizance of nothing that passes  
 " in the mind, and does not break out into criminal  
 " actions ; but that the Church employing her in-  
 " fluence



“ influence to temper the passions, to regulate the  
 “ inward dispositions, and to prevent sins, as well as  
 “ crimes, is that tribunal at which even intentions  
 “ are to be tried, and sins, that do not ripen into  
 “ crimes, nor immediately affect civil Society, are  
 “ to be punished [14].”

This, I will suppose, his Lordship intended as a fair representation of the Author's argument for the *independency* of the Church. But the Argument, as it stands in the *Alliance*, is drawn from the different *powers* belonging to the two Societies; as those *powers* are deduced from their different *ends*. But different powers implying different administrations, they create a mutual independency; and different administrations implying an incapacity of their clashing with one another, shew plainly that such an independency can never produce an Imperium in Imperio. This is the natural order of the argument, as it stands in the *Alliance*. Let us see now, how his Lordship represents it. He begins rightly, with the different ends, *viz. Salvation of Souls, and Security of temporal interests*: But, proceeding to speak of the different *powers*, adapted to those different *ends, viz. Coercion* in the State, and *Persuasion* only in the Church (from whence arises a mutual independency) he mistakes the *consequences* of these powers, which are *punishment of overt acts, and subdual of the passions*, he mistakes them, I say, for the *powers themselves*; from which *consequences* indeed no independency ensues; because *subdual of the passions* may, in his Lordship's opinion at least, be obtained by coercive power, as well as

*punishment of overt acts.* And if both Societies have *coercive power*, one must needs be dependent on the other. I take notice of this mistake only to shew you, what a poor and imperfect conception, his Lordship had of the Argument of the *Alliance*. Had he told us, tho' in fewer words, that the Author's reasoning against the pretence of an Imperium in Imperio arising out of a mutual independency, was this, That the State having coercive power, and the Church having none, the administration of the two Societies could never clash ; so as to induce the mischief of an Imperium in Imperio ; Had he told us this, I say, we should have seen, that at least he *understood* his Adversary.

But let us consider how he goes about to answer what he so ill represents.

“ Now in answer to all this (says his Lordship)  
 “ WE MAY DENY, with truth and reason on our  
 “ side, that the avowed ends of religious, and the  
 “ real ends of civil Society are so distinct as to re-  
 “ quire distinct powers, *and a mutual independency.*  
 “ The Salvation of Souls is not the immediate end  
 “ of civil Society, and I wish it was not rather the  
 “ pretence, than the end of ecclesiastical policy ; but  
 “ if to abstain from evil and to do good works be  
 “ means of salvation, the means of salvation are the  
 “ objects of civil government. It is the duty of  
 “ Princes and Magistrates to promote a strict ob-  
 “ servation of the Law of Nature, of private and  
 “ public morality, and to make those who live in  
 “ subjection to them, good men, in order to make  
 “ them good citizens. For this purpose, the balance  
 “ and the sword are put into their hands, that they  
 “ may measure out punishment to every one, who  
 “ injures

“injures the Community, or does wrong to his  
 “neighbour; and a rigorous punishment of crimes,  
 “especially if it be accompanied with rewards and  
 “encouragements to virtue, *for both are intrusted to*  
 “*the same men* [15], is the surest way not only to  
 “reform the outward behaviour, but to create an  
 “habitual inward disposition to the practice of Vir-  
 “tue [16].”

*We may, says his Lordship, deny that the avowed ends of religious, and the real ends of civil Society, are so distinct.*—Here he contradicts his master LOCKE. This indeed is a small matter. I shall shew he contradicts Truth, and the whole system of human affairs, both in the constitution of Laws and in the administration of Justice.—But before we come to that, there is a great deal to be done.—*We may, says his Lordship, deny that the AVOWED ends of religious, and the REAL ends of civil Society, are so distinct, as to require distinct powers and a mutual dependency.* The *avowed ends*, does he say? *Avowed* by whom? Common sense requires he should mean, *avowed* by those who go upon the principles of the book of *Alliance*. But then he *might* have said *real*; for the *avowed* and the *real* ends are the same: He *should* have said *real*; for the fair use of the proposition, and the force of the argument drawn from it, both require this word. But by what he predicates of these *avowed ends*, *viz.* their *not re-*

[15] This is said, I suppose, in opposition to what is asserted in the Book of the *Alliance*, (to shew the imperfection of the plan of civil power) that *reward* is not (as it is generally understood to be) one of the Sanctions of civil government, in the sense that *Punishment* is so. But as this is all his Lordship has to say against it, I shall here let the matter rest between them.

[16] Vol. iv. p. 414.

*quiring distinct powers*, we see, he means *avowed* by corrupt Churchmen. (*The salvation of souls* (says he, immediately after) *is rather the pretence than the end of ecclesiastical policy*;) and these *ends* are Church Uniformity for the sake of spiritual dominion. Now these *avowed ends*, we readily confess, cannot be obtained without *coercive power* of the civil kind. Here then you have his Lordship, after all his declamation against spiritual tyranny, coming at last, in the true spirit of a free-thinking politician, to profess that religious persecution and coercive power are, in the order of things, as justly and reasonably employed in matters of conscience, as in the overt acts of civil life: now tho' this be altogether upon principle, (for what should restrain a Statesman, who believes nothing of the truth of religion and sees all the mischiefs of diversity of opinions, from attempting to bring about an outward uniformity, by force?) Yet you would not have expected it in this place, where his Lordship is defending religious Liberty, against the Priest-craft of the *Alliance*: Nor would you have found it, had not the distresses of controversy driven him into his native quarters, before his time. The *Alliance* went on this principle, that the Church was a Society, independent of the Civil, as not having coercive power like the Civil. To overturn this argument, his Lordship was forced to deny the minor, and so unawares has brought in PERSECUTION as one of the natural powers of the Church. But to compass this matter neatly, and without noise, he has recourse to his old trade, the employing, under an ambiguous expression, the *abuse* of the thing for the thing itself.—*The avowed ends of religious — the real ends of civil society.*——But



it was so evident a truth, that the *salvation of souls* was the real end of religious Society, and *the security of temporal interests*, the real end of the Civil, that he must have lost his senses who could be brought to believe that *coercive power* was as proper to promote the first as the second ; or that *instruction and exhortation* was as proper to promote the second as the first : one of which things, his assertion, *that the Church and State have not distinct powers*, necessarily implies : To disguise this absurdity therefore for, *real*, which fair argument required, he substitutes the ambiguous word, *avowed*, which his bad cause required : And under this cover, he denies, that the two societies are *so distinct as to require distinct powers*.—Well, this however we understand ; and have thoroughly canvassed. But what mean the words that follow ? —AND A MUTUAL INDEPENDENCY. The author of the *Alliance* indeed had said, that the ends of the two societies were so distinct as to require *distinct powers*. But he was not so absurd to add—*and a mutual independency* ; because, *independency* was not the *mean* of attaining an end, like *distinct powers*, but a *consequence* of those powers : for if the powers, by which two societies are administered, be different, those societies, (seeing their administrations can never clash,) must needs be independent on one another. This is given only as a fresh instance of the cloudy apprehension this great Statesman had of a plain argument, the argument of the *Alliance*, built on the first principles of Law and Politics.

Let me now proceed with his reasoning. He is to prove, what he had asserted, that the two Societies *are not so distinct as to require distinct powers*. He is wri-

ting against the book or rather against the Author of the *Alliance*; who lays it down as an acknowledged truth, that the end of the Religious is *salvation of Souls*; the end of the Civil, *security of temporal interests*. To this his Lordship replies, that salvation of souls is only the *pretended* end of the Religious; but it is the *real*, tho' not *immediate* end, of the Civil. And thus he has with great dexterity wiped out all distinction between the two Societies. I have already detected both the fraud and the fallacy of the first part of his assertion. I come now to the other, *that salvation of souls is the real, tho' not immediate, end of civil Government*. Here the meanness of his sophistry is still more apparent, than in the former part. It stands thus,—"The *immediate* end of civil government is confessed, on all hands to be *security of temporal interests*.—This is done by keeping men *to abstain from evil*, and exciting them *to good works*—*Good works are the means of salvation*—Therefore the *means of salvation are the objects of civil government*; or, in other words, the salvation of souls is at least the *real*, tho' *mediate* end of civil Society."

The Author of the *Alliance* had obviated all this paultry Chicane in the following words: "Civil Government, I suppose, will be allowed to have been invented for the attainment of some certain end or ends exclusive of others: and this implies the necessity of distinguishing this end from others. Which distinction arises from the different properties of the things pretending. But amongst all those things which are apt to obtrude, or have in fact obtruded, upon men as the ends of civil Government, there is but one difference in their properties,

“ perties, as ENDS : which is this, *that one of these*  
 “ *is attainable by civil Society only, and all the rest are*  
 “ *easily attained without it.* The thing then with the  
 “ first mentioned property must needs be that *genuine*  
 “ *end* of civil Society. And this is no other than  
 “ *security to the temporal liberty and property of man* [17].”

But his Lordship's sophism consists in the ambiguity of the word END ; which either signifies the consequence or issue of a *mean*, simply ; or, the consequence and issue, with intention and fore-thought. In the first sense it may be true, that salvation is the mediate end of civil Society ; but then it is nothing to the purpose. In the second sense it is to the purpose, but not true. The civil Magistrate, all men see, had not this consequence or issue in his thoughts ; as is evident from hence, that, in adapting his punishments to the various species of unlawful actions, he does not proportion them to the heinousness of the offence, as estimated on the principles of *natural* or of *revealed* Religion, but on their malignant influence on civil Society. A plain indication, that, when he measured out punishments to offences, he had only *political* and not *religious* considerations in his view. But you shall hear what the Author of the *Alliance* has said on this subject, who had confuted his Lordship's sophism even before he had conceived it.

“ We have shewn (says this writer) that it was  
 “ the care of the *Bodies*, not of the *Souls* of men, that  
 “ the Magistrate undertook to give account of. What-  
 “ ever therefore refers to the *body*, is in his jurisdic-  
 “ tion ; whatever to the *soul*, is not. But, and if

[17] *Alliance*, p. 32—3.

“ there be that which refers equally to both (as  
 “ *Morals* plainly do) such thing must needs be partly  
 “ within, and partly without his province ; that is,  
 “ it is to be *partially* considered by him ; his care  
 “ thereto extending so far only as it affects Civil So-  
 “ ciety. The other consideration of it, namely as  
 “ it makes part of Religion, being in the Hands of  
 “ those, who preside in another kind of Society.  
 “ Again, with regard to civil practice ; if we cast  
 “ our eye on any Digest of Laws, we find that evil  
 “ actions have their annexed punishment denounced,  
 “ not as they are VICES, *i. e.* not in proportion to  
 “ their deviation from the eternal rule of right : nor  
 “ as they are SINS, *i. e.* not in proportion to their  
 “ deviation from the extraordinary revealed will of  
 “ God ; which two things indeed coincide : but as  
 “ they are CRIMES, *i. e.* in proportion to their ma-  
 “ lignant influence on civil Society. But the view  
 “ in which the *State* regards the *practice of Morality*  
 “ is evidently seen, in its recognition of that famous  
 “ maxim, by which penal laws in all Communities  
 “ are fashioned and directed, THAT THE SEVERITY  
 “ OF THE PUNISHMENT MUST ALWAYS RISE IN  
 “ PROPORTION TO THE PROPENSITY TO THE CRIME.  
 “ A maxim evidently *unjust* were actions regarded by  
 “ the State, as they are in themselves only ; because  
 “ the *Law of Nature* enjoins only in proportion to the  
 “ ability of performance ; and human abilities abate  
 “ in proportion to the contrary propensities : evi-  
 “ dently *impious*, were actions regarded by the State  
 “ as they refer to the will of God, because this State-  
 “ measure directly contradicts his method and rule  
 “ of punishing. But suppose the Magistrate's office  
 “ to



“ to be what is here assigned, his aim must be  
 “ the SUPPRESSION of *crimes*, or of those actions  
 “ which malignantly affect society; and then no-  
 “ thing can be more reasonable than this proceeding;  
 “ for then his end must be the good of the *whole*,  
 “ not of *particulars*, but as they come within that  
 “ view. But the good of the whole being to be pro-  
 “ cured only by the *prevention* of crimes, and those  
 “ to which there is the greatest propensity being of  
 “ the most difficult prevention, the full severity of  
 “ his Laws must of necessity be turned against  
 “ these [18].”

But, his Lordship goes on to inform us, What those *means* are which Princes and Magistrates employ to procure this *mediate end* of civil Society, the *Salvation of Souls*; and they are, he says, COERCIVE force. — *For this purpose, the ballance and the sword are put into their hands, that they may measure out punishment to every one, who injures the community or does wrong to his neighbour. And a rigorous punishment of crimes, especially if it be accompanied with rewards and encouragements to virtue, is the surest way not only to reform the outward behaviour, but to create an inward disposition to the practice of virtue.*

Who would have expected that it should come at last to this, so contrary to his Lordship's assertion in the case of an *extraordinary providence*, That a vigorous and exact distribution of rewards and punishments under the MAGISTRATE'S PROVIDENCE (which indeed is the only one his Lordship thinks worth a rush) should be so far from *taking away merit and making*

[18] *Alliance*, p. 35—6—7.

*virtue servile*, that it is the *surest way of creating an inward disposition to the practice of virtue!* i. e. the surest way of making virtue *free* and *meritorious*. But there is something marvelously perverse in his Lordship's conduct. The exact distribution of rewards and punishments by Heaven makes virtue worthless and servile, tho' the administration of Providence be able to operate on the mind and intention, the only way if any, of *creating an inward disposition to the practice of virtue*; that is, of making it free and meritorious. On the contrary, if you will continue to believe him, the exact distribution of rewards and punishments by the civil Magistrate, makes virtue free and meritorious, tho' the Magistrate's administration be unable to operate on the mind and intention, and influences only the outward act; which is (if any be) to make virtue worthless and servile.

But to come to the point, which these observations naturally lead to. The very means his Lordship assigns for the promotion of this imaginary end, namely *coercive force for salvation of souls*, entirely subverts his principle, and shews that salvation of souls could be no end of civil Society, since the means are in no wise calculated to promote the end; it not being action simply, which intitles to the favour of God, but action, upon proper motives. Now with these, (which result into what we call Conscience,) force, or coercion, is absolutely inconsistent: Force may make hypocrites, but nothing but the rational convictions of Religion can make men lovers of Virtue.

Now if it be by such kind of reasoning as this that the *whole edifice of ecclesiastical independency and grandeur may be brought to the ground*, (to use his Lordship's  
big

big language) Church Power was never worth the rearing.

To proceed. His Lordship with much gravity, tells us next, that “ A Clergy might co-operate with  
 “ the civil Magistrate very usefully, no doubt, by ex-  
 “ hortations, reproofs, and example.—This they might  
 “ do as assistants to the civil Magistrate, in concert  
 “ with him, and in subordination to him. *To what*  
 “ *purpose therefore do they claim and affect independency*  
 “ *on him?* Greater power never did, nor can enable  
 “ them to do greater good. Would they erect a tri-  
 “ bunal to *punish intentions*? The very pretence is im-  
 “ pertinent. Would they erect it to *punish where no*  
 “ *injury is offered, nor wrong done*? The design is un-  
 “ just and arbitrary. The ideas of crimes are deter-  
 “ minate and fixed. The Magistrate cannot alter  
 “ them. The ideas of Sins are more confused and  
 “ vague; and we know by long and general expe-  
 “ rience, how they vary in the minds, or at least in  
 “ the writings of casuists. Would they erect such a  
 “ tribunal to *try the orthodoxy of men’s faith*? Such a  
 “ one is erected in some countries, under the name of  
 “ the Inquisition, and is justly detested in all. To  
 “ what end and purpose then can SPIRITUAL  
 “ COURTS and COERCIVE POWERS ATTRIBUTED  
 “ TO THE CLERGY serve, unless it be to make  
 “ them Judges and Parties in their own cause, when  
 “ matters of interest are concerned [18]?”

His Lordship, it must be remembered, is here rea-  
 soning with the Author of the *Alliance*, against his no-  
 tions of the rights of a Clergy in an established

[18] Vol. iv. p. 415—16.

Church. And the noble person's first misrepresentation, you see, is, that amongst these rights, the claim of independency on the State during their establishment, is one ; and that the coercive power exercised by them, under the Alliance, is exercised as *inherent* in their order. *To what purpose* (says his Lordship) *do they* [the Clergy] *CLAIM AND AFFECT independency on him, the civil Magistrate?* And again, *To what end and purpose can spiritual Courts, and coercive powers, ATTRIBUTED to the Clergy, serve?* And, as if this was not plain enough, in the very next page, addressing himself to POPE, he says, " Amongst all the fallacies which have been employed by Churchmen, one of the most absurd has been advanced, tho' not invented [18], by a paradoxical Acquaintance of yours ; and it is to maintain the INDEPENDENCY of the Church, and to suppose, AT THE SAME TIME, a sort of original Contract between the Church and State, the terms of which, every whimsical Writer, EVEN THIS SCRIBLER, adjusts as he pleases [19]." Falshood and ill language commonly go together. But let them go.

You shall now hear what the Author of the *Alliance* holds on these two points, and from his own mouth. First, as to the *independency*,—" Let us see next (says he) what the STATE gains by it [the *Alliance*.] These [advantages] in a word may be comprized in its SUPREMACY IN MATTERS ECCLESIASTICAL. THE CHURCH RESIGNING UP HER INDEPENDENCY, and making the Magistrate her su-

[18] It was invented, it seems, by his friend Dr. Senior.

[19] Vol. iv. p. 417.



“ SUPREME HEAD, without whose approbation and allowance, she can administer, transact, or decree nothing [1].”

Secondly, as to *coercive power*. “ The third and last PRIVILEGE THE CHURCH GAINS, by this Alliance, is the being INTRUSTED WITH A JURISDICTION, ENFORCED BY COACTIVE POWER [2].”

His Lordship assures us, the Author of the Alliance holds, that the *independency* of the Church is *retained* in an establishment: the Author himself, says that it is *given up*. His Lordship assures us, the Author holds an *inherent coercive power* in the Church; the Author himself says, that *coercive power is a grant of the State*, during the Alliance.

And here you may take notice, how greatly his Lordship has improved upon his Masters, the Authors of the *Rights of the Christian Church*, and of the *Independent Whig*. They had ventured indeed to charge both these doctrines on the body of the English Clergy: But as one can never be sure what an indiscreet or corrupt member of so large a body may have said, the confutation of their calumny was not so easy. His Lordship is more bold, he charges these opinions on a particular member of the established Church, by name: but then he is more fair, he puts it in the power of the person injured to do himself justice; for it so happens, that this person not only denies the independency of the Church under an establishment, and all claim to inherent coercive power whatsoever, but has laid down principles

[1] *Alliance*, p. 147.

[2] *Alliance*, p. 134.

to discredit, and rules to prevent the return of, those usurpations. The Author of the *Alliance* has vindicated [3] the English Clergy from the prevarications of TINDAL and GORDON ; It had been hard, had he found no charitable hand to vindicate him from the same calumny, when revived by this noble Lord.

As therefore, no independency in alliance, is either claimed or affected ; and no inherent coercive power is attributed to the Clergy, We will suppose his Lordship's simple question to be, " For what end is " that tribunal, called a *Spiritual Court*, erected ? " And had he been so candid to let the Author of the *Alliance*, to whom he directs his question, speak for himself, he had not waited for an answer. For the Author tells us, in the most conspicuous part of his book, and in great letters, that it is FOR REFORMATION OF MANNERS *only* [4]. But, as if the Author had entirely left us to ourselves to conjecture how he intended to employ this *spiritual tribunal*, his Lordship falls a guessing : and there is no kind of absurdity, he does not propose, as favoured by his Adversary, tho' they be such as his Adversary had already exploded.

*To what purpose, says his Lordship, do the Clergy claim and affect independency on the Magistrate ? Greater power never did, nor can enable them to do greater good. Would they erect a tribunal to PUNISH INTENTIONS ? The very pretence is impertinent.*

Before I come to his Lordship's *conjecture*, give me leave, Sir, to say one word of the happiness of his

[3] *Alliance*, p. 81, & seq.

[4] *Ibid.* p. 134.

*induction*. This *Tribunal*, or this coercive power, which he makes to follow independency, is so far from being produced by it, that coercive power never comes into the Church till it has given up it's independency. The Author of the *Alliance* assigns a plain reason. "The State (says he) having, by this Alliance, bestowed upon the Clergy a Jurisdiction with coercive power, such privilege would create an IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO had not the *civil Magistrate* in return, the *supremacy of the Church* [5]."

And now, to his conjecture. Is it, says he, *to punish intentions*? The Author of the *Alliance* says, No, it is for *reformation of manners only*. But you understand not half his Lordship's drift, unless you consider these questions as proposed to insinuate, that the Author of the *Alliance* held the Absurdities contained in them. So here, for instance, you are to understand, that Mr. W. held this Tribunal was to *punish intentions*. However, I will acquit his Lordship of malice; it seems to be an innocent blunder. The Author of the *Alliance* did indeed talk of a *Tribunal regarding irregular intentions as criminal*; and by ill luck, the noble Person mistook this tribunal, for a *spiritual Court*. The Author's words are these—"The effectual correction of such evils [as arise from the *intemperance of the sensual appetites*] must be begun by moderating and subduing the Passions themselves. But this, civil Laws are not understood to prescribe, as punishing those passions only when they proceed to act: and not rewarding the attempts to subdue them. *It must be a tribunal re-*

[5] *Alliance*, p. 149.

" *garding*

“ regarding irregular intentions as criminal which can do  
 “ this ; and that is no other than the tribunal of Reli-  
 “ gion. When this is done, a coactive power of the  
 “ civil kind may have a good effect, but not till  
 “ then. And who so proper to apply this coactive  
 “ power, in such cases, as that Society, which fitted  
 “ and prepared the subject, for its due reception and  
 “ application [6].” This *tribunal regarding irregular intentions as criminal*, the Author calls the *tribunal of Religion*, (*Forum conscientiae*) and distinguishes it from that other tribunal, which is invested with *coactive power of the civil kind*, called *spiritual Courts*: he makes the first a preparative to the other. Yet, strange to believe ! his Lordship mistook this *tribunal of Religion*, so described and distinguished, for a *spiritual Court* : and upbraids the Author of the *Alliance* for supporting a *tribunal with coercive powers, to PUNISH INTENTIONS*. But we shall see more of his Lordship’s acumen, as we go along.

His second charge against the principles of the *Alliance* is in these words—*Would they erect this tribunal to punish, where NO INJURY IS OFFERED, NOR WRONG DONE ? The design is unjust and arbitrary. The ideas of crimes are determinate and fixed. The Magistrate cannot alter them. The ideas of sins are more confused and vague ; and we know by long and general experience, how they vary in the minds, or at least in the writings of Casuists.*

*To punish where no injury is offered nor wrong done*, is his Lordship’s periphrasis for the *punishment of vague lust*, which the Author of the *Alliance* makes one

[6] *Alliance*, p. 99—100.



branch of the reformation of manners, and consequently an object of spiritual Courts. But his Lordship's own opinion of the *quality* of vague lust, intimated in this periphrasis, is but a second consideration. His principal purpose in giving it, was to discredit the tyranny of spiritual Courts, in punishing where no fault is committed. To forget his BIBLE is nothing : but to forget his HORACE is a disgrace indeed. Now this honest Pagan reckoned the prohibition of *vague lust*, as one of the chief objects of *civil laws*.

“ Fuit hæc sapientia quondam

“ Publica privatis fecernere, *sacra profanis* ;

“ CONCUBITU PROHIBERE VAGO ; dare jura maritis.

All this is so very extraordinary, that you will not readily believe his Lordship could design the *punishment of vague lust*, by the words—*punishing where no injury is offered nor wrong done* ; nor would I neither, did he not so clearly explain himself, in his curious distinction between *crimes* and *sins* : which, because it was occasioned by, and alludes to, a passage in the *Alliance*, it may not be amiss previously to transcribe that passage : “ If we cast our eye on any digest of Laws  
 “ we find that evil actions have their annexed punishment denounced, not as they are VICES, *i. e.*  
 “ in proportion to their deviation from the eternal  
 “ rule of right : nor as they are SINS, *i. e.* not in  
 “ proportion to their deviation from the extraordinary revealed will of God ; which two things indeed coincide ; but as they are CRIMES, *i. e.* in  
 “ proportion to their malignant influence on civil  
 “ So-

“ Society [7].” The Author of the *Alliance* said this, to shew that the civil Magistrate does not concern himself with Religion, *as such*. His Lordship borrows the same distinction between *crimes* and *sins*, to shew, that it is arbitrary and unjust to punish *sins*, as *spiritual Courts* undertake to do: for, says he, *the ideas of CRIMES are determinate and fixed: The ideas of SINS are more confused and vague*. From this, it appears, that his Lordship mistook *vices, sins, and crimes*, for different actions; whereas they are the same actions under different considerations: either as they respect *natural light, revealed Religion, or civil laws*; and so have different names imposed upon them. The *ideas* therefore of these three modifications of forbidden actions are all equally *determinate and fixed*, or all equally *confused and vague*. But it comes with a peculiar ill grace from his Lordship to object to the *confused and vague idea of SINS*, since this idea is formed upon the revealed will of God in the Gospel, which, in a hundred places of his *Essays* he tells us, coincides with the eternal rule of right; a rule, which he acknowledges to be the most determinate and fixed of all things.

But he says, *the Magistrate cannot alter the ideas of crimes, as the Casuist may, the idea of sins*. That is, the Magistrate cannot give the Name of Crimes to innocent actions. What should hinder him? He had two advantages above the Casuist: First, *coercive power*: secondly, the *vague and confused* measure to which crimes refer; namely, to the influence of actions on Society. Matter of fact confirms this observation. Look round the World; enquire through antient and

[7] *Alliance*, p. 35—6:

modern Times, and you shall find, that the *Magistrate* has been guilty of infinitely more abuse in ranging actions under the idea of *Crimes*, than the *Casuiſt*, in ranging actions under the idea of *Sins*. This was not improper to be obſerved in answer to his Lordſhip's EXPERIENCE, which uſhers in his old ſophiſm, ready at every turn to help him out, the *abuse* of the thing for the thing itſelf—*We know*, ſays he, *by long and general experience, how the ideas of ſins vary in the minds, or at leaſt in the WRITINGS of caſuiſts.* By which it would ſeem, the noble Author knows as little of *Casuiſts*, as of any other ſort of learned men, whoſe characters he has treated ſo Lordly. For corrupt caſuiſtry does not ſo much conſiſt *in varying the ideas of Sins*, concerning which they are generally agreed, as in contriving to evade the puniſhment denounced againſt them.

His laſt conjecture about the uſe of an eccleſiaſtical Tribunal, on the principles of the *Alliance*, is, that it is erected for the puniſhment of Opinions. *Would they erect*, ſays he, *ſuch a tribunal to try the orthodoxy of men's faith?* Why no, ſays the Author of the ALLIANCE, in as plain terms as he can ſpeak; —NO MATTERS OF OPINION COME WITHIN THIS SPIRITUAL JURISDICTION [8]: And he not only ſays it, but proves it too [9].—*To what end and purpoſe then*, ſays his Lordſhip, *can ſpiritual courts and coercive powers ſerve, unleſs it be to make the Clergy judges and parties in their own cauſe, when matters of intereſt are concerned?*—*To what end?* The Author of the *Alliance* has told him plainly and directly; FOR THE

[8] *Alliance*, p. 136.

[9] P. 137—8.

REFORMATION OF MANNERS ONLY. But such an answer did not serve his Lordship's turn. He will make the Author say as he would have him ; or injoin him silence, and answer for him, himself. He insinuates therefore, in the last place, that the end aimed at is to determine in civil matters where the temporal interest of the Clergy is concerned, and where they become Judges in their own cause. Hear then what the Author of the *Alliance* says upon this head likewise ; “ CIVIL MATTERS, which tempo-  
 “ poral Courts may conveniently inspect, can never  
 “ belong to an ecclesiastical Jurisdiction. It hath  
 “ been shewn, that this Court was erected as a suc-  
 “ cedaneum to the Civil, to take cognizance of such  
 “ actions as the Civil could not reach, or could not  
 “ remedy : which shews, the State could never in-  
 “ tend to put those things under the ecclesiastical  
 “ Jurisdiction that fall most conveniently under it's  
 “ own. Besides, for ecclesiastical Courts to ingross  
 “ matters that belong to the civil jurisdiction, as it  
 “ can possibly have no good use, may very possibly  
 “ be attended with this evil, of inviting and en-  
 “ couraging the Church to aim at more power than  
 “ is consistent, either with her own good, or the  
 “ good of the State. The great Founder of our Re-  
 “ ligion said, *Who made me a Judge or Divider be-*  
 “ *tween you ?* And what he would not assume to him-  
 “ self, he would hardly bestow upon his Church :  
 “ and that the State should ever intend to give her  
 “ what was the peculiar right of temporal Courts, is  
 “ as difficult to suppose. We must conclude then,  
 “ that such practice, wherever it is found, was de-  
 “ rived not from the reasonable Laws of this *Alli-*

“ *ance,*



“ *ance*, but from the authority of old papal usurpations [19].” Thus far the Author of the *Alliance*; where you may find a great deal more to the same purpose.

But his Lordship goes on with his confutation. —  
 “ By admitting the independency of the Church on  
 “ the State, the State acknowledges an original in-  
 “ dependency in the Church, derived from a greater  
 “ authority than her own: and the supposed terms  
 “ of *Union* may be construed to be rather concessions  
 “ of the religious Society to the civil, for the sake of  
 “ order and peace, than grants of the civil to the re-  
 “ ligious Society. Thus Religion and the Church  
 “ are set on the same foot: no human authority can  
 “ alter one, but must receive it in *the terms* in which  
 “ it has been revealed; and so may a good Casuist  
 “ prove on this hypothesis, that no human authority  
 “ can measure out any conditions of Establishment  
 “ to the other. Thus the State becomes no better  
 “ than a coordinate, but inferior power [20].” I  
 once met with a Philosopher of deep thought, who  
 professed the same reverence for artificial Nonsense,  
 that the Turks pay to naturally Folly. His System on  
 this point was very singular. He supposed that, as  
 in the *material* World there was an universal, tho’  
 very subtle fire, diffused in secret thro’ all bodies;  
 which, by a late contrivance might be allured or  
 drawn out from the most inanimate or lumpish Mat-  
 ter, even from the dirty shoes of the Chronologer of  
 Leicester, the Man who makes Time of Eternity;  
 So, in the *intellectual*, that there was a certain witty

[19] *Alliance*, p. 138—9—40. [20] V, iv. p. 417.

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Spirit, which lay dormant in the most inexplicable  
Nonfense ; and only wanted the application of some  
Engine of analogous invention to rouse it, and set it  
free. 'Till such a one be discovered, we can but  
guess at his Lordship's meaning.

*By admitting the independency of the Church on the State, (says he) the State acknowledges an original independency in the Church derived from a greater Authority than her own. If, by Church, he means the christian Church, in general, it is confessed that it's independency is derived from a greater authority than what the State claims for any of it's rights. The Church holding of God immediately and in an extraordinary manner ; the State, only mediately, and in a common way. But what are the consequences his Lordship would deduce from thence ? The first is, that then the supposed terms of union may be construed to be rather concessions of the religious Society to the civil, for the sake of order and peace, than grants of the civil to the religious Society. The supposed terms are terms of Alliance between two independent Societies. These terms cannot, in the nature of things, be any other than mutual concessions and mutual grants. What then does he mean, by their being construed to be rather concessions of the religious Society than grants of the civil ? By the supposition on which his Lordship condescends to reason, When the Church in Alliance gives up its original independency it is without doubt a concession ; because it is giving up a right : And when the State in Alliance, confers a coercive power on the Church, this, is certainly a grant ; because an original independent religious Society can have no inherent coercive power. However some meaning, it is likely, his Lordship had.*  
And

And it seems to be this, “ That if the Church have an original independency, no such *Alliance* as is supposed, could be made : for that the terms on the side of the Church, would not be conditional but voluntary concessions, the State having nothing to give, in return.” This would be talking sense at least, tho’ not truth. But, first to *suppose* the fact, that the terms of this Union are mutual grants and mutual concessions ; and then to deny mutual grants, and mutual concessions, is giving such a form to his argument as will need a *first Logic* to turn into sense, as much as the doctrine conveyed under it needs a *first Philosophy* to turn into truth. Thus much however You may see ; Some cloudy conception his Lordship plainly had, that a Society of *divine* original could never enter into Alliance with another, only of *human*. When the Sons of God came down amongst the Daughters of Men, we are told they begot Giants. His Lordship betrays his apprehensions, that this coalition between the civil and religious Societies would produce an issue altogether as monstrous, a kind of STATE LEVIATHAN. Indeed, he charges the Author of the *Alliance* with being no better than a Pander or Procurer in this intrigue. But whatever his apprehensions were, his conception was altogether unworthy both of a Philosopher and a Statesman. The AUTHOR OF THE ALLIANCE hath shewn from the nature of things, that Religion composes an independent society : The GOSPEL, by divine institution hath declared the Christian Religion to be an independent society. His LORDSHIP hath shewn, from the nature of things, that civil wants create an independent society of the civil kind : And the Law, by divine

institution, hath declared the Jewish Republic to be an independent civil society. Now I would ask his Lordship, if nothing hindered this *civil Society of divine original*, from entering into leagues and conventions with all the neighbouring nations, which were not, for political reasons, excepted by name, what should hinder this *religious Society of divine original* from entering into Alliance with the State?

Another Consequence his Lordship draws from an original independency in the Church is, that RELIGION *and the CHURCH are set on the same foot*. That is, as I understand him, for he might have expressed himself better, the DISCIPLINE of the Church is as unalterable as the DOCTRINE: The inference from which is, that the *State must receive the CHURCH on the terms in which it was revealed*: From whence his Lordship draws another consequence, that *no human Authority can measure out any conditions of establishment to the Church*: and, from thence another, (for his Lordship's false conceptions are always attended with superfetations,) that the *State becomes an inferior Power, or Creature to the Church*. All these brave consequences, we see, arise out of this principle, "that, in a Church of Divine Original, the *Discipline* is as unalterable as the *Doctrine*." And of the truth of this principle his Lordship is so confident, that he calls his Adversary a *Stupid Fellow* for not owning it. "The STUPID FELLOW, who advanced this Paradox in English, did not see how ill the parts of it hang together, nor that if ecclesiastical Government was, by divine appointment, independent of civil, no such contract as he supposes could be made. The religious society, notwithstanding their  
" known



“ known moderation, could not have parted from  
 “ that independency AND SUPERIORITY over the  
 “ civil power, which God had given them [3].”

It is true, this STUPID FELLOW, did not see it. And I don't well know how he should ; since, on the other hand, he saw it to be impossible that any *such contract* as he supposes could be made, unless the Church or religious Society were *independent* of the civil. For what *contract* is it, which this Author supposes to have been made between Church and State ? He tells us, in express words, it is a *mutual compact* by FREE CONVENTION [4]. Now the entering into a *free convention* is at the pleasure of the contracting parties. But Parties who have this liberty, must needs be *independent* on one another.

Well, but he has his reason, such as it is, to confound this STUPID FELLOW. *The Religious Society* (says he) *could not have parted from that independency, AND SUPERIORITY, over the civil Power, which God had given them.* And now indeed, after much cloudy flourishing, we are come to the point ; which is, WHETHER A RELIGIOUS SOCIETY CAN PART WITH THAT INDEPENDENCY WHICH GOD, *as well as the nature of things*, HATH BESTOWED UPON IT ? This is in truth a question worth debating. But as his Lordship rarely suffers an important proposition, which he is set either upon denying or depraving, to pass thro' his hands without first perplexing it, in the expression with an absurdity or an equivocation, I shall be obliged, before we can pass forward, to free this from the Bolingbrokian embarrass. *The religious*

[3] Vol. iv. p. 418.

[4] *Alliance*, p. 87.

*Society* (says he) *could not have parted from that independency AND SUPERIORITY over the civil power which God hath given them.* Now as the Author of the *Alliance* contends only for the independency of the Church *before Alliance*, and as his Lordship's reasoning acknowledges that the question is only concerning independency *before Alliance*, he must needs suppose, by adding, *AND SUPERIORITY over the civil*, that this *superiority* is a consequence of *independency*. And so, indeed, he speaks of it more plainly just before, — *Thus, [i. e. from the independency of the Church,] the State becomes no better than a coordinate, BUT INFERIOR, Power.* Now if we judge of this matter on the principles of the Law of Nature and Nations, *superiority* is so far from following *independency*, that it cannot consist with it. For why is religious Society by nature *independent*, (as the Author of the *Alliance* shews it is) but for the reason that Author gives, that it is *essentially different* from the civil, *by having different ends and means* [5].” But there is no ground for superiority of one Person or Society over another, but where some natural relation or connexion exists between them : none exists in this case ; therefore a pretence of superiority on the one side, and of dependency on the other, is absurd. However, as I am verily persuaded his Lordship did not know enough of these matters even to prevaricate neatly in the point in question, I consider it as an innocent blunder, arising from the following words of the *Alliance*, shamefully, indeed, misunderstood. — “ Such  
“ then is the nature of Christ's kingdom [*i. e.* the

[5] *Alliance*, p. 65.“ *christ-*

“ christian Church] it is essentially framed to com-  
 “ pose a firm and lasting Society ; it is made such by  
 “ divine appointment, and in order to fit it for pub-  
 “ lic service, it is both by nature and institution de-  
 “ clared SOVEREIGN, and independent of civil Go-  
 “ vernment, that it may adapt itself by *free Alliance*  
 “ to the various kinds of human Policies [6].”

Now *sovereign in itself and independent of civil govern-  
 ment*, this great Writer hath paraphrased to signify,  
*independency and superiority over the civil,*

— “ Thalem talento non emam Milesium :

“ Nam, ad sapientiam Hujus, nimius nugator fuit.

But, to come to the question ; which is WHETHER A  
 RELIGIOUS SOCIETY CAN PART WITH THAT INDE-  
 PENDENCY WHICH GOD, *as well as the Nature of things*,  
 HATH BESTOWED UPON IT. His Lordship determines  
 in the negative. *For if, says he, ecclesiastical Govern-  
 ment was by divine appointment independent of the civil,*  
*the Religious Society could not have parted with that inde-  
 pendency which God had given them.*

Man was, by *divine appointment*, made free and in-  
 dependent ; therefore, according to this reasoning, he  
 could not part with his *independency*, and become sub-  
 ject to civil Laws. Hold, says his Lordship, Man  
 was made free, that he might be subject to no laws  
 but those to which he had given his consent ; and as  
 he needed protection from Laws, he had a right to  
 part with his independency if he could get protection  
 upon no other terms. And is not this the very case  
 of the religious Society in question, which is only an

[6] *Ibid.* p. 180.

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artificial person, by nature and institution free, and  
standing in need of protection ?

But his Lordship's assertion, you will find, bottoms at last upon this Principle, that DIVINE AUTHORITY REDUCES ALL IT'S LAWS TO ONE AND THE SAME SPECIES : An Error which *Bigots* and *Fanatics* indeed, are equally fond of indulging ; and has been indulged by them to the infinite disservice both of civil and of religious Society : But that a *Philosopher* and a *Statesman* should know so little of the NATURE OF LAWS is perfectly astonishing. The first elements of his profession might have taught him, " That the Authority by which a thing is commanded makes no alteration in the essence of the thing." Natural and positive duties retain their respective natures in the Code of Religion. Natural duties are eternal ; Positive duties are revocable. Of these latter, some are lasting as the Dispensation to which they belong ; others only temporary. Of the temporary, some cease not till they are expressly revoked ; others cease with the occasion that enjoined them. These last are again to be distinguished into Privileges and Duties ; privileges may be receded from at pleasure ; but duties must either be revoked, or the occasion must be plainly seen to cease. Now the INDEPENDENCY in question, is one of those institutions in the divine Law, which ceases with the occasion ; and is besides, a privilege, which may be receded from, at pleasure. Again, In the divine Laws, some things are enjoined to be believed as Truths ; others to be practised as Utilities. Of utilities some are general ; others particular : The first of these are permanent and constant ; the second variable. Of the first, is  
the



the Church's composing a *Society*: of the second, is it's *particular form*. Thus, Jesus seemed to institute an equal Ministry; the Apostles, episcopal Government; and modern Churches have chosen one or the other, as best suited to the various civil Governments with which they had allied.

As Christianity was, by divine institution, a *Society at large*, to authorize and to enable the several Churches to give particular forms to ecclesiastical Government; so the *independency* was bestowed upon it, to enable it to enter into free Alliance with the State. When God himself allied the Jewish Church with the State, he did not leave that Religion a *society at large*; neither did he ordain it *independent*: he prescribed, in the minutest manner, the form of Church Government; and made it dependent on the State. But the Author of the *Alliance* tells his story better. “ The  
 “ christian religion (says he) was not only left inde-  
 “ pendent of the State by not being united to it like  
 “ the Jewish; (and being so left it must needs by the  
 “ Law of Nature be independent,) but its indepen-  
 “ dency, was likewise secured by divine appoint-  
 “ ment, in that famous declaration of it's founder,  
 “ *My kingdom is not of this world*; which bears this  
 “ plain and obvious sense, *That the kingdom of Christ,*  
 “ *to be extended over all Mankind, was not like the king-*  
 “ *dom of God, confined to the Jewish people, where Reli-*  
 “ *gion was incorporated with the State; and therefore,*  
 “ *of this world, as well in the exercise of it, as in the*  
 “ *rewards and punishments by which it was administered:*  
 “ *but was independent of all civil communities; and*  
 “ *therefore, neither of this world, as to the exercise of*  
 “ *it, nor as to the rewards and punishments by which it*  
 “ was

“ *was administered*. — But whoever imagines that, from  
 “ this *independency by institution*, the Church cannot  
 “ convene and unite with the State, concludes much  
 “ too fast. We have observed, that this property in  
 “ the *Kingdom of Christ* was given as a mark to dis-  
 “ tinguish it from the *kingdom of God*, that is, it was  
 “ given to shew that this Religion extended to all  
 “ mankind ; and was not, like the Mosaic, confined  
 “ to one only people. Consequently, that very rea-  
 “ son which made it proper for the Mosaic Religion  
 “ to be united by divine appointment to the State,  
 “ made it fit, the Christian should be left free and  
 “ independent. But for what end, if not for this,  
 “ To be at liberty to adapt itself to the many various  
 “ kinds of civil policies, by a suitable union and al-  
 “ liance.—An Alliance then we must conclude the  
 “ christian Church was at liberty to make, notwith-  
 “ standing this declared nature of *Christ's kingdom*.  
 “ So far is indeed true, that it is debarred from enter-  
 “ ing into any such *Alliance* with the State as may  
 “ admit any LEGISLATOR in Christ's kingdom but  
 “ himself [that is, a power in the Magistrate to al-  
 “ ter DOCTRINES.] But no such power is granted  
 “ or usurped by the *supremacy* of the State [7].”  
 [which extends only to DISCIPLINE.]

From all this it appears, that the *unalterable* part  
 of the Law of Christ is the DOCTRINE : and the  
 only *alterable* part, the DISCIPLINE : but it is the lat-  
 ter, with which Society, as such, is chiefly concern-  
 ed, when it enters on *Alliance* with the Church.  
 Therefore, when his Lordship says, *Religion and the*

[7] *Alliance*, p. 178--9, &c.

*Church being set on the same foot, no human authority can alter one, but must receive it on the terms in which it has been revealed, if he means, there can be no alteration in discipline, I have shewn he is mistaken : if he means, there can be no alteration in doctrine, he is certainly right ; and I consider his Lordship's observation as a complaint, that, by the constitution of the Christian Church, the Magistrate cannot tyrannize over Conscience.*

In the mean time we see to what little purpose this great Philosopher and Statesman had read his HOOKER ; of whom he confesses something might be learnt. Now, HOOKER would have shewn him, that divine authority does not reduce all it's Laws to one and the same species.—“ Positive Laws (says this  
 “ truly great Man) are either permanent or else  
 “ changeable, according as the matter itself is, concerning which they were first made. Whether  
 “ GOD or MAN be the maker of them, ALTERA-  
 “ TION they so far forth admit, as the MATTER doth  
 “ exact. Wherefore, to end with a general rule concerning all the Laws which God hath tied men  
 “ unto : those Laws divine, that belong, whether  
 “ naturally or supernaturally, either to men as men,  
 “ or to men as they live in politique Society, or to  
 “ men as they are of that politique Society which is  
 “ the Church, without any further respect had unto  
 “ any such variable accident as the State of men,  
 “ and of Societies of men, and of the Church itself  
 “ in this world, is subject unto ; all Laws that so be-  
 “ long unto men, they belong for ever, yea altho’  
 “ they be positive Laws, unless, being positive,  
 “ God himself which made them, alter them. The

“son is, because the subject or matter of Laws in  
 “general, is thus far forth constant: which matter  
 “is that for the ordering whereof, Laws were insti-  
 “tuted, and being instituted are not changeable  
 “without cause, neither can they have cause of  
 “change, when that which gave them their first in-  
 “stitution remaineth for ever one and the same. On  
 “the other side, Laws that were made for men, or So-  
 “cieties, or Churches, in regard of their being such as do  
 “not always continue, but may perhaps be clean other-  
 “wise a-while after, and so may be required to be other-  
 “wise ordered than before; the Laws of God himself  
 “which are of this nature, NO MAN ENDOWED WITH  
 “COMMON SENSE will ever deny to be of a different  
 “constitution from the former, in respect of the one's con-  
 “stancy, and the mutability of the other [8].”

So much for this country Parson. And how poorly  
 does his Lordship figure before him with his assertion,  
 that *divine law makes every thing, which relates to the  
 Church, equally unalterable?* Yet this noble Haranguer,  
 thus ignorant of the very first elements of Law, can  
 dictate with the authority of an Oracle, and be  
 received with the reverence due to one, concerning  
*civil liberty, Church usurpations, a Patriot King and the  
 ballance of power* But Master Hooker will tell you,  
 how easily all this may be done without knowing  
 more than our neighbours.

—“Thus far therefore (says he) we have endea-  
 “voured in part to open, of what nature and  
 “force Laws are, according unto their several kinds:  
 “the Law which God himself hath eternally set

[8] *Eccles. Pol. L. i. Sect. 15.*

“down



“ down to follow in his own works ; the Law which  
 “ he hath made for his creatures to keep ; the Law  
 “ of natural and necessary Agents ; the law which  
 “ angels in Heaven obey ; the Law whereunto, by  
 “ the light of reason, men find themselves bound, in  
 “ that they are men ; the Law which they made by  
 “ composition for multitudes and politique Societies  
 “ of men to be guided by ; the Law which belong-  
 “ eth unto each nation ; the Law that concerneth  
 “ the fellowship of all ; and lastly the Law which  
 “ God himself hath supernaturally revealed. *It*  
 “ *might peradventure have been more* POPULAR AND  
 “ MORE PLAUSIBLE TO VULGAR EARS, *if this*  
 “ *discourse had been spent in* EXTOLLING THE FORCE  
 “ OF LAWS, *in shewing the* GREAT NECESSITY OF  
 “ THEM, *when they are* GOOD, and in AGGRAVAT-  
 “ ING THEIR OFFENCE BY WHOM PUBLIC LAWS  
 “ ARE INJURIOUSLY TRADUCED. *But forasmuch*  
 “ *as with such kind of matter* THE PASSIONS OF MEN  
 “ *are rather stirred one way or other, than* THEIR  
 “ KNOWLEDGE *any way set forward* unto the trial of  
 “ that whereof there is doubt made, I have there-  
 “ fore turned aside from that BEATEN PATH, and  
 “ chosen, tho’ a LESS EASY, yet a more profitable  
 “ way, in regard of the end we propose [9].”

Great Names, however, are still of good use to his  
 Lordship : for tho’ he cannot profit by their lights,  
 he can shine at their expence : and, having well chi-  
 caned their expressions, can afterwards convert the  
 truths contained in them to his own use. Let me  
 give you, out of many, one example of this kind.

[9] *Eccl. Pol. L. i. Sect. 16.*

HOOKE

HOOKE and LOCKE have been supposed to write tolerably well on the origin of civil Government. Alas ; *nil sine Theseo*. There is nothing so well done, which his Lordship cannot mend. He reproves Both of them, with much solemnity, for *representing mankind to themselves, like a number of savage individuals out of Society, in their natural State, instead of considering them as members of families from their birth*. “ This “ (he says) has made them reason INCONSISTENTLY, “ and on a FALSE FOUNDATION. Inconsistently, “ because they sometimes acknowledge paternal Government to have preceded civil, and yet reason “ about the institution of civil, as if men had then “ first assembled in any kind of society, or had been “ subject to any kind of rule ; for to say that the Law “ of nature was of itself such a rule, and that every “ one of these independent inhabitants of the earth “ did or might exercise Justice for himself, and “ others on those who violated the Law, was language unworthy of Mr. LOCKE, and unnecessary “ to his System.—Falsely, because it is *easy to demonstrate* that mankind never was in such a State [10] ”

To say the truth *easy* enough, and like *demonstrating* day-light. A man need only open his eyes to see that a Mother does not abandon her infant as soon as she has dropt it, nor the Father renounce the care of it and her. Is it possible then that HOOKE, LOCKE, and their Followers, should want to be told by his Lordship so obvious a truth, That, before civil Society, mankind did not start up like mushrooms, a number of savage individuals at once,

[10] Vol. v. p. 125—6.

but came as they could be got, and entered as they were born, into tribes and families. Why then, you ask, did not HOOKER and LOCKE so consider them, when they were deducing the origin of civil Society? For very important reasons; and, one would think, very obvious ones.

First because the real origin of civil Society being equally shewn on either supposition, the truths which followed from it, were clearer seen, as they were less embarrassed, by considering Mankind before civil Society, as individuals.

But this was not all. Had They considered men before civil Society as ranked under tribes, the *rights* belonging to the Heads of families, thus brought into view, tho' neither relative to, nor connected with, those of a civil kind, might have too much countenanced that absurd System, which derives political Rule from the *Patriarchal*; a system which, both for its absurdities and mischiefs, it was the purpose of LOCKE and HOOKER to expose and discredit. The former therefore did judiciously, to assert, as he might do it truly; (for the *exercise of justice* no more belonged to Fathers of Families, as such, than the *exercise of Regal prerogative*) that, before the institution of Civil Society, *every one of these independent inhabitants of the earth did, or might, exercise justice for himself and others, on those who violated the Law.* Yet this, his Lordship calls language unworthy of his Master. Nay, so great a stranger is he to this whole matter, that he declares the representation to be UNNECESSARY: whereas we see it was done to keep the unwary from the sight of circumstances of no use to assist their judgment,

304      A VIEW OF LORD BOLINGBROKE'S  
judgment, and easily abused by designing men, to  
mislead them.

—But to proceed with our Subject. His Lordship  
goes on against the Book of the *Alliance* in this Man-  
ner. “ This imaginary Contract, in short, whether  
“ well or ill made, never existed at any time, nor  
“ in any Country ; though, to have been real, and  
“ really authorized, it should have been the same at  
“ all times and in all Countries where Christianity  
“ was propagated. Political Societies make and al-  
“ ter and break their *Alliances*, as the varying reason  
“ of state suggests. Different orders of civil Go-  
“ vernment in the same Society change, and with  
“ them the whole Constitution of such Governments,  
“ as reason or passion, the interests or the dispositions  
“ of men determine them. *But a Religion given by*  
“ *God is in its nature invariable.* And therefore if a  
“ Religious Society with certain privileges, immuni-  
“ ties, and prerogatives be necessary to preserve it so,  
“ the *order and constitution* of such a Society must be  
“ *invariable* too. The CHURCH must be established by  
“ the same divine Authority as the RELIGION, and  
“ be by consequence independent of the State. But  
“ nothing of this kind has been. Christ's *kingdom*  
“ *was not of this World.* He sent out his Apostles to  
“ teach, and to baptize ; and the utmost power he  
“ gave them, besides that of working Miracles to  
“ convince and to convert, was to shake off the dust  
“ of their feet, and to protest against the infidelity of  
“ those who refused to receive them, and the Gospel  
“ they published. The Apostles ordained others to  
“ accompany and to succeed them in the same office,  
“ the office of teaching and baptizing. The Apo-  
“ stles



“ fles could give no more power than they received ;  
 “ and no argument *of right* can be drawn from any  
 “ thing that passed, or from any thing that these  
 “ Men did for the Maintenance of their Sect, while  
 “ Christianity was a Sect [11].”

*This imaginary Contract* (he says) *never existed at any time or in any country.* If he means, a *Contract* actually and formally executed, I have answered that already, and shewn, that the objection holds equally against *the original contract between King and People* ; which I suppose his Lordship allows not to be so *imaginary* but that the prerogative of the one, and the rights of the other, ought every where to be regulated on the conditions of it. But You shall hear the Author of the *Alliance* on this matter.

“ [12] When I say that *all* regular policied States  
 “ had *an Established Religion*, I mean no more than  
 “ He would do, who, deducing Civil Society from  
 “ its true Original, should, in order to persuade Men  
 “ of the Benefits it produces, affirm that all Nations  
 “ had a *Civil Policy*. For as this Writer could not  
 “ be supposed to mean that every one constituted a  
 “ free State, on the Principles of public Liberty,  
 “ which yet was the only Society he purposed to prove  
 “ was founded on Truth, and productive of public  
 “ Good ; because it is notorious, that the far greater  
 “ Part of Civil Policies are founded on different Prin-  
 “ ciples ; or abused to different Ends : so neither  
 “ would I be understood to mean, when I say all  
 “ Nations concurred in making this *Union*, that they  
 “ all exactly discriminated the Natures, and fairly

[11] Vol. iv. p. 419—20. [12] *Alliance*, p. 114—117.

“ adjusted

“ adjusted the Rights of both Societies, on the Prin-  
 “ ciples here laid down; tho’ an *Establishment* result-  
 “ ing from this Discrimination and Adjustment be the  
 “ only one I would be supposed to recommend. On  
 “ the contrary, I know this Union has been gene-  
 “ rally made on mistaken Principles; or, if not so,  
 “ hath degenerated in length of Time; by which  
 “ means the national Religion in the Pagan World  
 “ hath been most commonly a Slave to the State;  
 “ and in the Christian System, the State sometimes a  
 “ Slave to the Established Church. And as it was  
 “ sufficient for that Writer’s Purpose, that those So-  
 “ cieties, whether good or bad, proved the Sense all  
 “ Men had of the Benefits resulting from Civil Policy  
 “ in general, though they were oft mistaken in the  
 “ Application; so it is for Ours, that this universal  
 “ Concurrence in the two Societies to *unite*, shews  
 “ the Sense Mankind had of the Usefulness of such  
 “ an *Union*. And lastly, as that Writer’s Principles  
 “ are not the less true on account of the general De-  
 “ viation from them in forming Civil Societies; so  
 “ may not the plain ones of *Aliance* here delivered;  
 “ tho’ so few States have suffered themselves to be  
 “ directed by them in Practice; nor any Man before  
 “ delivered them in Speculation; especially if, as in  
 “ that Case, so in this, we can derive such *Mistake*  
 “ and *Degeneracy* from their Causes. It would draw  
 “ me too far out of my Way to explain distinctly the  
 “ Causes of the *Mistake*; and the intelligent Reader,  
 “ who carefully attends to the whole of this Dis-  
 “ course, will not be at a Loss to discover the most  
 “ considerable of them; some of which I have al-  
 “ ready hinted at; and others, I may possibly, in the  
 “ Sequel

“ Sequel of this Discourse, take occasion to mention.  
 “ As for the *Degeneracy*, we have observed, that the  
 “ *Alliance* is of the Nature of the FOEDERA INÆ-  
 “ QUALIA : Now, the common Issue of such, *Grotius*  
 “ acquaints us with, in these Words : *Interim verum*  
 “ *est accidere plerumque, ut qui superior est in fœdere, si*  
 “ *IS POTENTIA MULTUM ANTECELLAT, PAULATIM*  
 “ *IMPERIUM PROPRIE DICTUM USURPET : PRÆ-*  
 “ *SERTIM SI FOEDUS PERPETUUM SIT* [13].”

But if, by, *never existed*, his Lordship means, that the mutual rights and privileges of either Society, which naturally follow such an *Alliance*, were never actually exercised and enjoyed by the two Societies, his assertion is false. They are at this present actually exercised and enjoyed by the two Societies, in ENGLAND, under our happy Constitution of Church and State. And it was a principal purpose of the Book of the *Alliance* to shew they are so, in order to realize the Theory. Here again it may not be improper to give you the Author's words : “ We see how unrea-  
 “ sonable and even how impolitic our Adversaries  
 “ are, when in their ill humour with *Establishments*,  
 “ they chuse to pick a quarrel with their own ; where  
 “ the national Religion is on a footing exactly agree-  
 “ able to the nature of a *free Convention between*  
 “ *Church and State*, on the principles of the Laws of  
 “ Nature and Nations. A felicity, they should have  
 “ known, that scarce any other People on the face of  
 “ the earth can boast of. In *England* alone the ori-  
 “ ginal terms of this *Convention* are kept up, to so  
 “ exactly, that this account of the *Alliance between*

[13] *De jure Belli & Pacis*, Lib. i. cap. iii. § 21.

“ *Church and State* seems rather a copy of the Church  
 “ and State of *England*, than a Theory, as indeed it  
 “ was, formed solely on the contemplation of Na-  
 “ ture, and the unvariable reason of things [14].”

*To make this contract* (says his Lordship) *real, and to be really authorized, it should have been the same at all times and in all countries where Christianity was professed.* In plain terms, *Right* waits to receive its nature from Man's acceptance of it: or, in still plainer, *Right* becomes *Wrong* when rejected. How would this political aphorism of his Lordship's sound when applied to the ORIGINAL CONTRACT between Prince and People? — *to make it real and to be really authorized, it should have been the same at all times and in all countries, where civil rule had been introduced.*

But *political Societies* (he says) *make and alter and break their alliances as the varying reason of state suggests.* If he would be here meant to speak of such which make these *alterations* justly, the same may be said of the *Alliance between Church and State*. The Author has shewn that, in this respect, the Alliances of political Societies with one another, and the Alliance of the political with the religious, stand just upon the same footing. “ If there be (says the Author) more  
 “ religious Societies than one at the time of Conven-  
 “ tion, the State allies itself with the largest of those  
 “ religious Societies. It is *fit* the State should do so,  
 “ because the larger the religious Society is, where  
 “ there is an equality in other points, the better en-  
 “ abled it will be to answer the ends of the Alliance.  
 “ It is *scarce possible* it should be otherwise, because

[14] *Alliance*, p. 167—8.



“ the two Societies being composed of the same in-  
 “ dividuals, the greatly prevailing Religion must  
 “ have a majority of it's members in the assemblies  
 “ of State, who will naturally prefer their own Re-  
 “ ligion to any other. Hence we see the reason why  
 “ the *Episcopal* is the established Church in *England*;  
 “ and the *Presbyterian* the established Church in *Scot-*  
 “ *land*. Hence too we see the reason of what was  
 “ before observed, concerning the duration of this  
 “ Alliance: that it is *perpetual* but not *irrevocable* :  
 “ i. e. It subsists just so long as the Church thereby  
 “ established maintains it's superiority of extent ;  
 “ which when it loses to any considerable degree the  
 “ Alliance becomes void. For the united Church  
 “ being then no longer able to perform it's part of  
 “ the Convention which is formed on reciprocal con-  
 “ ditions, the State becomes disengaged ; and a *new*  
 “ *Alliance* is of course contracted with the now pre-  
 “ vailing Church, for the reasons which made the  
 “ *old*. Thus formerly, the Alliance between the  
 “ *Pagan Church* and the Empire of Rome was dissolv-  
 “ ed ; and the *Christian* established in it's place : and  
 “ of late, the Alliance between the *Popish Church* and  
 “ the Kingdom of England was broken ; and an-  
 “ other made with the *Protestant*, in it's stead [15].”

*Different orders of civil government, in the same Socie-*  
*ty, change, (says his Lordship) and with them the whole*  
*Constitution of such Governments, as reason or passion, the*  
*interests or dispositions of men determine them. — And is*  
*it not the same in Church-Government ? It is here*  
*Episcopacy ; there Presbytery ; and in another place*  
*Independency.*

[15] *Alliance*, p. 197—98.

But, *a Religion given by God is in its nature invariable.* In its DOCTRINE it is: Yes, and in its DISCIPLINE likewise, (says his Lordship) and thus I prove it. *If a religious Society with certain privileges, immunities, and prerogatives, be necessary to preserve it so, the order and constitution of such a Society must be invariable too.* The inference is just. But what principle of the *Alliance* (against which his Lordship is here arguing) supposes, that *one certain set of privileges, immunities, and prerogatives* is necessary to preserve a religious Society in that State and Condition? This Theory says, Religion composed a Society before it had any of those *privileges, immunities, and prerogatives*; and will remain a Society when it has lost them. For it had none of them till it came into Alliance with the State, and will hold none of them longer than that Alliance continues. But, if by a strange liberty of expression, his Lordship means, by *privileges, immunities, and prerogatives*, only CHURCH-GOVERNMENT in general, so far forth as it is a Society; I own that this is *necessary to preserve a religious Society* in the State and Condition of a Society: But then, give me leave to say, it does not follow from thence, that *the order and constitution of such a Society must be invariable too*: Because Church Government may be administered by an Episcopacy, a Presbytery, or an Independency. The Specific form of Church-Government amongst the Jews was prescribed, and therefore intended to be invariable, because Moses united the Religion to the State, under the collective name of LAW: The specific form of Church-Government amongst Christians was not prescribed, and therefore none seems intended to be invariably followed, because Jesus did not unite his Religion

Religion to the State, but left it to particular Churches to follow such as were most agreeable to the forms of those civil Societies, in which they were to be established. For this purpose it was sufficient that he instituted his Religion, a *Society*, by directing the members of it to *hear the Church*, and by appointing Officers as it's organs to convey it's decisions. On this matter it may not be improper again to hear the Author of the *Alliance*, who speaking of the *Jewish* and *Christian* Churches, says, “ This, Both had in com-  
 “ mon, to be political Societies by divine appoint-  
 “ ment ; but different in this, that God, for *wise*  
 “ *ends*, minutely prescribed the whole mode of  
 “ Jewish policy : and CHRIST, on the contrary, with  
 “ the same divine wisdom only constituted his Church  
 “ a politic Society at large, and left the mode of  
 “ it to human discretion [16].”

Those *ends*, the Author thus explains, in another place. “ The *Jewish* Religion was, like the true  
 “ *natural*, which it ratified, essentially fitted to com-  
 “ pose a Society ; and like the *Christian*, of which it  
 “ was the first rudiment, made such by divine ap-  
 “ pointment. But then unlike the Christian, in this,  
 “ that it was not left independent of civil Govern-  
 “ ment, to unite with it at its pleasure, on terms agreed  
 “ upon ; but was for great and wise reasons at once  
 “ united to it, by God himself. Which also he was  
 “ pleased to do, not by way of *Alliance* as between  
 “ two bodies that were to continue distinct, and  
 “ might be separated, but by mutual conversion into  
 “ one another, and perfect incorporation [17].”

[16] *Alliance*, p. 164.[17] *Alliance*, p. 176.

His Lordship then owns, that if *the Church be established by the same divine authority as the religion*, (that is, if religion be formed into a Society) *it is by consequence independent of the State*. I am apt to suspect, he here grants more than he is aware of: For it follows from this concession, that if the Christian Religion even composes a Society by nature, tho' not by divine appointment, it must be *independent* of the State: because the *independency* does not arise from the *Authority* which formed it, but from the *nature* it possesses: And the Author of the Alliance has shewn [18] that Religion composes a Society by natural right. His Lordship's endeavour therefore to avoid the *consequence* of *independency*, by affirming that *the Church was not established by the same divine authority as the Religion*, would be to no purpose even tho' he could prove it. However let us hear how he supports his assertion.

His first argument is the declaration of Jesus himself, that *his Kingdom was not of this World*. The question is, Whether Christ's Religion composes a Society, and a Society independent? And his Lordship quotes a declaration of Jesus to prove it does *neither*, which in the very terms imply that it does *both*. For what is a *Kingdom*, but a *Society*? And what is the *not being of this World*, but a declaration of *independency*? Indeed the Author of the *Alliance* employed the *subject* of the proposition, *Christ's Kingdom*, to prove it was a SOCIETY; and the *attribute*, its not being of *this World*, to prove, that Church and State are INDEPENDENT of one another. For

[18] Book i. c. 5.



was Christ's Religion a *Kingdom of this World*; the consequence would be, that either the State is *dependent* on the Church, or the Church on the State; because, in that case, both having COERCIVE POWER, (as all *kingdoms of this World* have) a mutual *independency* would make that solecism in Politics called, IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO: Whereas, *Christ's Kingdom not being of this World*, and his *Apostles*, as his Lordship rightly observes, having *no power*, (*besides Miracles*) but that of teaching, exhorting, and protesting against infidelity, i. e. having *no coercive power*, there remained no pretence for its *dependency* on the State.

His Lordship's second Argument against the *independency* of the Church is, that Jesus *sent out his Apostles to teach, and to baptize, and the utmost power he gave them, besides that of working miracles to convince and to convert, was to shake off the dust of their feet, and to protest against the infidelity of those who refused to receive them, and the Gospel they published. The Apostles ordained others to accompany and to succeed them in the same Office of teaching and baptizing. The Apostles could give no more power than they had received.*

1. He is to prove that the Christian Religion did not compose a Society by institution. And how does he set to work? With an argument which shews it to be a Society by *institution*, and without *coercive power*; the very Society which the Author of the *Alliance* contends for. *Jesus sent out his Apostles,—they ordained others to accompany and to succeed them. Here a Society is plainly instituted; for you find officers appointed; and they provide for a Succession.—The utmost power they had was to teach and baptize those who wil-*

*lingly received the Gospel.* Here all *coercive* power is excluded; and that exclusion makes the Society *independent*. What more may be inferred from this account (and which his Lordship should have inferred) is, that tho' a Society was instituted, yet the particular form of Church-Government was left to human discretion: But he could find no Society of Christ's appointment, where he saw no particular form of Church-Government minutely marked out, as in the Mosaic Dispensation. Tho', had he found any such it would, when he least suspected it, have been most to his purpose; for of such, and only of such, he might have said truly, that being *given by God, it is in its nature invariable*.

2. His observation, that the *Apostles could give no more power than they had received*, insinuates that the Author of the *Alliance* contended for *inherent coercive power* in the Church; which is a gross misrepresentation of his Adversary, who expressly affirms that the Church has no such power, while *unallied*; and when *allied*, receives it, in a very limited manner, from the State; and enjoys it no longer than the *Alliance* continues. But these misrepresentations are things essential to his Lordship's polemics. So again, "To pretend (says he) that the Church has a right to the former [*i.e.* wealth and grandeur] by *compact* or by virtue of an *Alliance* with the State, would be to say whatever comes uppermost in a WHIMSICAL HEAD [19]." This is to insinuate that the Author of the *Alliance* pretends that the *wealth and grandeur* of the Church necessarily arises from it's

*alliance with the State. But let him speak for himself, and you shall hear him saying the direct contrary——the acquisition of honours, riches, and power could not be a motive for Alliance. His reason is, that it would be impertinent in a Church to aim at them, because they are things a Church could neither use nor profit by [20]."*

His Lordship concludes this long paragraph in these words—*No argument of right can be drawn from any thing that passed, nor from any thing that these men [the Apostles] did for the maintenance of their Sect, while Christianity was a Sect.* His Lordship here forgets, as usual, the personage he assumes, which is that of a Believer, who supposes, the Apostles acted, in all things, by the direction of their Master: consequently, *an argument of RIGHT MAY be drawn from every thing that passed, and from all they did, in support or maintenance of their sect, while Christianity was a Sect.* It is true, if we suppose the Apostles to be Politicians like his Lordship, a sort of men who put in practice all kind of means to support and maintain their Cause or Party, no argument *of right* can be drawn from any thing they did or said. But when God directs the actions and organs of his Ministers in the propagation of Religion, we know from the knowledge of his Attributes, that no rights of Humanity or Society will be violated; and consequently, that from every such action, *an argument of right may be drawn.*

If, indeed, his Lordship meant no more by his profound observation than this, That, from what the Apostles did, to assert and maintain the *independency* of Christ's Religion while it remained a Sect, *no argument of*

[20] *Alliance*, p. 112.

*right can be drawn* to prove it must *continue* independent when it becomes established, I perfectly agree with him: and I have but one objection to the understanding him in so reasonable a sense, which is, that it supports the Theory of the *Alliance*; which, I presume, was not in his Lordship's intention. Besides, it contradicts what he so much labours to prove, 'That, if the independency of the Church was of divine institution, the Church could not give it up, when it entered into Alliance.

In a word, the whole of his Lordship's reasoning against an *Alliance between Church and State* from the nature of a *Church*, may be reduced to these four propositions:

1. If Christianity be not a Society by divine institution it is no Society at all.

2. If Christianity be an independent Society by divine institution it could not give up its independency to the State.

3. If Christianity be a Society by divine institution a certain form of Church government must be explicitly prescribed.

4. If such a form be explicitly prescribed then that Form, and the Discipline which belongs to it, must be as unalterable as the Doctrine; which is contrary to the genius of this supposed Alliance.

Now I have shewn, that every one of these four propositions is utterly void of all truth and reason.

After these exploits, nothing was wanting to make his Lordship's victory compleat against *Alliances* and *Establishments*, but to discredit that first and most famous one of all, made by CONSTANTINE. "This great Revolution (says he) was effected in part by circumstances



“ cumstances I have mentioned, and by others that  
 “ favoured the growth of Christianity. The impe-  
 “ rial Authority did the rest, but did it ill; so ill,  
 “ that the chief of those political views which CON-  
 “ STANTINE had in making this ESTABLISHMENT  
 “ were defeated by it, and the admission of a reli-  
 “ gious Society into the State, in the manner in  
 “ which he admitted it, was the cause of all the  
 “ ecclesiastical and theological evils that have fol-  
 “ lowed from his time to ours, and that are so falsely  
 “ imputed to Religion itself. We may be assured,  
 “ that the SOCIETY co-operated with the COURT,  
 “ to bring about a Revolution so much to their ad-  
 “ vantage; and thought themselves happy enough  
 “ to be *dependent*, not *independent* on the Emperor;  
 “ his *instruments* not his *allies*, whatever appearances  
 “ he might give, or suffer them to assume, in those  
 “ solemn ecclesiastical Farces, wherein he conde-  
 “ scended to act, in some respects, a second part.—  
 “ But while he recalled to his mind, as he did most  
 “ probably, the great service Religion was of to an-  
 “ cient Rome, he seemed to forget, that when that  
 “ Religion flourished, and was of so much service to  
 “ the State, it was under the immediate inspection  
 “ of the State. There was no Council but the Se-  
 “ nate to define Doctrines, nor to regulate Disci-  
 “ pline. And men were at the head of the religious,  
 “ because they were at the head of the civil, admini-  
 “ stration; instead of being at the head of the latter,  
 “ because they were at the head of the former. —  
 “ He [*Constantine*] meant that this [spiritual power]  
 “ should be distinct from the civil; THAT THEY

“ SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT OF ONE ANOTHER, and  
 “ both dependent on him [1].”

That noblest part of Legislation, the adjusting the rights and privileges, and settling the bounds and limits of the TWO SOCIETIES, his Lordship, as we said before, seems much a stranger to. Indeed, every new paragraph makes his ignorance but the more conspicuous by his endeavouring to disguise it; as his attempts are generally made at the expence of a Contradiction.

In the Establishment of Religion under CONSTANTINE, the Church, he says, became dependent on the supreme civil Magistrate. *They thought themselves happy enough to be dependant, not independent on the Emperor; his instruments, not his allies.* Yet, in the same breath, he tells us, that this very Emperor was contented to *act a second part* to these his *instruments*, or, in other words, to become *theirs*: Nay, he expressly affirms, that Christianity was on another footing in new Rome, than Paganism had been in the old: Now Paganism, he tells us, was the *instrument* of the supreme Magistrate. Christianity then, must be an *Ally*, not an *instrument* to the supreme Magistrate. His Lordship says, this Establishment was *ill, very ill, made*: However that be, every body sees it is *very ill* represented.——*It defeated all Constantine's political views, all the good he intended.* It is not unlikely. We have an example before us, in his Lordship's *Essays* throughout, that his *contradictions* can defeat all the evil *intended*; this is doing something more, for malice is not so easily defeated as benevolence.

[1] Vol iv. p. 432--445.

But if you ask, Why, in this account of CONSTANTINE's Establishment, the Church is one while made the *Instrument*, and another, the *Ally* of the civil Magistrate? I will tell you. His Lordship had decried the ALLIANCE both in *fact* and *right*. There never was, he says, in FACT, such an Alliance. To countenance this assertion, CONSTANTINE's Establishment is represented as being made on different terms; terms whereby the Church became the tool and instrument of the civil Magistrate. But then again, he was to shew that such an Alliance was not of RIGHT, as being very mischievous to the State: This turns the Tables; and then CONSTANTINE *meant*, that the *spiritual power should be distinct from the civil, and that they should be* INDEPENDENT OF ONE ANOTHER (for he all along misrepresents the Theory of the *Alliance*, as making the Church keep its independency after the Union) indeed he says,—and *both dependent on himself* [2]; but this was only added to soften the absurdity. To such wretched shifts do his Principles ever and anon reduce him:—The Religious and the Civil Society are independent of one another; yet the Religious is dependent on the supreme Magistrate; *i. e.* on him who represents the civil Society, and is at it's head.

But now let us examine the ground-work of this curious paragraph, without any particular regard to the embroidery of his contradictions.

He says, *the Church was happy enough to be dependent, NOT INDEPENDENT, on the Emperor; his Instruments, NOT HIS ALLIES.* This sentence is made up of a

[2] Vol. iv. p. 445.

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false insinuation, and a mistaken consequence. The  
insinuation is that the Author of the *Alliance* holds,  
the independency of the Church, on the Magistrate,  
during an Establishment. The mistaken consequence  
is, that if the Church be dependent, it is the Instru-  
ment, not the Ally, of the State. But GROTIUS, as  
he is quoted in the book of the *Alliance*, might have  
set his Lordship right in this matter. “ This (says  
“ the Author) is what GROTIUS calls *foedus inæ-*  
“ *quale*. Inæquale FOEDUS, hic intelligo quod ex  
“ ipsa vi pactionis MANENTEM PRÆLATIONEM quan-  
“ dam alteri donat : Hoc est ubi quis tenetur alterius  
“ imperium ac majestatem conservare, ut POTENTIORI  
“ PLUS HONORIS, inferiori plus auxilii deferatur. *De*  
“ *jur. B. & P. L. i. c. iii. Sect. 21 [3].*” Hence,  
in the opinion of this great Lawyer, alliance and de-  
pendence are very consistent things.

*In ancient Rome*, says his Lordship, *there was no*  
*Council, but the Senate, to DEFINE DOCTRINES, nor to*  
*REGULATE DISCIPLINE.* Now in ancient Rome it  
so happened, there were no Doctrines to define [4].  
And as to Discipline, this was regulated not by the  
Senate, but by the Colleges of the Priests. When  
the Senate imagined the necessities of State required  
the observance of religious Rites, they sent to the  
Priests for their directions concerning the choice and  
regulation of them. The Senate were the Masters whe-  
ther they would have any celebrated; but if of that they  
had determined, they were tied down to the rules and

[3] *Alliance*, p. 88.

[4] See *Div. Leg. B. ii. Sect. 5.*



directions of the sacred Books, as the sense of them was represented and interpreted by the Priests [5].

On the whole, his Lordship assures us, that CONSTANTINE *established the Church very ill*; and so says the Author of the *Alliance*. Nay, which is more, he proves he did so, and explains the causes of his mistakes.

His Lordship's account of *Constantine's* Establishment, and the Author's account of that by an *Alliance*, stand thus,

[5] When the Romans entered on a war with Philip of Macedon, Senatus decrevit (they are the words of Livy) uti Consules majoribus hostiis rem divinam facerent *quibus Diis ipsis videretur*, cum precatione ea: Quam rem, &c. He then tells us that the Consuls made their report to the Senate; and there we find the part their Priests had in this matter. — Quum pronunciaſſent Consules; rem divinam RITE perfectam esse, et precationem admisisse Deos ARUSPICES RESPONDERE, *lætæque extæ esse et prolationem finium, victoriamque et triumphum portendi* — L. xxxi. c. 5. But the State further ordered that the Consul, to make the Gods propitious, should according to old custom make a Vow: and on this occasion we have a more explicate account of the Share the old Pagan Church had in this matter, by which we find it was not the Senate, but the College of Priests which regulated Discipline, or, if his Lordship will have it so, *defined Doctrine*. Civitas religiosa (says the Historian) ne quid prætermitteretur, quod aliquando factum esset; ludos Jovi, donumque *vovere Consulem* jussit *moram voto publico Licinius pontifex maximus attulit*, qui negavit ex incerta pecunia vovere debere. Si ea pecunia non posset in bellum usui esse; reponi statim debere, nec cum alia pecunia misceri. *Quod nisi factum esset, Votum RITE solvi non posse*. Quanquam et res, et auctor movebat; tamen ad COLLEGIUM PONTIFICUM referre Consul jussus, si posset recte votum incertæ pecuniæ suscipi. Posse rectiusque etiam esse; Pontifices decreverunt. Vovit in eadem verba Consul, *præcunte maximo Pontifice*. — L. xxxi. c. 9.

1. CONSTANTINE *made the Church his Instruments, not his Allies.* The ALLIANCE makes the Church the Ally, and not the Instrument, of the Civil Magistrate.

2. CONSTANTINE *placed men at the head of the civil Administration, because they were at the head of the religious.* The ALLIANCE places men at the head of the religious, because they were at the head of the civil administration.

3. CONSTANTINE *did not take to himself the title of supreme head of the Church under God and Christ.* The ALLIANCE makes the supreme Magistrate head of the Church under God and Christ.

4. CONSTANTINE *gave riches and coercive power to the Church without assuming this supremacy or headship.* The ALLIANCE, when it gave riches and coercive power to the Church, conferred the Supremacy on the civil Magistrate.

His Lordship's conclusion from this long story of CONSTANTINE is this, that "He and his Successors" raised that spiritual tyranny, which was established "and grown into full strength before CHARLES THE GREAT [6]." And what could we expect less when every term in the *Alliance* was violated or neglected? This was just as natural as that civil Tyranny should grow to a head, when the terms of the *original contract* between prince and people, had not been adverted to or observed? In a word, the mischiefs, which, his Lordship tells us, followed from *Constantine's establishment* are the best recommendation of the *theory of the Alliance*; a theory formed, as it were, and

fitted to avoid and guard against them : It has in fact done so, and rendered our present Constitution of Church and State the most happy and prosperous of any upon the face of the Earth.

At last, as if on set purpose to recommend the *Theory of the Alliance*, his Lordship concludes his Section concerning CONSTANTINE in these words :  
 “ Thus it seems to me that the great and fundamen-  
 “ tal error, from whence so many others proceeded,  
 “ and which CONSTANTINE COMMITTED IN THE  
 “ ESTABLISHMENT OF CHRISTIANITY, was this,  
 “ *he admitted a Clergy into an establishment, on the same*  
 “ *foot, on which this order had stood, while Christianity*  
 “ *was the Religion, and these men were the heads, the*  
 “ *directors, the governors, and magistrates of a Sect, by no*  
 “ *authority, but that of the Sect itself.* He admitted  
 “ them vested with this authority, which might be  
 “ necessary as long as Christians made a Sect apart,  
 “ out of the protection of the laws ; and which be-  
 “ came unnecessary and dangerous, when Christia-  
 “ nity had a legal establishment.—The conduct of  
 “ Constantine on this occasion must needs appear ex-  
 “ tremely absurd to every one who considers the con-  
 “ sequences it had [7].” Can there be a greater  
 encomium on the principles of the *Alliance*? The  
*fundamental error* of CONSTANTINE’S establishment  
 was, the suffering the Church to RETAIN IT’S IN-  
 DEPENDENCY. The fundamental condition of esta-  
 blishment on the theory of *Alliance* is, that the  
 Church GIVES UP IT’S INDEPENDENCY.

[7] Vol. iv. p. 438—9.

After this, would you expect to hear him return again to his abuse of the ALLIANCE? :“ The sole  
 “ intention and sole effect of it [the theologic system  
 of the schools] “ was to establish an ecclesiastical  
 “ Empire, under that spiritual Monarch the Pope,  
 “ and his spiritual Ministers the Clergy. THIS WAS  
 “ THE EFFECT OF THAT SUPPOSED ALLIANCE  
 “ BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND STATE [8].”

Before, It was CONSTANTINE *and his Successors*,  
*who raised that spiritual Tyranny* [9]: And it was  
 done, he says, by means of *his Establishment*; which  
 suffered the Church to retain its independency, *and*  
*admitted it on the same foot on which it had stood while*  
*it was a Sect* [10]. But now, it is the *supposed Alli-*  
*ance between Church and State* which raised this spiri-  
 tual Tyranny; an Alliance which will not suffer the  
 Church to retain in it's dependency; or *admit it on*  
*the same foot on which it stood while it was a Sect.*

We have seen such amazing instances of his Lord-  
 ship's contradictions, as not to be surprized at the  
 boldest of them. Sometimes, when rapt in a fit of  
 rhetoric, he does, by his contradictions, what the man  
 in the Play did by his *ingratitude*, he strives to *cover*  
*the monstrous bulk of them*, by a proportionable *size of*  
*words*; sometimes again, to shew his utter contempt  
 of the Public, he chuses to follow the advice there  
 given; *to let them go naked, that men may see them the*  
*better*. But, when he masks his double face, the falsi-  
 fication of the Theory of the Alliance always affords  
 him the best play. He constantly takes it for grant-

[8] Vol. iv. p. 621--2.

[9] Vol. iv. p. 446.

[10] Vol. iv. p. 453.



ed or avouches it for a fact, throughout his whole argument against the Book, that the Author contends for and maintains the *independency of the Church on the State, under an establishment*. This brings CONSTANTINE's Establishment, and the Establishment on the principles of the ALLIANCE, pretty much to the same thing; so that the mischiefs ascribed to one, may be safely transferred to the other.

And here, Sir, in conclusion, the odd fortune of this book of the *Alliance* is worth Your notice. It had been writ against by many nameless scribblers, before his Lordship: And two very capital crimes had been objected to it: The one was, *That it makes the Church a Creature of the civil Magistrate*; the other, *That it makes the civil Magistrate a Creature of the Church*. Some insisted on the first of these charges, some on the second. But to prevent it's escaping, one furious fellow, in a thing called a *Comment on the Alliance*, roundly insisted upon both. So that his Lordship, whose care is for the State, and the Dissenting Answerers who are as anxious for the Church, will come in but for halves in the full merit of this illustrious Commentator.

I have now, Sir, given you, as I promised, a view of his Lordship's POLITICAL TALENTS. The Author whom I have defended against him, is no further my concern than as he afforded me the occasion. Nor is there any reason he should grow vain of the superior distinction of being picked out to be immolated, as it were, to the FIRST PHILOSOPHY. For let me tell him, that as I defended him for want of  
a bet-

a better, so his Lordship abused him because he could not find a worse. He had personally *injured* and *affronted* his Lordship. And to these insolencies, the following words allude where his Lordship takes leave of his Friend, in the last volume of his never-dying Works, “You have, I know, at your elbow a *very* “*foul-mouthed and very trifling Critic*, who will endeavour to IMPOSE UPON YOU ON THIS OCCASION, “AS HE DID ON A FORMER. He will tell you, again, “that I CONTRADICT myself, &c. But if the *dogmatic pedant* should make this objection, be pleased “to give him this answer, &c. [11].”

This, the Curious will readily perceive smells of the Anecdote. As the secret has been communicated to me by a good hand, I shall not scruple to lay it before You. It may serve at least to entertain you, in the quality of Farce to this serious Piece.

Mr. POPE had permitted LORD BOLINGBROKE to be considered by the public, as his PHILOSOPHER AND GUIDE: and in their conversations concerning the impious complaints against Providence on account of the unequal distribution of things natural and moral in the present System, they agreed that such objections might be well evaded on the Platonic principle of THE BEST. This encouraged the Poet to philosophise: and the fruits of his speculations we have in the celebrated ESSAY ON MAN. In which, if you will take his Lordship's word, or indeed, attend to his argument, you will find that Pope was so far from putting his prose into verse, (as has been invidiously suggested) that he has put

[11] Vol. v. page the last.

Pope's

Pope's verse into prose. They agreed, as we observed, in the principle of *the Best*. And Mr. Pope thought they had agreed in the question, to which this principle was to be applied. But time has since shewn that they differed very widely. The *Essay on Man* is a real vindication of Providence, against Libertines and Atheists.—The *Essays on the first Philosophy* are a pretended vindication of Providence against an imaginary confederacy between Divines and Atheists.—The Poet directs his argument against Atheists and Libertines in support of RELIGION; — The Philosopher, against Divines, in support of NATURALISM. But tho' his Lordship thought fit to keep this a secret from his Friend, as well as from the Public; yet he took so friendly a share in the prodigious success of the *Essay on Man*, that he could not forbear making the Poet, then alive and at his devotion, the frequent topic of his ridicule amongst their common Acquaintance, as a man who understood nothing of his own principles, nor saw to what they naturally tended. For the truth of this instance of his Lordship's virtuous emulation, I appeal to a right honourable Gentleman now living.

While things were in this State, Mr. de Croufaz wrote some malignant and absurd *remarks* on the *Essay on Man*; accusing it of Spinozism, Naturalism, and all the heretical *-isms* in the Bigot's Dictionary. These Remarks by great chance fell into the hands of the author of the *Divine Legation*. And mere indignation at an ill-natured caviller put him upon writing a defence of the *first epistle*. Which, being well received by the Public, he was induced to defend the  
rest

rest on the same principles of natural and revealed Religion, against this blundering Swiss Philosopher; frequently indeed misled by a very faithless translation of the *Essay* into french verse.

Mr. Pope, who was naturally on the side of Religion, embraced the sense given to the *Essay* by his new Commentator, with the utmost pleasure and satisfaction; as appears by the Letters he wrote on that occasion. You will hardly suppose, his Lordship took the same delight in them. He saw his Pupil *reasoned* out of his hands; He saw (what was worse) the *Essay* republished with a Defence, which put the Poem on the side of Religion, and the Poet out of the necessity of supporting himself on his Lordship's System, when he should condescend to impart it to him: And, (what was worst of all) he saw a great number of lines appear, which out of complaisance had been struck out of the MS. and which, at the Commentator's request, being now restored to their places, no longer left the religious sentiments of the Poet, equivocal.

It was his chagrine at these changes which occasioned his Lordship, (when he NEW MODELED the *introductory Letter to his Essays, addressed to Mr. Pope*) to end it in this manner, "I cannot conclude my discourse on this occasion better than by *putting you in*  
 " *mind* of a passage you quoted to me *once* with great  
 " applause from a sermon of FORSTER, and to this  
 " effect, "Where MYSTERY begins; RELIGION ends."  
 " The Apophthegm pleased me much, and I was glad  
 " to hear such a truth from any pulpit, since it shews  
 " an inclination at least, to purify Christianity from  
 " the leaven of *artificial Theology*; which consists prin-  
 " cipally



“ cipally in making things that are very plain, myf-  
 “ terious ; and in pretending to make things that are  
 “ impenetrably mysterious, very plain. *If you con-*  
 “ *tinue ftill of the fame mind, I fhall have no excuse to*  
 “ *make to you, for what I have written, and fhall write.*  
 “ *Our opinions coincide. If you have changed your mind,*  
 “ *think again and examine further.* You will find it is  
 “ the MODEST, not the PRESUMPTUOUS, Enquirer  
 “ who makes a real and fafe progrefs in the difcovery  
 “ of divine truths. One follows Nature and Nature’s  
 “ God ; that is, he follows God in his Works, and  
 “ in his Word ; nor prefumes to go further, by *me-*  
 “ *taphyfical and theological commentaries of his own in-*  
 “ *vention*, than the two texts, if I may ufe this ex-  
 “ preffion, carry him very evidently. -- They who  
 “ have done otherwife, have been either ENTHUSI-  
 “ ASTS OR KNAVES [12].” But alas ; this kind  
 admonition came too late. Mr. Pope had now got a  
 better *Guide* than either FORSTER or his LORDSHIP.  
 I mean, Mr. LOCKE ; who, in the conclufion of his  
 firft Letter to Bifhop Stillingfleet, had taught the Poet  
 to anfwer thus, “ I know not any thing more difin-  
 “ genuous, than not publicly to own a conviction  
 “ one has received, concerning any thing erroneous  
 “ in what one has printed ; nor can there, I think,  
 “ be a greater offence againft Mankind than to pro-  
 “ pagate a falfhood, whereof one is convinced ;  
 “ efpecially in a matter wherein Men are highly con-  
 “ cerned not to be mifled. The HOLY SCRIPTURE  
 “ is to me, and always will be, the conftant GUIDE

[12] Vol. iv. p. 344.

“ of my assent : and I shall always hearken to it, as  
 “ containing infallible truth, relating to things of the  
 “ highest concernment. *And I wish I cou'd say there*  
 “ *were no MYSTERIES in it. I acknowledge there are,*  
 “ *to me,* and I fear always will be. But where I  
 “ want the evidence of things, there yet is ground  
 “ enough for me to believe, because God has said it :  
 “ and I shall presently condemn and quit any opinion  
 “ of mine, as soon as I am shewn that it is contrary  
 “ to any Revelation in the holy Scripture [13].”

But the Author of the *Divine Legation* soon after committed a much greater offence against his Lordship's philosophic Dignity. And to this, the following words, quoted above, more particularly allude : *You have, I know, at your elbow, a very scul-mouthed and a very trifling Critic, who will endeavour to impose upon you on this occasion, as he did on a FORMER.*

About the year 1742, a little before Lord Bolingbroke's return to England, this *Critic* was with Mr. Pope at T. who shewed him a printed book of *Letters on the Study and use of History*, and desired his opinion of it. It was the first volume of the work since published under that name. Mr. W. on turning over the book, told him his thoughts of it with great ingenuity. What he said to Mr. Pope of the main subject is not material : but of the Digression concerning the Authenticity of the Old Testament, he told his Friend very frankly, that the Author's arguments, poor as they were, were all borrowed from other

[13] *Locke's Works*, Vol. i. p. 405.

Writers ; and had been often confuted to the full satisfaction of the learned world : that, the Author of these *Letters*, whoever he was, had mistaken some of those reasonings ; had misrepresented others ; and had added such mistakes of his own, as must discredit him with the learned, and dishonour him with all honest men : that therefore, as he understood the Author was his Friend, he could not do him better service than advise him to strike out this *Digression*, a digression that had nothing to do with his subject, and would set half his Readers against the work, which, without this occasion of scandal, would have much ado to make head against the other half, whenever it should appear. Mr. Pope said, his friend (whose name he kept secret,) was the most candid of all Writers ; and that he the Author of the D. L. could not do him a greater pleasure than to tell him his thoughts with all freedom on this occasion. He urged this so warmly, that his friend complied, and, as they were then alone, scribbled over half a dozen sheets of paper before he rose from the table, where they were then sitting. Mr. Pope read what was written : and, as he had a wonderful partiality for those he loved, approved of them : and to convince his friend (the *Scribler* as my Lord rightly calls him) that he did so, he took up the printed Volume and crossed out the whole *Digression*. The remarks were written, as you may well suppose, with all the civility, Mr. W. was likely to use to a friend Mr. Pope appeared so much to reverence : but the word *prevarication*, or something like it, chanced, it seems, to escape his pen. The papers were sent to Paris ; and  
received.

received with unparalleled indignation. Little broke out; but something did; and Mr. Pope found he had not paid his court by this officious piece of service. However, with regard to the Writer of the papers, all was carried, when his Lordship came over, with singular complaisance; such as men use when their design is to draw on those whose homage they propose to gain. In the mean time, his Lordship was meditating and compiling an angry, and elaborate Answer to this private, hasty, and impertinent, tho' well meant, *Scribble*: and it was as much as They could do, who had most influence over him, to prevail with him at length to burn it. For the truth of all this, I might appeal to a noble Person, one of the greatest Characters of this, or indeed of any age; who being much courted by his Lordship, (for superior virtue will force homage from the most unlike) was for some time able, and at all times most desirous, of restraining the extravagance of that *first Philosophy*, which he detested and despised.

The event has since shewn, that it had been happy for his Lordship's reputation, had the advice to strike out the *Digression*, been approved. For it is this which first sunk him in the popular opinion; and made men overlook the merit of the very best of all his Compositions.

Mr. Pope, however, was still flattered and caressed. And the vengeance treasured up against him for the impiety of erasing those sacred pages, did not break out till the Poet's death. then indeed it came forth with redoubled vehemence, and on the most  
ridi-



ridiculous pretence. Pope had, as his Lordship pretended, unknown to him, printed an Edition of the *Patriot Prince*, or *Patriot King*, (for it had two titles, as his Lordship's various occasions required) a very innocent thing, which might have been proclaimed by the common Cryer, without giving the least umbrage or offence. To say the truth, it was a mere School-declamation, which, in great pomp of words, informs us of this Secret, *That if a Prince could but once be brought to love his Country, he would always act for the good of it.* As extraordinary as this discovery appears, there was much odd practice employed to give a colour of necessity for the publishing it. However, published it was, and the memory of Pope traduced in so cruel, so scandalous a manner, that the Reader is suffered to conclude, even CURL himself could not have acted a more infamous or rascally part: For it must be owned, his Lordship has dealt one equal measure to his COUNTRY, his RELIGION, and his FRIEND. And for what was all this outrage? To speak the worst of the offence, For one of those private offices of indiscreet good will, which generous men are always ready to forgive, even when they see themselves most incommoded by it

The Public stood amazed. And those who had any regard for the Poet's Memory, waited with impatience to see, Which of his *old* Friends would rescue it from his Lordship's talons. Contempt I suppose, of so cruel a treatment, kept them all silent. However, the same contempt at length provoked an Anonymous Writer to publish a Letter to the *Editor of the Patriot King*; for his Lordship had divided himself

self into the two personages of *Editor* and *Author*. This Letter, written with all the respect due to his Rank and Character, he thought fit to ascribe to the Author of the *Divine Legation* ; so that you need not wonder if it exposed the suspected writer to all his Lordship's rage, and to all the ribaldry of his Sycophants ; of which, some, that was said to pass through this great Man's hands, was in language bad enough to disgrace even Gaols and Garrets.

This, SIR, is the Anecdote I promised you. And now I shall release you from so tedious a Subject. I have compleated my *View of his Lordship's Philosophy* ; which I chose to address to You in compliance with his Challenge ; who appeals, for the truth of all he advances, from *Artificial Theology* and *School-Learning*, to the breast of the PLAIN HONEST MAN,

“ Slave to no Sect, who takes no private road,

“ But looks through nature up to nature's God ;

HIM whose heart is filled with the love of God and Man. To this Tribunal he appeals : and to this I have now brought him. What he will gain by it, You, whom he has made his judge, must now tell us. I greatly suspect, that of all his Principles one only is likely to escape your censure ; and with this, as I would part with him upon good terms, I shall conclude : it breaks out unexpectedly from amidst the corruption of party politics ; and in all likelihood was ingendered by them. — SOME MEN THERE ARE, THE PESTS OF SOCIETY I THINK THEM, WHO PRETEND A GREAT REGARD TO RELIGION IN GENERAL, BUT WHO TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY OF DECLAIMING  
PUBLICLY

PUBLICLY AGAINST THAT SYSTEM OF RELIGION, OR AT LEAST AGAINST THAT CHURCH-ESTABLISHMENT, WHICH IS RECEIVED IN BRITAIN [14].

*I am, &c.*

[19] *Dissertation on Partics*, p. 148. 8vo. Edit.

F I N I S.

E R R A T A.

P. 205. *l.* 8. *for* — he believe them too? — *read* —  
Did he believe them too?

P. 248. *l.* 25. *dele the first* so

P. 273. *l.* 7. *for* — one of which things, — *read* — one  
or both of which things,

P. 275. *l.* 20. *for* — on their — *read* — to their

P. 324. *l.* 17. *dele* in