THE

WORKS

OF THE

RIGHT REVEREND

WILLIAM WARBURTON,

LORD BISHOP OF GLOUCESTER.

IN SEVEN VOLUMES.

VOLUME THE SIXTH.

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BISHOP WARBURTON'S

WORKS.

VOLUME THE SIXTH:

CONTAINING

CONTROVERSIAL TRACTS.

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A VINDI-

A

VINDICATION

OF THE

AUTHOR

OF

THE DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES, &c.

FROM

The Aſperſions of the COUNTRY CLERGYMAN'S LETTER in the WEEKLY MISCELLANY of FEBRUARY 24, 1737.

A

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THE DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES, &c.

AFTER having twice offered my Thoughts to the Public, on two very *important Subjects*, and had the Honour to be favourably heard, it muſt needs be a ſufficient Mortification to me to be obliged to deſcend to *ſo low a Subject as myſelf*. *That*, and the Deference due to the Public, had certainly reſtrained this Appeal to it, had the Matter terminated there. But when the Accuſation intended againſt me appeared viſibly deſigned to render a projected Defence of Revelation ſuſpected; which, I will preſume (and, as the Author of it, the Reader will excuſe me for preſuming) may be of ſome ſmall Service to our Holy Faith, I thought it my Duty to vindicate myſelf, in this public Manner, from the *horrid Accuſations* of a Letter Writer in the *Weekly Miſcellany* of the 24th of *February* laſt. Whether this was the true Motive of this Vindication will be beſt ſeen by the Temper in which it is written.

The Letter Writer begins with me in this Manner, *A late Writer, the Author of the Divine Legation of Moſes, &c. is very ſevere upon* ALL *Clergymen who take the Liberty of cenſuring the Conduct* OF ANY OF THEIR BRETHREN. The Paſſage, on which this Accuſation is founded, is in p. 21 * of the Dedication——*I appeal then to the Public*, whether my *Severity* falls on thoſe *who cenſure the conduct of any of their Brethren:* or on thoſe, *who abuſe the whole Body of the Clergy, conſidered as an Order inſtituted by Chriſt, and eſtabliſhed by the State.*

He goes on,——*If I am capable of underſtanding the Meaning and Driſt of his Book, he had Reaſon to apprehend it might draw upon him the Cenſures of all the Clergy who are ſincere Friends to Chriſtianity—— therefore it might be politic to obviate the Force of ſuch Animadverſions before-hand.* Had I been conſcious of deſerving the Cenſure of any honeſt Man, I had done, like thoſe who delight in Miſchief; I had wounded in the Dark. But when I choſe to write without a Name, it was for very contrary Purpoſes. When I preſumed to publiſh (in Defence of the Eſtabliſhed Clergy) a Vindication of the Church of *England*, under the Title of *The Alliance between Church and State*, which ſurely might deſerve their Pardon, leſt the World ſhould imagine I expected *more*, I put it out without my Name. And now writing in the common Cauſe of *Chriſtianity*, I have publicly owned it. For if ever the Suſpicion of being aſhamed of the Faith of *Jeſus* be more carefully to be avoided at one time than at another, it muſt certainly be in *this*, when Infidelity is become ſo reputable as to be eſteemed a Teſt of ſuperior Parts and Diſcernment.

He proceeds,——*I ſhall add, that if he really means to defend Chriſtianity, he hath publiſhed the weakeſt Defence of it that I have ever read.* How are we to underſtand him here? Muſt we rectify the Propoſition thus,——*If the Author gives this Volume as a Defence of Chriſtianity, then it is the weakeſt?*——The Conſequence will then indeed be true. But I had cut off all Pretence for *begging the*

* Firſt Edit. 8vo.

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Premiſſes. For I have formally and expreſſly ſaid in the Beginning, and repeated it towards the End, that the Deſign of this Volume was only preparatory to the Defence of Revelation, and to prove *the uſe of Religion in general, and the Doctrine of a future State in particular to Civil Society.* And had I not ſaid *this*, the Book itſelf would ſhew that it is no more a *Defence of Chriſtianity* than the firſt Propoſition of the three Terms is a Syllogiſm.

But if the Letter Writer means, what his Words expreſs,—— *That if I have a ſerious Purpoſe of defending Chriſtianity, this Volume is the weakeſt Defence?* his Premiſſes will be true indeed, but then they will have no relation to his Concluſion. For it does not follow from thoſe Premiſſes, that this *is any Defence at all*; any more than that, if I had a ſerious Purpoſe of building a Houſe, the Foundation-ſtones were that Houſe.

The Deference due to the Public, from ſo obſcure a Writer as myſelf, was the true Reaſon why this firſt Part came out ſeparately; the Author not preſuming to obtrude a voluminous Work upon it till he had ſome Aſſurance of its Willingneſs to receive it. But the ſame regard that obliged me to this Conduct, would not ſuffer me to make a Secret of the *Medium* by which I pretended to eſtabliſh my Demonſtration, eſpecially as it had the Fortune to be generally eſteemed a *Paradox.* I therefore *gave the Proof in form* two Years ago in the *Appendix* to *The Alliance between Church and State.* There it is to be found; and had the Letter Writer, inſtead of indulging his monſtrous Suſpicions of the Author, turned himſelf to making Objections to his Argument, he might poſſibly have then as much ſerved *Truth* as he now has violated *Charity.*

He goes on,—*He is a warmer Advocate for Dr.* ——, *who denies the Divine Inſpiration of the Scriptures, than for the Scriptures themſelves.* How *warm an Advocate* I am for him, we ſhall ſee by and by; how *true an Accuſer* the Letter Writer is of him, we ſhall examine at preſent. Dr. —— ſays *, *it is* NECESSARY *to believe of the Scriptures in general that they are divinely inſpired*; and that

* Remarks on a Reply to the Defence of a Letter to Dr. W. p. 69.

all

all which he *denies* is, *that the Scriptures are of abſolute and univerſal Inſpiration* *. He ſhews that *Tillotſon* and *Grotius* were of the ſame Opinion, who, he charitably preſumes, were *Chriſtians*. And as he tells his Friends and Acquaintance the ſame he tells the Public, the Letter Writer muſt excuſe me, if I believe a Man whoſe Candour, Sincerity, Benevolence, and Charity I have experienced, before *him*, who has not given me the Pleaſure of remarking in him any of thoſe Chriſtian Qualities.

But I would not have the Letter Writer infer, that, becauſe he has been pleaſed to make me Dr. ——'s *Advocate*, I am to be reſponſible for his Opinions. I differ widely from him in the Matter of *Inſpiration*, and as widely in ſome others. But we can differ from each other, and avow and maintain our Difference of Opinion, without Violation of common Humanity, Friendſhip, or Chriſtian Charity. I will give the Letter Writer another Inſtance of Difference in Opinion between us, from this very Book he ſo much condemns. The Writer of the *Defence of the Letter to Dr. W.* p. 45, ſays,——*Is the Notion of the Divine Origin of the Law and Inſpiration of Moſes to be reſolved into Fiction, or Fable, or Political Lying? No, far be it from me to think or ſay ſo. But this perhaps one may venture to ſay, that the Suppoſition of ſome Degree of ſuch Fiction may poſſibly be found neceſſary to the ſolving the Difficulties of the Moſaic Writings, without any Hurt to their Authority, or Advantage to Infidelity.* I am, as I ſay, of a different Opinion. The Writer endeavours to ſupport *his* by ſeveral Arguments; amongſt which one is, *the Profeſſions and Example of the ancient Sages and Legiſlators.* Now, in the ſecond Section of my Third Book I have inquired into the Principles that induced the ancient Sages and Legiſlators to deem it lawful to deceive for the Public Good; in the Diſcovery of which, I think, I have made it evident *that thoſe Reaſons or Principles* could have no Place amongſt the Founders and Propagators of the *Jewiſh* and *Chriſtian* Religions. This Truth

* Remarks on a Reply to the Defence of a Letter to Dr. W. p. 70.

(as

(as well as ſeveral others interſperſed throughout this Firſt Volume, and which may perhaps give Offence to the indiſcreet Zeal of the Letter Writer) is in my next Volume applied and inforced to the Overthrowing that Opinion *that ſome Degree of Fiction may be neceſſary, &c.* And even in *this* I could not forbear, in the moſt conſpicuous Place of my Book, to ſhew the Uſe of it, as may be ſeen by theſe Words of the Contents, B. III. S. 2.——*The Principles, that induced the ancient Sages to deem it lawful to deceive for Public Good in Matters of Religion, are explained* AND SHEWN TO BE SUCH AS HAD NO PLACE IN THE PROPAGATION OR GENIUS OF THE JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN RELIGION.

But I am a warm Advocate for Dr. ——. In what? I have called him *a very formidable Adverſary to the Free Thinkers.* And I think I had Reaſon: For the Arguments he hath uſed for the TRUTH of *Chriſtianity* againſt *Tindal* have never yet been anſwered by them, nor I think ever can. I ſay *for the Truth of Chriſtianity*; for his Reaſonings, from p. 59 to 64 *, relate only to its Truth, and can be underſtood in no other Senſe. After this, to think he would have *Chriſtianity* ſupported only becauſe it is uſeful, is ſuch a Way of interpreting a Writer as my Charity will never ſuffer to follow.

The Opinion I have of Dr. ——'s Abilities, and of the Sincerity of his Profeſſions, were the true Reaſons of that Eſteem I expreſs for him; being deſirous of allaying all Diſguſt, if any hath ariſen in him, from the Treatment of his leſs candid Adverſaries; and of engaging him to a further and more compleat Vindication of our Holy Faith, at a Time when the good Diſpoſitions of the meaneſt Advocate for Revelation ſhould not, I think, in Prudence be diſcouraged: Nay, was I ſo unhappy to think of Dr. —— as the Letter Writer is diſpoſed to do, I ſhould yet be inclined to behave myſelf very differently towards him. I ſhould be ſo far from eſtranging him further from the Faith by uncharitable Anathemas,

* Letter to Dr. W.

that

that I ſhould do all I could to court and allure him to *Chriſtianity*, *by thinking well of its Profeſſors*. Thus much, I conceive, *Chriſtian Charity* would require; and how far *Chriſtian Policy* would perſuade, let the *Learned* ſay, who know what Ornament his Pen would be to the Chriſtian Faith, and his *Acquaintance* of what Example his Morals to Chriſtian Practice.

But the Letter Writer, having taken it into his Head, that Dr. ——'s true Sentiments are, that *Chriſtianity* can only be defended as uſeful in the preſent Circumſtances of Life, makes, as it would ſeem, this Imagination the *Key* to *my* real Sentiments and Deſigns in defending Revelation. Hence thoſe ſtrange Expreſſions——*If I am capable of underſtanding the Meaning and Drift of his Book—he muſt excuſe me, if I ſuſpect his Faith and condemn his Book——This I am ſure of, the Author muſt be a ſubtile Enemy to Revelation, or a very indiſcreet Friend——I muſt own he has left me in no Doubt.* Now if thoſe be Dr. ——'s true Sentiments, which yet I no more believe than that *Tindal* was a *Chriſtian* in his Heart, I ſhall not ſcruple to ſay that he whom I called one of the moſt formidable of the Free-Thinkers Adverſaries, is indeed one of the weakeſt and moſt contemptible. But if they be *mine*, after all I have ſaid in this Volume, I will not ſcruple to ſay, that That Character would be far too mild for me; and that it would be but Juſtice to eſteem me the moſt abandoned Writer that ever appeared in any Cauſe.

Let us now take this *Key*, and apply it to what I have written.—And it will indeed thoroughly ſerve the Letter Writer's *declared* Purpoſe *to leſſen my Credit*. For it will make the whole Volume a Heap of Abſurdities and Contradictions. But lay aſide this viſionary *Key*, and let me be interpreted by thoſe common Rules that all Mankind have ever uſed in underſtanding one another, and then it will be ſeen I could not poſſibly have had any other Intention than TO PROVE MOSES TO BE A TRUE PROPHET SENT IMMEDIATELY AND EXTRAORDINARILY FROM GOD.—I pretend to do it from *Moſes's* Omiſſion

Omiſſion of the Doctrine of a future State; which under an *unequal* Providence, is (as I have ſhewn in this Book, that being the only End of writing it) abſolutely neceſſary to Society. From whence I conclude *Moſes's* Pretenſions were true: who aſſured the *Iſraelites* that God had choſen them to be his People, had condeſcended to be their King, and would conſequently govern them by an EQUAL, that is an EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE; which Concluſion (that appears almoſt ſelf-evident) I employ my ſecond Volume to ſupport, illuſtrate, and free from Objections.

Hence it appears on what Account I ſo much inſiſt on the *Uſefulneſs* and *Neceſſity* of Religion in general, and the Doctrine of a future State in particular to Society. The Courſe of my Argument, and all the Rules of Logic, obliged me to this Conduct: And indeed I thought it the peculiar Happineſs of my Argument that they did ſo; for I ſuppoſe, till the Infidels be convinced that Religion is *uſeful* to civil Society, they will never be brought to believe it *true*.

I now haſte to the other Part of the Letter-writer's Charge, leſt he ſhould be tempted, in his Impatience, to repeat it; and ſay again, that *I am a warmer Advocate for Dr.* —— *than for the Scriptures*. The Reader, who has never ſeen my Book, will naturally conclude from theſe Words, that either I had *undervalued Scripture*, or at leaſt neglected a fair Opportunity of *vindicating it*. He will be ſurpriſed to be told that the latter Part of the Charge was only for *compleating the Antitheſis*. So indeed it appears to me; but the Reader ſhall judge for himſelf.

There are but two Places in this Volume, in which I had Occaſion to make Obſervations on the Scripture; the one is at p. 117, where I endeavour to ſhew that the Argument which the Commentators uſe to prove the Pentateuch (againſt *Spinoſa* and others) to be written by *Moſes*, is a very ſtrong and ſolid one. The other is at p. 83. where I ſay, that the New Teſtament *does not contain any regular or compleat Syſtem or Digeſt of moral Laws*; *the occa-*

ſional Precepts there delivered, how excellent and divine ſoever, ariſing only from Conjunctures and Circumſtances that were the Subjects of thoſe Preachings or Writings, in which ſuch Precepts are found. For the reſt, for a general Knowledge of the whole Body of moral Duty, the great Pandect of the Law of Nature is held open by it to be ſearched and ſtudied. Finally, *ſays the Apoſtle* Paul, whatſoever Things are true, *&c.*

I ſuppoſe then, if the Letter Writer had any particular Meaning, this was the Place that was to juſtify him in ſaying that *I was no warm Advocate for the Scriptures.* But does the *New Teſtament* contain any ſuch *compleat or regular Syſtem?* will the Letter Writer ſay ſo? will any one beſides ſay ſo? How weak and *indiſcreet a Friend* ſoever he may pleaſe to think me of Religion, I will aſſure the Reader, that as I make it one Point of my Religion to ſay nothing but what I think the Truth, ſo I do not uſe to throw about thoſe Truths at random. The Obſervation was here neceſſary to overthrow the moſt pernicious Doctrine that ever infected Society. If it was true, then, it was not untimely urged. But had the Letter Writer had a little Patience, he would have ſeen in the ſecond Volume (as that will be the Caſe of many other Truths interſperſed throughout the firſt) that, by the Aſſiſtance of this very Truth, I overthrow a prevailing Notion, which I ſuppoſe *He*, no more than *I*, will think very orthodox, namely, *that Chriſtianity* is ONLY *a Republication of the Religion of Nature.*

This, I can aſſure the Reader, is the Caſe of all other Principles occaſionally laid down in this firſt Volume, which are not only here uſed to prove the Uſefulneſs and Truth of Religion in general, but are in the next Volume applied to prove *the Truth of Revelation in particular.* To give one Inſtance at preſent, in the ſixth Section of the ſecond Book, I have attempted to explain the Nature of Paganiſm, as diſtinguiſhed from true Revelation; where I have ſhewn, that though they abounded

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in pretended Revelations, they were utter Strangers to the Idea of one Revelation's being founded upon, or the Completion of another. This Principle I apply and inforce in the ſecond Volume againſt the fourth Chapter *of* Collins's *Grounds and Reaſons of the Chriſtian Religion*, where he lays it down for one of his fundamental Principles (againſt all Antiquity and Fact) *that it is a common and neceſſary Method for new Revelations to be built and grounded on precedent Revelations.* See p. 20—26.

The Letter Writer proceeds——*Mr.* Warburton *modeſtly ſays, they* [*the* Engliſh *Clergy*] *have undertaken to prove Chriſtianity without underſtanding it.* As in the Caſe before, about cenſuring the Conduct of Clergymen, the Letter Writer turned what I ſaid in *general* of the Body, *particularly*, to Individuals; ſo here, by a ſtrange Perverſity, he turns what I ſaid *particularly* of ſome certain Perſons, *generally*, to the *Engliſh* Clergy. My Words are theſe, p. 2. *Who, in this long Controverſy between us and the Deiſts, hath not applied to certain late Advocates of Revelation what was formerly ſaid of* Arnobius *and* Lactantius, *that they undertook the Defence of Chriſtianity before they underſtood it?*

But have none but *Engliſhmen* wrote of late in Defence of *Chriſtianity?* Have no *Engliſhmen* but the *Engliſh Clergy* wrote in Defence of it? If neither of theſe Queſtions can be anſwered in the Negative, I would aſk a third, What poſſeſſed the Letter Writer to bear Witneſs againſt me, to the World, that I have any where ſaid *that the Engliſh Clergy have undertaken to prove Chriſtianity without underſtanding it?* I ſolemnly declare, that in the Paſſage above quoted I meant no *Engliſh Clergyman* whatſoever. So far from that, I expreſsly ſay, in p. 19 of the Dedication, *that the Clergy of the eſtabliſhed Church are they who have been principally watchful in the Common Cauſe of Chriſtianity*, and MOST SUCCESSFUL in repelling the Inſults of its Enemies. I muſt *appeal* then, this *ſecond* Time, *to the Public for Juſtice.*

As I was cold in Defence of Scripture in general, ſo my next Charge is, that I have *undervalued the Evidence ariſing from Miracles*. Would the Reader know how?——Hardly, by ſaying, as I expreſsly do, p. 3, *that Men have proved our Religion actually divine thereby*. But this went for nothing, becauſe I ſaid in the ſame Place, that the *external* Evidence (in which Miracles are included) is *not capable of ſtrict Demonſtration*; but that the *Internal* is. Now here might be ſome Pretence for ſaying I *over-valued internal* Evidence: But by what Kind of Logic it could be inferred that, *therefore*, I *undervalued* Miracles, I know not.

The Letter Writer next turns (as it would ſeem) from me to thoſe who deny *the Divinity of* Chriſt, *the Merits of his Death, the Obligation and Effects of the Sacraments, and the Doctrine of Grace*. But it is but *ſeeming*. He appears willing that theſe falſe Opinions ſhould be thought mine: For having charged me with *horrid Crimes*, without Shadow of Proof or Probability, he would cover the Scandal by inſinuating me guilty of Heterodoxy; or why elſe did he lead his Reader to the very Door of Calumny, by artfully joining *me*, as *undervaluing* Miracles, to one of *theſe*, who he ſays *denies* the Truth of one of them?

But the Letter Writer ſhould have conſidered, if this was his Deſign, that in this very Book I affirm more than once or twice, that the *Doctrine of Redemption* is the Foundation, and of the very Eſſence of *Chriſtianity*. He ſhould have known that all or moſt of thoſe true Chriſtian Doctrines mentioned above are contained in the *Doctrine of Redemption*.

There are, and thoſe eſteemed ſincere *Chriſtians* too, who would have taken the Names of Infidel and Heretic for Favours at the Hand of the Letter Writer. But I am of a different Humour. Theſe Titles have no Charms for me. I have lived ſome Time in the World; and, bleſſed be GOD, *without giving or taking Offence*. This Time has been ſpent in my Pariſh Church (for I am a Country

a Country Clergyman, and reſide conſtantly on my Cure) in the Service of my Neighbour, in my Study, and in the Offices of filial Piety,

" With lenient Arts t'extend a Mother's Breath,
" Make Languor ſmile, and ſmooth the Bed of Death,
" Explore the Thought, explain the aſking Eye,
" And keep awhile one Parent from the Sky."

Exceſs of Zeal in ſuch as the Letter Writer, and Defect of Religion in others of better Breeding, ſo efface theſe Feelings of Nature, that I could hardly have known how to have told them, had I not both the Example, and the fine Words too, of one of the politeſt Men of the Age to keep me in Countenance. The Time ſpent in my Study has been employed in confirming my own Faith againſt the erroneous Opinions the Letter Writer has raked together, and *then*, in planning a Work to confirm my Brethren. All the Reward I ever had, or ever expect to have here, is the Teſtimony of a good Conſcience within Doors, and a good Name without. The firſt no Man can take from me; the other, this Letter Writer, in the moſt unchriſtian Manner, has attempted to invade.

——But I heartily forgive him: And inſtead of putting uncharitable Conſtructions on his ſecret Intentions, will believe, though I know no more of him than by his Letter, that he is *ſincere*, and only unhappily agitated by a furious Zeal for the Cauſe of GOD and Religion; inſtead of thinking *he ought to be hindered from any farther Advancement in the Church.* If the Want of that be the Cauſe of his Spleen and Virulency, I heartily wiſh it may be ſpeedily removed: nay, that the Letter he has wrote againſt me may contribute towards it. Inſtead of *uſing any warm Endeavours to leſſen his Credit*, which he profeſſes in ſo many Words to be his Purpoſe againſt me, I wiſh him all Increaſe of Reputation and Honour: and inſtead of inſulting him with the Words

he

he ſeems to apply to me—*I pray for the Forgiveneſs and Converſion of all bad Men*, I will aſſure him, that I pray for *him* as a Brother.

I have only one Word more to add: I have preſumed to appeal to the Public, in a Matter indeed that little concerns it, yet perhaps of ſome Moment in the Conſequence and Example. But whatever Neceſſity I now found myſelf under of not ſubmitting to ſo falſe a Charge, the Public need not be under Apprehenſions that I ſhall ever give them a ſecond Trouble of the ſame Kind. It muſt be ſome ſtrange Provocation indeed that can make me repeat it. For if I can *forgive* Injuries of this Kind, it is ſure no hard Taſk to deſpiſe them. In a Word, I have made my Defence againſt theſe Calumnies now once for all; and my Enemies muſt pardon me, if I decline to be *drawn in*, into a Controverſy of this Nature; or to be *drawn off* from the Subject I have commenced in Defence of Revelation. And, by the Grace of God, no *unchriſtian Treatment* ſhall ever make me languid or remiſs in vindicating the Truth of the *Chriſtian Cauſe*. Whether I am a *weak* Defender of *Chriſtianity* muſt be ſubmitted to the Judgment of the Public. But I am perſuaded that That Public will ſuſpend all Severity of Judgment till they ſee the whole Performance: and then, I hope, thoſe who now think I have advanced a *Paradox* that cannot be ſupported, will be of another Opinion. But if it ſhould not be my good Fortune to make out my Point to their Satisfaction, yet I ſhould hope they will paſs a more equitable Conſtruction on the Attempt than the Letter Writer has thought fit to do; and make all favourable Allowances for the Newneſs and Difficulty of the Subject, and the many incidental Points touched upon, which will, I hope, be thought by all Perſons of Equity, Candor, and good Learning, to have their Uſe. In the mean Time, I can ſay with great Truth, and, I hope I may do it with *Modeſty*, that what I offer to the Public concerning *The Divine Legation of Moſes* is not a haſty ſudden Thought, and what has appeared flattering to me upon its firſt

Appearance

Appearance only; as ſuch Things often ſtrike, which, upon Review, give no Satisfaction. But this has been long the Subject of my Thoughts; often laid by, and then again, at proper Intervals, reſumed, reviewed, and turned on all Sides. What then I have been in no Haſte to approve after carefully weighing and examining *every Part*, I ſhall hope the equitable Reader will be in no Haſte to condemn or ſuſpect while he has ſeen only *one*.

A CRITICAL

A

CRITICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL COMMENTARY

ON

MR. POPE'S ESSAY ON MAN.

IN WHICH IS CONTAINED

A VINDICATION OF THE SAID ESSAY

From the MISREPRESENTATIONS of

MR. *DE RESNEL*, the *French Tranſlator*,

AND OF

MR. *DE CROUSAZ*,

Profeſſor of Philoſophy and Mathematics in the Academy of *Lauſanne*, the COMMENTATOR.

"*Vide quam iniqui ſunt divinorum munerum æſtimatores etiam quidam*
"PROFESSI SAPIENTIAM." SEN.

TO MY

WORTHY FRIEND

RALPH ALLEN, Esq.

SIR,

I GIVE myſelf the pleaſure of converſing with you, in this Form; as I ſee you leſs under the Idea of a Patron, than of a joint Labourer with me in the Service of Mankind. For while I attempt to explain the Theory of this divine Philoſophy of *Univerſal Benevolence*, you illuſtrate it by your Practice. At moſt therefore I can but offer you the Essay on Man, ſet in a juſt Light, as a Mirrour for your Cabinet; where you may behold the perfect Image of your own Mind: And the Works of this Artiſt, who is beholden only to *Truth* for their Poliſh and their Luſtre, you are too well acquainted with to ſuſpect them of Flattery. To preſerve the Luſtre of this Mirrour was the ſole Purpoſe of the following *Letters*. For the dull Breath of Malice had attempted to defile its Purity; and, by ſtaining it with the black Imputation of *Fataliſm*, to tarniſh every Virtue it reflected.

It hath been obſerved in *Phyſics*, that Nature never gave an Excellence, but ſhe at the ſame time produced its contrary, with Qualities peculiarly adapted to its Deſtruction. As we ſee how this ſerves the wiſe Ends of Providence, by keeping us in that State

of *Imperfection* and *Dependence* in which it hath pleaſed the Author of all Things to place us, we need not be much ſurpriſed to find the ſame Phænomenon in the *moral World*: In no Inſtance more apparent than in the *Doctrine of* FATE, which, almoſt coæval with the *Practice of* VIRTUE, is yet altogether the Deſtruction of it.

But as there is not that Decay, nor Degeneracy of *Good*, in the *natural* as in the *moral World*; ſo neither is there that increaſe of *Evil*. I ſay this chiefly with regard to the *Doctrine of Fate*, which hath been ſtill growing, from Age to Age, in Abſurdity and Impiety: And therefore no Wonder, that *Virtue*, whoſe ſpecific Bane it is, ſhould proportionably ſicken and decline.

Indeed, it ſtopped not till it became like the *Tree* in the *Chaldæan's* Viſion, which *reached to Heaven, and extended over the whole Earth*; and *received* all the irrational and impure Creation, *Birds, Beaſts, and Inſects, to its Shade and Shelter.*

To conſider *Fate* in its Growth and Progreſs, it divides itſelf into four principal Branches.

The *firſt* and earlieſt is that which aroſe from the ſtrange and prodigious Events in the Life of Man: Where the amazed Beholder obſerving the Ends of human Wiſdom ſo perpetually defeated, even when ſupported by the likelieſt Means, concluded that nothing leſs than an over-ruling *Fate* had traverſed his well-conducted Deſigns. This early Concluſion concerning God's Government *here*, from Obſervations on *Civil* Events, was again inferred in After-ages, by another Set of Men, with regard to his Government *hereafter*, from their Contemplations on *Religious*; while, from an utter Inability to penetrate the Deſigns of Providence in its partial Revelations to Mankind, they concluded that *Fate* or *Predeſtination* had determined of our future, as well as preſent Happineſs. Theſe, which are only different Modifications of the ſame imaginary Power, may be called the POPULAR and RELIGIOUS *Fate.*

The

The *ſecond* kind aroſe from a ſuppoſed moral Influence of the *heavenly Bodies*: founded in an early Superſtition that the *Hero-Gods* had migrated into *Stars*. It was firſt underſtood to be confined to *Communities*, as ſuch were the more immediate Care of theſe *Heroes* while living: But the ſame Conſiderations which produced the firſt Species of *Fate*, in a little time, extended it to *Particulars*. And this is the CIVIL or ASTROLOGIC *Fate*. Hitherto, *Free-will* was only curbed, or rendered uſeleſs. To annihilate it quite, needed all the Power of *Philoſophy*. So true is the Obſervation, that without *Philoſophy* Man can hardly become either thoroughly abſurd or miſerable.

The *Sophiſt*, in his profound Inquiries into human Nature, and on what it is we do, when we judge, deliberate, and reſolve, came at length to this ſhort Concluſion, *That the Mind is no more than a Machine, and that its Operations are determined in the ſame Manner that a Balance is inclined by its Weights.* This abſolute Neceſſity of Man's Actions is the *third* Species of *Fate*, called the PHILOSOPHIC.

From this, to the *laſt*, that is to ſay, the Neceſſity of GODS, was an eaſy Step. For when, from the very Nature of *Mind* and *Will*, the *Philoſopher* had demonſtrated the Abſurdity of Freedom in Man, the ſame Concluſion would hold as to all other Beings whatſoever. And this is the ATHEISTIC *Fate*.

Theſe, Sir, were the glorious Effects of PRIDE: which our incomparable Friend, with ſo good Reaſon, eſteems the Source of all our Miſery and Impiety. The *Pride* of accounting for the *Ways of Providence* begot the two firſt Species: and the *Pride* of comprehending the *Eſſences of Things*, the two latter. *Ah! miſera mens hominum, quo te* FATA *ſæpiſſimè trahunt!* In the Name of *Paul*, if one might be allowed to aſk, *What ſhall deliver us from the Body of this Fate?* which hangs about the Soul like that Puniſhment of the ancient Tyrant, who bound *dead* Bodies to the living. I anſwer, the *Religion* of JESUS: which hath inſtructed

us

us as clearly in the Nature of *Man*, as in the Nature of *God*; in the *Subject*, as well as in the *Object*, of Worſhip. A *Worſhip* founded, as Reaſon and Conſcience tell us it ought, on theſe two great Principles, the FREEDOM and the WEAKNESS of *Man*. The firſt, making our Approach to God a REASONABLE SERVICE; the latter, God's Approach to us a COVENANT OF GRACE. And this, Sir, is that *glorious Goſpel*, which you are not aſhamed to adore, as able *to put to Silence the Ignorance of fooliſh Men*.

And, in fact, the *faſhionable* Reaſoner is now gone over to the Cauſe of *Liberty*; but ſtill true to his overweening *Pride*, is gone over—in the other Extreme. Let the Fataliſt talk what he pleaſes of the Mind's being a *Ballance*; if its Operations be mechanical, I am ſure it is more like a *Pendulum*, which, when well leaded, is inceſſantly ſwinging from one ſide to the other. For the vain Reaſoner is now as much diſpoſed to deny the *Weakneſs* of the Mind, as before to deny its *Freedom*. Hence it is, we ſee the *Chriſtian* Doctrine of GRACE deſpiſed and laughed at; and the Means inſtituted by its Founder for obtaining it, as impiouſly as ſophiſtically, explained away. Yet without human *Freedom* Religion in *general* is a Farce; and but on the Truth of human *Weakneſs*, the Religion of *Jeſus*, a Falſehood.

With regard then to *Free-will*, what need we more than the Declaration of *Religion?* The ſimple-minded Man naturally ſuppoſes it; the good Man feels it; the thinking Man underſtands it; and nothing but vain *Philoſophy* holds out both againſt *Nature* and *Grace:* Not ſo openly indeed as formerly; but ſtill as obſtinately. The ableſt Advocates of *Neceſſity* now inveloping it in *Syſtems*; and inſinuating it in all the artful Detours of what they call a *ſufficient Reaſon*.

None have gone farther, or with more Succeſs, into this Contrivance than the famous *Leibnitz*; who, with great Parts and Application of Mind, had an immoderate Ambition of becoming Founder of a Sect. He firſt attempted to raiſe a Name, like the

Heroes

Heroes of old, by the Invaſion of another's Property: But being detected and repulſed, he turned himſelf to *Invention*; and framed an *Hypotheſis* in direct Oppoſition to that *Theory* which he before ſeemed willing to have made his own. This *Hypotheſis*, founded in a refined *Fataliſm*, he choſe to deliver by Hints only, and in piece-meal; which, at the ſame time that it gave his Scheme an Air of Depth and Myſtery, kept its Abſurdities from being obſerved. So that it ſoon made its Fortune amongſt the *German* Wits; who were not out of their way when they took the ſame deep and cloudy Road with their Maſter. It was no Wonder then, that this ſhould raiſe a Jealouſy in the Advocates of Religion, and make the warmer ſort of them (not the beſt at a charitable Diſtinction, though great Logicians) to miſtake their Friends for their Enemies.

Amongſt other *Follies* of this kind, it brought down a Storm of Calumny on the ESSAY ON MAN; and, in its Turn, occaſioned this *Vindication* of our inimitable Poet. A ſhort, and an eaſy Taſk. For my Point, you know, Sir, was not to expoſe the *Abſurdity* of *Fate*; but to prove the *Eſſay* free from a Doctrine, which my Adverſary and I agreed to be an *Abſurdity*. But if any one, confiding in the Tricks of Sophiſtry under the cloudy Conveyance of Metaphyſics, would diſpute this Point with us; I ſhall give up my Share of him to my Adverſary, and leave him entirely to the Mercy of his *Logic*. All the Anſwer he muſt expect from me, is of that kind with the Philoſopher's, who, diſputing with one who denied local Motion, only uſed his Legs, and walked out of his Company: That is to ſay, I ſhall decline his Challenge merely for the Exerciſe of my Freedom. And indeed, what other Anſwer does he deſerve, who refuſes to acquieſce in that CONSCIOUSNESS of *Freedom* which every plain Man has, on reflecting upon what paſſes in his Mind when he thinks and acts?

But yet, it may be worth while to remark the Nature of this *Conſciouſneſs*; from which alone (as I think, Sir, I have had the Pleaſure to obſerve to you in our Converſation on theſe Subjects)

Freedom

Freedom of *Will* may be demonſtrated to all but the downright Atheiſt. It will, I ſuppoſe, be allowed to be an Impreſſion on the Mind, made by *Reflexion*, as ſtrong as any of thoſe made by *Senſation*. And ſure he muſt be as blind as even blind Fate can make him, who does not ſee thus far at leaſt. So that the only queſtion is, whether it be, like them, ſubject to Deception? I anſwer, No. And firſt, for a *natural* Reaſon, As the Organs of Senſe are not employed to convey the Intelligence: But ſecondly and principally, for a *moral* one, As there would be nothing left to redreſs the wrong Repreſentation. For, *Reaſon*, which performs this Office in the falſe *Impreſſions of Senſe*, is the very Faculty employed in making the *Impreſſions of Reflexion*. Were theſe therefore liable to the ſame Kind of Deception, we ſhould be unavoidably led into and kept in Error by the natural Frame and Conſtitution of Things. But as this would reflect on the Author of Nature, no Theiſt, I preſume, will be inclined to admit the Conſequence. If the *Fataliſt* ſhould reply, that *Reaſon*, when well *exerciſed* and *refined*, does here, as in the falſe *Impreſſions of Senſe*, lay open the Deluſion; this, I muſt tell him, is the very *Folly* we complain of: That, when Things are ſubmitted to the Arbitrement of *Reaſon*, her Award ſhould be rejected while ſtanding in the Road of *Nature*, with all her Powers and Faculties entire; and not thought worthy to be heard, till made giddy in the airy Heights of *Metaphyſics*, and racked and tortured by all the Engines of Sophiſtry: In a word, when *Reaſon* is no more herſelf; but ſpeaks as her *Keepers* and *Tormentors* dictate.

However, it is not the looking *within* only, that aſſures the Theiſt of his *Freedom*. What he may obſerve *abroad* of the horrid Miſchiefs and Abſurdities ariſing from the *Doctrine of Fate*, will fully convince him of this Truth. It ſubverts and annihilates *all Religion*: For the Belief of Rewards and Puniſhments, without which *no Religion* can ſubſiſt, is founded on the Principle of Man's being an *accountable* Creature; but when *Freedom of Will* is wanting,

ing, Man is no more ſo than a Clock or Organ. It is likewiſe highly injurious to *Society*: For whoever thinks himſelf no longer in his own Power, will be naturally inclined to give the Reins to his Paſſions, as it is ſubmitting to that *Fate* which muſt at laſt abſolutely turn and direct them.

But, after all, the moſt powerful Argument for *Freedom*, I confeſs, Sir, is ſuch a *Life* as yours. Of which, though I could ſay much, and with Pleaſure, I will only ſay that it has made me, in common with every one who knows you,

Your obliged,

Your affectionate, and

Your faithful Servant,

May 18, 1742.

W. WARBURTON.

PREFACE.

THERE are two ſorts of Writers, I mean the BIGOT and the FREE-THINKER, that every honeſt Man in his Heart eſteems no better than the Peſts of Society; as they are manifeſtly the Bane of *Literature* and *Religion*. And whoever effectually endeavours to ſerve either of Theſe, is ſure immediately to offend both of Thoſe. For, the Advancement of Literature is as favourable to true Piety, as it is fatal to *Superſtition*; and the Advancement of Religion as propitious to real Knowledge as diſcrediting to *vain Science*.

The Author of the following *Letters*, who hath aimed at leaſt to do this Service, by his Writings, regarding theſe two ſorts of Men, as the irreconcileable Enemies of his deſign, began without any Ceremony (for he was not diſpoſed, for their Sake, to go about) to break through thoſe lumpiſh impediments they had thrown acroſs the Road of Truth; and laboured to clear the way, not only for himſelf, but for all who were diſpoſed to follow him. In which it fared with him as it ſometimes happens to thoſe who undertake to remove a public Nuiſance for the Benefit of their Neighbourhood, where the nicer Noſes hold themſelves offended even in the Service thus undeſervedly rendered to them. For notwithſtanding our Author hath taken all Opportunities, and even *ſought out* Occaſions to celebrate every Writer, living or dead, who was any way reſpectable for Knowledge, Virtue, or Piety, in whatever Party, Sect, or Religion, he was found, eſpecially ſuch as he had the Misfortune to diſſent from, and this ſometimes with ſo liberal a hand as to give offence on that ſide likewiſe; though he hath done this, I ſay, yet

having, for the Reaſons above, declared eternal War with *Bigotry* and *Free-thinking*, the ſtrong, yet ſincere Colours in which he hath drawn the Learning, Senſe, Candour, and Truth of thoſe Subjects in which theſe noble Qualities are moſt eminent, have been cenſured as Inſolence and Satire, and a Tranſgreſſion of all the bounds of Civility and Decorum. But he will not be eaſily induced, by the Clamours of the falſely Delicate, to betray the Intereſts of all that is good and valuable amongſt Men, in complaiſance to their Notions of Politeneſs. 'Tis no time to ſtand upon ceremony when Religion is ſtruggling for Life; when *the whole Head is ſick, and the whole Heart faint.*

The *Bigot*, who, between a corrupt Will, and a narrow Underſtanding, imputes odious Deſigns to his Adverſaries, and impious Conſequences to their Opinions, is not, I ſuppoſe, to be *complimented*, either into Senſe or Honeſty. The Writer here confuted is amongſt the chief of them. And it is not impoſſible but the recent Memory of the like Uſage our Author himſelf met with from others of the ſame leaven, might give him a quicker Senſe and ſtronger Reſentment of the Injury done his Neighbour.

As for the Tribe of *Free-thinkers*, *Toland*, *Tindal*, *Collins*, *Coward*, *Blount*, *Strutt*, *Chub*, *Dudgeon*, *Morgan*, *Tillard*, and their Fellows, the mortal Foes both of Reaſon and Religion, injured *Wit* as well as *Virtue*, by the Mouth of their happieſt Advocate and Favourite, long ago called out for *Vengeance* on them:

—The Licence of a following Reign
Did all the Dregs of bold *Socinus* drain;
Then unbelieving Prieſts reform'd the Nation,
And taught more pleaſant Methods of Salvation;
Where Heaven's free Subjects might their Rights diſpute,
Leſt God himſelf ſhould ſeem too abſolute.
Encourag'd thus, Wit's Titans brav'd the Skies,
And the Preſs groan'd with licens'd Blaſphemies.
Theſe Monſters, Critics, with your Darts engage,
Here point your Thunder, and exhauſt your Rage!

A COM-

A

COMMENTARY

ON

MR. POPE'S ESSAY ON MAN.

LETTER I.

WHEN a great Genius, whoſe Writings have afforded the World much Pleaſure and Inſtruction, happens to be enviouſly attacked and falſely accuſed, it is natural to think, that a Senſe of Gratitude due from Readers ſo agreeably obliged, or a Senſe of that Honour reſulting to our Country from ſuch a Writer, ſhould raiſe a general Indignation. But every Day's Expeperience ſhews us the very contrary. Some take a malignant Satisfaction in the Attack; others, a fooliſh Pleaſure in a literary Conflict; and the greater Part look on with an abſolute Indifference.

Mr. *De Crouſaz's* Remarks * on Mr. *Pope's Eſſay on Man*, ſeen in part, through the deceitful Medium of a *French* Tranſlation,

* They are contained in two ſeveral Books, the one intituled, *Examen de l'Eſſai de Mr. Pope*; à Lauſanne, 1737. The other, *Commentaire ſur la Traduction en vers de M. l'Abbé Du Reſnel de l'Eſſai de Mr. Pope ſur l'Homme*; à Geneve, 1738.

have

have juſt fallen into my Hands. As thoſe Remarks appear to me very groundleſs and unjuſt, I thought ſo much due to Truth, as to vindicate our Great Countryman from his Cenſure.

The principal Object therefore of this Vindication ſhall be, to give the Reader a fair and juſt Idea of the *Reaſoning* of that *Eſſay*, ſo egregiouſly miſrepreſented; in which I ſhall not conſider it as a *Poem* (for it ſtands in no need of the Licence of ſuch kind of Works to defend it) but as a *Syſtem of Philoſophy*; and content myſelf with a plain Repreſentation of the Sobriety, Force, and Connection of *that Reaſoning*.

I ſhall begin with the firſt Epiſtle. The opening of which, in *fifteen* Lines, is taken up in giving an Account of his Subject; which he ſhews us (agreeably to the Title) is An Essay on Man, or a Philoſophical Inquiry into his *Nature*, and *End*, his *Paſſions*, and *Purſuits*:

> A mighty Maze!—but not without a Plan,

as Mr. *De Crouſaz* and I have found it, between us. The next Line tells us with what Deſign he wrote, *viz.*

> To vindicate the Ways of God to Man.

The Men he writes againſt he hath frequently informed us are ſuch, as

> Weigh their Opinion againſt Providence. l. 110.

Such as,

> — cry, if Man's unhappy, God's unjuſt. l. 114.

Such as fall into the Notion,

> That Vice and Virtue there is none at all. Ep. ii. l. 202.

This occaſioneth the Poet to divide his *Vindication of the Ways of God* into *two* Parts. In the *firſt* of which he gives *direct* Anſwers to thoſe Objections which libertine Men, on a View of the Diſorders ariſing from the Perverſity of the human Will, have intended

tended againſt Providence: And, in the *ſecond*, he *obviates* all thoſe Objections, by a true Delineation of human Nature, or a *general* but exact *Map of Man*; which theſe Objectors either not knowing, or miſtaking, or elſe leaving (for the mad Purſuit of *metaphyſical Entities)* have loſt and bewildered themſelves in a thouſand fooliſh Complaints againſt Providence. The *firſt Epiſtle* is employed in the Management of the *firſt* part of this Diſpute; and the *three* following in the Management of the *ſecond*. So that the whole conſtitutes a complete *Eſſay on Man*, written for the beſt Purpoſe, *to vindicate the Ways of God.*

The Poet therefore having enounced his *Subject*, his *End of Writing*, and the *Quality of his Adverſaries*, proceeds [from l. 16 to 23.] to inſtruct us *from whence* he intends to draw his Arguments for their Confutation; namely, from the *viſible Things* of God, in this Syſtem, to demonſtrate the *inviſible Things* of God, his *eternal Power and God-head:* And *why*; becauſe we can *reaſon only from what we know*, and we *know* no more of *Man* than what we ſee of his Station here; no more of *God* than what we ſee of his Diſpenſations to Man in this Station; therefore

Thro' Worlds unnumber'd though the God be known,
'Tis ours to trace him only in our own *.

This naturally leads the Poet to exprobrate the miſerable Folly and Impiety of pretending to pry into, and call in queſtion, the profound Diſpenſations of Providence: Which reproof contains [from l. 22 to 43] the moſt ſublime Deſcription of the Omniſcience of God, and the miſerable Blindneſs and Preſumption of Man.

Preſumptuous Man! the Reaſon would'ſt thou find
Why form'd ſo weak, ſo little, and ſo blind?
Firſt, if thou canſt, the harder Reaſon gueſs
Why form'd no weaker, blinder, and no leſs?

* Hunc cognoſcimus ſolummodo per Proprietates ſuas et Attributa, et per ſapientiſſimas et optimas rerum ſtructuras et cauſas finales. Newtoni Principia Schol. gener. ſub finem.

Aſk

Aſk of thy Mother Earth, why Oaks are made,
Taller or ſtronger than the Weeds they ſhade?
Or aſk of yonder argent Fields above,
Why *Jove's* Satellites are leſs than *Jove*?

In the four laſt Lines, the Poet has joined the utmoſt Beauty of Argumentation to the Sublimity of Thought; where the ſimilar Inſtances, propoſed for their Examination, ſhew as well the *Abſurdity* of their Complaints againſt Order, as the *Fruitleſsneſs* of their Enquiries into the Arcana of the Godhead.

So far his modeſt and ſober *Introduction*: In which he truly obſerves, that no Wiſdom leſs than omniſcient

Can tell why Heav'n has made us as we are.

Yet though we can never diſcover the *particular* Reaſons for this Mode of our Exiſtence, we may be aſſured in *general* that it is *right*: For now entering upon his Argument, he lays down this ſelf-evident Propoſition as the Foundation of his *Theſis*, which he reaſonably ſuppoſes will be allowed him: *That of all poſſible Syſtems, infinite Wiſdom hath formed the beſt*; [l. 43, 44.] From hence he draws two Conſequences.

1. The *firſt* [from l. 44 to 51.] is, that as the beſt Syſtem cannot but be ſuch a one as hath no inconnected Void; ſuch a one in which there is a perfect Coherence and gradual Subordination in all its Parts; there muſt needs be, in ſome part or other of the Scale of Life and Senſe, ſuch a Creature as MAN; which reduces the Diſpute to this abſurd Queſtion, *Whether God has placed him wrong?*

It being ſhewn that MAN, *the Subject of his Inquiry*, has a neceſſary Place in ſuch a Syſtem as this is confeſſed to be: And it being evident that the Abuſe of Free-will, from whence proceeds all moral Evil, is the certain Effect of ſuch a Creature's Exiſtence; the next Queſtion will be, how theſe Evils can be accounted for, conſiſtently with the Idea we have of God's Attributes? Therefore,

2. The *ſecond* Conſequence he draws from his Principle, *That of all poſſible Syſtems, infinite Wiſdom has form'd the beſt*, is, that whatever

whatever is wrong in our private Syſtem, is right, as relative to the whole [l. 50 to 53.]

Reſpecting Man, whatever wrong we call,
May, *muſt* be right, as relative to ALL.

That it *may*, he proves [from l. 52 to 61.] by ſhewing in what conſiſts the Difference between the *ſyſtematic* Works of God and thoſe of Man, *viz.* that, in the *latter*, a thouſand Movements ſcarce gain one Purpoſe; in the *former*, one Movement gains many Purpoſes. So that

—Man, who here ſeems *principal* alone,
Perhaps acts *ſecond* to ſome Sphere unknown.

And *acting thus*, the Appearances of *wrong* in the *particular* Syſtem may be *right* in the *univerſal*: For,

'Tis but a Part we ſee, and not a Whole.

—That it *muſt*, the whole body of this Epiſtle is employed to illuſtrate and inforce. Thus *partial Evil is univerſal Good*, and thus Providence is fairly acquitted.

From all this he draws a general Concluſion [from l. 60 to 87.] that, as what had been ſaid is ſufficient to vindicate the Ways of Providence, Man ſhould reſt ſubmiſſive and content, and confeſs every Thing to be diſpoſed for the beſt; that to pretend to inquire into the Manner how God conducts this wonderful Scheme to its Completion, is as abſurd as to imagine that the Horſe and Ox ſhall ever come to comprehend why they undergo ſuch different *Manage* and *Fortunes* in the Hand of Man; nay, that ſuch Knowledge, if communicated, would be even pernicious to Man, and make him neglect or *deſert* his Duty here.

Heav'n from all Creatures hides the Book of Fate,
All but the Page preſcrib'd, the preſent State,
From Brutes what Men, from Men what Spirits know,
Or who would ſuffer Being here below?

This he illuſtrates by an Inſtance in the Lamb, which is happy in not knowing the Fate that attends it from the Hand of the Butcher; and from thence takes occaſion to obſerve, that God is the equal Maſter of all his Creatures, and provides for the proper Happineſs of each Being.

Who ſees with equal Eye, as God of all,
A Hero periſh, or a Sparrow fall *.

But now the Objector is ſuppoſed to put in, and ſay; "You tell "us indeed, that all things will turn out for Good; but we ſee "ourſelves ſurrounded with preſent Evil; and yet you forbid us "all Inquiry into the Manner how we are to be extricated; and "in a Word, leave us in a very diſconſolate Condition." Not ſo, replies the Poet [from l. 86 to 95.] you may reaſonably, if you ſo pleaſe, receive much comfort from the HOPE of a happy Futurity; a *Hope* given us by God himſelf for this very Purpoſe, as an Earneſt of that Bliſs, which *here* indeed perpetually flies us, but is reſerved for the good Man *hereafter*.

What future Bliſs he gives not thee to know,
But gives that *Hope* to be thy Bleſſing now.
Hope ſprings eternal in the human Breaſt,
Man never *is*, but always *to be* bleſt.
The Soul uneaſy, and confin'd from home,
Reſts and expatiates in a Life to come.

Now the Reaſon why the Poet chuſes to inſiſt on this Proof of a future State in Preference to others, I conceive, is in order to give his Syſtem (which is founded in a ſublime and improved *Platoniſm*) the utmoſt Grace of Uniformity. For we know this HOPE was *Plato's* peculiar Argument for a future Stte; and the Words here employed, *The Soul uneaſy, &c. his* peculiar Expreſſion: We have ſeen the Argument illuſtrated with great Force of Reaſoning, by our moſt eminent modern Divines: But no where

* Matt. x. 29.

ſtronger

ſtronger urged than by our Poet, in this *Eſſay*. He ſays here, in expreſs Terms, That *God gave us Hope to ſupply that future Bliſs which he at preſent keeps hid from us*. In his 2d Ep. l. 264. he goes ſtill farther, and ſays, this HOPE quits us not even at Death, when every Thing mortal drops from us.

Hope travels through, nor quits us when we die.

And, in the 4th Epiſtle he ſhews how the ſame HOPE is a certain Proof of a future State, from the Conſideration of God's giving Man no Appetite in vain, or what he did not intend ſhould be ſatisfied; (which is *Plato's* great Argument for a future State.) For, deſcribing the Condition of the good Man, he breaks out into theſe rapturous Strains:

For him alone Hope leads from Goal to Goal,
And opens ſtill, and opens on his Soul;
Till, lengthen'd on to Faith, and unconfin'd,
It pours the Bliſs, that fills up all the Mind.
He ſees, why Nature plants in Man alone
Hope of known Bliſs, and Faith in Bliſs unknown:
Nature, whoſe Dictates to no other Kind
Are giv'n in vain, but what they ſeek they find. l. 331, *et ſeq.*

It is only for the good Man, he tells us, that Hope leads from Goal to Goal, *&c.* It would be ſtrange indeed then, if it ſhould be a Deluſion.

But it hath been objected, that the *Syſtem of the beſt* weakens the other natural Arguments for a future State, becauſe if the Evils, which good Men ſuffer, promote the Benefit of the whole, then every thing is here in order; and nothing amiſs that wants to be ſet right: Nor has the good Man any reaſon to expect a Reparation, when the Evils he ſuffered had ſuch a Tendency. To this we reply, that the *Syſtem of the beſt* is ſo far from weakening thoſe natural Arguments, that it ſtrengthens and ſupports them. To conſider it a little, if thoſe Evils to which good Men are ſubject be

mere *Diſorders*, without any Tendency to the greater Good of the Whole, then, though we muſt indeed conclude that they will hereafter be ſet right, yet this View of Things, repreſenting God as ſuffering Diſorders for no other Purpoſe than to ſet them right, gives us a very low Idea of the divine Wiſdom. But if thoſe Evils (according to the *Syſtem of the beſt*) contribute to the greater Perfection of the Whole, a Reaſon may be then given for their Permiſſion, and ſuch a one as ſupports our Idea of Divine Wiſdom to the higheſt religious Purpoſes. Then, as to the good Man's *Hopes* of a Retribution, thoſe ſtill remain in their original Force. For our Idea of God's Juſtice, and how far that Juſtice is engaged to a Retribution, is exactly and invariably the ſame on either Hypotheſis. For though the *Syſtem of the beſt* ſuppoſes that the *Evils themſelves* will be fully compenſated by the Good they produce to the *Whole*, yet this is ſo far from ſuppoſing that *Particulars* ſhall ſuffer for a *general Good*, that it is eſſential to *this Syſtem*, to conclude that, at the Completion of Things, when the whole is arrived to the State of utmoſt Perfection, *particular* and *univerſal* Good ſhall *coincide*.

> Such is the WORLD's great Harmony, that ſprings
> From Union, Order, full Conſent of Things;
> Where *ſmall* and *great*, where *weak* and *mighty*, made
> To *ſerve* not *ſuffer*, *ſtrengthen* not *invade*.
>
> Ep. iii. l. 296, *et ſeq.*

Which Coincidence can never be without a retribution to good Men for the Evils ſuffered here below.

To return then to the Poet's Argument, he, as we ſaid, bids Man comfort himſelf with Expectation of future Happineſs, and ſhews him that this HOPE is an Earneſt of it: But firſt of all puts in one very neceſſary Caution,

> Hope *humbly* then, with *trembling* Pinions ſoar.

And provoked at thoſe Miſcreants, whom he afterwards [Ep. 3. l. 262.] deſcribes as building *Hell on Spite, and Heaven on Pride*, he

he upbraids them [from l. 94 to 109.] with the Example of the poor *Indian*, to whom alſo Nature hath given this *common* HOPE *of Mankind*. But though his untutored Mind had betrayed him into many childiſh Fancies concerning the Nature of that future State, yet he is ſo far from excluding any Part of his own Species (a Vice which could proceed only from vain Science, which *puffeth up*) that he humanely admits even *his faithful Dog to bear him Company*.

And then [from l. 108 to 119.] ſhews them, that Complaints againſt the *eſtabliſhed Order of Things*, begin in the *higheſt Abſurdity* from miſapplied *Reaſon* and *Power*, and end in the *higheſt Impiety*, in an Attempt to degrade the God of Heaven, and aſſume his Place.

Go wiſer thou, and in thy Scale of Senſe
Weigh thy *Opinion* againſt *Providence*:
Deſtroy all Creatures for thy Sport or Guſt,
Yet cry, if Man's *unhappy*, God's *unjuſt*;
If Man alone ingroſs not Heaven's high Care,
Alone made *Perfect here*, *Immortal there*,

That is, be made God, *who only is Perfect and hath Immortality*: To which Senſe the Lines immediately following confine us:

Snatch from his Hand the Balance and the Rod,
Rejudge his Juſtice, be the God of God.

From theſe Men, the Poet turns to his *Friend*, and [from l. 118 to 137.] remarks that the Ground of all this Extravagance is *Pride*; which, more or leſs, infects the whole Species:—ſhews the ill Effects of it, in the Caſe of the fallen Angels; and obſerves, that even *wiſhing* to invert the Laws of Order is a lower Species of their Crime:—then brings an Inſtance of one of the Effects of Pride, which is the Folly of thinking every thing made *ſolely* for the Uſe of Man; without the leaſt regard to any other of God's Creatures.

Aſk for what End the heavenly Bodies ſhine,
Earth for whoſe Uſe? PRIDE anſwers, 'Tis for *mine*.

For

For *me*, kind Nature wakes her genial Power,
Suckles each Herb, and ſpreads out ev'ry Flower;
Annual for *me*, the Grape, the Roſe, renew
The Juice nectareous, and the balmy Dew;
For *me*, the Mine a thouſand Treaſures brings,
For *me*, Health guſhes from a thouſand Springs;
Seas roll to waft *me*, Suns to light *me* riſe,
My Footſtool, Earth; *my* Canopy, the Skies.

The Ridicule of imagining the *greater Portions* of the material Syſtem were ſolely for the Uſe of Man, *Philoſophy* has ſufficiently expoſed: And *Common Senſe*, as the Poet ſhews, inſtructs us to know that *our Fellow Creatures*, placed by Providence the joint Inhabitants of this Globe, are deſigned by Providence to be joint Sharers with us of its bleſſings.

Has God, thou Fool! work'd ſolely for *thy* Good,
Thy Joy, *thy* Paſtime, *thy* Attire, *thy* Food?
Who for *thy* Table feeds the wanton Fawn,
For him as kindly ſpreads the flow'ry Lawn.
Is it for *thee*, the Lark aſcends and ſings?
Joy tunes his Voice, Joy elevates his Wings.
Is it for *thee* the Linnet pours his Throat?
Loves of his own and Raptures ſwell the Note.
Is thine alone the Seed that ſtrows the Plain?
The Birds of Heaven ſhall vindicate their Grain. Ep. 3. l. 27.

Having thus given a general Idea of the Goodneſs and Wiſdom of God, and the Folly and Ingratitude of Man, the great Author comes next (after this neceſſary Preparation) to the *Confirmation* of his *Theſis*, That partial moral Evil is univerſal Good: But introduceth it with a proper Argument to abate our Wonder at the Phænomenon of moral Evil, which Argument he builds on a Conceſſion of his Adverſaries. "If we aſk you, ſays he, [from l. 136 "to 147.] whether Nature doth not err from the gracious End of "its

" its Creator, when Plagues, Earthquakes, and Tempeſts, unpeople " whole Regions at a time? you readily anſwer, No. For that " God acts by general and not by particular Laws; and that the " Courſe of Matter and Motion muſt be neceſſarily ſubject to ſome " Irregularities, becauſe nothing created is perfect." Say you ſo? I then aſk, why you ſhould expect this Perfection in Man? If you own that the great *End* of *God* (notwithſtanding all this Deviation) be *general Happineſs*, then it is *Nature*, and not God that deviates; and do you expect greater Conſtancy in Man?

Then Nature deviates, and can Man do leſs?

i. e. If Nature, or the inanimate Syſtem (on which God hath impoſed his Laws, which it obeys as a Machine obeys the Hand of the Workman) may in Courſe of Time deviate from its firſt Direction, as the beſt Philoſophy ſhews it may *; where is the Wonder that Man, who was created a Free Agent, and hath it in his Power every moment to tranſgreſs the eternal Rule of Right, ſhould ſometimes go out of Order?

Having thus ſhewn how Moral Evil came into the World, namely, by *Man's Abuſe of his own Free-will*, he comes to the point, the *Confirmation* of his *Theſis*, by ſhewing how *moral* Evil promotes *Good*; and employs the *ſame* Conceſſion of his Adverſaries, concerning *natural* Evil, to illuſtrate it.

1. He ſhews it tends to the *Good* of the *Whole*, or *Univerſe* [from l. 146 to 157.] and this by Analogy. " You own, ſays he, " that Storms and Tempeſts, Clouds, Rain, Heat, and Variety of " Seaſons are neceſſary (notwithſtanding the accidental Evils they " bring with thm) to the Health and Plenty of this *Globe*; why then " ſhould you ſuppoſe there is not the ſame Uſe, with regard to the

* While Comets move in very eccentrick Orbs, in all Manner of Poſitions, blind Fate could never make all the Planets move one and the ſame Way in Orbs concentrick, ſome inconſiderable Irregularities excepted, which may have riſen from the mutual Actions of Comets and Planets upon one another, and which will be apt to increaſe till this Syſtem wants a Reformation. Sir Iſ. Newt. Optics, Queſt. ult.

" *Univerſe*,

"*Univerſe*, in a *Borgia* and a *Catiline*?" But you ſay you can ſee the one and not the other. You ſay right. One terminates in *this Syſtem*, the other refers to the *Whole*. But, ſays the Poet, in *another Place*,

—of this Frame, the Bearings and the Ties,
The ſtrong Connexions, nice Dependencies,
Gradations juſt, has thy pervading Soul
Look'd thro'? Or can a *Part* contain the *Whole*?

l. 29, *et ſeq.*

Own therefore, ſays he, *here*, that,

From Pride, from Pride our very Reaſoning ſprings;
Account for *moral* as for *natural* Things:
Why charge we Heaven in thoſe, in theſe acquit?
In both *to reaſon right*, is *to ſubmit*.

2. But ſecondly, to ſtrengthen the foregoing *analogical* Argument, and to make the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God ſtill more apparent, he obſerves next [from l. 156 to 165] that *moral Evil* is not only productive of *Good* to the *Whole*, but is even productive of *Good in our own Syſtem*. It might, ſays he, perhaps appear better to *us*, that there were nothing in this World but *Peace* and *Virtue*,

That never Air nor Ocean felt the Wind,
That never Paſſion diſcompos'd the Mind.

But then conſider, that as our *material Syſtem* is ſupported by the Strife of its Elementary Particles, ſo is our *intellectual Syſtem* by the Conflict of our Paſſions, which are the Elements of human Action.

Love, Hope, and Joy, fair Pleaſure's ſmiling Train,
Hate, Fear, and Grief, the Family of Pain,
Theſe mix'd with Art, and to due Bounds confin'd,
Make and maintain the Balance of the Mind.

Ep. 2. l. 107, *et ſeq.*

For

For (as he ſays again in his *ſecond* Epiſtle, where he illuſtrates this Obſervation at large)

What Crops of Wit and Honeſty appear
From Spleen, from Obſtinacy, Hate or Fear! l. 175.

In a word, as without the benefit of tempeſtuous *Winds*, both *Air* and *Ocean* would ſtagnate, and corrupt, and ſpread univerſal Contagion throughout all the Ranks of Animals that inhabit, or are ſupported, by them; ſo, without the Benefit of the *Paſſions*, that *Harmony*, and *Virtue*, the Effects of the Abſence of thoſe Paſſions, would be a lifeleſs Calm, a ſtoical *Apathy*,

Contracted all, retiring to the Breaſt:
But Health of Mind is *Exerciſe*, not *Reſt*. Ep. 2. l. 93.

Therefore, concludes the Poet, inſtead of regarding the *Conflict of Elements*, and the *Paſſions of the Mind*, as *Diſorders*; you ought to conſider them as what they are, Part of the *general Order* of Providence: and that they are ſo, appears from their always preſerving the ſame unvaried Courſe, throughout all Ages, from the Creation, to the preſent Time:

The *general Order*, ſince the Whole began,
Is kept in *Nature*, and is kept in *Man*.

We ſee therefore it would be doing great Injuſtice to our Author to ſuſpect that he intended, by this, to give any Encouragement to *Vice*; or to inſinuate the *Neceſſity* of it to a happy Life, on the equally execrable and abſurd Scheme of the Author of the *Fable of the Bees*. His Syſtem, as all his *Ethic Epiſtles* ſhew, is this, That the Paſſions, for the Reaſons given above, are neceſſary to the Support of *Virtue*: That indeed the Paſſions in Exceſs, produce *Vice*, which is, in its own Nature, the greateſt of all Evils; and comes into the World from the Abuſe of Man's Free-will; but that God, in his infinite Wiſdom, and Goodneſs, deviouſly turns the natural

Bias of its Malignity to the Advancement of human Happineſs, and makes it productive of general *Good*:

TH' ETERNAL ART EDUCES GOOD FROM ILL. Ep. 2. l. 165.

This, ſet againſt what we have obſerved of the Poet's Doctrine of a *future State*, will furniſh us with an Inſtance of his *ſteering* (as he well expreſſes it in his Preface) *between Doctrines ſeemingly oppoſite: If his Eſſay has any Merit, he thinks it is in this.* And doubtleſs it is uncommon Merit to reject the Extravagances of every Syſtem, and take in only what is rational and real. The *Characteriſtics*, and the *Fable of the Bees*, are two ſeemingly inconſiſtent Syſtems: The Extravagancy of the firſt is in giving a Scheme of *Virtue without Religion*; and of the latter, in giving a Scheme of *Religion without Virtue*. Theſe our Poet leaves to any body that will take them up; but agrees however ſo far with the *firſt*, that Virtue would be worth having, though itſelf was its only Reward; and ſo far with the *latter*, that God makes Evil, againſt its Nature, productive of Good.

The Poet having thus juſtified Providence in its *Permiſſion* of partial MORAL EVIL, employs the remaining part of this Epiſtle in vindicating *it* from the *Imputation* of certain ſuppoſed NATURAL EVILS. For now he ſhews, that though the Complaint of his Adverſaries againſt Providence be on Pretence of *real moral Evils*, yet, at bottom, it all proceeds from their Impatience under *imaginary natural ones*, the Iſſue of a depraved Appetite for viſionary Advantages, which if Man had, they would be either *uſeleſs* or *pernicious* to him, as unſuitable to his State, or repugnant to his Condition. [from l. 164 to 199] "Though God (ſays he) hath ſo bountifully "beſtowed on Man, Faculties little leſs than *Angelic*, yet he ungratefully graſps at higher; and then, extravagant in another "Extreme, with a Paſſion as ridiculous as that is impious, envies "even the peculiar Accommodations of *Brutes*. But here his own "Principles ſhew his Folly." He ſuppoſes them all made for his Uſe: Now what Uſe could he have of them, when he had robbed them

them of all their Qualities. *Qualities*, as they are at preſent divided, diſtributed with the higheſt Wiſdom: But which, if beſtowed according to the froward Humour of theſe childiſh Complainers, would be found to be every where either *wanting* or *ſuperfluous*. But even with theſe *brutal* Qualities Man would not only be no Gainer, but a conſiderable Loſer, as the Poet ſhews, in explaining the Conſequences that would follow from his having his Senſations in that exquiſite Degree in which this or that Animal is obſerved to poſſeſs them.

He tells us next [from l. 198 to 225] that the complying with ſuch extravagant Deſires would not only be *uſeleſs and pernicious to Man*, but would be breaking the Order, and deforming the Beauty, of God's Creation. In which *this* Animal is ſubject to *that*, and *all* to Man; who by his Reaſon enjoys the Benefit of all their Powers:

Far as Creation's ample Range extends,
The Scale of *ſenſual*, *mental* Powers aſcends:
Mark how it mounts, to Man's imperial Race,
From the green Myriads in the peopled Graſs!
Without this juſt Gradation, could they be
Subjected theſe to thoſe, or all to thee?
The Powers of all ſubdued by thee alone,
Is not thy Reaſon all thoſe Powers in one?

And farther [from l. 224 to 259] that this breaking the Order of Things, which as a Link or Chain connects all Beings from the higheſt to the loweſt, would unavoidably be attended with the Deſtruction of the Univerſe:

For if each Syſtem in Gradation roll,
Alike eſſential to th' amazing Whole;
The leaſt Confuſion but in one, not all
That Syſtem only, but the Whole muſt fall.
Let Earth unbalanc'd from her Orbit fly,
Planets and Suns ruſh lawleſs thro' the Sky:

Let ruling Angels from their Spheres be hurl'd,
Being on Being wreck'd, and World on World,
Heaven's whole Foundations to their Centre nod,
And Nature tremble to the Throne of God.

For that the ſeveral Parts of the Univerſe muſt at leaſt compoſe as entire and harmonious a Whole, as the Parts of an human Body do, cannot be doubted: Yet we ſee what Confuſion it would make in our Frame, if the Members were ſet upon invading each other's Office.

What if the Foot, ordain'd the Duſt to tread,
Or Hand to toil, aſpir'd to be the Head? &c.
Juſt as abſurd, for any Part to claim
To be another in this gen'ral Frame:
Juſt as abſurd, to mourn the Taſk and Pains
The great directing * MIND of ALL ordains.

Who will not acknowledge that ſo harmonious a Connection in the Diſpoſition of Things, as is here deſcribed, is tranſcendently beautiful? But the *Fataliſts* ſuppoſe ſuch a one.—What then? Is the firſt great free Agent debarred from a Contrivance ſo exquiſite, becauſe ſome Men, to ſet up their Idol, *Fate*, abſurdly repreſent it as preſiding over ſuch a Syſtem?

Having thus given a Repreſentation of God's Creation, as *one entire Whole*, where all the Parts have a neceſſary Dependance on and Relation to each other, and where every *Particular* works and concurs to the Perfection of the *Whole*; as ſuch a Syſtem would be thought above the reach of vulgar Ideas; to reconcile it to their Conceptions, he ſhews [from l. 258 to 273] that God is equally and intimately preſent to every Sort of Subſtance, to every Particle of Matter, and in every Inſtant of Being; which eaſes the labouring

* Veneramur autem et colimus ob Dominum. Deus enim ſine Dominio, Providentia, et cauſis Finalibus, nihil aliud eſt quam FATUM et NATURA. Newtoni Princip. Schol. gener. ſub finem.

Imagination,

Imagination, and makes it expect no leſs, from ſuch a *Preſence*, than ſuch a *Diſpenſation*.

And now, the Poet, as he had promiſed, having *vindicated the Ways of God to Man*, concludes [from l. 272 to the End] that from what had been ſaid it appears, that the very Things we blame contribute to our Happineſs, either as *Particulars*, or as *Parts of the Univerſal Syſtem*; that our *Ignorance*, in accounting for the Ways of Providence, was allotted to us out of Compaſſion; that yet we have as much *Knowledge* as is ſufficient to ſhew us, that we are, and always ſhall be, as bleſt as we can bear; for that NATURE is neither a *Stratonic* Chain of blind Cauſes and Effects,

(*All Nature* is but *Art* unknown to thee);

nor yet the fortuitous Reſult of *Epicurean* Atoms,

(*All Chance, Direction* which thou canſt not ſee);

as theſe two Species of Atheiſm ſuppoſed it; but the wonderful Art and Direction (unknown indeed to Man) of an all-powerful, all-wiſe, all-good, and free Being. And therefore we may be aſſured, that the Arguments brought above, to prove partial moral Evil productive of univerſal Good, may be ſafely relied on; from whence one certain Truth reſults, in ſpite of all the Pride and Cavils of vain Reaſon, That WHATEVER IS, is RIGHT, WITH REGARD TO THE DISPOSITION OF GOD, AND TO ITS ULTIMATE TENDENCY. And this Truth once owned, all Complaints againſt Providence are ſecluded.

But that the Reader may ſee, in one View, the *Exactneſs of the Method*, as well as *Force of the Argument*, I ſhall here draw up a ſhort *Synopſis* of this Epiſtle. The Poet begins in telling us his Subject is *An Eſſay on Man*.—His End of Writing is *to vindicate Providence*.—Tells us againſt whom he wrote, *the Atheiſts*.—From whence he intends to fetch his Arguments, *from the viſible Things of God ſeen in this Syſtem*.—Lays down this Propoſition as the Foundation of his Theſis, *that of all poſſible Syſtems, infinite Wiſdom has*

formed

formed the beſt.—Draws from thence two Conſequences; 1. *That there muſt needs be ſomewhere ſuch a Creature as Man*; 2. *That the moral Evil which He is the Author of, is productive of the Good of the Whole.* This is his general *Theſis*; from whence he draws this *Concluſion, That Man ſhould reſt ſubmiſſive and content, and make the Hopes of Futurity his Comfort—but not ſuffer this to be the Occaſion of* PRIDE, which is the Cauſe of all his impious Complaints.

He proceeds to confirm his *Theſis.*—Previouſly endeavours to abate our Wonder at the Phænomenon of *moral Evil.*—Shews firſt *its Uſe to the Perfection of the Univerſe*, by Analogy, from the Uſe of *Phyſical Evil* in this particular Syſtem.—Secondly, *its Uſe in this Syſtem*, where it is turned, providentially, from its natural Biaſs, to promote Virtue.—Then goes on to vindicate Providence from the Imputation of certain *ſuppoſed natural Evils*, as he had before juſtified it for the Permiſſion of *real moral Evil*, in ſhewing that though the Atheiſt's Complaint againſt Providence be on Pretence of *real moral Evil*, yet the true Cauſe is his Impatience under *imaginary natural Evil*; the Iſſue of a *depraved Appetite for fantaſtical Advantages*, which he ſhews, if obtained, would be *uſeleſs*, or *hurtful* to *Man*—and deforming and deſtructive to the *Univerſe*; as breaking into that *Order* by which it is ſupported.—He deſcribes that *Order, Harmony, and cloſe Connection of the Parts.* And, by ſhewing the intimate *Preſence* of *God* to his whole Creation, gives a Reaſon for an Univerſe ſo amazingly beautiful, and perfect. From all this he deduces his general *Concluſion*, that *Nature being neither a blind Chain of Cauſes and Effects, nor yet the fortuitous Reſult of wandering Atoms, but the wonderful Art and Direction of an all-wiſe, all-good, and free Being*; *Whatever is, is Right, with regard to the Diſpoſition of God and its Ultimate Tendency*; which once granted, all Complaints againſt Providence are at an End.

This is a plain and conſiſtent Account of the Argument of this famous Epiſtle, which (though here humbled, and ſtripped of all its Ornaments) hath ſuch a *Force of Reaſoning* as would ſupport

Rhimes

Rhimes as bad as *Donne's*, and ſuch a *Strain of Poetry* as would immortalize even the wretched Sophiſtry that Mr. DE CROUSAZ has employed againſt it.

Whoſe Objections it is now high time we ſhould conſider. For having ſhewn what Mr. *Pope's* Syſtem really is, we come next to ſhew what it is *not*; namely, what that Writer hath the Injuſtice, or the Folly, to repreſent it. He begins his *Examination*, with ſaying, that "Mr. *Pope* ſeems to him, quite through-"out his Syſtem, to embrace the *pre-eſtabliſhed Harmony* of the "celebrated *Leibnitz*, which, in his Opinion, eſtabliſhes a Fa-"tality deſtructive of all Religion and Morality *."—That the *pre-eſtabliſhed Harmony* of *Leibnitz* terminates in Fate, is readily owned; but that Mr. *Pope* hath eſpouſed that impious Whimſy, is an utter Chimæra. The *pre-eſtabliſhed Harmony* was built upon, and is an outrageous Extenſion of, a Conception of *Plato's*; who combating the atheiſtical Objections about the Origin of Evil, employs this Argument in Defence of Providence; "That, "amongſt an infinite Number of poſſible Worlds in God's Idea, "*this*, which he hath created, and brought into Being, and admits "of a Mixture of Evil, is the *beſt*." But if the *beſt*, then Evil conſequently is *partial*, comparatively ſmall, and *tends* to the greater Perfection of the *whole*. This *Principle* is eſpouſed and ſupported by Mr. *Pope* with all the Power of Reaſon and Poetry. But neither was *Plato* a *Fataliſt*, nor is there any *Fataliſm* in the Argument. As to the Truth of the Notion, that is another Queſtion; and how far it clears up the very difficult Controverſy about the Origin of Evil, that is ſtill *another*. That it is a full Solution of all Difficulties, I cannot think, for Reaſons too long to be given in this Place. Perhaps we ſhall never have a full Solution here; and it may be no great Matter though we have not, as we are demonſtrably certain of the *moral Attributes* of the Deity. However,

* Examen de l'Eſſai de Mr. Pope ſur l'Homme.

what

what may juſtify Mr. *Pope* in inforcing and illuſtrating this *Platonic* Notion is, that it has been received by the moſt celebrated and orthodox *Divines* both of the ancient and modern Church.

This Doctrine, we own, then, was taken up by *Leibnitz*; but it was to ingraft upon it a moſt pernicious *Fataliſm*. *Plato* ſaid, God *choſe* the beſt: *Leibnitz* ſaid, he *could not but* chuſe the beſt. *Plato* ſuppoſed *Freedom* in God, to chuſe one of two Things equally good: *Leibnitz* held the Suppoſition to be abſurd; but however, admitting the Caſe, he maintained that God could *not* chuſe *one* of *two* Things *equally* good. Thus it appears the firſt went on the *Syſtem* of *Freedom*; and that the latter, notwithſtanding the moſt artful Diſguiſes in his *Theodicée*, was a thorough *Fataliſt*. For we cannot well ſuppoſe he would give that *Freedom* to Man which he had taken away from God. The Truth of the Matter ſeems to have been this: He ſaw, on the one hand, the monſtrous Abſurdity of ſuppoſing, with *Spinoſa*, that *blind* Fate was the Author of a coherent Univerſe; but yet, on the other, could not conceive, with *Plato*, that God could foreſee and conduct, according to an archetypal Idea, a World, of all poſſible Worlds the *beſt*, inhabited by *free Agents*. This Difficulty, therefore, which made the *Socinians* take *Preſcience from God*, diſpoſed *Leibnitz* to take *Free-will from Man*: And thus he faſhioned his fantaſtical Hypotheſis: He ſuppoſed that, when God made the Body, he impreſſed on his new-created Machine a certain Series or *Suite* of *Motions*; and that when he made the fellow Soul, the ſame Series of *Ideas*, whoſe Operations, throughout the whole Duration of the Union, ſo exactly jumped, that whenever an *Idea* was excited, a correſpondent *Motion* was ever ready to ſatisfy the *Volition*. Thus for Inſtance, when the Mind had the Will to raiſe the Arm to the Head, the Body was ſo pre-contrived as to raiſe, at that very Moment, the Part required. This he called the PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY. And with this he promiſed to do Wonders.

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Now we ſee, that, from the Principle of *Plato*, as well as from that of *Leibnitz*, this grand Conſequence follows, THAT WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT; becauſe every thing in this World, even Evil itſelf, tends to the greater Perfection of the *whole*. This Mr. *Pope* employs as a *Principle*, throughout a Poem (the moſt ſublime that ever was written) to humble the Pride of Man, who would impiouſly make God accountable for his Creation. What then does common Senſe teach us to underſtand by *whatever is, is right?* Did the Poet mean *right* with regard to Man, or *right* with regard to God? *Right* with regard to itſelf, or *right* with regard to its ultimate Tendency? Surely *with regard to God:* For he tells us, his Deſign is

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Preſumptuous Man! the Reaſon would'ſt thou find
Why form'd ſo weak, ſo little, and ſo blind? l. 35.
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As he proceeds, he ſtill applies his Reaſoning to the *ſame Men*:

Go —— and in thy Scale of Senſe
Weigh thy Opinion againſt Providence;
Call Imperfection what thou fancy'ſt ſuch;
Say, here *he gives too little, there too much*;
Deſtroy all Creatures for thy Sport or Guſt:
Yet cry, If Man's unhappy, *God's unjuſt*. l. 109, & *ſeq.*

And *concludes* with this Reproof to them:

Ceaſe then, nor *Order Imperfection* name. l. 273.

Having premiſed thus much, we now proceed to Mr. *De Crouſaz*.

Mr. *Pope* had ſaid:

The Lamb thy Riot dooms to bleed to-day,
Had he thy Reaſon, would he ſkip and play?
Pleas'd to the laſt, he crops the flow'ry Food,
And licks the Hand juſt rais'd to ſhed his Blood.
O Blindneſs to the Future! kindly giv'n,
That each may fill the Circle mark'd by Heav'n. l. 77, & *ſeq.*

On which his *Commentator*:—"We do not, indeed, perceive "any Thing in Beaſts, that ſhews they have an Idea or Apprehen- "ſion of Death. But, ſurely, with regard to Man, to reflect on "Death, and to contemplate the Certainty of it, are of great "Uſe to a prudent Life and a happy Death. Reaſon and Religion "agree in this, and a Man muſt want both one and the other, to "cry out,

"O Blindneſs to the Future! kindly giv'n,
"That each may fill the Circle mark'd by Heav'n.

"This ſuppoſes, that if Men had a Foreknowledge of their Deſ- "tiny, they would do all they could to avoid it, and that they "would ſucceed: Becauſe, without this Ignorance, Heaven, it "ſeems, could never bring all its *Beings to fill that Circle marked*

"*out*

" *out by* it. Yet this, notwithſtanding, is a Conſequence that can " have no Place, if it be impoſſible for Men to act with Freedom. " But the Doctrine of FATE neceſſarily draws us into Contradic- " tions *." Mr. *Crouſaz* introduces his *Commentary*, by ſolemnly acquainting his Reader, *That he had, from his very Infancy, a ſtrong Biaſs towards* LOGIC: *that he has given a conſiderable Time to that Study, and does not repent his Pains; that he has profited by Maxims which he has found in Books not written with a Deſign to give them; that he has run through every Book that has fallen into his Hands under that Title, or any Thing approaching to it; that he has not even neglected the moſt out-of-faſhioned Works of this Kind: But, as the greateſt Treaſure is worthleſs, unleſs well uſed, he is reſolved to employ ſome of it upon Mr.* Pope †. And here you have the Fruits of his Labours. Here he has ſhewn, to ſome Purpoſe, his Skill in *extracting Doctrines from Books not deſigned to give them.* And for this Paſſage I will be anſwerable, that he has *extracted a Doctrine* from it which our POET did *not deſign to give*; who, when he had anſwered the *atheiſtical* Objection about poſitive Evil, ſuppoſes the Objector to reply to this Effect:—It may be true, what you ſay, that *partial Evil tends to univerſal Good*: But why, then, has not God let me clearly into this Secret, and acquainted me with the Manner how? The Poet replies, " For very good Reaſons. You were " ſent into the World on a Taſk and Duty to be performed by you. " And as the knowing theſe Things might diſtract you, or draw " you from your Station; it was in Mercy that God hath hid " theſe Things from you:

Heav'n from all Creatures hides the Book of Fate,
All but the Page preſcrib'd, their preſent State,
From Brutes what Men, from *Men what Spirits know*;
Or who would ſuffer Being here below? l. 73, *& ſeq.*

* Commentaire ſur la Traduction en vers de Mr. l'Abbé du Reſnel de l'Eſſai de Mr. Pope ſur l'Homme, p. 63, 64.

† P. 27, 28.

" To illuſtrate this by a familiar Inſtance; how kindly hath Nature " acted by the Lamb, in hiding its Death from it; the Know- " ledge of which would have imbitter'd all its Life?" This is the Force of the Poet's Argument; and nothing can be better connected, or more beautiful. But our great *Logician*, inſtead of attending to the Argument of a very cloſe Reaſoner (whoſe Thread of Reaſoning, therefore, one ſhould have imagined might have conducted a Mathematician too, as he is, to the true Senſe of the Paſſage) rambles after a Meaning that could not poſſibly be Mr. *Pope's*; becauſe it both diſagrees with the Context, and directly oppoſes what he lays down in expreſs Words in this very Eſſay. Mr. *De Crouſaz*, we ſee, imagines that this Inſtance of the *Lamb* was given to ſhew how *hurtful a Gift* God beſtowed upon us, when he gave us the Knowledge of our End. Mr. *Pope* ſays expreſly, that it was a *friendly Gift*:

To each *unthinking* Being Heav'n a *Friend*,
Gives not the *uſeleſs Knowledge of its End*:
To *Man imparts it*; but with ſuch a View,
As, while he dreads it, makes him *hope* it too.
Ep. iii. l. 75, *& ſeq.*

i. e. " Heaven, which is not only friendly to Man, but Beaſt, gives " not this *latter* the Knowledge of its End; becauſe ſuch Knowledge " (which is neceſſarily attended with Anxiety) would be uſeleſs to " it. On the other hand, He gives it to Man; becauſe it is of the " higheſt Advantage to him, who, being to exiſt in a future State, " may, by this Means, make a fitting Preparation for his good " Reception there; which Preparation will *temper*, and, at length, " *quite ſubdue* the Anxiety neceſſarily attendant (as is ſaid) on the " Knowledge of our End, by the certain *Hope* of a happy Im- " mortality."

After theſe extraordinary Fruits of our Logician's long Application to *the Art of Thinking*, he goes on, for four Pages together *,

* Commentaire, p. 66 to 70.

to

to ſhew how uſeful and neceſſary it is for Man to cultivate his Underſtanding. You aſk whom he contradicts in this? He abſurdly ſuppoſes, Mr. *Pope*; while he is indeed but quarelling with his own Imaginations. Here we muſt recollect what we obſerved above of the Subject of the Poem; which is a Vindication of Providence againſt impious Complainers. As theſe will not acknowledge it juſt and good, becauſe they cannot comprehend it, and as this Argument is only ſupported by *Pride*, the Poet thought proper to mortify that *Pride*; which could not be done more effectually, than by ſhewing them, that even a Savage *Indian* reaſoned better:

Lo! the poor *Indian*, whoſe untutor'd Mind
Sees God in Clouds, and hears him in the Wind;
His Soul proud Science never taught to ſtray
Far as the Solar Walk, or Milky Way;
Yet ſimple Nature to his Hope has giv'n,
Behind the cloud-topt Hill, an humbler Heav'n;
To *be* contents his natural Deſire,
He aſks no Angel's Wing, or Seraph's Fire, *&c.*
l. 95, *& ſeq.*

What are we to conclude from hence? That Mr. *Pope* intended to diſcourage all Improvements of the human Underſtanding? or that it was only his Deſign to deter Men from Impiety, and from preſuming to *rejudge the Juſtice* of their Creator? Mr. *Crouſaz*, contrary to common Senſe, and the whole Tenor of the Epiſtle, has choſen the former Part; though Mr. *Pope* had immediately added,

Go wiſer thou, and in thy Scale of Senſe
Weigh thy Opinion againſt Providence.
Call Imperfection what thou fancy'ſt ſuch,
Say, Here he gives too little, there too much;
Deſtroy all Creatures for thy Sport or Guſt:
Yet cry, If Man's unhappy, God's unjuſt. l. 109, *& ſeq.*

But

But to this, the *Commentator*:—" To whom does Mr. *Pope* ad-
" dreſs himſelf in this long Period? Is it to thoſe preſumptuous
" Men, who are continually confounding themſelves, and abuſing
" the Fruitfulneſs of their Imaginations, to teize good Chriſtians
" with Objections againſt Providence? Their Raſhneſs and Im-
" patience well deſerve, in my Opinion, the Cenſures Mr. *Pope*
" here inflicts upon them *."—Wonderful! Our Logician has, at length, diſcovered the Subject of Mr. *Pope's* Epiſtle. Why then did he not do Juſtice to Truth, by ſtriking out all the reſt of his Remarks? For if this be right, all the reſt muſt, of conſequence, be wrong.

Mr. *Pope* ſays, ſpeaking of the End of Providence,

> As much that End a conſtant Courſe requires
> Of Showers and Sunſhine, as of Man's Deſires;
> As much eternal Springs and cloudleſs Skies,
> As Men for ever temp'rate, calm and wiſe. l. 147, *& ſeq.*

On which the *Examiner*, " A continual Spring and a Heaven
" without Clouds would be fatal to the Earth and its Inhabitants;
" but can we regard it as a Misfortune that Men ſhould be always
" ſage, calm and temperate? I am quite in the dark as to this
" Compariſon †." Let us try if we can drag him into light, as unwilling as he is to ſee. The Argument ſtands thus.—Preſumptuous Man complains of moral Evil; Mr. *Pope* checks and informs him thus: The Evil, ſays he, you complain of, tends to univerſal Good; for as Clouds, and Rain, and Tempeſt, are neceſſary to preſerve Health and Plenty in this ſublunary World, ſo the *Evils* that ſpring from diſorder'd Paſſions are neceſſary.—To what? Not to Man's Happineſs here, but to the Perfection of the Univerſe in general. So that,

> If Plagues or Earthquakes break not Heaven's Deſign,
> Why then a *Borgia* or a *Catiline*?

* Commentaire, p. 79. † Examen de l'Eſſai, &c.

On

On which the Examiner thus descants,—"These Lines have no "Sense but on the System of *Leibnitz*, which confounds Morals with "Physics; and in which, all that we call Pleasures, Grief, Contentment, "Inquietude, Wisdom, Virtue, Truth, Error, Vices, Crimes, Abomi- "nations, are the inevitable Consequence of a fatal Chain of Things "as ancient as the World. But this is it which renders the System "so horrible, that all honest Men must shudder at it. It is, in- "deed, sufficient to humble human Nature, to reflect that this "was invented by a Man, and that other Men have adopted it *." This is, indeed, very tragical; but we have shewn above, that it hath its Sense on the *Platonic*, not the *Leibnitzian* System; and besides, that the Context confines us to that Sense.

What hath misled the Examiner is his supposing the Comparison to be between the Effects of *two Things in this sublunary World*; when not only the *Elegancy*, but the *Justness of it* consists in its being between the *Effects* of a Thing in the *Universe at large*, and the familiar and known *Effects* of one in *this sublunary World*. For the *Position* inforced in these Lines is this, *that partial Evil tends to the Good of the Whole*:

> *Respecting Man*, whatever Wrong we call,
> May, must be right, as relative *to all*. l. 51.

How does the Poet inforce it? Why, if you will believe the Examiner, by illustrating the Effects of partial moral Evil in a particular System, by that of partial natural Evil in the *same* System, and so leaves his *Position* in the lurch; but we must never believe the great Poet reasons like the *Logician*. The Way to prove his Point he knew was to illustrate the Effect of partial moral Evil in the *Universe*, by partial natural Evil in a *particular System*. Whether partial moral Evil tend to the Good of the Universe, being a *Question*, which by reason of our Ignorance of *many* Parts of that Universe, we cannot decide, but from known Effects; the Rules of Argument require that it be proved by *Analogy*, *i. e.* setting it

* Examen de l'Essai, &c.

by

by, and comparing it with a Thing *certain*; and it is a Thing *certain*, that partial natural Evil tends to the Good of our *particular Syſtem*. This is his Argument: And thus, we ſee, it ſtands clear of Mr. *De Crouſaz's* Objection, and of *Leibnitz's Fataliſm*.

After having inforced this analogical *Poſition*, the Poet then indeed, in order to ſtrengthen and ſupport it, employs the ſame Inſtance of natural Evil, to ſhew that, even here to *Man*, as well as to the *Whole*, *moral Evil* is productive of Good, by the gracious Diſpoſition of Providence, who turns it deviouſly from its natural Tendency.

Mr. *Pope* then adds,

> From Pride, from Pride, our very Reaſoning ſprings;
> Account for moral, as for nat'ral Things:
> Why charge we Heaven in thoſe, in theſe acquit?
> In both, to reaſon right, is to ſubmit. l. 153, *& ſeq.*

Our *Commentator* aſks—"Why, then, does Mr. *Pope* pretend to "reaſon upon the Matter, and rear his Head ſo high, and decide "ſo dogmatically, upon the moſt important of all Subjects*?" This is indeed pleaſant. Suppoſe Mr. *De Crouſaz* ſhould undertake to ſhew the Folly of pretending to penetrate into the Myſteries of *revealed* Religion, as here Mr. *Pope* has done of *natural*, muſt he not emplcy the Succours of Reaſon? And could he conclude his Reaſonings with greater Truth and Modeſty, than in the Words of Mr. *Pope?—To reaſon right, is to ſubmit*.—But he goes on, "If you will believe him [Mr. *Pope*] the Sovereign Perfections "of the eternal Being have *inevitably* determined him to create this "Univerſe, becauſe the Idea of it was the moſt perfect of all thoſe "which repreſented many poſſible Worlds. Notwithſtanding, "there is nothing perfect in this Part, which is aſſigned for our "Habitation: it ſwarms with Imperfections; it is God who is the "Cauſe of them, and it was not in his Power to contrive Matters "otherwiſe. The Poet had not the Caution to recur to Man's

* Commentaire, p. 94.

"Abuſe

"Abuſe of his own Free-will, the true Source of all our Miſeries, "and which are agreeable to that State of Diſorder in which Men "live by their own Fault *." I will venture to ſay, every Part of this Reflection is falſe and calumnious. The firſt Part of it, that the *Eternal Being*, according to Mr. *Pope*, *was inevitably* determined, and that he *had not Power to contrive Matters otherwiſe*, I have already ſhewn to be ſo. It is ſtill a more unpardonable Calumny to ſay that Mr. *Pope has thrown the Cauſe of moral Evil upon God, and had not the Caution to recur to Man's Abuſe of his own Free-will:* For Mr. *De Crouſaz* could not but ſee that the Poet had, in ſo many Words, thrown the Cauſe entirely upon *that Abuſe*, where, ſpeaking of natural and moral Evil, he ſays,

> What makes all Phyſical and Moral Ill!
> There deviates Nature, and here WANDERS WILL,
> GOD SENDS NOT ILL. Ep. iv. l. 109, *& ſeq.*

When he had ſaid this, and acquitted the ſupreme Cauſe, he then informs us what is God's Agency, after Natural and Moral Evil had been thus produced by the Deviation of Nature, and Depravity of Will; namely that he hath ſo contrived, in his infinite Wiſdom and Goodneſs, that Good ſhall ariſe from this Evil.

> ——If rightly underſtood,
> Or partial Ill is univerſal Good,
> Or Chance admits, or Nature lets it fall,
> Short and but rare, till Man improv'd it all. l. 111, *& ſeq.*

And ſpeaking in another Place of God's Providence, he ſays,

> That counterworks each Folly and Caprice,
> That diſappoints th' Effects of ev'ry Vice. Ep. ii. l. 229.

What is this but bringing Good out of Evil? And how diſtant is that from being the Cauſe of Evil?

* Commentaire, p. 94, 95.

After this, a *Philoſopher* ſhould never think of writing more till he had rectified what he had already wrote ſo much amiſs.

The next Paſſage the *Examiner* attacks is the following:

Better for us, perhaps, it might appear,
Were there all Harmony, all Virtue here;
That never Air or Ocean felt the Wind;
That never Paſſion diſcompos'd the Mind:
But all ſubſiſts by elemental Strife,
And Paſſions are the Elements of Life. I. 157, *& ſeq.*

Here the Examiner upbraids Mr. *Pope* for degrading himſelf ſo far as to write to the groſs Prejudices of the People. "In the cor-"poreal Nature (ſays he) there is no Piece of Matter that is per-"fectly ſimple; all are compoſed of ſmall Particles, called ele-"mentary; from their Mixture, proceeds a Fermentation, ſome-"times weak, and ſometimes ſtrong, which ſtill farther attenuates "theſe Particles: and thus agitated and divided, they ſerve for "the Nouriſhment and Growth of organic Bodies; to this Growth "it is we give the Name of Life. But what have the Paſſions in "common with theſe Particles? Do their Mixture and Fermenta-"tion ſerve for the Nouriſhment of that Subſtance which thinks, "and do they conſtitute the Life of that Subſtance *?" Thus Mr. *De Crouſaz*, who, as, a little before, he could not ſee the *Nature* of the Compariſon, ſo here, by a more deplorable Blindneſs, could not ſee that there was *any* Compariſon *at all*. "You, ſays "Mr. *Pope*, perhaps may think it would be better, that neither "Air nor Ocean was vexed with Tempeſts, nor that the Mind "was ever diſcompoſed by Paſſion; but conſider, that as in the "one Caſe our *material* Syſtem is ſupported by the Strife of its "elementary Particles, ſo in the *Intellectual*, the Paſſions of the "Mind are, as it were, the Elements of *human Life*, *i. e.* Actions." All here is clear, ſolid, and well-reaſoned, and hath been conſidered

* Examen de l'Eſſai.

above.

above. What muſt we ſay then to our *Examiner's* wild Talk of *the Mixture and Fermentation of elementary Particles of Matter for the Nouriſhment of that Subſtance that thinks, and of its conſtituting the Life of that Subſtance?* I call it the Examiner's, for, you ſee, it is not Mr. *Pope's*; and Mr. *Creuſaz* ought to be charged with it, becauſe it may be queſtioned whether it was a *ſimple Blunder*, he urging it ſo invidiouſly as to inſinuate that Mr. *Pope* might probably hold the *Materiality of the Soul.* However, if it was a Miſtake, it was a pleaſant one, and aroſe from the Ambiguity of the Word *Life*, which in *Engliſh*, as *la Vie* in *French*, ſignifies both *Exiſtence* and *human Action*, and is always to have its Senſe determined by the Context.

Mr. *Pope* ſays, ſpeaking of the Brute Creation,

Nature to theſe, without Profuſion, kind,
The proper Organs, proper Powers aſſign'd. l. 171.

Mr. *Crouſaz* obſerves, that "In this Verſe, by the Term *Na-*
"*ture*, we muſt neceſſarily underſtand the *Author of Nature*; it
"is a Figure much in Uſe. SPINOZA has employ'd all his Meta-
"phyſics to confound theſe two Significations *." Therefore, I ſuppoſe, Mr. *Pope* muſt not employ the Word at all, though it be to vindicate it from that *Abuſe*, by diſtinguiſhing its *different* Significations. But this we are to conſider as a Touch of our Logician's Art. It is what they call *Argumentum ad invidiam.*

The Poet,

For as Creation's ample Range extends,
The Scale of ſenſual, mental Powers aſcends:
Mark how it mounts to *Man's imperial Race*,
From the green Myriads in the peopled Graſs.

Ep. i. l. 199, & *ſeq.*

On this the *Commentator*, "That Place of Honour, which the
"Poet has refuſed to Man in another Part of his Epiſtle, he gives

* Commentaire, p. 99.

" him here, becauſe it ſerves to embelliſh and perfect the Grada-
" tion. At every Step Mr. *Pope* forgets one of thoſe principal and
" moſt eſſential Rules, which Mr. *Des Cartes* lays down in his
" *Method*; that is, exactly to review what one aſſerts, ſo that *no*
" *Part* be found to be *gratis dictum*, nor the *Whole* repugnant to
" itſelf *." This we are to underſtand, as ſaid, διαλεκτικῶς. But I ſhall beg leave to obſerve that our Logician here gives his Leſſons very impertinently. For, that Mr. *Pope*, in calling the *Race of Man imperial*, hath beſtowed no Title on him in this Place, which he had denied him elſewhere. He, with great Piety and Prudence, ſuppoſes what the Scripture tells us to be true, *that Man was created Lord of this inferior World*; he *ſuppoſes* it, I ſay, in theſe Lines of this very Epiſtle:

Without this juſt Gradation could they be
Subjected theſe to thoſe, and *all to thee?*
The Powers of all ſubdued by thee alone,
Is not thy Reaſon all thoſe Powers in one? l. 221, *&c. ſeq.*

He *expreſsly aſſerts* it in the *third Epiſtle*:

Heaven's Attribute was univerſal Care,
And *Man's Prerogative to rule*, but ſpare. l. 160.

And this, in the very Place where he gives the Deſcription of Man in Paradiſe.

What miſled our Critic ſo far as to imagine Mr. *Pope* had here contradicted himſelf was, I ſuppoſe, ſuch Paſſages as theſe:

Aſk for what End the heavenly Bodies ſhine, *&c.*

And again:

Has God, thou Fool! work'd ſolely for thy Good, *&c.*

But in Truth this is ſo far from a Contradiction to what was ſaid before of *Man's Prerogative*, that it is a Confirmation of it, and of what the Scripture tells us concerning it. And becauſe this Matter

* Commentaire, p. 108.

has

has been miſtaken, to the Diſcredit of the Poet's religious Sentiments, by Readers, whom the Conduct of certain licentious Writers, treating this Subject in an abuſive Way, hath rendered jealous and miſtruſtful, I ſhall endeavour to explain it. Scripture ſays, that Man was made *Lord* of All.—But this Lord, become, at length, intoxicated with Pride, the common Effect of Sovereignty, erected himſelf, like particular Monarchs, into a *Tyrant*. And as *Tyranny* conſiſts in ſuppoſing *all made for the Uſe of one*; he took thoſe Freedoms with *all*, that are conſequent on ſuch a Principle. He ſoon began to conſider the whole Animal Creation as his *Slaves*, rather than his *Subjects*; as being created for no Uſe of *their own*, but for *his* only; and therefore uſed them with the utmoſt Barbarity: And not ſo content; to add *Inſult* to his *Cruelty*, he endeavoured to philoſophiſe himſelf into an Opinion, that *Animals* were mere *Machines*, inſenſible of Pain or Pleaſure. And thus, as Mr. *Pope* ſays, *Man* affected to be the *Wit*, as well as *Tyrant of the Whole* *. Our *Commentator* can tell us what deep Philoſopher it was that invented this witty Syſtem, and by the Aſſiſtance of what METHOD ſo wonderful a Diſcovery was brought to Light. It became then one who adhered to the Scripture Account of *Man's Dominion*, to reprove this Abuſe of it, and to ſhew that,

Heaven's Attribute was *univerſal Care*,
And *Man's Prerogative to rule*, BUT SPARE.

The poetical Tranſlator † has turned the Words, *to Man's imperial Race*, by

Juſqu'à l'Homme, *ce Chef*, *ce Roy de l'Univers!*
Even to Man, *this Head*, *this King of the Univerſe*.

Which is ſo ſad a Blunder, that it contradicts Mr. *Pope's* whole Syſtem. Who, although he allows Man to be King of this inferior

* Grant that the Powerful ſtill the Weak controul,
Be *Man* the *Wit* and *Tyrant* of the whole. Ep. iii. 54.

† M. L'Abbé du Reſnel.

World,

World, is far from thinking him *King of the Univerſe*. If the Syſtem itſelf could not teach him this, yet methinks the following Lines of this very Epiſtle might:

So Man, who here ſeems *Principal* alone,
Perhaps acts *Second* to ſome Sphere unknown. l. 57.

If the Tranſlator imagined Mr. *Pope* was here ſpeaking *ironically*, where he talks of *Man's imperial Race*, and ſo would heighten the Ridicule by *ce Roy de l'Univers*, the Miſtake is ſtill worſe; the Force of the Argument depending upon its being ſaid *ſeriouſly*. For the Poet is ſpeaking of a Scale, from the *higheſt* to the loweſt, in the Mundane Syſtem.

But now we come to the famous Paſſage which is to fix the Charge:

All are but Parts of one ſtupendous Whole,
Whoſe Body Nature is, and God the Soul.
That, chang'd through all, and yet in all the ſame,
Great in the Earth as in th' Etherial Frame,
Warms in the Sun, refreſhes in the Breeze,
Glows in the Stars, and bloſſoms in the Trees,
Lives thro' all Life, extends thro' all Extent,
Spreads undivided, operates unſpent,
Breathes in our Soul, informs our mortal Part,
As full, as perfect, in a Hair as Heart;
As full, as perfect, in vile Man that mourns,
As the rapt Seraph that adores and burns:
To him no high, no low, no great, no ſmall;
He fills, he bounds, connects, and equals all.
Ep. i. l. 259, *& ſeq.*

On which our *Examiner*, blind to the Light of Reaſon, as well as *deaf* to the *Charms* of Harmony—*A Spinoziſt* (ſays he) *would expreſs himſelf in this Manner* *. I believe he would, and ſo would

* Examen de l'Eſſai.

St.

St. *Paul* too, writing on the ſame Subject, namely, the Omnipreſence of God in his Providence, and in his Subſtance. *In him we live and move and have our Being* * ; *i. e.* we are *Parts* of him, *his Offspring*, as the *Greek* Poet, a *Pantheiſt*, quoted by the Apoſtle, obſerves : and the Reaſon is, becauſe a religious *Theiſt*, and an impious *Pantheiſt*, both profeſs to believe the Omnipreſence of God. But would *Spinoza*, as Mr. *Pope* does, call God *the great directing Mind of all*, who hath intentionally created a perfect Univerſe †?" Or would Mr. *Pope*, like *Spinoza*, ſay there is but one univerſal Subſtance in the Univerſe, and that blind too? We know *Spinoza* would not ſay the firſt; and we ought not to think Mr. *Pope* would ſay the latter, becauſe he ſays the direct contrary throughout the Poem. Now it is *this* latter only that is *Spinoziſm*.

But this ſublime Deſcription of the Godhead contains not only the *Divinity* of St. *Paul*; but, if that will not ſatisfy, the *Philoſophy* likewiſe of Sir *Iſaac Newton*.

The Poet ſays,

All are but *Parts* of one ſtupendous Whole,
Whoſe Body Nature is, and God the *Soul*.

The *Philoſopher*, "Deus omnipræſens eſt, non per *Virtutem* ſolam, "ſed etiam per SUBSTANTIAM: nam *Virtus* ſine *Subſtantia* ſubſiſtere "non poteſt ‡."

Mr. *Pope*,

That, chang'd thro' all, and *yet in all the ſame*,
Great in the Earth as in th' Etherial Frame,
Warms in the Sun, *refreſhes* in the Breeze,
Glows in the Stars, and *bloſſoms* in the Trees,
Lives thro' all Life, *extends thro' all Extent*,
Spreads undivided, operates unſpent.

* *For in him we live and move, and have our Being; as certain alſo of your own Poets have ſaid, For we are alſo his Offspring*, Acts xvii. 28.

†, For that is the Meaning of

All Nature is but Art, unknown to thee;
All Chance, Direction which thou canſt not ſee.

‡ Newtoni Principia Schol. gener. ſub finem.

Sir

Sir *Iſaac Newton*—" In ipſo continentur et moventur univerſa, " ſed *abſque mutua paſſione.* Deus *nihil patitur* ex corporum moti- " bus; illa *nullam ſentiunt reſiſtentiam* ex Omni-præſentia Dei.— " *Corpore omni* et figura corporea deſtituitur *.—*Omnia regit et* " *omnia cognoſcit.*—Cum unaquæque ſpatii particula ſit *ſemper*, et " unumquodque Durationis indiviſibile momentum, *ubique*, certe " rerum omnium Fabricator ac Dominus non erit *nunquam*, *nuſ-* " *quam* †."

Mr. *Pope*,

Breathes in our Soul, informs our mortal Part,
As full, as perfect, in a Hair as Heart;
As full, as perfect, in vile Man that mourns,
As the rapt Seraph that adores and burns:
To him no high, no low, no great, no ſmall;
He fills, he bounds, connects, and equals all.

Sir *Iſaac Newton*—" Annon ex Phænomenis conſtat eſſe Entem " Incorporeum, Viventem, Intelligentem, Omnipræſentem, qui in " ſpatio infinito, tanquam ſenſorio ſuo, *Res ipſas* intime cernat, " penituſque perſpiciat, *totaſque intra ſe præſens præſentes complec-* " *tatur* ‡."

But now admitting, for Argument's ſake, that there was an Ambiguity in theſe Expreſſions, ſo great, as that a *Spinoziſt* might employ them to expreſs his own particular Principles; and ſuch a thing might well be, without any Reflection on the *Poet's* Religion, or Exactneſs as a Writer, becauſe it is none on the *Apoſtle's*, who actually did that which Mr. *Pope* is not only falſely, but, as we ſee from this Inſtance, fooliſhly accuſed of doing, and becauſe the *Spinoziſts*, in order to hide the Impiety of their Principle, are uſed to expreſs the *Omnipreſence* of God in Terms that any religious Theiſt might employ: In this Caſe, I ſay, how are we to judge of the Poet's Meaning? Surely by the whole Tenor of his Argument.

* Newtoni Principia Schol. gener. ſub finem. † Id. ib.
‡ Opticæ Quæſt. 20.

Now

Now take the Words in the Senſe of the *Spinoziſts*, and he is made, in the Concluſion of his Epiſtle, to overthrow all he has been advancing throughout the Body of it: For *Spinoziſm* is the Deſtruction of an Univerſe, where every thing tends, by a foreſeen Contrivance in all its Parts, to the Perfection of the *Whole*. But allow him to employ the Paſſage in the Senſe of St. *Paul*, *that we and all Creatures live, and move, and have our Being in God*, and then it will be ſeen to be the moſt logical Support of all that had preceded. For the Poet having, as we ſay, laboured through his Epiſtle, to prove that every Thing in the Univerſe tends, by a foreſeen Contrivance, and a preſent Direction of all its Parts, to the Perfection of the *Whole*; it might be objected that ſuch a Diſpoſition of Things implying in God a painful, operoſe, and inconceivable Extent of Providence, it could not be ſuppoſed that ſuch Care extended to *all*, but was confined to the more noble Parts of the Creation. This groſs Conception of the *Firſt Cauſe*, the Poet expoſes, by ſhewing that God is equally and intimately preſent to every Particle of Matter, to every Sort of Subſtance, and in every Inſtant of Being.

And how truly, may be ſeen by *the Inquiry into the Nature of the human Soul*, wrote expreſſly againſt *Spinoziſm*, where the excellent Author has ſhewn the Neceſſity of the *immediate Influence of God*, in every Moment of Time, to keep Matter from falling back into its primitive Nothing.

The *Examiner* goes on: "Mr. *Pope* hath Reaſon to call this "Whole, a *ſtupendous Whole*; nothing being more paradoxical and "incredible, if we take his Deſcription literally *." I will add, nor nothing more ſo than St. *Paul's*, *in him we live, and move, and have our Being*, if taken *literally*. I have met with one who took it ſo, and from thence concluded, with great Reach of Wit, *that* SPACE *was* GOD.

But Mr. *Pope* having ſaid of God, that he,

Breathes in our Soul, informs our mortal Part,
As full, as perfect, in a Hair as Heart:"

* Examen de l'Eſſai.

the *Commentator* remarks, that "one ſhould make a criminal Abuſe "of theſe pompous Expreſſions, if once launched out, with SPI- "NOZA, to confound the Subſtance of God with our own; and to "imagine that the Subſtance of what we call *Creature*, is the ſame "with that Being's, to which we give the Name of *Creator* *." *Spinoza* is ſtill the Burthen of the Song. To cut this Matter ſhort, we ſhall therefore give Mr. *Pope's* own plain Words and Sentiments, in a Line of this very Eſſay, that overturn all *Spinoziſm* from its very Foundations: Where, ſpeaking of what *Common Senſe* taught Mankind, before *falſe Senſe* had depraved the Underſtanding, he ſays,

> THE WORKER FROM THE WORK DISTINCT WAS KNOWN,
> And ſimple Reaſon never ſought but one. Ep. iii. l. 230.

But the *Commentator* is, at every Turn, crying out, *A Follower of* Spinoza *would expreſs himſelf juſt ſo.* I believe he might; and ſure Mr. *Crouſaz* could not be ignorant of the Reaſon. It being ſo well known that that unhappy Man, the better to diſguiſe his Atheiſm, covered it with ſuch Expreſſions as kept it long concealed even from thoſe Friends and Acquaintance with whom he moſt intimately correſponded. Hence it muſt neceſſarily happen, that every the beſt intentioned, moſt religious Writer will employ many Phraſes, that a *Spinoziſt* would uſe, in the Explanation of his Impiety.

To perſiſt, therefore, from henceforth, in this Accuſation, will deſerve a Name, which it is not my Buſineſs to beſtow.

Mr. *Pope* concludes thus:

> Ceaſe then, nor Order Imperfection name:
> Our proper Bliſs depends on what we blame.
> Know thy own Point: this kind, this due Degree
> Of Blindneſs, Weakneſs, Heaven beſtows on thee.

* Commentaire.

Submit.—In this, or any other Sphere,
Secure to be as bleſt as thou canſt bear:
Safe in the Hand of one diſpoſing Power,
Or in the natal, or the mortal Hour. l. 273, *& ſeq.*

" The Heart gives itſelf up (ſays Mr. *De Crouſaz*) to the Mag-
" nificence of theſe Words.—But I aſk Mr. *Pope*, with regard to
" ſuch conſolatory Ideas, whether he was not beholden, in ſome
" Meaſure, to Religion for them *?" This is in the true Spirit of modern Controverſy.—Our Logician had taken it into his Head, that the Poet had no Religion; though he does not pretend his Proofs riſe higher than to a legitimate Suſpicion; and finding here a Paſſage that ſpoke plainly to the contrary, inſtead of retracting that raſh uncharitable Opinion, he would turn this very Evidence of his own Miſtake into a new Proof for the Support of it; and ſo inſinuate, you ſee, that Mr. *Pope* had here contradicted himſelf. He then preaches, for two Pages together, on the Paſſage, and ends in theſe Words: " From all this I conclude, that the Verſes
" in Queſtion are altogether edifying in the Mouth of an honeſt
" Man, but that they give Scandal and appear profane in the
" Mouth of an ill one †." How exactly can *Rome* and *Geneva* jump on Occaſion! So the Conclave adjudged, that thoſe Propoſitions, which in the Mouth of St. *Auſtin* were altogether edifying, became ſcandalous and profane in the Mouth of *Janſenius*.

But the Examiner purſues the Poet to the very End, and cavils even at thoſe Lines, which might have ſet him right in his Miſtakes about the Senſe of all the reſt.

All Nature is but Art, unknown to thee;
All Chance, Direction which thou canſt not ſee;
All Diſcord, Harmony not underſtood;
All partial Evil, univerſal Good;
And ſpite of Pride, in erring Reaſon's Spite,
One Truth is clear, *Whatever is, is* RIGHT.

* Commentaire, p. 124, 125. † Ib. p. 127.

" See (ſays our *Examiner*) Mr. *Pope's* general Concluſion, *all that* " *is, is right.* So that at the Sight of *Charles* the Firſt loſing his " Head on the Scaffold, Mr. *Pope* muſt have ſaid, *this is right*; at " the Sight too of his Judges condemning him, he muſt have ſaid, " *this is right*; at the Sight of ſome of theſe Judges, taken and con- " demned for the Action which he had owned to be right, he " muſt have cried out, *this is doubly right* *."

How unaccountable is this Perverſeneſs! Mr. *Pope*, in this very *Epiſtle*, has himſelf *thus* explained *Whatever is, is right*,

> Reſpecting Man, whatever wrong we call,
> May, muſt be right, as relative to *all*,
> —So Man, who here ſeems Principal alone,
> Perhaps acts Second to ſome Sphere unknown,
> Touches ſome Wheel, or verges to ſome Goal;
> 'Tis but a Part we ſee, and not a Whole. l. 51, *& ſeq.*

But it is amazing that the Abſurdities ariſing from the Senſe in which the Examiner takes Mr. *Pope's* grand Principle, *Whatever is, is right*, could not ſhew him his Miſtake: For could any one in his Senſes employ a Propoſition in a Meaning from whence ſuch evident Abſurdities immediately ariſe? I had obſerved, that this *Concluſion* of Mr. *Pope's*, *that whatever is, is right*, is a Conſequence of his *Principle*, that *partial Evil tends to univerſal Good*. This ſhews us the only Senſe in which the Propoſition can be underſtood, namely, that WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT, WITH REGARD TO THE DISPOSITION OF GOD, AND TO ITS ULTIMATE TENDENCY. Now is this any Encouragement to Vice? Or does it take off from the Crime of him who commits it, that God providentially produces Good out of Evil? Had Mr. *Pope* abruptly ſaid in his Concluſion, *the Reſult of all is, that whatever is, is right*, Mr. *De Crouſaz* had even then been inexcuſable for putting ſo abſurd a Senſe upon the Words, when he might have

* Examen de l'Eſſai.

ſeen

ſeen that it was a *Coucluſion* from the general *Principle* above-mentioned; and therefore muſt neceſſarily have another Meaning: But what muſt we think of him? when the Poet, to prevent Miſtakes, had delivered in this very place, the *Principle* itſelf, together with this *Concluſion* as the Conſequence of it:

All Diſcord, Harmony not underſtood;
All partial Evil, univerſal Good;
And ſpight of Pride, in erring Reaſon's Spight,
One Truth is clear, *Whatever is, is right.*

I cannot ſee how he could have told his Reader plainer, that *this Concluſion* was the Conſequence of *that* Principle, unleſs he had wrote THEREFORE, in great Church Letters.

Thus have I gone through what I found material in Mr. *De Crouſaz's Examen* and *Commentary* on the *firſt* Epiſtle: I will only obſerve, that he has, in ſeveral Places, charged Mr. *Pope* with pretended Abſurdities and Impieties, for which his *free* Tranſlator * is only anſwerable. But as he profeſſes not to underſtand *Engliſh*, thoſe Things might have been paſſed over, had he not had, at the ſame time, a very exact and excellent Tranſlation in proſe †, by which he might have diſcovered the Miſtakes of the other. Notwithſtanding that, he has choſen to follow a Verſion abounding in Abſurdities; becauſe it gave him frequent Opportunity to calumniate. On this account therefore, it may not be amiſs to give an Inſtance or two of theſe confederate Miſrepreſentations, as a Specimen of this Part of the Performance, likewiſe.

The Tranſlator ſays,

Il ne deſire point cette celeſte Flame,
Qui des purs Seraphins devore, et nourrit l'Ame ‡.

That is, the Savage *does not deſire that heavenly Flame, which, at the ſame time that it devours the Souls of pure Seraphims, nouriſhes them.* Mr. *De Crouſaz* remarks: "Mr. *Pope*, by exalting the Fire

* Mr. Reſnel. † By Mr. De Silhouette. ‡ Commentaire, p. 77.

"of

" of his Poetry by an Antitheſis, throws, occaſionally, his Ridicule " on thoſe heavenly Spirits. The *Indian*, ſays the Poet, contents " himſelf without any thing of that Flame, which devours at the " ſame time that it nouriſhes." But Mr. *Pope* is altogether free from this Imputation; nothing can be more grave or ſober than his *Engliſh* on this Occaſion:

To *be*, contents his natural Deſire;
He aſks no Angel's Wing or Seraph's Fire. l. 105.

But neither, I dare ſay, did the Tranſlator mean any Thing of Ridicule in his *devore & nourrit l'ame*. It is the ſober ſolid Jargon of the Schools; and Mr. *l'Abbé* no doubt had frequently heard it from the Benches of the *Sorbonne*. Indeed had a Writer like Mr. *Pope* uſed ſuch an Expreſſion, one might have ſuſpected that he was not ſo ſerious as he ſhould be.

The Poet, ſpeaking of God's Omnipreſence, ſays,

As full, as perfect, in vile Man that mourns,
As the rapt Seraph that adores and burns. l. 269.

Which Mr. *l'Abbé* has thus tranſlated,

Dans un homme ignore ſous une humble chaumiere,
Que dans le Seraphin, rayonnant de lumiere *.

That is, *as well in the ignorant Man, who inhabits an humble Cottage, as in the Seraphim encompaſſed with Rays of Light*. Our *Frenchman* here, in good earneſt, thought, that *a vile Man that mourned* could be none but ſome poor Inhabitant of a Country Cottage. Which has betrayed Mr. *De Crouſaz* into this important Remark: " For all that, we ſometimes find in Perſons of the loweſt " Rank, a Fund of Probity and Reſignation, that preſerves them " from Contempt; their Minds are indeed but narrow, yet fitted " to their Station, *&c.*" But Mr. *Pope* had no ſuch childiſh Idea in his head. He was oppoſing here the *human Species* to the *angelic*,

* Commentaire, p. 120.

lic, and ſo ſpoke of *that*, when compared to *this*, as vile and diſconſolate. The Force and Beauty of the Reflection depend on this Senſe, and, what is more, the Propriety of it; and it is amazing that neither the *Tranſlator* nor the *Critic* could ſee it. There are many Miſtakes of this Nature, both of one and the other, throughout the *Tranſlation* and the *Commentary*, which perhaps we may have occaſion to take notice of as we proceed.

In a Word, if it were of ſuch Men as our Commentator that Mr. *Pope* ſpeaks, when he expreſſes his Contempt for Modern Philoſophers, he might well ſay,

> Yes, I deſpiſe the Man to Books confin'd,
> Who from his Study rails at human Kind,
> Though what he learns he ſpeaks, and may advance
> Some general Maxims, or be right by Chance.

LETTER

LETTER II.

HARD hath been the Fate of our great Countryman, to fall into the hands of ſuch a *Critic* and *Tranſlator*. We have already ſeen how Mr. *De Crouſaz* hath diſcharged himſelf. I now turn to M. *l'Abbé du Reſnel*, whoſe Sufficiency at leaſt equals the Malice and Calumny of the other; and is attended with juſt the ſame Iſſue.

I have ſhewn, in my firſt Letter, that this noble Production of human Wit and Reaſon is as ſingular for its philoſophical *Exactneſs of Method*, as for its poetical Sublimity of Style.

Yet hear how our Tranſlator deſcants upon the Matter: "The "only reaſon for which this Poem can be properly termed an "*Eſſay*, is, that the Author has not formed his Plan with all the "Regularity of Method which it might have admitted."—And again,—"I would not willingly have made uſe, in my Verſion, "of any other Liberties than ſuch as the Author himſelf muſt have "taken, had he attempted a *French* Tranſlation of his own Work; "but I was by the unanimous Opinion of all thoſe whom I have "conſulted on this Occaſion, and, amongſt theſe, of ſeveral *Eng-*"*liſhmen*, compleatly ſkilled in both Languages, *obliged to follow* "*a different Method. The* French *are not ſatisfied with Sentiments* "however beautiful, *unleſs they are methodically diſpoſed; Method* "*being the Characteriſtic that diſtinguiſhes our Performances from thoſe* "*of our Neighbours*, and almoſt the only Excellence which they

"agree

"agree to allow us. That Mr. *Pope* did not think himself con-
"fined to *a regular Plan*, I have already obſerved. I have there-
"fore, by a neceſſary Compliance with our Taſte, divided it into
"*Five Cantos* *." But the Reader will ſee preſently, that our Tranſlator was ſo far from being able to judge of Mr. *Pope's Method*, that he did not even underſtand either his *Subject* or his *Senſe*, on which *all Method* is to be regulated.

For I now come to the Poet's *ſecond Epiſtle*. He had ſhewn, in the *firſt*, that the Ways of God are too high for our Comprehenſion; whence he rightly concludes, that

The proper Study of *Mankind* is *Man*.

This *Concluſion*, from the Reaſoning of the *firſt* Epiſtle, he methodically makes the Subject of his *Introduction* to the *ſecond*; which treats of *Man's Nature*. But here immediately the Accuſers of Providence would be apt to object, and ſay, "Admit that we had
"run into an Extreme, while we pretended to cenſure or penetrate
"the Deſigns of Providence, a Matter indeed too high for us; yet
"have you gone as far into the Oppoſite, while you only ſend us to
"the Knowledge of ourſelves. You muſt mock us when you talk
"of this as a *Study*; for ſure we are intimately acquainted with
"ourſelves. The proper Concluſion therefore from your Demon-
"ſtration of our Inability to comprehend the Ways of GOD, is,
"that we ſhould turn ourſelves to the Study of the Frame of NA-
"TURE." Thus, I ſay, would they be apt to object; for there are no Sort of Men more elate with *Pride* than theſe *Freethinkers*; the Effects of which the Poet hath ſo well expoſed in his *firſt* Epiſtle, eſpecially that Kind of Pride, which conſiſts in a boaſted Knowledge of their own Nature. Hence we ſee the general Argument of the late Books againſt Religion turns on a ſuppoſed Inconſiſtency between Revelation, and what they preſume to call the eternal Dictates of human Nature. The Poet therefore, to convince them

* See Engliſh Tranſlation of his Preface.

that this Study is leſs eaſy than they imagine, replies [from l. 2 to 19] to the *firſt Part* of the Objection, by deſcribing the dark and feeble State of the *human Underſtanding*, with regard to the *Knowledge of ourſelves*: And farther, to ſtrengthen this Argument, he ſhews, in anſwer to the *ſecond Part* of the Objection [from l. 18 to 31] that the higheſt Advances in natural Knowledge may be eaſily acquired, and yet we all the while continue very ignorant of ourſelves. For that neither the *cleareſt* Science, which reſults from the *Newtonian* Philoſophy, nor the *moſt ſublime*, which is taught by the *Platonic*, will at all aſſiſt us in this *Self-Study*; nay, what is more, that Religion itſelf, when grown *Fanatical and Enthuſiaſtic*, will be equally uſeleſs: though pure and ſober Religion will beſt inſtruct us in Man's Nature, that Knowledge being eſſential to Religion, whoſe *Subject* is Man, conſidered in all his Relations, and conſequently whoſe *Object* is God.

To give this *ſecond* Argument its full Force, he illuſtrates it [from l. 30 to 43] by the nobleſt Example that ever was in Science, the incomparable NEWTON, whom he makes ſo ſuperior to *Humanity*, as to repreſent the *Angelic Beings* in doubt, when they obſerved him of late unfold all the Law of Nature, whether he was not to be reckon'd in their Number; juſt as Men, when they ſee the ſurprizing Marks of Reaſon in an *Ape*, are almoſt tempted to think him of their own Species. Yet this *wondrous Creature*, who ſaw ſo far into the Works of *Nature*, could go no farther in *human* Knowledge, than the Generality of his Kind. For which the Poet aſſigns this very juſt and adequate Cauſe: In all other Sciences, the Underſtanding is unchecked and uncontrouled by any oppoſite Principle; but in *the Science of Man*, the *Paſſions* overturn, as faſt as *Reaſon* can build up.

Alas, what Wonder! Man's ſuperior Part
Uncheck'd may riſe, and climb from Art to Art;
But when his own great Work is but begun,
What Reaſon weaves, by Paſſion is undone.

This

This is a brief Account of the Poet's fine Reaſoning in his Introduction. The Whole of which his poetical Tranſlator has ſo miſerably miſtaken, that, of one of the moſt ſtrong and beſt connected Arguments, he has rendered it the moſt obſcure and inconſiſtent, which even the officious *Commentator* could ſcarce make worſe by his important and candid Remarks. Thus beautifully does Mr. *Pope* deſcribe Man's Weakneſs and Blindneſs, with regard to his own Nature:

—Plac'd on this Iſthmus of a middle State,
A Being darkly wiſe, and rudely great;
With too much Knowledge for the Sceptic Side,
With too much Weakneſs for the Stoic's Pride,
He hangs between; in doubt to act, or reſt;
In doubt to deem himſelf a God, or Beaſt;
In doubt, his Mind, or Body to prefer,
Born but to die, and reaſoning but to err.

And as he hath given this Deſcription of Man, for the very contrary Purpoſe to which *Sceptics* are wont to employ ſuch Kind of Paintings, namely, not to deter Men from the *Search*, but to excite them to the *Diſcovery* of *Truth*; he hath, with great Judgment, repreſented Man as doubting and wavering between the *right* and *wrong* Object; from which State there are great *Hopes* he may be relieved by a careful and circumſpect Uſe of Reaſon. On the contrary, had he ſuppoſed Man ſo blind as to be buſied in chuſing, or doubtful in his Choice, between two Objects *equally wrong*, the Caſe had appeared deſperate; and all *Study* of Man had been effectually *diſcouraged*. But his Tranſlator not ſeeing into the Force and Beauty of this Conduct, hath run into the very Abſurdity I have here ſhewn Mr. *Pope* hath ſo artfully avoided.

The Poet ſays,

Man hangs between; in doubt to ACT, or REST.

Now he tells us 'tis Man's Duty to *Act*, not to *Reſt*, as the

Stoics thought; and to their Principle this latter Word alludes, he having juſt before mentioned that *Sect* *, whoſe Virtue, as he ſays, is

—fix'd as in a Froſt;
Contracted all, retiring to the Breaſt:
But Strength of Mind is EXERCISE, not *Reſt*. l. 92, *& ſeq.*

But the Tranſlator is not for mincing Matters.

Seroit-il en naiſſant *au travail condamné?*
Aux *douceurs du repos* ſeroit-il deſtiné!

According to him, Man doubts whether he be condemned to *a ſlaviſh Toil and Labour*, or deſtined to the *Luxury of Repoſe*; neither of which is the Condition whereto Providence deſigned him. This therefore contradicts the Poet's whole Purpoſe, which is to recommend the Study of Man, on a Suppoſition that it will enable him to determine *rightly* in his *Doubts* between the *true* and *falſe* Object. 'Tis on this Account he ſays,

Alike in Ignorance, his Reaſon ſuch,
Whether he thinks too *little*, or too *much*;
Chaos of Thought and Paſſion, all confus'd,
Still by *himſelf abus'd*, or *diſabus'd*.

i. e. the proper Sphere of his Reaſon is ſo narrow, and the Exerciſe of it ſo nice, that the too immoderate Uſe of it is attended with the ſame Ignorance that proceeds from the not uſing it at all. Yet, though in both theſe Caſes, he is *abuſed by himſelf*, he has it ſtill in his own Power to *diſabuſe himſelf*, in making his *Paſſions* ſubſervient to the *Means*, and regulating his *Reaſon* by the *End of Life*. Mr. *De Crouſaz* himſelf had ſome Glimmering of the Abſurdity of thoſe two Lines of the Tranſlator: And becauſe he ſhall not ſay, I allow him to have ſaid nothing reaſonable throughout his whole *Commentary*, I will here tranſcribe his very Words:

* With too much Weakneſs for the *Stoic's* Pride.

"Ce

" Ce qui fait encore, que les Antitheſes frapent au lieu d'inſtruire,
" c'eſt qu'elles ſont outrées. *L'Homme n'ait-il condamné au travail?*
" *Doit-il ſe permettre la moleſſe et le repos?* Quel ſujet de decou-
" ragement ou de trouble, ſi l'on n'avoit de choix qu'entre deux
" partis ſi contraires? Mais nous ne naiſſons ni deſtinés à un
" repos oiſif, ni condamnés á un travail accablant et inhumain."
p. 138.

Again, Mr. *Pope*,

In doubt to deem himſelf a *God*, or *Beaſt*.

i. e. He doubts, as appears from the Line immediately following this *, whether his Soul be *Mortal* or *Immortal*; one of which is the Truth, namely, its Immortality, as the Poet himſelf teaches, when he ſpeaks of the Omnipreſence of God:

Breathes in our *Soul*, informs our *mortal* Part. 1 Ep. l. 267.

The Tranſlator, as we ſay, unconſcious of the Poet's Purpoſe, rambles, as before:

Tantôt de ſon eſprit admirant l'Excellence,
Il penſe qu'il eſt Dieu, *qu'il en a la puiſſance*;
Et tantôt gemiſſant des beſoins de ſon Corps,
Il croit que de la brute, il n'a que les *reſorts*.

Here his Head (turned to a ſceptical View) was running on the different Extravagances of *Plato* in his *Divinity*, and of *Des Cartes* in his *Philoſophy*. Sometimes, ſays he, Man thinks himſelf a *real God*, and ſometimes again a *meer Machine*; Things quite out of Mr. *Pope's* Thoughts in this Place.

Again, the Poet, in a beautiful Alluſion to the Sentiments and Words of *Scripture*, breaks out into this juſt and moral Reflection upon *Man's* Condition here,

Born but to die, and reaſoning but to err.

* In doubt his *Mind* or *Body* to prefer.

The

The Tranſlator turns this fine and ſober Thought into the moſt outrageous Scepticiſm;

Ce n'eſt que pour mourir, qu'il eſt né, qu'il reſpire,
Et *tout ſa raiſon n'eſt preſque qu'un delire:*

and ſo makes his Author directly contradict himſelf, where he ſays of Man, that he hath

—too much Knowledge for the Sceptic Side.

Strange! that the Tranſlator could not ſee his Author's Meaning was, that, as we are *born to die* and yet enjoy ſome ſmall Portion of Life; ſo, though we *reaſon to err*, yet we comprehend ſome few Truths. Strange! that he could not ſee the Difference between that weak State of Reaſon, in which Error mixes itſelf with all its true Concluſions concerning Man's Nature; and *an abſtract Quality, which we vainly call Reaſon, but which*, he tells us, *is indeed ſcarce any thing elſe but Madneſs.* One would think he paid little Attention to the concluding Words of this ſublime Deſcription, where the Poet tells us, Man was

Created *half to riſe*, and half to fall;
Great Lord of all Things, yet a Prey to all;
Sole Judge of Truth, in endleſs Error hurl'd:
The *Glory*, Jeſt, and Riddle of the World.

Indeed he paid ſo much, as to contrive how he might pervert them to a Senſe conſiſtent with his

Et tout ſa raiſon n'eſt preſque qu'un *delire:*

Which he does in theſe Words:

Tantôt feu, tantôt ſage, il change A CHAQUE INSTANT.

This is indeed making a *Madman* of this *ſole Judge of Truth*, to all Intents and Purpoſes. But Mr. *Pope* ſays nothing of his *changing every Moment from Sage to Fool*; he only ſays, that Folly and Wiſdom are the inſeparate Partage of *Humanity:* Which is quite another Thing.

But

But *Miſtakes*, like *Misfortunes*, ſeldom come ſingle; and the reaſon is the ſame, in both caſes, becauſe they influence one another. For the Tranſlator, having miſtaken both the *Nature* and *End* of the Deſcription of the Weakneſs of human Nature, imagined the Poet's *ſecond* Argument for the Difficulty of the *Study of Man*, which ſhews, that the *cleareſt* and *ſublimeſt* Science is no Aſſiſtance to it, nor even Religion itſelf, when grown *Fanatical and Enthuſiaſtic*; he imagined, I ſay, that this fine Argument was an *Illuſtration* only of the foregoing Deſcription, in which Illuſtration, Inſtances were given of the ſeveral *Extravagances in falſe Science*; whereas the Poet's Deſign was, juſt the contrary, to ſhew the prodigious Vigour of the human Mind, in Studies which do not relate to itſelf; and yet that all its Force, together with thoſe Effects of it, avail little in this Inquiry.

But there was another Cauſe of the *Tranſlator's* Error; he had miſtaken, as we ſay, the Poet's *firſt* Argument for a Deſcription of the Weakneſs of the human Mind with regard to *all Truth*; whereas it is only ſuch with regard to the *Knowledge of Man's Nature*. This led him, as it would ſeem, to conclude, that, if Mr. *Pope* were to be underſtood as ſpeaking *here* in his *ſecond* Argument, of real and great Progreſs in *Science*, it would *contradict* what had been ſaid in the Deſcription; and therefore, out of Tenderneſs to his Author, he turns it all to imaginary *Hypotheſes*.

Let us take the whole Context.

I.

Go, wondrous Creature! mount where Science guides,
Go meaſure Earth, weigh Air, and ſtate the Tides;
Shew by what Laws the wand'ring Planets ſtray,
Correct old Time, and teach the Sun his Way.

II.

Go ſoar, with *Plato*, to th' Empyreal Sphere,
To the firſt Good, firſt Perfect, and firſt Fair;

III.

III.

Or tread the mazy Round his Followers trod,
And quitting Senſe call imitating God.
Go teach eternal Wiſdom how to rule,
Then drop into thyſelf, and be a Fool.

Mr. *Pope*, ſays, *Go, wondrous Creature*; and he never ſpeaks at random. The Reaſon of his giving Man this Epithet is, becauſe, though he be, as the Poet ſays, in another Place *, *little leſs than Angel* in his Faculties of Science, yet is he miſerably blind in the Knowledge of himſelf. But the *Tranſlator* not apprehending the Poet's Thought, imagined it was ſaid ironically, and ſo tranſlates it;

Va, ſublime Mortel, fier de ton Excellence,
Ne crois rien d'impoſſible à ton Intelligence.

Mr. *Pope*—

—Mount where Science guides,
Go meaſure Earth, weigh Air, and ſtate the Tides;
Shew by what Laws the wand'ring Planets ſtray;
Correct old Time, and teach the Sun his Way.

This is a *Deſcription* of the *real* Advances in Science, ſuch as the *Newtonian*. And the very Introduction to it,—*Mount where* Science *guides*, ſhews it to be ſo.

But the Tranſlator, carried away with the Fancy of its being an *Illuſtration* of the foregoing Deſcription, turns the Whole to *vain*, *falſe*, *imaginary* Science, ſuch as that of *Des Cartes*:

Le Compas à la main, *meſure l'univerſe*;
Regle *à ton gré* le flux et le reflux des mers;
Fixe le poids de l'air, et *commande* aux planetes;
Determine le cours de leurs marches ſecretes;

* Ep. i. l. 166.

Soumets

Soumets à ton calcul l'Obſcurité des tems,
Et de l'Aſtre du jour conduis les movemens.

Here, in order to add the greater ridicule to his falſe Senſe, he introduces the Philoſopher, *with Compaſs in hand, meaſuring the Univerſe*, mimicking the Office of God in the Act of Creation, as he is repreſented by the Ancients, who uſed to ſay, Ὁ Θεὸς γεωμέτρει. Whereas Mr. *Pope's* Words are,

Go meaſure Earth—

Alluding to the noble and uſeful Project of the modern Mathematicians to meaſure a Degree at the Equator and the polar Circle, in order to determine the true Figure of the Earth, of great Importance to Aſtronomy and Navigation.

Regulate, ſays he, *according to your own Will, the Flux and Reflux of the Sea*; and this, *Des Cartes* preſumed to do: But it was *Newton* that *ſtated the Tides*. It is the pretended Philoſopher that *fixes the Weight of the Air*; but the real Philoſopher that *weighs Air*. It was *Des Cartes* that *commanded the Planets, and determined them to roll according to his own good Pleaſure*; but it was *Newton* who

Shew'd by what Laws the wand'ring Planets ſtray.

Submit, ſays the Tranſlator, *the Obſcurity of Time to your Calculation*.—The Poet ſays,

Correct old Time.

He is here ſtill ſpeaking of *Newton*. *Correct old Time* alludes to that great Man's *Grecian Chronology*, which he reformed on thoſe two ſublime Conceptions, the *Difference between the Reigns of Kings, and the Generations of Men*, and *the Poſitions of the* Colures *of the Equinox and Solſtices, at the time of the* Argonautic *Expedition.*

And when the Tranſlator comes to the *third* Inſtance, which is that of *falſe Religion*, he introduceth it thus,

Et joignant la folie à la *temerité.*

Which ſhews how ill he underſtood Mr. *Pope's* Inſtances of the *Natural Philoſophy* of *Newton*, and the *Metaphyſical Philoſophy* of *Plato*. And yet all the Juſtneſs, the Force, and Sublimity of the Poet's Reaſoning conſiſt in a right Apprehenſion of them.

Mr. *Pope*—

Go teach Eternal Wiſdom how to rule,
Then drop into thyſelf, and be a Fool.

Theſe *two* Lines have only contributed to keep the Tranſlator in his Error; for he took the *firſt* of them to be a *Recapitulation* of all that had been ſaid from l. 18. Whereas *both* of them together, are a *Concluſion* from it, to this Effect: "Go now, vain Man, "elated with thy Acquirements in *real* Science and *imaginary* In-"timacy with God; Go and run into all the Extravagances I "have exploded in the firſt Epiſtle, *where* thou pretendedſt to "teach Providence how to govern; then drop into the Obſcu-"rities of thy own Nature, and thereby manifeſt thy Ignorance "and Folly."

Mr. *Pope* then confirms and illuſtrates this Reaſoning by one of the greateſt Examples that ever was:

Superior Beings, when of late they ſaw
A mortal Man unfold all Nature's Law,
Admir'd ſuch Wiſdom in an earthly Shape,
And ſhew'd a NEWTON, as we ſhew an *Ape*.

In theſe Lines he ſpeaks to this Effect.—"But to make you "fully ſenſible of the Difficulty of this Study, I ſhall inſtance in the "great *Newton* himſelf; whom when ſuperior Beings, not long "ſince, ſaw capable of unfolding the whole Law of Nature, they "were in doubt whether the Owner of ſuch prodigious Science "ſhould not be reckoned of their own Order; juſt as Men, when "they ſee the ſurpriſing Marks of Reaſon in an Ape, are almoſt "tempted to rank him with their own Kind. And yet this won-"drous Man could go no farther in the Knowledge of his own Na-"ture, than the Generality of his Species."

Thus

Thus ſtands the Argument, in which the Poet has paid a higher Compliment to the great *Newton*, as well as a more ingenious, than was ever yet paid him by any of his moſt zealous Followers: Yet the Tranſlator, now quite in the dark, by Miſtake upon Miſtake, imagined his Deſign was to depreciate *Newton's* Knowledge, and to humble the Pride of his Followers: Which hath made him play at croſs Purpoſes with his Original:

Des celeſtes Eſprits la vive Intelligence
Regarde avec pitie notre foible Science;
Newton, le grand *Newton*, que nos admirons tous,
Eſt peut-etre pour eux, ce qu'un Singe eſt pour nous.

"The heavenly Spirits, whoſe Underſtanding is ſo far ſuperior "to ours, look down with Pity on the Weakneſs of human "Science; *Newton*, the great *Newton*, whom we ſo much ad- "mire, is perhaps in no higher Eſteem with them, than an Ape "is with us."

But it is not their *Pity*, but their *Admiration*, that is the Subject in Queſtion: And it was for no ſlight Cauſe they admired; it was to ſee *a mortal Man unfold the whole Law of Nature*: which, by the way, might have ſhewn the Tranſlator, that the Poet was ſpeaking of *real* Science in the foregoing Paragraph. Nor was it Mr. *Pope's* Intention to bring any of the Ape's *Qualities*, but its *Sagacity*, into the Compariſon. But why the *Ape's*, it may be ſaid, rather than the Sagacity of ſome more decent Animal; particularly *the half-reaſoning Elephant*, as the Poet calls it, which, as well on Account of this its Superiority, as for its having no ridiculous Side, like the *Ape*, on which it could be viewed, ſeems better to have deſerved this Honour? I reply, Becauſe as none but a Shape reſembling human, accompanied with great Sagacity, could occaſion the Doubt of that Animal's relation to Man, the Ape only having that Reſemblance, no other Animal was fitted for the Compariſon. And on this Ground of Relation the whole Beauty of the Thought depends; *Newton*, and thoſe ſuperior Beings being

equally immortal Spirits, though of different Orders. And here let me take notice of a new Species of the *Sublime*, of which our Poet may be juſtly ſaid to be the Maker; ſo new that we have yet no Name for it, though of a Nature diſtinct from every other poetical Excellence. The two great Perfections of Works of Genius are *Wit* and *Sublimity*. Many Writers have been *witty*, ſeveral have been *ſublime*, and ſome few have even poſſeſſed both theſe Qualities *ſeparately*. But none that I know of, beſides our Poet, hath had the Art to *incorporate* them. Of which he hath given many Examples, both in this Eſſay, and in his other Poems. One of the nobleſt being the Paſſage in Queſtion. This ſeems to be the laſt Effort of the Imagination, to poetical Perfection. And in this compounded Excellence the Wit receives a *Dignity* from the Sublime, and the Sublime a *Splendour* from the Wit; which, in their State of ſeparate Exiſtence, they both wanted.

To return, This Miſtake ſeems to have led both the *Tranſlator* and *Commentator* into a much worſe; into a ſtrange Imagination that Mr. *Pope* had here reflected upon Sir *Iſaac Newton's* moral Character; which the Poet was as far from doing, as the Philoſopher was from deſerving: For,

After Mr. *Pope* had ſhewn, by this illuſtrious Inſtance, that a great Genius might make prodigious Advances in the Knowledge of *Nature*, and at the ſame time remain very ignorant of *himſelf*, he gives a Reaſon for it:—In all other Sciences the Underſtanding has no oppoſite Principle to cloud and biaſs it; but in the Knowledge of Man, the *Paſſions* obſcure as faſt as *Reaſon* can clear up.

> Could he, whoſe *Rules the rapid Comet bind*,
> Deſcribe, or fix, one Movement of the Mind?
> Who ſaw thoſe Fires *here riſe, and there deſcend* *,
> Explain his own Beginning, or his End?

Alas,

* Sir *Iſaac Newton* in calculating the *Velocity* of a *Comet's* Motion, and the Courſe it deſcribes, when it becomes viſible in its Deſcent to, and Aſcent from the Sun, conjectured,

Alas, what Wonder! Man's ſuperior Part
Uncheck'd may riſe, and climb from Art to Art;
But when his Own great Work is but begun,
What Reaſon weaves, by Paſſion is undone.

Here we ſee, at the fifth Line, the Poet turns from *Newton*, and ſpeaks of *Man* and his *Nature* in general. But the *Tranſlator* applies all that follows to that Philoſopher:

Toi qui juſques aux cieux oſes porter ta vue,
Qui crois en concevoir et l'ordre et l'etendue,
Toi qui veux dans leur cours, leur preſcrire la loi,
Sçais-tu regler ton cœur, ſçais-tu regner ſur toi?
Ton eſprit qui ſur tout vainement ſe fatigue,
Avide de ſçavoir, ne connoit point de digue;
De quoi par ſes travaux s'eſt-il rendu certain?
Peut-il te decouvrir ton principe et ta fin?

On which the *Commentator* thus candidly remarks; "It is not "to be diſputed, but that whatever Progreſs a great Genius hath "made in Science, he deſerves rather Cenſure than Applauſe, if "he has ſpent that Time in barren Speculations, curious indeed, "but of little Uſe, which he ſhould have employ'd to know him-"ſelf, *his Beginning and his End*, and how to regulate his Con-"duct; and if, inſtead of that Candour and Humanity, and Deſire "to oblige, Virtues ſo becoming our Nature, he be over-run with "Ambition, Envy, and a Rage of Preheminence, whoſe Violence "and Rancour are attended with the moſt ſcandalous Effects, of "which there are too many Inſtances; *Vices which* Mr. Newton "*lived and died an entire Stranger to* *."

jectured, with the higheſt Appearance of Truth, that they revolve perpetually round the Sun, in *Ellipſes* vaſtly excentrical, and very nearly approaching to *Parabolas*. In which he was greatly confirmed, in obſerving between two Comets a Coincidence in their *Perihelions*, and a perfect Agreement in their Velocities.

* Commentaire, p. 147.

I have

I have tranſcribed this Paſſage to expoſe the malignant Motives the *Commentator* appears to have had in writing againſt the *Eſſay on Man*. As to the *Tranſlator*, it would be indeed harder to know what Motives he could have in tranſlating it, for it is plain he did not underſtand it. Yet this is he who tells us, that *the Author of the Eſſay has not formed his Plan with all the Regularity of Method which it might have admitted; that he was obliged to follow a different Method; for that the* French *are not ſatisfied with Sentiments however beautiful, unleſs they be methodically diſpoſed, Method being the Characteriſtic that diſtinguiſhes their Performances from thoſe of their Neighbours.*

Thus neither did the *Critic*, nor *Tranſlator*, ſuſpect (and never were poor Men ſo miſerably bit) that

> Thoſe oft' are Stratagems which Errors ſeem,
> Nor is it *Homer* nods, but we that dream.

The poetical Tranſlator could not imagine ſo great a Poet would pique himſelf upon cloſe Reaſoning; and the faſtidious Philoſopher, of courſe, concluded, that a Man of ſo much Wit could hardly reaſon well; ſo neither of them gave a proper Attention to the Poet's Syſtem. A Syſtem logically cloſe, though wrote in Verſe, and complete, though ſtudiouſly conciſe: This ſecond Epiſtle particularly (the Subject of the preſent Letter) containing the trueſt, cleareſt, ſhorteſt, and conſequently the beſt Account of the Origin, Uſe, and End of the Paſſions, that is, in my Opinion, any where to be met with. Which I now proceed to conſider, in the ſame ſtrict Manner I have ſcrutinized the *Introduction*. For our Poet's Works want nothing but to be fairly examined by the ſevereſt Rules of Logic and good Philoſophy, to become as illuſtrious for their Senſe, as they have long been for their Wit and Poetry.

I go on therefore to the Body of the Diſcourſe; which, as plain as it is, I find Mr. *De Crouſaz* has made a Shift (though extremely free with his Inſinuations of Irreligion and *Spinoziſm*) to miſtake from

from End to End. So true is the old Saying, *Homine imperito nihil eſt iniquius.*

The Poet having thus ſhewn the Difficulty attending the *Study of Man*, proceeds to our Aſſiſtance in laying before us the *Elements* or true *Principle* of this *Science*, in an Account of the Origin, Uſe, and End, of the Paſſions. He begins [from l. 42 to 49] with pointing out the *two* grand *Principles* in human Nature, SELF-LOVE and REASON. Deſcribes their *general* Nature: The firſt *ſets* Man upon acting, the other *regulates his Action.* However, theſe Principles are *natural*, not *moral*: And, therefore, *in themſelves*, neither *good* nor *bad*; but *ſo*, only as they are *directed.*

Nor this a *good*, nor that a *bad* we call,
Each works its End, to move or govern all;
And to their *proper* Operation ſtill
Aſcribe all *Good*, to their *improper Ill.*

This Obſervation is made with great Judgment, in Oppoſition to the deſperate Folly of thoſe *Fanatics*, who, as the *Aſcetic*, pretend to eradicate *Self-Love*; as the *Myſtic*, would ſtifle *Reaſon*; and *both*, on the abſurd Fancy of their being *moral*, not *natural* Principles.

The Poet proceeds [from l. 48 to 57] more *minutely* to mark out the diſtinct Offices of theſe *two Principles*, which he had before aſſigned only in *general*; and here he ſhews their *Neceſſity*; for without *Self-Love*, as the *Spring*, Man would be *unactive*, and without Reaſon, as the *Balance*, active to *no Purpoſe.*

Fixt like a Plant on his peculiar Spot,
To draw Nutrition, propagate, and rot:
Or, Meteor-like, flame lawleſs through the Void,
Deſtroying others, by himſelf deſtroy'd.

Having thus explained the *Ends* and *Offices* of each Principle, he goes on [from l. 56 to 69] to ſpeak of their *Qualities*: And ſhews how they are fitted to diſcharge thoſe Functions, and anſwer their reſpective

reſpective *Intentions*. The Buſineſs of *Self-Love* being to excite to Action, it is quick and impetuous; and moving inſtinctively, has, like *Attraction*, its Force prodigiouſly increaſed as the Object approaches, and proportionably leſſened as that recedes. On the contrary, *Reaſon*, like the *Author of Attraction*, is always calm and ſedate, and equally preſerves itſelf, whether the Object be near, or far off. Hence the *moving* Principle is made more *ſtrong*; though the *reſtraining* be more *quick-ſighted*. The Conſequence he draws from this is, that, if we would not be carried away to our Deſtruction, we muſt always keep Reaſon upon Guard.

But it would be objected, that if this Account be true, human Life would be *moſt* miſerable, and, even in the wiſeſt, a perpetual Conflict between *Reaſon* and the *Paſſions*. To this therefore the Poet replies [from l. 68 to 71.] *Firſt*, that Providence has ſo graciouſly contrived, that even in the voluntary Exerciſe of *Reaſon*, as in the mere mechanic Motion of a Limb, *Habit* makes that, which was at firſt done with Pain, eaſy and natural. And, *ſecondly*, that the *Experience* gained by the long Exerciſe of *Reaſon* goes a great Way towards *eluding* the Force of *Self-love*. Now, the *attending to Reaſon*, as here recommended, will gain us this *Habit* and *Experience*.

> *Attention*, Habit and Experience gains;
> Each ſtrengthens Reaſon, and Self-love reſtrains.

Hence it appears, that this Station in which Reaſon is to be kept conſtantly upon Guard, is not ſo uneaſy a one as may be at firſt imagined.

From this Deſcription of *Self-love* and *Reaſon* it follows, as the Poet obſerves [from l. 70 to 83] that both conſpire to one *End*, namely, *human Happineſs*, though they be not equally expert in the Choice of the Means; the Difference being this, that the *firſt* haſtily ſeizes every thing which has the *Appearance* of Good; the *other* weighs and examines whether it *be indeed* what it appears.

This

This ſhews, as he next obſerves, the Folly of the *Schoolmen*, who conſider them as two *oppoſite* Principles, the one *Good*, and the other *Ill:* The Obſervation is ſeaſonable and judicious; for this dangerous *School-Opinion* gives great Support to the *Manichean* or *Zoroaſtran* Error, the Confutation of which was one of the Author's chief Ends of Writing. For if there be two Principles in Man, a *good* and *bad*, it is natural to think him the joint Product of the two *Manichean* Deities (the firſt of which contributed to his *Reaſon*, the other to his *Paſſions*) rather than the Creature of *one individual Cauſe*. This was *Plutarch's* Notion, and, as we may ſee in him, of the more ancient *Manicheans*. It was of Importance therefore to reprobate and ſubvert a Notion that ſerved to the Support of ſo dangerous an Error. And this the Poet has done with more Force and Clearneſs than is often to be found in whole Volumes wrote againſt that heretical Opinion:

Let ſubtile Schoolmen teach theſe Friends to fight,
More ſtudious to *divide*, than to unite;
And Grace and Virtue, Senſe and Reaſon ſplit,
With all the raſh Dexterity of Wit.

But the *French* Tranſlator has miſtaken theſe Lines for a Reflection, not on the *Theology*, as Mr. *Pope* intended them, but on the *Logic* of the *Schools*, with which the Poet had here nothing to do. This, it is true, delights in *Diſtinctions* without *Difference*, which is indeed a Fault, but not of ſo high Malignity as the other: *that*, which the Poet cenſures, leading directly into Error; *this*, which his Tranſlator reproves, only hindering our Progreſs in Truth or Science.

Qu'un Scholaſtique vain cherchant à *diſcourir*
Cache la Verité loin de la découvrir,
Que, par un *long tiſſu d'Argumens inutiles*,
Par des tours ambigus, par des raiſons *inutiles*,
Voulant tout diviſer juſques à l'infini,
Il ſepare avec art ce qui doit être uni.

Now, though this Fault in the *Logic of the Schools* be univerſally owned and condemned by all *out of them*, and by no one more than by Mr. *De Crouſaz* himſelf, in his Books of *Logic*, yet in pure Contradiction to Mr. *Pope*, who, as he thought, had condemned it, he could not forbear ſaying, *A Poet may happen to write with more Elegance than a Schoolman, and yet for all that not be able to expreſs himſelf with more Juſtneſs and Preciſion* *.

The Poet having given this Account of the Nature of *Self-love* in *general*, comes now to *anatomize* it, in a Diſcourſe of the PASSIONS, which he aptly names the *Modes of Self-love*; the Object of all theſe, he ſhews [from l. 82 to 91] is *Good*; and when under the Guidance of Reaſon, *real Good*; either of our own, or of another; for ſome *Goods* not being capable of Diviſion or Communication, and *Reaſon*, at the ſame time, directing us to provide for ourſelves, we therefore, in purſuit of theſe Objects, ſometimes aim at *our own* Good, ſometimes at the Good of *others*; when fairly aiming at our own, the *Paſſion* is called *Prudence*, when at another's, *Virtue*.

Hence (as he ſhews from l. 90 to 95) appears the Folly of the *Stoics*, who would *eradicate* the Paſſions, Things ſo neceſſary both to the Good of the *Individual*, and of the *Kind*. Which prepoſterous Method of promoting Virtue, he therefore very reaſonably reproves. But as it was from Obſervation of the Evils occaſioned by the Paſſions, that the *Stoics* thus extravagantly projected their Extirpation, the Poet recurs [from l. 94 to 101] to his grand Principle, ſo often before, and to ſo good Purpoſe, inſiſted on, that

— partial Ill is univerſal Good:

and ſhews, that, though the Tempeſt of the Paſſions, like that of the Air, may tear and ravage ſome few Parts of Nature in its Paſſage, yet the ſalutary Agitation produced by it preſerves the whole in Life and Vigour. This is his *firſt* Argument againſt the *Stoics*, which he illuſtrates by a very beautiful Similitude, on a Hint taken from Scripture Story †:

* Commentaire, p. 152.

† 1 Kings xix. 11, 12.

Nor

Nor God alone in the *ſtill Calm* we find,
He mounts the *Storm*, and walks upon the Wind.

But the Tranſlator, not taking this Alluſion, has turn'd it thus:

Dieu lui-même, Dieu ſort de *ſon profond repos*.

And ſo has made an *Epicurean* God of the Governor of the Univerſe, of whom Scripture afforded Mr. *Pope* this grand and ſublime Idea. Mr. *De Crouſaz* does not ſpare this Expreſſion of *God's coming out of his profound Repoſe*.—*It is* (ſays he) *exceſſively poetical, and preſents us with Ideas which we ought not to dwell upon.* But when he goes on—*(there is nothing in God's directing the Storm which can authoriſe the Paſſions that diſturb our Happineſs* *), he talks very impertinently. Mr. *Pope* is not here arguing from *Analogy*, that as God raiſes and heightens the *Storm*, ſo ſhould we raiſe and heighten the *Paſſions*. The Words are only a ſimple Affirmation in the poetic Dreſs of a Similitude, to this Purpoſe.—"Good is not only "produced by the Subdual of the Paſſions, but by the turbulent "Exerciſe of them:"

Nor *God* alone *in the ſtill Calm* we find,
He mounts the *Storm*, and *walks upon the Wind*.

A Truth conveyed under the moſt ſublime Imagery that Poetry could conceive or paint. For he is here only ſhewing the providential Effects of the Paſſions, and how, by *God's* gracious Diſpoſition, they are turned away from their natural Biaſs, to promote the Happineſs of Mankind. As to the Method in which they are to be treated by *Man*, in whom they are found, all that he contends for, in favour of them, is only this, that they ſhould not be quite rooted up and deſtroyed, as the *Stoics*, and their Followers in all Religions, fooliſhly attempted. For the reſt, he conſtantly repeats this Advice:

The Action of the *Stronger* to ſuſpend,
REASON ſtill uſe, to REASON ſtill attend.

* Commentaire, p. 158.

His *ſecond* Argument againſt the *Stoics* [from l. 100 to 113] is, that *Paſſions* go to the Compoſition of a *moral Character*, juſt as *Elementary Particles* go to the Compoſition of an *organized Body*: Therefore, for Man to go about to deſtroy what compoſes his very Being, is the Height of Extravagance: It is true, he tells us that theſe *Paſſions* which in their natural State, like *Elements*, are in perpetual Jar, muſt be tempered, ſoftened, and united, in order to perfect the Work of the *great plaſtic Artiſt*; who, in this Office, employs human *Reaſon*: Whoſe Buſineſs it is to follow the *Road of Nature*, and to obſerve the *Dictates of the Deity*. *Follow her and God.* The Uſe and Importance of this Precept is evident: For in doing the *firſt*, ſhe will diſcover the Abſurdity of attempting to eradicate the Paſſions; in doing the *ſecond*, ſhe will learn how to make them ſubſervient to the Intereſt of Virtue:

> Suffice that Reaſon keep to *Nature's* Road,
> Subject, compound them, follow *her* and *God.*
> Love, Hope, and Joy, fair Pleaſure's ſmiling Train,
> Hate, Fear, and Grief, the Family of Pain,
> Theſe mixt with Art, and to due Bounds confin'd,
> Make and maintain the Balance of the Mind.

His *third* Argument againſt the *Stoics* [from l. 112 to 117] is, that the Paſſions occaſion in us a perpetual Excitement to the Purſuit of Happineſs; which without theſe powerful Inciters we ſhould neglect, in an inſenſible Indolence. Now *Happineſs* is the *End* of our Creation; and this *Excitement* the *Means* of *Happineſs*: Therefore theſe Movers, the *Paſſions*, are the Inſtruments of God, which he has put into the Hands of Reaſon, to work withal:

> Pleaſures are ever in our Hands or Eyes,
> And when in Act they ceaſe, in Proſpect riſe;
> Preſent to graſp, and future ſtill to find,
> The whole Employ of Body and of Mind.

The

The Poet then proceeds in his Subject; and this laſt Obſervation leads him naturally to the Diſcuſſion of his next Principle. He ſhews then, that though all the *Paſſions* have their Turn in ſwaying the Determinations of the Mind, yet every Man has one MASTER PASSION that at length ſtifles or abſorbs all the reſt. The *Fact* he illuſtrates at large, in the *firſt Epiſtle of his ſecond Book*. Here [from l. 116 to 132] he gives us the *Cauſe* of it: "Thoſe "Pleaſures or Goods, which are the Objects of the Paſſions, af-"fect the Mind, by ſtriking on the Senſes; but, as through the "Formation of the Organs of the human Frame, every Man has "ſome Senſe ſtronger and more acute than others, the Object, "which ſtrikes that ſtronger or acuter Senſe, whatever it be, will "be the Object moſt deſired; and, conſequently, the Purſuit of that "will be the *ruling Paſſion*:"

All ſpread their Charms, but charm not all alike,
On different Senſes different Objects ſtrike;
Hence different Paſſions more or leſs inflame,
As ſtrong, or weak, the Organs of the Frame;
And hence one *Maſter Paſſion* in the Breaſt,
Like *Aaron's* Serpent, ſwallows all the reſt.

—that the Difference of Force in this *ruling Paſſion* ſhall at firſt, perhaps, be very ſmall or even imperceptible; but *Nature*, *Habit*, *Imagination*, *Wit*, nay even *Reaſon* itſelf, ſhall aſſiſt its Growth, till it hath at length drawn and converted every other into itſelf.

All this is delivered in a Strain of Poetry ſo wonderfully ſublime, as ſuſpends for a while the *ruling Paſſion* in every Reader, and ingroſſes his whole Admiration:

As Man, perhaps, the Moment of his Breath
Receives the lurking Principle of Death;
The young Diſeaſe, that muſt ſubdue at length,
Grows with his Growth, and ſtrengthens with his Strength:
So, caſt and mingled with his very Frame,
The Mind's Diſeaſe, its RULING PASSION came:

Each

Each vital Humour which ſhould feed the whole,
Soon flows to this, in Body and in Soul;
Whatever warms the Heart, or fills the Head,
As the Mind opens, and its Functions ſpread,
Imagination plies her dangerous Art,
And pours it all upon the peccant Part.
Nature its Mother, Habit is its Nurſe;
Wit, Spirit, Faculties, but make it worſe;
Reaſon itſelf but gives its Edge and Power,
As Heaven's bleſt Beam turns Vinegar more ſour *.

This naturally leads the Poet to lament the *Weakneſs and Inſufficiency of human Reaſon* [from l. 138 to 151]; and the honeſt Purpoſe he had in ſo doing was, plainly to intimate the Neceſſity of a more ſublime Diſpenſation to Mankind:

We, wretched Subjects, though to lawful Sway,
In this weak Queen ſome Fav'rite ſtill obey.
Ah! if ſhe lend not *Arms* as well as Rules,
What can ſhe more than tell us we are Fools?
Teach us to mourn our Nature, not to mend,
A ſharp Accuſer, but a helpleſs Friend!

St. *Paul* himſelf did not chuſe to employ other Arguments, when diſpoſed to give us the higheſt Idea of the Uſefulneſs of *Chriſtianity* †. But, it may be, the Poet finds a Remedy in *natural Religion*: Far from it. He here leaves Reaſon unrelieved. What

* The Poet, in ſome other of his *Epiſtles*, gives Examples of the Doctrine and Precepts here delivered. Thus, in that of the Uſe of Riches, he has illuſtrated this Truth in the Character of *Cotta*:

Old *Cotta* ſham'd his Fortune and his Birth,
Yet was not Cotta *void of Wit or Worth.*
What though (the Uſe of barb'rous Spits forgot)
His Kitchen vied in Coolneſs with his Grot?
If *Cotta* liv'd on Pulſe, *it was no more*
Than Bramins, Saints, and Sages, did before.

† See his Epiſtle to the Romans, c. vii.

is

is this then but an Intimation that we ought to ſeek for a Cure in that Religion which only dares profeſs to give it?

But Mr. *De Crouſaz* ſays, the Poet, in this Repreſentation of human Reaſon, has contradicted what he ſaid of it in the 80th and 98th Lines of this Epiſtle. And, poſſeſſed with this Notion, he goes on, in his declamatory Way, ſo unworthy a grave Logician: *Does Mr.* Pope *take a Pleaſure in blowing hot and cold, in giving us ſucceſſively the Sweet and Bitter, to reduce us to ſuch a State that we may not know what to ſtick to? If there be no ill Deſign at Bottom in theſe Contradictions, but that they only ſpring from the imprudent Cuſtom, eſtabliſhed in the Schools, of talking Pro and Con* *, &c. And then tells an idle common-place Story of Cardinal *Perron*. In the mean time it happens that this is no Contradiction at all, or, if it be, it is that very Contradiction into which St. *Paul* likewiſe fell, when he ſo continually recommended the Uſe of Reaſon, and yet ſo energetically deſcribed its Imbecillity and Impotence. But as our *Logician* ſaid before, on a like Occaſion, *this might be edifying in a good Man, yet give Scandal in an ill one.*

To proceed, as it appears from the Account here given of the *ruling Paſſion*, and its *Cauſe*, which reſults from the Structure of the Organs, that it is the *Road of Nature*, the Poet ſhews [from l. 150 to 157] that this Road is to be followed. So that the Office of Reaſon is not to direct us what Paſſion to exerciſe, but to aſſiſt us in RECTIFYING, and keeping within due Bounds, that which Nature hath ſo ſtrongly impreſſed; for that

> A mightier Power the ſtrong Direction ſends,
> And ſeveral Men impels to ſeveral Ends.

Here Mr. *De Crouſaz* pours out the full Stream of his Candour and Politeneſs, in his Criticiſm on theſe Lines:

> Yet Nature's Road muſt ever be preferr'd;
> Reaſon is here no Guide, but ſtill a Guard;

* Commentaire, p. 166.

'Tis

'Tis her's to RECTIFY, not overthrow,
And treat *this Paſſion* more as Friend than Foe.

The only Refuge I have here left (ſays he) *is to ſuppoſe that Mr.* Pope *thought the very Mention of this Notion would be ſufficient to expoſe the Abſurdity and Horror of it, and of thoſe who regulate their Conduct on ſuch unrighteous and ſhocking Ideas. And I conceive I ſhould do M.* l'Abbé de Sep-Fontaines *much Injuſtice, if I did not believe this was his intention in tranſlating this Paſſage. But, to have a more perfect Idea of the Ridicule and Horror of it, let us put the Words into the Mouth of a Confeſſor* *, *&c.* And ſo he goes gayly on †, to repreſent a ghoſtly Father encouraging his Penitents in their ſeveral Vices on Mr. *Pope's* pretended Principles. But we ſhall ſpoil his Mirth, by only aſſuring him, that the Poet's Precept can have no other Meaning than this, "That as the *ruling Paſſion* is implanted "by *Nature*, it is Reaſon's Office to regulate, direct, and reſtrain, "but not to overthrow it. To regulate the Paſſion of *Avarice*, for "inſtance, into a parſimonious Diſpenſation of the public Reve-"nues; to direct the Paſſion of *Love*, whoſe Object is Worth and "Beauty,

"To the firſt *Good*, firſt *Perfect*, and firſt *Fair* ‡,

"as his Maſter *Plato* adviſes; and to reſtrain *Spleen*, to a Contempt "and Hatred of Vice." This is what the Poet meant, and what every unprejudiced Man could not but ſee he muſt needs mean, by RECTIFYING THE MASTER PASSION, though he had not *confined* us to this Senſe, in the *Reaſon* he gives of his *Precept*, in theſe Words:

A *mightier Power* the ſtrong Direction ſends,
And ſeveral Men impels to ſeveral *Ends*.

For what Ends are they which God impels to, but the Ends of Virtue?

* Commentaire, p. 170. † Id. 171, 172.
‡ Τὸ καλὸν—τ' ἀγαθόν.

But

But for a *more perfect Idea* (to ſpeak in his own free Terms) *of the Ridicule* of our Logician's Comment, let us attend to what he remarks on theſe two laſt Lines. *Theſe Words* (ſays he) *may be underſtood in more than one Senſe, which is not rare, and may have a more or leſs reſtrained Meaning. They are ſuſceptible of a Senſe extravagant and injurious to Providence, and they will admit of a reaſonable one, and very worthy our Attention* *. Here, we ſee, he doubts about the Meaning of the *Reaſon* of the Precept; admits it may have a good one; and yet condemns, without Heſitation, and in the groſſeſt and moſt ſhocking Terms, the *Precept* itſelf; whoſe Meaning muſt yet, according to all rational Rules, even thoſe of his own Logic, if it have any ſuch, be determined by the *Reaſon* of it.

But to return. The Poet having proved that the *ruling Paſſion* (ſince Nature hath given it us) is not to be overthrown, but *rectified*, the next Inquiry will be of what Uſe the *ruling Paſſion* is; for an *Uſe* it muſt have, if Reaſon be to treat it thus mildly? *This* Uſe he ſhews us [from l. 156 to 187] is twofold, *Natural* and *Moral*.

1. Its *natural* Uſe is to conduct Men ſteddily to *one certain End*, who would otherwiſe be eternally fluctuating between the *equal* Violence of various and diſcordant Paſſions, driving them up and down at random:

Like varying Winds, by *other* Paſſions toſt,
This drives them conſtant to a certain Coaſt;

and by that Means enables them to promote the *Good of Society*, by making each a Contributor to the common Stock.

Let *Power* or *Knowledge*, *Gold* or *Glory* pleaſe,
Or (oft more ſtrong than all) the *Love of Eaſe*:
Through Life 'tis follow'd.—

2. Its *moral* Uſe is to ingraft our *ruling Virtue* upon it:

Th' eternal Art, educing Good from Ill,
Grafts on this Paſſion our *beſt Principle*;

* Commentaire, p. 174.

and by that Means enables us to promote *our own Good* by turning the Exorbitancy of the *ruling Paſſion* into its *neighbouring Virtue*:

See *Anger*, Zeal and Fortitude ſupply;
Ev'n *Av'rice*, Prudence; *Sloth*, Philoſophy:
Nor Virtue, male or female, can we name,
But what will grow on Pride, or grow on Shame.

The Wiſdom of the divine Artiſt is, as the Poet finely obſerves, very illuſtrious in this Contrivance: For the Mind and Body having now one common Intereſt, the Efforts of Virtue will have their Force infinitely augmented:

'Tis thus the Mercury of Man is fixt,
Strong grows the Virtue with his Nature mixt;
The Droſs cements what elſe were too refin'd,
And *in one Intereſt Body acts with Mind.*

But leſt it ſhould be objected that this Account favours the Doctrine of *Neceſſity*, and would inſinuate that Men are *only acted upon* in the Production of Good out of Evil; the Poet teacheth [from l. 186 to 193] that Man is a *free Agent*, and hath it in his *own Power* to turn the natural Paſſions into *Virtues* or into *Vices*, properly ſo called:

Reaſon the Biaſs turns from Good to Ill,
And *Nero* reigns a *Titus*, if he WILL.

Secondly, If it ſhould be objected, that though the Poet doth indeed tell us ſome Actions are *beneficial* and ſome *hurtful*, yet he could not call thoſe *Virtuous*, nor theſe *Vicious*, becauſe, as he has deſcribed Things, the *Motive* appears to be only *Gratification of ſome Paſſion*; give me leave to anſwer for him, that this would be miſtaking the Argument, which in this Epiſtle [to l. 239.] conſiders the Paſſions *only with regard to Society*, that is, with regard to their *Effects* rather than their *Motives*.—That however it is his Deſign to teach that Actions are *properly virtuous and vicious*; and though it

it be difficult to diſtinguiſh *genuine* Virtue from *ſpurious*, they having both the ſame *Appearance*, and both the ſame *public Effects*; yet they may be diſembarraſſed. If it be aſked, by what Means? He replies [from l. 192 to 195] by *Conſcience*, which is ſufficient to the Purpoſe; for 'tis only a Man's *own* Concern, to know whether his Virtue be pure and ſolid; for what is that to *others*, while the Effect of this Virtue, whether real or unſubſtantial, is, as to *them*, the ſame?

This Light and Darkneſs, in our Chaos join'd,
What ſhall divide? *The God within the Mind.*

A *Platonic* Phraſe for CONSCIENCE; and here employed with great Judgment and Propriety. For *Conſcience* either ſignifies, *ſpeculatively*, the Judgment we paſs of Things upon whatever Principles we chance to have; and then it is only OPINION, a very unable Judge and *Divider:* Or elſe, it ſignifies, *practically*, the Application of the *eternal Rule of Right* (received by us as the *Law of God)* to the Regulation of our Actions; and then it is properly CONSCIENCE, *The God* (or the Law of God) *within the Mind*, of Power to divide the Light from the Darkneſs in this Chaos of the Paſſions.

But ſtill it will be ſaid, why all this Difficulty to diſtinguiſh true Virtue from falſe? The Poet ſhews *why* [from l. 194 to 201] "That though indeed Vice and Virtue ſo invade each other's "Bounds, that ſometimes we can ſcarce tell where one ends and "the other begins, yet great Purpoſes are ſerv'd thereby, no leſs "than the perfecting the Conſtitution of the Whole; as Lights "and Shades, which run into one another in a well-wrought "Picture, make the Harmony and Spirit of the Compoſition." But on this Account to ſay there is neither *Vice* nor *Virtue*, the Poet ſhews [from l. 200 to 207] would be juſt as wiſe as to ſay there is neither *black* nor *white*; becauſe the Shade of *that*, and the Light of *this*, often run into one another:

Aſk your *own Heart*, and nothing is ſo plain;
'Tis to miſtake them coſts the Time and *Pain*.

This is an Error of *Speculation*, which leads Men ſo fooliſhly to conclude, that there is neither *Vice* nor *Virtue*.

2. There is another of *Practice*, which hath more common and fatal Effects; and is next conſidered [from l. 206 to 211:] It is this, That though, at the firſt Aſpect, *Vice* be ſo horrible as to affright all Beholders, yet, when by Habit we are once grown familiar with her, we firſt ſuffer, and in time begin to loſe the Memory of her Nature:

Vice is a Monſter of ſo frightful Mien,
As, to be hated, needs but to be ſeen;
Yet ſeen too oft, familiar with her Face,
We firſt endure, then pity, then embrace.

Which neceſſarily implies an equal Ignorance in the Nature of *Virtue*. Hence Men conclude, that there is neither one nor the other.

But it is not only that *Extreme of Vice next to Virtue*, which betrays us into theſe Miſtakes: We are deceived too, as he ſhews us [from l. 210 to 221], by our Obſervations about the *other Extreme*.

But where th' Extreme of Vice was ne'er agreed:
Aſk where's the North? at *York* 'tis on the *Tweed*;
In *Scotland*, at the *Orcades*; and there
At *Greenland*, *Zembla*, or the Lord knows where.

For, from the *Extreme* of Vice's being unſettled, and perpetually ſhifting, Men conclude, that *Vice itſelf* is only nominal.

3. There is yet a *third* Cauſe of this Error of *no Vice no Virtue*, compoſed of the other two, *i. e.* partly *ſpeculative*, and partly *practical*: And this alſo the Poet conſiders [from l. 220 to 229] ſhewing it ariſeth from the *Imperfection* of the *beſt* Characters, and the *Inequality* of *all*; whence it happens that no Man is extremely virtuous

virtuous or vicious, nor extremely conſtant in Purſuit of either. Why it ſo happens the Poet aſſigns an admirable Reaſon in this Line:

For, Vice or Virtue, SELF *directs it ſtill.*

An Adherence or Regard to what is, in the Senſe of the World, a *Man's own Intereſt*, making an Extreme in either impoſſible. Its Effect in keeping a good Man from the *Extreme of Virtue* needs no Explanation: And in an ill Man, *Self-intereſt* ſhewing him the Neceſſity of ſome kind of Reputation, the procuring and preſerving *that* will neceſſarily keep him from the *Extreme of Vice.*

The Mention of this Principle that *ſelf directs Vice and Virtue*, and its Conſequence, which is, that

Each Individual ſeeks a ſeveral Goal;

leads the Author to obſerve

That Heaven's great View is one, and that the Whole;

and this brings him naturally round again to his main Subject, namely, *God's producing Good out of Ill*, which he proſecutes in his inimitable Manner [from l. 228 to 239].

That counterworks each Folly and Caprice;
That diſappoints th' Effect of ev'ry Vice:
That happy Frailties to all Ranks apply'd,
Shame to the Virgin, to the Matron Pride,
Fear to the Stateſman, Raſhneſs to the Chief,
To Kings Preſumption, and to Crowds Belief.

I. *Hitherto* the Poet hath been employed in diſcourſing of the *Uſe of the Paſſions*, with *regard to Society at large*, and in freeing his Doctrine from *Objections.* This is the *firſt* general Diviſion of the Subject of *this Epiſtle.*

II. He comes to ſhew [from l. 238 to 251] the Uſe of theſe Paſſions, *with regard to the more confined Circle of our Friends, Relations, and Acquaintance.* And this is the *Second* general Diviſion:

Wants,

Wants, *Frailties*, *Paſſions* cloſer ſtill ally
The common Intereſt, or endear the Tie:
To *theſe* we owe true Friendſhip, Love ſincere,
Each home-felt Joy that *Life* inherits here:
Yet from *the ſame* we learn in *its* Decline
Thoſe Joys, thoſe Loves, thoſe Intereſts to reſign.

As theſe Lines ſeem not to have been underſtood by the *Tranſlator*, and are ſcandalouſly miſrepreſented by the *Commentator*, who would inſinuate them to be a kind of Approbation of *Suicide* *, I ſhall here give the Reader their plain and obvious Meaning.

" To theſe Frailties (ſays he) we owe all the Endearments of pri-
" vate Life; yet, when we come to that Age, which generally
" diſpoſes Men to think more ſeriouſly of the true Value of Things,
" and, conſequently, of their Proviſion for a future State, the
" Conſideration that the *Grounds* of thoſe *Joys*, *Loves and Friend-*
" *ſhips*, are *Wants*, *Frailties and Paſſions*, proves the beſt Expe-
" dient to wean us from the *World*; a Diſengagement ſo friendly
" to that Proviſion we are now making for *another*." The Obſervation is new, and would in any Place be extremely beautiful, but has *here* an infinite Grace and Propriety, as it ſo well confirms, by an Inſtance of great Moment, the Poet's general Theſis, *That God makes Ill, at every Step, productive of Good.*

III. The Poet having thus ſhewn the Uſe of the Paſſions in *Society* and in *domeſtic Life*, he comes in *the laſt Place* [from l. 250 to the End] to ſhew their Uſe to *the Individual*, even in their *Illuſions*; the imaginary Happineſs they preſent helping to make the real Miſeries of Life leſs inſupportable. And this is his *third* general Diviſion:

—*Opinion* gilds with varying Rays
Thoſe painted Clouds that beautify our Days:
Each Want of Happineſs by Hope ſupply'd,
And each Vacuity of Senſe by Pride.

* Commentaire, p. 206.

Theſe

These build as fast as Knowledge can deſtroy:
In Folly's Cup ſtill laughs the Bubble Joy;
One Proſpect loſt, another ſtill we gain;
And not a Vanity is given in vain.

Which muſt needs vaſtly raiſe our Idea of God's Goodneſs, who hath not only provided more than a Counter-balance of *real* Happineſs to human Miſeries, but hath even, in his infinite Compaſſion, beſtowed on thoſe, who were ſo fooliſh as not to have made this Proviſion, an *imaginary* Happineſs; that they may not be *quite* over-borne with the Load of human Miſeries. This is the Poet's great and noble Thought, as ſtrong and ſolid as it is new and ingenious. But ſo ſtrangely perverſe is his *Commentator*, that he will ſuppoſe him to mean any thing rather than what the obvious Drift of his Argument requires; yet, to ſay Truth, cares not much in what Senſe you take it, ſo you will believe him that Mr. *Pope's* general Deſign was to repreſent human Life as *one grand Illuſion fatally conducted.* But if the Rules of *Logic* ſerve for any other Purpoſe than to countenance the Paſſions and Prejudices of ſuch Writers, it may be demonſtrated, that what the Poet here teaches is only this, "That theſe Illuſions are the Follies of Men, which "they *wilfully* fall into, and through their own *Fault*; thereby "depriving themſelves of much Happineſs, and expoſing themſelves to equal Miſery: But that ſtill God (according to his "Univerſal way of Working) graciouſly turns theſe Follies ſo far "to the Advantage of his miſerable Creatures, as to be the *preſent* "Solace and Support of their Diſtreſſes,"

—Tho' Man's a Fool, yet God is wiſe.

LETTER

LETTER III.

WE are now got to the *Third Epiſtle* of the *Eſſay on Man.* Mr. *Pope*, in explaining the Origin, Uſe, and End of the Paſſions, in the *ſecond* Epiſtle, having ſhewn that Man has *ſocial* as well as *ſelfiſh* Paſſions; that Doctrine naturally introduceth the *Third*, which treats of Man as a SOCIAL Animal; and connects it with the *Second*, which conſidered him as an INDIVIDUAL. And as the Concluſion from the Subject of the *Firſt* Epiſtle made the Introduction to the *Seeond*, ſo here again, the Concluſion of the *Second*,

Ev'n mean Self-love becomes, by Force divine,
The Scale to meaſure others Wants by thine,

makes the Introduction to the *Third*:

Here then we reſt; the Univerſal Cauſe
Acts to *one* End, but acts by *various* Laws.

The Reaſon of *Variety* in thoſe Laws, all which tend to *one* and the ſame End, the Good of the *Whole*, generally, is, becauſe the Good of the *Individual* is likewiſe to be provided for; both which together make up the Good of the Whole *univerſally*. And this is the Cauſe, as the Poet ſays elſewhere, that

Each Individual ſeeks a *ſeveral* Goal. Ep. ii. l. 227.

But

But to prevent their reſting *there*, God has made each need the Aſſiſtance of another: and ſo,

On mutual Wants, built mutual Happineſs. Ep. iii. l. 112.

It was neceſſary to explain theſe two firſt Lines, the better to ſee the Pertinency and Force of what follows [from l. 2 to 7] where the Poet warns ſuch to take Notice of this Truth, whoſe circumſtances placing them in an *imaginary* Station of Independence, and a *real* one of Inſenſibility to mutual Wants (from whence general Happineſs reſults) make them but too apt to overlook the true Syſtem of Things; ſuch as thoſe in *full Health* and *Opulence*. This Caution was neceſſary with regard to *Society*; but ſtill more neceſſary with regard to *Religion*: Therefore he eſpecially recommends the Memory of it both to Clergy and Laity, when they *preach* or *pray*; becauſe the *Preacher* who does not conſider the *Firſt Cauſe* under this View, as a Being conſulting the Good of the Whole, muſt needs give a very *unworthy* Idea of him: And the Suppliant, who prays as one not related to a *Whole*, or as diſregarding the Happineſs of it, will not only pray in *vain*, but *offend* his Maker, by an impious Attempt to counterwork his Diſpenſation:

In all the Madneſs of ſuperfluous *Health*,
The Trim of *Pride*, the Impudence of *Wealth*,
Let this great Truth be preſent Night and Day,
But moſt be preſent, if we *preach* or *pray*.

The Tranſlator, not ſeeing into the admirable Purpoſes of this Caution, hath quite dropt the moſt material Circumſtances contained in the *laſt* Line; and, what is worſe, for the ſake of a fooliſh Antitheſis, hath deſtroyed the whole Propriety of the Thought, in the *firſt* and *ſecond*, and ſo, between both, hath left his Author neither Senſe nor Syſtem,

Dans le Sein du bonheur, *ou de l'Adverſité*.

Now, of all Men, thoſe *in Adverſity* have the leaſt need of this Caution, as being the leaſt apt to forget *that God conſults the Good of*

the Whole, and provides for it, by procuring mutual Happineſs by means of mutual Wants: Becauſe ſuch as yet retain the Smart of any freſh Calamity are moſt compaſſionate to others labouring under the ſame Misfortunes, and moſt prompt and ready to relieve them.

The Poet then introduceth his Syſtem of human *Sociability* [l. 7, 8] by ſhewing it to be the Dictate of the Creator, and that *Man*, in *this*, did but follow the Example of *general Nature*, which is united *in one cloſe Syſtem of Benevolence*:

> Look round our World; behold the Chain of Love
> Combining all below, and all above.

This he proves, *firſt* [from l. 8 to 13] (on the noble Theory of *Attraction*) from the Oeconomy of the *material World*; where there is a general Conſpiracy in all the Particles of Matter to work for one End; the Uſe, Beauty, and Harmony of the whole Maſs.

I.

> See plaſtic Nature working to this End,
> The ſingle Atoms each to other tend,
> Attract, attracted to, the next in Place
> *Form'd* and *impell'd* it's Neighbour to embrace.

Formed and impelled, ſays he. Theſe are not Words of a looſe undiſtinguiſhed Meaning, thrown in to fill up the Verſe. This is not our Author's Way, they are full of Senſe; and of the moſt philoſophical Preciſion. For to make Matter ſo *cohere* as to fit it for the Uſes intended by its Creator, a proper Configuration of its inſenſible Parts is as neceſſary as that Quality ſo equally and univerſally conferred upon it, called *Attraction*.

But here again the Tranſlator, miſtaking this Deſcription of the *Preſervation* of the material Univerſe by the Principle of Attraction, for a Deſcription of its *Creation*, has quite deſtroyed the Poet's fine analogical Argument, by which he proves, from the Circumſtance

cumſtance of mutual Attraction in Matter, that Man, while he ſeeks Society, and thereby promotes the Good of his Species, co-operates with God's *general Diſpenſation*. For the Circumſtance of a *Creation* proves nothing but a *Creator*:

Voi du *Sein du Chaos* eclater la lumiere,
Chaque Atome ebranlé courir pour s'embraſſer, *&c.*

The Poet's *ſecond* Argument [from l. 12 to 27] is taken from the *vegetable* and *animal World*; whoſe Beings ſerve *mutually* for the Production, Support, and Suſtentation of each other.

II.

See Matter next, with various Life endued,
Preſs to one Centre ſtill, *the general Good*;
See dying Vegetables Life ſuſtain,
See Life diſſolving vegetate again:
All Forms that periſh other Forms ſupply,
By Turns they catch the vital Breath, and die;
Like Bubbles to the Sea of Matter born,
They riſe, they break, and to that Sea return, *&c.*

One would wonder what ſhould have induced Mr. *l'Abbé* to tranſlate the two laſt Lines, thus:

Sort du neant y rentre, et reparoit au jour.

Comes out of Nothing, and enters back again into Nothing.

But he is generally as conſiſtently wrong as his Author is right. For having, as we obſerved, miſtaken the Poet's Account of the *Preſervation* of the *material* World, for the *Creation* of it; he makes the very ſame Miſtake with regard to the *vegetable* and *animal*; and ſo comes in here (indeed rather of the lateſt) with his *Production of Things out of nothing*.

I ſhould not have taken notice of this Miſtake but for Mr. *De Crouſaz's* ready Remark. "Mr. *Pope*, ſays he, deſcends even to "the moſt vulgar Prejudices; when he tells us, that *each Being*

" *comes out of Nothing*, the common People think that that which " diſappears is annihilated. The Atoms, the ſmalleſt Particles, the " Roots of terreſtrial Bodies ſubſiſt *, *&c.*" But who it is that deſcends to the worſt *vulgar Prejudices*, the Reader will ſee when he is told that Mr. *De Crouſaz* knew very well that Mr. *Pope* ſaid not one Word of each Being's *going back into Nothing*; both from his not finding it in the Proſe Tranſlator, and from *Reſnel's* Confeſſion in his Preface, that he had taken great Liberties with his Original.

But this Part of the Argument, in which the Poet tells us, that God

Connects each Being, greateſt with the leaſt;
Made Beaſt in Aid of Man, and Man of Beaſt;
All ſerv'd, all ſerving——

awaking again the old *Pride* of his Adverſaries, who cannot bear that *Man* ſhould be thought to be *ſerving* as well as *ſerved*; he takes this Occaſion *again to humble* them [from l. 26 to 53] by the ſame kind of Argument he had ſo ſucceſsfully employed in the *firſt* Epiſtle, and which our *firſt* Letter has conſidered at large.

However, his Adverſaries, loth to give up the Queſtion, will reaſon upon the Matter; and we are now to ſuppoſe them objecting againſt Providence in this Manner.—We grant, ſay they, that in the *irrational*, as in the *inanimate* Creation, *all is ſerved, and all is ſerving*. But, with regard to Man, the Caſe is different; he ſtands ſingle. For his *Reaſon* hath endowed him both with Power and Addreſs, ſufficient to make all Things *ſerve him*; and his *Self-love*, of which you have ſo largely provided for him, will diſpoſe him, in his Turn, *to ſerve none*. Therefore your Theory is imperfect.—" Not ſo, replies the Poet [from l. 52 to 83] I grant you, Man in- " deed affects to be *the Wit and Tyrant of the Whole*, and would fain " ſhake off

—That Chain of Love,
Combining all below and all above:

* Commentaire, p. 221.

" But

"But Nature, even by the *very Gift* of *Reaſon*, checks this *Ty-*
"*rant*: For *Reaſon* endowing Man with the Ability of ſetting
"together the *Memory* of the paſt, and *Conjecture* about the Future;
"and paſt Misfortunes making him apprehenſive of more to come,
"this diſpoſes him to pity and relieve others in a *State* of Suffer-
"ing. And the Paſſion growing habitual, naturally extends its
"Effects to all that have a *Senſe* of ſuffering. Now as Brutes have
"neither Man's *Reaſon*, nor his inordinate *Self-love* to draw them
"from the Syſtem of Benevolence, ſo they wanted not, and
"therefore have not, this *human Sympathy* of another's Miſery. By
"which Paſſion we ſee thoſe Qualities, in Man, balance one ano-
"ther, and ſo retain him in that general *Order*, in which Provi-
"dence has placed its whole Creation. But this is not all; Man's
"Intereſt, Amuſement, Vanity, and Luxury, tie him ſtill cloſer
"to the Syſtem of Benevolence, by obliging him to provide for
"the Support of other Animals; and though it be, for the moſt
"part, only to devour them with the greateſt Guſt, yet this does
"not abate the proper Happineſs of the Animals ſo preſerved, to
"whom *Providence has not given the uſeleſs Knowledge of their End*.
"From all which it appears, that the Theory is yet uniform, and
"perfect.

Grant that the Powerful ſtill the Weak controul;
Be Man the Wit and Tyrant of the Whole:
Nature that Tyrant checks; he only knows
And helps another Creature's Wants and Woes.
Say, will the Falcon, ſtooping from above,
Smit with her varying Plumage, ſpare the Dove?
Admires the Jay the Inſect's gilded Wings,
Or hears the Hawk when *Philomela* ſings?
Man cares for all, *&c.*——
For ſome his Intereſt prompts him to provide,
For more his Pleaſure, yet for more his Pride.

This

This is the Force of this fine and noble Argument. The ſenſeleſs and ſcandalous Reflections of Mr. *De Crouſaz* on the latter Part of it, I have refuted in my former Letter.

But even to this, as a *Caviller* would ſtill object, we muſt ſuppoſe him ſo to do, and ſay—Admit you have ſhewn that Nature hath endowed all Animals, whether human or brutal, with ſuch Faculties as admirably fit them to promote the *general Good:* Yet, in its Care for *this*, hath not Nature neglected to provide for the *private* Good of the Individual? We have Cauſe to think it hath, and we ſuppoſe that it was on this excluſive Conſideration that it kept back from Brutes the Gift of *Reaſon* (ſo neceſſary a means of *private* happineſs), becauſe *Reaſon*, as we find in the Inſtance of Man, where there is Occaſion for all the complicated Contrivance you have deſcribed above, to make the Effects of his *Paſſions* counterwork the immediate Powers of his *Reaſon*, in order to keep him ſubſervient to the *general* Syſtem; *Reaſon*, we ſay, naturally tends to draw Beings into a *private*, independent Syſtem.

This the Poet anſwers by ſhewing [from l. 82 to 109] that the *Happineſs* of *animal* and *human* Life is widely different. The Happineſs of human Life conſiſting in the Improvement of the Mind, can be procured by *Reaſon* only: But the Happineſs of animal Life conſiſting in the Gratifications of Senſe, is beſt promoted by *Inſtinct*. And, with regard to the regular and conſtant Operation of each, in *that*, Inſtinct hath plainly the Advantage: For *here* God directs *immediately*; *there*, only *mediately*, through Man:

> Reaſon, however able, cool at beſt,
> Cares not for Service, or but ſerves when preſt;
> Stays till we call, and then not often near;
> But honeſt Inſtinct comes a Volunteer.
> And Reaſon raiſe o'er Inſtinct as you can,
> In this 'tis *God directs*, in that 'tis *Man*.

The Commentator (who I will, in Charity, ſuppoſe ſaw nothing of this fine and ſober Reaſoning, nor was apprehenſive of the *Objection* which occaſioned it, though that Objection ariſes directly from

from the Subject) accuſeth the Poet of deſigning to *repreſent Brutes as perfect as Man, who is* (ſays he) *of a Nature ſuſceptible of Religion* *. But if our Commentator could not ſee the Chain of Reaſoning, he might yet, methinks, have attended to this plain Denunciation of the Poet, which introduceth the Diſcourſe that gives him ſo much Offence:

Whether with Reaſon or with Inſtinct bleſt,
Know all enjoy the Power, *which ſuits them beſt:*
To Bliſs alike by that Direction tend,
And find the Means proportion'd to the End.

Which ſhews the *Perfection* here ſpoken of not to be a Perfection *equalled* to that of another Being, but only ſuch an one as is *proportioned* to the Being itſelf, of whom this Perfection is predicated.

The Poet now comes to the *main* Subject of his Epiſtle, the Proof of Man's SOCIABILITY, from the two general Societies compoſed by him; the NATURAL, ſubject to *paternal* Authority; and the CIVIL, ſubject to that of a Magiſtrate: Which he hath had the Addreſs to introduce, from what had preceded, in ſo eaſy and natural a Manner, as ſhews him to have the Art of giving all the Grace to the Dryneſs and Severity of Method, as well as Wit to the Strength and Depth of Reaſon. For the philoſophic Nature of his Work requiring he ſhould ſhew by what Means thoſe Societies were introduced, this affords him an Opportunity of ſliding gracefully and eaſily from the *Preliminaries* into the *main Subject*; and ſo of giving his Work that Perfection of Method, which we find only in the Compoſitions of great Writers.

For having juſt before, though to a different Purpoſe, deſcribed the Power of beſtial Inſtinct to attain the Happineſs of the *Individual*, he goes on in ſpeaking of Inſtinct as it is ſerviceable both to *that*, and to the *Kind* [from l. 108 to 148] to illuſtrate the Original of Society. He ſhews, that though, as he had before obſerved, God had founded the proper Bliſs of each Creature in the

* Commentaire, p. 229.

Nature

Nature of its own *Being*, yet theſe not being independent Individuals, but Parts of a Whole, God, to bleſs that Whole, built mutual Happineſs on mutual Wants: Now for the Supply of mutual Wants, Creatures muſt neceſſarily come together; which is the firſt Ground of Society amongſt Men:

Whate'er of Life all-quickening Æther keeps,
Or breathes through Air, or ſhoots beneath the Deeps,
Or pours profuſe on Earth; one Nature feeds
The vital Flame, and ſwells the genial Seeds.
Not Man alone, but all that roam the Wood,
Or wing the Sky, or roll along the Flood,
Each loves itſelf, but not itſelf alone,
Each Sex deſires alike, till two are one.

He then proceeds to that called *natural*, ſubject to *paternal* Authority, and ariſing from the Union of the two Sexes; deſcribes the imperfect Image of it in Brutes; then explains it at large in all its Cauſes and Effects: And, laſtly, ſhews, that as IN FACT, like mere *animal* Society, it is founded and preſerved by mutual Wants, the Supplial of which cauſes mutual Happineſs; ſo is it likewiſe in RIGHT, as a *rational* Society, by Equity, Gratitude, and the Obſervance of the Relation of Things in general:

Reflection, Reaſon, ſtill the Ties improve;
At once extend the Intereſt, and the Love:
With Choice we fix, with Sympathy we burn,
Each Virtue in each Paſſion takes its Turn;
And ſtill new Needs, new Helps, new Habits, riſe,
That graft Benevolence on Charities.
Mem'ry and Forecaſt juſt Returns engage,
That pointed back to Youth, this on to Age;
While Pleaſure, Gratitude, and Hope combin'd,
Still ſpread the Intereſt, and preſerv'd the Kind.]

But the Atheiſt and *Hobbiſt*, againſt whom Mr. *Pope* writes, deny the Principle of *Right*, or of *natural Juſtice*, before the Invention of

of *civil Compact*, which, they ſay, gave Being to it: And accordingly have had the Effrontery publickly to declare, *that a State of Nature was a State of War*. This quite ſubverts the Poet's *natural Society*: Therefore, after his *Account* of *that* State, he proceeds to ſupport the *Reality* of it, by overthrowing the oppugnant Principle of *no natural Juſtice*; which he does [from l. 147 to 170] by ſhewing, in a fine Deſcription of *the State of Innocence*, as repreſented in Scripture, that a State of Nature was ſo far from being without *natural Juſtice*, that it was, at firſt, the *Reign of God*, where *Right* and *Truth* univerſally prevailed:

> Nor think, in Nature's State they blindly trod,
> The State of Nature was the Reign of God.
> Self-love, and ſocial, at her Birth began,
> Union, the Bond of all Things, and of Man.
> Pride then was not; nor *Arts*, that Pride to aid;
> Man walk'd with Beaſt, joint Tenant of the Shade.

Now let us hear Mr. *De Crouſaz*, who tells us, *he had redoubled his Attention upon this Epiſtle* *.—Mr. *Pope* (ſays he) *ſpeaks with the Aſſurance of an Eye-witneſs of what paſſed in this firſt Age of the World* †.—And why ſhould he not, when conducted by his Faith in Scripture Hiſtory?—*That which he here repreſents*, ſays he, *is much leſs credible in itſelf, that that which* Moſes *teacheth us* †. Now what muſt we think of our Logician's Faith, who taking it for granted, that Mr. *Pope* would not borrow of *Moſes*, has here condemned, before he was aware, the Credibility of Scripture Hiſtory? For the Account here given of the *State of Innocence* is indeed no other than that of *Moſes* himſelf.

He goes on—*This Religion, common to Brutes and Men, inſinuates to us, that, in thoſe happy Times, Men had no more Religion than Brutes* †.

* Commentaire, p. 218. † Ib. p. 240.

This ſhrewd Reflection points at the following Lines:

In the ſame Temple, the reſounding Wood,
All vocal Beings hymn'd their equal God.

But does not the Poet ſpeak, in this very place, of Man, as officiating in the prieſtly Office at the Altar, and offering up his blameleſs euchariſtical Sacrifice to Heaven?

The Shrine with Gore unſtain'd, with Gold undreſt,
Unbrib'd, unbloody, ſtood the blameleſs Prieſt.

As to the Line,

All vocal Beings hymn'd their equal God,

our Logician ſhould be ſent to Scripture for its Meaning; who, had he been as converſant with the *Pſalmiſt* as with *Burgerſdicius*, would have learned to have judged more piouſly as well as more charitably. The *inſpired* Poet calling to Mind (as Mr. *Pope* did here) the *Age of Innocence*, and full of the great Ideas of thoſe

——Chains of Love,
Combining all below, and all above;

which

Draw to one Point, and to one Centre bring
Beaſt, *Man*, or *Angel*, *Servant*, *Lord*, or *King*;

breaks out into this rapturous and divine Apoſtrophe, to call back the devious Creation to its priſtine Rectitude. That very State Mr. *Pope* deſcribes above:—"Praiſe the Lord, all ye *Angels*: praiſe "him, all ye Hoſts. Praiſe him, Sun and Moon; praiſe him, all "ye Stars of Light. Let them praiſe the Name of the Lord, for "he commanded, and they were created. Praiſe the Lord from "the Earth, ye Dragons, and all Deeps: Fire and Hail, Snow "and Vapour, ſtormy Wind fulfilling his Word: Mountains and "all Hills, fruitful Trees, and all Cedars: *Beaſts* and all Cattle, "creeping Things, and *flying Fowl*: *Kings* of the Earth and all "*People*; *Princes* and all *Judges of the Earth*. Let them praiſe "the

" the Name of the Lord; for his Name alone is excellent, his " Glory is above the Earth and Heaven." *Pſal.* cxlviii.

To return. Strict Method (in which, by this time, the Reader finds the Poet more converſant than our Logician was aware of) leads him next to ſpeak of that Society which ſucceeded the *natural*, namely the *civil*. But as he does all by eaſy Steps, in the natural Progreſſion of Ideas, he firſt explains [from l. 169 to 200] the *intermediate Means* which led Mankind from *natural* to *civil* Society. Theſe were the *Invention* and *Improvement of Arts*. For while Mankind lived in a mere State of Nature, unconſcious of the Arts of Life, there was no need of any other Government than the *paternal*; but when Arts were found out and improved, then that more perfect Form under the Direction of a *Magiſtrate* became neceſſary. And for theſe Reaſons; *Firſt*, to bring thoſe Arts, already found, to *Perfection*; and, *Secondly*, to ſecure the Product of them to their rightful *Proprietors*. The Poet, therefore, comes now, as we ſay, to the *Invention of Arts*; but being always intent on the great End for which he wrote his *Eſſay*, namely, to mortify that *Pride*, which occaſions the impious Complaints againſt Providence, he, with the greateſt Art and Contrivance, ſpeaks of theſe *Inventions*, as only Leſſons learnt of mere Animals guided by Inſtinct; and thus, at the ſame time, gives a new Inſtance of the wonderful Providence of God, who has contrived to teach Mankind in a Way not only proper to humble human Arrogance, but to raiſe our Idea of infinite Wiſdom to the greateſt Pitch. All this he does in a *Proſopopœia* the moſt ſublime that ever entered into the human Imagination:

See him from *Nature* riſing ſlow to *Art!*
To copy *Inſtinct* then was *Reaſon's* Part:
Thus then to Man the Voice of Nature ſpake—
" Go, from the Creatures thy Inſtructions take;
" Thy Arts of Building from the *Bee* receive,
" Learn of the *Mole* to plow, the *Worm* to weave;

" Learn of the little *Nautilus* to ſail,
" Spread the thin Oar, and catch the driving Gale, *&c.*
" Yet go! and thus o'er all the Creatures ſway,
" Thus let the Wiſer make the reſt obey,
" And for thoſe *Arts* mere *Inſtinct* could afford,
" *Be crown'd as Monarchs*, or as *Gods ador'd.*"

The Delicacy of the Poet's Addreſs, in the firſt Part of the laſt Line, is very remarkable. I obſerved, that, in this Paragraph, he has given an Account of thoſe *intermediate Means* that led Mankind from *natural* to *civil* Society, namely, the Invention and Improvement of Arts. Now here, on his Concluſion of this Account, and Entry upon the Deſcription of *civil Society* itſelf, he connects the two Parts the moſt gracefully that can be conceived, by this true hiſtorical Circumſtance, that it was the *Invention* of thoſe Arts, which raiſed to the Magiſtracy, in this *new Society*, now formed for the *perfecting* them.

I cannot leave this Part without taking notice of the ſtrange Turn the Tranſlator has given to theſe two Lines:

Thus then to Man the Voice of Nature ſpake—
" Go, from the Creatures thy Inſtructions take."

La Nature *indigné* alors ſe fit entendre;
Va, *malheureux* mortel, va, lui dit-elle, apprendre
Des *plus vils* animaux.——

One would wonder what ſhould make him repreſent *Nature* in ſuch a Paſſion at Man, and calling him Names, when Mr. *Pope* ſuppoſes her in her beſt good Humour, and Man the moſt *happy* in the Direction here given. But what led him into this Miſtake was another full as groſs: Mr. *Pope* having deſcribed the State of Innocence, which ends at theſe Lines,

Heaven's Attribute was univerſal Care,
And Man's Prerogative to rule, but ſpare,

turns

turns from *thoſe* Times to a View of *theſe latter Ages*, and breaks out into this tender and humane Complaint:

Ah, how unlike *the Man of Times to come!*
Of half that live the Butcher and the Tomb;
Who, Foe to Nature, hears the general Groan,
Murders their Species, and betrays his own, *&c.*

Unluckily, the Tranſlator took this *Man of Times to come*, for the Corrupter of that *firſt Age*; and ſo imagined the Poet had introduced *Nature* only to ſet things right: he then ſuppoſed, of courſe, ſhe was to be very angry, and not finding Mr. *Pope* had repreſented her in any great Emotion, he was willing to improve upon his Original.

To proceed, after all this neceſſary Preparation, the Poet ſhews [from l. 199 to 211.] how *Civil Society* followed, and the Advantages it produced. But theſe are beſt deſcribed in his own Words:

Great Nature ſpoke; obſervant Men obey'd;
Cities were built, Societies were made:
Here roſe one little State; another near
Grew by like Means, and join'd through Love, or Fear.
Did here the Trees with ruddier Burthens bend,
And there the Streams in purer Rills deſcend?
What War could raviſh, Commerce could beſtow,
And he return'd a Friend, who came a Foe.
Converſe and Love Mankind might ſtrongly draw,
When Love was Liberty, and Nature Law.
Thus States were form'd.——

Nothing can be juſter than this Account, or more corroborative of the Poet's general Theory. Yet his Tranſlator has a ſtrange Fatality in contradicting him, whenever he attempts to *paraphraſe his Senſe.*

The firſt Line Mr. *l'Abbé* turns thus,

Par ces mots la Nature excita l'Induſtrie,
Et de l'Homme feroce enchaina la furie,
Chained up the Fury of Savage Man,

And

And ſo contradicts his Author's whole Syſtem of *Benevolence*, and goes over to the Atheiſt's, who ſuppoſes the *State of Nature* to be a *State of War*. That which ſeems to have miſled him was theſe Lines:

> What War could raviſh, Commerce could beſtow,
> And he return'd a Friend, who came a Foe.

But the Tranſlator ſhould have conſidered, that though his Author maintains *a State of Nature to be a State of Peace*, yet he never imagined there could be *no* Quarrels in it. He well knew, that *Self-love drives through Juſt and through Unjuſt* *. He puſhes no Syſtem to an Extravagance; *but ſteers between Doctrines ſeemingly oppoſite* †, or, in other Words, follows Truth uniformly throughout.

Having thus explained the Original of *Civil Society*, he ſhews us next [from l. 210 to 216] that to this Society a *civil Magiſtrate*, properly ſo called, did belong: and this, in Confutation of that idle Hypotheſis of *Filmer*, and others; which pretends that God conferred the *regal* Title on the *Fathers of Families*, from whence Men, when they had inſtituted Society, were to fetch their *Magiſtrates*. On the contrary, our Poet ſhews that a *King* was unknown till *common Intereſt*, which led Men to inſtitute civil Government, led them, at the ſame time, to inſtitute a *Governor*. However, that it is true that the ſame *Wiſdom* or *Valor*, which gained *regal* Obedience from Sons to the *Sire*, procured *Kings* a *paternal* Authority, and made them conſidered as *Fathers of their People*. Which probably was the *Original* (and, while miſtaken, continues to be the chief *Support*) of that ſlaviſh Error; Antiquity repreſenting its earlieſt Monarchs under the Idea of a *common Father*, πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν. Afterwards indeed they became a kind of *Foſter-Fathers*, ποιμένα λαῶν, as *Homer* calls them: Till at length they began to *devour* that Flock they had been ſo long accuſtomed to *ſhear*; and, as *Plutarch*

* Ep. iii. l. 270.

† See Preface.

ſays

fays of *Cecrops*, ἐκ χρησῦ βασιλέως ἄγριον κ) δρακοντώδη γενόμενον TYPANNON.

—the Name of King unknown,
Till common Intereſt placed the Sway in one.
'Twas Virtue only (or in Arts, or Arms,
Diffuſing Bleſſings, or averting Harms)
The ſame which in a Sire the Sons obey'd,
A Prince, the Father of a People made.

Our Author has good Authority for his Account of the Origin of Kingſhip. *Ariſtotle* aſſures us of this Truth, that *'Twas Virtue only or in Arts or Arms.* Καθίσαλαι Βασιλεὺς ἐκ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀρετῆς ἢ πραάξεων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἢ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν τοιάτε γένες *.

The Poet now returns [at l. 216 to 242] to what he had left unfiniſhed in his Deſcription of *natural Society*. This, which appears irregular, is indeed a fine Inſtance of his thorough Knowledge of the Art of Method. I will explain it.

This third Epiſtle, we ſee, conſiders *Man with reſpect to Society*; the ſecond, *with reſpect to himſelf*; and the fourth, *with reſpect to Happineſs*. But in none of theſe Relations does the Poet ever loſe ſight of him under *that* in which he ſtands to GOD; it will follow therefore, that ſpeaking of him *with reſpect to* SOCIETY, the Account would be then moſt imperfect, were he not at the ſame time conſidered *with reſpect to his* RELIGION; for, between theſe two there is a cloſe, and, while Things continue in *Order*, a moſt *intereſting* Connection.

True Faith, true Policy, UNITED ran;
That was but Love of God, and this of Man. l. 240.

Now *Religion* ſuffering no *Change*, or *Depravation*, when Man firſt entered into civil Society, but continuing the ſame as in the State of Nature, the Poet, to avoid Repetition, and to bring the

* Polit. lib. v. c. 10.

Accounts

Accounts of *true* and *falſe* Religion nearer to one another, in order to *contraſt* them by the Advantage of that Situation, deferred giving Account of his *Religion*, till he had ſpoken of the Origin of *that* Society. Thence it is, that he here reſumes the Account of the *State of Nature*, that is, ſo much of it as he had left untouched, which was only the *Religion* of it. This conſiſting in the *Knowledge* of one God, the Creator of all Things, the Poet ſhews how Men came by that Knowledge. That it was either found out by REASON, which, giving to every *Effect* a *Cauſe*, inſtructed them to go from *Cauſe* to *Cauſe*, till they came to the FIRST, who being *cauſeleſs*, would neceſſarily be judged *ſelf-exiſtent*: Or taught by TRADITION, which preſerved the Memory of the Creation.—He then tells us *what* theſe Men, undebauched by falſe Science, underſtood by God's NATURE and ATTRIBUTES. 1*ſt*, Of God's *Nature*; that they eaſily diſtinguiſhed between the *Workman and the Work*; and ſaw the *Subſtance* of the Creator to be diſtinct and different from *that* of the Creature; and ſo were in no Danger of falling into the horrid Opinion of the *Greek* Philoſophers, and their Follower *Spinoza*. And ſimple Reaſon teaching them, that the Creator was but *One*, they eaſily ſaw that *all was right*; and were in as little Danger of falling into the *Manichean* Error, which, when *oblique Wit* had *broke the ſteddy Light* of Reaſon, imagined *all was not right*, having before imagined all was not the Work of *One*. 2*dly*, *What* they underſtood of God's *Attributes*; that they eaſily conceived a *Father* where they had found a *Deity*, and that a *ſovereign Being* could only be a *ſovereign Good*.

Till then, by Nature crown'd, each Patriarch ſate,
King, Prieſt, and Parent of his growing State:
On him, their *ſecond Providence*, they hung,
Their Law his Eye; their Oracle his Tongue, *&c.*
Till drooping, ſickening, dying, they began
Whom they rever'd as God, to mourn as Man.

I. Then,

I.

Then, looking up from Sire to Sire, explor'd
One great firſt Father, and that Firſt ador'd.

II.

Or plain Tradition that this all *begun*,
Convey'd unbroken Faith from Sire to Son.

I.

The Worker from the Work diſtinct was known,
And ſimple Reaſon never ſought but *one*.
Ere Wit oblique had broke that ſteddy Light,
Man, like his Maker, ſaw that *all was right*.

II.

To Virtue in the Paths of Pleaſure trod,
And own'd a *Father* when he own'd a God.
Love all the Faith, *&c.*

Our *methodical* Tranſlator, not apprehending that the Poet was here returned to finiſh his Deſcription of the State of Nature, has fallen into one of the groſſeſt Miſtakes that ever was committed. He has taken this Account of *true Religion*, for an Account of the *Origin of Idolatry*, and thus fatally embelliſhes his own Blunder,

Jaloux d'en conſerver les traits et la figure,
Leur zele induſtrieux inventa la Peinture.
Leurs neveux, attentifs à ces hommes fameux,
Qui par le droit du ſang avoient régné ſur eux,
Trouvent-ils dans leur ſuite un grand, un premier pere,
Leur aveugle reſpect l'adore et le révere.

Here you have one of the fineſt Pieces of Reaſoning in the World, turned, at once, into as mere a Heap of Nonſenſe. You will wonder how it came about: The unlucky Term of *Great firſt Father* confounded our Tranſlator, and he took it to ſignify a *Great-Grandfather*. But he ſhould have *conſidered* that Mr. *Pope* always

repreſents God as every wiſe and good Man would do, and as our Religion directs us to do, under the Idea of a FATHER: He ſhould have *obſerved* that the Poet is here deſcribing thoſe Men, who

To *Virtue* in the Paths of Pleaſure trod,
And own'd a *Father*, where they own'd a *God*.

You may be ſure Mr. *De Crouſaz* has not let let theſe fine Strokes about the *Original of Painting* eſcape him. But here the Critic (which is a Wonder) proves clearer-ſighted than the Tranſlator; he ſaw that the Lines in Queſtion were a Continuation of ſomething *not immediately preceding*; but that was *all* he ſaw, as may appear by his ſagacious Remark. "We ſhall be miſtaken "(ſays he) if we regard this Paſſage as a Continuation of the "Hiſtory immediately going before. It would be too great an "Anachroniſm to ſuppoſe it. The Government of *Fathers* of "*Families* did not ſucceed that of *Kings*; on the contrary, the "Reign of *theſe* was eſtabliſhed on the Government of *thoſe* *."

Order leads the Poet to ſpeak next [from l. 241 to 246] of the *Corruption* of *civil Society* into Tyranny, and its *Cauſes*; and here, with all the *Art of Addreſs*, as well as *Truth*, he obſerves, it aroſe from the Violation of that *great Principle*, which he ſo much inſiſts upon throughout his Eſſay, *That each was made for the Uſe of all*:

Who firſt taught Souls enſlav'd, and Realms undone,
Th' enormous Faith of *many made for one?*
That proud Exception to all Nature's Laws,
T' invert the World, and counterwork its Cauſe.

And in this *Ariſtotle* places the Difference between a King and a Tyrant; that the *firſt* ſuppoſes himſelf made for the People; the *other*, that the People are made for him †.

* Commentaire, p. 249.

† Βέλτιον δ' ὁ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ εἶναι φύλαξ, ὅπως οἱ μὲν κεκτημένοι τὰς οὐσίας, μηθὲν ἄδικον πάσχωσιν, ὁ δὲ Δῆμος μὴ ὑβρίζηται μηθὲν, ἢ δὲ ΤΥΡΑΝΝΙΣ, πρὸς ἅπαν ἀποβλέπει κοινόν; εἰ μὴ τῆς ἰδίας ὠφελείας χάριν. Pol. l. v. c. 10.

But

But we may be ſure, that in this Corruption, where natural Juſtice was thrown aſide, and *Force*, the Atheiſt's Juſtice, preſided in its ſtead, *Religion* would follow the Fate of *civil Society*. We know, from ancient Hiſtory, it did ſo. Accordingly, Mr. *Pope* [from l. 245 to 270] with corrupt Politics deſcribes corrupt Religion and its Cauſes; he *firſt* informs us, agreeable to his exact Knowledge of Antiquity, that it was the POLITICIAN, and not the PRIEST (as our illiterate Tribe of Free-thinkers would make us believe) who firſt corrupted Religion. *Secondly*, that the SUPERSTITION, he brought in, was not invented by him, as an *Engine* to play upon others (as the dreaming *Atheiſt* feigns, who would thus miſerably account for the Origin of Religion), but was a *Trap* he firſt fell into himſelf.

> Force firſt made Conqueſt, and that Conqueſt, Law;
> Till *Superſtition taught the Tyrant awe*,
> Then *ſhar'd the Tyranny, then lent it aid*,
> And Gods of Conquerors, Slaves of Subjects made.

All this is agreeable to the Poet's vaſt Knowledge of human Nature. For that *Impotency* of Mind, as the *Latin* Writers call it*, which gives Birth to the enormous Crimes neceſſary to ſupport a Tyranny, naturally ſubjects its Owner to all the *vain*, as well as *real* Terrors of Conſcience. Hence the whole Machinery of *Superſtition*.

> She, 'midſt the Lightning's Blaze and Thunder's Sound,
> When rock'd the Mountains, and when groan'd the Ground,
> She, from the rending Earth and burſting Skies,
> Saw Gods deſcend, and Fiends infernal riſe.

And it is no Wonder that thoſe, who had ſo impiouſly attempted to counterwork the Deſign of Nature, by acting as if *many were*

* They expreſſed the *Paſſion for tyrannizing* by this Word. A fine *Roman* Hiſtorian ſays of *Marius*, that he was *Gloriæ inſatiabilis*, IMPOTENS *ſemperque inquietus*. And of *Pompey*, *Potentiâ ſuâ nunquam aut raro ad* IMPOTENTIAM *uſus*.

made for one, ſhould now imagine they ſaw all Nature arming in Vengeance againſt them.

It is true, the Poet obſerves, that afterwards, when the Tyrant's Fright was over, he had Cunning enough, from the Experience of the Effect of Superſtition upon himſelf, to turn it by the Aſſiſtance of the Prieſt (who for his Reward went Shares with him in the Tyranny) as his beſt Defence againſt his Subjects.

> With Heaven's own Thunders ſhook the World below,
> And play'd the God an Engine on his Foe.

For a Tyrant naturally and reaſonably takes all his *Slaves* for his *Enemies*.

Having given the *Cauſes* of Superſtition, he next deſcribes its *Objects*:

> Gods partial, changeful, paſſionate, unjuſt,
> Whoſe Attributes were Rage, Revenge, and Luſt:
> Such as the Souls of Cowards might conceive,
> And, form'd like Tyrants, Tyrants would believe.

The ancient Pagan Gods are here very exactly deſcribed. This Fact is a convincing Evidence of the Truth of that Original which the Poet gives to Superſtition: For if theſe Phantaſms were firſt raiſed in the Imagination of Tyrants, they muſt needs have the Qualities here aſſigned them. For *Force* being the Tyrant's *Virtue*, and *Luxury* his *Happineſs*, the Attributes of his God would of Courſe be *Revenge* and *Luſt*; in a Word, the *Antitype* of himſelf. But there was another, and more ſubſtantial Cauſe, of the Reſemblance between a *Tyrant* and a *Pagan God*; and that was the making *Gods of Conquerors*, as the Poet ſays, and ſo canonizing a Tyrant's *Vices* with his *Perſon*. That theſe Gods ſhould ſuit a People humbled to the Stroke of a Maſter, will be no Wonder, if we recollect a generous Saying of the *Ancients*;—*That, that Day which ſees a Man a Slave, takes away half his Virtue.*

The

The Inference our Poet draws from all this [from l. 269 to 284] is, that *Self-love* drives through Right and Wrong; it cauſes the Tyrant to violate the Rights of Mankind; and it cauſes the People to vindicate that Violation. For *Self-love* being common to the whole Species, and ſetting each Individual in purſuit of the ſame Objects, it became neceſſary for each, if he would ſecure his own, to provide for the Safety of another's. And thus Equity and Benevolence aroſe from that ſame *Self-love* which had given Birth to Avarice and Injuſtice.

> For what one likes, if others like as well,
> What ſerves one Will, when many Wills rebel?
> How ſhall he keep, what ſleeping or awake
> A Weaker may ſurpriſe, a Stronger take?
> His Safety muſt his Liberty reſtrain;
> All join to guard what each deſires to gain.

The Poet hath not any where ſhewn greater Addreſs in the maſterly Diſpoſition of his Work, than with regard to the *Inference* before us; which not only gives a proper and timely Support to what he had before advanced, in his *ſecond Epiſtle*, concerning the Nature and Effects of *Self-love*; but is a neceſſary Introduction to what follows concerning the *Reformation* of *Religion* and *Society*, as we ſhall ſee preſently.

The Poet hath now deſcribed the Riſe, Perfection, and Decay of *civil Policy* and *Religion*, in the more early Ages. But the Deſign had been imperfectly executed, had he here dropp'd his Diſcourſe; there was, after this, a Recovery from their ſeveral Corruptions. Accordingly, he hath choſen that happy Period for the Concluſion of his Song. But as good and ill Governments and Religions ſucceed one another without ceaſing, he now, with great Judgment, leaves *Facts*, and turns his Diſcourſe [from l. 283 to 296] to ſpeak of a more laſting Reform of Mankind, in the Invention of thoſe *philoſophic Principles*, by whoſe Obſervance a *Policy*

and

and *Religion* may be for ever kept from ſinking into *Tyranny* and *Superſtition.*

'*Twas then* the ſtudious Head, or generous Mind,
Follower of God, or Friend of human Kind,
Poet or Patriot roſe, but to reſtore
The Faith and Morals, Nature gave before;
Relum'd her ancient Light, not kindled new,
If not God's Image, yet his Shadow drew;
Taught Power's due Uſe to People and to Kings,
Taught not to ſlack, nor ſtrain its tender Strings, &c.

The eaſy and juſt Tranſition into this Subject, from the foregoing, is admirable. In the foregoing, he had deſcribed the *Effects* of *Self-love*; now the *Obſervation* of theſe Effects, he, with great Art and high Probability, makes the *Occaſion* of thoſe *Diſcoveries*, which ſpeculative Men made of the *true Principles* of Policy and Religion, deſcribed in the preſent Paragraph; and this he evidently hints at in that fine Tranſition,

'TWAS THEN the ſtudious Head, &c.

Mr. *De Crouſaz*, who ſaw nothing of this Beauty, ſays,—*It is not eaſy to gueſs to what Epoch Mr.* Pope *would have us refer his* THEN *. He has indeed proved himſelf no good *Gueſſer*, which yet is the beſt Quality of a Critic. I will therefore tell him without more ado, Mr. *Pope* meant the *polite and flouriſhing Age of* Greece; and thoſe Benefactors to Mankind, which, I preſume, he had principally in View, were *Socrates* and *Ariſtotle*, who, of all the Pagan World, ſpoke beſt of *God*, and wrote beſt of *Government*.

Having thus deſcribed the *true Principles of civil and eccleſiaſtical Policy*, the great Poet proceeds [from l. 295 to 305] to illuſtrate his Account by the ſimilar Harmony of the Univerſe:

* Commentaire, p. 261.

Such

Such is the World's great Harmony, that ſprings
From Union, Order, full Concent of Things!
Where ſmall and great, where weak and mighty, made,
To ſerve, not ſuffer, ſtrengthen, not invade,
More powerful each as needful to the reſt,
And in proportion as it bleſſes, bleſt,
Draw to one Point, and to one Centre bring
Beaſt, Man, or Angel, Servant, Lord, or King.

Thus, as in the *Beginning* of this Epiſtle, he ſupported the *great Principle of mutual Love or Aſſociation in general*, by Conſiderations drawn from the *Properties* of Matter, and the mutual *Dependence* between vegetable and animal Life; ſo, in the *Concluſion*, he has inforced the *particular Principles of civil and religious Society*, from that *univerſal Harmony* which ſprings, in part, from thoſe *Properties* and *Dependencies*.

But now the Poet, having ſo much commended the Inventions and Inventors of *the philoſophic Principles of Religion and Government*, leſt an evil Uſe ſhould be made of this, by Men's reſting in *Theory* and *Speculation*, as they have been always too apt to do, in Matters whoſe *Practice* makes their Happineſs, he cautions his Reader [from l. 304 to 311] againſt this Error, in a *Warmth of Expreſſion*, which the ſublime Ideas of that *univerſal Harmony*, operating inceſſantly to *univerſal Good*, had raiſed up in him.

For *Forms* of Government let Fools conteſt;
Whate'er is beſt adminiſter'd is beſt.
For *Modes* of Faith let graceleſs Zealots fight;
His can't be wrong, whoſe Life is in the Right.
All muſt be falſe, that thwart this one great End;
And all of God, that bleſs Mankind, or mend.

The Seaſonableneſs of this Reproof will appear evident enough to thoſe who know, that mad Diſputes about *Liberty* and *Prerogative* had *once* well nigh overturned our Conſtitution; and that

others

others about *Myſtery* and *Church Authority* had almoſt deſtroyed the very Spirit of our holy Religion.

But theſe fine Lines have been ſtrangely miſunderſtood. The Author, againſt his own expreſs Words, againſt the plain Senſe of his Syſtem, has been conceived to mean, *That all Governments and all Religions were, as to their Forms and Objects, indifferent.* But as this wrong Judgment proceeded from Ignorance of the *Reaſon* of the Reproof, as explained above, that Explanation is alone ſufficient to rectify the Miſtake.

However, not to leave him under the leaſt Suſpicion, in a Matter of ſo much Importance, I ſhall juſtify the Senſe here given to this Paſſage more at large. Firſt by conſidering the *Words themſelves:* And then by comparing this miſtaken Senſe with the Context.

The Poet, we muſt obſerve, is here ſpeaking, not of civil Society *at large*, but of a *juſt* legitimate Policy,

Th' according Muſic of a WELL-MIX'D State.

Now theſe are of ſeveral Kinds; in ſome of which the *Democratic*, in others the *Ariſtocratic*, and in others the *Monarchic* FORM prevails. Now as each of theſe *mix'd Forms* is equally legitimate, as being founded on the Principles of natural Liberty, that Man is guilty of the higheſt *Folly*, who chuſes rather to employ himſelf in a ſpeculative Conteſt for the ſuperior Excellence of one of theſe Forms to the reſt, than in promoting the good Adminiſtration of that ſettled *Form* to which he is ſubject. And yet all our warm Diſputes about Government have been of this kind. Again, if, by *Forms of Government*, muſt needs be meant *legitimate Government*, becauſe that is the Subject under Debate, then by *Modes of Faith*, which is the correſpondent Idea, muſt needs be meant the Modes or *Explanations* of the *true Faith*, becauſe the Author is here too on the Subject of *true Religion*;

Relum'd her ancient Light, not kindled new.

Beſides,

Beſides, the very Expreſſion (than which nothing can be more preciſe) confines us to underſtand, by *Modes of Faith*, thoſe human Explanations of Chriſtian Myſteries, in conteſting which, Zeal and Ignorance have ſo perpetually violated Charity.

Secondly, If we conſider the *Context*; to ſuppoſe him to mean, that *all Forms of Government are indifferent*, is making him directly contradict the preceding Paragraph; where he extols the Patriot for diſcriminating the *true* from the *falſe* Modes of Government. He, ſays the Poet,

> Taught Power's due Uſe to People and to Kings,
> Taught not to ſlack, nor ſtrain its tender Strings;
> The leſs and greater ſet ſo juſtly true,
> That touching one muſt ſtrike the other too;
> 'Till jarring Intereſts of themſelves create
> Th' according Muſic of a *well-mix'd State*.

Here he recommends the *true* Form of Government, which is the *mixt*. In another Place he as ſtrongly condemns the *falſe*, or the abſolute *Jure Divino* Form:

> For Nature knew no *Right Divine* in Men. l. 237.

To ſuppoſe him to mean, *that all Religions are indifferent*, is an equally wrong as well as uncharitable Suſpicion. Mr. *Pope*, though his Subject in this *Eſſay on Man* confines him to *natural Religion* (his Purpoſe being to vindicate God's natural Diſpenſations to Mankind againſt the Atheiſt), yet gives frequent Intimations of a more ſublime Diſpenſation, and even of the Neceſſity of it; particularly in his *ſecond* Epiſtle [l. 139], where he ſpeaks of the *Weakneſs and Inſufficiency of human Reaſon* *.

Again, in his fourth Epiſtle [l. 331] ſpeaking of the good Man, the Favourite of Heaven, he ſays,

> For him alone, *Hope* leads from Goal to Goal,
> And opens ſtill, and opens on his Soul;

* See the ſecond Letter, p. 94.

Till lengthen'd on to *Faith*, and unconfin'd,
It pours the Bliſs that fills up all the Mind.

But *natural Religion* never lengthened *Hope* on to *Faith*; nor did any Religion, but the Chriſtian, ever conceive that *Faith* could fill the Mind with Happineſs.

Laſtly, The Poet, in this very Epiſtle, and in this very Place, ſpeaking of the great Reſtorers of the Religion of Nature, intimates that they could only draw God's *Shadow*, *not his Image*:

Relum'd her ancient Light, not kindled new,
If not *God's Image*, yet his *Shadow* drew.

As reverencing that Truth, which tells us that this *Diſcovery* was reſerved *for the glorious Goſpel of* Chriſt, *who is the* IMAGE OF GOD *.

Having thus largely conſidered Man in his *ſocial Capacity*, the Poet, in order to fix a momentous Truth in the Mind of his Reader, concludes the Epiſtle in recapitulating the *two Principles* which concur to the Support of *this Part* of his Character, namely, *Self-love* and *ſocial*; and ſhewing that they are only two different Motions of the *Appetite*, *to Good*, by which the Author of Nature has enabled Man to find *his own* Happineſs in the Happineſs of the *Whole*. This the Poet illuſtrates with a Thought as ſublime as is that general Harmony he deſcribes:

On their own Axis as the Planets run,
Yet make at once their Circle round the Sun;
So two conſiſtent Motions act the Soul,
And one regards itſelf, and one the Whole.
Thus God and Nature link'd the general Frame,
And bad *Self-love* and *ſocial* be the ſame.

For he hath the Art of converting Poetical Ornaments into Philoſophic Reaſoning; and of improving a *Simile* into an *Analogical Argument*. But of this Art, more in our Next.

* 2 Cor. iv. 4.

LETTER

LETTER IV.

THE Poet, in the two foregoing Epiſtles, having conſidered MAN with regard to the MEANS (that is, *in all his Relations*, whether as an *Individual*, or a Member of *Society*) comes now, in this laſt, to conſider him with regard to the END, that is, HAPPINESS.

It opens with an *Invocation* to *Happineſs*, in the Manner of the ancient Poets, who, when deſtitute of a Patron *God*, applied to the *Muſe*, and, if ſhe was engaged, took up with any ſimple *Virtue*, next at hand, to inſpire and proſper their Deſigns. This was the *ancient Invocation*, which few modern Poets have had the Art to imitate with any degree of Spirit or Decorum; while our Author, not content to heighten this poetic Ornament with the Graces of the *Antique*, hath alſo contrived to make it ſubſervient to the Method and Reaſoning of his philoſophic Compoſition. I will endeavour to explain ſo uncommon a Beauty.

It is to be obſerved that the Pagan Deities had each their *ſeveral Names* and *Places of Abode*, with ſome of which they were ſuppoſed to be more delighted than with others, and conſequently to be then moſt propitious when invoked by the favourite *Name* and *Place*: Hence we find the Hymns of *Homer*, *Orpheus*, and *Callimachus*, to be chiefly employed in enumerating the ſeveral Names

and Places of Abode by which the Patron God was diſtinguiſhed. Now, our Poet, with great and maſterly Addreſs, hath made theſe *two Circumſtances* ſerve to introduce his Subject, according to the exacteſt Rules of Logic. His Purpoſe is to write of *Happineſs*; Method therefore requires that he firſt define what Men mean by *Happineſs*, and this he does in the Ornament of a poetic *Invocation:*

O *Happineſs!* our Being's End and Aim,
Good, Pleaſure, Eaſe, Content! whate'er thy NAME.

After the DEFINITION, that which follows next, in order of Method, is the PROPOSITION, which here is, *that human Happineſs conſiſts not in external Advantages, but in Virtue.* For the Subject of this Epiſtle is the detecting the *falſe* Notions of Happineſs, and ſettling and explaining the *true*; and this the Poet lays down in the next ſixteen Lines. Now the Enumeration of *Happineſs's* ſeveral ſuppoſed *Places of Abode* (which, in Imitation of the ancient Poets, he next mentions in the *Invocation*, and which makes ten of the ſixteen Lines) is a Summary of *falſe Happineſs*, placed in *Externals:*

Plant of Celeſtial Seed! if dropt below,
Say in what mortal Soil thou deign'ſt to grow?
Fair opening to ſome *Court's* propitious Shine,
Or deep with *Diamonds* in the flaming Mine?
Twin'd with the Wreaths *Parnaſſian Laurels* yield,
Or reap'd in *Iron Harveſts* of the Field?

The ſix remaining Lines deliver the *true* Notion of Happineſs to be in *Virtue.* Which is ſumm'd up in theſe two;

Fixt to no Spot is Happineſs ſincere,
'Tis no where to be found, or every where.

The Poet, having thus *defined* his *Terms*, and laid down his *Propoſition*, proceeds to the Support of his *Theſis*; the various Arguments of which make up the body of the Epiſtle.

He

He begins [from l. 18 to 27] with detecting the *falſe Notions of Happineſs*. Theſe are of two kinds, the *Philoſophical* and *Popular*: The latter he had recapitulated in the *Invocation*, when *Happineſs* was call'd upon at her ſeveral ſuppoſed Places of Abode; the *Philoſophic* then only remained to be delivered.

Aſk of the *Learn'd* the Way, the Learn'd are blind,
This bids to *ſerve*, and that to *ſhun* Mankind:
Some place the Bliſs in *Action*, ſome in *Eaſe*;
Thoſe call it Pleaſure, and Contentment theſe.

The Confutation of theſe *Philoſophic* Errors, he ſhews to be very eaſy, *one common Fallacy* running through them all; namely this, That, inſtead of telling us in what the *Happineſs of human Nature* conſiſts, which was what was aſked of them, each buſies himſelf to explain in what he placed *his own peculiar Happineſs*:

Who thus define it, ſay they more or leſs
Than this, that Happineſs is Happineſs?

And here, before we go any farther, it will be proper to turn to our *Logician*, who, blind to theſe Beauties in the admirable Diſpoſition of the Subject, is extremely ſcandalized at the Poet for not proceeding immediately to explain *true Happineſs* (after having defined his Terms and delivered his Theſis) but for going back again (as he fancies) to a Conſideration of the *falſe*.—Speaking of the ſixteen Lines, he ſays—"Happineſs is then near me, and I feel "myſelf conſiderably refreſhed; but, by ill Luck, it is only for a "Moment, my Doubts preſently return, and I find myſelf in the "Hands of a Poet, who can do what he will with me, and who "having placed me on the very Borders of Happineſs, on a ſudden "ſhuts up all its Avenues*."

But a very little *Patience* and *Impartiality* would have ſhewn him, that they were immediately laid open again in the very next Lines [from 26 to 33] where the Poet ſhews, that if you will but

* Commentaire, p. 271.

take

take the Road of *Nature*, and leave that of *mad Opinion*, you will ſoon find Happineſs to be a Good of the Species, and, like common Senſe, equally diſtributed to all Mankind:

Take Nature's Path, and mad Opinion's leave,
All States can reach it, and all Heads conceive;
Obvious her Goods, in no Extreme they dwell,
There needs but thinking right, and meaning well;
And, mourn our various Portions as we pleaſe,
Equal is common Senſe, and common Eaſe.

But this is ſo far from ſatisfying our Bully-Critic, that it only furniſhes him with freſh Matter for a Quarrel. He is much offended at the two firſt Lines. "—I muſt here renew my Complaints. "Take Nature's Path, you ſay; and what am I to underſtand by "this Nature? Muſt I take the *reaſonable Nature* for my Guide? "But, according to you, the Philoſophers have conſulted it to no "purpoſe. Shall I give myſelf up to the *Animal Nature?* This "would ſoon reduce me to great Diſtreſſes. Encompaſſed with "Doubts and Difficulties, what have I left, but to ſuffer "myſelf to be borne away by Chance or Hazard? And to con-"clude, that the Counſel here given of taking *Nature's Path*, "comes at length to this, to march ſteddily on in the Footſteps of "Fatality *."

It would be hard indeed, if our Commentator could not find the Road to *Fatality*, in every Step the Poet takes. But here, in avoiding the Horns of his own chimerical *Dilemma*, he jumps upon it more aukwardly than uſual. The Poet, ſays he, muſt either mean the *Reaſonable*, or the *Animal Nature*. Agreed. He could not mean the *Animal* Nature. This too is true. Nor the *Reaſonable*. Why not? Becauſe it ſtood the Philoſophers in no ſtead. What then? Do you think he has ever the worſe Opinion of it on that Account? They could not poſſibly have run into more Miſtakes

* Commentaire, p. 272, 273.

about

about *Happineſs*, than you have about the Poet's *Meaning*: And yet, for all that, I apprehend he will think never the worſe, either of *Reaſon* or *himſelf*.

But what is indeed incredible, after Mr. *De Crouſaz* had thus commented the two firſt Lines, he goes on with his Remarks on the immediately following, *Obvious her Goods, &c.* in theſe Words: "*See Mr.* Pope *once again under the Neceſſity of reſtoring Reaſon to its Rights* *." Prodigious! It ſeems then, after all, Mr. *Pope* by *Nature's Path*, did indeed mean the *reaſonable Nature*. For we now ſee it was Mr. *De Crouſaz*, not Mr. *Pope*, that was *under the Neceſſity of reſtoring Reaſon to its Rights*.

To proceed, the Poet having expoſed the *two falſe ſpecies of Happineſs*, the PHILOSOPHICAL and POPULAR, and denounced the *True*, in order to eſtabliſh the *laſt*, goes on to a Confutation of the two *former*.

I. He firſt [from l. 32 to 47] confutes the PHILOSOPHICAL, which, as we ſaid, makes Happineſs a *particular*, not a *general* Good: And this two Ways:

1. From his *grand Principle*, That *God acts by general Laws*: The Conſequence of which is, that *Happineſs*, which ſupports the well-being of every Syſtem, muſt needs be *Univerſal*, and not *Partial*, as the Philoſophers conceived:

> Remember, Man! *The univerſal Cauſe*
> *Acts not by partial, but by general Laws*;
> And makes, what Happineſs we juſtly call,
> Subſiſt not in the Good of One, but All.

2. From *Fact*, That Man inſtinctively concurs with this Deſignation of Providence, to make Happineſs univerſal, by his having no Delight in any thing *uncommunicated* or *uncommunicable*:

> There's not a Bleſſing Individuals find,
> But ſome way leans and hearkens to the kind.

* Commentaire, p. 281.

No

No Bandit fierce, no Tyrant mad with Pride,
No cavern'd Hermit reſts ſelf-ſatisfied.
Abſtract what others feel, what others think,
All Pleaſures ſicken, and all Glories ſink.

II. The Poet, in the ſecond Place [from l. 46 to 65] confutes the POPULAR Error concerning *Happineſs*, namely, that it conſiſts in *Externals*: which he does,

1. By inquiring into the Reaſons of the preſent providential Diſpoſition of *external Goods*: A Topic of Confutation choſen with the greateſt Accuracy and Penetration. For, if it appears *they* were diſtributed in the Manner we ſee them, for Reaſons *different* from the *Happineſs of Individuals*, it is abſurd to think that they ſhould make *Part* of that Happineſs.

He ſhews therefore, that Diſparity of external Poſſeſſions among Men was for the ſake of *Society*, 1. to promote the Harmony and Happineſs of a *Syſtem*:

Order is Heaven's firſt Law; and, this confeſt,
Some are, and muſt be, greater than the reſt,
More rich, more wiſe,—

Becauſe the *Want* of external Goods in ſome, and the *Abundance* in others, increaſe general Harmony in the *Obliger* and *Obliged*.

Yet here (ſays he) mark the impartial Wiſdom of Heaven; this very *Inequality of Externals*, by contributing to *general Harmony* and Order, produceth an *Equality of Happineſs* amongſt *Individuals*; and, *for that very reaſon*,

Heaven to Mankind impartial we confeſs,
If all are equal in their Happineſs:
But mutual Wants this Happineſs increaſe,
All Nature's Difference keeps all Nature's Peace.
Condition, Circumſtance is not the Thing:
Bliſs is the ſame, in Subject, or in King;

In

In who obtain Defence, or who defend;
In him who is, or him who finds, a Friend.
Heaven breathes thro' every Member of the Whole
One common Bleſſing as one common Soul.

2. This Diſparity was neceſſary, becauſe, if external Goods were equally diſtributed, they would occaſion perpetual Diſcord amongſt Men all *equal* in Power:

But Fortune's Gifts if each alike poſſeſt,
And each were equal, muſt not all conteſt?

From hence he concludes, That, as *External Goods* were not given for the Reward of Virtue, but for many different Purpoſes, God could not, if he intended Happineſs for all, place it in the Enjoyment of *Externals*:

If then to *all* Men Happineſs was meant,
God in Externals could not place Content.

2. His ſecond Argument [from l. 64 to 71] againſt the *popular Error* of Happineſs's being placed in *Externals*, is, that the *Poſſeſſion* of them is inſeparably attended with *Fear*, the *Want* of them with *Hope*; which directly croſſing all their Pretenſions to making happy, evidently ſhew that God had placed Happineſs *elſewhere*:

Fortune her Gifts may variouſly diſpoſe,
And theſe be happy call'd, unhappy thoſe;
But Heaven's juſt Balance equal will appear,
While thoſe are plac'd in HOPE, and theſe in FEAR:
Not preſent Good or Ill, the Joy or Curſe,
But future Views of better or of worſe.

Hence, in concluding this Argument, he takes occaſion [from l. 70 to 75] to upbraid the deſperate Folly and Impiety of thoſe, who, in ſpite of God and Nature, will yet attempt to place *Happineſs in Externals*.

O Sons of Earth! attempt ye ſtill to riſe,
By Mountains pil'd on Mountains, to the Skies?
Heaven ſtill with Laughter the vain Toil ſurveys,
And buries Madmen in the Heaps they raiſe.

I muſt not here omit to obſerve, that the Tranſlator (unconſcious of all this fine Reaſoning between the 32d and 75th Lines, where the Poet firſt confutes the *Philoſophic* Errors concerning Happineſs, and next the *Popular*) hath ſtrangely jumbled together and confounded his different Arguments on theſe two different Heads. But this is not the worſt; he hath perverted the Poet's Words to a horrid and ſenſeleſs *Fataliſm*, foreign to the Argument in hand, and directly contrary to Mr. *Pope's* general Principles.

The Poet ſays,

Remember, Man! the univerſal Cauſe
Acts not by partial, but by general Laws.

His Tranſlator,

——Une Loi generale
Determine toûjours la Cauſe Principale.

That is, *a general Law ever determines the principal Cauſe*, which is the very *Fate* of the ancient Pagans, who ſuppoſed that Deſtiny gave Law to the *Father of Gods and Men*.

The Poet ſays again,

Order is Heaven's firſt Law:

That is, *the firſt Law made by God, relates to Order*, which is a beautiful Alluſion to the Scripture Hiſtory of the Creation, when God firſt appeaſed the Diſorders of *Chaos*, and ſeparated the Light from the Darkneſs. Let us now hear his Tranſlator:

L'Ordre, cet inflexible et grand Legiſlateur,
Qui des decrets du Ciel eſt le premier Auteur:

Order,

Order, that inflexible and grand Legiſlator, who is the firſt Author of the Laws of Heaven. A Propoſition abominable in moſt Senſes, and abſurd in all.

But now what ſays Mr. *De Crouſaz* to this, who is perpetually crying out, *Fate! Fate!* as Men in Diſtraction call out *Fire?* The Reader will be ſurprized to hear him paſs this cool Reflexion on two ſo obnoxious Paſſages.—"*This* Order, the firſt Author of Laws, *preſents us with very harſh Expreſſions, and bold Ideas, which Mr.* Pope *elſewhere condemns as raſh and unjuſtifiable* *. But this is his Moderation, when Mr. *L'Abbé* comes under his Critique: And we know, the excellent Proſe Tranſlation gave him the Advantage of knowing whom he had to do with.

To proceed, the Poet having thus confuted the two Errors concerning *Happineſs*, PHILOSOPHICAL and POPULAR, and proved that true Happineſs was neither *Solitary and Partial*, nor yet *placed in Externals*; goes on [from l. 74 to 91] to ſhew in what it *doth* conſiſt. He had before ſaid in general, and repeated it, that Happineſs lay in common to the whole Species. He now brings us better acquainted with it, in a more explicite Information of its Nature; and tells us, it is all contained in *Health*, *Peace*, and *Competence*; but that theſe are to be gained only by VIRTUE, namely, by *Temperance*, *Innocence*, and *Induſtry*:

> Reaſon's whole Pleaſures, all the Joys of Senſe,
> Lie in three Words, Health, Peace, and Competence.
> But Health conſiſts with Temperance alone,
> And Peace, O *Virtue!* Peace is all thy own.

The firſt Line,

> *Reaſon's whole Pleaſures, all the Joys of Senſe,*

is the moſt beautiful Paraphraſis for *Happineſs*; for all we feel of Good is by *Senſation* and *Reflexion*. The Tranſlator, who ſeemed little to concern himſelf with the Poet's Philoſophy or Argument,

* Commentaire, p. 282.

miſtook this Deſcription of *Happineſs* for a Deſcription of the *intellectual and ſenſitive Faculties*, oppoſed to one another; and therefore thus tranſlates it:

Le charme ſeducteur, dont s'enyvrant les Sens,
Les Plaiſirs de l'Eſprit encore plus raviſſans.

And ſo, with the higheſt Abſurdity, not only makes the Poet conſtitute *ſenſual Exceſſes* a Part of human Happineſs, but likewiſe the Product of Virtue.

After this, we ſhall no longer wonder at ſuch kind of Tranſlations as the following:

Mr. *Pope* ſays,

And Peace, O *Virtue!* Peace is all thy own.

The Tranſlator,

Pour vous, O Paix du Cœur, digne fille des Cieux,
Vous êtes du bonheur le gage precieux.

Conſcious Innocence, ſays the Poet, *is the only Source of internal Peace*, and *known Innocence* of *external*; therefore Peace is the ſole Iſſue of Virtue; or, in his own emphatic Words, *Peace is* ALL *thy own*; a concluſive Obſervation in his Argument. *O Peace*, ſays the Tranſlator, *thou art the precious Pledge of Happineſs*; an Obſervation, which concludes no more than that the Tranſlator did not underſtand the Argument, which ſtands thus:—Is Happineſs rightly placed in Externals? No, for it conſiſts in Health, Peace, and Competence. Health and Competence are the Product of Temperance and Induſtry; and Peace, of perfect Innocence.

But hitherto, the Poet hath only conſidered *Health* and *Peace*:

But *Health* conſiſts with Temperance alone,
And *Peace*, O Virtue! Peace is all thy own.

One Head yet remains to be ſpoken to, namely, *Competence*. In the Purſuit of *Health* and *Peace* there is no Danger of running into Exceſs. But the Caſe is different with regard to *Competence*.

Here,

Here, *Wealth* and *Affluence* would be too apt to be miſtaken for it, in Mens paſſionate Purſuit of external Goods. To obviate this Miſtake therefore, the Poet ſhews, that, as *exorbitant Wealth* adds nothing to the Happineſs ariſing from a *Competence*, ſo, as it is generally ill-gotten, it is attended with Circumſtances that weaken another Part of this triple Cord, namely, *Peace*:

The Good or Bad the Gifts of Fortune gain;
But theſe leſs taſte them as they worſe obtain.
Say, in Purſuit of Profit or Delight,
Who riſque the moſt, that take wrong Means or right?
Of Vice or Virtue, whether bleſt or curſt,
Which meets Contempt, or which Compaſſion firſt?
Count all th'Advantage proſperous Vice attains,
'Tis but what Virtue flies from, and diſdains;
And grant the Bad what Happineſs they would,
One they muſt want, which is, to paſs for good.

Here Mr. *De Crouſaz's* Remarks are indeed very extraordinary—"To whom (ſays he) are theſe Interrogatories addreſſed?—If you "refer yourſelf to the Judgment of a Troop of young Libertines, "ſuch as are to be found in great Cities, and in Armies, you will "certainly not have the Laughers on your Side *," &c. What then? If *Reaſon* require they ſhould, is not that ſufficient for the Poet's Purpoſe, in a Diſcourſe where *Reaſon* is continually appealed to, in a Controverſy between him and them? But our Logician's Perverſity is without Example. Till now, his Quarrel with the Poet was, that his Arguments flattered the corrupt Sentiments of Libertiniſm. At preſent he is as captious with him for their oppoſing thoſe Sentiments. Does not this look as if he were reſolved to approve of nothing Mr. *Pope* could ſay?

Our Author having thus largely confuted the Miſtake of *Happineſs's conſiſting in Externals*, proceeds to expoſe the terrible CONSEQUENCES of ſuch an Opinion, on the Sentiments and Practice of

* Commentaire, p. 289, 290.

all

all Sorts of Men, making the DISSOLUTE impious and atheiſtical, the RELIGIOUS uncharitable and intolerant, and the GOOD reſtleſs and diſcontent. For when it is once taken for granted, that *Happineſs conſiſts in Externals*, it is immediately ſeen that *ill* Men are often more happy than *good*; which ſets all Conditions on objecting to the Ways of Providence, and ſome even on raſhly attempting to rectify its Diſpenſations, though by the Violation of Law, divine and human. Now this being the moſt momentous Part of the Subject under Conſideration, is deſervedly treated moſt at large. And here it will be proper to take notice of the exquiſite Art of the Poet, in making this Confutation ſerve, at the ſame time, for a full Solution of all Objections which might be made to his main Propoſition, *that Happineſs conſiſts not in Externals*.

1. He begins, firſt of all, with the ATHEISTICAL *Complainers*, and purſues their Impiety [from l. 90 to 129] with all the Vengeance of his Eloquence.

> Oh blind to Truth, and God's whole Scheme below!
> Who fanſy Bliſs to Vice, to Virtue Woe:
> Who ſees and follows that great Scheme the beſt,
> Beſt knows the Bleſſing, and will moſt be bleſt.

He expoſes their Folly, even on their own Notions of *external Goods*.

1. By *Examples* [from line 96 to 109] where he ſhews *firſt*, that, if good Men have been untimely cut off, this is not to be aſcribed to their Virtues, but to a Contempt of Life that hurried them into Dangers. *Secondly*, That if they will ſtill perſiſt in aſcribing *untimely Death* to Virtue, they muſt needs, on the ſame Principle, likewiſe aſcribe *long Life* to it. Conſequently as the Argument, in *Fact*, concludes both ways, in *Logic*, it concludes neither.

> But Fools the *Good* alone unhappy call,
> From Ills or Accidents that chance to *all*.

Say,

Say, was it Virtue, more though Heaven ne'er gave,
Lamented *Digby!* ſunk thee to the Grave?
Tell me, if Virtue made the Son expire,
Why full of Days and Honour lives the Sire?
Why drew *Marſeilles'* good Biſhop purer Breath,
When Nature ſicken'd, and each Gale was Death?
Or why ſo long (in Life if long can be)
Lent Heaven a Parent to the Poor, and me?

This laſt Inſtance of the Poet's Illuſtration of the Ways of Providence, the Reader ſees, has a peculiar Elegance; where a Tribute of Piety to a *Parent* is paid in a Return of Thanks to [*Lent Heaven a Parent*, &c.] and made ſubſervient of [*Or why ſo long*—] his Vindication of, the *Great Father of all Things.*

2. He expoſes their Folly [from line 108 to 129] *by Conſiderations drawn from the Syſtem of Nature*; and theſe, two-fold, *Natural* and *Moral.* You accuſe God, ſays the Poet, becauſe the good Man is ſubject to Natural and Moral Evil: Let us ſee whence theſe proceed. Natural Evil is the neceſſary Conſequence of a material World ſo conſtituted: But that this Conſtitution was *beſt*, we have proved in the firſt Epiſtle. Moral Evil ariſeth from the depraved Will of Man: Therefore neither the one nor the other from God.

What makes all Phyſical or Moral Ill?
There deviates Nature, and here wanders Will.
God ſends not Ill, if rightly underſtood;
Or partial Ill is univerſal Good;
Or Chance admits, or Nature lets it fall,
Short, and but rare, till Man improv'd it all.

But you ſay (adds the Poet, to theſe impious Complainers) that though it be fit Man ſhould ſuffer the Miſeries which he brings upon himſelf, by the Commiſſion of moral Evil, yet it ſeems to be unfit his innocent Poſterity ſhould bear a Share of them. To this, ſays he, I reply,

We

We juſt as wiſely might of Heaven complain
That righteous *Abel* was deſtroy'd by *Cain*,
As that the virtuous Son is ill at eaſe,
When his lewd Father gave the dire Diſeaſe.

But you will ſtill ſay (continues the Poet) why does not God either prevent, or immediately repair theſe Evils? You may as well aſk, why he doth not work continual Miracles, and every Moment reverſe the eſtabliſhed Laws of Nature:

Shall burning *Ætna*, if a Sage requires,
Forget to thunder, and recal her Fires?
On Air or Sea new Motions be impreſt,
O blameleſs *Bethel!* to relieve thy Breaſt?
When the looſe Mountain trembles from on high,
Shall Gravitation ceaſe, if you go by?
Or, ſome old Temple nodding to its Fall,
For *Chartres'* Head reſerve the hanging Wall?

This is the Force of the Poet's Reaſoning, and theſe the Men to whom he addreſſes it, namely, the *Libertine* Cavillers againſt Providence.

II. But now, ſo unhappy is the Condition of our corrupt Nature, that theſe are not the only Complainers. *Religious* Men are but too apt, if not to *ſpeak out*, yet ſometimes ſecretly to *murmur* againſt Providence, and ſay, *its Ways are not equal:* Eſpecially thoſe more inordinately devoted to a Sect or Party are ſcandalized, that the Just (for ſuch they eſteem themſelves) *who are to judge the World*, have no better *Portion in their own Inheritance.* The Poet therefore now leaves thoſe more *profligate* Complainers, and turns [from l. 128 to 147] to the *Religious*, in theſe Words:

But ſtill this World (ſo fitted for the Knave)
Contents us not. A better ſhall we have?
A *Kingdom of the Juſt* then let it be,
But firſt conſider how thoſe *Juſt* agree.

As

As the more impious Complainers wanted external Goods to be the Reward of Virtue for the *moral* Man; ſo theſe want them for the *Pious*, in order to have *a Kingdom of the Juſt*. To this the Poet holds it ſufficient to anſwer: Pray, Gentlemen, firſt agree amongſt youſelves, who *thoſe Juſt* are. We allow,

The Good muſt merit God's peculiar Care,
But who but God can tell us who they are?
One thinks on *Calvin* Heaven's own Spirit fell,
Another deems him Inſtrument of Hell:
If *Calvin* feels Heaven's Bleſſing or its Rod,
This cries, There is, and that, There is no God.

As this is the Caſe, he even bids them reſt ſatisfied; remember his fundamental Principle, *That whatever is, is right*; and content themſelves (as their Religion teaches them to profeſs a more than ordinary Submiſſion to the Ways of Providence) with that common Anſwer which he with ſo much Reaſon and Piety gives to every Kind of Complainer.

However, though there be yet no Kingdom of the *Juſt*, there is ſtill no Kingdom of the *Unjuſt*. That both the *Virtuous* and the *Vicious*, whatſoever becomes of thoſe whom every Sect calls the *Faithful*, have their Shares in external Goods; and, what is more, the *Virtuous* have infinitely the moſt Enjoyment in them:

—This World, 'tis true,
Was made for *Cæſar*, but for *Titus* too:
And which more *bleſt?* who chain'd his Country, ſay,
Or he whoſe Virtue ſigh'd to loſe a Day?

I have been the more careful to explain this laſt Argument, and to ſhew againſt whom it is directed, becauſe much depends upon it for the Illuſtration of the Senſe, and the juſt Defence of the Poet. For if we ſuppoſe him ſtill addreſſing himſelf to thoſe *impious* Complainers, confuted in the thirty-eight preceding Lines, we ſhould make him guilty of a *Paralogiſm* in the Argument about the

Juſt, and in the Illuſtration of it by the Caſe of *Calvin*. For then the Libertines aſk, Why the *Juſt*, that is, the *moral Man*, is not rewarded? The Anſwer is, That none but God can tell who the *Juſt*, that is, the *truly faithful Man*, is. Where the term is changed, in order to ſupport the Argument; for about the *truly Moral Man* there is no Diſpute; about the *truly Faithful*, or the *Orthodox*, a great deal. But take the Poet right, as arguing here aqainſt *religious* Complainers, and the Reaſoning is ſtrict and logical. They aſk, Why the *truly Faithful* are not rewarded? He anſwers, They may be for ought you know, for none but God can tell who they are. Mr. *De Crouſaz's* Objections to this Reaſoning receive all their Force from that wrong Suppoſition, That the Poet was here arguing againſt *Libertine* Complainers; and conſequently they have no Force at all.

III. The Poet having diſpatched theſe two Species of Complainers, comes now to the third and ſtill more pardonable Sort, the diſcontented *good Men*, who lament only, that *Virtue ſtarves, while Vice riots*. To theſe the Poet replies [from l. 146 to 155] that admit this to be the Caſe, yet they have no Reaſon to complain, either of the good Man's Lot in particular, or of the Diſpenſation of Providence in general. Not of the *former*, becauſe *Happineſs*, the Reward of Virtue, conſiſts not in *Externals*; nor of the *latter*, becauſe ill Men may gain Wealth by commendable Induſtry, good Men want Neceſſaries through Indolence or bad Conduct.

But as modeſt as this Complaint ſeems at firſt View, the Poet next ſhews [from l. 154 to 165] that it is founded on a Principle of the higheſt Extravagance, which will never let the diſcontented *good Man* reſt, till he becomes as vain and fooliſh in his Imaginations as the very worſt ſort of Complainers. For that when once he begins to think he wants what is his due, he will never know where to ſtop, while God has any thing to give.

But this is not all; he proves next [from l. 164 to 175] that theſe Demands are not only *unreaſonable*, but in the higheſt degree *abſurd*

abſurd likewiſe. For that thoſe very *Goods*, if granted, would be the *Deſtruction* of that *Virtue* for which they are demanded as a *Reward*. He concludes therefore on the whole, that,

What nothing earthly gives, or can deſtroy,
The Soul's calm Sunſhine, and the heart-felt Joy,
Is Virtue's Prize.—

But the Poet now enters more at large upon the Matter: And ſtill continuing his Diſcourſe to this *third* Sort of Complainers (whom he indulges as much more pardonable than the *firſt* or *ſecond*, in rectifying all their Doubts and Miſtakes) proves both from *Reaſon* and *Example*, how unable any of thoſe things are, which the World moſt admires, to make a *good* Man *happy*. For, as to the *philoſophic* Miſtakes concerning Happineſs, there being little Danger of their making a general Impreſſion, the Poet, after a ſhort Confutation, had diſmiſſed them all together. But *external Goods* are thoſe Syrens, which ſo bewitch the World with Dreams of *Happineſs*, that of all Things the moſt difficult is, to awaken it out of its Deluſions; though, as he proves, in an exact Review of the moſt Pretending, they diſhonour *bad* Men, and add no Luſtre to the *Good*. That it is only this third and leaſt criminal Sort of Complainers, againſt which the remaining Part of the Diſcourſe is levelled, appears from the Poet's ſo frequently addreſſing himſelf, while he inforces his Arguments in Behalf of Providence, from henceforward to his Friend.

I. He begins therefore [from line 174 to 195] with conſidering RICHES. 1. He examines, firſt, what there is of *real* Value in them, and ſhews, they can give the *good* Man only that very Contentment he had before, or, at moſt, but burthen him with a Truſt to be diſpenſed for the Benefit of others:

For *Riches*, can they give but to the Juſt
His *own Contentment*, or *another's Truſt?*

Since the *good* Man eſteems all, beſide what is ſufficient to ſupply

him with the Conveniencies of Life, as entruſted to him by Providence, for the Supplial of others Neceſſities.

It is true, he tells us elſewhere, that another Sort of *good* Men are of a different Opinion:

> The grave Sir *Gilbert* holds it for a Rule,
> That *every Man in Want is Knave or Fool:*
> *God cannot love* (ſays *Blunt*, with lifted Eyes)
> *The Wretch he ſtarves*—and piouſly denies.
>
> *Of the Uſe of Riches*, l. 103.

And theſe are they to whom he here alludes, where he ſays,

> O Fool! to think God hates the worthy Mind,
> The Lover, and the Love, of Human-kind,
> Whoſe Life is healthful, and whoſe Conſcience clear,
> Becauſe he wants a thouſand Pounds a Year!

The Poet next examines the *imaginary* Value of Riches, as the Fountain of *Honour*. For his Adverſaries Objection ſtands thus:—As Honour is the genuine Claim of Virtue, and Shame the juſt Retribution of Vice; and as *Honour*, in their Opinion, follows Riches, and Shame Poverty; therefore the *good Man* ſhould be *rich*. He tells them in this they are much miſtaken:

> Honour and Shame from no Condition riſe;
> Act well your Part, there all the Honour lies.

What Power then has *Fortune* over the *Man?* None at all. For, as her *Favours* can confer neither Worth nor *Wiſdom*; ſo neither can her *Diſpleaſure* cure him of any of his *Follies*. On his *Garb* indeed ſhe has ſome little Influence; but his *Heart* ſtill remains the ſame:

> *Fortune* in Men has ſome ſmall Difference made,
> One *flaunts* in Rags, one *flutters* in Brocade.

II. Then, as to NOBILITY, by *Creation* or *Birth*, this too he ſhews [from l. 195 to 207] is, in itſelf, as devoid of all real Worth as

as the reſt: Becauſe, in the *firſt* Caſe the *Title* is generally gained by no Merit at all:

Stuck o'er with Titles, and hung round with Strings,
That thou may'ſt be by Kings, or Whores of Kings.

In the *ſecond*, by the Merit of the firſt Founder of the Family, which will always, when reflected on, be rather the Subject of *Mortification* than *Glory*:

Go! if your ancient, but ignoble, Blood
Has crept through Scoundrels ever ſince the Flood,
Go! and pretend your Family is young;
Nor own your Fathers have been Fools ſo long.

III. The Poet in the next Place [from l. 206 to 227] unmaſks the falſe Pretences of GREATNESS, whereby it is ſeen that the *Hero* and *Politician* (the two Characters which would monopolize that Quality) after all their Buſtle, effect only this, if they want Virtue, that the one proves himſelf a *Fool*, and the other a *Knave*: And *Virtue* they but too generally *want*. The *Art of Heroiſm* being underſtood to conſiſt in Ravage and *Deſolation*: and the *Art of Politics*, in *Circumvention*. Now

—Grant that thoſe can conquer, theſe can cheat,
'Tis Phraſe abſurd to call a *Villain*, Great:
Who wickedly is wiſe, or madly brave,
Is but the more a *Fool*, the more a *Knave*.

It is not *Succeſs* therefore that conſtitutes *true Greatneſs*; but the *End aimed at*; and the *Means* which are *employed*: And if theſe be right, Glory will be the *Reward*, whatever be the *Iſſue*:

Who noble Ends by noble Means obtains,
Or failing, ſmiles in Exile or in Chains,
Like good *Aurelius* let him reign, or bleed
Like *Socrates*, that Man is great indeed.

IV. With regard to FAME, that ſtill more fantaſtic Bleſſing, he ſhews [from l. 226 to 249] that all of it, beſides what we hear ourſelves,

ourſelves, is merely nothing; and that even of this ſmall Portion, no more of it gives the Poſſeſſor a real Satisfaction, than what is the Fruit of Virtue.

All *Fame* is foreign, but of true Deſert,
Plays round the *Head*, but comes not near the *Heart*.

Thus he ſhews, that *Honour*, *Nobility*, *Greatneſs*, *Glory*, ſo far as they have any thing real and ſubſtantial, that is, ſo far as they contribute to the *Happineſs* of the Poſſeſſor, are the ſole Iſſue of *Virtue*, and that neither *Riches*, *Courts*, *Armies*, nor the *Populace*, are capable of conferring them.

V. But laſtly, the Poet proves [from l. 248 to 259] that as *no external* Goods can make Man happy, ſo neither is it in the Power of *all internal*. For, that even SUPERIOR PARTS bring no more real Happineſs to the Poſſeſſor, than the reſt, nay, put him into a worſe Condition; for that the Quickneſs of Apprehenſion, and Depth of Penetration, do but ſharpen the Miſeries of Life:

In Parts ſuperior, what Advantage lies?
Tell (for You can) what is it to be wiſe?
'Tis but to know how little can be known;
To ſee all others Faults, and feel our own, *&c.*
Painful Pre-eminence! yourſelf to view
Above Life's Weakneſs, and its COMFORTS *too.*

This to his Friend—nor does it at all contradict what he had ſaid to him concerning *Happineſs* in the Beginning of the Epiſtle:

'Tis never to be bought, but always free,
And fled from Monarchs, *St. John!* dwells with thee.

For he is now proving that nothing either external to Man, or what is not in his own Power, and of his own Acquirement, can make him happy *here*. The moſt plauſible Rival of *Virtue* is *Knowledge*. Yet even this, he ſays, is ſo far from giving any degree of real

real Happineſs, that it deprives Men of thoſe *common Comforts* of Life, which are a kind of Support to us under the Want of *Happineſs*: Such as the more innocent of thoſe *Deluſions* which he ſpeaks of in the ſecond Epiſtle, where he ſays,

Till then, Opinion gilds with varying Rays
Thoſe painted Clouds, that beautify our Days, *&c.* l. 265.

Now *Knowledge* (as is here ſaid) *deſtroys* all thoſe Comforts, by ſetting Man *above Life's Weakneſſes*: So that in him, who thinks to attain *Happineſs* by *Knowledge*, the *Fable* is reverſed, and in a prepoſterous Attempt to gain the *Subſtance*, he loſes even the *Shadow*. This I take to be the true Senſe of this fine Stroke of Satire, on the wrong Purſuits after *Happineſs*.

Having thus proved how empty and unſatisfactory all theſe Greateſt external Goods are, from an Examination of their Nature, the Poet proceeds to ſtrengthen his Argument [from l. 258 to 299] by theſe two *farther* Conſiderations,

1ſt, That the Acquirement of theſe Goods is made with the Loſs of one another; or of greater, either as inconſiſtent with them, or as ſpent in attaining them:

How much of other each is ſure to coſt?
How each for other oft is wholly loſt?
How inconſiſtent greater Goods with theſe?
How ſometimes Life is riſqu'd, and always Eaſe?

2dly, That the Poſſeſſors of each of theſe Goods are generally ſuch as are ſo far from raiſing Envy in a good Man, that he would refuſe to take their Perſons, though accompanied with their Poſſeſſions. And this the Poet illuſtrates by Examples:

Think, and if ſtill the Things thy Envy call,
Say, would'ſt thou be the Man to whom they fall? *&c.*

3dly,

3dly, Nay, that even the Poſſeſſion of them all together, where they have excluded Virtue, only terminates in more enormous Miſery:

If all, united, thy Ambition call,
From ancient Story learn to ſcorn them all.
There, in the *Rich*, the *Honour'd*, *Fam'd*, and Great,
See the falſe Scale of Happineſs complete!
Mark by what wretched Steps their Glory grows,
From Dirt and Sea-weed, as proud *Venice* roſe, *&c.*

Having thus at length ſhewn, that *Happineſs* conſiſts neither in *any external* Goods, nor in *all* kinds of *internal*, that is, ſuch of them as are not of our own Acquirement, he concludes [from. l. 298 to 301] that it is to be found in VIRTUE ALONE:

Know then this Truth (enough for Man to know)
Virtue alone is Happineſs below.

Which the Tranſlator turns thus:

Appren donc qu'il n'eſt point icy bas de *Bonheur*
Si la Vertu ne regle et l'Eſprit, et le Cœur.

i. e. *Learn therefore that there is no Happineſs here below, if Virtue does not regulate the Heart and the Underſtanding*, which deſtroys the whole Force of the Poet's Concluſion. He had proved, that Happineſs conſiſts neither in *external Goods*, as the *Vulgar* imagined, nor yet in the *viſionary* Purſuits of the *Philoſophers*: He therefore concludes that it conſiſts in VIRTUE ALONE. His Tranſlator ſays, *without Virtue there can be no Happineſs*. And ſo ſay the Men againſt whom the Poet is here arguing. For though they ſuppoſed *external* Goods requiſite to Happineſs, yet it was, when enjoyed according to the Rules of Virtue. Mr. *Pope* ſays,

Virtue ALONE is Happineſs below,

and ſo ought his Tranſlator to have ſaid after him.

Hitherto

Hitherto the Poet had proved, NEGATIVELY, that *Happineſs conſiſts in Virtue*, by ſhewing it conſiſted not in any other thing. He now [from l. 300 to 317] proves the ſame POSITIVELY, by an Enumeration of its *Qualities*, all naturally adapted to give, and to increaſe human Happineſs: As its *Conſtancy*, *Capacity*, *Vigour*, *Efficacy*, *Activity*, *Moderation*, and *Self-ſufficiency*:

The only Point where human Bliſs ſtands ſtill,
And taſtes the Good, without the Fall to Ill;
Without Satiety, tho' e'er ſo bleſs'd,
And but more reliſh'd, as the more diſtreſs'd:
Good, from each Object, from each Place, acquir'd,
For ever exercis'd, yet never tir'd;
Never elated, while one Man's oppreſs'd;
Never dejected, while another's bleſs'd;
And where no Wants, no Wiſhes can remain,
Since, but to wiſh more Virtue, is to gain.

Having thus proved that *Happineſs* is indeed placed in *Virtue*, he proves next [from l. 316 to 319] that it is RIGHTLY placed there: For, that *then*, and *then only*, ALL may partake of it, and ALL be capable of reliſhing it:

See the ſole Bliſs Heaven *could* on ALL beſtow,
Which who but feels can taſte, but thinks can know.

The Poet then obſerves, with ſome Indignation, [from l. 318 to 331] that as eaſy and as evident as this Truth was, yet *Riches* and *falſe Philoſophy* had ſo blinded the Perception, even of *improved* Minds, that the Poſſeſſors of the *firſt* placed Happineſs in *Externals* unſuitable to Man's *Nature*; and the Followers of the *latter* in refined *Viſions*, unſuitable to his *Situation*: While the ſimple-minded Man, with NATURE only for his Guide, found plainly in what it ſhould be placed:

Yet *poor* with *Fortune*, and with *Learning blind*,
The Bad muſt miſs, the Good untaught will find;

Slave to no Sect, who takes no private Road,
But *looks thro' Nature up to Nature's God.*
Purſues that Chain, which links th' immenſe Deſign,
Joins Heaven and Earth, and Mortal and Divine.
Sees that no Being any Bliſs can know,
But touches ſome above, and ſome below;
Learns, from this Union of the riſing *Whole*,
The firſt laſt Purpoſe of the human Soul;
And knows where Faith, Law, Morals, all began,
All end, in LOVE OF GOD, and LOVE OF MAN.

To this Mr. *De Crouſaz*,—"I made my Remarks as I went "along, in reading the Poem of Mr. *Du Reſnel*; and, in Propor- "tion as I advanced in it, I have had the moſt agreeable Satisfac- "tion to find, that my Commentaries have been too haſty and im- "mature on this Poem; in ſo clear a Light has the illuſtrious "*Abbé* placed thoſe Truths, which the Proſe Tranſlator had deli- "vered with much leſs Preciſeneſs. In this Tranſlation I evi- "dently meet with the ſacred Terms of *Faith*, *Hope*, and *Charity*; "but I don't know where he had them. And it is not eaſy for "me to find, how the Ideas which I have been accuſtomed to fix "to them can agree with them. I am puzzled to know what they "have to do here *."

This, to uſe our Critic's own Words, is a Specimen of that *Galimatias*, which runs through his whole Commentary. He ſuſpects, he approves, he doubts, he applauds; but it all ends in Calumny and Condemnation. Here you have an old Veteran Controverſialiſt of ſeventy-five, who gives the World his *ſecond Thoughts* (for he had publiſhed his *Examen* before he wrote his *Commentary*) telling us that he ſcribbled at random, and made the greateſt Part of his Remarks before he had read over the Book he wrote againſt: A Book that contains a regular, well-digeſted Syſtem, whoſe Parts, having a mutual Dependance, neceſſarily ſupport and illuſtrate one

* Commentaire, p. 332.

another.

another. But if a Man would make ſo free with himſelf as to tell this ſtrange Story to the World, which certainly he had a Right to do, he ſhould, as his moral Character was concerned, have made Satisfaction for his Folly, by ſtriking out all thoſe odious Imputations with which the foregoing Part of his Commentary abounds. Inſtead of this, he was not only content to leave the Calumnies of *Fataliſm* and *Spinoziſm* un-retracted; but has thought fit to renew them, even after this Confeſſion of his haſty, *immature* Way of Writing. Ah! miſera mens hominis, quo te *fatum* ſæpiſſime trahit! What but this could have forced him to write a whole Book in Contradiction to the very *Principle* he himſelf lays down to proceed by? *An over-ſcrupulous Exactitude* (ſays he) *would hurt the very End of Poetry. But we muſt make it a Law to interpret one Expreſſion by another, for fear of attributing Notions to a Poet that would be injurious to him* *.

But to return: This is not all; the Poet ſhews farther [from l. 330 to 343] that, when the ſimple-minded Man, on his firſt ſetting out in the Purſuit of Truth, in order to Happineſs, has had the Wiſdom

To look thro' Nature up to Nature's God,

inſtead of adhering to any Sect or Party, where there was ſo great Odds of his chuſing wrong; That then the Benefit of gaining the *Knowledge of God's Will written in the Mind* is not there confined; for that ſtanding on this *ſure Foundation*, he is now *no longer* in Danger of chuſing wrong, amidſt *ſuch Diverſities* of Religions; but by purſuing this grand Scheme of Univerſal Benevolence, in *Practice*, as well as *Theory*, he arrives at length to the *Knowledge of the revealed Will of God*, which is the *Conſummation* of the *Syſtem of Benevolence*:

For him alone *Hope* leads from Goal to Goal,
And opens ſtill, and opens on his Soul,

* Commentaire, p. 196.

'Till lengthen'd on to FAITH, and unconfin'd,
It pours the Bliſs, that fills up all the Mind.

But let us once more hear Mr. *De Crouſaz*: "We are brought "(ſays he) at length to the *Truths of Revelation*.—See Man once "again re-eſtabliſhed in his Rights, raiſed as far above Brutes as "Heaven is above the Earth. How infinite a Difference between "what one reads in this *fourth* Epiſtle, and what the Poet ven-"tured to propoſe in the *firſt*, and in part of the *two following*? "There, corrupt Minds *thought* they read their own Sentiments; "and even this, which we find here, is inſufficient to bring them "back again from their Preventions *."

That the *three firſt* Epiſtles have nothing contrary to the *fourth*, we have not only ſufficiently evinced, but ſhewn likewiſe, that the Doctrine of this *laſt*, ſo much approved by Mr. *De Crouſaz*, is the neceſſary Conſequence of that laid down in every one of the *preceding*, ſo much condemned by him. But, that *corrupt Minds thought they read their own Sentiments there*, nay, that it will *be hard to bring them back again from their Preventions*, I can eaſily conceive; becauſe, not only *Partiality* to Mens *own* Opinions, but *Prejudice* againſt the Opinions of *others*, may make them fancy they ſee Doctrines in a *celebrated Writer*, which are indeed not there. And then, *Self-love* on the one hand, and *Self-conceit* on the other, may eaſily keep both in their ſeveral Deluſions, againſt all the Power of Conviction.

To proceed, The Poet, in the laſt Place, marks out [from l. 342 to 363] the *Progreſs* of his *Good Man's* Benevolence, puſhed through *natural* Religion to *revealed*, 'till it arrives to that Height, which the *Sacred Writers* deſcribe as the very Summit of *Chriſtian Perfection*: And ſhews how the Progreſs of *human* differs from the Progreſs of *divine* Benevolence. That the *divine* deſcends from Whole to Parts; but that the *human* muſt riſe from indi-

* Commentaire, p. 332, 333.

vidual

vidual to univerſal. And with this rapturous Deſcription the Subject of the Epiſtle cloſes:

Self-love thus puſh'd to ſocial, to divine,
Gives thee to make thy Neighbour's Bleſſing thine:
Is this too little for the boundleſs Heart?
Extend it, let thy Enemies have Part.
Graſp the whole Worlds of Reaſon, Life, and Senſe,
In one cloſe Syſtem of Benevolence.
Happier, as kinder! in whate'er Degree,
AND HEIGHT OF BLISS, BUT HEIGHT OF CHARITY.
God loves from Whole to Parts; but human Soul
Muſt riſe from Individual to the Whole.
Self-love but ſerves the virtuous Mind to wake,
As the ſmall Pebble ſtirs the peaceful Lake;
The Centre mov'd, a Circle ſtrait ſucceeds,
Another ſtill, and ſtill another ſpreads, *&c.*

The laſt Part of the Obſervation is important. *Rochefocault*, *Eſprit*, and their wordy Diſciple *Mandeville*, had obſerved, that *Self-love* was the *Origin* of all thoſe Virtues Mankind moſt admire; and therefore fooliſhly ſuppoſed it was the *End* likewiſe: And ſo, *taught* that the higheſt Pretences to Diſintereſtedneſs were only the more artful Diſguiſes of *Self-love*. But Mr. *Pope*, who ſays, ſomewhere or other,

Of human Nature Wit its worſt may write,
We all revere it in our own Deſpite,

ſaw, as well as they, and every body elſe, that the Paſſions began in *Self-love*; yet he underſtood human Nature better than to imagine they terminated there. He knew that Reaſon and Religion could convert *Selfiſhneſs* into its very oppoſite; and therefore *teaches* that

Self-love but ſerves the virtuous Mind to wake,

and

and thus hath vindicated the Dignity of human Nature, and the philoſophic Truth of the Chriſtian Doctrine.

But let us turn once more to Mr. *De Crouſaz*, who, conſtant to himſelf, concludes, in the ſame even tenor in which he firſt ſet out. "A Man (ſays he) muſt uſe ſome Efforts to go even ſo far "as to love his Enemies.—But as to what concerns all Parts of the "Univerſe, and all the living Beings that inhabit it, as well thoſe "we ſee not, as thoſe we do ſee, we find nothing in ourſelves re-"pugnant indeed to the giving them our Love; but then, on the "other hand, we do not feel any Motions towards the rendering it "to them. And while ſo great a Number of Objects, with which "we are cloſely ſurrounded, demand our Attention and Concern, "it appears not only ſuperfluous but even irrational, to teaze our-"ſelves with I cannot tell what Kind of Tenderneſs, for the Inha-"bitants of *Jupiter* *, *&c.*"

This preſents him with a pleaſant Idea, and he purſues it with his uſual Grace and Vivacity.

After this one would ſcarce think that in the very next Words he ſhould confute himſelf, anſwer his own Objections, and vindicate the very Charity he had ridiculed. And yet this he now does, as much without Fear, as the other was without Wit. "I own "(ſays he) that a Soul devoted to its Creator, and ſtruck and raiſed "with Admiration at the attentive View of his mere corporeal "Creation, would be ready to lend thoſe Beings his Voice and Sen-"timents, in order to join with them in an Offering of Praiſe and "Thankſgiving to their common Creator, whoſe Glory they ſo "magnificently declare, though without any Knowledge of the "Truth which they proclaim. Nay, I go farther, and ſay, that a "Soul ſo ſanctified, and at the ſame time well aſſured, that there "are innumerable Choirs of happy Intelligences, who continually "adore their Creator in extatic Raptures, far ſurpaſſing our Con-"ceptions, will *congratulate* with them on their Glory † and Feli-"city."

* Commentaire, p. 336.

† Ib. p. 337, 338.

"city." Here we see described, and, to say the Truth, not ill, that very State of Mind which produced the Raptures of our admirable Poet:

Grasp the whole Worlds of Reason, Life, and Sense,
In one close System of Benevolence.
Happier, as kinder! in whate'er Degree,
And height of Bliss but height of Charity.

No, says our Critic, who would still keep on foot the Censure he himself has overthrown; the Elevations I speak of, are not *Elevations of Charity for those glorious Intelligences. We are the Objects of their Charity, not they of ours* *. Egregious Philosopher! By Charity, Mr. *Pope* not only *means* Benevolence, but expressly *calls* it *so*. And *Benevolence* surely may be as well exercised *towards* Superiors, as *by* them.

But he proceeds—"This pretended chimerical Affection can have "no Foundation but in the chimerical System of *a Whole*, of which "we make a Part, and of which all the Parts without Exception "are so dependent on each other, that, if any *one only* be displaced, "or never so little deviating from its proper Function, that Dis-"order will affect the rest, and spread itself over the *Whole*: And, "by consequence, extend to us, who make an essential Part of that "Whole. *Self-love* therefore, interests itself in every thing that "exists and moves." *Self-love* was never sent on such an Errand, no not by *Rochefocault* or *Esprit*, though they forced it to do all their Drudgery. Here, a Man who never yet once rightly understood *what* his Adversary *did say*, will now pretend to guess at his *Reasons for saying*. One might have foreseen with what Success. But something he has taught us, and that is, to rest content with the Poet's own Reasoning. His Argument then for this extended Benevolence is, that as God has made *a Whole*, whose Parts have a perfect Relation to, and an entire Dependency on each other, Man, in extending his Benevolence throughout that *Whole*, acts in

* Commentaire, p. 338.

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Conformity to the Will of his Creator; and therefore, this *Enlargement* of his Affection becomes a *Duty*.

But the Poet hath not only ſhewn his *Piety* in this *Precept*, but the utmoſt *Art* and *Addreſs* likewiſe in the *Diſpoſition* of it. The *Eſſay on Man* opens with expoſing the Murmurings, and impious Concluſions of fooliſh Men againſt the preſent Conſtitution of Things. As it proceeds, it occaſionally detects all thoſe falſe Principles and Opinions that led them to conclude thus perverſely. Having now done all that was neceſſary in *Speculation*, the Poet turns to *Practice*; and ends his Eſſay with the Recommendation of an acknowledged Virtue, *Charity*, which, if exerciſed in the Extent that Conformity to the Will of God requires, would effectually *prevent* all Complaints againſt the preſent Order of Things: Such Complaints being made with a total Diſregard to every thing, but their own *private Syſtem*; and ſeeking Remedy in the Diſorder, and at the Expence of all the reſt.

The Art and Contrivance, we ſee, is truly admirable. But Mr. *De Crouſaz* purſues his own Ideas. For to know Mr. *Pope's*, ſeems to have been his leaſt Concern throughout his whole *Commentary*. "This Syſtem [namely, of *a Whole*] will carry us to a great length. "*Miracles*, which deviate from the ordinary Courſe of Nature, "muſt paſs from henceforward as idle Fable." [Obſerve his reaſon] "It was impoſſible that any kind of thing which has happened, "ſhould not have happened, or not have happened in the Manner "it hath *." As to Mr. *Pope's* Fataliſm, we have ſaid enough of that Matter already. But now, if, for Diſputation's Sake, we admit what, for Truth's Sake, we muſt reject, according to my Notions of Logic, this Concluſion would follow, *that therefore Miracles could not but have been*; not Mr. *Crouſaz's*, *that therefore they never could be*. Miracles are proved, like other Matters of Fact, by *human Teſtimony*: If *that* ſays, Iron at one time ſwam, at other times ſunk, and we ſuppoſe Things ordered fatally; theſe two

* Commentaire, p. 339.

Events

Events were equally *neceſſary*: So that, to make out his Concluſion, he muſt be forced to add downright *Atheiſm* to his *Fate*.

Mr. *De Crouſaz* has now puſhed Matters to a decent Length. He has ſaid, the Poet's *Extent of Charity was irrational—the Syſtem on which it was founded chimerical—that it ended in Fate—and overthrew all Miracles*. One would imagine this ſhould have ſatisfied the moſt orthodox Reſentment. But there wanted ſomething to make a right polemical Climax. To crown the Whole, therefore, he tells us, that, "According to the Poet, the Univerſe would "not have been a Work ſufficiently worthy of God, had there not "been Atheiſts, Superſtitious, Perſecutors, Tyrants, Idolaters, "Aſſaſſins, and Poiſoners *." What I can find in the *Eſſay* coming neareſt to this, is, That thoſe Miſchiefs do not deform God's Creation; *becauſe* the divine Art is inceſſantly producing Good out of Evil: And that as this Univerſe is the beſt of all thoſe in God's Idea, therefore, whatever is, is right, with reſpect to that Univerſe: Either as tending, *in its own Nature*, to the Perfection of it, or made ſo to tend by infinite Wiſdom, *contrary to its Nature*. The true Conſequence drawn from all this, is, *That an Univerſe with Atheiſts, Superſtitious*, &c. *is ſufficiently worthy of God*. How that can infer this other, *That the Univerſe would not have been a Work ſufficiently worthy of God, had there not been Atheiſt, Superſtitious*, &c. I leave Mr. *De Crouſaz* to draw out by his own *Logic*, or, which ſeems the more ductile of the two, his own Conſcience.

The Poet's Addreſs to his Friend, which follows, and cloſes this *Epiſtle*, comes not within the Deſign of theſe Obſervations! which are only to explain the *Philoſophy* and *Reaſoning* of *the Eſſay on Man*. Otherwiſe, this ſingle Apoſtrophe would furniſh a Critic with Examples of every one of thoſe *five* Species of Elocution, from which, as from its Sources, *Longinus* deduceth the SUBLIME †.

* Commentaire, p. 340.

† —πέντε πηγαί τινές εἰσιν τ' ὑψηλοφίας. 1. Πρῶτον μὲν καὶ κράτιστον τὸ περὶ τὰς νοήσεις ἀδρεπήβολον. 2. Δεύτερον δὲ τὸ σφοδρὸν καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικὸν πάθος. 3. Ποιὰ τῶν σχημάτων πλάσις. 4. Ἡ γενναῖα φράσις. 5. Πέμπτη δὲ μεγέθους αἰτία, καὶ συγκλείουσα τὰ πρὸ ἑαυτοῖς ἅπαντα, ἡ ἐν ἀξιώμασι καὶ διάρσει σύνθεσις.

1. The firſt and chief is *a Grandeur and Sublimity of Conception:*

Come then, my Friend! my Genius come along,
O Maſter of the Poet, and the Song!
And while the Muſe now ſtoops, and now aſcends,
To Man's low Paſſions, or their glorious Ends.

2. The *Second*, that *Pathetic Enthuſiaſm, which at the ſame time melts and enflames:*

Teach me, like thee, in various Nature wiſe,
To fall with Dignity, with Temper riſe,
Form'd by thy Converſe, happily to ſteer
From grave to gay, from lively to ſevere,
Correct with Spirit, eloquent with Eaſe,
Intent to reaſon, or polite to pleaſe.

3. *A certain elegant Formation and Ordonance of Figures:*

O! while along the Stream of Time, thy Name
Expanded flies, and gathers all its Fame,
Say, ſhall my little Bark attendant ſail,
Purſue the Triumph and partake the Gale?

4. A *ſplendid Diction:*

When Stateſmen, Heroes, Kings, in Duſt repoſe,
Whoſe Sons ſhall bluſh their Fathers were thy Foes,
Shall then this Verſe to future Age pretend
Thou wert my Guide, Philoſopher, and Friend?
That, urg'd by thee, I turn'd the tuneful Art,
From Sounds to Things, from Fancy to the Heart;
For Wit's falſe Mirror held up Nature's Light;

And *fifthly, which includes in itſelf all the reſt, a Weight and Dignity in the Compoſition:*

Shew'd erring Pride whatever *is*, is RIGHT;

That

That REASON, PASSION, anſwer *one great* AIM;
That true SELF-LOVE and SOCIAL are the SAME;
That VIRTUE only makes our BLISS below;
And all our Knowledge is OURSELVES TO KNOW?

But this, as we ſay, is not our Province at preſent. I ſhall therefore content myſelf with an Obſervation, which this ſublime Recapitulation of the general Argument, in the laſt Lines, affords me to conclude with. Which is, of one great Beauty that ſhines through the whole *Eſſay*. It is this, that the Poet, whether he ſpeaks of Man as an *Individual*, a Member of *Society*, or the Subject of *Happineſs*, never miſſeth an Opportunity, while he is explaining his *State* under any of theſe Capacities, to illuſtrate it, in the moſt artful Manner, by the Inforcement of his grand Principle, *That every thing tends to the Good of the Whole*. From whence his Syſtem receives the reciprocal Advantage of having that grand *Theorem* realized by *Facts*, and his *Facts* juſtified on a *Principle of Right* or Nature.

Thus have I endeavoured to analyſe and explain the noble Reaſoning of theſe four Epiſtles. Enough, I preſume, to convince our Critic's *Friends* that it hath a Preciſion, Force, and Cloſeneſs of Connection, rarely to be met with, even in the moſt formal Treatiſes of Philoſophy. Yet in doing this, it is but too evident I have deſtroyed that Grace and Energy which animates the Original. So right was Mr. *Pope's* Prediction of the Event of ſuch an Undertaking, where he ſays, in his Preface, that, *he was unable to treat this Part of his Subject more in Detail, without becoming dry and tedious*. And now let the Reader believe, if he be ſo diſpoſed, what our great Logician inſinuates to be his own Sentiments, as well as thoſe of his Friends: "That certain Perſons have conjectured that "Mr. *Pope* did not compoſe this *Eſſay* at once, and in a regular "Order; but that after he had wrote ſeveral Fragments of Poetry, "all finiſhed in their Kind; one, for Example, on the Parallel "between *Reaſon* and *Inſtinct*; another, upon Man's groundleſs

" *Pride*; another, on the Prerogatives of *human Nature*; another, " on *Religion* and *Superſtition*; another, on the *Original of Society*; " and ſeveral Fragments beſides, on *Self-love* and the *Paſſions*; he " tacked theſe together as he could, and divided them into four " Epiſtles, as, it is ſaid, was the Fortune of *Homer's* Rhapſodies *." Yes, I believe full as much of Mr. *Pope's Rhapſodies*, as I do of *Homer's*. But if this be the Caſe, that the *Leaves* of theſe *two great Poets* were wrote at random, toſſed about, and afterwards put in Order, like the *Cumæan* Sibyls; then, what we have till now thought an old lying Bravado of the Poets, *That they wrote by Inſpiration*, will become a ſober Truth. For, if *Chance* could not produce them, and *human deſign* had no hand in them, what muſt we conclude, but that they are, what they are ſo commonly called, *Divine?*

However, ſo honourable an Account of *Rhapſody Writing* ſhould by all means be encouraged, as Matter of Conſolation to certain modern Writers in Divinity and Politics. But the Miſchief is, our Logician has given us an unlucky Proof in his own Caſe, that *all Rhapſodiſts* are not ſo happy.

To be ſerious: As to *Homer*, one might hope, by this time, thoſe old exploded Fooleries about his *Rhapſodies* would be forgotten. But as to his *Tranſlator*, it muſt be owned, he has given Cauſe enough of Diſguſt to our *Philoſophers* and *Men of Reaſon*. Till this time, every Poet, good or bad, ſtuck fairly to his Profeſſion: But Mr. *Pope*, now the laſt of the poetic Line amongſt us, on whom the large Patrimony of his whole Race is devolved, ſeems deſirous, as is natural in ſuch Caſes, to ally himſelf to a more laſting Family; and ſo, after having diſported himſelf at Will, in the flowery Paths of Fancy, and revelled in all the Favours of the Muſes, boaſts of having taken up in time, and courted and eſpouſed *Truth*:

That not in *Fancy's* Maze he wander'd long,
But ſtoop'd to *Truth*, and moraliz'd his Song.

But now, in what Light, muſt we think, will the graver Chriſtian Reader regard the Calumnies we have here confuted? How ſad

* Commentaire, p. 346.

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an Idea will this give him of the *preſent* Spirit of Chriſtian Profeſſion, that a Work, wrote ſolely to recommend the *Charity* that Religion ſo ſtrongly inforceth, and breathing nothing but Love to God, and univerſal Good-will to Man, ſhould bring upon the Author ſuch a Storm of uncharitable Bitterneſs and Calumny, and that, from a pretended Advocate of Chriſtianity? A Religion the very Vitality of which (if we may believe its Propagators) is Univerſal Benevolence: *For the End of the Commandment is Charity* *. Conformably hereunto we may obſerve, that in their *Epiſtles* to the *Churches*, whatever the Occaſion was, whatever Diſcipline they inſtituted, whatever Points of Faith they explained, whatever Hereſies they ſtigmatized, whatever Immoralities they condemned, or whatever Virtues they recommended, CHARITY was ſtill the Thing moſt conſtantly enforced, as the very End of all, *the Bond of Perfectneſs* †. The *beloved* Diſciple of our Lord, particularly, who may ſurely be ſuppoſed to know his Maſter's Will, hath wrote *his* Epiſtle on ſet Purpoſe to recommend this ſingle Virtue: At a Criſis too, when, as Hereſies were ſpringing up apace, a *modern Controverſialiſt* would be apt to think he might have employed his Time better. And why (it may be reaſonably aſked) ſo very much on *Charity*, in an Age when Chriſtians had ſo few Provocations or Temptations to violate it? For their Faith being yet chaſte from the Proſtitutions of the *Schools*, and their Hierarchy yet uncorrupted by the Gifts of *Conſtantine*, the Church knew neither *Bigotry* nor *Ambition*, the two fatal Sources of uncharitable Zeal. I will tell you, it was the Providence of their prophetic Spirit, which preſented to them the Image of thoſe miſerable Times foretold by their Maſter, when *Iniquity ſhould abound, and the Love of many wax cold* ‡. So that if the Men of thoſe Times ſhould perſiſt in violating *this Bond of Perfectneſs*, after ſo many repeated Admonitions, they might be found altogether without Excuſe. For I can by no means enter into the Views of that profound Philoſopher, who diſcovered that *Jeſus* and his Followers might preach up Love

* 1 Tim. i. 5. † Col. iii. 14. ‡ Matt. xxiv. 12.

and

and Charity, the better to enable a Set of Men, ſome Centuries afterwards, to tyranniſe over thoſe whom the *engaging Sounds of Charity and Brotherly Love* had intrapped into Subjection *.

I am aware that certain modern Propagators of the Faith, aided with a *School Diſtinction*, will tell you, that it is pure Charity which ſets them all at work; and that what you call *Uncharitableneſs*, when they inſult the Fame, the Fortune, or the Perſon of their Brother, is indeed the very Height of Charity, a Charity for his *Soul*. This indeed may be the Height of the Hangman's Charity, who waits for your Cloaths: But it could never be St. *Paul*'s. His was *not eaſily provoked, thought no Evil, bore all Things, hoped all Things, endured all Things* †. It was a Charity that began in Candour, inſpired good Opinion, and ſought the temporal Happineſs of his Brother.

I leave it with Mr. *De Crouſaz* to think upon the different Effects which Exceſs of Zeal in the Service of Religion hath produced in him. For I will, in very *Charity*, believe it to be really *that*; notwithſtanding we every Day ſee the moſt deſpicable Tools of *others Impotency*, and the vileſt Slaves to their *own Ambition*, hide their corrupt Paſſions under the ſelf-ſame Cover. This learned Gentleman ſhould reflect on what the ſober Part of the World will think of his Conduct. For though the Apoſtle bids AGED MEN BE SOUND IN FAITH, he adds immediately, and IN CHARITY, IN PATIENCE ‡ likewiſe. But where was his *Charity* in labouring, on the ſlighteſt Grounds, to repreſent his Brother as propagating *Spinoziſm* and Immorality? Where was his *Temper*, when he became ſo furious againſt him, on the Suppoſition of his eſpouſing a *Syſtem* he had *never read*, that of *Leibnitz*; and juſtifying a Doctrine he had *never heard of*, the *pre-eſtabliſhed Harmony*? Where was his *Patience*, when, having conceived this of him, on the mere Authority of a *moſt miſtaken Tranſlator*, he would not ſtay to inquire whether the Author owned the Faithfulneſs of the Verſion; but

* Characteriſticks, vol. i. p. 87. vol. iii. p. 115. Ed. 1737.

† 1 Cor. xiii. 5. 7. ‡ Titus ii. 2.

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publiſhed his Conceptions, and the ſtrongeſt Accuſations upon thoſe Conceptions, in Volume after Volume, to the whole World? Where, if in any of theſe Imaginations ſo founded, he ſhould be miſtaken, he became guilty of a deliberate and repeated Act of the higheſt Injuſtice; the attempting to deprive a virtuous Man of his honeſt Reputation.

If Mr. *De Crouſaz* preſumes his Zeal for the Honour of God will excuſe his Violations of Charity towards Men, I muſt tell him, *he knows not what Spirit he is of.* *If a Man* (ſays the beloved Diſciple of our Lord) *ſay, I love God, and hateth his Brother, he is a Liar: For he that loveth not his Brother whom he hath ſeen, how can he love God whom he hath not ſeen* * ? A Free-thinker may perhaps laugh at the Simplicity of this Argument, which yet he would affect to admire, could any one find it for him in *Plato.* But let him for once condeſcend to be inſtructed by his *Bible*, and hearken to a little *Chriſtian* Reaſoning.

" You ſay you *love God* (ſays the Apoſtle) though you hate your " Brother: Impoſſible! The Love of any Object begins originally, " like all the other Paſſions, from Self-love. Thus we love our- " ſelves, by Repreſentation, in our Offſpring; which Love extends " by degrees to our remoter Relations, and ſo on through our " Neighbourhood, to all the Fellow-Members of our Community. " And now Self-love, refined by Reaſon and Religion, begins to " loſe its Nature, and deſervedly aſſumes another Name. Our " Country next claims our Love; we then extend it to all Man- " kind, and never reſt till we have, at length, fixed it on that " *moſt amiable* of all Objects, the great Author and Original of Being. " This is the Courſe and Progreſs of human Love:

God loves from Whole to Parts, but human Soul
Muſt riſe from Individual to the Whole.

Now (purſues the Apoſtle) I reaſon thus: " Can you, who are " not yet arrived at that inferior Stage of Benevolence, the Love

* 1 John iv. 20.

" of

" of your Brother, *whom you have ſeen*, that is, whom the Neceſ-
" ſities of Civil Life, and a Senſe of your mutual Relation might
" teach you to love, pretend to have reached the very Height and
" Perfection of this Paſſion, the Love of God *whom you have not*
" *ſeen?* that is, *whoſe* wonderful Oeconomy in his Syſtem of Crea-
" tion, which makes him ſo amiable, you cannot have the leaſt
" Conception of; *you*, who have not yet learnt that your own pri-
" vate Syſtem is ſupported on the great Principle of Benevolence?
" *Fear* him, *flatter* him, *fight* for him, as you dread his *Power*,
" you may; but to *love* him, as you know not his *Nature*, is im-
" poſſible." This is the Apoſtle's grand and ſublime Reaſoning;
and it is with the ſame Thought on which the Apoſtle founds his Argument that our moral Poet ends his Eſſay, as the juſt and neceſſary Concluſion of his Work:

Self-love but ſerves the virtuous Mind to *wake*,
As the ſmall Pebble ſtirs the peaceful Lake;
The *Centre* mov'd, a *Circle* ſtrait ſucceeds,
Another ſtill, and ſtill another ſpreads;
Friend, *Parent*, *Neighbour*, firſt it will embrace,
His *Country* next, and next, *all human Race*;
Wide, and more wide, th' O'erflowings of the Mind
Take every Creature in, of every Kind;
Earth ſmiles around, with boundleſs Bounty bleſt,
AND HEAVEN BEHOLDS ITS IMAGE IN HIS BREAST.

REMARKS

REMARKS

ON A BOOK, INTITULED,

FUTURE REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS

BELIEVED BY THE ANTIENTS,

PARTICULARLY THE PHILOSOPHERS;

Wherein some Objections of the Rev. Mr. WARBURTON, in his DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES, are considered, 1742.

WITH

A POSTSCRIPT, IN ANSWER TO SOME OBJECTIONS OF DR. SYKES;

AND,

A LETTER TO BP. SMALLBROOK.

"Beware lest any Man spoil you through PHILOSOPHY and vain "Deceit, after the Traditions of Men, after the Rudiments of "the World, and not after CHRIST." Col. ii. 8.

ADVERTISEMENT to the SECOND EDITION, 1742.

THE Author of the Pamphlet here examined hath lately made a public Confeſſion of his Authorſhip, ſigned with his own *Name*; and thereby ſaved himſelf from all farther Correction of this kind. For he who is ſo loſt to Shame, as a WRITER, to *own* what he before wrote, and ſo loſt to Shame, as a MAN, to *own* what he hath now written, muſt needs be paſt all Amendment, the only reaſonable View in *Correction*. I ſhall therefore but do, what indeed (were it any more than repeating what he himſelf hath diſcovered to the Public) would be juſtly reckoned the crueleſt of all things, tell my Reader the Name of this Miſerable; which we find to be I. TILLARD.

REMARKS.

REMARKS.

I.

THOUGH I could not perſuade myſelf to take this Notice of ſuch a kind of Writer as him of the *Miſcellany*, yet a very little thing, the Reader ſees, will engage me to give an Adverſary Satisfaction; while I ſuffer myſelf to be ſeduced into a Controverſy by the Writer of a late Book, intituled, *Future Rewards and Puniſhments believed by the Ancients, particularly the Philoſophers; wherein ſome Objections of the Reverend Mr.* Warburton, *in his* Divine Legation of Moses, *are conſidered* *.

And a very little Thing it was; only the finding in his Book one ſingle Truth, which does me a Piece of Juſtice, that the *orthodox* Writer above-mentioned would by no means be brought unto, even after his Conviction of Calumny on that Head. It is in theſe Words; *But I muſt here do ſo much Juſtice to Mr.* Warburton, *as to acknowledge, that the Point he denies, is, that the Philoſophers only did not believe future Rewards and Puniſhments; whereas he allows all others did believe them* †.

* 8vo, London, 1740. Printed by M. Steen, in the Inner-Temple Lane.

† P. 84.

For the reſt, neither his *Abilities* nor his *Candour* deſerved this Notice. His *Abilities* are duly celebrated in theſe few Sheets; and for his *Candour*, the Reader will, I believe, require no farther Proof than the following:—*After all theſe lively Deſcriptions—if there can the leaſt Doubt remain in the Reader's Breaſt—it muſt ariſe from the Influence and Prepoſſeſſion of a few random Expreſſions now and then thrown out to depreciate the Philoſophers, by certain Perſons, who, thinking themſelves obliged to ſay ſomething out of the common Road, very frequently diſcover their* IGNORANCE AND WANT OF SENSE IN THE VERY ATTEMPT TO DISPLAY THEIR LEARNING: *But that* SUCH PRETENDERS TO KNOWLEDGE, SUCH EMPTY MIMICS OF REAL WORTH, MAY NO LONGER IMPOSE *upon Perſons of good Underſtanding—I ſhall* *, *&c.*

But though I ſhew this Diſtinction to a puny Truth half overlaid, which I was forced to draw from under an unwieldy Heap of Blunders and Prevarications: yet, let it be obſerved, that this is only for once, and out of due Regard to the firſt Writer againſt me, that has condeſcended to ſay any thing truly of me: For I hope common Honeſty is not ſo rare, even *amongſt Anſwerers by Profeſſion* (of all ſober Knaves the moſt corrupt) that this Tribute need be paid twice unto it.

My Conſiderer begins his Preface thus: *The Motive which principally induced me to publiſh the following Collection and Obſervations, was the ſtrange and unjuſtifiable Methods which ſome Men take to advance their own* SYSTEMS *by depreciating and running down thoſe of others* †. The Reader ſees what the Man would be at. Here is no Diſguiſe or Reſerve however. It is the old Infidel *Grudge* againſt the *intolerant* Spirit of Chriſtianity, deliveredly as crudely as ever his dear Friends, the *Philoſophers*, urged it againſt the *primitive Apologiſts*. Their great Quarrel to Chriſtianity was, that its Defenders endeavoured *to advance their own Syſtems, by depreciating and running down thoſe of others* ‡: And this, in their, and in their

* P. 164, 165. † P. iii. ‡ See The Divine Legat. vol. I. p. 431—434.

Advocates

Advocates Opinion, *was a ſtrange and unjuſtifiable Method.* And how ſhould he think otherwiſe? when he has ſo mean an Opinion of the Cauſe of Revelation, as to tell us preſently after, That moſt of that vaſt number of Books that have been wrote to prove the Neceſſity and Excellency of our holy Religion, are thought very mean and inſufficient by the unprejudiced and inquiſitive Adverſary, but appear in a very different Light to the Mob of Chriſtians, who, by the happy Prejudice of Education, have been brought up to doubt of nothing. But hear him in his own more emphatic Words: *The vaſt number of Books and Pamphlets which have of late Years been ſo plentifully poured out, to prove the Neceſſity and Excellency of our holy Religion, certainly deſerve the Approbation and Thanks of every zealous and truly devout Chriſtian: And though many of theſe Performances have been* THOUGHT BY THE ADVERSARY VERY MEAN AND INSUFFICIENT, *yet they have appeared in a quite different Light in the Eyes of the Bulk of Mankind*; WHO, FROM THE HAPPY CAST OF THEIR NATIVITY, HAVE, IN THEIR EARLIEST AGE, BEEN TAUGHT TO FORM A MUCH BETTER JUDGMENT OF THINGS; AND WHO, SELDOM HAVING ANY DOUBTS OR SCRUPLES TO DISTURB THEM, *are therefore the eaſier confirmed in the quiet and full Perſuaſion of theſe Doctrines* THEY AT FIRST RECEIVED *.

Had I not Reaſon to ſay as I did, "That the Heathen Philoſo-
"phers of our Times might be well excuſed in being angry to ſee
"their ancient Brethren ſhewn for Knaves in Practice, and Fools
"in Theory; but that any elſe ſhould think themſelves concerned
"in the Force and Fidelity of the Drawing, was a Myſtery I did
"not know what to make of †?"

It is therefore Matter of much Conſolation to me, to find that the real Friends of Revelation have at length left theſe *Heathen Philoſophers* (the Men whom only it concerns) to diſpute this Point with me. I have now got a *Gentleman Freethinker* under my Hands; and, if thoſe other Folks will be but eaſy, I'll promiſe to give a good Account of him.

* P. iii. iv. † Divine Legat. vol. II. p. 136.

Our

Our *Conſiderer* proceeds to ſhew the Reaſons why ſome Defenders of Chriſtianity will not acknowledge the Doctrine contained in his Book. He graciouſly acquits them of all Malice and Deſign, and throws it firſt,

1. Upon their Ignorance. *The firſt of which is the Ignorance, in this particular, of by far the greateſt Part of them* [Defenders of Chriſtianity] *who really do not know that Rewards and Puniſhments in another Life are any where ſpoken of but in the New Teſtament, unleſs it be in ſome dark and figurative Terms, which* (AS IF THERE WERE NONE SUCH AMONGST THEMSELVES) *they think they have a Right to laugh at and expoſe. They remember, perhaps, ſome Stories in their School-books of* Elyſium, *of* Tartarus, *of* Cerberus, *&c. and conclude, very haſtily, that this was all that was ever thought of or believed by the Heathens concerning a World to come* *. It was not for nothing, we find, that he deſpiſed the Defenders of Chriſtianity as Scribblers, whom none but a prejudiced Mob would give any Credit to: For the *far greateſt Part of them*, it ſeems, knew no more of Antiquity than a few *Stories in their School-books*. But who can enough admire the Modeſty of this, in one, who confeſſes he has forgot his *Greek*, and this only in order to inſinuate that he has ſome *Latin* which yet ſticks by him?

2. He throws it, *Secondly*, Upon their *Prejudices*, that is, *their great Attachment to their own Religion*. On this Head, he talks I don't know what——*of captivated Lovers—pious Zeal—Prejudice of Education—Intereſt—Preferment*; in ſhort the common Dog-trot of Infidelity and Freethinking.

After this Specimen of his *Modeſty*, he preſents us with one of his *Abilities*. *As to what relates* (ſays he) *to the Subject of the following Sheets, the Caſe in Fact is this. It is indiſputably true, and beyond all reaſonable Contradiction, that the Doctrine of future Rewards and Puniſhments is clearly and plainly delivered and laid down in the New Teſtament: And it is as indiſputably true, and beyond all reaſon-*

* P. v.

able

ble Contradiction, that the Doctrine of future Rewards and Punishments IS CLEARLY AND PLAINLY DELIVERED AND LAID DOWN *in the Books and Writings of the Heathens.* THE TRUTH OF WHICH POINT *is now submitted to the Judgment of every impartial Reader* *. This *indisputable Point*, which he writes a Book to prove, is, I believe, strictly *so.* At least it was never disputed by his humble Servant. On the contrary, I have said, the Heathen Philosophers *were perpetually inculcating to the People the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments in their Discourses and Writings* †. But his Title-page professes to prove *the Truth* of a very different *Point*, not quite so *indisputable. Future Rewards and Punishments* BELIEVED *by the Ancients, particularly the Philosophers, wherein some Objections of the Reverend Mr.* W. *in his* Divine Legation of MOSES *are considered.* Thus we see this able Writer has mistaken his Question before he be got to the End of his Preface. *Diòs me de contiénda con quièn me entienda*, says the Spanish Proverb, *God grant me an Adversary that understands me.* But, wretch that I am, after having met with such an Adversary, I am now forced to contend with one that does not understand himself.

His Preface concludes thus: *I thought once to have changed the Order in which the Quotations of the second Chapter are placed.* BUT METHOD IN SUCH CASES DEPENDING ALMOST AS MUCH UPON THE FANCY OF EVERY READER AS THE REAL PROPRIETY OF THE THING ITSELF, *I chose rather to submit them as they are* ‡, &c. By these his frank Sentiments of *Method*, it appears he has forgot his *Logic* too, if ever he had any, as well as his *Greek*, which, he tells us, *he had neglected, like Lord Chief Justice* Hale, *by a long Avocation to Studies of quite another Nature* §. Whatever his Studies were, he can scarce persuade the Reader to think them like *Lord Chief Justice* Hale's. That learned Man indeed lost his *Greek*, but got a great deal of *good Sense.* Our Author too has lost his *Greek.* And what has he got? Marry, the Knack of writing without any Sense at all.

* P. vii. † Divine Legat. Book III. § 2. Vol. II. p. 8. ‡ P. ix. § P. viii.

II.

We come now to his *firſt Chapter*, the only one that I am concerned in; and therefore the only one I ſhall, at preſent, give myſelf the Trouble of conſidering. As juſt before he had innocently blundered *out* of the Queſtion; ſo now by entering on his Attendance on the Author of *The Divine Legation*, he has as innocently blundered *into* it: And thus has ſet all right again.

After having frankly told the Reader, that the Author of *The Divine Legation had not the direct and immediate Diſcovery of Truth, and the* REAL *and* SUBSTANTIAL *Improvement of Mankind* [*i. e.* the Recommendation of Pagan Philoſophy] *in his Thoughts and Studies, but the Advancement of a certain favourite Scheme* * [*i. e.* of Revelation] he goes on to † quote the Apologies I make for venturing to deny a commonly received Opinion. On which he thus deſcants: *By all which, and indeed his whole manner of treating this Subject, he plainly diſcovers ſuch a great Diſtruſt of his Arguments and Concluſions to convince the Judgment of his Reader, that* ‡, *&c.* I am a very unlucky Writer. If I expreſs myſelf with *Confidence*, I am ſuppoſed to diſtruſt other Men's Opinions; if with *Diffidence*, my own. But let him reſt himſelf content. I am under no manner of Diffidence. Or, if I had any, his writing againſt me had eaſily removed it. However, in this I ſhall never recriminate. I confeſs, he writes all the way as much without *Fear* as Wit.

I ſhall (ſays our crafty Advocate) *paſs over his nice Diſtinctions, Diviſions, and Subdiviſions* §. Now this, I cannot but think hard. He had before made his Exceptions to *Greek*, and I dare ſay he would think it unfair to have it urged againſt him after he had ſo fairly pleaded *Ignoramus* to it; yet a critical Uſe of that Language is alone ſufficient to determine a deciſive Queſtion in this Controverſy, namely, *of the Spinoziſm of the ancient Philoſophers:* And here he debars me all Benefit of *Logic*, and won't have Patience while I ſtate the Queſtion, and divide the Subject. *I ſhall paſs over* (ſays he) *his*

* P. 1, 2. † P. 2, 3. ‡ P. 3. § Ibid.

nice

nice Diſtinctions, Diviſions, and Subdiviſions. So that becauſe he knows neither *Greek* nor *Method*, I ſhall uſe none. Here then I might fairly diſmiſs this *minute Philoſopher*, who dares me to the Combat, and yet excepts againſt all the Weapons in Uſe. But not to diſappoint the Company we have brought together, I will accept his Challenge, and fight him with his own wooden Dagger.

I proceed (ſays he) *directly to take notice of thoſe Reaſons which,* IN MY APPREHENSION, *any ways affect the preſent Queſtion; and theſe, I think, may be reduced to two.* 1ſt, "*That the Philoſophers* "*held it lawful, for the public Good, to ſay one Thing, when they* "*thought another, and that they actually did ſo.* 2dly, *That they* "*held ſome fundamental Principles of Philoſophy, which were altoge-* "*ther inconſiſtent with the Doctrine of future Rewards and Puniſh-* "*ments* *." But ſurely, if he will needs write againſt me, his Buſineſs is not only to conſider what, *in his Apprehenſion*, tends to the Proof of my Point, but likewiſe what *in my Apprehenſion* I had ſaid does ſo. For Inſtance, *in his Apprehenſion*, this Argument, *That the Philoſophers held it lawful in general to ſay one Thing, when they thought another*, and this, that they actually *did ſo*, tends to the Proof of my Point. And, *in my Apprehenſion*, this other Argument likewiſe, *That the Philoſophers acted on the above Principle, with regard to a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments, the very Doctrine in queſtion*, has, at leaſt, as ſtrong a Tendency: For which Reaſon I had employed *ſix large Pages* to inforce it. But to all this my Adverſary has thought fit to ſay—Nothing.

However, if he will needs confine the Strength of my Diſcourſe to thoſe two Points, I muſt be content, and accept the beſt Terms he can be brought to. Nor will the Reader perhaps think theſe bad ones. But, alas! he yet knows little of our Advocate. Of a hundred Arguments from Reaſon and Authority which ſupport thoſe two Points, he has not ventured ſo much as at a *Decimation*; and

* P. 3, 4.

his Attack of thoſe few he ſhuffles off in ſo evaſive a manner, as would never get him *Victory in the Schools* *, nor hardly Credit at the Bar. But what would he not do, or what would he not forbear to do, for his Philoſophers? For if that Set of modern Heathens, as he gravely tells us, ARE NOT FAR FROM THE KINGDOM OF GOD, *who being really in good earneſt in the Search of Truth, have without Prejudice conſidered, and have calmly, ſeriouſly, and with the utmoſt Diligence examined into the Obligation of the ſeveral Religions, or Sects of Religion, which now prevail in the World; and after the matureſt Deliberation are ſatisfied there is nothing extraordinary or immediately divine in any of them; but that, upon the Whole, all which they contain or pretend to (except what relates to our Duty to God, and our Obligations to Morality) is merely human Invention, and the Product of Deſign, of Error, or of Enthuſiaſm* †. If theſe be ſo near Day, in what a hopeful Condition are thoſe of the *elder Houſe*, who certainly cannot be ſaid to have rejected the Goſpel; though ſo ready to give *a diligent and diſpaſſionate Examination* to any thing that would afford room for a Diſpute.

III.

But we muſt take him as we find him, and be thankful. The Reader will ſay preſently we have Reaſon. For he now proceeds to the Confutation of the firſt Point, *That the Philoſophers held it lawful, for public Good, to ſay one Thing, when they thought another.* And how does he ſet about it? Truly in a very new Way. By PROVING it at large, from the fourth to the ſixteenth Page: Which, he *honeſtly*, for the *ſecond Time*, concludes thus: *All which is, in Effect, no more than what Mr.* Warburton *himſelf ſays* ‡. Why, no; but he being able to ſay it ſo much better, had a Mind to ſhew his Parts. And now, according to his own Confeſſion, *the Philoſophers holding it lawful, for the public Good, to ſay one thing when they thought another*; and I having proved, to which Proof

* P. 3. † P. 201, 202. ‡ P. 16, 17.

he

he has not oppoſed a ſingle Syllable, *that they practiſed this Rule in the very Point in Queſtion*, the Diſpute is fairly at an End. This will certainly ſurprize our leſs attentive Readers: But they muſt know, all this good-natured Pains was neither for their Sakes nor for mine, but for his dear *Philoſophers*. The Caſe ſtood thus: When I ſpoke of the *double Doctrine*, I conſidered the Practice of it as not altogether free from Blame. Not that this Repreſentation contributed to prove it practiſed in the Point in queſtion, but becauſe I thought the Repreſentation *true*. But my Adverſary, as we ſee, having taken it for granted, that *I had not the direct and immediate Diſcovery of* TRUTH *in my Thoughts and Studies* *, had nothing left, but the firſt Reaſon to aſſign for my Repreſentation, which affecting the Credit of his Maſters, he will endeavour, as great an Enemy as he is to *Diviſions* and *Diſtinctions*, to *diſtinguiſh* away this Opprobrium. He therefore *divides* the Practice of the *double Doctrine* into two Sorts. The one, a little criminal: The other, quite free from Blame †. And to ſhew his Judgment, in the firſt Claſs he places *Prieſts* and *Politicians* ‡, and in the *ſecond*, the *Chineſe Literati* §, who, taught Atheiſm in private; and *Orpheus* ||, who againſt his Conſcience, as he ſays, taught Polytheiſm in public. But the Claſs of Innocents, you may be ſure, was erected chiefly for his dear Philoſophers, whoſe *double Doctrine* he impiouſly compares to the Practices of the ever bleſſed *Jeſus* **. For which I remit him to the *appointed* Defenders of Religion: who will, I hope, give him due Correction for all his Inſults on their *Ignorance* and their *School-Books*.

The mighty Argument then he labours with, and for the ſake of which he has, before he was aware, given up the whole Cauſe, is this: "The Philoſophers Practice of the *double Doctrine* was innocent and laudable: therefore it could never be employed to preach up a Future State of Rewards and Puniſhments in Public, and to

* P. 1, 2. † P. 7. ‡ Ibid.
§ P. 12. || P. 13, 14. ** P. 30—39.

" preach it down in private."——This, I ſuppoſe, he would have ſaid, had he known how to expreſs his own Meaning. Let us ſee then what Force it has upon his Principles. For, as much as he contends for the Propagation of Truth, he is not likely to die a Martyr to it; as you may hear by his talking.——*To diſturb the public Peace, to break the Laws, and fruitleſly to expoſe ourſelves to manifeſt Danger for the ſake of propagating our Religion,* SEEMS TO CARRY A CONTRADICTION IN ITSELF, *and would need no Confutation, if the miſtaken Principles and Practice of a few Zealots did not inflame ſome People to think otherwiſe* *. It is no wonder this ſhould raiſe his Indignation. For had not *Chriſt* and his Apoſtles been guilty of the very Miſdemeanor that, he tells us, *carries a Contradiction in itſelf* (which, whatever it means in his Jargon, is ſurely ſomething very bad) we had never had the poor Philoſophers at this time of Day ſo diſgracefully puſhed beſide the Chair. But for this, I again ſend him to be diſciplined by the *Defenders* aforeſaid; and go on to try his Argument on his own Principle. *The Philoſophers,* as he confeſſes, *uſed, for the public good, to ſay one thing when they thought another.* They ſaw that the Doctrine of a Future State of Rewards and Puniſhments was firmly believed by the People, and of infinite Service to Society. But their ſpeculative Opinions led them to reject it. What was to be done? Telling what they thought the Truth would be injurious, on the Suppoſition, both to Society and themſelves. And (as he aſſures us) *fruitleſsly to expoſe one's ſelf to manifeſt Danger for the ſake of propagating one's Religion, ſeems to carry a Contradiction in itſelf.* Here then their Principle of *ſaying one thing when they thought another*, came in Practice, nothing being left, but to *profeſs* in public, and *believe* in private. But he will ſay, perhaps, *that ſincere impartial Inquirers after Truth*, like his Philoſophers, could not, *after the moſt careful Examination*, reject the Doctrine of future Rewards and Puniſhments. Why not, I aſk him? They might be as coſtive of Belief, for ought he knows,

* P. 43.

as

as his favourite Claſs of Free-thinkers; who, with the ſame Qualifications, reject all Revelation in general. But it ran ſtrangely in his Head, that if I thought the Philoſophers practiſed the double Doctrine on the Point in queſtion, I muſt needs ſuppoſe they had *no fixed Principles.*—*But it is very unreaſonable* (ſays he) *and unjuſt from hence to conclude, that they who do ſo, have no Belief of their own, or that they think all Religion whatever the Invention of deſigning Men* *. And again——*So that, notwithſtanding their double Doctrine, they had ſtill ſome fixed ones of their own* †. Why, thou mighty Defender of Heathen Wiſdom! who ever ſaid they had not! Or who but *ſuch* a Defender would not have ſeen, that all the force of my Argument reſts upon this very Truth, that they had *fixed Principles*, that they had a *Belief of their own?*

But as if he had not done enough in this obliging way, he will go on, and prove for me, that *the double Doctrine was not about different Opinions, but the ſame.* I indeed thought it incumbent on *me* to ſhew this: becauſe it was bringing my Argument home to the Point, that a Future State was one of the Objects of the *double Doctrine.* But how it could be made to ſerve *his* Purpoſe, was quite beyond my reach. Judge then of my Surprize, when I ſaw him attempt to prove it at large; and to conclude his Proof thus: *It appears then that the external Doctrine related to the ſame thing as the internal* ‡. I was ſome time at a loſs for his Meaning in the former Caſe: but here I gave over the Search as deſperate. Not but I concluded there was Miſchief ſomewhere. At laſt I found this ſlender thing of an Argument lie lurking under a *Conundrum.* I don't know whether it will bear the handling; but at preſent it hangs together thus: "The external Doctrine related to the ſame thing as the internal. Now *a Future State* "is *one* thing, and *no Future State*, another. Theſe therefore "being *two*, could not be the Object of the *double Doctrine*, which "was concerned with *one* thing only." But our Advocate is ſo

* P. 45. † P. 47. ‡ P. 24.

far

far from being able to make a good Argument, that, to the Shame of his *Profeſſion*, he knows not how to make a good *Quibble*. For I had all along affirmed the Philoſophers, both in their *external* and *internal* teaching, held *a Future State* (here's his *one and the ſame thing* for him:) In their *external*, a Future State *with* Rewards and Puniſhments; in their *internal*, a Future State *without* them.

But though he contends, that *the external Doctrine related to the ſame thing with the internal, yet it does not* (he ſays) *in the leaſt appear, that the Philoſophers believed one thing, and taught a quite contrary to the People* *. This is ſtrange indeed. Theſe Philoſophers then muſt be like their Advocate, and teach *nothing*. Otherwiſe, if the external Teaching was for the People, and the internal what the People could not be truſted with, and both about the ſame thing, the two Ways of Teaching muſt certainly proceed upon contrary Propoſitions. But, perhaps, in the Humour he is now in, an Authority may be better liked than a Reaſon. I will give him one above all Exception: His own. In another Place he tells us, *it did fully appear, that the Philoſophers believed one thing, and taught a quite contrary to the People*; for he ſays——THE EXTERNAL THEREFORE MUST BE JUST THE REVERSE [to the internal] WITH RELATION TO THE SAME POINTS †.

IV.

Our Advocate hath given me ſo little room to quarrel with him on this Head, that the Reader muſt needs have had a very poor and meagre Entertainment. Nothing but a ſtill-born Blunder, and the Ghoſt of a departed Quibble. He muſt therefore be content to make out his Treat with what cold Scraps I can pick up from the over-ſodden *Crambe* of his *Logic* and *Literature*.

In the fifth Page he ſays, Mr. *Warburton* EXPRESSES *himſelf very* AMBIGUOUSLY, *where he aſſerts that they held it lawful, for the public*

* P. 19. † P. 24.

good,

good, to ſay one thing when they thought another. FOR, *in the preſent Queſtion, if we underſtand by this, that the Philoſophers believed a Future State in a ſpiritual, refined, and rational Senſe, while they ſometimes countenanced the People in their groſs, vulgar, and corporeal Notions of it, then what he lays down is certainly true: But if we underſtand it,* AS HE INTENDS WE SHOULD, *that the Philoſophers preached the Doctrine of a Future State to the People, while themſelves believed the contrary,* viz. *that there was no future State of Rewards and Puniſhments at all; then his Charge on the Philoſophers is abſolutely falſe.*

The *Logic* of this incomparable Period ſtands thus:

1. Firſt I talk *ambiguouſly,* BECAUSE it is in his Power to miſderſtand me; *for in the preſent Caſe* (ſays he) *if* WE *underſtand,* &c. not *becauſe* of any thing I myſelf ſaid, or omitted to ſay. For when I aſſerted what he here lays to my Charge, I had added, *that the Philoſophers preached the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments to the People, while themſelves believed the contrary*; and repeated it ſo often over, that this Writer himſelf, who accuſes me of *expreſſing myſelf ambiguouſly,* confeſſes, in the very Attempt to prove his Accuſation, that he knows my Meaning. *But if we underſtand it* (ſays he) AS HE INTENDS WE SHOULD——

2. Secondly, I talk *ambiguouſly,* BECAUSE, in his Senſe of the Words, they are true, in mine, not true.

Theſe are ſuch Diſcoveries in the *Art of Reaſoning,* that I could almoſt wiſh the Author would add a Chapter of *Ambiguities* to our common *Logics.* A thing, I'll aſſure him, very much wanted.

In his ſeventeenth Page we have theſe Words, *Notwithſtanding which* [viz. the double-doctrine], *the Deſign and End of the Philoſophers in both, was ſtill in general the ſame, that is, to improve Mankind as much as they would bear; and the Doctrines in Subſtance and at the bottom were all along one and the ſame;* JUST AS

true.

true Chriſtianity MAY NOW BE, *though in ſome Countries ſcarce diſcernible, being overwhelmed with Legends, falſe Miracles, Image-worſhip, and all the Trumpery of Popiſh Superſtition.*

Here's a Period, let me tell you, that has no weak Side of *Senſe*, but is impenetrable all round. Does he mean that the external and internal Doctrines of the Philoſophers were in general the ſame, *juſt as* pure Chriſtianity, and corrupt Chriſtianity *overwhelmed with Legends, falſe Miracles, Image-worſhip, and all the Trumpery of Popiſh Superſtition*, are in general the ſame? Or does he mean that the external and internal Doctrines of the Philoſophers were both to improve Mankind as much as they could bear, *juſt as* pure Chriſtianity, and corrupt Chriſtianity *overwhelmed with Legends, falſe Miracles, Image-worſhip, and all the Trumpery of Popiſh Superſtition*, are both to improve Mankind as much as they can bear? Or laſtly, which perhaps ſhould have been aſked firſt, had he any Meaning at all? However it is every Way ſo profound, that I ſhould adviſe him to add a Chapter of *Compariſons* to his Chapter of *Ambiguities*, that the one may furniſh us with *Examples* to fit his *Rules* in the other. This ſhall ſuffice at preſent for a Specimen of his *Art of Reaſoning*.

Let us turn to his *Literature*, and ſee firſt how he manages his *Latin Tranſlations*.

He gives us the following Quotation from Ælian's *Various Hiſtory* * : *Ita vero etiam Socratem non explicite differere; ſi quis autem eas Diſſertationes* CONVERTAT, *planiſſimas eſſe*; and tranſlates it thus: *Socrates uſed to talk ambiguouſly; but if any one turns and* SIFTS *his Diſcourſes* WITH ATTENTION, *they will appear moſt plain and eaſy* †.

The Reader will ſeek to no Purpoſe in the Latin for *ſifts with Attention*; but this was the Paraphraſe of a Word he did not underſtand, *convertat*, στρέψει, uſed by the Author in alluſion to its *literal*, not *figurative* Senſe. *Ælian* had juſt before told a Story of

* L. xiv, c. 15.

† P. 18.

one,

one, a *Connoiſſeur* like our Advocate, who would needs have a Horſe painted rolling on his Back. The Artiſt brought him a running Horſe; which not contenting him, the other put it into the Poſture required, by turning the Picture upſide down. Turn *Socrates* thus, ſays *Ælian*, and you have his true Meaning. That is, *underſtand him by Contraries*. And this Rule was given with Judgment. For *Socrates* being perpetually *ironical*, take him in the reverſe, and he is in his right Senſes. But our Advocate knew as little of *Socrates's* Character as of his Tranſlator's Latin. "*Pauſo-*
"*nem enim Pictorem, quum audiviſſet a quodam, ut volutantem ſe*
"*equum pingeret, currentem eum pinxiſſe. Quum igitur is qui tabulam*
"*pingendam locârat, indignaretur, tanquam contra pactum ille pinx-*
"*iſſet, roſpondiſſe Pictorem,* VERTE [ὅτι στρέψον] *Tabulam, & ita volu-*
"*tans tibi eſto Equus, qui nunc eſt currens. Ita vero etiam Socratem*
"*non explicitè differere; ſi quis autem eas Diſſertationes* CONVERTAT
"[στρέψει] *planiſſimas eſſe.*" Let us now ſee how ably he acquits himſelf of his *Original* Writers.

He brings a Paſſage from *Macrobius* in theſe Words, *Si quid de his aſſignare conantur, quæ non ſermonem tantummodo, ſed cogitationem quoque humanam ſuperant, ad ſimilitudines & exempla confugiunt.—Sic ipſa Myſteria figurarum cuniculis operiuntur; ne vel hæc adeptis nuda rerum talium ſe Natura præbeat; ſed Summatibus tantum Viris Sapientia Interprete veri Arcani conſciis; contenti ſint Reliqui ad venerationem figuris defendentibus a vilitate ſecretum,* 1. *Macrob.* 2. *Ed. Lond.* 1694. Which he tranſlates thus, "TO THE SAME PURPOSE *Macro-*
"*bius*, ſpeaking of God and Nature," ſays, *The Philoſophers when*
"*they treated of ſuch Subjects as were beyond all our Words, and ex-*
ceeded even our Thoughts, they had Recourſe to Similies and Alluſions. FOR THAT THESE THINGS WERE AS MYSTERIES, WHICH THE WISE ONLY WERE CAPABLE OF RECEIVING; *but that others ſhould be content* WITH AN AWFUL VENERATION *for them under the Veil of Figures and Allegories,* LEST THEY SHOULD BE DESPISED *.

* P. 20.

This comes of *Freethinking*, and leaving his *School-books* to the *Clergy*: who owe him a Shame for that contemptuous Donation *.

1. We ſee here, he makes the Words, *Si quid de his aſſignare conantur*, to *confugiunt*, to relate to the *double Doctrine* of the Philoſophers, as is evident by this Introduction, *To the ſame Purpoſe Macrobius.* To what Purpoſe, I beſeech you? Why, to the Purpoſe of *Burnet's* Words immediately preceding, which expreſsly treat of the Nature of *the twofold Doctrine of the Ancients.* But who but a *Freethinker* would not have found that theſe of *Macrobius* relate to a quite different thing? namely, the Inability of expreſſing ſpiritual and abſtract Ideas any otherwiſe than by Words conveying ſenſible and material Images. Not, like the *external Doctrine*, a Matter of *Choice*, but *Neceſſity*; a Neceſſity ariſing from the Nature of Things. A Way of ſpeaking the Philoſophers could not avoid, even when conveying their *internal Doctrine* to their *Adepts.* But now the Reader will be apt to aſk, If this be ſo, as is evident even from the Words themſelves, what muſt we do with the reſt of the Paſſage, beginning at *Sic ipſa Myſteria*——which does indeed relate to the *double Doctrine*; for it gives a Reaſon why Men *have Recourſe to Similies and Alluſions*, a Reaſon founded in the Nature and Expediency of the *double Doctrine?* What ſhall I ſay? that our Advocate has wilfully murdered and diſmembered poor *Macrobius?* or, that it was mere Chance-medley? Let the Reader determine. It is ſufficient he be made to know, that the latter Part of the Quotation, beginning at *Sic ipſa Myſteria*, has no other Relation to the former Part, beginning at *Si quid de his aſſignare*, than is between two Things ſet in direct Oppoſition to one another.

2. *Macrobius* had obſerved, that the Philoſophers did not admit the *fabulous* in *all* their Diſputations; but in thoſe only which related to the Soul, the HEAVENLY BODIES, and the HERO-GODS. On the contrary, when they diſcourſed of the *Firſt Cauſe*, and the *Mind* proceeding from him, that then every thing was delivered

* See the Quotation, at p. 174.

agreeably

agreeably to ſtrict Truth—" *Sciendum eſt tamen non in omnem Diſ-*
" *putationem Philoſophos admittere fabuloſa vel licita* *, *ſed his uti*
" *ſolent, cum vel de anima, vel de* ÆRIIS, ÆTHERIISVE POTES-
" TATIBUS, *vel de* CETERIS DIS *loquuntur. Ceterum cum ad ſum-*
" *mum & principem Omnium Deum, qui apud Græcos τ' ἀγαθὸν qui*
" *πρῶτον αἴτιον nuncupatur, tractatus ſe audet attollere; vel ad Men-*
" *tem, quam Græci νοῦν appellant, Originales rerum ſpecies, quæ ἰδέαι*
" *dictæ ſunt, continentem, ex ſummo natam & profectam Deo: Cum*
" *de his, inquam, loquuntur, Summo Deo & Mente, nihil fabuloſum*
" *penitus attingunt.*" But then he immediately ſubjoins, in the Words in Queſtion, that, though here they ſpoke nothing but the *Truth*, yet, by Reaſon of the high Abſtraction and ſpiritual Nature of the Subject, they were unavoidably at a loſs for adequate Expreſſions, and therefore obliged to ſpeak figuratively, that is, make uſe of ſenſible and material Images. SED SI QUID DE HIS ASSIGNARE CONANTUR, QUÆ NON SERMONEM TANTUMMODO, SED COGITATIONEM QUOQUE HUMANAM SUPERANT, AD SIMILITUDINES ET EXEMPLA CONFUGIUNT.

When *Macrobius* had ſaid this, and illuſtrated the laſt Obſervation by an Example from *Plato*, he goes on to the other Part of his Subject, namely, to tell us how the Philoſophers managed when they treated of the other Gods and the Soul; then (he ſays) they admitted of the *fabulous*; not childiſhly, or to pleaſe a wanton Imagination, but becauſe they knew that expoſing Nature, naked as ſhe was, would be greatly injurious to her. Who, as ſhe withdraws herſelf from the Knowledge of the Vulgar by her various Covering and Diſguiſe of FORMS, ſo it is her Pleaſure that the

* All the old Editions had theſe Words *vel licita*: the more *modern*, not knowing what to make of them, fairly ſunk them. *Gronovius* takes notice of the Fraud, and reſtores them to their Place, but in order finally to degrade them on a fair Hearing. He ſays they are corrupt, and ſhould be read *vel ficta*. But *licita* is the genuine Word, which this Critic would have ſeen, had he apprehended that it ſignified thoſe *theological Fables allowed of by public Authority*. So that *fabuloſa vel licita* ſignify *either ſuch Fables as the Philoſophers themſelves invented, or ſuch as they borrowed from the popular Belief.*

Philoſophers ſhould handle her Secrets in Fable and Allegory.— " De Diis autem, ut dixi, ceteris, & de Anima non fruſtra ſe, nec " ut oblectent, ad Fabuloſa convertunt; ſed quia ſciunt Inimicam " eſſe Naturæ apertam nudamque expoſitionem ſui: quæ ſicut vul- " garibus Hominum ſenſibus intellectum ſui vario rerum TEGMINE " OPERIMENTOQUE ſubtraxit; ita a prudentibus Arcana ſua voluit " per Fabuloſa tractari."——Then follow the reſt of the Words, which ſhould be tranſlated thus: *So the Myſteries themſelves are hid under the Deceits of figurative Repreſentations, leſt the naked Truth ſhould obtrude itſelf even on the Initiated. But while the Greateſt Men, with Wiſdom for their Guide, are conſcious of the true Secret; the reſt may be well content with ſuch Repreſentations as ſecure the dignity of the Secret, and are contrived to excite their Veneration.* SIC IPSA MYSTERIA FIGURARUM CUNICULIS OPERIUNTUR, NE VEL HÆC ADEPTIS NUDA RERUM TALIUM SE NATURA PRÆBEAT: SED SUMMATIBUS TANTUM VIRIS, SAPIENTIA INTERPRETE, VERI ARCANI CONSCIIS, CONTENTI SINT RELIQUI AD VENERATIONEM FIGURIS DEFENDENTIBUS A VILITATE SECRETUM. The Reader now ſees that *this* Period, and the *other*, beginning with *Si quid de his aſſignare*, which our Advocate had tacked to it, are ſo far from belonging to one another, that the firſt deſcribes the unavoidable Condition that attends the ſpeaking *Truth*; the other the Advantages that may be reaped from *lying*. But as ill as he underſtood the Original, his own bad Tranſlation, methinks, might have informed him, that the two Parts of the Quotation would have nothing to do with one another, they are ſo full of Contradiction. The firſt Part ſays, the high Subjects there ſpoken of *are beyond all our Words, and exceed even our Thoughts*. The ſecond Part ſays *no ſuch Matter, the wiſe are capable of receiving them.* For the *reſt*, they muſt do as they can; *be content with*, I do not know what, *an awful Veneration, &c.* But more of this Matter preſently.

3. For I have not yet done with this wondrous Advocate of old Philoſophy. We have ſeen how he has acquitted himſelf as to the general

general Purport of the *Quotation*: Let us now ſee whether he be equally happy in the Senſe he gives of the Words and Phraſes.

The learned Reader perceives, that the Words laſt quoted, *Sic ipſa Myſteria, &c.* are an Illuſtration and Inforcement, taken from the Practice of the *Myſteries*, of the foregoing Obſervation, *that it was commendable to hide ſome things under Fables.* How does our Advocate tranſlate *Sic ipſa Myſteria?* Thus, FOR THESE THINGS WERE AS MYSTERIES. So, from an *Illuſtration* he makes it an *Illation*: And *Myſteria*, the Rites ſo called, he degrades to a ſimple Secret. SIC FOR — IPSA THESE THINGS—MYSTERIA WERE AS MYSTERIES.——A hopeful Scholar! He had Reaſon to upbraid us with the *Memory* of our *School-books* *. Well, but what are *theſe things* that are ſo like *Myſteries?* Why, even by his own Aocount, *abſtract Ideas expreſſed in metaphorical Terms.* According to this, the DICTIONARY ſhould be the moſt *myſterious* Book in the World: And ſo, I ſuppoſe, our Freethinker found it: And having a natural Averſion to *Myſteries*, he turned himſelf *to Studies of quite another Nature* †.

The next Words, *Figurarum Cuniculis operiuntur*, he has paſſed over untranſlated, and with good Reaſon. For as they allude to the *Shews of the Myſteries* repreſented in *ſubterraneous Places*, he could have no kind of Conception of them. The next—*ne vel hæc Adeptis nuda rerum talium ſe Natura præbeat*, undergo the ſame Neglect; and on the ſame Account. He knew not what to make of *Adeptis*, the *Initiated*; and he thought too it contradicted.

The next—*Sed Summatibus tantum Viris, Sapientia Interprete, veri Arcani conſciis.* Here he breaks Silence, and, on my Word, to the Purpoſe, WHICH THE WISE ONLY WERE CAPABLE OF RECEIVING. *Sapientia Interprete, the Wiſe only are capable of receiving.* Notwithſtanding the Difference of Number, it is plain he thought *Sapientia Interprete* was put in *Appoſition* to *Summatibus Viris.* He did not ſee the Conſtruction was *Summatibus Viris veri Arcani con-*

* See p. v. of his Preface.

† P. viii. of the Preface.

ſciis.

ſciis, Sapientiâ Interprete, nor that the *Sapientia Interpres* alluded to the *Hierophant* of the *Myſteries,* who explained the Secret to the moſt capable of the *Initiated,* the *Summatibus Viris*; by which *Macrobius* meant Heroes, Princes, Legiſlators, in Alluſion to their old Practice, of ſeeking Initiation into the greater Myſteries *. And thoſe he had diſtinguiſhed from the reſt of the *initiated,* by the foregoing Words, *ne vel hæc Adeptis nuda rerum talium ſe Natura præbeat.*

The concluding Words are, *Contenti ſint Reliqui ad Venerationem Figuris defendentibus a Vilitate Secretum,* which he tranſlates, *but that others ſhould be content* WITH AN AWFUL VENERATION FOR THEM, *under the Veil of Figures and Allegories,* LEST THEY SHOULD BE DESPISED. What is meant by a *Worſhipper's* being *content with an awful Veneration* I do not underſtand: Much leſs his being *content with an awful Veneration, leſt* the things venerated *ſhould be deſpiſed.* The Object *worſhipped* indeed may be well enough ſaid to *be content with an awful Veneration, leſt,* if it ſhould be unreaſonable, and expect more, it might come to be *deſpiſed.* But, as our profound Tranſlator well obſerves, *Theſe Things are as Myſteries,* and ſo we will leave them. However, the learned Reader ſees he took *contenti ſint Reliqui ad Venerationem Figuris,* to be the ſame as *contenti ſint Reliqui veneratione Figurarum,* whereas it is equivalent to *contenti ſint Reliqui Figuris ad Venerationem excogitatis*; and ſhould be tranſlated thus: *The reſt may be well content with ſuch Repreſentations as ſecure the Dignity of the Secret, and are contrived to excite their Veneration.* What muſt we think of our Advocate? Does not he come well inſtructed in his Cauſe? Which ſhall we admire moſt; his Modeſty, his Learning, or his Good Faith? But his *Tranſlations,* of which his Book is almoſt all made up, abound with theſe Beauties; I ſhall therefore reſerve the Examination of them for a Work by itſelf, and leave him at preſent,

With all his bluſhing Honours thick upon him.

* Divine Legation, Vol. I. p. 243.

V. Our

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Our Advocate goes on to the ſecond of the Arguments, which, *in his Apprehenſion*, affects the preſent Queſtion: namely, *that the Philoſophers held ſome fundamental Principles, which were altogether inconſiſtent with the Doctrine of future Rewards and Puniſhments.* Of theſe he tells us, and, indeed, tells us fairly, *that the firſt was, that God could neither be angry nor hurt any one. The ſecond, that the Soul was a diſcerped Part of the Whole, and that this whole was God, into whom it was again to be reſolved* *.

Theſe he undertakes to examine in their Order.

From the *firſt*, that *God could not be angry nor hurt any one*, I drew this Concluſion, that they could not believe a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments. Which I endeavoured to ſupport from a Paſſage in *Tully's Offices* to this Effect. The Writer is commending *Regulus* for keeping his Oath. But (ſays he) it may be objected, what is there in an Oath? The Violator need not fear the Puniſhment of Heaven, for *all* the Philoſophers hold *that God cannot be angry nor hurt any one.* To this *Tully* replies, and owns that indeed it was a Conſequence of the general Opinion of *God's not being angry*, that the perjured Man had nothing to fear from the divine Vengeance. But then it was not this Fear, which was indeed nothing, but Juſtice and good Faith which made the real Sanction, or moral Obligation of an Oath. "Quid eſt igitur, dix-
"erit quis, in Jurejurando? Num iratum timemus Jovem? At
"hoc quidem *commune* eſt *omnium* Philoſophorum, *numquam nec*
"*iraſci Deum, nec nocere*——Hæc quidem Ratio non magis contra
"*Regulum* quam contra omne Jusjurandum valet: ſed in Jureju-
"rando non qui Metus, ſed quæ Vis ſit, debet intelligi. Eſt enim
"Jusjurandum Affirmatio religioſa. Quod autem affirmate, quaſi
"Deo Teſte, promiſeris, id tenendum eſt: jam enim non ad
"Iram Deorum, quæ nulla eſt; ſed ad Juſtitiam & ad Fidem
"pertinet †."

* P. 47. † De Offic. l. 3. c. 28; 29.

1. Now what ſays our Advocate to this? *Upon the whole of this Authority* (he ſays) *I think it appears that the* OBJECTOR *rightly cited an Opinion of the Philoſophers*, but, miſtaking the true Meaning, *drew a wrong Concluſion from it*. Tully, NOT TROUBLING HIMSELF TO CONFUTE OR SET HIM RIGHT, *goes on with his Purpoſe, and proves the intrinſic Sacredneſs and Obligation of an Oath, without regarding the Circumſtances of Hope or Fear* *. What an Idea has he here given us of this great Reaſoner! *Tully* thinks an Objector worth taking notice of, and yet WILL NOT TROUBLE HIMSELF TO CONFUTE HIM. Without doubt our Advocate here compared *Tully* to himſelf for reaſoning; as before he had compared himſelf to Chief Juſtice *Hale* for *Greek*. And becauſe he can write books againſt an *Objector* † without *troubling himſelf to confute him*, he thought *Tully* might do ſo too. But the beſt of the Story is, that this *Objector* proves to be *Tully's* own ſelf: *Dixerit quis, a Man might perhaps object* (ſays he). And ſure *Tully* did not *miſtake the true meaning of a common Opinion*. And as for a voluntary Slip, it was not *His* Way, as it is this Author's, to make Blunders, and paſs them off for other Men's, with a *dixerit aliquis*. But it ſeems, *Tully* not only *miſtook the true Meaning*, but *drew a wrong Concluſion from it*. This is hard. And, harder ſtill, he had not the Patience to ſtay and ſet himſelf right. But ſure, if he had all this Leiſure to diſcredit his own Judgment, by inventing wrong Meanings, and drawing worſe Concluſions, he would have found time to reſtore himſelf to his Reader's Opinion by confuting them. But then, whether the Objection was *Tully's* or another Man's, what a low Opinion muſt *Tully* have, in the mean time, of the Importance of a *Future State* to Society, if, in a Book *of Offices*, *he would not trouble himſelf to confute or ſet an Objector right*, whom he had brought in with a miſtaken Argument that overturned *it?* There is indeed a Time when a ſerious Writer would not *trouble himſelf to confute or ſet a Wrangler right*. And it is ſuch an one as this, where

* P. 49. † See his Title-page.

the

the Perverſity is ſo great, as to become an Inſult upon every Reader's Underſtanding.

2. But his *Tranſlation* is in all reſpects as curious as his *Comment*. It follows in theſe Words: *But ſome one might object and ſay, that* Regulus *need be under no Apprehenſion from the Breach of his Oath, of his being puniſhed by the Gods, ſince it is a* WELL KNOWN SAYING *amongſt Philoſophers, That God cannot be angry.* "*Tully*, in anſwer "to this, ſays" *that this might be a Reaſon not only againſt* Regulus, *but againſt all Oaths whatſoever; for* (ſays he) *in ſwearing it is not the Fear of Puniſhment, but the* EFFICACY and IMPORTANCE *of it, which is to be regarded; for an Oath is a religious Affirmation made in the Preſence of God, and as ſuch ought to be ſolemnly obſerved. To conclude then, it is not the Anger of the Gods, which is* NOTHING [IN THE PRESENT CASE] *but Juſtice and Good Faith which is* [IMMEDIATELY] *to be* RESPECTED *.

Hoc quidem COMMUNE *eſt* OMNIUM *Philoſophorum*, ſays *Tully*. *It is a* WELL-KNOWN SAYING AMONGST *the Philoſophers*, ſays his Tranſlator, inſtead of, *this is a Tenet common to all the Philoſophers, commune Dogma, Decretum.*

In Jurejurando (ſays *Tully*) *non qui Metus, ſed quæ* VIS *ſit debet intelligi. In ſwearing* (ſays his Tranſlator) *it is not the Fear of Puniſhment, but the* EFFICACY *and* IMPORTANCE *of it which is to be regarded.* The pretended Objector obſerving that the People were chiefly influenced, in their Oaths, by the Fear of Divine Puniſhment, argues againſt the *Efficacy* of Oaths in this Manner. All the Philoſophers (ſays he) hold that God cannot be angry, therefore he cannot puniſh; conſequently Oaths will have no *Efficacy*, or there will be nothing in an Oath. To this *Tully* gives a plain Anſwer. The *Efficacy* of an Oath (ſays he) is not to be meaſured by the Degree of Fear that attends the taking it, but by the moral Obligation of keeping it, that is, by its proper *Sanction*. *In Jurejurando non qui Metus, ſed quæ* VIS *ſit debet intelligi*. Literally,

* P. 48, 49.

in ſwearing it ought to be conſidered, not what Fear attends it, but what Sanction it hath. And then ſhews, this Sanction to be good Faith. All here is cloſe and well argued. Let us now hear how his Tranſlator makes him reaſon. An Oath (ſays the Objector) is of no EFFICACY [*quid eſt in ſurejurando?*] becauſe *Fear* is no more. Oh, replies *Tully*, it is not *Fear*, but the EFFICACY and IMPORTANCE of an Oath that is to be regarded. Admirably concluded. And had *Tully* reaſoned thus, I ſhould have believed he had *forgot his Greek too, and turned himſelf to Studies of quite another Nature.*

But the Flower of Tranſlations is the following: *Tully*; *Jam enim non ad Iram Deorum*, QUÆ NULLA EST. His Tranſlator; *To conclude then, it is not the Anger of the Gods, which is* NOTHING [IN THE PRESENT CASE] *Quæ nulla eſt!* Here he believed in good earneſt that *quæ nulla eſt* was equivalent to *quæ nihil ad rem pertinet:* and ſo it may be, for ought I know, in his *Law-Latin*, but in *Cicero's*, it ſignifies the ſame as *quæ vana & commentitia eſt.* Tully; *ſed ad Juſtitiam & ad Fidem* PERTINET. His Tranſlator; *but Juſtice and Good Faith which is* [IMMEDIATELY] *to be* RESPECTED. *Pertinet, immediately to be reſpected.* He could not find the Nominative Caſe to his Verb, and ſo took *pertinet* to be the impersonal. But another time let him remember it is governed of ID. *Jam enim* [*id quod promiſeris*] *non ad Iram Deorum, quæ nulla eſt, ſed ad Juſtitiam & ad Fidem pertinet.* Literally thus, *For now what you have promiſed relates not to the Anger of the Gods, which is indeed no Anger, but to Juſtice and Good Faith.* This concludes the Argument very logically. But our Advocate ſays, *Juſtice and good Faith is* IMMEDIATELY *to be reſpected:* Which vitiates the whole Reaſoning. Firſt, as theſe Words do not imply *the Sanction*, the very thing *Tully* is here fixing. Secondly, as they do imply that *ſomething elſe* was to be *reſpected*, the very thing *Tully* is here oppoſing.

Is not this an able Intepreter of his old Philoſophers? Yet the poor Man did his beſt; and, without doubt, laboured hard. With what

what Gravity does he introduce this Subject! *From the firſt* [Principle] *that God could not be angry nor hurt any one, he* [Mr. W.] *draws a Concluſion, that they could believe no future State,* &c. *which he endeavours to ſupport by a Paſſage in* Tully, *the* TRUE SENSE *of which, when* CONSIDERED, *will not, as I apprehend, anſwer his Purpoſe* *.

VI.

But he will ſtill go on: *To ſhew* (ſays he) *that the Ancients did not draw the ſame Concluſion from this Opinion of the Philoſophers, as the Objector in* Tully *or Mr.* Warburton, *it appears in many places that they believed*——What? *that the* GODS *actually puniſhed this very Crime, and that Men incurred their Anger and Diſpleaſure by committing it* †. And ſo ſay I too. Nay more, I ſhew at large ‡ the Conſiſtency of this Belief, that *the Gods* puniſhed, with that other, that *the one God* did not. And yet to eſtabliſh this important Point he brings two Witneſſes, *Cornelius Nepos* and *Xenophon*.

But, as if conſcious of the Impertinence, he talks more to the Purpoſe in what follows. *And that Mr.* Warburton's *Diſtinction between the Anger of Demons and that of the Supreme Being may have no Place here, it may be neceſſary to ſhew by a Paſſage or two, that, as to the Effects, the ſame is aſſerted of the* SUPREME GOD §. This is ſaying ſomething. But now to his Evidence. The firſt he produces are three Poets. *Heſiod* (ſays he) *tells us, that he who ſpeaks the Truth in public, will be rewarded by all-ſeeing* Jove; *but he who forſwears himſelf is irreparably loſt, and his Poſterity ſhall come to nothing, but the Generation of the Juſt ſhall flouriſh. And* Phocylides, *Forſwear not thyſelf either inadvertently or knowingly, for the immortal God hateth a falſe Oath; and others have ſpoke to the ſame Purpoſe* ||, for which he quotes 4 *Iliad.* 167.

* P. 47, 48. † P. 50. ‡ Divine Legat. vol. II. p. 85, & ſeq.
§ P. 52. || P. 52, 53.

1. Let us attend to the Queſtion. It is, Whether the *Greek Philoſophers* believed the *One Supreme God* puniſhed and rewarded? And for the Proof of the Affirmative, he brings us three *Greek Poets*. But this is not the worſt:

2. Two of theſe *Poets* do not ſo much as ſpeak of the *Supreme Being*, but of the falſe Idol Gods of the People. *Homer* and *Heſiod* expreſly call the God, they here ſpeak of as the Rewarder and Puniſher of true and falſe Swearers, ΖΕΥΣ ΚΡΟΝΙΔΗΣ, *Jupiter Saturnius*. Now it will be News, I ſuppoſe, to this Writer, that *Jupiter Saturnius* was not the *One Supreme Being*, but *Jupiter the Son of Saturn*, an Idol-Deity, though ſet at the Head of the College.

The other *Greek Poet* is, if poſſible, ſtill leſs to his Purpoſe. For he happens to be no Heathen at all; indeed not ſo honeſt a Man: but a falſe Chriſtian, the Diſgrace of our holy Religion, who would put himſelf on the World for old *Phocylides* the *Mileſian*, contemporary with *Theognis*. But the Impoſture hath been detected by Critics of the firſt Order, ſuch as *Joſeph Scaliger*, *Ger.* and *Iſ. Voſſius*, *D. Heinſius*, *Huetius*, *Reiſkius*, *Barthius*, *Taubman*, &c. To the abundant Arguments they have produced, we may add this very Expreſſion, cited by my Adverſary, Ψεύδορκον ϛευγέει Θεὸς ἄϐρο⟃.

3. But had theſe *Poets* been *Philoſophers*, and their *Idol Gods*, the *Supreme*, who, unleſs it was our Advocate, would not have ſeen that, in popular Writings, they muſt needs talk popularly, and keep an *eſoteric* Opinion, ſo deſtructive of Society, to themſelves?

But he comes yet cloſer to the Point.——*And* PLATO *ſays*, GOD *will execute Vengeance on him, who, ſlighting the awful Majeſty of his Divine Power, ſhall at any time forſwear himſelf* *. He hath given us a *Philoſopher* at laſt we ſee; but to underſtand with what Judgment, we muſt again ſtate the Queſtion.

1. Which is, whether the Greek Philoſophers BELIEVED that the Supreme God puniſhed and rewarded. Now our Advocate hath

* P. 52, 53.

owned,

owned, and, what is more, hath *proved* that the Philoſophers had a two-fold Doctrine, an internal and an external; that the one contained Matter of *Belief*, the other of *Utility*. I have proved (to which our Advocate hath ſaid nothing) that the Philoſophers divided their Writings into two Claſſes, the *exoteric* and *eſoteric*; and that this very Book of *Plato*, intituled, *Of Laws*, from whence he hath taken the Paſſage above, was of the *exoteric* kind. Yet for all this, he can without bluſhing, or, perhaps, without knowing why he ſhould bluſh, quote the Book *of Laws*, for *Plato's* real Sentiments, in contradiction to what *Tully* and *Lactantius* tell us was Part of the *eſoteric* Doctrine of *all* the Philoſophers. The impartial Reader with hardly reflect on this without ſome Sort of Pity or Indignation. But what will he ſay when I tell him that this *Fallacy*, with others as groſs, that have been and ſhall be taken notice of in their Place, run through every Page of his Performance?

2. But we have not yet done with this Quotation from *Plato*. It is doomed to undergo a ſtill greater Diſgrace. In an evil Hour did our Advocate forget his *Greek*, unconſcious that *Fate* and *Free-thinking* had decreed to raiſe him up, in Spite of Nature, for the Preparer of the Way to pure Pagan Philoſophy, with his

—Petite hinc, Juvenesque, Seneſque,
Finem animo certum miſeriſque viatica canis *.

For here *Serranus* hath given him a terrible *quid pro quo*; which he hath innocently ſwallowed. This Tranſlator makes *Plato* ſay DEUS *illum Odio proſequitur, qui* SACROSANCTA DIVINI NUMINIS *Authoritate neglecta falſum Juramentum dicit* †. But *Plato* ſays no ſuch thing. He ſpeaks of *the* GODS, in the *plural*, ſuch as the People worſhipped. The whole Paſſage is in theſe Words: *Let no Man, when he invokes the* GODS *for his Truth, mix any thing of Falſhood, Fraud, or Inſincerity, either in his Word or Deed; unleſs he chuſes to become*

* The Motto to his Title-page.

† Plat. 917, a. Ed. Serr.

moſt

moſt hateful to the Gods. As in the firſt Place is he, who, without any Reverence to the GODS, *ſwears falſely: And in the ſecond Place, he, who lies before his Betters.* Ψεῦδ῾ μηδεὶς μηδὲν μηδ᾽ ἀπάτην, μηδέ τι ἀίδηλον, γέν῾ ἐπικαλέμεν῾ ΘΕΩΝ, μήτε λόγῳ μήτε ἔργῳ πράξειεν, ὃ μὴ θεομισέσ᾽ [*Diis infenſiſſimus*, ſays *Serranus* rightly here] ἔσεσθαι μέλλων· ἔτ῾ δ᾽ ἐσιν ὁ ἂν ὅρκυς ὀμνὺς ψευδεῖς μηδὲν φρονίζῃ ΘΕΩΝ· δεύτερ῾ δὲ, ὃς ἂν ἐνάντιον τῶν Κρειττόνων αὑτῷ ψεύδεται. Had our Advocate had the leaſt Taſte of Antiquity, he might have ſeen, from the concluding Period, with what Spirit the whole was written. With no other ſure than to inſtruct the People in their Devoirs to Society. A likely Place to find any of *Plato's eſoteric* Doctrines.

But if one conſiders the whole Evidence together, one would wonder how it could ever enter ſeriouſly into the Head of one, whoſe Profeſſion (if it taught him any thing) taught him to judge of *the Nature of Evidence*, that *Poets* writing to the People, and ſpeaking their Language, or a *Poetical Philoſopher* writing a Popular *book of Laws* to keep them in Order, ſhould ever talk to a Heathen Commonalty of the *only One God.*

VII.

But he is wiſer in what follows. *The next Authority* (ſays he) *Mr.* Warburton *brings to ſtrengthen his Concluſion is from* Lactantius, *which he calls an illuſtrious Inſtance; but on reading, it turns out ſo low and inſipid,* THAT IT IS NOT WORTH CONSIDERING *. Indeed, ſo ſhort! How happy had it been for him had he paſſed the ſame Judgment on all the reſt! The Argument from *Lactantius* ſtood thus: That eloquent Writer, in defending *Chriſtianity*, found nothing ſo much oppoſed the Doctrine of a *future Judgment*, as a prevailing Principle common to all the Philoſophers, that God could not be angry. He therefore compoſed his Diſcourſe, intituled, *De Ira Dei*, to combat this following Syllogiſm:

* P. 53.

If

If God hath no Affections of Love or Hatred, Fondneſs or Anger, he cannot reward or puniſh.
But he hath no Affections, &c.
Therefore, &c.

A modern Advocate of Religion would certainly have denied the *major*, but that was a Principle which *Lactantius* expreſly tells us was received by all Parties. He therefore turns his whole Diſcourſe againſt the *minor*; and endeavours to prove that God hath theſe Affections. Nor does he at all mince the Matter. For he tells us there are in God, as in Man, the Paſſions of Love and Hatred: And, to make all ſure, contends for God's having an human Form. Now the Inference I drew from it was this, that, as *Lactantius* was admirably well ſkilled in all Pagan Philoſophy, he could not miſtake a Principle which all the Philoſophers held, nor a Conſequence which they all drew from it. The *Principle* was, that the Supreme God had no Affections; and the *Conſequence*, that he could neither reward nor puniſh. Therefore this *Principle* and this *Conſequence* were held by ALL, the Point to be proved. It was on this Account, that I called the Caſe of *Lactantius* an *illuſtrious one*. Our Advocate ſays 'tis *low and inſipid, and not worth conſidering*. Utri creditis, Quirites?

But I commended him too ſoon. He won't let the Matter reſt when 'tis well: See then what comes of it.

He tells the Reader, that *I myſelf ſay* Lactantius *knew little of Chriſtianity* *. Egregious Advocate! muſt not this be the very Cauſe (if there were any Cauſe at all) of thoſe *Philoſophic Prejudices*, which ſo fatally diſpoſed him to attack the *minor* rather than the *major*?—*That he fell into many Errors* †. Could it be otherwiſe while he oppoſed the *minor*?——*That his Treatiſe was obſcure* ‡. Muſt it not needs be ſo, when his Oppoſition to the *minor* led him to maintain,

* P. 53. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid.

tain, that there is in God, as in Man, the Paſſions of Love and Hatred?——*And ſtrongly contended that God had a human Form* *. Was not this Extravagance a full Proof that the Connexion between the *Principle* (of God's having no Paſſions) and the *Conſequence* (that he could neither puniſh nor reward) was ſo univerſally held that he could find no Way to *break through*; but was forced to *evade* it, by aſſerting God had Paſſions? For which to provide a proper Subject, he thought fit to give him a human Form likewiſe.—*All then* (ſays our Advocate) *that appears from this illuſtrious Inſtance is, that* Lactantius *groſly miſtook this fine Sentiment of the Philoſophers* †. Does he know whom he talks of? Why, this *Lactantius* was a *Philoſopher* himſelf; not like that canting Tribe of Dunces, *Porphyry*, *Jamblichus*, &c. who firſt brought their Fanaticiſm into the Schools of Philoſophy, which ſo ſoon after, and ſo fatally, infected the Church of *Chriſt*; but one whom the greateſt Monarch of the World made choice of for the Governor of his Son. He was a *Lawyer* too, and his Critics ſay, a happy Emulator of the Eloquence of *Cicero*. Yet our Advocate believes in good earneſt, that *he groſly miſtook this fine Sentiment of the Philoſophers*. Alas! What he *miſtook* were *the fine Sentiments of Chriſtianity*; and this in too warm a Zeal for overturning thoſe of *Philoſophy*, which he underſtood but too well.——*And in combating with it fell into a Puddle of foul Abſurdities* ‡. Who told him ſo? Doctors differ. St. *Jerom* calls this Tract *De Ira Dei, pulcherrimum Opus*. Which had our Advocate known, without doubt, he had oppoſed the Judgment of a Father of the Church to mine. For, to ſay the Truth, I am anſwerable for all the Freedoms he here takes with *Lactantius*; what he knew of the *De Ira Dei* being only from *The Divine Legation*. But I produce the Authority of *Jerom*, who differs ſo much from my Sentiments of the Tract, to ſhew the Reader that *Lactantius's* Manner of ſupporting a *future Judgment* againſt the Philoſophers,

* P. 53. † P. 54. ‡ Ibid.

was

was the approved Defence of the learned Chriſtians of that time. Conſequently *Lactantius* did not *groſly miſtake this* FINE *Sentiment of the Philoſophers.*

VIII.

But this *Principle* ſeems fated to diſgrace him; ſo that he can't for his Life let it alone. He goes on therefore in theſe Words: *To clear this Matter more fully, it may now be proper to conſider the* PRINCIPLE *itſelf, which, as Mr.* Warburton *ſays, greatly embarraſſed Antiquity; becauſe the Ancients, ſays he, could not diſtinguiſh between human Paſſions and the divine Attributes of Juſtice and* Goodneſs, p. 393 **. But I hope to make it appear, that the Ancients were not all embarraſſed; and that they diſtinguiſhed in this Particular, juſt in the ſame Manner as we do now* †.

He tells the Reader, I ſay *the* PRINCIPLE *greatly embarraſſed Antiquity*, and refers to page 393*. Let the Reader then hear me ſpeak. "We ſee *Tully* owns the *Conſequence* of this univerſal *Principle*.— "A modern Reader, full of the Philoſophic Ideas of theſe late "Ages, will be ſurpriſed, perhaps, to be told, THAT THIS CON- "SEQUENCE GREATLY EMBARRASSED ANTIQUITY; when he can "ſo eaſily evade it, by diſtinguiſhing between human Paſſions and "the divine Attributes of Juſtice and Goodneſs, on which alone "the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments is in- "vincibly eſtabliſhed. But the Ancients had no ſuch preciſe Ideas "of the Divine Nature. They knew not how to ſever Anger from "its Juſtice, nor Fondneſs from its Goodneſs."——He charges me with ſaying the PRINCIPLE *greatly embarraſſed Antiquity*: and I ſay the CONSEQUENCE from that Principle *greatly embarraſſed Antiquity*. What are we to think of this? That it was done with Deſign? Alas! No. The poor Man knew no Difference between *Principles* and *Conſequences*, Premiſſes and Concluſions. Or if he had any Meaning, it was to ſhew his Contempt of theſe, and all other my

* Div. Leg. ed. 4to, vol. II. p. 88. † P. 54.

nice Diſtinctions, Diviſions, and Subdiviſions, which, he tells us, *he paſſes over as needleſs Curioſities*.*

But his next attendant Effort is ſtill more ſurpriſing. For he riſes in his Blunders, like *Homer's* Battles in their Terror. I had ſaid *the Ancients were embarraſſed.* He will prove *they were not at all embarraſſed,* without ſo much as knowing what *Ancients* muſt needs be meant. Now the intelligent Reader ſees they are the ancient CHRISTIAN, not *Pagan* Writers, for this plain Reaſon, That, though I hold neither Chriſtian nor Pagan Writers could *diſtinguiſh between human Paſſions and the divine Attributes,* yet none but *Chriſtian* Writers could be *embarraſſed* with the *Conſequence* of God's not being angry (which Conſequence was, that therefore he could not puniſh) becauſe none but *Chriſtians* (according to my Aſſertion) held that he could puniſh. Now from their holding, as they did at firſt, with the *Philoſophers,* that God *could not be angry,* and with the *Founders of their Faith,* that he *would puniſh,* aroſe all that EMBARRAS I took notice of; and which of courſe I muſt ſuppoſe the Pagans free from, by their not holding thoſe two ſuppoſed contrary Propoſitions. Our Advocate, who had not the leaſt Conception of all this, will yet venture to contradict me; and taking it for granted, as he does every thing he can't prove, that I meant PAGAN Antiquity lay under this *Embarraſs,* he brings a Number of Paſſages from Pagan *Philoſophers* to confute my Aſſertion. Thus all he proves, if he ſhould chance to prove any thing, being nothing to the Purpoſe, I might here fairly leave him to himſelf.

But as *Pagan Antiquity,* though it was not *embarraſſed* like the *Chriſtian,* yet was not at all more *exact* in its Ideas of the Divine Attributes, I will permit our Advocate, for once, to ſuppoſe, that I had ſaid, that *the ancient Philoſophers were embarraſſed, and could not diſtinguiſh between human Paſſions, and the Divine Attributes:* Let us ſee then what he will make of it. But as I reſtore him his Arms, and

* P. 3.

inſtruct

inſtruct him how to uſe them, it may be allowed me to remind my Reader,

1. That when I ſay they could not diſtinguiſh between *human Paſſions and the Divine Attributes*, I mean the Attributes of the *firſt Cauſe of all Things*.

2. When I ſay they could not *diſtinguiſh*, I mean diſtinguiſh in ſuch a Manner, as to leave Room for the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments; all other *Diſtinctions* being out of the Queſtion.

Well then, to prove that Antiquity was not embarraſſed, how does this mighty Champion of Old Philoſophy ſet out? Why firſt he proves *that he himſelf is not embarraſſed* *. Secondly, that *thoſe who read the Scriptures cannot be embarraſſed* †. But this is only to feel his own Strength, and make the Flouriſh of his Arms. He ſoon comes to himſelf, and then ſays, *But that the Reader may ſee how rightly the Philoſophers could diſtinguiſh between human Paſſions and the Divine Attributes, I ſhall now lay before him ſome Paſſages, in which it is ſaid God is not ſubject to Paſſion, or that he is void of Anger, and can hurt none; and others, where he is ſaid to be angry, and to puniſh Sinners for their Crimes; by which every one may the better judge, whether the Ancients were not exactly of the ſame Opinion as himſelf, and did not ſpeak as Chriſtians now do, ſometimes with regard to the ineffable and abſolute Rectitude of an infinitely perfect Being, and ſometimes with Reſpect to the Relation he bears to us his finite and imperfect Creatures* ‡. This is indeed to the Point.

And firſt, ſays he, *I readily agree with Mr.* Warburton, *that it was the Opinion of all the Philoſophers, that God could not be angry, nor hurt any one* §. And though we agree in this, yet he will bring ſeveral Witneſſes to prove it. This is always his Way when he has ſo ſafe Ground to go upon. Thus he proved the *double Doctrine* of the Philoſophers, and the *ſingle Object* of that double Doctrine. And on ſuch Occaſions, I muſt acquaint the Reader, he is a moſt

* See p. 54. † P. 55. ‡ P. 55, 56. § P. 56.

unmerciful Prover. But as he can never forbear mixing and confounding the ſeveral Parts of his Subject, the laſt of his Teſtimonies, to prove *God cannot be angry*, being taken from *Seneca*, he is drawn to another Queſtion before his Time. But Order, Method, and Logic, we know, are nothing with this Writer. However, a good Thing never comes amiſs. What then ſays *Seneca? That that Man is miſtaken, who ſuppoſes the Gods can hurt any one; for they neither can do wrong, nor ſuffer it, both of which betoken Frailty. But* Seneca *immediately after ſays, that the* GODS *do exact Puniſhment, and chaſtiſe ſome for their Good. Therefore* Seneca *muſt either contradict himſelf, or ſpeak of the ſame Beings in different Reſpects; and indeed theſe two laſt Paſſages of* Seneca, *one of which is quoted by Mr.* Warburton, TO PROVE *that the Gods can hurt none, ſeem to have no Reference to their juſt Anger againſt Sinners, but to ſuch Hurt or Injury as ariſes from Wrong or Injuſtice* *.

1. This whole Remark is nothing to the Purpoſe. *Seneca* here means the GODS of Paganiſm, not *the firſt Cauſe of all Things*, where he talks of their *puniſhing and chaſtiſing*. Now the *firſt Cauſe* is the Subject of our Queſtion.

2. *But of theſe two Paſſages, one is quoted by me* (he ſays) TO PROVE *that the Gods can hurt none.* The Paſſage is in page 402, of the ſecond Edition †. My Words are theſe, *A Benevolence too that went not from the Will, but the Eſſence of the Supreme Being*; SO Seneca *informs us, Quæ cauſa eſt Diis, &c.* Here again his old Luck follows him. I quoted it to ſhew what *Kind* of *Benevolence* they gave to *God:* He ſays, I *quoted it to prove the Gods can hurt none.*

Having thus notably ſupported his Agreement with me, that it was the Opinion of the Philoſophers that God could not be angry nor hurt any one; he proceeds, *But that* THEY *are angry, ſo as to puniſh the wicked for their Crimes, might be proved by a multitude of*

* P. 58.

† Vol. II. p. 99, of this edition.

Teſti-

Teſtimonies *. Without doubt it might. But what then? I require him to ſhew, that the Philoſophers believed the *One God* could be angry and puniſh; and he ſays, they believed their *falſe Gods* could. And ſo ſaid I, and proved it likewiſe. Yet he brings Witneſs upon Witneſs, Poets upon Philoſophers, to ſhew they thought THE GODS *could be angry and puniſh:* And then goes on thus: *By all which it manifeſtly appears, that when the Ancients ſaid,* GOD *could not be angry, they meant, &c* †. Was there ever ſuch a Reaſoner? He will prove what the Ancients thought of their *falſe* GODS, a Thing nobody aſked; and from thence conclude, what they thought of the SUPREME, a Thing nobody will believe.

But leſt the Reader ſhould ſuſpect, as he has little Reaſon, that this was only a Blunder in Words; and that though our Advocate promiſed to ſhew by Quotations, what was nothing to the Purpoſe, yet the Quotations themſelves might haply inform us of what was; I ſhall run through his Paſſages.

The two firſt ‡ are from *Plato's Book of Laws*, a Writing of the *exoteric* Kind, in which the Philoſopher ſpeaks to the People; and conſequently muſt needs ſpeak of thoſe Gods they were acquainted with. In one of the Paſſages he actually uſes the *plural*, in the other the *ſingular*, uſed perpetually, in the Writings of the Ancients, for the *plural:* Sometimes as the peculiar tutelary God of the People was meant; ſometimes as it was *Jupiter* the firſt of the Claſs; but moſt frequently as it was a common Figure of Speech for a *Greek* Republican to ſay the *God* or the *Magiſtrate*, when there were a hundred of each. But what will ſurpriſe our Advocate (who appears not to have received Inſtruction on this Matter) they ſometimes, though very rarely, uſed the *Plural* for the *Singular*. As *Seneca*, in the Place that came in Queſtion juſt above, *Quæ cauſa eſt Diis*, &c. and *Salluſt*, in another, that will come in Queſtion below. A little Diſcernment is ſufficient to take them right, in either of theſe *converſions*. But this is more, it ſeems, than we are

* P. 58, 59. † P. 60. ‡ P. 59.

to

to expect of our Advocate, who puzzling on, between his *true* and *falſe* Gods, hangs, like a falſe Teacher as he is, between Heaven and Earth, in the Fool's Paradiſe of Pagan Philoſophy.

The other two Paſſages he brings * are from a ſpurious Thing given to *Cicero*. This was a pleaſant Miſtake. He had ſeen me quote *Tully de Conſolatione*, twice, and therefore thought he might ſafely do the ſame. But my two Paſſages were from the genuine Fragments of that loſt Book; his two, by the Malice of his old Luck, from that Forgery of *Sigonius*, intituled, *De Conſolatione*, and fathered upon *Tully*: But it could never get a Godfather till our Advocate became its *Sponſor*. *Cicero* (ſays he) *ſays that a Man by his Wickedneſs becomes an Enemy and hated of God.* And for this *deciſive* Saying, *Cic. de Conſol.* is quoted.

He goes on, *But we need not queſtion the Philoſophers, when the Poets ſay the ſame* †. Nay, it muſt be owned they're all in a Story. And how ſhould they chuſe, when prompted by their *falſe Gods*, in whoſe Favour they are ſpeaking?

At length however, as if even ſenſible of the Impertinence of all he had been ſaying, he goes on thus: *But not to let this Matter reſt wholly upon* CONCLUSIONS, *though never ſo well grounded.*—— He means *Inferences.* You muſt excuſe him. If he be there, or thereabouts, 'tis enough for a Man ſo averſe to the *Nicety of Diſtinction.* Well, *not to let it reſt then* (though I ſuſpect it had been the wiſer Courſe, as I am ſo well acquainted with his Way of mending Matters) What then? Why, he will *further ſhew what Conſtructions they put upon ſuch Expreſſions, by one who has wrote a whole Chapter upon this Queſtion,* "*In what Senſe can the Gods, who* "*are immutable, be ſaid to be either angry or appeaſed?*" *In which* "*he tells us, that God cannot, properly ſpeaking, be ſaid to rejoice,* "*for then he muſt ſometimes be affected with Sorrow; nor to be angry,* "*ſince Anger is a Motion of the Mind; nor to be pleaſed with Gifts,* "*for that would be to be overcome with Pleaſures, &c.; but while*

* P. 59. † P. 60.

"*we*

" *we are good, we are united to the Gods by Similitude, and when* " *wicked, ſeparated for our Unlikeneſs: Not that they are really angry,* " *but that our Offences hinder the Light of their Goodneſs from ſhining* " *upon us; wherefore it is the ſame thing to ſay, God hateth, or is angry* " *with Sinners, as to ſay the Sun is hid from the Eyes of thoſe who are* " *blind* *." These are the Words of *Salluſt* the Philoſopher. To which I anſwer,

1. That this *Salluſt* is no legal Evidence. I have expreſſly excepted againſt him and all his Fellows, all that came ſo long after the Times in queſtion; which I confine to the Period before *Chriſt*. The riſing of the *Goſpel*, I confeſs, again and again, gave ſuch Light to the *Philoſophers*, that they refined all their Doctrines by its Splendor, and then, like their mimic Brethren of the preſent Age, ungratefully abuſed their Benefactors. Theſe are my Words in one Place of my Book: " Such was the general Doctrine on this " Point before the coming of Chriſtianity. But then thoſe Philo- " ſophers who held out againſt its Truth, after ſome Time, new- " modelled both their Philoſophy and Religion: making their " Philoſophy more religious, and their Religion more philoſophical. " —So amongſt the many Improvements of Paganiſm, the ſoften- " ing this Doctrine was one.—And it is remarkable, that *then, and* " *not till then, the Philoſophers began really to believe the Doctrine of a* " *future State of Rewards and Puniſhments* †." What now muſt we think of our Advocate? Was there ever any thing ſo ſhameleſs? Yet this is one of his hackney Fallacies, that runs on all his Errands.

2. But as our Advocate is turned Solicitor, and, without doubt, has been at much pains in finding out this Witneſs, we will hear him. And if he ſhould chance to prove what I affirm, and what my Adverſary denies, it would be but the common Caſe of Evidence picked up at a Venture, to ſupport a bad Cauſe. To keep him no longer in Suſpenſe, I muſt here let him know, that, had I

* P. 62, 63. † Divine Legat. vol. II. p. 116.

ſearched

to expect of our Advocate, who puzzling on, between his *true* and *falſe* Gods, hangs, like a falſe Teacher as he is, between Heaven and Earth, in the Fool's Paradiſe of Pagan Philoſophy.

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* P. 59. † P. 60.

"*we*

" *we are good, we are united to the Gods by Similitude, and when* " *wicked, ſeparated for our Unlikeneſs: Not that they are really angry,* " *but that our Offences hinder the Light of their Goodneſs from ſhining* " *upon us; wherefore it is the ſame thing to ſay, God hateth, or is angry* " *with Sinners, as to ſay the Sun is hid from the Eyes of thoſe who are* " *blind* *." These are the Words of *Salluſt* the Philoſopher. To which I anſwer,

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* P. 62, 63. † Divine Legat. vol. II. p. 116.

ſearched

ſearched all Antiquity, I could not have found a Paſſage more to my Purpoſe. Such is his old Luck at quoting.

This *Salluſt* having put together ſome common-place Stuff *of the Gods and the World*, in his fourteenth Chapter propoſes to ſpeak to this Queſtion, *How the immutable Gods may be ſaid to be angry and appeaſed.* Πῶς οἱ Θεοὶ μὴ μεταβαλλόμενοι, ὀργίζεσθαι καὶ θεραπεύεσθαι λέγονται. He ſays, in the firſt place, that God has no human Paſſions, he *neither rejoices, is angry, nor appeaſed with Gifts,* οὐ χαίρει Θεὸς—οὐδὲ ὀργίζεται—οὐδὲ δώροις θεραπεύεται. So far doubtleſs is agreeable to Truth. But how then? Why that the Gods *are eternally beneficent*, or, as *Seneca* had ſaid, *Cauſa Diis benefaciendi* NATURA, *and beneficent only, but never hurtful,* ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ἀγαθοί τε εἰσὶν AEI, καὶ ὠφελεῖσι μόνον· βλάπτουσι δὲ οὐδέποτε. Thus having avoided one Extreme, he falls into another, and ſuppoſeth it *blind Nature* and not *Will* that determines God's Beneficence. The Inference from this is, that the Rewards and Puniſhments of Heaven are the *natural and neceſſary Effects* of Actions; not *poſitive, arbitrary Conſequences*, or the Deſignation of Will. And ſo our Philoſopher maintains. For now the Difficulty being, that if *Nature be the Cauſe of the Beneficence of the Godhead*, how can Providence beſtow Good on the virtuous Man, and Evil on the Wicked? Our Sophiſt reſolves it thus: *While we are good, we are joined by Similitude of Nature to the Gods; and when evil, ſeparated by Diſſimilitude—They become our Enemies, not becauſe they are angry at us, but becauſe our Crimes hinder the Gods from ſhining on us—wherefore it would be the ſame thing to ſay, that God is turned away from the Evil, as to ſay, the* SUN IS HID FROM A BLIND MAN. Ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀγαθοὶ μὲν ὄντες δι' ὁμοιότητα Θεοῖς συναπτόμεθα, κακοὶ δὲ γενόμενοι δι' ἀνομοιότητα χωριζόμεθα—οὐκ ἐκείνων ὀργιζομένων, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων Θεὸς μὲν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐώντων ἐλλάμπειν—ὥστε ὅμοιον τὸν Θεὸν λέγειν τὸς κακὸς ἀποστρέφεσθαι καὶ τὸν ΗΛΙΟΝ τοῖς ἐσεφημένοις τῶν ὄψεων κρύπτεσθαι. An apt Compariſon, and very expreſſive of the Caſe; where the Influence of the Deity is ſuppoſed to be *natural*, like the Sun's, and conſequently all Reward and Puniſhment, not the

the *moral*, but the *neceſſary* Iſſue of Things. A Platonic * Principle entirely ſubverſive of the proper Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments, as believed every where by the People, and taught by the Chriſtian Religion. But this Matter I had explained at large in page 398 of the Book * he pretends to write againſt. The Pagans then, we find, in taking away human Paſſions from *God*, left him nothing but an eſſential Excellence, that went not from his *Will*, but his *Nature* only, and conſequently was deſtitute of *Morality*. This was one Extreme. The *Primitive Chriſtians*, as *Lactantius*, ſeeing clearly that the Platonic Notion of God overturned a *future Judgment*, and not ſeeing that Medium which their Maſters in Science, the *Philoſophers*, had miſſed of, maintained that God had human Paſſions. And this was the other Extreme. And whence, I pray, did both ariſe, but from neither's being able to diſtinguiſh *between human Paſſions* and THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES OF JUSTICE AND GOODNESS, the true Medium between *human Paſſions* and a *blind Excellence of Nature?* Did not I gueſs right when I ſaid, if he would not let the Matter reſt, he would ſoon make it worſe? Yet hear how triumphantly he goes off; unconſcious of all the fine Work he has been making. *And now I may venture to affirm* (ſays he) *that no one can reaſonably imagine this Opinion of the Philoſophers, that God cannot be angry, &c. could be any the leaſt Obſtacle to their believing a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments* †. I, for my Part, will only *venture to affirm* that the Diſpute between us (if that may be called a *Diſpute* where there is no *Contradiction*) ſtands thus: I had ſaid, *The Ancients could not diſtinguiſh between human Paſſions and the divine Attributes of Juſtice and Goodneſs in the* FIRST CAUSE *of all Things:* And he has proved *they could diſtinguiſh between juſt and unjuſt Paſſions in their* IDOLATROUS GODS. I had ſaid *they could not ſo diſtinguiſh as to leave any Foundation for the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments*: And he has proved *that I ſaid true*, by one of his own Witneſſes, *Salluſt* the Philoſopher.

* Div. Leg. Book III. Sect. 2. & ſeqq. † P. 63.

But, what the Reader can *reaſonably imagine*, upon this View of the Evidence, as I would not pretend to direct his Judgment, *I will* not *venture to affirm.*

IX.

I now come to the next Principle (ſays our Advocate) *which Mr.* Warburton *lays down as repugnant to the Belief of a future State, &c. which is,* "*That the generality of the Philoſophers held the Soul to be a* "*diſcerped Part of a whole, and this whole was God, into whom it was* "*again to be reſolved.*" BUT HERE HE BEGINS, AS IN OTHER PLACES, TO EXPRESS HIS FEARS "*that the Reader will ſuſpect* (*as* "*I am apt to think he will*) *theſe Kind of Phraſes are highly* "*figurative Expreſſions, and not to be meaſured by the ſevere Standard* "*of metaphyſical Propriety*;" *and therefore he deſires the Reader to take notice of another Conſequence from this Principle, which is, that the Soul was eternal* à parte antè, *as well as* à parte poſt; *and this, as he ſays, was univerſally held by Antiquity, though he attempts to bring but one Authority to prove it, which he ſays is above Exception; and therefore I ſhall tranſcribe it out of his own Book, as he quotes it from* Cudworth, *that the Reader may the better judge of its Validity.* "*It* "*is a thing very well known* (*ſays the great* Cudworth) *that accord-*
"*ing to the Senſe of Philoſophers theſe two things were always in-*
"*cluded together, in that one Opinion of the Soul's Immortality, name-*
"*ly its Præ-exiſtence as well as its Poſt-exiſtence; neither was there*
"*ever any of the Ancients before Chriſtianity, that held the Soul's*
"*future Permanency after Death, who did not likewiſe aſſert its Præ-*
"*exiſtence; they clearly perceiving, that if it was once granted that*
"*the Soul was generated, it could never be proved but that*
"*it might alſo be corrupted: And therefore the Aſſerters of the*
"*Soul's Immortality commonly began here; firſt to prove its Præ-exiſ-*
"*tence* *, *&c.*"

Here (ſays he) *he begins, as in other Places, to expreſs his* FEARS. This is the ſecond Time he has told me of my *Fears.* And without

* P. 64, 65.

Doubt

Doubt he took me in good earneſt for ſome very *fearful Animal*, or he would never have ventured ſo wantonly to inſult me. But the Reader perhaps may be curious to know how that Writer expreſſes his *Fears* of his own Arguments, who has been repreſented by the Bigots of the oppoſite Party, as deſpiſing all other Men's. The *fearful* Paſſage is in theſe Words: "And that the Reader may "not ſuſpect theſe kind of Phraſes, as that the *Soul is Part of God*; "*diſcerped from him*; *of his Nature*; which perpetually occur in the "Writings of the Ancients, to be only *highly figurative Expreſſions*, "and not to be meaſured by the exact Standard of metaphyſical "Propriety; he is deſired to take notice of one Conſequence drawn "from this Principle, and univerſally held by Antiquity, which "was this, that the Soul was eternal *à parte antè*, as well as *à parte* "*poſt*; which the Latins well expreſſed by the Word *Sempiter-*"*nus* *." Does the Reader find any of that Paſſion here which our quick-ſighted Advocate has diſcovered? All I can ſay to the Matter is, that as it is the Puniſhment of *free-acting* to *fear* for one's ſelf, *where no fear is*; ſo it is, it ſeems, the Reward of *free-thinking* to *ſee* Fear for others where no Fear is.

Well, but let us hear what he has to ſay to the Paſſage from *Cudworth*. *Now I readily agree* (ſays he) *that what* Cudworth *ſays of the Philoſophers is true*; *but deny that what Mr.* Warburton *quotes him for, can any ways be proved from thence*; *which is, that the Philoſophers held the Soul to be eternal* à parte antè *as well as* à parte poſt; *and indeed there is not* ONE WORD *which either expreſſes, or,* WITH ANY TOLERABLE PROPRIETY, *implies any ſuch Doctrine. They held, ſays* Cudworth, *the Soul's Præ-exiſtence, or that it was in Being before the Body*; *but it will* IMMEDIATELY OCCUR *to the Reader, that if it præ-exiſted only one Day or one Hour, before it was infuſed into the Body, it really præ-exiſted as much, though not ſo long, as if it had been from Eternity. And the whole Deſign of* Cudworth *is to*

* Divine Legation, Vol. II. p. 104.

ſhew, that the Ancients held the Soul to be immortal. FOR *this Reaſon amongſt others that it was not propagated with the Body, and therefore could not be corrupted with it; but was a diſtinct Subſtance from it, for that it præ-exiſted, or was made before it, as he proves from a Paſſage of* Ariſtotle. *Therefore the Doctrine of Præ-exiſtence does not in the leaſt prove the Soul to be eternal* à parte antè; *much leſs that it was diſcerped or torn from God in a literal Senſe* *. Pity me, Reader! who am forced into a Controverſy with an Advocate of *old Philoſophy*, who has not yet ſo much as learnt his firſt Elements either in the *old* or *new*. Why, thou mighty Man of Law! if the Ancients were to prove (as in this Caſe you own they were) that the Soul was eternal *à parte poſt* by an Argument taken from its *Præ-exiſtence*, and that it was an acknowledged Principle (as we both agree it was) *that whatſoever was generated could not be proved to be incorruptible*, muſt not by that *Præ-exiſtence* be meant an *eternal* Præ-exiſtence? For if there were a Time when the Soul was *generated*, though many millions of Years before its Entrance into the Body, it could not be proved to be *eternal à parte poſt*. The acknowledged Principle *that whatever was generated could not be proved to be incorruptible*, forbidding that Concluſion. For the Reader muſt take notice, their Point was not to give an *analogical Probability* that the Soul *ſimply* ſurvived the Body, but a *metaphyſical Demonſtration* that it would ſurvive *for ever*. And let him not imagine that our Advocate has only miſtaken the Queſtion, and argued right from the wrong State of it. He delivers it truly in theſe Words, *The whole Deſign of* Cudworth *is to ſhew, that the Ancients held the Soul to be* IMMORTAL. He wanted, we ſee, no Knowledge of the particular Queſtion; all his Want was Want of common Apprehenſion. Yet *Cudworth* thought the Argument ſo obvious, that no one, who was fit to read his Book, could poſſibly miſtake in it: and therefore contented himſelf in uſing *Præ-exiſtence* ſimply, without adding *eternal*, as the Argument neceſſarily determined the *Mode* of the *Præ-*

* P. 65, 66.

exiſtence.

exiſtence. Yet has he at length got a Reader who is fairly able to miſtake him, and who, inſtead of being thankful for an Explanation made, as it appears, for his peculiar Uſe, will find fault with his Inſtructor, and not content with ſaying that *there is not one Word in* Cudworth, *which expreſſes my Senſe*, will add, *that there is nothing that can with any tolerable Propriety imply it.* This he ſays; and yet (what exceeds Belief) he had but juſt before tranſcribed theſe very Words of *Cudworth*: THEY CLEARLY PERCEIVING, THAT, IF IT WAS ONCE GRANTED THAT THE SOUL WAS GENERATED, IT COULD NEVER BE PROVED, BUT THAT IT MIGHT ALSO BE CORRUPTED. Now if he would not ſee it, is he fit to write? And, if he could not, is he fit to be read? Who can be poſitive, after this, that he ever ſaw *Cudworth's* Book, which concludes the whole Obſervation in theſe Words: "The "*Totum* or *Compoſitum* of a Man or Animal may be ſaid to be "*generated* and *corrupted* in regard of the Union and Diſunion, "Conjunction and Separation of thoſe two Parts, the Soul and "Body. But the Soul itſelf, according to theſe Principles, IS "NEITHER A THING GENERABLE NOR CORRUPTIBLE *." Yet our Advocate tells us, *the whole Deſign of* Cudworth *is to ſhew, that the Ancients held the Soul to be immortal* FOR *this Reaſon amongſt others, that it was not propagated with the Body, and therefore could not be corrupted with it.* Which is juſt as wiſe a *Reaſon* as the following: *The laſt Lord Mayor of* London *will live a thouſand Years,* FOR *this Reaſon, amongſt others, that he was in being before his Entrance on his Office, and exiſted after his going out of it.* But he has all the Way done Wonders with his FOR. I have taken upon me to dignify ſeveral of them with *Capitals* for their eminent Services. But the bold Humour of the *Engliſh* is, never to ſpare this Particle. On the contrary, the *French*, a wiſe People, when the Royal Academy was founded for the Advancement of *Eloquence*, with which *Reaſon* had little to do, held a ſolemn Seſſions for the Extirpation of their FOR, CAR, as an uſeleſs and dangerous Word.

* Intell. Syſt. p. 39.

And

And though I think it escaped, and even survived the Edict of *Nantes* (notwithstanding all the Mischief it had done the Catholic Cause) yet their prudent Writers are extremely reserved in the Use of this and all other their *illative Particles*. Feu Gomberville (says one of their Dictionary Writers) *haissoit le mot* CAR, *parce, disoit-il, qu'il venoit du Grec. The late* Gomberville *hated the word* CAR, *because, as he said, it came from the* Greek. How happy for us, that our FOR is differently descended, or we had lost a great Reasoner, who bears as thorough an Antipathy to Greek, as ever did Monsieur *Gomberville!*

He goes on, *And if I may be allowed to argue in the same Way as Mr.* Warburton. The Public, I believe, will pardon him, let him begin when he will. Well, but allow him to do what, however, we are never to expect of him, to talk a little plain Sense; what then? Why *the Ancients could not strictly believe this Doctrine* [that the Soul was Part of God], *because it is greatly* INCONSISTENT *with another well-known Opinion amongst them, that Souls were linked to Bodies for a Punishment, or sent down as into a State of Tryal.* Now for his Reason.—FOR *to suppose in the gross Sense, that Pieces or Parts of the ever perfect and supreme God were so served,* IS WHAT NO ONE WILL IMAGINE THE PHILOSOPHERS CAPABLE OF *. FOR is here again, as usual, on very desperate Service. He Promises to shew the *Inconsistency* between two *metaphysical* Opinions. What Reader now but would expect a *metaphysical* Reason? Instead of that, he puts us off with a *moral* one. *No one will imagine the Philosophers capable of holding both those Opinions.* And to finish the Absurdity, this is called arguing like me, in an Instance where I proved the Meaning of a *metaphysical* Term by a *metaphysical* Opinion. *If I may be allowed*, says he, *to argue in the same Way as Mr.* Warburton.

2. But to be at a Word with him and his Philosophers together. What both are CAPABLE OF we shall now see. It is agreed that

* P. 66, 67.

Pythagoras

Pythagoras and *Plato* held that *Souls were linked to Bodies for a Puniſhment, or ſent down as into a State of Trial.* Yet of this very PYTHAGORAS *Cicero* ſpeaks thus: *Nam* Pythagoras, *qui cenſuit Animum eſſe per naturam rerum omnem intentum & commeantem ex quo noſtri animi* CARPERENTUR, *non vidit Diſtractione humanorum Animorum* DISCERPI ET LACERARI DEUM. Of PLATO and his Followers *Arnobius* ſpeaks thus: *Ipſe denique Animus qui* IMMORTALIS *a vobis &* DEUS ESSE NARRATUR, *cur in Ægris æger ſit, in Infantibus ſtolidus, in Senectute deſeſſus? Delira & fatua & inſana!* Here we ſee what two great Writers of Antiquity *thought the Philoſophers capable of.* Was he ignorant of this? No; I had quoted them in the Diſcourſe he pretends to confute *. Did he attempt to confute them? No; nor a great Number more to the ſame Purpoſe, unleſs this may be called a Confutation, *And we may obſerve, that* SOME *of his Authorities to prove this are exceedingly ſtrained, and, as himſelf acknowledges more than once, are otherwiſe underſtood by learned Men.* SOME? What then are the reſt? But as to theſe *ſome*, does he prove what he ſays? Yes: And how? By quoting my Acknowledgment, that *they are differently underſtood by learned Men.* And now, Reader! What doſt thou *imagine* our Advocate *capable of?*

X.

He goes on.—*And becauſe the Philoſophers, ſpeaking of the Soul, often call it the Image of God, divine and immortal,* &c. *he would lead the Reader, from ſuch Expreſſions, unwarily to imagine, that it was literally a Part of God, eternal* à parte antè, *the ſame as the Soul of the World,* &c. *But I hope to make the Contrary appear by ſome plain Teſtimonies of Antiquity: and the firſt I ſhall produce is one Mr.* W. *himſelf has helped me to, and is from* Stobæus, *where* Speuſippus, *one of* Plato's *Followers, ſays,* "*that the Mind was neither*

* Divine Legation Vol. II. pp. 108, 110.

"*the*

" *the ſame with the One or the Good, but had a peculiar Nature of* " *its own.*" *This, Mr.* W. *owns, expreſly contradicts what he aſſerted of* Plato's *holding the Soul to be Part of God*; " *but he ſays that* " Stobæus *and the learned* Stanley *were both miſtaken in thinking* " Speuſippus *ſpoke of the human Mind, whereas, ſays he, it relates to* " *the third Perſon in the Trinity.*" *Now ſuppoſing we take Mr.* Warburton's *judgment before that of* Stobæus *or* Stanley, *we may ſtill fairly conclude, that if even the third Perſon in the Trinity was not the ſame as God, but had a peculiar Nature of his own, much leſs was the Soul of Man the ſame; but that it had a diſtinct Nature likewiſe* *.—*He would lead,* ſays he, *the Reader by ſuch Expreſſions* unwarily to imagine, that it was *literally a part of God.* Hear then, by what kind of Expreſſions I would miſlead the unwary Reader. *A natura Deorum* (ſays *Cicero*) *ut doctiſſimis ſapientiſſimiſque placuit, hauſtos animos & libatos habemus.* And again, *Humanus autem animus decerptus ex Mente divina, cum alio nullo niſi cum ipſo Deo comparari poteſt* †.—He will not diſpute whether *Stobæus* and *Stanley*, or I, be in the right. He does well. But then he ſays, *We may ſtill* FAIRLY CONCLUDE, *that if even the third Perſon in the Trinity was not the ſame as God, but had a peculiar Nature of his own, much leſs was the Soul of Man the ſame; but that it had a diſtinct Nature likewiſe.* Such a *Concluder* would have made *Ariſtotle* forſwear Syllogiſm. In the 404th Page of the firſt Volume of the *Divine Legation* ‡ he ſaw theſe Words: " Again, the Maintainers " of the *Immateriality* of the Divine Subſtance were likewiſe divided " into two Parties; the firſt of which held but *one* Perſon in the " Godhead; the other *two* or *three.* SO THAT AS THE FORMER " BELIEVED THE SOUL TO BE PART OF THE SUPREME GOD; THE " LATTER BELIEVED IT TO BE PART ONLY OF THE SECOND OR " THIRD HYPOSTASIS." What is to be done with this Prevaricator? Will he plead guilty, to have the Benefit of his Clergy? Or will he own he could not read, and ſo ſtand upon his Defence?—

* P. 67, 68. † Div. Leg. vol. II. p. 103. ‡ Vol. II. p. 102. of this edition.

" You

" You may complain (I hear him ſay) but whoſe Fault is it? You " had put this Paſſage amongſt your *nice Diſtinctions, Diviſions, and* " *Subdiviſions:* And thoſe I was not obliged to take notice of, after " having ſo fairly given you Warning that I *paſſed over* all ſuch as " *needleſs Curioſities.*"

But I begin to be quite weary of my Advocate; I am drawing towards a *Concluſion* with him, and will diſpatch him with all poſſible Expedition. What follows won't ſtay us long. *As to the Paſſage which he quotes from* M. Antoninus, *it is nothing more than an Exhortation to conſider what will become of the Soul when it is diſunited or ſeparated from the Body: and though Mr.* W. *makes him to ſpeak of its being reſolved into the* Anima Mundi; *yet he owns at the ſame Time, that neither* Gataker *in his Notes, or* Caſaubon, *had any Notion that the Doctrine of Reſuſion was here alluded to* *. *Gataker* and *Caſaubon* did not underſtand it in my Senſe. Does he pretend to ſay I underſtand it wrong? He pretends to know nothing of the Matter: So I leave it to thoſe who do. For I ſhould have a ſtrange Love for anſwering, if I gave this any other Reply than *Antoninus's* own Words: " [To die] is not only according to the " Courſe of Nature, but of great Uſe to it. [We ſhould con- " ſider] how cloſely Man is united to the Godhead, and in what " Part of him that Union reſides; and what will be the Condition " of that Part or Portion of it when it is reſolved [into the *Ani-* " *ma Mundi*] †."

The next Authority (ſays he) *I ſhall produce, is from* PLOTINUS, *who tells us that the Soul is from God; and therefore neceſſarily loves him, yet it is a different Exiſtence from him.* Here again he plays his old Trick upon us. *Plotinus*, a Philoſopher deep in the Times of Chriſtianity. I have tried in vain to make him underſtand. I will try now if I can make him bluſh; while he forces me to repeat, for the ſecond Time, the following Words of the *Divine Legation.* " Such was the general Doctrine on this Point"

* P. 68.

† Divine Legation, vol. II. p. 114.

[namely, that the Soul was God, or Part of God] before the coming of Chriſtianity; "but then thoſe Philoſophers, who held "out againſt its Truth, after ſome Time new-modelled both their "Philoſophy and Religion; making their Philoſophy more religious, and their Religion more philoſophical.—So amongſt the "many Improvements of Paganiſm, THE SOFTENING THIS DOCTRINE WAS ONE. The modern *Platoniſts* confining *the Notion of "the Soul's being Part of the Divine Subſtance to that of Brutes.*— "And it is remarkable that then, and not till then, the Philoſophers began *really* to believe the Doctrine of a future State *."
How true this is we may ſee by this very Quotation from *Plotinus*. And one of common Apprehenſion would have ſeen, by his Words, *yet it is a different Exiſtence from him*, that this was an Innovation in Philoſophy. For were it not the common Opinion, that the Soul was *of the ſame Exiſtence* with God, or Part of him, this Caution and Explanation had been impertinent. However, he goes on unmercifully to ſhew the Orthodoxy of *Plotinus*, and of his Commentator *Ficinus*, in this Point: Where ſpeaking I don't know what, nor why, of the *vegetative Soul*, he takes an Opportunity to criticiſe a Paſſage I brought from *Plutarch*. *Of this Soul* [namely the *vegetative*] *it is of which* Plutarch *manifeſtly ſpeaks, where he ſays*, "*that* Pythagoras *and* Plato *held the Soul to be immortal; for "that launching out into the Soul of the Univerſe, it returned to its "Parent and Original.*" THAT THIS MUST BE INTENDED OF THE VEGETATIVE SOUL IS PLAIN, *from his mentioning two other Souls from the ſame Authorities, immediately after in a quite different Light.* "Pythagoras *and* Plato, *ſays he, hold that the rational Soul is im- "mortal; for that this Soul is not God, but the Workmanſhip of the "Eternal God; and it is the irrational Soul which is mortal and cor- "ruptible.*" *So that unleſs we can ſuppoſe* Plutarch *intended to make* Pythagoras *and* Plato *contradict themſelves, we muſt conclude their Opinions in this Paſſage to be, that the vegetative Soul was diffuſed*

* Divine Legation, vol. II. p. 116.

into

into the Life of the Univerſe; that the ſenſitive or irrational Soul was mortal and corruptible; and that the rational Soul was a diſtinct Exiſtence made by God. But this laſt Part is not at all taken notice of by Mr. Warburton, *though in the very ſame Paragraph with the firſt which he quotes* *.

1. *Unleſs we can ſuppoſe* (ſays he) Plutarch *intended to make* Pythagoras *and* Plato *contradict themſelves. Suppoſe*, Quotha! Did he never hear that this *Plutarch* wrote an expreſs Treatiſe *on the Contradictions of the Stoics?* A Sect of as good a Houſe as either *Pythagoras* or *Plato.* Will he never ſee, that if the Philoſophers had a double Doctrine, which he has laboured to prove, they muſt perpetually *contradict themſelves?* But our Advocate is ſo *captivated a Lover* †, ſo enamoured of his dear Philoſophers, that the very Air of a Contradiction ſhocks him.

2. Well then, not to diſguſt the Delicacy of a Lover, I will humour him. It ſhall be no Contradiction; nor will I *ſuppoſe* Plutarch ſuch a Brutal as to inſinuate any thing ſo groſs. But now, if, like a true *Inamorato*, he will not ſuffer them to be defended by any Hand but his own, then we ſhall begin to differ. He tells us that *when* Plutarch *ſays* Pythagoras *and* Plato *held the Soul to be immortal*, IT IS PLAIN THIS MUST BE INTENDED OF THE VEGETATIVE SOUL.—*An immortal vegetative Soul!* 'Tis a *Prodigy* that deſerves an *Expiation.* But to know whether *Plutarch* or our *Advocate* be the real Father of this Monſter, it will be neceſſary to tranſcribe the whole Chapter: "*Pythagoras* and *Plato* held the "Soul to be immortal; for that lanching out into the Soul of the "Univerſe, it returns to its Parent and Original. The Stoics ſay, "that on its leaving the Body, the more infirm *(that is, the Soul of* "*the Ignorant)* ſuffers the Lot of the Body: But the more vigo-"rous *(that is, the Soul of the Wiſe)* endures to the Conflagration. "*Democritus* and *Epicurus* ſay the Soul is mortal, and periſhes "with the Body: *Pythagoras* and *Plato*, that the reaſonable Soul

* P. 70, 71. † P. v. of the Preface.

" is uncorrupt *(for it is to be obſerved, the Soul is not God, but the* " *Workmanſhip of the Eternal God)* and the irrational mortal." Πυθαγόρας, Πλάτων, ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν· ἐξιᾶσαν γὰρ εἰς τὸ τᾶ παντὸς ψυχὴν ἀναχωρεῖν πρὸς τὸ ὁμογενές. Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ, ἐξιᾶσαν τῶν σωμάτων ὑποφέρεσθαι, τὴν μὲν ἀθενεςέραν ἅμα τοῖς συγκρίμασι γενέσθαι. (ταύτην δὲ εἶναι τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων) τὴν δὲ ἰσχυροτέραν, οἵα ἐςὶ περὶ τὰς σοφὰς, ἢ μέχρι τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως. Δημόκριτον, Ἐπίκουρον, φθαρτὴν, τῷ σώματι συνδιαφθειρομένην. Πυθαγόρας ἢ Πλάτων, τὸ μὲν λογικὸν, ἄφθαρτον (ΚΑΙ ΓΑΡ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀ θεὸν, ἀλλ' ἔργον τᾶ ἰδίᾳ θεᾷ ὑπάρχειν) τὸ δὲ ἄλογον, φθαρτόν. Περὶ τῶν Αρεσ. τοῖς φιλ. Βιβλ. δ'. Κ. ζ. Here we ſee, the Soul firſt mentioned, and ſaid to be *immortal*, and to launch out into the Soul of the Univerſe, was the ſame which the Stoics held to endure, when it had been in their wiſe Man, till the Conflagration; was the ſame which *Democritus* and *Epicurus* held to be mortal. And was this the VEGETATIVE Soul? How hard has the World dealt with *Democritus* and *Epicurus* for twenty round Ages, only for holding that the *vegetative Soul was mortal?* A very reaſonable Opinion, had there been any *vegetative Soul* at all. But what then muſt we ſay to the *Contradiction*, which I have promiſed to remove, and which ſeems now quite fixed, ſince we have evaporated this Spirit of *vegetative Immortality*, from the Paſſage? The plain Solution of the Difficulty is this: When *Plutarch* had mentioned the impious Notion of the Soul's *Mortality*, firſt ſtarted by *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, he oppoſes it by that of *Pythagoras* and *Plato*. He had told us before, that theſe held the Soul to be *immortal*: But now, uſing their Authority to confute the other *two*, he, like a judicious Writer, explains it with more Exactneſs. He tells us, that *Pythagoras* and *Plato* held the *reaſonable* Soul to be immortal, the *irrational* mortal. When, in the Beginning of the Chapter, he had ſaid, they held the Soul to be immortal, he added *their* Reaſon, *For that launching out*, &c. ΓΑΡ εἰς τὸ τᾶ παντὸς, &c. Now here, in the Concluſion, mentioning again the ſame Dogma, he adds *his own*, *For it is to be obſerved the*

the Soul is not God, &c. ΚΑΙ ΓΑΡ τὴν ψυχὴν, &c. For *Plutarch* had, with the reſt of the Philoſophers of the Chriſtian Times, refined his Notions on this Matter: *They* ſaid, *the Soul was immortal, becauſe it was related to the Soul of the Univerſe: He ſaid, it was immortal, becauſe it was the Work of God.* *Henry Stephens*, who, it ſeems probable, ſaw this was *Plutarch's*, and not *Pythagoras's* or *Plato's* Philoſophy, makes the Words ᾗ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ὁ θεὸν ἀλλὰ τῦ ἀϊδίε θεῦ ὑπάρχειν) a Parentheſis, as he does ταύτην δὲ εἶναι τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων) and as he ſhould have done οἷα ἐςὶ περὶ τὲς σοφὲς; both which are the explanatory Remarks of *Plutarch.* And now it is to be hoped our Advocate ſees *why this laſt Part was not at all taken notice of by Mr.* Warburton *though in the very ſame Paragraph with the firſt which he quoted.* But what does he now ſee of his *Contradiction?*

We have ſaid what it was that induced *Plutarch* to interfere with his own Opinion in this Matter. The very ſame Concern for the Orthodoxy of old Pagan Philoſophy (then to be oppoſed to Chriſtianity) that now ſeems to diſtreſs our Advocate. The very ſame that made *Plotinus* cry out, as above, *The Soul neceſſarily loves God, yet is a different Exiſtence from him.* And this will account for *Plutarch's* labouring ſo much as he does, in the Place quoted by our Advocate, at his 75th Page, to free *Plato* from the Charge of making the Soul eternal and uncreated. For a Charge, it ſeems, it was, and a heavy one too, upon him. Now where *Plutarch* performs the faithful Office of an Hiſtorian, in delivering us the *Placits* of the old Philoſophers, there, we ſee, he owns both *Pythagoras* and *Plato* held this Opinion; but here, where he acts the *Advocate*, I mean of old Pagan Philoſophy, he endeavours to *diſtinguiſh* away the Accuſation. Thus at length we ſee the *Contradiction* lies at *Plutarch's* Door; which will require more than a *vegetative Immortality* to remove: *Legulcio dignus vindice Nodus.*

Theſe three Paſſages, from *Stobæus*, *M. Antoninus*, and *Plutarch*, are the only three of the great Number I brought to prove the *Greek* Philoſophers held the Soul to be Part of God, which our Advocate

Advocate has ventured to undertake. Theſe he thought he could manage: And Envy muſt own he has acquitted himſelf to Admiration.

XI.

But that *Plato* was orthodox in this Point, he will now ſhew from *Plato* himſelf.—*And that this was* Plato's *Opinion* (ſays he) *concerning the human rational Soul, I ſhall further prove—from himſelf.—In one Place he ſays,* "*We have ſpoke moſt truly in aſſerting the* "*Soul was made before the Body, and the Body in the ſecond Place, and* "*after the Soul, foraſmuch as the governing Part ought in Point of* "*Time to be created before that which is governed**." Where ſays he this? Where think you but in the old Place, his *Book of Laws?* It is an odd Fancy this, in our Advocate, to go ſo continually to *a Book of Laws* for *Plato's religious* Sentiments. *Law* and *Goſpel*, let me tell him, agreed no better formerly than they do now. But he muſt needs go as his *Index* led him. Which in this Road always points *exoterically*. Let us follow him then into his Warehouſe of *Laws*. Here, to our great Surprize, we find, that *Plato* is not ſpeaking of the Origin of the human rational Soul, but of a very different Thing. This *tenth Book of Laws*, from whence he takes his Quotation, is employed to prove the Being of a God againſt Atheiſm. One of his Arguments, for an *eternal Mind*, is, That that is the firſt efficient Cauſe which moves itſelf and all other Things. But MIND moves itſelf and all other Things: Therefore MIND is the firſt efficient. Hence, in the Words of the Quotation, it is inferred, *That the Soul was before the Body*, Ψυχὴν μὲν πρόϵρον γϵγονέναι σώματος ἡμῖν. And farther, that there is one general Soul or Mind, that governs the Univerſe, Ψυχὴν δὲ διοικοῦσαν ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς πάντη κινουμένοις ἡμῶν ἐκ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνάγκη διοικεῖν φάναι; Now, who ſees not that it was *Plato's* Buſineſs here, to ſhew only in the *Abſtract*, that Mind was prior to Body; and altogether beſides his Purpoſe to ſpeak of the Origin of the human Soul? Yet our Advocate, miſled by the

* P. 71, 72.

Latin

Latin Tranſlator, and unaided by any Diſcernment of his own, makes *Plato's* Words relate to the Creation of the Soul. *That the Soul was* MADE *before the Body*; *Animum ante Corpus* FACTUM *fuiſſe*. But *Plato* in his *Epinomis*, referring to this very Place, explains the Meaning in theſe Words: *That every Soul is elder than every Body*; ὅτι πρεσβύτερον εἴη ψυχὴ σώματος ἅπασα παντός. Yet was this Paſſage ſo far from helping our Advocate to the true Senſe of his Quotation, that he even refers to it for the Confirmation of his Miſtake. All therefore that *Plato's* Argument required was to prove, that *Mind* was before *Body*. But had he thought proper to digreſs about the *Origin* of the Soul, he muſt needs have made it *ungenerated*, from a Principle he lays down in this very Place, namely, That *the Soul was a ſelf-moving Subſtance*; Τὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν φῆς λόγον ἔχειν τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν, ἥπερ τ' ἔνομα ὂ δὴ πάντες ψυχὴν προσαγορεύομεν; for a *ſelf-moving* and an *eternal-moving* Subſtance were the ſame Thing amongſt the Ancients. So *Plutarch* tells us, that *Thales was the firſt who taught the Soul to be an eternal moving* OR *ſelf-moving Nature*, Θαλῆς ἀπεφήνατο πρῶτος τὴν ψυχὴν φύσιν ἀεικίνητον Ἢ αὐτοκίνητον *.

Our Advocate goes on with his *Plato*: *In another Place* (ſays he) *God, after having made the* ANGELS, *is introduced as delivering them Materials to form Man and other Animals, and as ſpeaking to them in this Manner*: "*Go to then, turn yourſelf to the Formation of Ani-*
"*mals, according to the Laws of Nature, and imitate that efficacious*
"*Power which I myſelf uſed in your Production; and ſince they will*
"*be created as it were Fellow-Citizens with yourſelves, they ſhall be*
"*eſteemed of divine Extract, and ſhall have Dominion over all other*
"*Creatures* †."

1. *God, after having made the* ANGELS (ſays he). Would the Reader know what Sort of *Angels* he has here to do with? Our Advocate is ſilent. But honeſt *Plato* tells us their Names: *Saturn, Rhea, Jupiter, Juno*, and the reſt of the Pagan Gods and *Demons*.

* Plat. Phil. l. 4. c. 2. † P. 72.

Περὶ

Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων δαιμόνων εἰπεῖν—Γῆς τε καὶ Οὐρανοῦ παῖδες Ὠκεανός τε καὶ Τηθὺς ἐγενέσθην· ἐκ τούτων δὲ, Φόρκυς τε καὶ Κρόνος καὶ Ῥέα, &c. But if *Philoſophers* are to paſs for *Apoſtles*, why may not *Heathen Gods* ſtand for *Angels?* Of theſe *holy Angels* Plato ſays it would be Impiety not to *believe* what the ancient Mythologiſts taught concerning them, ΠΕΙΣΤΕΟΝ δὲ τοῖς εἰρηκόσιν ἔμπροσθεν, ἐκγόνοις μὲν θεῶν ἔσιν ὡς ἔφασαν, σαφῶς δέ που τοὺς αὐτῶν προγόνους εἰδόσιν· ἀδύναλον οὖν θεῶν παισὶν ἀπιςεῖν. Being now in the Humour, he tells us, that when God created Souls he diſpoſed them *among ſt the Stars*: ξυςήσας δὲ τὸ πᾶν διεῖλε ψυχὰς ἰσαρίθμους τοῖς ἄςροις, ἔνειμεθ' ἑκάςην πρὸς ἕκαςον——That they ſuffered *Tranſmigration into Brutes*—ἔνθα καὶ εἰς θηρίου βίον ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ ἀφικνεῖται· μὴ πανυόμενον δὲ ἐν τούτοις ἔτι κακίας, τρόπον ὃν κακόνοιλο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότηλα τῆς τοῦ τρόπου γενέσεως, εἴς τινα τοιαύτην ἀεὶ μελαβαλλεῖ θηρίου φύσιν. And is not this a likely Place to find *Plato's real* Sentiments concerning the Soul?

2. But what do we talk of his real Sentiments? The Book, from whence our Advocate brings this Paſſage, contains not *Plato's* Sentiments at all, but another Man's, one *Timæus Locrus*, of whoſe Book, *de Anima Mundi*, this Work of *Plato's* is a *Comment*. The Paſſage in Queſtion, particularly, being a *Paraphraſe* on theſe Words of *Timæus*, ΜΕΤΑ δὲ τὰν τῶ κόσμω σύςασιν, &c *.

But our Advocate, now grievouſly bemired, yet flounders on.—*And again* PLATO MUCH TO THE SAME PURPOSE SAYS, "*that after* "*God had formed the World, he allotted the human Soul to be diſpoſed* "*of by Nature, as his Vicegerent* †," &c. Can the Reader now gueſs whither we are ſent to look for theſe Words?—To 3 *Plat.* 99. D. which fairly brings us a Mile beyond *Plato*, to a Treatiſe of *Timæus Locrus*, intituled *De Anima Mundi*. The ſwallowing *Sigonius* for *Cicero* was a Trifle to this Exploit. Here he ſaw writ in fair *Latin* Characters, over the Page, *Timæi Locri de Anima Mundi*. If one did not know him, one ſhould take him to be of the Humour of that Critic, who had *a great mind that every thing that was good*

* Plato Serr. Vol. III. p. 99. † P. 73.

ſhould

ſhould be his Favourite Author's. But he was puzzled with the two Titles. One was, *the Timæus of* Plato; the other, *the Anima Mundi of Timæus.* This was the deep Problem of *the Horſe-mill, and Mill-horſe:* But the beſt of the Story is, he here again (as in the former Caſe of the *Book of Laws* and *Epinomis*) brings theſe Words of *Timæus* to confirm his Senſe of the foregoing Quotation from *the Timæus of* Plato; and ſays, as well he might, *'tis much to the ſame Purpoſe.* This I remark to the Honour of his Penetration. For though he did not know one was the *Text*, and the other the *Comment*, yet he found out by mere Dint of Sagacity, that they were very near a-kin. And this is all the Fruit of his *Platonic* Journey. Unhappy Advocate! What a Progreſs haſt thou made! from *Plato* nothing to the Purpoſe, to no *Plato* at all! But we had beſt ſtop here, leſt the next Quotation ſhould be from *No Body.* And indeed 'tis next to *no body*; 'tis from *Apuleius*, a Writer in the *Chriſtian Times.* A Trick, now too ſtale even to laugh at.

We are come at laſt to our Advocate's *Peroration.* And to ſay the Truth, it was Time for him to have done. *Therefore, after all this* (ſays he) *Mr.* Warburton *need not any longer admire, &c.* No truly, he has eaſed me of this Paſſion, The *Admiring* at a Free-thinker.—*It is very true, that ſome few Expreſſions now and then may be found in the Writings of the Philoſophers, as, that the Soul is a Part of God; comes from God; is diſcerped from him; is a Ray of the Divinity; is one with God, &c. if taken in a ſtrict literal Senſe, might in ſome Meaſure anſwer Mr.* Warburton's *Purpoſe:* BUT WHEN THE LITERAL SENSE IS PLAINLY ABSURD, *and the Contrary maintained by a Multitude of clear Expreſſions, we of courſe underſtand them* FIGURATIVELY *. Without doubt. So that when we are told *Epicurus* held the Sun and Moon to be no bigger than they ſeem; *Pyrro*, that nothing could be known; and *Zeno*, that all Crimes were equal; *the literal Senſe being plainly abſurd*; we muſt believe nothing of the Matter. But as he hath talked of the *figu-*

* P. 75, 76.

rative Terms of a Language, in which he underſtands no Terms at all, he ſhould now learn to hold his Tongue, and hearken to his Teachers. The great *Gaſſendi* was incomparably the beſt verſed in ancient *Greek* Philoſophy of any Man in theſe latter Ages, and he never dreamt of this more than *figurative* Folly of our Advocate. He knew the *Greek* and *Latin* Expreſſions would bear no ſuch Interpretation: And therefore tells us roundly, that there was ſcarce an ancient Philoſopher, who was not what we now call a *Spinoziſt*. "*Interim* (ſays he) *tamen* VIX ULLI *fuere (quæ humanæ Mentis Cali-*
"*go, atque Imbecillitas eſt) qui non inciderint in Errorem illum de*
"REFUSIONE IN ANIMAM MUNDI. *Nimirum, ſicut exiſtimarunt*
"SINGULORUM ANIMAS PARTICULAS ESSE ANIMÆ MUNDANÆ,
"*quarum quælibet ſuo Corpore, ut Aqua Vaſe, includeretur; ita & re-*
"*putarunt unamquamque Animam, Corpore diſſoluto, quaſi diffracto Vaſe,*
"*effluere, ac* ANIMÆ MUNDI E QUA DEDUCTA FUERIT, ITERUM
"UNIRI *."

And now, after all that has paſſed between us, I may be allowed at parting to aſk my nameleſs Adverſary what he is? His betters, when they went *incognito*, have been thus queſtioned, and without Offence. The great *Pythagoras* himſelf was aſked it; and his Anſwer will fit our Advocate as if it had been made for him. And that he may not be forced to deſcend from his preſent Dignity of Quotation, I will preſs him no farther, but ſuppoſe he gives an Enquirer this, that his ancient Maſter made to *Leon*, Prince of the *Phliaſians*, who aſked him what he was. ART (ſays he) *I know none; but I am a* PHILOSOPHER †.

XII.

Let us conclude with a general View of our Advocate's Performances. He will write againſt the *Third Book of the Divine Legation of* Moſes: But propoſes only to conſider what in *his Apprehen-*

* Divine Legat. Vol. II. p. 106.

† Artem quidem ſe ſcire nullam; ſed eſſe Philoſophum. Cic. Tuſc. Diſp. l. 5. c. 3.

ſion

ſion affects the Argument. Yet of this *little*, for his *Apprehenſion* is not *much*, he has not conſidered one tenth Part. And how that abounds in all kind of *falſe Reaſoning*, and *abſurd Quotation*, we have given the Reader a kind of Specimen. But to make amends for an imperfect Repreſentation, he may be pleaſed to take notice, that, beſides all particular local Graces, there are FOUR GENERAL FALLACIES, that run throughout this noble Work. Two in Point of *Quotation*, two of *Reaſoning*.

I. The firſt is in quoting Poets, or any body, inſtead of Philoſophers.

II. The ſecond in quoting Philoſphers after *Chriſt*.

III. The third in urging *exoteric* Doctrines for *eſoteric*.

IV. And the fourth in concluding from what was ſaid of *falſe* Gods, to what they thought of the *true*.

I call theſe by the knaviſh Title the *Schools* of Philoſophy have given them, which, like the *Courts of Law*, make no Proviſion for Fools: But, upon my Word, I am not ſatisfied whether they be not very honeſt *Blunders*. However, he has now his Choice to call them what he will, ſo he no longer pretend to call them Arguments.

His *firſt* Chapter, as I ſaid, is the only one with which I am concerned. His *ſecond* is intituled, *The Opinions of the Philoſophers concerning a future State*. It is made up of ſome ſix dozen of ill-choſen Quotations, which ſo amazed him that he could not forbear ſaying on the Entrance to his Labour, *It ſeems very ſurprizing, notwithſtanding all the following Authorities, and many more which no doubt this learned Gentleman muſt have met with to the contrary, that he ſhould thus ſpeak of the Philoſophers:* "*I have examined their Writings with* "*all the Exactneſs I was able, and it appears evident to me that theſe* "*Men believed nothing of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments,* "*which they moſt induſtriouſly propagated in Society* *." By this

* P. 2.

Time, I ſuppoſe, I have eaſed him of his *Surprize*: So that we are now even by a reciprocal Cure. In one Point however he is right. He ſuppoſes I could have furniſhed him with *many more Authorities*. I could, I'll aſſure him: More than with ſix hundred to his ſix dozen. But it is pleaſant to obſerve, in this *Chapter of Quotations*, with what Judgment he brings in three *Epicureans*, *Virgil*, *Lucian*, and *Celſus*, to bear Witneſs to a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments, who without doubt *believed* what they ſaid. Honeſt *Celſus* cries out, under the *Maſk* and in the *Tone* of a modern Free-thinker, *God forbid, that either they, or I, or any Man living, ſhould endeavour to ſubvert the Belief of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments* *. Who, when he hears this, can forbear concluding with our Advocate—*I ſay, when a Man talks in this manner, it is hardly poſſible not to imagine him in Earneſt* †.

I call this his *Chapter of Quotations*. It is its proper Title: It is made up of them, and a jolly Company they are, but ſo tranſcendently choſen and tranſlated, that ſome Time or other it may chance to become as famous as *Scarron's Chapter of Horſe-Litters*, which once, indeed, on a Time met together becauſe they were forced; but for all that each of them, while in the Diſpoſal of their Owners, was taking a different Road. At preſent I ſhall only deſire the Reader to obſerve, that the *three firſt* of the *four general Sophiſms* ſhine throughout this Chapter with a diſtinguiſhed Luſtre.

He has two more *Chapters* upon ſomething or other; and then concludes with a Paſtoral-Letter to the Free-thinkers, *Ut* SOBRII *ad evertendam Rempublicam Chriſtianam accederent*.

Thus it hath been my Fortune to diſpleaſe the *Bigots* on both Sides. I make no Queſtion, but the impartial Reader will be ready to congratulate with me on ſo fair an Appearance of being in the Right.

As for this fantaſtic Zealot in the Cauſe of Paganiſm, I have uſed him, it is true, with little Ceremony. Let the Reader judge, if he deſerved more. I had put my Name to what I wrote, and he

* P. 152. † P. 82.

attacks

attacks me in ſecret. Had either I concealed mine, or he told his, he might then have expected (if on other Accounts he had a Right to it) what the uſual Commerce of Civility demands between People upon equal Terms: But writing without a Name, in the Manner he has done, is leaſt of all excuſable. For, when a Man's Perſon or Reputation is attacked, I know little Difference between the Ruffian, and the Writer, in the Dark.

I may be the rather allowed to ſpeak freely on this Head, becauſe I never yet wrote againſt any Book or Author whatſoever, any farther than occaſional Reflections on particular Queſtions, which no one can avoid who treats of Subjects like thoſe I am engaged in. Once indeed, and but once, I took upon myſelf the Honour of *defending* a ſublime Genius againſt the Cavils of an injurious Pedant. But an *Attack* by *Anſwer*, *Remarks*, *Confutation*, or any of the formal Apparatus of literary Aſſault, I never made on any Author whatſoever. To ſay the Truth, I prize my Eaſe and Quiet at too high a Rate, to hazard them in the Vain or *intereſted* Employment of diſcrediting any Popular or Party Writer whatſoever.——*Nec quiſquam noceat Cupido mihi Pacis!*

I ſhould now, perhaps, crave Pardon of the ſeverer Reader for the Levities that have eſcaped me both *here* and in the *Preface*. But if he that loſes may have leave to ſpeak, ſure he that's libell'd though he loſes nothing, may have leave to laugh. And what elſe was to be done with my *Doctor and Student?* who, whether they railed or reaſoned, how much ſoever in their own Profeſſions, were ſtill on the wrong Side common Senſe and common Honeſty. For they have managed Things ſo well, that the one has loſt his *Reaſoning* in the Study of the *Law*, and the other his *Charity* in Defence of the *Goſpel*. Beſides, on ſome Occaſions, what Mortal can forbear? Who would have ſuſpected our ſolemn tragic Doctor for a *riſible Animal?* Yet there are Seaſons, when his own Blunders diſpoſe him to be jocular, and he irreverently aims at Wit with the Face of an *Iriſh* Inquiſitor *.

* See The Weekly Miſcellany throughout.

In Concluſion, *If any Man* (to uſe the Words of a great Writer) EQUAL TO THE MATTER *, *ſhall think it appertains him to take in Hand this Controverſy, either excepting againſt aught written, or perſuaded he can ſhew better how this Queſtion may receive a true Determination; if his Intents be ſincere to the Public, and ſhall carry him on without* BITTERNESS *to the* OPINION *or to the* PERSON *diſſenting, let him not, I intreat him, gueſs by the Handling which meritoriouſly hath been beſtowed on theſe Objects of Contempt and Laughter, that I account it any Diſpleaſure done to me to be contradicted in Print: But as it leads to the Attainment of any thing more true, ſhall eſteem it a Benefit; and ſhall know how to return his* CIVILITY *and* FAIR ARGUMENT *in ſuch Sort, as he ſhall confeſs that to do ſo is my Choice, and to have done thus was my Chance.*

* Mr. Chubb, I am told, has addreſſed ſomething or other to me at the End of his late Diſcourſe on Miracles. I ſuppoſe he only wants my Acknowledgments; and he ſhall have them: For the reaſon above ſhews why I muſt always decline his kind Overtures of farther Acquaintance. I confeſs then he is a very extraordinary Perſon: and think he may ſay with the ſubtil Peaſant in Moliere—Oui, ſi j'avois étudié, j'aurois été ſonger à des choſes où l'on n'a jamais ſongé.

POST-

POSTSCRIPT TO THE REMARKS,

In Anſwer to ſome OBJECTIONS of Dr. SYKES.

TO put Things of a Sort together, I ſhall take this Occaſion to pay my Reſpects to the Author of the *Principles and Connexion of natural and reveal'd Religion* *, who has honoured me, in paſſing, with a couple of random Reflexions. A kind of Fatality ſeems to attend theſe Gentlemen; who, when I lie ſo open to them, have ſtill the Luck to offer at me in the wrong Place.

In his 399th Page he has theſe Words: "It is not of any Mo-
"ment to enter further into what Philoſophers have ſaid, when
"they attempt to account for the Soul's *Eternity*. Common Senſe
"taught them, that real proper Puniſhments were inflicted upon
"Men for Sins. Who can read *Plato's Gorgias* (which is not
"ranked amongſt the *Exoterics* by a late Writer, in which alone
"the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments, he
"thinks, are [is] detailed out); who can read that, and conceive that
"*Plato* did not really believe a State of future Puniſhments and
"Rewards? When he had profeſſed at large, how wicked Men
"are puniſhed, and how good Men are rewarded in a future State,
"he declares *That to be his full Perſuaſion, and from thence it was*

* Arthur Aſhley Sykes, D. D.

"*that*

" *that he endeavoured to appear before his Judge having a moſt pure* " *Soul.* And if they imagined Men to be *puniſhed for Sin*, and *re-* " *warded for Virtue*, even ſuppoſing this was talked of in a Way " that might be proved fabulous, yet the Doctrine itſelf was un- " ſhaken. Suppoſe the Fables of *Acheron*, and *Styx*, and *Cocytus*, " and *Elyſian Fields*, may be all demonſtrated to be falſe; yet it " does not follow, that the Thing conveyed under theſe Words " were [was] believed to be all falſe. It does not follow that Souls " were believed to die, or to be uncapable of receiving Puniſh- " ments or Rewards: but only that this Manner of repreſenting " them is falſe *." —Theſe are his Words; and they deſerve to be well conſidered.

It is not of any Moment (he ſays) *to enter further into what Philoſophers have ſaid, when they attempt to account for the Soul's* ETERNITY. I thought it of great Moment. I am ſure I found it of great Difficulty. And if I have ill explained what the *Philoſophers meant by the Soul's Eternity*, one Reaſon was, that I wanted more Helps than Antiquity would afford me. But it is the Privilege of veteran Diſputers, to *want* nothing but willing Hearers. But why will he *enter no further*, when he goes out of his Way to pay me this Viſit?

Becauſe *common Senſe* (he ſays) *taught them, that real proper Puniſhments were inflicted upon Men for Sins.* I have ſhewn from *Fact* that common Senſe did not teach them. No matter: He will prove from *Reaſon* that it did. His Argument is plain and ſimple. Common Senſe *might* teach them: therefore common Senſe *did* teach them. This it is to be a practiſed Diſputant. It is but knowing what common Senſe *might* teach, and he will preſently tell you, by his Scale of Logic, what it *did.* By the ſame way, I make no doubt, he could prove that the *Epicureans* believed a Providence; the *Stoics* Inequality of Crimes; and the *Pyrrhonians* the Certainty of Truth. He has only to ſhew that *common Senſe taught them*, or

* P. 400.

was

was ready to teach them; and we have only to believe, that they were as ready to *learn*. I had myſelf a kind of Gueſs, *that common Senſe* might have *taught the Philoſophers that real proper Puniſhments were inflicted upon Men for Sins*; and had I known no more of Antiquity than this Writer has *entered into*, 'tis ten to one but I had concluded as he does, *that common Senſe* did *teach them*. Though hardly, I think, after another had clearly ſhewn the Contrary from Antiquity. However, the Reader may not be diſpleaſed to hear how much I gave to *common Senſe* in the Introduction to my Diſcourſe on the *Philoſophers*. Theſe were my Words:—"It will be "proper to premiſe, that the Conſtitution of the *Greek* Philoſo- "phy being above meaſure refined and ſpeculative, it always uſed "to be determined by *metaphyſical* rather than *moral* Principles; "and to ſtick to all Conſequences, how abſurd ſoever, that were "ſeen to ariſe from ſuch Principles. Of this we have a famous "Inſtance in the ancient *Democritic* Philoſophy, *&c.*——So well "ſupported, we ſee, is that Cenſure which a celebrated *French* "Writer paſſes upon them: *When the Philoſophers once beſot them- "ſelves with a Prejudice, they are even more incurable than the "People themſelves: becauſe they beſot themſelves not only with the "Prejudice, but with the falſe Reaſoning employed to ſupport it.* "The Reverence and regard to *metaphyſical* Principles being ſo "great, we ſhall ſee, that the *Greek* Philoſophers muſt of neceſſity "reject the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments, "how many *invincible* moral Arguments ſoever there really be in "Support of it, when we come to ſhew, that there were two *meta- "phyſical* Principles concerning *God* and the *Soul*, univerſally em- "braced by all, which neceſſarily exclude all Notion of a future "State of Reward and Puniſhment *."

In the *Concluſion* I repeat the ſame Obſervation in the following Words:—"Theſe two Errors in the metaphyſical Speculations of "the Philoſophers, concerning the Nature of God and of the Soul,

* Div. Leg. vol. II. p. 86.

" were what neceſſarily kept them from giving Credit to a Doctrine " highly probable in itſelf, and rendered ſo even by themſelves, " from many moral Conſiderations, perpetually preached up to the " People. But, as we obſerved before, it was their ill Fate to be " determined, in their Opinions, rather by *metaphyſical* than *moral* " Arguments. This is ſeen by comparing the Belief and Conduct " of SOCRATES with the reſt. He was ſingular in confining himſelf " to the Study of *Morality*, and as ſingular in *believing* the Doc- " trine of a future State of Reward and Puniſhment. What could " be the Cauſe of this latter Singularity but the former? Of which " it was a natural Conſequence. For, having thrown aſide all " other Speculations, he had nothing to miſlead him. Whereas the " reſt of the Philoſophers applying themſelves, with a kind of Fa- " naticiſm, to Phyſics and Metaphyſics, had drawn a Number of " abſurd, though ſubtile Concluſions, that directly oppoſed the " Conſequences of thoſe moral Arguments. And as it is common " for Parents to be fondeſt of their weakeſt and moſt deformed Offs- " pring, ſo theſe Men, as we ſaid, were always more ſwayed by " their metaphyſical than moral Concluſions *." Now this was all I could, in Conſcience, allow to *common Senſe*, when Antiquity ſtood ſo directly in my Way.

But leſt it ſhould be ſaid he had overlooked *all* Fact, he has thought fit to make the following Obſervation: *Who can read* Plato's Gorgias *(which is not ranked amongſt the Exoterics by a late Writer, in which alone the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments, he thinks, is detailed out)*; *who can read that, and conceive that* Plato *did not really believe*, &c. The Force of this Obſervation, the Reader ſees, lies in the Parentheſis, *that I have not ranked the* Gorgias *of* Plato *amongſt his Exoterics*. But how, if this be falſe? Let the following Words of the *Divine Legation* determine: " It is very true, that, in his Writings, he [*Plato*] in- " culcates the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Puniſh-

* Divine Legation, vol. II. p. 132.

" ments;

" ments; but this always in the groſſeſt Senſe of the Populace,—
" *that the Souls of ill Men deſcended into Aſſes or Swine*,—that the
" uninitiated lay in Mire and Filth: that there were three Judges
" of Hell; and talks much of *Styx*, *Cocytus*, *Acheron*, &c. and all
" ſo *ſeriouſly* as ſhews he had a mind to be believed. But did he
" himſelf believe them? We may be aſſured he did not *." Where, at the Word *ſeriouſly*, I expreſſly refer to the GORGIAS, *Phædo*, and *Republic*. Now, if the *Phædo* and *Republic* (as he will not deny) be of the *exoteric* Kind, and I place the *Gorgias* in the ſame Claſs, is not this *ranking the* Gorgias *amongſt the Exoterics?* What then was it that could induce this Writer to ſay, I had not ranked it there? Was it the following Paſſage? " But *Albinus*, an old *Platoniſt*,
" has, *in ſome meaſure*, ſupplied this Loſs [namely, the Loſs of a
" Treatiſe of *Numenius*, concerning the ſecret Doctrine of *Plato*]
" by his *Introduction to the Dialogues of* Plato. From whence it
" appears, that thoſe very Books, in which *Plato* details out the
" Doctrine of a future State of Reward and Puniſhment, are all of
" the *exoteric* Kind. *For in that Claſs* Albinus *ranks* the *Criton*,
" *Phædo*, *Minos*, *Sympoſium*, *Laws*, *Epiſtles*, *Epinomis*, *Menexenus*,
" *Clitophon*, and *Philebus* †." If this were the Paſſage, 'tis plain the Writer miſtook the latter Part for a formal Liſt of *Plato's exoteric* Writings. But the very Words might have taught him better: (I only ſay that *in that Claſs* Albinus *ranks* ſuch and ſuch Tracts) Eſpecially if he had looked into the Diſcourſe referred to: where he would have found the Reaſon why I expreſſed myſelf in that Manner. And I don't uſe to write at hazard, as *haſty* as he thinks me. *Albinus*, in his fifth Section, divides *Plato's* Dialogues into Claſſes. Not into the two general ones of *exoteric* and *eſoteric*; but into the more minute, and different, of *natural*, *moral*, *dialectic*, *confutative*, *civil*, *explorative*, *obſtetric*, *and ſubverſive* ‡.

* Div. Leg. vol. II. p. 64. † Ibid. p. 61.

‡ Τῷ μὲν φυσικῷ,——τῷ δὲ ἠθικῷ——τῷ δὲ λογικῷ,——τῷ δὲ ἐλεγκτικῷ,——τῷ δὲ πολιτικῷ,——τῷ δὲ πειραστικῷ,——τῷ δὲ μαιευτικῷ,——τῷ δὲ ἀνατρεπτικῷ. Alb. Introd. in Plat. Dial. Sect. 5. apud Fabr. Bibl. Græc. lib. 3. c. 2.

It will be aſked then, how I came to ſay, that *Albinus* ranked the *Criton*, *Phædo*, *Minos*, *Sympoſium*, *Laws*, *Epiſtles*, *Epinomis*, *Menexenus*, *Clitophon* and *Philebus*, in the *exoteric* Claſs? For this plain Reaſon, he ſays they were all of the *civil* Kind. And I hope I need not tell the learned Reader, that all of that Kind were *exoterical*. And now it is ſeen why I might well ſuppoſe the *Gorgias* of the *exoteric* Kind; and yet, why I could not uſe *Albinus's* Authority for placing it with the reſt: Becauſe it is evidently of the *civil* Claſs, and yet not ranked there by that old *Platoniſt*. The Reaſon of his different Aſſignment was this: The *Gorgias* is a Dialogue concerning the Uſe and Abuſe of Rhetoric. The Sophiſts had abuſed this Art to pervert public Juſtice, and to amaſs Wealth and Power. They are here ſhewn that its true Uſe was to aid and inforce the Laws, and to render the Members of a Community wiſer and better. Hence, in Concluſion, the Author takes occaſion to inforce the Practice of Virtue from the Conſideration of *future Rewards and Puniſhments*: his uſual Manner of concluding his political Diſcourſes; the *Gorgias* being, indeed, properly a Supplement to the Books of *Law* and *Republic*: But it being at the ſame time altogether employed in overturning the Practice of the *Sophiſts*, was, I ſuppoſe, the Reaſon why *Albinus* thought it came more naturally into that Claſs which he calls *ſubverſive*. This is a true Account of the *Gorgias*; as well as of my plain Sentiments, concerning it, in the firſt Volume of *The Divine Legation*. And yet this Writer cries out, *Who can read the* Gorgias, *and conceive that* Plato *did not really believe a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments?* Rather, let me aſk, Who that *has* read the *Gorgias*, can talk at this rate?

Well, but his Reaſon: "When he [*Plato*] had profeſſed at large, "how wicked Men are puniſhed, and how good Men are rewarded "in a future State, he declares *that to be his full Perſuaſion, and* "*from thence it was, that he endeavoured to appear before his Judge* "*having a moſt pure Soul.*" The original is, Ἐγὼ μὲν ἔν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ΥΠΟ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΛΟΓΩΝ πέπεισμαι, καὶ σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀποφανοῦμαι τῷ κριτῇ ὡς ὑγιεςάτην ἔχων τὴν ψυχήν. Here, we ſee, the

the Writer has ſunk upon us the important Words ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν λόγων, upon which the whole Sentence turns. This could hardly be by Chance. The Reaſons of the Omiſſion are but too evident. Ἐγὼ μὲν ἔν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ΥΠΟ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΛΟΓΩΝ πέπεισμαι, *I am perſuaded* (ſays the Speaker) *O Callicles*, ON THE AUTHORITY OF THESE DOCTRINES. Say you ſo? To underſtand then how *full* the Perſuaſion was, we muſt conſider what Credibility *theſe Doctrines* had. Now he that reads the *Gorgias* will find, that they conſiſted of a long fabulous Account of *the Eſtabliſhment of the three Judges of Hell**: And of a ſtrange Opinion, that the Dead not only retained the viſible Marks of the Paſſions and Affections of the Soul, but alſo the Scars and Blemiſhes of the Body †. It was on the Authority, therefore, of theſe goodly Doctrines, that the Speaker founds his Belief: and what is more, it was to theſe Doctrines that the very Words, in which he expreſſes this Belief, allude: Ἀποφανοῦμαι τῷ ΚΡΙΤΗ, relating to the *infernal Judges*; and the ΥΓΙΕΣΤΑΤΗΝ τὴν ψυχὴν, the *moſt ſound or healthy Soul*, to its Affections, Marks and Blemiſhes. The Speaker therefore muſt of courſe believe a future State thus circumſtanced, if he believed any future State at all. Here is no room for the Writer's Evaſion: who ſuppoſes the Philoſophers *might reject the Fables of* Acheron, *and* Styx, *and* Cocytus, *and* Elyſian Fields, *and yet believe the Thing conveyed under theſe Words*. For here the Belief of the *Thing* is expreſly ſaid to be built on the Authority of thoſe *Fables*: But thoſe Fables our Author gives up as not really believed. By his Favour therefore I would conclude that the *Thing* built upon them was not believed.

But as I little thought this Writer would have had the better of me on the believing Side, I will ſuppoſe, as he does contrary to Evidence, that the Speaker did indeed in this Place deliver his real

* Tom. I. p. 523. Ed. Serr. See Div. Leg. vol. I. p. 271, & ſeq.

† Plato, ut ſuprà, tom. I. p. 524. See Div. Leg. vol. I. p. 276.

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Sentiments. Let us ſee now what will come of it. He aſks, *Who can read the* Gorgias, *and conceive, that* Plato *did not really believe—when he has profeſſed at large.*——So then; the Diſpute between us is, Whether PLATO believed a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments? And, to prove that PLATO did, he gives me a Speech of SOCRATES. For unluckily what he quotes for the Words of *Plato* are the Words of his *Maſter*; who, I have endeavoured to ſhew, by better Reaſons than ſuch a kind of Speech, did really believe a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments.

But he goes on:—*And* IF THEY IMAGINED *Men to be puniſhed for Sin, and rewarded for Virtue, even ſuppoſing that this was talked of in a Way that might be* PROVED *fabulous, yet the Doctrine itſelf was unſhaken.* Without doubt, if I will allow *they imagined* a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments, he will prove *they believed* one; that being the Concluſion he ſeems to aim at in the aukward Expreſſion of—*proved fabulous*, and—*was unſhaken*. For the Point between us is not about what was *true* or *falſe*, but about what was *believed* or *diſbelieved*. But he himſelf ſeems diſſatisfied with his Expreſſion, and therefore attempts to mend it in this Repetition (for it would be hard that he who begs his Queſtion, ſhould not be able to get to his Concluſion). *Suppoſe the Fables of* Acheron, *and* Styx, *and* Cocytus, *and* Elyſian Fields, *may be all* DEMONSTRATED *to be falſe, yet it does not follow, that the Thing conveyed under theſe Words was believed to be all falſe.* Here again his Words, *demonſtrated to be falſe*, leave him juſt where he was. For nothing can be concluded concerning the Philoſophers believing or not believing a Thing, from our *demonſtrating* it to be true or falſe. His Expreſſion fails him here again. He therefore attempts it a *third* time. *It does not follow, that Souls were believed to die, or to be uncapable of receiving Puniſhments or Rewards, but only that this manner of repreſenting them* IS FALSE. As ill as ever! He is ſtill in the very Place where he ſet out. And that which at firſt ſo perplexed him has ſtuck by him through all his Variation of Phraſe—*Is falſe*, for, *was not believed*. As if the Philoſophers muſt needs diſbelieve all that

that was falſe, and believe all that was true. And indeed it ſeems to have been this ſtrange Prepoſſeſſion that has made him run into all his Confuſion of Language. A Diſeaſe that fatally infected the Lawyer of late Memory. I put his expreſſions in the moſt favourable Light. For if there be no Blunder, there is much Malice: The Period (ſuppoſing the Words accurate) tending to prove the *Credibility* of a Future State of Rewards and Puniſhments; which, being directed againſt my Diſcourſe, neceſſarily inſinuates, that I had wrote ſomething againſt that *Credibility*. But I have too good Opinion of his Honeſty, to believe this to be his ſecret Purpoſe.

What therefore this Writer ſo fruitleſsly labours to bring forth, is this ſimple Conception, That the Philoſophers might believe the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments in general, and yet diſbelieve all the particular Fables of the Populace concerning it. But thoſe who are acquainted with Antiquity, will know, that this *was* not, and *could* not be the Caſe. I have given a Reaſon in the firſt Volume * of *The Divine Legation*, to ſhew, *it was not*, in theſe Words: "We have given juſt above a Quotation from *Tully's* "Oration for *Cluentius*, in which he having ridiculed the *popular* "*Fables* concerning a future State, ſubjoins, *If theſe be falſe, as all* "*Men ſee they are, what hath Death deprived us of beſides a Senſe of* "*Pain?* Nam nunc quidem quid tandem illi mali Mors attulit? "Niſi forte *ineptiis ac fabulis* ducimur, ut exiſtimemus illum apud In"feros Impiorum ſupplicia perferre, &c. *Quæ ſi falſa ſunt, id quod* "*omnes intelligunt, quid ei tandem aliud Mors eripuit præter ſenſum* "*doloris?* From this Inference of *Cicero's* it appears, that we have "not concluded amiſs, when, from ſeveral Quotations, interſperſed "throughout this Work, in which a Diſbelief of the *common Notion* "of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments is implied, we have "inferred the Writer's Disbelief of a future State of Rewards and "Puniſhments in general." There are many Reaſons likewiſe,

* Div. Leg. ed. 4to, vol. II. p. 83.

why it *could not be the Caſe*; too long indeed to mention here; however, I will juſt hint at one. The Pagan Notion of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments was founded in old Tradition: But that Tradition, which conveyed down the general Doctrine, brought along theſe *Circumſtances* of it. But I forget, that I am arguing with an Enemy to all Tradition: Who, as highly as he advances the Knowledge of the Philoſophers, yet is unwilling to allow they were indebted for it to any thing but their own Reaſon. So entirely has that childiſh Sophiſm got the better of him: *Whatſoever Reaſon might teach, it did teach.* But how has he made out his Point? By encountering a few weak Efforts of the *Fathers* in Support of traditional Knowledge. He has great reaſon to boaſt his Victory: It is like his who triumphed for having tript up a Cripple. But Reverence for Age ſhould diſpoſe us to ſpare the Fathers, eſpecially when more able-bodied Men ſtand in our Way. Till he meet with theſe, I would recommend the following Fact to his Conſideration. The more ancient Philoſophers, in the Delivery whether of their moral, natural, or theologic Principles, conſtantly recommend them on this Footing, that they received them from TRADITION: One Truth came from a *Prieſt* of this Religion; and another from the *ſacred Books* of that. Scarce any thing is ever repreſented as the Deduction of their own Reaſoning: Though ſuch a Repreſentation had been attended with much Honour, and we know they were immoderately fond of Glory. Now if this were the Caſe, I only aſk, *Why ſhould we not believe them?*

II.

The Writer's ſecond Remark begins thus: "It has been maintained indeed by ſome, that all that the old Philoſophers held, "was a natural *Metempſychoſis*, or a Tranſition from one Body to "another, without any moral Deſignation whatſoever. But ſurely "this Concluſion is too haſty: For when it was ſaid, that the "Souls of ill Men deſcended into *Aſſes* or *Swine*, they did not ſuppoſe the Souls of good Men ſo to deſcend. The Souls of evil "Men,

" Men, *e. g.* of *Murderers, went into the Bodies of Beaſts, thoſe of* " *laſcivious Men into the Bodies of Swine or Goats,* ϖοτὶ κόλασιν, *for* " *Puniſhment,* ſays *Timæus Locrus.* Was this done for Puniſhment, " and yet was no Regard paid to the Morals of wicked Men * ?"

It hath been maintained (ſays he) *by ſome, that the old Philoſophers held only a natural Metempſychoſis—but ſurely this Concluſion is too haſty.* Who it is that has been too haſty, is ſubmitted to the Judgment of the Public: Whether I, in *concluding* from a hundred well-weighed Circumſtances; or He, in *cenſuring* from one only, and that, as we ſhall ſee, neither weighed nor underſtood.

But *it is too haſty,* FOR *when it was* SAID, *that the Souls of ill Men deſcended into Aſſes or Swine, they did not ſuppoſe the Souls of good Men ſo to deſcend.* How are we to underſtand him? If by SAID be only meant *taught,* then, from what they *ſaid* of the *Souls of ill Men,* nothing can be concluded, concerning what they SUPPOSED or *believed* of the *Souls of good Men:* Becauſe it was their Way to *ſay* one Thing and *ſuppoſe* another. But if by SAID we are to underſtand *ſuppoſed* or *believed,* then I will readily grant, that, *if they ſuppoſed the Souls of ill Men to deſcend, they did not ſuppoſe the Souls of good Men ſo to deſcend.* But why this to *me?* Did *I* ever ſay, the old Philoſophers *ſuppoſed,* that is, believed, that *the Souls of ill Men deſcended into Aſſes or Swine?* He would inſinuate I did; as appears not only from his Addreſs, but from his plain Alluſion to the following Words of my Book: *However, it is true, that in his Writings he* [Plato] *inculcates the Doctrine of a future State of Reward and Puniſhment—that the Souls of ill Men deſcended into Aſſes and Swine—did he himſelf believe it? we may be aſſured he did not* †, &c." Was it from theſe Words he gathered, that I held, *Plato ſuppoſed,* what, I own, he *inculcated?* Let him look again, and I imagine he will alter his Opinion. But he will ſtill ſay, though *I* do not hold, that the ancient Philoſophers ſo *ſuppoſed*; yet, what is more to the Purpoſe, an *ancient Philoſopher* does.

* Divine Legation, vol. II. p. 53. † Ib. vol. II. p. 64.

For thus he goes on: *The Souls of evil Men*, e. g. *of Murderers, went into the Bodies of Beaſts, thoſe of laſcivious Men into the Bodies of Swine and* GOATS, *ϖοῖ κόλασιν, for Puniſhment*, SAYS TIMÆUS LOCRUS. *Was this done for Puniſhment, and yet was no Regard paid to the Morals of wicked Men?* This is indeed amazing! The Reader cannot forget, that I quoted this very Paſſage at large *; as the moſt inconteſtable Evidence, that the *Pythagoreans* did not believe one Word of all they taught concerning *the Souls of ill Men deſcending into the Bodies of Brutes for Puniſhment*; Timæus Locrus prefacing the Relation of thoſe Tranſitions in theſe very Words: *For as we ſometimes cure the Body with unwholeſome Remedies, when ſuch as are moſt wholeſome have no Effect*, SO WE RESTRAIN THOSE MINDS BY FALSE RELATIONS *which will not be perſuaded by the true: There is a Neceſſity therefore of inſtilling the Dread of thoſe foreign Torments. As that the Soul ſhifts and changes its Habitation; that the Coward is thruſt ignominiouſly into a Woman's Form, the Murderer impriſoned within the Furr of a Savage, the Laſcivious condemned to animate a Boar or Sow* †, *&c.* Ὡς γὰρ τὰ σώματα νοσώδεσι ϖόκα ὑγιάτομες, εἶκα μὴ εἰκῇ τοῖς ὑγιεινοτάτοις· ἔτω τὰς ψυχὰς ἀπείργομες ΨΕΥΔΕΣΙ ΛΟΓΟΙΣ, εἶκα μὴ ἄγηται ἀληθέσι· λέγοιντο δ' ἀναγκαίως χὴ τιμωρίαι ξέναι ὡς μελενδυομέναν τᾶν ψυχᾶν, τῶν μὲν δειλῶν ἐς γυναικέα σκάνεα, ϖοθ' ὕβριν ἐκδιδόμεναι· τῶν δὲ μιαιφόνων ἐς θηρίων σώματα, ΠΟΤΙ ΚΟΛΑΣΙΝ· λάϊνων δ', ἐς συῶν ἢ κάπρων μορφάς ‡.

Did *Timæus Locrus* then *ſuppoſe*, i. e. believe, *that the Souls of ill Men deſcended into Brutes?* Does he not expreſsly tell us he ſuppoſed they did not, but that theſe Fables were inculcated in order to reſtrain the Populace from Vice? To tamper then with my own Evidence, and to turn it againſt me in this Manner, as if nothing had been ſaid, is ſo new a Stroke in Controverſy, that we have yet no Name for it; but, on Occaſion, ſhall now be able to aſſign it a Patronymic.

However, to do the Writer Juſtice, I muſt be ſo fair to ſay, that it may admit of ſome Doubt, whether ever he read this Paſſage in

* Divine Legat. vol. II. p. 53. † Ibid. ‡ De Anima Mundi, ſub fine.

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The Divine Legation, or only in the *Letters to Serena*, a Book that undergoes his Cenſure in the ſame Place where I am ſo unhappy to incur it. I am inclined to think the latter, from this remarkable Circumſtance. The Author of the *Letters to Serena* had tranſlated ἐς συῶν ἢ ΚΑΠΡΩΝ μορφὰς, *into the Forms of Swine or* GOATS *. And ſo too has this Writer: *into the Bodies* (ſays he) *of Swine or* GOATS †, which is ſo ſingular an Interpretation, that, notwithſtanding the Proverb, that *good Wits jump*, I can hardly think them to be both original. But perhaps that excellent Correſpondent of *Serena's* had here a mind to ſhew his Learning; and knowing, that the *Tyrrhenians*, a *Greek* Colony in *Italy*, uſed κάπρος for a *Goat*, he would conclude, by Analogy, that the *Locrians*, another *Greek* Colony in *Italy*, did the ſame. Again, *Timæus Locrus* ſays, ἐς θηρίων σώματα; *Toland*, *into Beaſts of Prey*. This Writer, *into the Bodies of Beaſts*. Here, where *Toland* is right, he leaves him; but ſticks charitably by him while he continues wrong. For θηρίων ſignifies *Beaſts of Prey*: And that preciſe Idea is required to complete the Senſe; the Habitation of the *Murderer* being here ſpoken of. Again, *Timæus* ſays, ϖοτὶ κόλασιν, which *Toland* faithfully renders *for a Puniſhment*; and which this Writer particularly inſiſts on, as the very Cream of his Argument: *Murderers* (ſays he) *went into the Bodies of Beaſts, thoſe of laſcivious Men into the Bodies of Swine or Goats,* ϖοῖ κόλασιν, FOR PUNISHMENT, *ſays* Timæus Locrus. *Was this done for Puniſhment, and yet, &c.* But here I muſt retract my Suſpicion; for from this laſt Inſtance it would ſeem, that he had read and compared my Tranſlation, in which the *Engliſh* of thoſe formidable Words, ϖοτὶ κόλασιν, is not literally to be found. And now the Secret is out. He ſeems to ſuppoſe I omitted them, as conſcious of their containing ſome ſtrange Matter againſt my general Opinion. But in truth, it was partly, becauſe they were redundant; *Timæus* repreſenting the whole Affair under the general Idea of a *Puniſhment*; and partly, becauſe the Senſe of ϖοτὶ κόλασιν was compriſed in the Word *impriſoned*, which I uſed in the very Caſe to

* Letters to Serena, p. 58. † P. 402 of his Connexions, &c.

which thoſe Words are applied. As to the Idea itſelf, that was ſo far from hurting my Argument, that it could not do without it.

He goes on :—*They* [the Philoſophers] *really conceived Puniſhments and Rewards of evil or good Actions in Men; and ſome imagined a Puniſhment by the means of Tranſmigration, others imagined a Puniſhment inflicted in* Hades, *others* BY IMMEDIATE ACTS OF PROVIDENCE; *and all ſuppoſed Rewards or Puniſhments, notwithſtanding they might treat as Fables the Stories of* Cocytus *and* Acheron *. He ſticks to his Point, we ſee; and will ſtill have it, that they believed a *Hell*, though they treated the Stories of *Cocytus* and *Acheron* as Fables, which (to tell him my Mind once for all) is juſt as if one ſhould ſay, ſome among us believe the Miſeries of the King's-Bench-Priſon, and yet treat the Stories of Jailors, Turnkeys, Bailiffs, and Attorneys, as mere Fables. But what have *immediate Acts of Providence* to do in this Period? Did not I endeavour to prove, that *all* the Theiſtical Philoſophers believed a Providence in this Life? Theſe Words therefore, as they are found in a Paragraph that relates ſolely to my peculiar Opinion, I can conſider in no other Light than as a falſe Inſinuation *ad invidiam*.

I have now attended this Writer quite through his little Excurſion. Let us ſee how he returns to himſelf; HOWEVER, *what I contend for, is, that the* HEATHEN *held a moral* [a future] *State of Rewards and Puniſhments, according to Good and Evil done here* †. It is worthy his Contention; and I ſhould be ready to be his *Second* in it. But why then ſhould he go out of his Way, and *contend* for another Thing that will do neither himſelf nor his Cauſe any Credit? I mean him Honour, when I ſay *his Cauſe*: For I really believe it to be the Cauſe of Chriſtianity. Now, I conceive this not at all advanced by endeavouring to ſhew that the ſacred Writers had but ſmall reaſon for their harſh Cenſure of the *Greek* Philoſophy ‡; as the *contending* for its Orthodoxy in this Point effectively does. But I will ſuppoſe the ſacred Writers have been miſunder-

* Connexions, &c. p. 402. † Ib. ‡ Divine Legation, Vol. II. p. 134.

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ſtood. And perhaps this may be no great Reflexion upon any Party; if we conſider, that the *Janſeniſts*, ſcarce inferior to any in their Talents of Reaſoning and Criticiſm, have ſtrangely miſtaken thoſe Cenſures, while they underſtood them to be directed againſt human Science in general. I ſuppoſed therefore, that, to ſhew the ſacred Writers only cenſured the *Greek* Philoſophy, and that it deſerved their Cenſure, was not one of the leaſt Services one might render to our holy Religion. But the Occaſion now ſeems to be more urgent. The Pretenſions of theſe Philoſophers have been of late highly advanced. The Author of the Book, intituled, *Future Rewards and Puniſhments believed by the Ancients*, hath, we ſee, forced the inſpired Teachers of Mankind to give them the right hand of Fellowſhip. I had expoſed their *prophane and vain Babblings* in one capital Inſtance, becauſe it came directly into my particular Deſign; as well for that I thought it uſeful to Revelation in general. I did not then indeed imagine the Neceſſity ſo preſſing. I may hereafter perhaps find Occaſion to examine theſe ſpurious Rivals of the Apoſtolic Function on every Head of Morality and Religion, in the manner I have already done on one; and fully vindicate the Majeſty of Sacred Writ in the juſt Sentence it hath paſſed upon them.

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LETTER

To the RIGHT REVEREND

DR. RICHARD SMALLBROOK,

Lord Biſhop of LICHFIELD and COVENTRY.

MY LORD,

THIS Trouble is occaſioned by a Paſſage in your Lordſhip's *late* printed *Charge* * to your Clergy, in which you have been pleaſed to cenſure me by Name with ſome Frankneſs, and, I am ſorry to ſay, with equal Injuſtice.

The Regard due to your Lordſhip's *Order*, eſpecially while in Diſcharge of your Function, would have certainly reſtrained me from complaining of ought that was a *mere Declaration* of your Lordſhip's Diſlike of my Writings. It is your Lordſhip's *Right and Duty* to warn your Clergy againſt all ill Books: And your Lordſhip is, in that Place and on that Occaſion, an authorized Denouncer of what are ſo. Had your Lordſhip therefore only ſaid, that *The Divine Legation* was a very bad Book, I had not attempted, by any Addreſs of this Nature, to diſturb you in the quiet Poſſeſſion of your

* Printed in 1741, by J. and P. Knapton, Octavo.

Opinion.

Opinion. But when a Reaſon added to that Declaration turns your vague Cenſure into a *formal Accuſation*, then, my Lord, it becomes equally my *Right and Duty* to defend my Character, if I find it miſtaken.

To put the Public therefore (which your Lordſhip has forced me to appeal to) in Poſſeſſion of the Fact, it will be neceſſary to go ſo far back as to tell them what it is your Lordſhip ſays you propoſe to make the Subject of your *Charge*. *It is* (in your own Words) *to lay before your Clergy ſome Reaſons, drawn from the Chriſtian Revelation itſelf, which evince the Pretenſions of Morality antecedently to divine Revelation, to be carried much too high, and vindicate the Chriſtian Faith, as well as Morality, from thoſe* INVIDIOUS INSINUATIONS *that have been been* CAST *upon them by* SEVERAL LATE WRITERS, WHO *will occaſionally be* ANIMADVERTED *upon in the following Diſcourſe* *.

Your Lordſhip having gone through your *Reaſons*, comes, in Page 24, to draw your Inferences from them. The ſecond of which, you tell us, is, "That though Chriſtian *Morality* is much "ſuperior to that of all other Religions, yet it does not of itſelf "(that is abſtractedly from the *Facts* recorded in the Goſpel, with "which it is incorporated) evince the *Truth*, though it does moſt "clearly the *Excellency* of the *Chriſtian* Religion. It is certain (ſays "your Lordſhip) that the Reaſonableneſs and Sanctity of the *moral* "Precepts of the Goſpel give great *Advantages* to Chriſtianity, as "compared with any other Religion ancient or modern. And this "of itſelf is ſufficient to give a well-diſpoſed Mind very favourable "Thoughts of the Chriſtian Religion, and to induce it to make "farther Enquiries into the Truth of thoſe *Facts* which eſtabliſh "its Divine Authority. And this is as far as the Argument needs "to be puſhed; and in fact it is as far as one of the beſt modern "Apologiſts for the Truth of Chriſtianity, the moſt learned "*Grotius*, in Concurrence with the principal Apologiſts amongſt "the Ancients, and more eſpecially the famous *Origen*, thought "fit to urge it. It is clear that they thought themſelves obliged

* Page 2.

"only

" only to ſhew, that the *Morality of the Goſpel* does vaſtly excel " that of all other Religious and Moral Inſtitutions, and is moſt " worthy of God in all reſpects. But neither they nor any other " thoughtful Perſons, that have formerly engaged on this Subject " (as far as I can recollect) have thought it reaſonable to lay ſo " great a Streſs on the Excellency of the *Morals* of the Goſpel, con- " ſidered diſtinctly from the *Facts* of the Goſpel, and in their own " Nature ſolely, as neceſſarily to infer from thence the Certainty " of the Chriſtian Revelation. And much leſs have they aſſerted, " as has been done by ſome LATE WRITERS, that the Morality of " the Goſpel, which they call the *internal Evidence* of it (though " indeed it has not the Nature of *Evidence* properly ſo called), is " the ſtrongeſt Evidence of the Truth of Chriſtianity, and is highly " ſuperior to all its *external Evidence*, that is, the Evidence which " ariſes from the *Facts* recorded in the Goſpel, and attended with " other Atteſtations of ancient Writers, which ſupport its Divine " Authority *." This is all from your Lordſhip; where at the word WRITERS we find a Mark of Reference to the following Note—*See Mr.* Arſcot's *Conſiderations on the Chriſtian Religion*, p. 10. 51. 59, 60, &c. Part II. p. 63. Part III. *and elſewhere.* SEE TOO MR. WARBURTON'S DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES, &c. p. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 †.

So that here, my Lord, I find this Propoſition affirmed, That Mr. *Warburton*, in his *Divine Legation of* Moſes, &c. p. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, has aſſerted THAT THE MORALITY OF THE GOSPEL, WHICH HE CALLS THE INTERNAL EVIDENCE OF IT, IS THE STRONGEST EVIDENCE OF THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIANITY, AND IS HIGHLY SUPERIOR TO ALL ITS EXTERNAL EVIDENCE.

This, my Lord, is your Accuſation; a very capital one it is; and ſuch as, if true, would prove me devoid of common Senſe, as well as in all other reſpects unworthy the Character I bear of a Chriſtian, a Clergyman, or a Defender of Revelation. I am there-

* Page 36, 37, 38.

† Page 38.

fore

fore neceſſitated to call upon your Lordſhip, in this public Manner, either to make it good, or to give me Reparation. Your Lordſhip confines the Proof of your Accuſation to the firſt, ſecond, third, fourth, and fifth Pages of the Firſt Volume of *The Divine Legation*. But as I am not diſpoſed to chicane in ſo ſerious a Matter, I hereby promiſe, that if either in thoſe Pages, or in any other Pages of that Work, or in any thing I have ever written, preached, or ſaid, your Lordſhip produces the Propoſition in queſtion as held and maintained by me, either in expreſs Terms, or deducible by fair and logical Conſequence, I promiſe, I ſay, to ſubmit to any Cenſure your Lordſhip's ſelf ſhall think fit to inflict. But if, on the other hand, you can produce no ſuch Propoſition, I ſhall then expect ſo much from your Lordſhip's Juſtice as to retract your Accuſation in the ſame public Manner you have been pleaſed to advance it.

I am, My LORD,

Your LORDSHIP'S

NOV. 17, 1741.

Moſt Obedient Servant,

W. WARBURTON.

REMARKS

ON SEVERAL

OCCASIONAL REFLECTIONS:

IN ANSWER TO

THE REV. DR. MIDDLETON, DR. POCOCKE,

THE MASTER OF THE CHARTER HOUSE,

DR. RICHARD GREY, and others.

Serving to explain and juſtify divers PASSAGES, in the

DIVINE LEGATION,

Objected to by thoſe LEARNED WRITERS.

TO WHICH IS ADDED,

A GENERAL REVIEW of the Argument of *The Divine Legation*, as far as is yet advanced: wherein is conſidered the Relation the ſeveral Parts bear to each other, and to the Whole.

TOGETHER WITH

AN APPENDIX,

In anſwer to a late Pamphlet intituled,

An Examination of Mr. W——'s *Second Propoſition.*

Quid immerentes hoſpites vexas, Canis,
Ignavus adverſum Lupos?
Nam, qualis aut Moloſſus, aut fulvus Lacon,
Amica vis Pastoribus,
Agam per altas aure ſublata nives,
Quæcunque præcedet Fera.
Tu quum timenda voce compleſti Nemus,
Projectum odoraris Cibum. *Hor.*

PREFACE

IN the Prefatory Diſcourſe to the Firſt Volume of the D. L. I ſpoke pretty largely of the *Uſe* of *Ridicule*, in Religious Subjects; as the *Abuſe* of it is amongſt the faſhionable Arts of Free-thinking: For which I have been juſt now called to Account, without any Ceremony, by the *Nameleſs* Author of a Poem intituled, *The Pleaſures of Imagination*. For 'tis my Fortune to be ſtill concerned with thoſe who either *do* go maſked, or thoſe who *ſhould*. I am a plain Man, and on my firſt Appearance in this Way, I told my Name and who I belonged to. After this, if Men will *rudely* come upon me in Diſguiſe, they can have no Reaſon to complain, that (in my Ignorance of their Characters) I treat them all alike upon the ſame free Footing they have put themſelves.

This Gentleman, a Follower of Ld. *S.* and, as it ſhould ſeem, one of thoſe to whom that Preface was addreſſed; Certainly, one of thoſe to whom I applied the Words of Tully, *non decet, non datum eſt*; who affect Wit and Raillery on Subjects not meet, and with Talents unequal; this Gentleman, I ſay, in the 105th and 106th. Pages of his Poem, animadverts upon me in the following Manner:

Since it is (ſays he) *beyond all Contradiction evident, that we have a* natural *Senſe or Feeling of the ridiculous, and ſince ſo good a Reaſon may be aſſigned to juſtify the Supreme Being for beſtowing it; one cannot without*

without Aſtoniſhment *reflect on the Conduct of thoſe Men who imagine it for the Service of true Religion to vilify and blacken it without Diſtinction, and endeavour to perſuade us that it is never applied but in a bad Cauſe.* The Reaſon here given, to ſhew, that *Ridicule* and *Buffoonry* may be properly employed on *ſerious* and even *ſacred* Subjects, is admirable: it is, becauſe we have *a natural Senſe or Feeling of the ridiculous*, and becauſe *no Senſation was given us in vain*; which would ſerve juſt as well to excuſe *Adultery* or *Inceſt*. For have we not as *natural a Senſe or Feeling* of the *Voluptuous*? And was it not given for as good Purpoſes? But he will ſay, it has its proper Objects. And does he think, I will not ſay the ſame of his *Senſe of Ridicule*? For he ſtretch'd a Point, when he told the Reader I *vilified and blacken'd it without Diſtinction*. The Thing I there oppoſed, was only, *an extravagant Diſpoſition to unſeaſonable Mirth* *. The *abuſive Way of Wit and Raillery on ſerious Subjects* †. With as little Truth could he ſay, that *I endeavoured to perſuade the Public that it is never applied but in a bad Cauſe*: For, in that very Place, I apologized for an eminent Writer who had applied it to a *good* one ‡.

But, in the next Words, if he means by, *is not*, ought not to be, he gives me up all I want. *Ridicule* (ſays he) *is not concerned with mere ſpeculative Truth or Falſhood.* Certainly. And, for that very Reaſon I would exclude it from thoſe Subjects. What need? He will ſay, For when was it ſo employed? Hold a little. Was it not concerned with *mere ſpeculative Truth*, when his Maſter ridiculed the *Subject* of Mr. Locke's *Eſſay of Human Underſtanding*, in the Manner mentioned in my Preface §? Was it not ſo concerned too, when the ſame Noble Perſon ridiculed Revelation, in the merry Story of the travelling Gentlemen, who put *a wrong Bias on their Reaſon* in order to believe right ‖?——Unleſs, by *mere ſpeculative*

* Div. Leg. ed. 4to. Ded. p. x. † Ibid. p. xii. ‡ Ibid. p. vii. & ſeq.
§ Dedication to the 1ſt vol. D. L. p. xxii. Note (‖).
‖ Char. II. vol. III. Miſc. 2. c. 3. p. 99.

Truths,

Truths, he means, Truths of *no Uſe*: And for all ſuch, he has my free Leave to treat them as he pleaſes. He has ſhewn, by his Poem, they are no improper Subject for his Talents.

He goes on, *It is not in abſtract Propoſitions or Theorems, but in Actions and Paſſions, Good and Evil, Beauty and Deformity, that we find Materials for it; and all theſe Terms are relative, implying Approbation or Blame.* The Reaſon here given, why, not *abſtract Propoſitions*, &c. but *Actions and Paſſions*, &c. are the Subject of *ridicule*, is, becauſe theſe latter are *relative Terms implying Approbation and Blame.* But are not the former as much *relative Terms, implying Aſſent and Denial?* And does not an abſurd Propoſition as frequently afford Materials for Ridicule as an abſurd Action? Let the Reader determine by what he finds before him. *To aſk then*, (ſays he) *whether Ridicule be a Teſt of Truth, is, in other Words, to aſk whether that which is ridiculous can be morally true; can be juſt and becoming; or whether that which is juſt and becoming can be ridiculous. A Queſtion that does not deſerve a ſerious Anſwer.* Why then did he put it? For it is of nobody's *aſking* but his own. However in Civility to his Maſter, or rather indeed to his Maſter's Maſters, the Ancient *Sophiſts*, who, we are told * in the *Characteriſtics*, ſaid ſomething very like it, I ſhall ſhew it deſerves a *very* ſerious Anſwer. For how, I pray, comes it to paſs, that to aſk *whether Ridicule be a Teſt of Truth, is the ſame Thing as to aſk whether that which is ridiculous can be morally true?* As if, whatever *Ridicule* was applied to, as a *Teſt*, muſt needs be *ridiculous*. Might not one aſk, *Whether the Copel* † *be a Teſt of Gold*, without incurring the Abſurdity of queſtioning *whether the Matter of the Copel was not ſtandard Gold?* What was the Man dreaming of? That a *Teſt*

* *'Twas the Saying of an Ancient Sage, that Humour was the only Teſt of Ridicule.* Vol. I. p. 74.

† I chuſe this Inſtance of the Refiner's *Copel*, becauſe the *Engliſh* for it, which is *Italian*, is *Teſt*; from whence the latter Word was metaphorically uſed to ſignify all Kinds of *ſure Trial*. This was proper to obſerve, as our Poet ſeems not to know the Meaning of the Word.

of Truth, and a *Detection of Falſhood*, were one and the ſame Thing? or that it was the Practice to bring nothing to the *Teſt* but what was known, beforehand, whether it was *true* or *falſe?* His Maſter ſeems much better verſed in the Uſe of Things. He ſays *, *Now, what Rule or Meaſure is there in the World, except in conſidering the real Temper of Things, to find which are truly ſerious, and which ridiculous? And how can this be done, unleſs by applying the Ridicule* TO SEE WHETHER IT WILL BEAR?

But if the Reader be curious to ſee to the Bottom of this Affair, we muſt go a little deeper. Lord *S*——, we find, was willing to know, as every honeſt Man would, whether thoſe things, which had the Apperance of Serioufneſs and Sanctity, were indeed what they appeared. The plain way of coming to this Knowledge had been hitherto by the Teſt of *Reaſon*. But this was too long and too ſlow a Progreſs for ſo ſublime a Genius. He would go a ſhorter and a quicker Way to work, and do the Buſineſs by *Ridicule*, given us, as his Diſciple tells us, for this very End, *to aid the tardy Steps of Reaſon*. This therefore the Noble Author would needs *apply*, to ſee *whether theſe Appearances would bear the Touch*. Now it was this ingenious Expedient, which I thought I had Cauſe to object to. For when you have applied this *Touch*, and that, to which it is applied, is found to bear it, what Reparation will you make to Truth, for the ridiculous Light in which you have placed her, in order only, as you pretend, to judge right of her? Oh, for that, ſays his Lordſhip, ſhe has the Amends in her own Hands: Let her railley again; *for why ſhould fair Honeſty be denied the Uſe of this Weapon* †? To this ſo wanton a Liberty with ſacred Truth, I thought I had many good Reaſons to oppoſe; and ſo, it ſeems, thought our Poet likewiſe: And therefore he endeavours to excuſe his Maſter, by putting another Senſe on *the Application of Ridicule as a Teſt*, which ſuppoſes the Truth or Falſhood of the Thing tried, to be *already known*. But the ſhift is unlucky;

* Char. Vol. I. p. 12.

† Ibid. p. 128.

for

for while it covers his Maſter, it expoſes himſelf. For now it may be aſked, what need of Ridicule at all, after the Truth is *known*; ſince you make its ſole Uſe to conſiſt in the *Diſcovery* of the true State of Things?

But the odd Fortune of our Poet's Pen makes the pleaſant Part of the Story. Here, we ſee, where he aims to make an abſurd Propoſition, for the Uſe of others, it proves a reaſonable one: 'Tis odds but we find him, before we have done, trying to make a reaſonable one, for his own Uſe, that turns out at laſt an Abſurdity.

But let us come to the *Philoſophy* of his Criticiſm: For *it is moſt evident, that as in a metaphyſical Propoſition offered to the Underſtanding for its Aſſent, the Faculty of Reaſon examines the Terms of the Propoſition; and finding one Idea, which was ſuppoſed equal to another, to be in Fact unequal, of Conſequence rejects the Propoſition as a Falſhood: So in Objects offered to the Mind for its Eſteem or Applauſe, the Faculty of Ridicule feeling an Incongruity in the Claim, urges the Mind to reject it with Laughter and Contempt.* And now, how does this ſublime Account, of Reaſon and Ridicule, prove the foregoing Propoſition to be abſurd? Juſt as much, I ſuppoſe, as the Height of St. *Paul's* proves *Grantham* Steeple to ſtand awry. I, for my Part, can collect nothing from it, unleſs it be that the Poet thought *metaphyſical Propoſitions* were the only proper Objects of the *Underſtanding's Aſſent, and the Reaſon's Examination.*

However, if it cannot *prove* what precedes, he will try to make it *infer* what follows: *When* Therefore (ſays he) *we obſerve ſuch a Claim obtruded upon Mankind, and the inconſiſtent Circumſtances carefully concealed from the Eye of the Public, it is our Buſineſs, if the Matter be of Importance to Society, to drag out thoſe latent Circumſtances, and, by ſetting them full in View, convince the World how ridiculous the Claim is; and thus a double Advantage is gained; for we both detect the moral Falſhood ſooner than in the Way of ſpeculative Enquiry, and impreſs the Minds of Men with a ſtronger Senſe of the Vanity and Error of its Authors. And this, and no more, is meant by*

the Application of Ridicule. A little *more*, if we may believe his Maſter: who ſays, it is not only to detect Error, but to *try* Truth, that is, in his own Expreſſion, to ſee *whether it will bear.* But why all this a-do; for now, we ſee, nobody miſtook what was *meant by the Application of Ridicule*, but himſelf—As to what he ſaid before, that when *Objects are offered to the Mind for its Eſteem and Applauſe, the Faculty of Ridicule, feeling an Incongruity in the Claim, urges the Mind to reject it with Laughter and Contempt*; it is ſo expreſſed, as if he intended it not for the Deſcription of the *Uſe*, but the *Eſſence* of *Ridicule.* Whereas the Dealers in this Traſh frequently *urge the Mind to reject* many things with *Laughter and Contempt*, without *feeling* any other *Incongruity*, than in their own Pretenſions to Truth and Honeſty. And this our Poet very well knows.

For now he comes to the Point. *But it is ſaid the Practice is dangerous, and may be inconſiſtent with the Regard we owe to Objects of real Dignity and Excellence. I anſwer, the Practice,* FAIRLY MANAGED, *can never be dangerous.* An *Anſwer* which has only taught me to *reply*, that the Uſe of Stilletto's and Poiſons, *fairly managed*, can never be dangerous. And yet all wiſe States, for the Security of its Members, when any of them have ſhewn a violent Propenſity to theſe things, have ever forbidden their promiſcuous Uſe and Sale.

However, he allows at length, that *Men may be diſhoneſt in obtruding Circumſtances foreign to the Object*; *and we may be inadvertent in allowing thoſe Circumſtances to impoſe upon us*; *but*—— but what? Why *the* SENSE OF RIDICULE ALWAYS JUDGES RIGHT. And, he had told us before, that this is a *natural Senſe, and beſtowed upon us by the Supreme Being, to aid our tardy Steps in Purſuit of Reaſon.* Why, as he ſays, who can withſtand this? Nothing can be clearer! Writers may be diſhoneſt; Readers may be impoſed on; the Public may be miſled; and Men may judge wrong. But what then, the *Senſe of Ridicule always judges right.* And while we can ſupport our *Platonic* Republic of *Ideas*, what ſignifies

fies what becomes of the *Fæces Romuli*, the *Actions* of the People? And ſo again it is, we ſee, in the Uſe of Poiſons: Though *Men may be diſhoneſt in obtruding them, and we may be inadvertent enough* to ſuffer them to *impoſe upon us*; yet what then? The Efficacy of Poiſon is without Malice; and does but do its kind; is a *natural* Power, and beſtowed upon us by the Supreme Being, to *aid our tardy Steps* in Purſuit of Vermin.—In Truth, one would imagine, by ſo extraordinary an Argument, that the Queſtion was not, *of the Injury to Society* by the Abuſe of Ridicule, but *of the Injury to Ridicule itſelf.*

But let us hear him out: *The* Socrates *of* Ariſtophanes *is as truly ridiculous a Character as ever was drawn. True; but it is not the Character of* Socrates, *the divine Moraliſt, and Father of ancient Wiſdom.* Indeed!—But then, if, like the true *Soſia*, in the other Comedy, *he* muſt bear the Blows of his fictitious Brother, what ſignifies it to injured Virtue, to tell us, that he did not deſerve them?

What then? (ſays he) *did the Ridicule of the Poet hinder the Philoſopher from detecting and diſclaiming thoſe foreign Circumſtances which he had falſely introduced into his Character, and thus rendering the Satiriſt doubly ridiculous in his Turn.* See here again! all his Concern, we find, is, leſt good Raillery ſhould be beat at its own Weapons. No, indeed, I cannot ſee how it could poſſibly *hinder the Philoſopher from detecting and diſclaiming.* But *this* it did, which ſurely deſerves a little Reflection, it hindered the *People* from *ſeeing* what he had *detected and diſclaimed*——A mighty Conſolation, truly, to expiring Virtue, that he *diſclaimed* the Fool's Coat they had put upon him; though it ſtuck to him like a *Sambenito*; and at laſt brought him to his Execution.

But what is the Sacrifice of a *Socrates* now and then, to ſecure the *free* Uſe of that ineſtimable Bleſſing, *Buffoonry?* So thinks our Poet; when all the Anſwer he gives to ſo natural, ſo compaſſionate an Objection as this, *No: but it nevertheleſs had an ill Influence on the Minds of the People*, is telling us a Story of the Atheiſt *Spinoza*; while the Godlike *Socrates* is left neglected, and in the

Hands of his Judges; whither *Ridicule*, this noble Guide of Truth, had ſafely brought him.

But let us hear the concluding Anſwer which the reſpectable *Spinoza* is employed to illuſtrate.——*And ſo* (ſays he) *has the Reaſoning of* Spinoza *made many Atheiſts; he has founded it indeed on Suppoſitions utterly falſe; but allow him theſe, and his Concluſions are unavoidably true. And if we muſt reject the Uſe of Ridicule becauſe, by the Impoſition of falſe Circumſtances, things may be made to ſeem ridiculous, which are not ſo in themſelves; why we ought not in the ſame Manner to reject the Uſe of Reaſon, becauſe, by proceeding on falſe Principles, Concluſions will appear true which are impoſſible in Nature, let the* vehement and obſtinate Declaimers *againſt Ridicule determine.*

Nay, we dare truſt it with any one; whoſe Common Senſe is not all turned to *Taſte.* What! Becauſe REASON, the Guide of Life, the Support of Religion, the Inveſtigator of Truth, muſt be ſtill uſed though it be continually Subject to Abuſe: therefore RIDICULE, the paultry *Buffoon* of *Reaſon*, muſt have the ſame Indulgence! Becauſe a King muſt be intruſted with Government, though he may miſuſe his Power; therefore the King's *Fool* ſhall be ſuffered to play the Madman! But upon what footing ſtandeth this extraordinary claim? Why, we have a *natural Senſe of the Ridiculous*; and the *Ridiculous has a natural Feeling of the Incongruous*; and then——*who can forbear laughing?* If to this, you add *Taſte*, *Beauty*, *Deformity*, *Moral-ſenſe*, *Moral-rectitude*, *Moral-falſhood*, you have then, I think, the whole Theory of the *Ridiculous.* But I can tell him of a plain *Engliſh* Proverb worth all his Modiſh *Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* put together, and that is, TO BE MERRY AND WISE. Which concerns him nearer than one may think. For who would imagine, that, while he was ſupporting Ridicule from the Charge of *Abuſe*, he ſhould be ſupplying his Adverſary with a freſh and flagrant Exception to his own Plea? Not indeed, that the Comment diſgraced the Text; or that there was much *Incongruity* in pleading for a Fault he had juſt then committed.

mitted. But ſo it is, kind Reader, that, where he is marſhalling the ſeveral Claſſes of Folly in human Life, he places the whole *Body of the Chriſtian Clergy* in the Firſt and Foremoſt: Amongſt thoſe, who, he tells us, *aſſume ſome deſirable Quality or Poſſeſſion which evidently does not belong to them**.

" Others, of graver Mien, behold; adorn'd
" With holy Enſigns, how *ſublime* they move,
" And, bending oft their *ſanctimonious* Eyes,
" Take homage of the *Simple-minded Throng*,
" AMBASSADORS of Heav'n †."

And well do they deſerve his *Moral-ridicule*, ſuppoſing them to be drawn *like*. For, if I underſtand any Thing of his Colouring, the Features are, Pride, Hypocriſy, Fraud, and Impoſture. I call it an Inſult on the whole Body of the Clergy, becauſe I know of no Part of them who hold that the *Miniſtry* of the Goſpel (or, as St. *Paul* calls it, *of Reconciliation*) *was given them by* the Religion of *Chriſt*, but hold likewiſe, with the ſame Apoſtle (who ſpeaks of himſelf here as a ſimple Miniſter of the Goſpel) *that they are* AMBASSADORS *for Chriſt* ‡.——But let it go like what it is, a poor pitiful Joke of his Maſter's §, and ſpoil'd too in the telling. The *Dulneſs* of the *Ridicule* will ſufficiently atone for the *Abuſe* of it. And I may find Time to call the Great Man of *Taſte* himſelf to account, for his ſo frequent and ill-employed *Raillery* againſt RELIGION.

* P. 49. † P. 96. ‡ 2 Cor. v. 23.
§ Char. vol. III. p. 336. Third edit.

REMARKS

REMARKS

ON SEVERAL

OCCASIONAL REFLECTIONS.

THE State of Authorſhip, whatever that of Nature be, is certainly a State of War: In which, eſpecially if it be an *holy War*, every Man's hand is ſet, not againſt his Enemy, but his *Brother*. But as theſe furious fighting men are generally as much miſtaken in the uſe of their Arms, as in the Objects of their Reſentments, there is ſeldom any great Harm done. I ſpeak for myſelf. I have found none. And indeed no wonder. I have been all the while very much out of the queſtion. For my Anſwerers write not ſo properly *againſt* me, as *for* ſomething they like better than me. This, for his dear *Orthodoxy*; That, for his dearer *Philoſophers*; A third, for his *Lawyers*; A fourth, for his *Caballiſts*; A fifth, for *himſelf*; and a ſixth for, I don't know what, beſides the pure *Love of Scribbling* *. So that I have been now, for ſome time, only a ſilent Looker-on; to ſee how the Public and they would get acquainted. I have given them full Liberty to try what They can

* Webſter, Tillard, W * *, Bate, Morgan, Bott.

make

make of it, or It of them: and wiſh them better luck with their Readers Intellects than I have had with theirs. For, from the firſt to the laſt of them, their conſtant cry has been, *They do not underſtand me.* Now, though I can allow this to be a better Reaſon for their writing at me than any they have hitherto aſſigned; yet it would be a very bad one for my anſwering them; becauſe it would keep me engaged *till they did underſtand me*; which I preſume no gentle Reader would think a reaſonable Taſk for one born when human Life is at the ſhorteſt. When therefore I took my laſt leave of the whole Tribe, in the Perſon of their great Exemplar and Archetype, the learned *Advocate* of Pagan Philoſophy, I engaged, that if any Writers more equal to the ſubject ſhould come abroad, I would return their Civility and fair Argument in ſuch ſort as that the World ſhould ſee I eſteemed every ſincere Inquirer after Truth rather as a Friend to the Publick than an Enemy to myſelf. Since that time, the Misfortune I had of differing in Opinion from ſome Writers of great Merit and Learning has been the diſagreeable Occaſion of reminding me of my Promiſe.

SECT. I.

See DIVINE LEGATION, Book IV. Sect. 6. ſub fin.

OF theſe, the firſt place would be due to my very learned Friend, the Author of the elegant and uſeful *Letter from Rome*; who, taking entirely to himſelf what was meant in general of the numerous Writers on the ſame Subject, and the more numerous Followers of the ſame Hypotheſis, hath done a * Notion of mine the Honour of his Confutation, in a *Poſtſcript* to that *Letter*. But the ſame friendly Conſiderations, which induced him

* Divine Legat. lib. iv. § 6. ſub fin.

to

to end the Poſtſcript with declaring his Unwillingneſs to enter further into Controverſy with me, have diſpoſed me not to enter into it at all. This, and neither any Neglect of him, nor any Force I apprehend in his Arguments, have kept me ſilent. In the mean time, I owe ſo much both to myſelf and the Public, as to take notice of a *Miſrepreſentation* of my *Argument*; and a *Change* of the *Queſtion* in Diſpute between us: Without which Notice, the Controverſy (as I agree to leave it in his Hands) could ſcarce receive an equitable Deciſion. The *Miſrepreſentation* I ſpeak of is in theſe words: "He [the Author of the D. L.] allows that the Writers, "who have undertaken to *deduce the Rites of Popery from Paganiſm*, "*have ſhewn an exact and ſurpriſing Likeneſs between them in a great* "*Variety of Inſtances.* This (ſays he) one would think, is allowing "every thing that the Cauſe demands: It is every thing, I dare ſay, "that thoſe Writers deſire *." That it is *every thing thoſe Writers deſire*, I can eaſily believe, ſince I ſee my learned Friend himſelf hath taken it for granted, that theſe two Aſſertions, 1. *The Religion of the preſent Romans derived from that of their heathen Anceſtors*; and, 2. *An exact Conformity or Uniformity rather of Worſhip between Popery and Paganiſm*, are convertible Propoſitions. For, undertaking, as his Title Page informs us, to prove, *the Religion of the preſent Romans derived from that of their heathen Anceſtors*; and having gone through his Arguments, he concludes them in theſe Words, "But it is high time for me to conclude, being perſuaded, "if I do not flatter myſelf too much, that I have ſufficiently made "good WHAT I FIRST UNDERTOOK TO PROVE, an exact Con-"formity or Uniformity rather of Worſhip between Popery and "Paganiſm †." But what he *undertook to prove*, we ſee, was, *The Religion of the preſent Romans derived from their heathen Anceſtors.* That I have, therefore, as my learned Friend obſerves, *allowed every thing thoſe Writers deſire*, is very likely. But then, whether I have *allowed every thing that the Cauſe demands*, is another

* Poſtſcript, p. 228. † Letter, p. 224.

Queſtion. Which I think can never be determined in the Affirmative, till it be ſhewn that no other probable Cauſe can be aſſigned of this *exact Conformity between Papiſts and Pagans*, but a *Borrowing or Derivation from one to the other*. And I gueſs, this is not now ever likely to be done, ſince I myſelf have actually aſſigned *another probable Cauſe*, namely, the *ſame Spirit of Superſtition operating in equal Circumſtances*.

But this juſtly celebrated Writer goes on—"This Queſtion, ac-"cording to his [the Author of *The Divine Legation*] Notion, is not "to be decided by *Facts*, but by a Principle of a different Kind, *a* "*ſuperior Knowledge of human Nature* *." Here I am forced to complain of a want of Candour, a want not natural to my learned Friend. For, whence is it, I would aſk, that he collects, *that, according to my Notion, this Queſtion is not to be decided by Facts, but a ſuperior Knowledge of human Nature?* From any thing I have ſaid? Or from any thing I have omitted to ſay? Surely, not from any thing I *have ſaid* (though he ſeems to inſinuate ſo much by putting the Words *a ſuperior Knowledge of human Nature* in Italick Characters, as they are called) becauſe I leave him in poſſeſſion of his *Facts*, and give them all their full Validity; which he himſelf obſerves; and, from thence, as we ſee, endeavours to draw ſome Advantage to his Hypotheſis: Nor from any thing I *have omitted to ſay*; for, in the ſhort Paragraph where I delivered my Opinion, and, by reaſon of its Evidence, offered but one ſingle Argument in its Support, that Argument ariſes from a ſuppoſed FACT, *viz.* that the *ſuperſtitious Cuſtoms in queſtion were many Ages later than the Converſion of the imperial City to the Chriſtian Faith*: Whence I concluded that the ruling Churchmen could have no Motive in borrowing from Pagan Cuſtoms, either as they were then faſhionable in themſelves, or reſpectable for the Number or Quality of their Followers. The *Suppoſition* I could eaſily convert into a *Proof*, were I not reſtrained by the Conſiderations before

* Poſtſcript, p. 228.

ſpoken

ſpoken of. And what makes this the more extraordinary is, that my learned Friend himſelf immediately afterwards quotes theſe words; and then tells the Reader that *the Argument conſiſts of an* HISTORICAL FACT *and of a Conſequence deduced from it.* It appears therefore, that, according to my Notion, the Queſtion *is* to be decided by *Facts*, and not by a *ſuperior Knowledge of human Nature.* Yet I muſt confeſs I then thought, and do ſo ſtill, that a *ſuperior Knowledge of human Nature* would do no Harm, as it might enable Men to judge better of *Facts* than we generally find them accuſtomed to do. But will this excuſe a candid Repreſenter for ſaying, that *the Queſtion, according to my Notion, was not to be decided by Facts, but a ſuperior Knowledge of human Nature?* However, to do my learned Friend all Juſtice, I muſt needs ſay, that, as if theſe were only Words of Courſe, or Words of Controverſy, he goes on, through the Body of his *Poſtſcript*, to invalidate my Argument from *Fact*; and we hear no more of a *ſuperior Knowledge of human Nature* than in this Place where it was brought in to be laughed at.

As to the Argument, it muſt even ſhift for itſelf. It has done more Miſchief already than I was aware of: And forced my learned Friend to extend his Charge from the *modern* to the *ancient Church of Rome.* For my Argument, from the *low Birth* of the Superſtitions in Queſtion, coming againſt his *Hypotheſis* after he had once and again declared the Purpoſe of his *Letter* to be the expoſing the heatheniſh Idolatry and Superſtition of the *preſent Church of Rome*; he was obliged, in ſupport of that Hypotheſis, to ſhew that even the *early Ages* of the Church were not free from the Infection. Which hath now quite ſhifted the Subject with the Scene, and will make the Argument of his Piece from henceforth to run thus, *The Religion of the preſent Romans derived from their early Chriſtian Anceſtors; and theirs, from the neighbouring Pagans.* To ſpeak freely, my Reaſoning (which was an Argument *ad hominem*, and, as ſuch, I thought would have been reverenced) reduced the learned Writer to this Dilemma; either to allow the Fact, and give up

his Hypotheſis; or to deny the Fact, and change his Queſtion. And he has choſen the latter as the leſſer Evil. For a ſimple *Queſtion* is but like a Wife to wrangle with; and when we loſe one we eaſily find another. But the *Hypotheſis* begot upon it is of the Nature of one's Offspring, whoſe Loſs perhaps is irreparable. I find, however, his *Lincoln's Inn Advocate* never thought him wedded to his Queſtion; for he takes the Change of it, like the Change of a Miſtreſs, for *Politeneſs*; and has accuſed me not only of ill-breeding, but of *Contradiction*, becauſe I would not change it too. I had *ſhewn*, in my *firſt* Volume of *The Divine Legation*, that the *ancient Chriſtians of Greece* had borrowed *ſeveral forms of Speech* from the Pagan Myſteries: And in my *ſecond*, I had *denied* that the *modern Chriſtians of Rome* had borrowed *ſeveral Forms of Worſhip* from the Pagan Ritual. On which, our Advocate catching me at this Advantage, thus candidly expoſtulates with me. *Thus the* SAME FACT, *when it tends to prove a part of a favourite Hypotheſis, is in your Hands notoriouſly true; but it is no ſooner made uſe of by the ingenious Author ſo often mentioned* [Dr. M.] *than it proves to be an utter Miſtake* *. And again, *the* DIFFERENT OPINIONS *which on different Occaſions you have entertained of this Matter, may ſerve to teach us* †, *&c. &c.* But let me aſſure this Writer, that when I ſpoke of the *Ancients* borrowing *Words* from the Pagan *Myſteries*, I no more meant the *Moderns* borrowing *Rites* from their *open Worſhip*, than, when ‡ I ſpoke of *Anſwerers by Profeſſion*, I meant *Lawyers by Profeſſion*; who, without flattering them, I may ſay, deſerve as little the Character there given of the ſaid *Anſwerers* as I do the Calumnies here beſtowed by this *Letter Writer*.

But his Charge of *Contradiction* was excuſable. The Doctor had led him up to the *primitive Church*, and there he found me; and there he ſuppoſed I had always been: And ſeeing me not quite conformable to the Doctor's Deciſions, he would quarrel with me for a

* Letter from a Gentleman of Lincoln's-Inn, p. 55. † Page 59.

‡ Divine Legation, Appendix to Book III. vol. II. p. 216.

Schiſmatic.

Schiſmatic. But I can eaſily overlook this (that he took upon truſt, as he did his *Greek*) for the ſake of ſo charitable Office as the teaching me how to write; which he kindly profeſſes to be the whole Purpoſe of his *Letter*.

My learned Friend will excuſe my ſpeaking thus much of a Controverſy which he knows, from the Time of the firſt Publication of his *Poſtſcript*, I had intended not to keep up. But thus much was neceſſary to ſtate it truly, and to hold it fairly on the Foot whereon he firſt placed it, and I had left it. As to the Subject itſelf, ſo curious and intereſting, if ever I ſhould be diſpoſed to treat it at large, as poſſibly I may, I would chuſe to do it *in Theſi*, and not in proſecution of any particular Controverſy.

SECT. II.

See DIVINE LEGATION, Book IV. Sect. 4.

THE firſt Writer I am concerned with is the Reverend Dr. *Richard Pococke*: Who, in his late Book of *Travels*, hath a *Chapter* on *the ancient Hieroglyphics of the Egyptians*, wherein, in oppoſition to my Account of the Nature of that Kind of Writing, he expreſſeth himſelf as follows—"If Hieroglyphical Figures ſtood "for Words or Sounds that ſignified certain things, the Power of "Hieroglyphics ſeems to be the ſame as of a Number of Letters "compoſing ſuch a Sound, that by Agreement was made to ſignify "ſuch a thing. For Hieroglyphics, as Words, ſeem to have ſtood "for Sounds, and Sounds ſignify Things; as for inſtance, it might "have been agreed that the Figure of a Crocodile might ſtand for "the Sound that meant what we call Malice: The children of the "Prieſts were early taught that the Figure of a Crocodile ſtood for "ſuch a Sound, and, if they did not know the Meaning of the "Sound, it would certainly ſtand with them for a Sound; though, "as the Sound, it ſignified alſo a Quality or Thing; and they "might

" might afterwards be taught the Meaning of this Sound; as words " are only Sounds, which Sounds we agree ſhall ſignify ſuch and " ſuch things; ſo that, to Children, Words only ſtand for Sounds, " which relate to ſuch Things as they know nothing of; and, in " this Senſe, we ſay Children learn many Things like Parrots, " what they do not underſtand, and their Memories are exerciſed " only about Sounds, till they are inſtructed in the Meaning of the " Words. This I thought it might be proper to obſerve, *as ſome* " *ſay Hieroglyphics ſtood for Things and not for Words*, if Sounds ar- " ticulated in a certain manner are Words. And though it may be " ſaid, that in this caſe, when different Nations, of different Lan- " guages, agree on common Characters, that ſtand for certain " Things they agree on, that then ſuch Figures ſtand for Things: " This will be allowed; but then they ſtand for Sounds too, that " is, the Sounds in each Language that ſignify ſuch Things: And, " as obſerved before, to Children, who know nothing of the ſeve- " ral Things they ſtand for; to them they are only Marks that " expreſs ſuch and ſuch Sounds: So that theſe Figures ſtand not " for Things alone, but as Words, for Sounds and Things *."

The Deſign of this Paſſage, the Reader ſees, is to oppoſe the Principle I went upon, in explaining the Egyptian Hieroglyphics, *That they ſtood for Things, and not for Words.* But that is all he ſees; for the obſcure Expreſſion, ariſing from a Confuſion of Ideas, will not ſuffer one to do more than gueſs at the Proof he aims at; which ſeems to be this—That Hieroglyphics cannot be ſaid to ſtand for Things *only*; becauſe Things being denoted by Words or Sounds; and Hieroglyphics exciting the Idea of Sounds (which are the Notes of Things), as well as the Idea of the Things themſelves, Hieroglyphics ſtand both for Sounds and Things.—This ſeems to be his Argument, put into intelligible Language. But, for fear of miſtaking him, let us confine ourſelves to his own Words.

* Pag. 228, 229, of a Book intituled, A Deſcription of the Eaſt, &c.

If

If hieroglyphical Figures (ſays he) *ſtood for Words or Sounds that ſignified certain Things, the Power of Hieroglyphics ſeems to be the ſame as of a Number of Letters compoſing ſuch a Sound that by Agreement was made to ſignify ſuch a Thing.* Without doubt, if *Hieroglyphics* ſtood for Sounds, they were of the Nature of *Words*, which ſtand for Sounds. But this is only an *hypothetical* Propoſition: Let us ſee therefore how he proves it.

FOR *Hieroglyphics*, AS WORDS, *ſeem to have ſtood for Sounds, and Sounds ſignify Things; as for Inſtance, it* MIGHT *have been agreed that the Figure of a Crocodile* MIGHT *ſtand for the ſame Sound that meant what we call Malice.* The Propriety of the Expreſſion is as remarkable as the Force of the Reaſoning. 1. Inſtead of ſaying, *but Hieroglyphics*, he ſays, *for Hieroglyphics*; which not expreſſing an *Illation*, but implying a *Reaſon*, obſcures the Argument he would illuſtrate. 2. He ſays, *Hieroglyphics, as Words, ſeem to have ſtood for Sounds.* Juſt before he ſaid, *Hieroglyphics ſtood for Words* OR *Sounds.* Here they are AS *Words*, or, *like* Words, and *ſeem to ſtand* FOR *Sound.* What muſt we ſtick to? are Words Sound? or, do they *ſtand for* Sound? He has given us both to chuſe of. But it is fit himſelf ſhould chuſe firſt: Which not having yet done, we go on, 3. Laſtly, to complete all, he corroborates this *ſeeming* Truth by an *Inſtance* in which the *Poſſibility* of its ſtanding for a Sound is mande a Proof of the *Likelihood* of its ſo doing; *It* MIGHT (ſays he) *have been agreed that the Figure of a Crocodile* MIGHT *ſtand, &c.*

But he makes amends for his former Diffidence in what follows. *The Children of the Prieſts were early taught that the Figure of a Crocodile ſtood for ſuch a Sound, and if they did not know the meaning of the Sound it would certainly ſtand with them for a Sound.* This indeed is an Anecdote. But where did he learn that theſe Children, before they could decipher the Sounds of their own Language, were taught Hieroglyphics? Till now, Hieroglyphics were underſtood to be reſerved for thoſe inſtructed in their ſecret and myſterious Science. But let us ſuppoſe that they were taught to Children amongſt their firſt Elements: Yet even here, as we ſhall ſee from

the

the Nature of the Thing, they could never ſtand as Marks for *Words* or *Sounds*. When a Child is taught the Power of Letters, he learns that thoſe Letters, that compoſe the Word *Malice*, for inſtance, expreſs the *Sound:* which, naturally ariſing from a Combination of the ſeveral Powers of each Letter, ſhews him that the Letters ſtand for ſuch a Sound or Word. But when he is taught that the Figure or Picture of a *Crocodile* ſignifies *Malice*, he as naturally and neceſſarily conceives (though he knows not the meaning of the Word) that it ſtands for ſome *Thing* ſignified by that Word, and not for a *Sound:* becauſe there is no natural Connexion between *Figure* and a *Sound*, as there is between *Figure* and a *Thing*. And the only Reaſon why the word *Malice* intervenes, in this Connexion, is becauſe of the Neceſſity of the Uſe of *Words* to diſtinguiſh Things, and rank them into ſorts. But the verieſt Child could never be ſo childiſh as to conceive that, when he was told the Figure of a Beaſt with four Legs and a long Tail ſignified *Malice*, that it ſignified the *Sound* of *Malice*; any more than if he were told it ſignified a *Crocodile*, that it ſignified the *Sound* of the Word *Crocodile*. The Truth is, the Ignorant often miſtake Words for Things, but never, Things for Words. The former is ſo true that they frequently take the *name* of a Thing for its *Nature*; and reſt contented in the Knowledge which that gives them. I remember a Country Fellow ſtareing at the Picture of an Elephant, a *thing* he had never ſeen before, aſked his Friend who ſtood by, *What it was?* and, on his anſwering, that it was *the great Czar*, inquired no further, but went away well ſatisfied in his Acquaintance with the ſtrange Beaſt. Yet I apprehend he did not underſtand his Informer to mean that it ſignified only the *Sound* of that Word. But perhaps our Author will ſay, the Caſes are different; that the *Elephant* was a mere Picture, and the *Crocodile* a Sign or Mark. But I have proved at large that the ancient *Egyptian* Hieroglyphics were at firſt *mere Pictures*; and that all the Alteration they received, in becoming *Marks*, was only the having their general Uſe of conveying Knowledge rendered more extenſive and expeditious.

To

To proceed; our Author conſiders next what he apprehends may be thought an Objection to his Opinion, *And though* (ſays he) *it may be ſaid that, in this Caſe, where different Nations of different Languages agree on common Characters, that ſtand for certain Things they agree on, that then ſuch Figures ſtand for Things.* To which he anſwers, *This will be allowed, but then they ſtand for Sounds too, that is, the Sounds in each Language that ſignify ſuch Things.* He who can *allow* this, and without Injury to his Cauſe, need be under no Fear of ever giving his Adverſary Advantages. We may expect to hear him ſay next, when diſputing about the *Colour* of an Object—*that it is Black, will be allowed; but then it is White too.* For a *Mark* for *Things* can no more be a *Mark* for *Sounds*, than *Black* can be *White.* The Reaſon is the ſame in both; the one Property excludes the other: Thus, if *hieroglyphic Marks* ſtand for *Things*, and are uſed as common Characters by various Nations differing in Speech and Language, they cannot ſtand for *Sounds*; becauſe theſe Men expreſs the ſame Thing by *different* Sounds; unleſs, to remove this Difficulty, he will go farther, and ſay, not, as he did before, that one *hieroglyphic Word* (to uſe his own Language) ſtood for *one Sound*, but, that it ſtands for an Hundred. Again, if *hieroglyphic Marks* ſtand for *Sounds*, they cannot ſtand for *Things*: Not for thoſe Things which are *not* ſignified by ſuch Sounds; this himſelf will *allow*: Nor yet, I affirm, for thoſe which *are*; becauſe it is the Sound that ſtands for the Thing ſignified by the Sound, and not the hieroglyphic Mark. But all this Miſtake proceeded from another as groſs, though leſs glaring, namely, *that Words ſtand both for Sounds and Things*, which we now come to. For he concludes thus, *So that theſe Figures* (viz. *Hieroglyphics*) *ſtand not for Things alone, but, as Words, for Sounds and Things.* An unhappy Illuſtration! which has all the Defects, both in point of Senſe and Expreſſion, that a Propoſition can well have. For if, by *Words*, he meant *articulated Sounds*, then the Expreſſion is Nonſenſe, as affirming, that Sounds ſtand for Sounds. And that he meant ſo is poſſible, becauſe, in the Beginning of the Paſſage quoted, he uſes *Words* for *articu-*

late Sounds——*Hieroglyphics*, ſays he, *ſtood for Words* OR *Sounds*. But if, by *Words*, he meant *Letters* (and that he might mean ſo, is poſſible likewiſe, for he preſently afterwards uſes *Words* in that Senſe too—*Hieroglyphics as Words*, ſays he, *ſeem to have ſtood for Sounds*) then the Propoſition is only falſe; the plain Truth being this, *Letters ſtand for Sounds only*; which Sounds they *naturally* produce; as Sounds *arbitrarily* denote Things.

But to be a little more particular; as in this Diſtinction lies the Judgment which is to be made, if ever it be rightly made, of the Controverſy between us. All this Confuſion of counter-reaſoning proceeds, as we obſerved before, *firſt*, from not reflecting that *Letters*, which ſtand for Words, and *Hieroglyphics* which ſtand for Things, have not an *arbitrary* but *natural* Deſignation. For as the *Powers* of Letters naturally produce Words or Sounds, ſo the *Figures* of Hieroglyphics naturally ſignify Things: Either more ſimply, when they expreſs *Subſtances*; or more artificially, when they denote *Modes*; yet in neither Caſe arbitrarily: but by *Repreſentation* in the firſt, and by *Analogy* in the laſt. *Secondly*, from his not conſidering, that as we cannot think nor converſe about Things either accurately or intelligibly without *Words*, ſo their Intervention becomes neceſſary in explaining the *Marks of Things*. But therefore, to make *Hieroglyphics the Marks of Sounds*, becauſe Sounds accompany *Things*, would be as abſurd as to make *Letters the Marks of Things*, becauſe Things accompany *Sounds*. And, who ever (beſides our Author) ſaid that *Letters ſignified Things as well as Sounds?* unleſs he had a Mind to confound all human Meaning. If he choſe to inſtruct, or even to be underſtood, he would ſay, that Letters *naturally* produced Sounds or Words; and that Words *arbitrarily* denoted Things: And had our Author ſpoken the ſame intelligible Language, and told us that Hieroglyphics *naturally* expreſſed Things, and that Things were *arbitrarily* denoted by Words, he would indeed have ſpared both of us the preſent Trouble, but then he had ſaid nothing *new*. But it is poſſible he might be led into his Concluſion by miſtaking, for *Egyptian*, a ridiculous Kind of

of *rebus-writing* more ridiculouſly called Hieroglyphics, the ſenſeleſs Amuſement of our idle People, in which, indeed, the Figures ſtand only for Sounds. As for thoſe ſignificative Figures properly called Hieroglyphics, they never denoted other than *Things*. If there ever were an Exception, it was in a late Traveller; whoſe ſignificative Egyptian *Figures*, I am told, are not ſo properly the Repreſentatives of the *Things* themſelves, as of the Writer's *Words*, or his verbal Deſcriptions to the Ingraver.—But there is no End of correcting the Extravagancies of a perverſe Imagination. Here we have one, who is for making the Egyptian *Hieroglyphics* a Kind of Letters: We have lately heard of another, ſtill more at Defiance with common Senſe, who is for making the *Hebrew* Letters a Kind of *Hieroglyphic* Characters *. And this without ever having travelled for it.

But

* See *Propoſals for printing by Subſcription the Book of* Job *in the* Hebrew *Character, and now firſt* Decyphered *into* Engliſh, *dated* July 1, 1743. From which, I ſhall beg Leave to borrow a Specimen of the *Undertaker's* Reaſoning and Eloquence. "To obviate," ſays he, "any Scruples of Alarm which the Appearance of Novelty and Paradox might "occaſion, it may be proper to acquaint the Reader——*What?*——that the new Ver-"ſion of *Job*, now offered to the Public, was made independently of any Tranſlation, "Commentator, or Critic," &c. Without doubt it was a ready way to quiet all Alarms, ariſing from the *Appearance* of *Novelty*, to tell his Readers, the Appearance was *real*. But perhaps by——*obviating any Scruples of Alarm*, this great Linguiſt might mean, what the Words naturally imply, the freeing his Reader from any *Scruples* about the Uncharitableneſs of being *alarmed* to one's Neighbours Diſcredit without very apparent Cauſe. And if this were his Meaning, he has certainly ſet his Reader's Conſcience at Eaſe. But with Regard to the *Alarm* itſelf, I know but one way of ſtilling *that*; which is, the reaſonable Proſpect his Reader has that this, which is now a *Novelty* and *Paradox*, is likely to continue ſo.

He goes on——"In the mean time, if the ſagacious Reader is prompted to ſearch "after Truth, too long concealed in her myſterious Receſſes——let him guard againſt "all Syſtematical Notions, and aſſume no other Hypotheſis but this, that the beſt Senſe "which can be affixed to the *Hebrew* Letters, conſiſtently with the Context, and with "the Laws of the Character, is the genuine Senſe of the Writer." The *Context*, does he ſay? Why, the *Context* is yet to make; as well as the *Senſe that is to be affixed to the* Hebrew *Letters*. And if, when he has them both in his Hands, he cannot make them

But our Author ſeems to have been miſled by a wrong Imagination; that the Public would expect it of a *Traveller* to be intimately converſant in all the old Learning and Religion of the Places he had viſited: As if theſe were to be picked out of the Rubbiſh of the dead Walls in which they were once contained, rather than from the living Monuments of their contemporary Inhabitants. But ſure the learned World is leſs unreaſonable; this would exceed even the old *Egyptian* Exaction, and be requiring *Brick*, not indeed without *Straw*, for enough of that, we ſee, is to be *gathered* in rambling *through the Land*; but, what is worſe, without *Materials*. However, to this Imagination it appears we owe his Account of the *Hieroglyphics* in the *preſent*, and of the *Mythology of the antient Egyptians*, in the preceding Chapter; which he introduces in this

agree, he muſt be the very dulleſt of all his bungling Tribe. The Man had heard, ſomewhere or other, of that trite critical Canon, *of interpreting agreeably to the Context*, which means only that the Parts ſhould conform to the Whole, and to one another; and the more obſcure be explained by the more intelligible: And this, he has innocently applied to *Parts* and a *Whole* that are to be all of his own making; which he may make as obſcure at leaſt, if not as intelligible, as he pleaſes.

Having thus ſtrongly *plumed* himſelf with his Grey-Gooſe Quill, he at length takes his Flight.——"Thus prepared," he ſays, "he will defy Difficulty and ſcorn Aſſiſ-"tance; eſteeming an officious Hint an Affront to his Genius, or ſuſpecting he was en-"vied the Pleaſure of inveſtigating the Theorem. Fantaſtic Glory! ſhort-lived Plea-"ſure! that muſt vaniſh into Indignation, for not having ſooner perceived ſo tranſparent "an Artifice." But here we leave him. He now ſoars out of Sight, and becomes inſcrutable to mortal Eyes.

Indeed, he might have paſſed without any Notice at all, had he not betrayed his *Kind* when he attempted to *roar*. For, though it be his Buſineſs to poſſeſs the Public with an high Idea of the Knowledge he is about to open to them from the Diſcovery of a *new real* CYPHER, yet he can't, for his Life (even in this very *Specimen*) forbear to call it a SACERDOTAL *Jargon—a Gibberiſh of their own*. Let the *Prieſts* then look to themſelves. Here is a *new* Church-Decipherer, who has not only diſcovered they are accuſtomed to write in *Jargon*, but has alſo found the *Key*. We know them to be always plotting againſt the *Government of Nature*: The Public therefore cannot but be as impatient for their Conviction, as this *Decipherer* is for the filling his *Subſcription*: Which, as it will be the Means of ſatisfying both, I would beg Leave to recommend to their Conſideration. *Subſcriptions are taken in by* J. Nourſe *at the* Lamb *without* Temple-Bar.

extra-

extraordinary Manner: "As the Mythology, or fabulous Religion "of the ancient *Egyptians*, may be looked on, in a great Meaſure, "as the Foundation of the Heathen Religion, in moſt other Parts; "ſo it may not be improper to give ſome Account of the Origin "of it, as it is delivered by the moſt ancient Authors, which "may give ſome Light both to the Deſcription of *Egypt*, and alſo "to the Hiſtory of that Country. We may ſuppoſe, that the "Ancients were the beſt Judges of the Nature of their Religion; "and conſequently, that all Interpretations of their Mythology, "by Men of fruitful Inventions, that have no ſort of Foundation "in their Writings, are forced, and ſuch as might never be in-"tended by them. On the contrary, it is neceſſary to retrench "ſeveral things the Ancients themſelves ſeem to have invented, "and grafted on true Hiſtory; and, in order to account for many "Things, the Genealogies and Alliances they mention muſt in "ſeveral reſpects be falſe or erroneous, and ſeem to have been "invented to accommodate the Honours of the ſame Deities to "different Perſons, they were obliged to deify, who lived at dif-"ferent Times; and ſo they were obliged to give them new Names, "invent Genealogies, and ſome different Attributes*."

He ſays, *We may ſuppoſe that the Ancients were the beſt Judges of the Nature of their Religion.* But the *Ancients*, here ſpoken of, were not *Egyptians*, but *Greeks*; and the *Mythology* here ſpoken of, was not *Greek*, but *Egyptian*: Therefore theſe *Ancients* might well be miſtaken about the Nature of a Religion which they borrowed from Strangers; the Principles of which, they themſelves tell us, were always kept ſecreted from them. But this is not all, they in fact were miſtaken; and by no means *good Judges of the Nature of their Religion*, if we may believe one of the moſt authentic of theſe Ancients, HERODOTUS himſelf, where diſcourſing of the *Greeks* he expreſsly ſays,—"But the Origin of each God, and whether "they are all from Eternity, and what is their ſeveral Kinds or

* P. 221, 222.

"Natures,

" Natures, to ſpeak the Truth, they neither knew at that time nor " ſince *.

He goes on—*and* CONSEQUENTLY *that all Interpretations of their Mythology by Men of fruitful Inventions, that have no ſort of Foundation in their Writings, are forced, and ſuch as might never be intended by them.* This is indeed a *Truth*, but it is no CONSEQUENCE, therefore impertinent. For, whether the *Ancients* were, or were not, *the beſt Judges*; whether the *Moderns* have, or have not, *fruitful Inventions*, yet if their *Interpretations have no ſort of Foundation in ancient Writings*, it is certain they *are forced, and ſuch as might never be intended by them.* But what does he get by this hypothetical Propoſition more than the Diſcredit of begging his Queſtion?

But the moſt extraordinary, is his making it an additional Reaſon for leaving the *Moderns*, and ſticking to the *Ancients*, that *the Ancients themſelves ſeem to have invented and grafted on true Hiſtory, and, in order* (he ſays) *to account for many Things, the Genealogies and Alliances they mention, muſt in ſeveral reſpects be falſe or erroneous, and ſeem to have been invented, etc.* Now, if the Ancients were thus miſtaken, the Moderns ſure might be excuſed in endeavouring to ſet them right: Therefore to a plain Reaſoner, this would *ſeem* to ſhew the *uſe* of *their Interpretations.* But this Uſe is better underſtood from our Author's own Example; who, in the Chapter we are upon, has attempted to give us ſome Knowledge of Antiquity without them.

And here we find, the *ancient Account*, to which he ſo cloſely adheres, is not only fabulous, by his own *Confeſſion*; but contradictory, by his own *Repreſentation*; a confuſed Collection of Errors and Abſurdities; the very Condition of Antiquity which forced the *Moderns* to have Recourſe to *Interpretations*: and occaſioned that Variety whereon our Author grounds his Charge againſt them. A

* Ἐνθεν δὲ ἐγένετο ἕκαστος τῶν Θεῶν, εἴτε δ' ἀεὶ ἦσαν πάντες, ὁποῖοί τε τινὲς τὰ εἴδεα, οὐκ ἠπίσταλο μέχρι ἔ πρίν τε καὶ χθὲς, ὡς εἰπεῖν λόγῳ. Lib. ii. cap. 33.

Charge

Charge however in which his *Ancients* themſelves will be involved; for they likewiſe had their *Interpretations*; and were, if their Variety would give it them, at leaſt, as *fruitful* in their *Inventions*. How differing, for inſtance, were they in Opinion concerning the Origin of ANIMAL WORSHIP * ? Was our Author ignorant that ſo extraordinary a Superſtition wanted Explanation? By no means. Yet for fear of incurring the Cenſure of a *fruitful Invention*, he, inſtead of taking the true Solution of a *Modern* Critic; or even any rational Interpretation † of the *ancient* Mythologiſt, whom yet he profeſſes to

* See Divine Legation, Vol. II. p. 468, & ſeq.

† This, at leaſt, the learned Author of the late *Defence of the prime Miniſtry of Joſeph* has thought it but decent to do, p. 522, whom I juſt mention here becauſe he does not ſo properly come within the Purpoſe of this Pamphlet. For as, in ſeveral Parts of his *Defence*, he conſents to me without Acknowledgment; ſo, in others, he differs from me without Contradiction. I have another Reaſon not to examine the Grounds of his Difference, and that is, becauſe I apprehend he may, on ſecond Thoughts, retract his Opinion on every of thoſe Points, as he ſeems already to have done in one or two. Thus for inſtance, ſpeaking p. 522, of the *Origin of Brute-worſhip*, in *Egypt*, he ſays, "But "there is another Reaſon [*of Brute-worſhip*] aſſigned by *Lucian*, that to me is the moſt "probable of all. He tells us that the Egyptians found out how to meaſure the Mo- "tions of the heavenly Bodies, and how to compute Years and Months and Seaſons. "They divided that Part of the Heavens and the fixed Stars ſtationed in it, through "which the moveable Stars and Planets paſs, into twelve Parts, and repreſented each "Part by ſome proper different Animal of their own. And from hence aroſe many Sorts "of ſacred Rites in Egypt, &c." Yet, at p. 458, he aſſigns a very different Original. "I think there is little doubt but that the monſtrous Figures of the Egyptian Gods, "and great Part of their ſtupid Idolatry and Beaſt-worſhip, took its Riſe from theſe *hie-* "*roglyphic* Characters."——So again, p. 472, ſpeaking of the *Origin of Idolatry*, he makes the firſt Species of it to be HERO-WORSHIP. "And I think (ſays he) that the Account "given of them [*the Sons of the* Elohim *in the antediluvian World*] by the Hiſtorian, that "they were *the mighty Men of old, Men of the Name*, as the Hebrew expreſſes it, famous "and remarkable from ancient Ages, points them out as the *moſt ancient*, Gods and He- "roes; a Suppoſition that we ſhall ſee preſently confirmed by the Teſtimony of profane "Hiſtory." Yet at p. 515, he makes the Beginnings of Idolatry to be the Worſhip of the HEAVENLY BODIES. "Theſe ſeveral Accounts put together clearly ſhew us the "Riſe and Progreſs of Superſtition and falſe Worſhip in the World. It *began*, as it was "natural

to follow, contents himſelf with that wretched Fable of *Typhon's* dividing the Body of *Oſiris* into twenty ſix Parts, and diſtributing them to his Accomplices: Which, being afterwards found by *Iſis*, and delivered by her to diſtinct Bodies of Prieſts to be buried with great Secrecy, ſhe enjoined them to pay divine Honours to him, and to conſecrate ſome particular Animal to his Memory. *From this Account* (ſays our Author very gravely) *we may ſee the Reaſon why ſo many ſacred Animals were worſhipped in Egypt* *. Again, the *Greek* Account, in *Diodorus*, of *Oſiris's Expedition*, has been ſhewn to be a Heap of impoſſible Abſurdities; yet our Author believes it all; and would have believed as much more rather than have run into the Raſhneſs of any *modern Invention*.—But this Matter comes under our next *Section*; where we have to do with a very different Sort of Writer; whoſe Regard, however, for Antiquity in *that* point is, we conceive, as much too ſmall as this Author's is too great.

" natural to imagine it ſhould, in the Adoration of the heavenly Luminaries, the Sun, " Moon, and Stars, who were ſuppoſed to preſide over the Day and Night, and the va- " rious Seaſons of the Year, and to whom the earlieſt Nations were taught to aſcribe " the Origin and Diſſolution of all Things. Next after theſe the Earth, and the " ſeveral Elements of which the World was ſuppoſed to conſiſt, had imaginary Deity " aſcribed to them, and came in for their Share of Adoration. And as the Glory of the " celeſtial Bodies, and the conſtant Benefit Men received by their Light, Warmth, and " continual Influences on the Earth, firſt impreſſed Men with Wonder, drew them into " Adoration, excited their Gratitude, and created in them an Imagination of their be- " ing Gods; they were AFTERWARDS led into an high Veneration for their Princes, " whom they admired for their Power, Prudence, Strength, and Knowledge: con- " ſidering them as their Benefactors who firſt taught them the Uſe of ſuch Things " as greatly tended to the Preſervation, Security, good Order, and Conveniencies of " Life."

* P. 226.

SECT.

SECT. III.

See DIVINE LEGATION, Book IV. Sect. 5.

WHEN I entered on a Confutation of Sir Iſaac Newton's *Egyptian Chronology*, I was willing, for the greater Satisfaction of the Reader, to ſet his Arguments for the *Identy of Oſiris and Seſoſtris*, on which that Chronology was founded, in the ſtrongeſt and cleareſt Light. On this Account I took them as I found them collected, ranged in Order, and ſet together in one View, with the greateſt Advantage of Repreſentation, by the very worthy and learned *Maſter of the Charter-Houſe*, in a profeſſed Apology for that excellent Author. But this Liberty the learned Writer hath been pleaſed to animadvert upon in the late *Latin* Edition * of the Tracts to which that Apology was prefixed——"We are not (ſays "he †) ignorant of what has lately happened, that the Author of "*The*

* *De veris annis D. N. Jeſu Chriſti natali & emortuali Diſſertationes duæ Chronologicæ.*

† "Non neſcimus nuperrime accidiſſe, ut Vir ingenio & eruditione præſtans ‡, quum "ratus ſit ad Divinam Legationem Moſis demonſtrandum aliquo modo pertinere, ut "probetur Oſiris non eſſe idem cum Seſoſtri, omnia huc allata in luſum jocumque ver-"terit, inſtituta comparatione Arthuri illius fabuloſi cum Wilhelmo Normanno, quos "æquè bonis rationibus in unum hominem conflari poſſe ait (quamvis nihil fere ha-"beant inter ſe commune aut ſimile) ac nos Oſirin cum Seſoſtri confundimus. Et de "hac re diſputationem in 70 paginas & ultra producit. In qua tamen hæc noſtra de Se-"ſoſtri neque negat neque refellit, ſed irridet. Alia vero quædam Newtoni dicta de "ſero inventis ab aliquo rege artibus, armis, inſtrumentis oppugnat, et ea quidem parte "cauſæ vincit. Nam ut iſta longe ante Seſoſtris ætatem apud Ægyptios reperta ſint, "Scriptura ſacra jubet credere; ab ullo unquam regum inventa eſſe haud ita certum. "Sed ea prius non attigimus, ut quæ nihil ad propoſitum noſtrum attinent, neque

‡ D. Warburton Div. Legat. Moſis Demonſt. &c. Tom. ii.

" *The Divine Legation* ſuppoſing it, ſome how or other, to concern " *Moſes's* divine Miſſion to prove that *Oſiris* was not the ſame with " *Seſoſtris*, hath turned all that is here ſaid into Ridicule, by a " Compariſon made between the fabulous *Arthur* and *William* the " *Norman*; who, he ſays, may be made one by as good Reaſons " (though they have ſcarce any thing alike or in common with one " another) as thoſe which we have brought to confound *Oſiris* with " *Seſoſtris*: And on this Point he draws out a Diſputation through " ſeventy Pages and upwards; wherein, notwithſtanding, he nei- " ther denies nor confutes, but only laughs at what we have here " ſaid of *Seſoſtris*. It is true indeed that ſome other of *Newton's* " Aſſertions he does oppoſe, as thoſe concerning the late Invention " of Arts, Arms, and Inſtruments by ſome certain King; and in " this Part of the Argument he has the better. For that theſe " Things were found out by the *Egyptians* long before the Age of " *Seſoſtris*, holy Scripture commands us to believe: But whether " found out by any of their Kings, is not ſo certain. However, theſe " were Matters we never touched upon, as relating nothing to our " Purpoſe; nor do they yet induce us to recede from that Conclu- " ſion of the famous *Newton*, That *Seſac* was *Seſoſtris*, *Oſiris*, and " *Bacchus*. But the Cauſe being now brought before the Public, " let the Learned determine of it." Thus far this candid and ingenuous Writer.

He ſays, *the Author of the Divine Legation ſuppoſes that it ſome how or other concerns* Moſes's *divine Miſſion to prove* Oſiris *not the ſame with* Seſoſtris; which ſeems to imply that this learned Perſon doth not ſee *how* it concerns it. And yet afterwards he owns, *that Scripture* (meaning the Writings of Moſes) *will not allow us to believe, with Sir* Iſaac, *that the Invention of Arts, Arms, and Inſtruments, was ſo late as the Time of* Seſoſtris. Now it follows, as I have

" nunc nos movent, ut pedem retrahamus ab iſta Cl. Newtoni concluſione Seſacum, " Seſoſtrim, Oſirin & Bacchum fuiſſe. Lite jam conteſtata judicent eruditi." In Dedic. p. xii. xiii.

ſhewn,

ſhewn, by certain Conſequence, that, if *Oſiris* and *Seſoſtris* were one and the ſame, then the Invention of Arts was as late as the Time of *Seſoſtris*. But this contradicting *Scripture*, or the Writings of *Moſes*, as the learned Writer himſelf confeſſeth, the Reader ſees *how it concerns* Moſes's *Miſſion to prove* Oſiris *not the ſame with* Seſoſtris.

The learned Writer, ſpeaking of the Compariſon I had made between *Arthur* and *William* the *Norman*, ſays, *they have ſcarce any thing alike or in common with one another.* I had brought together *thirteen* Circumſtances (the very number the learned Writer thinks ſufficient to eſtabliſh the Identity of *Oſiris* and *Seſoſtris*) in which they perfectly agreed. I am perſuaded he does not ſuſpect me of falſifying their Hiſtory. He muſt mean therefore that *thirteen* in my Compariſon, is *ſcarce any thing*, which, in his, is *every thing*.

He goes on,—*in a Diſputation of ſeventy Pages and upwards the Author of the* Divine Legation *neither denies nor confutes, but only laughs at what we have ſaid of* Seſoſtris. What is it the learned Writer *hath* ſaid of *Seſoſtris?* Is it not this? That between his Hiſtory and that of *Oſiris* there are many Strokes of Reſemblance: From whence he infers (with Sir *Iſaac*) that theſe two Heroes were one and the ſame. Now if he means I have not *denied* nor *confuted* this *Reſemblance*, he ſays true. I had no ſuch Deſign. It is too well marked by Antiquity to be denied. Neither, let me add, did I *laugh* at it. What I *laughed* at (if my bringing a ſimilar caſe is to be called by that Word) was his *Inference* from this *Reſemblance*, that therefore *Oſiris* and *Seſoſtris* were one and the ſame. But then too I did more than *laugh*: I both *denied* and *confuted* it. Firſt I *denied* it, by ſhewing that this *Reſemblance* might really be though *Oſiris* and *Seſoſtris* were *two different* Men, as appeared by an equal Reſemblance in the actions of *two different* Men, *Arthur* and *William the Norman*. But as the general Hiſtory of ancient *Egypt* would not ſuffer us to believe all that the *Greek* Writers have ſaid

of this *Reſemblance*, I then explained the Cauſes that occaſioned their miſtaken Accounts of the two perſons, from whence ſo perfect a Reſemblance aroſe. Secondly, I *confuted* it, by ſhewing from the concurrent Teſtimony of Antiquity, and from ſeveral internal Arguments deducible from that Teſtimony, that *Oſiris and Seſoſtris* were in fact two different Perſons, living in two very diſtant Ages.

The learned Writer proceeds,—*It is true indeed that ſome other of* Newton's *Aſſertions he does oppoſe, as thoſe concerning the late Invention of Arts, Arms, and Inſtruments, and in this Part of the Argugument he gets the better.* But if I have the better here, it is paſt Diſpute I overthrow the whole Hypotheſis of the *Identity of Oſiris and Seſoſtris*. For, as to that *Reſemblance*, which Antiquity hath given them, *that*, conſidered ſingly, when the pretended *late Invention* of Arts hath been proved a Miſtake, will indeed deſerve *only to be laughed at*. But were it, as Sir *Iſaac Newton* endeavoured to prove, that the Invention of Arts was no earlier than the Time of *Seſoſtris* or *Seſac*, there is then indeed an end of the *ancient Oſiris* of *Egypt*; and *He* ſo much boaſted of by that People can be no other than the *Seſoſtris* of this Author. For the very Foundation of the Exiſtence of the *ancient Oſiris* was his civilizing *Egypt*, and teaching them the Arts of Life: But if this were done by *Seſoſtris*, or in his Reign, then is *He* the true *Oſiris* of *Egypt*. As on the contrary, were the *Invention of Arts* as early as Scripture Hiſtory repreſents it, then is *Egypt* to be believed, when ſhe tells us that *Oſiris*, their Inventor of Arts, was many Ages earlier than *Seſoſtris* their Conqueror: And conſequently all Sir *Iſaac Newton's Identity* ſeparates and falls to pieces. In a word, take it which way you will, if *Oſiris* were the ſame as *Seſoſtris*, then muſt the Invention of Arts (for all Antiquity have concurred in giving that Invention to *Oſiris*) be as late as the Age of *Seſoſtris*, the *Seſac* of *Newton*: But this, Scripture Hiſtory will not ſuffer us to believe. If, on the other hand, *Oſiris* and *Seſoſtris* were not the ſame, then was the Invention of Arts (and for the ſame Reaſon) much earlier than the Age of *Seſoſtris*; as indeed all Mankind thought before Sir *Iſaac*. Theſe

were

were the Conſiderations which induced that great Man, who ſo well underſtood the Nature and Force of Evidence, to employ his whole Sagacity of Criticiſm in proving the Invention of Arts to be about the Age of his *Seſoſtris* or *Seſac*. And is it poſſible he ſhould have a Follower who cannot *ſee* that he hath done this? or the *Neceſſity* he had of doing it? It will be ſaid, perhaps, "that Sir "*Iſaac* has, indeed, argued much for the low Invention of Arts: "but hath neither inforced it under the Name of an Argument, "nor ſtated it in the Form here repreſented." The Objection would ill become a Follower of the great *Newton*, who ſhould know that his Maſter's Method, as well in theſe his *critical* as in his *phyſical* Inquiries, was to form the principal Members of his Demonſtration with an unornamented Brevity, and leave the Supplial of the ſmall connecting Parts to his Reader's Capacity. Beſides, in ſo obvious, ſo capital, ſo neceſſary an Argument for this *Identity*, it had been a ridiculous Diſtruſt of common Senſe, after he had ſpent ſo much Pains in endeavouring to prove the *low Invention of Arts*, to have ended his Reaſoning in this formal Manner: "And "now, Reader, take Notice that this is a concluſive Argument for "the *Identity* of *Oſiris* and *Seſoſtris*." Laſtly, let me obſerve, that this very Reaſon which induced Sir *Iſaac* to be ſo large in the *Eſtabliſhment* of his Point, *the low Invention of Arts*, induced me to be as large in the *Subverſion* of it. And now ſome reaſonable Account, I hope, is given of the ſeventy long Pages.

What follows is ſtill more extraordinary.—*However theſe were Matters* (ſays the learned Writer, ſpeaking of the Invention of Arts) *we never touched upon as relating nothing to our Purpoſe*. Here I cannot but lament the learned Writer's ill Fortune. There was but one ſingle Point, in the Book he would defend, which is eſſentially to his Purpoſe, and *that*, he hath given up as *nothing to his Purpoſe*; And more unlucky ſtill, on a Review of the Argument, hath treated it as an Error in his Author who took ſo much Pains about it, but yet as an Error that does not at all affect the Queſtion. For,

He

He concludes thus—*nor do they yet induce me to recede from that Concluſion of the famous* Newton, *that* Seſac *was* Seſoſtris, Oſiris, *and* Bacchus.——*Seſac*, as I ſaid before, I have no Concern with. And as to *Bacchus*, it is agreed to be only a different Name for *Oſiris*. The thing I undertook to prove was that *Oſiris* and *Seſoſtris* were not one and the ſame Perſon: But, in doing this, I did not mean to ſay that *Oſiris* was not one of the Names of *Seſoſtris*. This is a very different Propoſition; and the rather to be taken notice of, becauſe I ſuſpect a Quibble in the Words of the learned Writer which would confound the *Difference*. Nor is this Suſpicion unreaſonable. For I have met with ſome who have even ventured to ſay that Sir *Iſaac* meant no more than that *Seſoſtris* was AN *Oſiris*. But if he meant no more, I would allow him to mean any thing, and never to have his Meaning diſputed. I, for my part, and ſo I ſuppoſe the reſt of the World, underſtood him to mean, "That "the old *Oſiris*, famous amongſt the *Egyptians* for Legiſlation and "the Invention of the Arts of Life, was the very ſame Man with "*Seſoſtris*, who, thoſe *Egyptians* ſay, was a different Man, of a "later Age, and famous for the Conqueſt of the habitable World." This was the Propoſition I undertook to confute. Wherein I endeavoured to ſhew, "that there was a *real Oſiris*, ſuch as the *Egyp*-"*tians* repreſented him, much *earlier* than their *Seſoſtris*." And now (to uſe this Writer's Words) *the Cauſe being brought before the Public, let the Learned determine of it*. As to the other Point, that *Seſoſtris* went by the Name of the earlier Hero, this I not only allow, but contend for, as it opens to us one of the principal Grounds of that Confuſion in their Stories which hath produced a Similitude of Actions whereon Sir *Iſaac Newton* layeth the Foundation of their IDENTITY.

SECT.

SECT. IV.

See DIVINE LEGATION, Vol. II. Book VI. Sect. 2.

THE reverend and learned Dr. *Richard Grey* having lately epitomized the Commentary of one *Albert Schultens* on the Book of *Job*, hath thought fit, in the *Preface* to his Abſtract, to criticiſe my Diſſertation on the ſame Book in the following manner.—"Nor ſhould we omit, in the fourth Place, the Opinion of "our Countryman, Mr. *Warburton*, who, with great Sharpneſs of "Wit and many Arguments ſufficiently ſpecious, endeavours to "prove that the whole Book of *Job* is dramatical and allegorical, "yet founded in true Hiſtory, and written by *Eſdra* in Solace of "the *Jews*, now returned from *Babylon* into their own Country, "and about to experience, contrary to their Expectations, an ordi- "nary and unequal Providence. Now in a matter very uncertain, "and which hitherto hath been made more uncertain by the dif- "ferent Opinions of learned Men, hardly any Hypotheſis perhaps "can be thought of which will ſatisfy in all its Parts *." Then having

* —Non autem prætermittenda eſt, quarto, ſententia doctiſſimi viri Warburtoni noſtri, qui magno ingenii acumine, multiſque argumentis, ſatis quidem ſpecioſis, probare nititur, Totum librum eſſe opus dramaticum & allegoricum, veræ tamen hiſtoriæ ſuperſtructum, ab Eſdra conſcriptum, in ſolatium Judæorum, qui e Babylone in ſuam patriam reverſi, providentiam ordinariam & inæqualem, contra atque expectabant, jam erant experturi. In re admodum ſane incerta, & quæ eruditorum hominum diſſenſione incertior adhuc reddita eſt, vix ulla forſan hypotheſis excogitari poſſit, quæ ex omni parte ſatisfaciat.——Ut ad eorum itaque ſententiam accedo, qui librum Jobi omnium ſacrorum codicum antiquiſſimum eſſe putant; ita a Moyſe quidem ex authenticis monumentis deſumptum, poeticeque ornatum fuiſſe, nullus dubito.——Atque ex noſtra hac opinione ratio ſatis idonea reddi poteſt omnium eorum textuum, ſiqui ſint, in quibus ſive ad legem, ſive ad hiſtoriam Judaicam ante ſcriptum librum, alluſum eſt, non minus acſi ab Eſdra eum ſcriptum fuiſſe concedatur, de quo viro diverſa ſentiunt eruditi. Quod vero ad eos locos, quos ad ſequiorum temporum hiſtorias referre putat vir doctiſſimus, nempe

having told us what *Spanheim* ſaid, and what his Author *Schultens* ſays, which are nothing to the matter in hand, he goes on thus: "There-

nempe ad Hezekiæ ægritudinem & convaleſcentiam, cap. xxxiii. 25. & exercitus Aſſyrii internecionem, cap. xxxiv. 20. ita eos intelligi ut nihil neceſſe eſt, ita commodius aliter accipi poſſe, ex notis, ad quas lectorem remitto, ſatis apparebit. Porro, opus eſſe dramaticum, ſeu potius veram hiſtoriam forma dramatica, habituque poetico exornatam, ſemper exiſtimavi; at vero ſubeſſe quoque allegoriam, perſuaderi nequeo, ſiquidem non ſcriptoris tantum ætas, ſed & libri ſcopus, quantum ego quidem video, ei ſententiæ adverſatur. Nam quod dicit vir clariſſ. id præcipue in hoc libro diſceptari, nempe an bonis ſemper bona, maliſque mala, an utriſque utraque promiſcue obtingant: hanc autem quæſtionem (a nobis quidem alienam, minuſque ideo perpenſam) nuſquam alibi gentium præterquam in Judæa, nec apud ipſos Judæos alio quovis tempore, quam quod aſſignat, moveri potuiſſe, id omne ex veritate ſuæ hypotheſeos pendet, et mea quidem ſententia, longe aliter ſe habet. Nempe id unum voluiſſe mihi videtur ſacer ſcriptor, ut piis omnibus, utcunque afflictis, humilitatis & patientiæ perpetuum extaret documentum ex contemplatione gemina, hinc infinitæ Dei perfectionis, ſapientiæ ac potentiæ; illinc humanæ, quæ in ſanctiſſimis quoque viris ineſt, corruptionis, imbecillitatis, & ignorantiæ. Quamvis enim in ſermonibus, qui in eo habentur, de religione, de virtute, de providentia, Deique in mundo gubernando ſapientia, juſtitia, ſanctitate, de uno rerum omnium principio, aliiſque graviſſimis veritatibus diſſertetur, hunc tamen quem dixi unicum eſſe libri ſcopum, tam ex initio & fine, quam ex univerſa ejus œconomia cuivis opinor manifeſtum erit. Ea enim, ut rem omnem ſummatim complectar, Jobum exhibet, primo quidem querentem, expoſtulantem, effræni luctui indulgentem; mox (quum, ut ſacri dramatis natura poſtulabat, amicorum contradictione ſiniſtriſque ſuſpicionibus magis magiſque irritatus & laceſſitus eſſet) imprudentius Deum provocantem, atque in juſtitia ſua gloriantem; ad debitam tandem ſummiſſionem ſuique cognitionem revocatum, tum demum, nec antea, integritatis ſuæ tam præmium, quam teſtimonium a Deo reportantem. Ex his, inquam, apparet, non primario agi in hoc libro de providentia, ſive æquali, ſive inæquali, ſed de perſonali Jobi integritate. Hanc enim (quod omnino obſervandum eſt) in dubium vocaverant amici, non ideo tantum quod afflictus eſſet, ſed quod afflictus impatientius ſe gereret, Deique juſtitiæ obmurmuraret: & qui ſtrenuus videlicet aliorum hortator fuerat ad fortitudinem & conſtantiam, quum ipſe tentaretur, victus labaſceret. Quum acceſſerat ſanctiſſimi viri malis hæc graviſſima omnium tentatio, ut tanquam improbus & hypocrita ab amicis damnaretur, & quod unicum ei ſupererat, conſcientiæ ſuæ teſtimonio ac ſolatio, quantum ipſi potuerunt, privandus foret, quid miſero faciendum erat? Amicos perfidiæ & crudelitatis arguit: Deum integritatis ſuæ teſtem vindicemque appellat: quum autem nec Deus interveniret, ad innocentiam ejus vindicandam, nec remitterent quicquam amici de acerbis ſuis cenſuris, injuſtiſque criminationibus,

" Therefore as I am of their Opinion who think the Book of *Job*
" the oldeſt in the Canon, ſo I am fully perſuaded that it was writ-
" ten by *Moſes* himſelf, who took it from authentic Records, and
" put it into the Dreſs of Poetry.——And, on this our Opinion,
" a good Account may be given of all thoſe Texts, if any ſuch
" there be, wherein Alluſion is made to the Jewiſh Law or Hiſtory
" before the Book was written, no leſs than if we ſhould allow it
" to have been written by *Eſdras*, of whom the Learned think
" differently. And as to thoſe Places which, in the Opinion of
" the Author of *The Divine Legation*, refer to Hiſtories of later
" Times, ſuch as the Sickneſs and Recovery of *Hezekiah*, cap.
" xxxiii. 25. and the Deſtruction of the *Aſſyrian* Army, cap. xxxiv.
" 20. it will ſufficiently appear by the Notes, to which I refer
" the Reader, that there is no need to underſtand them in this
" Senſe, and that they are more commodiouſly underſtood other-
" wiſe. Further, that the Work is dramatical, or, to ſpeak more
" properly, a true Hiſtory in the Form of a Drama, and adorned
" with a poetic Dreſs, was always my Opinion: But that any
" Allegory lies under it I can by no means perſuade myſelf to be-
" lieve; becauſe not only the Age of the Writer, but the very

nationibus, ad ſupremum illud judicium provocat in quo redemptorem ſibi aſſuturum, Deumque a ſuis partibus ſaturum, ſumma cum fiducia ſe noviſſe affirmat. Jam vero ſi cardo controverſiæ fuiſſet, utrum, ſalva Dei juſtitia, ſancti in hac vita adfligi poſſent, hæc ipſa declaratio ſitem finire debuerat. Sin autem de perſonali Jobi innocentia diſceptetur, nil mirum quod veterem canere cantilenam, Jobumque ut fecerant, condemnare pergerent ſocii, quum Dei ſolius erat, qui corda hominum explorat, pro certo ſcire, an jure merito ſibi Jobus hoc ſolamen attribueret, an falſam ſibi fiduciam vanus arrogaret. Hac igitur difficultate ſublata, nempe cur non ſtatim obmutuerunt amici, quum de futuro judicio tam ſolenniter magnificeque dixiſſet Jobus, nil obſtat quo minus celebrem illum contextum cap. xix. non de temporali in integrum reſtitutione, ſed de reſurrectione ad vitam æternam, intelligere poſſis. Quod ſi argumentis a commentatore noſtro allatis, ea quoque adjeceris quæ vir omni laude major, jam epiſcopus Sariſburienſis, in diſſertatione ſua, *De ſententia veterum de circumſtantiis & conſequentiis lapſus humani* pulcherrime contexuit, nil ultra, credo, deſideraris, vel ad libri antiquitatem, vel ad vexatiſſimi hujus loci ſenſum, confirmandum. *Præf.* p. x—xv.

" Scope of the Book (as far as I can ſee) leads us to conclude other-
" wiſe. For as to what this Writer ſays, that the main Queſtion
" handled in the Book of *Job* is whether Good happens to the Good,
" and Evil to evil Men, or whether both happen not promiſcu-
" ouſly to both: and that this Queſtion (a very foreign one to us,
" and therefore the leſs attended to) could never be the Subject of
" Diſputation any where but in the Land of *Judæa*, nor there
" neither at any other time than that which he aſſigns: All this,
" I ſay, depends on the Truth of his Hypotheſis; and is, in my
" Opinion, far otherwiſe. For the ſole Purpoſe of the ſacred Wri-
" ter ſeems to me to be this, to compoſe a Work that ſhould re-
" main a perpetual Document of Humility and Patience to all good
" Men in Affliction, from this two-fold Conſideration, as on the
" one hand, of the infinite Perfection, Power, and Wiſdom of
" God; ſo on the other of human Corruption, Imbecillity, and
" Ignorance, diſcoverable even in the beſt of Men. For although
" in the Speeches that occur there be much Talk of Religion,
" Virtue, and Providence; of God's Wiſdom, Juſtice, and Holi-
" neſs, in the Government of the World; of one Principle of all
" things, and other moſt important Truths; yet that this, which
" I have aſſigned, is the only Scope of the Book, will appear mani-
" feſt to every one, as well from the beginning and the end, as from
" the Oeconomy of the whole. For to ſay all in a word, it firſt
" preſents *Job* complaining, expoſtulating, and indulging himſelf
" in an ungovernable Grief, but ſoon after (when, as the Nature
" of the ſacred Drama required, by the Contradiction of his Friends
" and their ſiniſter Suſpicions he became more and more teized and
" irritated) raſhly challenging God, and glorying in his own In-
" tegrity; yet at length brought back to a due Submiſſion and
" Knowledge of himſelf; and then, at laſt, and not before, re-
" ceiving from God both the Reward and Teſtimony of his Up-
" rightneſs. From all this, I ſay, it appears that the perſonal In-
" tegrity of *Job*, and not the Queſtion concerning an equal or un-
" equal Providence, is the principal Subject of the Book. For *that*

" it

" it was (and there our Attention ſhould be fixed), which his " Friends doubted of; not ſo much on account of his Affliction, as " for the not bearing his Affliction with Patience, but complaining " of the Juſtice of God. And that he who was an able Adviſer of " others to Fortitude and Conſtancy, ſhould, when his own Trial " came, ſink under the Stroke of his Diſaſters. *See* cap. iv. ver. 12. 34. " Now when the moſt grievous Trial of all was added to the other " Evils of this holy Perſon, to be condemned by his Friends as a " Profligate and a Hypocrite, and to be deprived, as much as in " them lay, of his only remaining Support, the Teſtimony of a " good Conſcience, what was left for the unhappy Man to do? He " accuſes his Friends of Perfidy and Cruelty; he calls upon God " as the Witneſs and Avenger of his Integrity: But when neither " God interpoſed to vindicate his Innocence, nor his Friends forbore " to urge their harſh Cenſures and unjuſt Accuſations, he appeals " to that laſt Judgment in which, with the utmoſt Confidence, he " affirms that he knew, his Redeemer would be preſent to him, " and that God would declare in his Favour. But now, if the " Hinge of the Controverſy had turned on this, Whether or no, " conſiſtently with God's Juſtice, good Men could be afflicted in " this Life, this Declaration ought to have finiſhed the Debate: " But if the Queſtion were concerning the perſonal Innocence of " *Job*, it was no Wonder that they ſtill ſung their old Song, and " went on as they had begun, to condemn their old afflicted Friend, " ſince it was in the Power of God alone to explore the Hearts of " Men, and to know for certain whether it was *Job's* Piety that " rightly applied a Conſolation, or whether it was his Vanity that " arrogated a falſe Confidence to himſelf.

" This Difficulty therefore being removed, namely, why his " Friends were not immediately put to Silence when *Job* had ſo " ſolemnly and magnificently talked of a future Judgment, nothing " hinders us from applying that celebrated Text cap. xix. not to a " temporal Reſtitution to his former Condition, but to a Reſur- " rection to eternal Life. But if, to the Arguments brought by our

" Commentator, you add alſo thoſe, which a Writer above all " praiſe, the preſent Biſhop of *Sarum*, hath moſt beautifully inter- " woven in his Diſſertation on *the Opinion of the Ancients concerning* " *the Circumſtances and Conſequences of the Lapſe of Mankind*, I be- " lieve you will want nothing to confirm you in the Opinion of " the Antiquity of the Book, and my Senſe of this moſt perplexed " Paſſage." Thus far the very candid and learned Writer; who will not be diſpleaſed with me for examining the Reaſons he hath here offered againſt my Explanation of the Book of *Job*.

He begins with ſaying, that *I have by many Arguments ſufficiently ſpecious, endeavoured to prove that the whole Book of Job is dramatical and allegorical, yet founded in true Hiſtory, and written by* Eſdra *in Solace of the Jews, &c.* And then immediately ſubjoins, *Now in a Matter very uncertain, and which hitherto hath been made more uncertain by the different Opinions of learned Men, hardly any Hypotheſis can be thought of which will ſatisfy in all its Parts.* Let us attend to the opening of his Cauſe. 1. He owns my *Hypotheſis to be ſufficiently ſpecious*, and yet calls the Subject, which this *Hypotheſis* explains, a *Matter very uncertain*; nay, HITHERTO *rendered more uncertain*—By what? why, if you will believe himſelf, by *many Arguments ſufficiently ſpecious*; for this is the Character he is pleaſed to give of theſe of mine, which fill up the Meaſure of thoſe *different Opinions*, from whence ſo great *Uncertainty* is accumulated. 2. He ſays that *in an uncertain Matter ſcarce any Hypotheſis can ſatisfy*. Now, though this be a common-place Thought, it is nevertheleſs a very falſe one. For it is only in *uncertain Matters* that *Hypotheſis's* are invented, to be applied, to account for the Appearances of Things: And ſure it is not of the *Nature* of an Hypotheſis to be *unſatisfactory?* 3. It is equally falſe that an *uncertain Matter is*, otherwiſe than by Accident, *rendered more uncertain by Diverſity of Opinions*. For the greater the Diverſity is, the greater is the Chance of coming to the Truth: As the more Roads Men take in an uncertain Way, the greater the Likelihood of finding out the Right. 4. It is not required in a *ſatisfactory* Hypotheſis that it ſhould *ſatisfy*

tisfy in all its Parts: For then the greateſt and moſt momentous Truths would never be acquieſced in, ſince ſome of the fundamental Points of Religion, natural and revealed, do not *ſatisfy in all their Parts*; there being inexplicable Objections even to *demonſtrative* Propoſitions. 5. But what is ſtrangeſt of all, though he ſays *hardly any Hypotheſis can be thought of which will ſatisfy in all its Parts*; yet, before he comes to the end of his Paragraph, he has found one that does *ſatisfy*: and, ſtranger ſtill, it is the *common* one, whoſe Incapacity of giving *Satisfaction* was the Reaſon for the Critics excogitating *ſo many different ones*. However, in this Hypotheſis he reſts, like a prudent Man as he is. *Therefore* (ſays he) *as I am of their Opinion who think the Book of* Job *the oldeſt in the Canon, ſo I am fully perſuaded that it was written by* Moſes *himſelf, who took it from authentic Records, and put it into the Dreſs of Poetry.* Indeed, to make Way through ſo much Doubt and Uncertainty, to an Opinion he may find his Account in, he has kept a Wicket open by the Inſertion of the Particle *vix*; *vix ulla forſan Hypotheſis*—but this will ſcarce ſerve his Purpoſe; For the Reaſons why *hardly any Hypotheſis can ſatisfy* extend as well to *that* he has given as to thoſe he has rejected: unleſs he will ſuppoſe the reſt to be diſcredited by diſſenting from *that*, and not *that* from the reſt: which perhaps after all may be his Thought.

He proceeds—*And on this our Opinion a good Account may be given of all thoſe Texts, if any ſuch there be, wherein Alluſion is made to the Jewiſh Law or Hiſtory before the Book was written, no leſs than if we ſhould allow it to have been written by* Eſdra, *of whom the Learned think differently.* Now, not to inſiſt upon this, that the *common Hypotheſis*, here followed, which makes *Moſes* the Author, ſuppoſes him to have wrote it *before* his Miſſion; and conſequently, *before* the *Jewiſh* Law and Affairs, alluded to, were given and tranſacted: Not, I ſay, to inſiſt on this, though no probable Reaſon can be aſſigned for *Moſes's* Writing ſuch a Work but for the People in *Captivity*; I will readily allow that *Moſes* might write any Thing that happened to him or his People, in or before his Adminiſtration,

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as eaſily as *Eſdra* could do. But the Queſtion is, which of the two is moſt *likely* to have done ſo. Our Author grants this to be a Work of *Imitation*, or of the dramatic Kind; in which the Manners and Adventures of the Perſons acting are to be repreſented. Now could *Moſes* miſtake, or, in ſuch a Work, give without miſtaking, the Hiſtory of his own Time for the Hiſtory of *Job's*? that is, make *Job* ſpeak of the *Egyptian* Darkneſs, or the Paſſage of the Red Sea? Adventures of the Writer's own atchieving. *Eſdra* indeed either way might well do this, as he lived ſo many Ages after the Facts in Queſtion. Could *Euripides*, for Example, have been ſo abſurd as to make *Oreſtes* and *Clytæmneſtra* ſpeak of *his own* Time or Actions? Though he might, without much Abſurdity, have made them mix the Manners, or allude to ſome Adventures of the Time of *Draco*. But our Author's Caution deſerves Commendation; *if* (ſays he) *there be any ſuch*: The Uſe of this is evident, that if his own Solution will not hold, he may be at Liberty to deny the Thing itſelf. But what he means, by obſerving it, in Diſcredit of *Eſdra's* Claim, that *Learned Men think differently of him*, as if they did not think differently of *Moſes* too, is, I confeſs, not ſo evident.

He goes on—*And as to thoſe Places, which in the Opinion of the Author of the D. L. refer to Hiſtories of later Times, ſuch as the Sickneſs and Recovery of* Hezekiah, chap. xxxiii. ver. 25. *and the Deſtruction of the* Aſſyrian *Army*, chap. xxxiv. ver 20. *it will ſufficiently appear, by the Notes to which I refer the Reader, that there is no need to underſtand them in this Senſe, and that they are more commodiouſly underſtood otherwiſe.* On this Point I agree to join Iſſue with him, and to refer myſelf to the Judgment of the Public.

Further, (ſays he) *that the Work is dramatical, or, to ſpeak more properly, a true Hiſtory in the Form of a Drama, and adorned with a poetical Dreſs, was always my Opinion: but that any Allegory lies under it, I can by no Means perſuade myſelf to believe; becauſe not only the Age of the Writer, but the very Scope of the Book (as far as I can ſee)*

ſee) leads us to conclude otherwiſe. As to the *Scope of the Book*, we ſhall examine that Matter by and by: But his other Argument, from the *Age of the Writer*, deſerves no Examination at all, as it is a downright begging the Queſtion; which is concerning the Writer and his Age. Now theſe, by reaſon of the Writer's Silence, being *uncertain*, muſt be determined by the Subject and Circumſtances of the Work, which are *certain*: For our Author, therefore, to diſprove a Circumſtance, brought to determine the Queſtion, by an Argument in which the Queſtion is taken for granted, I ſhould think unfair, were it not become the authorized Logick of all thoſe Writers who give their own *Opinions* for *Principles*. It reſts then at laſt, we ſee, in his *Belief* and *Perſuaſion*: And this is always regulated on the Belief and Perſuaſion of thoſe who went before. Thus he believes the Book to be *dramatical*, becauſe others have believed ſo too: He believes it not to be *allegorical*, becauſe he could find no other in that Belief before the Author of the *D. L.*— But let us now hear what he has to ſay concerning *the Scope of the Book.*

For as to what this Writer [the Author of the *D. L.*] *ſays, that the main Queſtion handled in the Book of* Job *is whether Good happens to the Good, and Evil to evil Men, or whether both happen not promiſcuouſly to both; and that this Queſtion (a very foreign one to us, and therefore the leſs attended to) could never be the Subject of Diſputation any where but in the Land of* Judæa, *nor there neither at any other time than that which he aſſigns; all this, I ſay, depends on the Truth of his Hypotheſis, and is, in my Opinion, far otherwiſe.* That which *depends on the Truth of an Hypotheſis* has, indeed, generally ſpeaking, a very ſlender Foundation: And I am partly of Opinion it was the common Prejudice againſt this Support that inclined our Author to give my Notions no better. But he ſhould have been a little more careful in timing his Obſervation: For, as it happens, what I have ſhewn to be the Subject of the Book is ſo far from depending on the Truth of my Hypotheſis, that the Truth

of

of my Hypotheſis depends on what I have ſhewn to be the Subject of the Book; and very fitly ſo, as every *reaſonable Hypotheſis* ſhould be ſupported on *Fact*. Now I appeal to the whole learned World, whether it be not as clear a *Fact* that the Subject of the Book of *Job* is *whether Good happens to the Good, and Evil to evil Men, or whether both happen not promiſcuouſly to both*; as that the Subject of the firſt Book of *Tuſculan Diſputations* is *de contemnenda morte*. On this I eſtabliſhed my Hypotheſis, that the Book of *Job* muſt have been written about the Time of *Eſdra*, becauſe no other aſſignable Time can be ſuited to the Subject.—But 'tis poſſible I may miſtake what he calls *my Hypotheſis*: For aught I know he may underſtand not *that* of the Book of *Job*, but *that* of the Book of the *Divine Legation*. And then, by *my Hypotheſis*, he muſt mean the great religious Principle I endeavour to evince, THAT THE JEWS WERE IN REALITY UNDER AN EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE. But it will be paying me a very unuſual Compliment to call *that* my Hypotheſis which the Bible was written to teſtify; which all Chriſtians *profeſs* to believe; and which none but Infidels *directly* deny. However, if this be the *Hypotheſis* he means, I need deſire no better a Support. But the Truth is, my Interpretation of the Book of *Job* ſeeks Support from nothing but thoſe common Rules of Grammar and Logic on which the Senſe of all kind of Writings are or ought to be interpreted.

He goes on in this Manner. *For the* SOLE *Purpoſe of the ſacred Writer ſeems to me to be this, to compoſe a Work that ſhould remain a perpetual Document of Humility and Patience to all good Men in Affliction from this two-fold Conſideration, as on the one hand of the infinite Perfection, Power, and Wiſdom of God; ſo on the other, of human Corruption, Imbecillity, and Ignorance, diſcoverable even in the beſt of Men.* Such Talk in a Sermon to his Pariſh for the ſake of a moral Application, might be right: But to ſpeak thus to the *learned World*, is ſurely out of Seaſon. The Critic will be apt to tell him he has miſtaken the *Actor* for the *Subject*, and might on the ſame principle as well

well conclude that the purpoſe of *Virgil's* Poem is not the Eſtabliſhment of an Empire in *Italy*, but the perſonal Piety of *Æneas*. But to be a little more explicite, as the peculiar Nature of this Work demands. The Book of *Job* conſiſts of two diſtinct Parts; the *Narrative*, contained in the Prologue and Epilogue; and the *Argumentative*, which compoſes the Body of the Work. Now when the Queſtion is of the Subject of a Book, who means other than the Body of it? Yet here our Author, by a ſtrange Fatality, miſtaking the *narrative* Part for the *argumentative*, gives us the Subject of the Introduction and Concluſion for that of the Work itſelf. And it is very true that the *beginning* and the *end do* exhibit *a perpetual Document of Humility and Patience to all good Men in Affliction*. But it is as true that the *Body* of the Work neither *does* nor *could* exhibit any ſuch Document. Firſt it *does not*; for, that Humility and Patience, which *Job* manifeſts before his entering into Diſpute, is ſucceeded by Rage and Oſtentation when he becomes heated with unreaſonable Oppoſition. Secondly, it *could not*; becauſe it is altogether *argumentative*; the Subject of which muſt neceſſarily be a *Propoſition* debated, and not a *Document* exemplified. A *Precept* may be conveyed in Hiſtory, but a Diſputation can exhibit only a debated *Queſtion*. I have ſhewn what that *Queſtion* is; and he, inſtead of proving that I have aſſigned a wrong one, goes about to perſuade the Reader, that there is no Queſtion at all.

He proceeds. *For although in the Speeches that occur there be much Talk of Religion, Virtue, and Providence, of God's Wiſdom, Juſtice, and Holineſs in the Government of the World, of one Principle of all things, and other moſt important Truths, yet that this which I have aſſigned is the only Scope of the Book will appear manifeſt to every one, as well from the Beginning and the End as from the Oeconomy of the whole. For to ſay all in a word, it firſt preſents* Job *complaining, expoſtulating, and indulging himſelf in an ungovernable Grief; but ſoon after (when as the Nature of the ſacred Drama required, by the Contradiction of his Friends, and their ſiniſter Suſpicions, he became more*

and more teized and irritated) raſhly challenging God, and glorying in his own Integrity: yet at length brought back to a due Submiſſion and Knowledge of himſelf. The Reader now ſees that all this is juſt as pertinent as if I ſhould ſay, Mr. *Chillingworth's* famous Book againſt *Knot* was not to prove *the Religion of Proteſtants a ſafe way to Salvation*, but to give the Picture of an artful Caviler and a candid Diſputer. For, although, in the Arguments that occur, there be much Talk of Proteſtantiſm, Popery, Infallibility, a Judge of Controverſies, Fundamentals of Faith, and other moſt important Matters, yet that this which I have aſſigned is the only Scope of the Book, will appear manifeſt to every one, as well from the beginning and the end, as from the Oeconomy of the whole. For it firſt of all preſents the Sophiſt quibbling, chicaning, and indulging himſelf in all the imaginable Methods of falſe Reaſoning: And ſoon after, as the Courſe of Diſputation required, reſting on his own Authority, and loading his Adverſary with perſonal Calumnies; yet at length, by the Force of Truth and good Logic, brought back to the Point, confuted, expoſed, and put to ſilence. Now if I ſhould ſay this of the Book of *Chillingworth*, would it not be as true, and as much to the Purpoſe, as what our Author hath ſaid of the Book of *Job?* The Matters in the Diſcourſe of *the Religion of Proteſtants* could not be treated as they are without exhibiting the two Characters of a Sophiſt and a true Logician. Nor could the Matters in the Book of *Job* be treated as they are without exhibiting a good Man in Afflictions, complaining and expoſtulating, impatient under the Contradiction of his Friends, yet at length brought back to a due Submiſſion, and Knowledge of himſelf. But therefore to make this the *ſole* or *chief* Scope of the Book, (for in this he varies) is perverting all the Rules of Interpretation. But what miſled him we have taken Notice of above. And he himſelf points to it, where he ſays, *the Subject I have aſſigned to the Book of* Job *appears the true both from the* BEGINNING *and the* END. It is true, he adds, and *from the Oeconomy of the whole* likewiſe.

Which

Which he endeavours to prove in this Manner:

For it firſt preſents Job *complaining, expoſtulating, and indulging himſelf in an ungovernable Grief: but ſoon after (when, as the Nature of the ſacred Drama required, by the Contradiction of his Friends, and their ſiniſter Suſpicions, he became more and more teized and irritated) raſhly challenging God, and glorying in his own Integrity: yet at length brought back to a due Submiſſion and Knowledge of himſelf; and then at laſt, and not before, receiving from God both the Reward and Teſtimony of his Uprightneſs.* This is indeed a fair Account of the Conduct of the Drama. And from this it appears, *firſt*, that that which he aſſigns for the ſole Scope of the Book cannot be the true. For if its Deſign were to give *a perpetual Document of Humility and Patience*, how comes it to paſs, that the Author, in the Execution of this Deſign, repreſents *Job complaining, expoſtulating, and indulging himſelf in an ungovernable Grief, raſhly challenging God, and glorying in his own Integrity?* Could a Painter, think you, in order to repreſent the Eaſe and Safety of Navigation, draw a Veſſel getting with much Pains and Difficulty into Harbour, after having loſt all her Lading and been miſerably torn and ſhattered by a Tempeſt? And yet you think a Writer, in order to give a *Document of Humility and Patience*, had ſufficiently diſcharged his Plan if he made *Job* conclude *reſigned and ſubmiſſive*, though he had drawn him turbulent, impatient, and almoſt blaſphemous throughout the whole Piece. *Secondly*, it appears from the learned Author's Account of the Conduct of the Drama, that that which I have aſſigned for the ſole Scope of the Book is the true. For if, in *Job's* diſtreſsful Circumſtance, the Queſtion concerning an *equal* or *unequal* Providence were to be debated: His Friends, if they held the former Part, muſt *needs* doubt of his Integrity; this doubt would naturally provoke *Job's* Indignation; and, when perſiſted in, cauſe him to fly out into the intemperate Exceſſes ſo well deſcribed by our Author; yet conſcious Innocence would at length enable Patience to do its Office, and the con-

cluſive Argument for his Integrity would be his Reſignation and Submiſſion.

The learned Writer ſhuts up the Argument thus. *From all this, I ſay, it appears, that the perſonal Integrity of* Job, *and not the Queſtion concerning an equal or unequal Providence, is the principal Subject of the Book.* He had before only told us his *Opinion*; and now, from his *Opinion*, he ſays it *appears*. But Appearances, we ſee, are deceitful; as indeed they will always be, when they ariſe only out of the Fancy or Inclination, and not from the real nature of things.

But he proceeds to puſh his Advantages. *For that* [i. e. his perſonal Integrity] *it was which his Friends doubted of, not ſo much on account of his Affliction, as for the not bearing his Affliction with Patience, but complaining of the Juſtice of God. And that he, who was an able Adviſer of others to Fortitude and Conſtancy, ſhould, when his own Trial came, ſink under the Stroke of his Diſaſters.*—But why not *on account of his Afflictions?* Do not we find that even now, under this *unequal* Diſtribution of Things, cenſorious Men (and ſuch doubtleſs he will confeſs *Job*'s Comforters to have been) are but too apt to ſuſpect great Afflictions for the Puniſhment of ſecret Sins? How much more prone to the ſame Suſpicion would ſuch men be in the Time of *Job*, when the Ways of Providence were more *equal?* As to his *Impatience in bearing Affliction*, that Symptom was altogether ambiguous, and might as likely denote want of Fortitude as want of Innocence, and proceed as well from the Pain of an ulcerated Body as the Anguiſh of a diſtracted Conſcience.

Well, our Author has brought the Patriarch thus far on his Way to expoſe his *bad Temper*. From hence he accompanies him to his Place of Reſt; which, he makes to be in a *bad Argument*.—*Now when* (ſays the learned Writer) *the moſt grievous Trial of all was added to the other Evils of this holy Perſon, to be condemned by his Friends as a Profligate, and an Hypocrite, and to be deprived, as much as*

as in them lay, of his only remaining Support, the Teſtimony of a good Conſcience, what was left for the unhappy Man to do? He accuſes his Friends of Perfidy and Cruelty; he calls upon God as the Witneſs and Avenger of his Integrity: But when neither God interpoſed to vindicate his Innocence, nor his Friends forbore to urge their harſh Cenſures and unjuſt Accuſations, he appeals to that laſt Judgment, in which with the utmoſt Confidence he affirms that he knew that his Redeemer would be preſent to him, and that God would declare in his Favour. To underſtand the Force of this Repreſentation, we muſt have in Mind this unqueſtionable Truth: "That be the Subject of the Book "what it will, yet if the ſacred Writer bring in the Perſons of the "Drama diſputing, he will take Care that they talk to the Purpoſe." Now we both agree that *Job's* Friends had pretended to ſuſpect his Integrity. This Suſpicion it was *Job's* Buſineſs to remove: and, if our Author's Account of the Subject be true, his only Buſineſs. To this end he offers various Arguments, which failing of their Effect, he, at laſt (as our Author will have it), appeals to the ſecond Coming of the Redeemer of Mankind. But was this likely to ſatisfy them? They demand a preſent Solution of their Doubts, and he ſends them to a future Judgment. Nor can our Author *ſay*, though he would *inſinuate*, that this was ſuch a ſort of Appeal as Diſputants are ſometimes forced to have Recourſe to, when they are run aground and have nothing more to offer: For *Job*, *after* this, proceeds in the Diſpute; and urges many other Arguments with the utmoſt Propriety. Indeed there is one way, and but one, to make the Appeal pertinent: And that is, to ſuppoſe our Author *miſtaken*, when he ſaid that *the perſonal Integrity of* Job, *and not the Queſtion concerning an equal or unequal Providence, was the main Subject of the Book:* And we may venture to ſuppoſe ſo without much danger of doing him wrong: For, the Doctrine of a *future Judgment* affords a Principle whereon to determine the *Queſtion of an equal or unequal Providence*; but it leaves the *perſonal Integrity of* Job juſt as it found it. But the learned Author is ſo little ſolicitous for the

Pertinency

Pertinency of the Argument, that he makes, as we ſhall now ſee, its *Impertinence* one of the great Supports of his Syſtem. For thus he goes on: *But now if the Hinge of the Controverſy had turned on this, whether or no, conſiſtently with God's Juſtice, good Men could be afflicted in this Life, this Declaration ought to have finiſhed the Debate: but if the Queſtion were concerning the perſonal Innocence of* Job, *it was no wonder that they ſtill ſung their old Song, and went on as they had begun, to condemn their old afflicted Friend; ſince it was in the Power of God alone to explore the Hearts of Men, and to know for certain whether it was* Job's *Piety that rightly applied a Conſolation, or whether it was his Vanity that arrogated a falſe Confidence to himſelf.* This is a very pleaſant Way of coming to the Senſe of a diſputed Paſſage: Not, as of old, by ſhewing it ſuports the *Writer's Argument*, but by ſhewing it ſupports nothing but the *Critic's Hypotheſis*. I had taken it for granted that *Job* reaſoned to the Purpoſe, and therefore urged this Argument againſt underſtanding him as ſpeaking of the Reſurrection in the xixth Chapter. "The "Diſputants (ſay I, Div. Leg. Vol. ii. Ed. 2.* p. 546), are all equally "embarraſſed in adjuſting the Ways of Providence. *Job* affirms "that the good Man is ſometimes unhappy: the three Friends pre- "tend that he never can; becauſe ſuch a Situation would reflect "upon God's Juſtice. Now the Doctrine of a *Reſurrection* ſuppoſed "to be urged by *Job* cleared up all this Embarras. If therefore his "Friends thought it true, it ended the Diſpute; if falſe, it lay "upon them to confute it. Yet they do neither: They neither "call it into queſtion, nor allow it to be deciſive. But without "the leaſt Notice that any ſuch thing had been urged, they go "on as they begun, to inforce their former Arguments, and to "confute that which they ſeem to underſtand was the only one "*Job* had urged againſt them, *viz.* the Conſciouſneſs of his own "Innocence." Now what ſays our learned Author to this? Why, he ſays, that if I be miſtaken, and he right, in his Account of the Book of *Job*, the Reaſon is plain why the three

* Vol. III. ed. 4to. p. 524.

Friends

Friends took no notice of *Job's* Appeal to a Reſurrection; namely, becauſe it deſerved none. As to his being in the *Right*, the Reader, I ſuppoſe, will not be greatly ſolicitous, if it be one of the Conſequences that the ſacred Reaſoner is in the *Wrong*. However, before we allow him to be right, it will be expected he ſhould anſwer the following Queſtions. If, as he ſays, the Point in the Book of *Job* was *only his perſonal Innocence*, and this, not (as I ſay) *upon* the Principle of *no innocent Perſon puniſhed*, I would aſk how it was poſſible that *Job's* Friends and Intimates ſhould be ſo obſtinately bent on pronouncing him guilty, the Purity of whoſe former Life and Converſation they were ſo well acquainted with? If he will ſay, the Diſputants went *upon that Principle*, I then aſk how came *Job's* Appeal to a Reſurrection not to ſilence his Oppoſers? as it accounted for the Juſtice of God in the preſent unequal Diſtribution of Things.

The learned Writer proceeds—*This Difficulty therefore being removed, namely, why his Friends were not immediately put to ſilence when* Job *had ſo ſolemnly and magnificently talked of a future Judgment, nothing hinders us from applying that celebrated Text* chap. XIX. *not to a temporal Reſtitution to his former Condition, but to a Reſurrection to eternal Life.* How well he has *removed the Difficulty*, the Reader now ſees. But he is too haſty, when he adds, that *now nothing hinders us from applying that celebrated Text* chap. XIX. *to a Reſurrection to eternal Life.* I have ſhewn, in my Diſcourſe on *Job*, that many Things *hinder* us from underſtanding it in this Senſe, beſides the Silence of the three Friends; ſuch as the Silence of *Elihu* the Moderator, nay even of God himſelf the Determiner of the Diſpute *. Which Difficulties become ſtill more perplexing, if indeed the *ſole Scope* of the Book be, as our Author ſuppoſes, to give *a perpetual Document of Humility and Patience to all good Men in Affliction:* For then the Doctrine needed the Sanction of the moſt deliberate and authoritative Speakers. Add to this, that the learned

* Divine Legation, vol. III. p. 298.

Writer's

Writer's Account of the *Author* creates new Difficulties. For can we ſuppoſe, *Moſes* would ſo clearly mention a *future Judgment* here, and entirely omit it in the *Pentateuch?* Or is it a Matter of ſo ſlight Moment that a ſingle Mention of it would ſuffice? Indeed, were *Eſdra* (as I ſuppoſe) the Author, much more might be ſaid in behalf of this Interpretation; as we have ſhewn that the later Prophets opened, by degrees, the great Principles of the Goſpel Diſpenſation: Of which I would fain think the Doctrine of the *Reſurrection of the Body* to be one.

He concludes—*But if, to the Arguments brought by our Commentator, you add alſo thoſe, which a Writer above all Praiſe, the preſent Biſhop of* Sarum, *hath moſt beautifully interwoven in his Diſſertation on* The Opinion of the Ancients concerning the Circumſtances and Conſequences of the Lapſe of Mankind, *I believe you will want nothing to confirm you in the Opinion of the Antiquity of the Book, and my Senſe of this moſt perplexed Paſſage.* To ſeek refuge in that excellent Prelate, whoſe Notions of the Nature and Deſign of the Book of *Job* overthrow all he has been ſaying, and confirm all he has been oppoſing, looks very much like Diſtreſs. However, if he will ſubmit to the Biſhop's Authority for the Scope of the Book in general, I ſhall be very willing to allow his Interpretation of the *nineteenth* Chapter. Our Author indeed does that great Man's Character but Juſtice. Yet how Dr. *Schultens* and Dr. *Sherlock* came to hit the ſame Palate, to me, I confeſs, is as hard to reconcile, as how *Bavius* and *Virgil* ſhould meet for a Model to the ſame Writer.

But the *Name* of that great Man is *auſpicious* to ſacred Truth. One can no ſooner mention him, on any Occaſion of Literature, than one ſees him pointing out ſome Truth or other, capable, if attended to, of clearing up whatever may be in queſtion. His fine Diſcourſe on the Book of *Job* abounds with Inſtances of this kind. One of which falls here naturally in my Way. And as it ſeems the leaſt ſupported of his Interpretations, and, at the ſame time, greatly confirms what I have advanced concerning the *Age* of the Book, I

ſhall

ſhall endeavour to ſet it in a juſt Light. The *Truth* I mean is in his Interpretation of theſe Words of *Job*, *By his Spirit the Heavens are garniſhed; his Hand formed the* CROOKED SERPENT *. By which, he ſuppoſes, is meant the DEVIL, the *apoſtate Dragon*, δράκων ἀποςάτης, as the *Septuagint*, by thus tranſlating it, ſeems to have underſtood the Place. For he reaſonably aſks, *How came the forming of a crooked Serpent to be mentioned as an Inſtance of Almighty Power, and to be ſet, as it were, upon an equal Foot with the Creation of the Heavens and all the Hoſt of them.*—*Can it poſſibly be imagined* (ſays he) *that the forming the crooked Serpent means no more than that* God *created Snakes and Adders* †. Certainly, this could never be the meaning. But then it will be objected by thoſe who are as loth to find a *Devil* for their *Tempter*, as a *God* for their *Redeemer* (imagining they are well capable of performing both Parts themſelves), that, by the *crooked Serpent*, is meant a *great Conſtellation* near the Arctic Pole, ſo called; or, at leaſt, that *enormous* Trail of Light to which the Pagans have given the Name of the *Via Lactea:* either of which will beautify the Senſe, and ennoble the Expreſſion of the Context; the Circumſtance, of *garniſhing the Heavens*, being immediately, precedent. It muſt be owned that this Interpretation has an extreme Air of Probability. But it is nevertheleſs a falſe one; as I ſhall now endeavour to ſhew.

It is certain then that the ancient *Hebrews* (if we may believe the Rabbins, who ſeem, in this caſe, to be unexceptionable Evidence) did not, in their Aſtronomy, repreſent the Stars, either ſingle, or in Conſtellations, by the Name, or Figure, of any Animal whatſoever; or diſtinguiſh them any otherwiſe than by the Letters of their Alphabet artificially applied. And this, they tell us, was their conſtant Practice, till in the latter Ages; when they got acquainted with the Science of the *Greeks:* then indeed, they learnt the Art of new tricking up their *Sphere*, and making it as

* Cap. xxvi. ver. 13.

† The Uſe and Intent of Prophecy, &c. 3d Edit. p. 213, 214.

faſhionable as their Neighbours. But they did it ſtill with Modeſty and Reſerve; and ſcrupled, even then, to admit of any human Figure. The Reaſon given for this Prudery (which was *the Danger of Idolatry*) is the higheſt Confirmation of the Truth of their Account. For it is not to be believed, that when the *Aſtronomy* and *Superſtition* of *Egypt* were ſo cloſely colleagued, and that by this very means, the *Names* given to the Conſtellations, that *Moſes*, who, under the Miniſtry of God, forbad the *Iſraelites to make any Likeneſs of any thing in Heaven above*, would ſuffer them to make *new Likeneſſes* there: which if not, in the firſt Intention, ſet up to be worſhipped, yet we know never waited long without obtaining that Honour. From all this it appears, that neither *Moſes* nor *Eſdra* could call a Conſtellation by the Name of the *crooked Serpent*. The Conſequence is, that his Lordſhip's Interpretation is to be received; there being nothing elſe of Moment to be oppoſed to its Truth. But this Senſe, we ſay, gives ſtrong Support to what we have obſerved, in *The Divine Legation*, concerning the Age of the Author. It being there ſhewn *, that, according to the Method uſed by Providence for the gradual Opening of the Goſpel Principles, we might look to find, in this very Place (as we in fact do find) the *firſt* more expreſs Information concerning the *real* Author of the Fall of Man, as recorded in the *third* Chapter of *Geneſis*.

But, to conclude with the learned Editor of the Book of *Job*. He had, I preſume, given the intelligent Reader more Satisfaction, if, inſtead of labouring to evade two or three independent though corroborating Proofs of the *Truth* of my Hypotheſis, he had well accounted how that Hypotheſis, which he affects to repreſent as a *falſe* one, ſhould be able to lay open and unfold the whole Poem upon one entire, elegant, and noble Plan, that does honour to the ſacred Writer who compoſed it. And not only ſo, but to clear up, conſiſtently with that *Plan*, all thoſe particular Texts, whoſe Want of Light had made them hitherto an eaſy Prey to Critics and In-

* Div. Leg. vol. III. p. 614, *&ſeq.*

terpreters

terpreters from every Quarter. And this, in a Poem become through Time and Negligence ſo deſperately perplexed, that Commentators choſe rather to find their own Notions in it than to ſeek for thoſe of the Author. This, how negligently ſoever the learned Writer may think of it, the Public, I am perſuaded, will conſider as a very uncommon Mark of Truth; and deſerving of another kind of Confutation than what he hath beſtowed upon it.

SECT. V.

See DIVINE LEGATION, Vol. I. and II.

HERE I ſhould have ended had I not been told, there was ſomething ſtill more wanted than a Defence of particular Paſſages; which commonly indeed carry their own Evidence along with them; and That was a general Review of the Argument of *The Divine Legation*, ſo far as it was yet advanced; explaining the Relation which the ſeveral Parts bear to each other, and to the whole: For that the deep Profeſſor who had digeſted his Theology into *Sums* and *Syſtems*, and the gentle Preacher who never ventured to let a Thought expatiate beyond the Limits of a *Pulpit Eſſay*, would join to tell me, I had promiſed to DEMONSTRATE THE DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES; and that now, I had written two large Volumes with that *Title*, all that they could find in them were Diſcourſes on the *Foundation of Morality*; the *Origin of civil and religious Society*; the *Alliance between Church and State*; the *Policy of ancient Lawgivers*; the *Myſteries of the Prieſts*, and the *Opinions of the Greek Philoſophers*; the *Antiquity of Egypt*, their *Hieroglyphics*, their *Heroes*, and their *Brutal-Worſhip*. That, indeed, at laſt, I ſpeak a little of the *Jewiſh Policy*, but I ſoon break away again as from a Subject I would avoid; and employ the remaining Part of the Volume on the *Sacrifice of Iſaac*, the *Book of Job*,

Job, and on *primary and ſecondary Propheſies*. But what, ſay they, is all this to the DIVINE LEGATION of MOSES?

Dic, Poſthume! de tribus Capeliis.

—To call the *Notion* a PARADOX was very well: But not to ſee that I had attempted to prove it, muſt be owned to be ſtill better. I was aware of this Complaint, becauſe I knew with whom I had to do; and therefore, in the Entry of my ſecond Volume, was willing that CICERO, who had been in the like Circumſtance himſelf, ſhould ſpeak for me *.

But (as it proved) to little Purpoſe. The Greatneſs of his Authority, and the Docility of his Readers, which made a few Words ſufficient in his Caſe, were both wanting in mine. So that I ſoon found myſelf under a Neceſſity of ſpeaking for *myſelf*, or rather, for my *Argument*. Which as it was drawn out to an uncommon Length, and raiſed upon a great Variety of Supports, ſought out from every Quarter of Antiquity, and ſometimes from the moſt remote and darkeſt, it was the leſs to be admired if every *candid* Reader ſhould not ſee their full Force and various Purpoſe; and ſtill leſs, if the *Envious* and *Prejudiced* ſhould concur to repreſent it as an inconnected Heap of Diſcourſes put together to disburthen a Common-place. For the Satisfaction therefore of the *former*, I ſhall endeavour to expoſe, in one clear and ſimple Light, the whole Conduct of theſe *myſterious* Volumes.

Nor ſhould the *latter* be neglected. Though 'tis odds but we part as diſſatisfied with one another, as *Bertrand* and his Cuſtomer. Of whom the Story goes, that a grave well-dreſſed Man, coming to

* Video hanc primam ingreſſionem meam non ex Oratoris diſputationibus ductam, ſed è mediâ Philoſophiâ repetitam, & eam quidem cum antiquam tùm ſubobſcuram, aut *reprehenſionis* aliquid, aut certe *admirationis* habituram. Nam aut mirabantur *quid hæc pertineant ad ea quæ quærimus:* quibus ſatisfaciet res ipſa cognita, ut non ſine cauſa alte repetita videatur: aut reprehendent, *quod inuſitatas vias indagemus tritas relinquamus.* Ego autem me ſæpe nova videre dicere intelligo cum pervetera dicam, ſed inaudita pleriſque. *Cicero.*

the

the Shop of that ingenious Inventer and Reliever of the Diſtreſſes of all thoſe who are too dull to know what they want, and too rich to be at Eaſe with what they have, demanded one of his beſt Reading Glaſſes; which when he had examined upon all Sorts of Print, he returned back with ſolemn Aſſurance that he could not read at all in it. *Bertrand*, when he had recovered from the Surpriſe of ſo ſtrange a Phenomenon, fairly aſked him, *Sir, could you ever read at all?* To which the other as fairly replied, *Had I been ſo happy, I had not come hither for your Aſſiſtance.* Should I not therefore, with the ſame Forecaſt, have aſked theſe People, "Gen-" tlemen, before I put my Argument for you in a new Light, pray " tell me, do you underſtand an Argument in any Light at all?" But would they have anſwered with the ſame Ingenuity? They are ſilent. They modeſtly let their *Works* ſpeak for them. To go on, therefore, with our Subject.

In reading the *Law* and *Hiſtory* of the *Jews*, with all the Attention I was able, amongſt the many very ſingular Circumſtances of that amazing Diſpenſation (from each of which, as I conceive, the *Divinity* of its Original may be clearly deduced) theſe two Particulars more forcibly ſtruck my Obſervation, *Firſt*, the *Omiſſion of the Doctrine of a Future State* of Rewards and Puniſhments in the Religion of that People; no Inſtance of the like Nature being to be found throughout the whole Hiſtory of Mankind: In all the infinite Variety of Gentile Religions this Doctrine ever making a principal and moſt eſſential Part. The *other* was no leſs ſingular, that the Founder of this Religion ſhould pretend *his Diſpenſation was to be adminiſtered by an extraordinary Providence*; that his Laws ſhould have all one conſtant Direction purſuant to this Pretence; and that the ſucceeding Writers of the Jewiſh Hiſtory ſhould all concur in the ſame Repreſentation: No Lawgiver or Founder of Religion ever promiſing the like Diſtinction; and no Hiſtorian ever daring to record ſo ſingular a Prerogative.

As

As unaccountable as the *former* Circumſtance appeared, when conſidered ſeparately and alone, yet when ſet againſt the *latter*, and their Relations to each other examined, one illuſtrious Reaſon of the *Omiſſion of the Doctrine of a Future State* was not only immediately perceived, but, from that very *Omiſſion*, the *Divinity* of the Jewiſh Religion clearly demonſtrated. Which, as Unbelievers had been long accuſtomed to decry from that very Circumſtance, I choſe *that* preferably to all other, as a Proof of THE DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES. The Argument is, in a ſupreme Degree, ſtrong and ſimple; and not needing many Words to make it underſtood.

I. *Religion*, ſuch as teaches a God, the Rewarder of Good, and the Puniſher of evil Actions, is abſolutely neceſſary for the Support of *Civil Society*: Becauſe human Laws alone are not ſufficient to reſtrain Men from Evil in any degree neceſſary for the carrying on the Affairs of public Regiment. But the *Inequality* of Events here below ſhaking the Belief of that *Providence* on which all Religion muſt be founded (for *he that cometh to God muſt believe that he is, and that he is a Rewarder of them who diligently ſeek him*) there was no other Way of ſupporting and re-eſtabliſhing that Belief than by the Doctrine of *a future State*, wherein all theſe Inequalities ſhould be ſet even, and every Action receive *its due Recompence of Reward*. The Doctrine therefore of a *future State is immediately* neceſſary to *Religion*; and, through that, *ultimately* to *civil Society*. Yet, here we find a Religion *without a future State*, profeſſed with great Advantage through many Ages by a civil-policied and powerful People. It appears, from what has been ſaid above, that, under the *common* Diſpenſations of Providence, *ſuch* a Religion would be ſo far from ſupporting Society, that it could not even ſubſiſt itſelf. We muſt conclude, therefore, that the *Jewiſh People* were, as their Founder and their Hiſtorians pretended, *indeed* under the Diſpenſation of an *extraordinary* Providence.

II. Again,

II. Again, it appears from the univerſal *Practice* of the ancient *Lawgivers*, and the *Principles* of the ancient *Sages*, that the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments was eſteemed thus neceſſary to Religion and Society, under the common Diſpenſations of Providence. The *Egyptian* Policy and Wiſdom particularly, from whence thoſe *Lawgivers* and *Sages* borrowed *theirs*, cultivated this Doctrine, for theſe Ends, with an amazing Aſſiduity. Now *Moſes*, who, as we are aſſured by the infallible Teſtimony of the Holy Spirit, was *learned in all the Wiſdom of the Egyptians*, and whoſe Laws themſelves, as the Deiſt confeſſes, beſpeak him a conſummate Maſter in his Art; this *Moſes*, I ſay, when inſtituting a *new* Religion, and forming an *uncivilized* People to Society, hath been ſo far from inculcating the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments, that he hath even *omitted* to make the leaſt Mention of it. Who ſees not then that one Reaſon of the *Omiſſion* muſt needs be, that this wiſe Lawgiver underſtood, his Religion and Policy might well ſubſiſt without it? But, under the common Diſpenſations of Providence, his Principles of *Egyptian* Wiſdom had taught him, that neither one nor the other could do ſo. What therefore are we to conclude, but that he himſelf was fully convinced of the *Truth* of what he taught his Countrymen, *That they were thenceforward to live under the extraordinary Providence of God.*

Theſe two Proofs of my MAIN PROPOSITION, from the *Thing omitted*, and the *Perſon omitting* (which as they are diſtinct and independent of one another, ſo I would deſire the Reader to obſerve that they are either of them *alone* ſufficient to eſtabliſh my Demonſtration) may be reduced to theſe two SYLLOGISMS.

I. Whatſoever Religion and Society have no future State for their Support, muſt be ſupported by an extraordinary Providence.
The Jewiſh Religion and Society had no future State for their Support.
Therefore the Jewiſh Religion and Society were ſupported by an extraordinary Providence.

Again,

Again, II. It was univerſally believed by the Ancients, on their common Principles of Legiſlation and Wiſdom, that whatſoever Religion and Society have no future State for their Support muſt be ſupported by an extraordinary Providence.

Moſes, ſkilled in all that Legiſlation and Wiſdom, inſtituted the *Jewiſh* Religion and Society without a future State for its Support.

Therefore *Moſes* who taught, believed likewiſe, that *this* Religion and Society were to be ſupported by an extraordinary Providence.

This is the grand PARADOX I have been accuſed of advancing: In the mean while, the *Free-thinker* eſteems it *none* to contradict the univerſal Voice of Antiquity; nor the *Syſtem-maker*, to explain away the whole Letter of ſacred Scripture. For had not Libertines denied the MAJOR Propoſitions of theſe two *Syllogiſms*; and certain Bigotted-believers, the MINOR; my Demonſtration of *The Divine Legation of Moſes* had not only been as *ſtrong*, but as *ſhort* too as any of *Euclid's*: whoſe *Theorems*, as *Hobbes* ſomewhere truly obſerves, were but the Paſſions and Prejudices of Men equally concerned in, would ſoon be made as much matter of Diſpute as any *moral* or *theological* Propoſition whatſoever.

It was not long then before I found that the Diſcovery of this important Truth would engage me in a full Dilucidation of my *four Propoſitions*: Neither a ſhort, nor an eaſy Task. The *two firſt* requiring a ſevere Search into the civil Policy, Religion, and Philoſophy of ancient Times: and the *two latter*, a minute Enquiry concerning the Nature and Genius of the *Jewiſh* Conſtitution. To the *firſt* part of this Enquiry, therefore, I aſſigned the *firſt* Volume; and to the *other*, the *ſecond*.

I. The

I.

I. The FIRST Volume begins with proving the MAJOR Propoſition of the *firſt* Syllogiſm, that *whatſoever Religion and Society have no future State for their Support, muſt be ſupported by an extraordinary Providence.* Where it is ſhewn, that *Civil Society*, which was inſtituted as a Remedy againſt *Force* and *Injuſtice*, falls ſhort in many Inſtances, of its Effect; as it cannot, by its own proper Force, provide for the Obſervance of above one *third* Part of *moral* Duties; and, of that third, but *imperfectly*: and, which is ſtill of greater Importance, that it totally wants the *firſt* of thoſe two Powers, *Reward* and *Puniſhment*, which are owned by all to be the neceſſary Hinges on which Government turns, and without which it cannot be carried on. To ſupply which Wants and Imperfections, ſome other coactive Power was to be added. This Power is ſhewn to be *Religion*; which teaching the *Providence* and *Juſtice* of the Deity, provides for all the natural Deficiencies of *civil Society*. But then thoſe *Attributes*, as we ſhew, can be ſupported only by the Doctrine of a *future State* of Rewards and Puniſhments; or by a preſent Diſpenſation of Things very different from that which we experience to be here adminiſtered.

The point being thus proved, the Diſcourſe proceeds in removing *Objections*. The Reader obſerves, that the Steps and Gradations of this great Truth riſe thus.—A *future State* is neceſſary, as it ſupports *Religion*; Religion is neceſſary, as it ſupports *Morality*; and Morality, as it ſupports *Society*. Hence I *concluded* the Doctrine of a *future State* to be neceſſary to Society. Now there are various degrees in *Libertiniſm*. Some, though they own Morality, yet deny *Religion*, to be neceſſary to Society: Others again go ſtill further, and deny even *Morality* to be neceſſary. As theſe equally attempt to break the Chain of my Reaſoning, they come equally under my Examination. And luckily, in the *firſt* Inſtance, a great Name, and in the *ſecond*, a great Book, invited me to this Entertainment. 1. The famous Mr. *Bayle* had attempted to prove that

Religion was not neceſſary to Society; that *Morality*, as diſtinguiſhed from Religion, might well ſupply its Place; and that an ATHEIST might have this Morality. His Arguments in Support of theſe Propoſitions I have examined at large. And having Occaſion, when I come to the laſt of them, to enquire into the *true Foundation of Morality*, I conſider all its Pretences; inquire into all its Advantages; and ſhew that *Obligation*, properly ſo called, proceeds from *Will*, and Will *only*. This Enquiry was *directly* to my Point, as the Reſult of it proves that the Morality of the Atheiſt muſt be without any true Foundation, and conſequently weak and eaſily ſhaken. Yet it had a further Propriety, as the Religion, whoſe divine Original I was here attempting to demonſtrate, has founded moral Obligation in *Will only*; and a peculiar Expediency, as it is become the Humour of the Times to ſeek for this *Foundation* in any thing rather than in what *Religion* places it. 2. But the Author of the *Fable of the Bees* went a large Step further, and endeavoured to prove that *Morality* was ſo far from being neceſſary to Society, that, on the contrary, it was Vice, not Virtue, which rendered States flouriſhing and happy. This pernicious Doctrine, which would cut away our Argument by the Root, was inforced with much laboured Art and plauſible Inſinuation. I undertook therefore to examine and confute the Principles it went upon: which I preſume to have done ſo effectually, as will ſecure the Reader from the Danger of being any longer miſled by it. In this manner I endeavoured to prove the MAJOR Propoſition of the *firſt* Syllogiſm: and, with this, the *firſt* Book of *The Divine Legation of Moſes* concludes.

II. The *ſecond* begins with proving the MAJOR Propoſition of the *ſecond* Syllogiſm, that *It was univerſally believed by the Ancients, on their common Principles of Legiſlation and Wiſdom, that whatſoever Religion and Society have no future State for their Support, muſt be ſupported by an extraordinary Providence.* This Proof divides itſelf into *two Parts*, the *Conduct of the Lawgivers*, and the *Opinion of the*

the Philoſophers. The *firſt Part* is examined in the *preſent* Book, and the *ſecond* in the *following.*

In proving the Propoſition from the *Conduct of the Lawgivers*, I ſhew, I. Their Care to PROPAGATE, Firſt, *Religion in general.* 1. As it appears from the *Reaſon of Things*, viz. the State of Religion all over the civilized World. 2. As it appears from *Fact*, ſuch as their univerſal Pretence to *Inſpiration*; which, it is ſhewn, was made only to eſtabliſh the Opinion of the Superintendency of the Gods over human Affairs: And ſuch as their univerſal Practice in the manner of *Prefacing* their Laws; where the ſame Superintendency was taught and inculcated. And here I deſire it may be obſerved, that the proving their Care to propagate *Religion in general*, proves, at the ſame time, their propagating the Doctrine of a *future State*; becauſe there never was any Religion in the World but the *Jewiſh*, of which that Doctrine did not make an eſſential Part. I ſhew, Secondly, their Care to *propagate* the *Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments in particular.* And, as the moſt effectual Method they employed to this Purpoſe was the Inſtitution of the MYSTERIES, I give a large Account of their Riſe and Progreſs; which I ſhew to have been from *Egypt* into *Greece.* The Detection of the ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΑ of theſe *Myſteries*, which were the *Unity of the Godhead*, and the *Error of the groſſer Polytheiſm*, not only confirms all that is advanced concerning the Riſe, Progreſs, and Order of the ſeveral Species of Idolatry, but rectifies and clears up much Embarraſs and Miſtake even in the beſt modern Critics, ſuch as *Cudworth*, *Prideaux*, *Newton*, *&c.* while they ventured, contrary to the Tenure of holy Scripture, to ſuppoſe that the *One God* was commonly known and worſhipped in the Pagan World. For finding many, in divers Countries, ſpeaking of the one God, they concluded he muſt needs have a national Worſhip paid to him; though the Scriptures, both of the Old and New Teſtament, repreſent the Gentiles in a total Ignorance of the true God, and entirely given up to Polytheiſm. This, as we ſay, has occaſioned much Confuſion and Miſtake in our beſt Writers on this Subject, while

they would reconcile their own Concluſions to Scripture Premiſes. Now the Diſcovery of the ἀπόῤῥητα of the Myſteries, enables us to explain the perfect Conſiſtency between ſacred and profane Antiquity; which, left to ſpeak for themſelves, and without Interpreters, inform us of this plain and conſiſtent Truth, "That the Doc-" trine of the One God was taught in all Places, as a profound " Secret to a *few* in the Celebration of their myſterious Rites; but " that a public or *national Worſhip* was paid to him no where but " in the Land of *Judæa*." Where, as *Euſebius* well expreſſes it, *for the Hebrew PEOPLE alone was reſerved the Honour of being initiated into the Knowledge of the Creator of all Things.* And, of this Difference, God himſelf ſpeaks, by the Prophet, *I have not ſpoken in ſecret, in a dark Place of the Earth; I ſaid not unto the Seed of Jacob ſeek ye me in vain* *. And the holy Apoſtle informs us of the Conſequence of this myſterious Manner of teaching the true God, that when, by this means, they came to the *Knowledge* of him, *they glorified him not as God* †. To confirm my Account of the Myſteries, I ſubjoin a critical Diſſertation on the *ſixth Book of Virgil's Æneis*; and another, on the *Metamorphoſis of Apuleius.* The *firſt* of which I prove to be one continued *Deſcription* of the *Myſteries*; and the *ſecond*, to be written purpoſely to *recommend* their Uſe and Efficacy. But by Miſchance (and the only one of this kind in the two Volumes) the Diſſertation on *Apuleius* is miſplaced. The Reader will obſerve that, through the Courſe of this whole Argument, on the Conduct of the ancient Lawgivers, it appears that all the fundamental Principles of their Policy were borrowed from EGYPT. A Truth that will be made greatly ſubſervient to the *Minor* of my *ſecond* Syllogiſm (that *Moſes was ſkilled in all the ancient Legiſlation and Wiſdom, and yet inſtituted the Jewiſh Religion and Society without a future State for its Support*) as well when I prove the *latter* Part of the Propoſition in the *ſecond* Volume, as the *former* Part, in the *Third*; where the Character of *Moſes* is vin-

* Iſaiah, xlv. 19.

† Romans, i. 21.

dicated

dicated from the Objections of Infidelity. From this, and from what has been ſaid above of *moral Obligation*, the intelligent Reader will take notice, that throughout *The Divine Legation*, I have all along endeavoured to ſelect for my Purpoſe ſuch kind of Arguments, in Support of the *particular* Queſtion in hand, as may, at the ſame time, either illuſtrate the Truth of *Revelation in general*, or ſerve as a Principle to proceed upon in the *Progreſs of the Argument*. Of which we ſhall give, as occaſion ſerves, ſeveral further Inſtances in the Courſe of this *Review*.

Thus, having ſhewn the Legiſlator's Care to *propagate* Religion in general, and the Doctrine of a future State in particular (in which is ſeen their Senſe of the inſeparable Connection between them), I go on, II. To explain the Contrivances they employed to PERPETUATE them: By which it may appear that, in their Opinion, *Religion* was not a temporary Expedient to ſecure their own Power, but a neceſſary Support of Civil Government. 1. The firſt Inſtance of their Care to this End was, as we ſhew, the ESTABLISHING every where *a national Religion protected by the Laws of the State*. But Men ignorant of true Religion could hardly avoid falling into Miſtakes in the *Mode* of this *Eſtabliſhment*; purſuing a right End by very wrong Means: Therefore, as the Subject of our Book is no idle unconcerning Speculation, but ſuch as affects us in all our higheſt Intereſts as Men and Citizens, I thought a Defence of the Juſtice and Equity of an ESTABLISHED RELIGION would well deſerve the Reader's beſt Attention; and this I have given him, in an Explanation of the true *Theory* of the *Alliance between Church and State*. 2. The ſecond Expedient the Legiſlator uſed for *perpetuating* Religion, I ſhew was the Allowance of a GENERAL TOLERATION, which, as it would, for the ſame Reaſon, be as wrongly conceived as an *Eſtabliſhment*, I have attempted to give the true *Theory* of that likewiſe. Where, ſpeaking of the Cauſe and firſt Occaſion of its Violation, the Subject naturally led me to vindicate true Religion from the Aſperſions of Infidelity. And here I ſhew that the firſt Perſecution for Religion was not *that* which was *committed*, but

that

that which was *undergone*, by the Chriſtian Church. And thus ends the *ſecond* Book of *The Divine Legation*.

III. The *Third* begins with the *latter Part* of the Proof of the MAJOR Propoſition of the *ſecond* Syllogiſm; namely, *the Opinions of the Philoſophers*. For as the great Waſte of Time hath deſtroyed moſt of the Monuments of ancient *Legiſlation*, I thought it proper to ſtrengthen my Poſition, of the Senſe of their Lawgivers, by that of their Sages and Philoſophers. Where I ſhew *firſt*, from their own Words, the Senſe they had in general of the Neceſſity of the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments to civil Society. But to ſet the Fact in the ſtrongeſt Light, I *next* endeavour to prove, that even thoſe of them (namely, the ſeveral Sects of *Grecian* Philoſophers) who did not believe this future State, yet, for the Sake of Society, ſedulouſly taught and propagated it. That they *taught* it, is confeſſed. That they did *not believe* it, was my Buſineſs to prove. Which I firſt do, by the three following *general* Reaſons. 1. That they all thought it allowable to ſay one Thing and think another. 2. That they perpetually practiſed what they thus profeſſed to be lawful. And, 3. That they practiſed it with regard to the very Doctrine in Queſtion. To explain and verify the two firſt of theſe Propoſitions, I had Occaſion to enquire into the Riſe, Progreſs, Perfection, Decline, and Genius of the ancient *Greek* Philoſophy under all its ſeveral Diviſions. In which, as its Riſe and Genius are ſhewn to have been from *Egypt*, we lay in a ſtill further Support for the *minor* Propoſition of the *ſecond* Syllogiſm.

The Diſcourſe then proceeds to a *particular* Enquiry into the Sentiments of *each* Sect of Philoſophy on this Point. Where it is ſhewn, from the *Character* and *Genius* of each School, and from the *Writings* of each Man, that none of them did indeed belive the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments. But, from almoſt every Argument brought for this Purpoſe, it, at the ſame time, appears of how high Importance they *all* thought it to Society.

Further,

Further, to ſupport this Fact, I prove next, that theſe Philoſophers not only *did not*, but *could not* poſſibly, believe the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments, becauſe it contradicted two metaphyſical Principles univerſally held and believed by them concerning the Nature of GOD and of the SOUL; which were, that *God could not be angry nor hurt any one*; and that *the Soul was Part of God, and reſolved again into him.* In explaining, and *verifying the Reception* of this latter Principle, I take Occaſion to ſpeak of its Original; which I ſhew was *Grecian*, and not *Egyptian*, as appears from the different Genius and Character of the two Philoſophies; though the ſpurious Books going under the Name of *Hermes*, but indeed written by late *Greek* Platoniſts, would perſuade us to believe the contrary. The uſe of *this* Enquiry likewiſe (concerning *the Origin of this Principle*) will be ſeen when we come to clear up the *Character* of *Moſes* as aforeſaid. But with regard to the general Queſtion (concerning *the Belief of the Philoſophers*) beſides the direct and principal uſe of it for the Support of the MAJOR Propoſition of the *ſecond* Syllogiſm, it has (as I ſaid before I had contrived my Arguments ſhould have) two further uſes; the one *to ſerve as a Principle in the Progreſs of my Argument*; the other *to illuſtrate the Truth of Revelation in general.* For, 1. It will ſerve for a ſufficient Anſwer to that Objection of the Deiſts, to be conſidered in the laſt Volume, that *Moſes did not propagate the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments, becauſe he did not believe it*: It being ſhewn, from *Fact*, that the not believing a Doctrine, ſo uſeful to Society, was eſteemed no Reaſon why the Legiſlator ſhould not propagate it. 2. It is a very ſtrong Proof of the *Neceſſity* of the Goſpel of *Jeſus*, that the Sages of *Greece*, with whom all the Wiſdom of the World was ſuppoſed to be depoſited, had *philoſophiſed* themſelves out of one of the moſt evident and uſeful Truths with which Mankind is concerned. Nor need we ſeek any other Juſtification of the Severity with which the holy Apoſtles always ſpeak of the Philoſophers or Philoſophy of *Greece*, than this, the ſhewing it was directed againſt theſe pernicious Principles; and

not,

not, as both *Deiſts* and *Fanatics* have concurred to repreſent it, a Condemnation of human Learning in general.

But as now it might be objected that, by this Repreſentation, we loſe on the one hand what we gain on the other; and that while we ſhew the *Neceſſity* of the Goſpel, we run a riſque of diſcrediting its *Reaſonableneſs*: For that nothing can ſeem to bear harder upon *this*, than that the beſt and wiſeſt Perſons of Antiquity did not believe a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments: as this, I ſay, might be objected, we have given a full Anſwer to it; and, to ſupport our Anſwer, ſhewn, that the two Extremes of this Repreſentation, which Divines have been accuſtomed to go into by contrary Ways, are attended with great and real Miſchief to Revelation. While the only View of Antiquity, which yields ſolid Advantage to the *Chriſtian* Cauſe, is ſuch a one as this here given; ſuch a one as ſhews natural Reaſon to be *clear* enough to *perceive* Truth, and the Neceſſity of its Deductions when propoſed; but not generally ſtrong enough to *diſcover* it, and draw right Deductions from it. And we preſume the *Objectors* may allow this to be the *true*, as we have *Cicero* himſelf for our Warrant, who with an Ingenuity becoming his profound Knowledge of human Nature thus deciſively expreſſes himſelf: "Nam neque tam eſt acris acies "in naturis hominum et ingeniis, ut res tantas quiſquam, niſi "monſtratas, poſſit videre; neque tanta tamen in rebus obſcuritas, "ut eas non peritus acri vir ingenio cernat, ſi modo adſpexerit*." In explaining this Matter, it is occaſionally ſhewn that of the *ancient* and *modern* Syſtems of *deiſtical Morality*, the confeſſedly ſuperior Perfection in the *latter* is entirely owing to the *unacknowledged* Aid of Revelation.—Thus the Reader ſees in what manner we have endeavoured to prove the MAJOR Propoſitions of the two *Syllogiſms*, that *whatſoever Religion and Society have no future State for their Support, muſt be ſupported by an extraordinary Providence*: And that *this was univerſally believed by the Ancients, on their common Principles*

* De Orat. l. iii. c. xxxi.

of

of Legiſlation and Wiſdom. For, having ſhewn that Religion and Society *were unable*, and *believed to be unable*, to ſupport themſelves under an *ordinary Providence* without a future State; if they *were* ſupported without that Doctrine, it *could be*, and *could be believed to be*, only by an *extraordinary Providence.*

But now, as this Proof is conducted through a long Detail of Circumſtances, ſhewing the *abſolute Neceſſity* of Religion in general to Civil Society, and the *Senſe* which all the Wiſe and Learned of Antiquity had of *that* Neceſſity; leſt this ſhould be abuſed to countenance the idle and impious Conceit, that *Religion was the Invention of Politicians*, I concluded the third Book and the Volume together, with proving, that the Notion is both impertinent and falſe. *Impertinent*, for that, were this Account of Religion right, it would not follow that Religion itſelf was viſionary; but, on the contrary, that it was moſt real, and ſupported on the eternal Relations of Things: *Falſe*, for that *Religion*, in fact, exiſted before the *Civil Magiſtrate* was in being. But my End in this was not *barely* to remove an Objection againſt the Truths *here* delivered; but to prepare an opening for thoſe which were to *follow.* For if Religion were ſo uſeful to Society, and yet not the Invention of the Magiſtrate, we muſt ſeek its Origin in another Quarter: either from *Nature*, or *Revelation*, or *both.*——Such is the Subject of the *firſt* Volume of *The Divine Legation:* Which, as I thought proper to publiſh ſeparately, I contrived ſhould not only contain *Part* of that Proof, but likewiſe be a *compleat* Treatiſe of itſelf, eſtabliſhing one of the moſt important Truths with which we have to do, viz. *The Neceſſity of Religion for the Support of Civil Government.* And if, in this View, I have been more than ordinary minute, while treating ſome Capital Articles in Support of that Queſtion, I preſume I ſhall not want the Reader's Pardon.

II.

We come now to the SECOND Volume of *The Divine Legation*; which is employed in proving the MINOR Propoſitions of the two

Syllogiſms; the firſt, *That the Jewiſh Religion and Society had no future State for their Support*; the other, *That* Moſes, *ſkilled in all the ancient Legiſlation and Wiſdom, inſtituted the Jewiſh Religion and Society without a future State for its Support.* But in proving the MINOR, a Method ſomething different from that obſerved in proving the MAJOR Propoſitions was to be followed. The MAJOR, in the firſt Volume, were proved *ſucceſſively*, and in their Order; but in this, the MINOR Propoſitions are inforced all the Way *together*: And this, from the Reaſon of the Thing; the Facts brought to prove the Doctrine omitted, at the ſame time, *accidentally* ſhew the Omiſſion deſigned; and the Facts, brought to prove it deſigned, *neceſſarily* ſhew it omitted. To proceed therefore with the Subject of the *ſecond* Volume.

IV. I juſt before obſerved, that the Concluſion of the *firſt* Volume, which detected the *Abſurdity* and *Falſity* of the atheiſtic Principle, that *Religion was a Creature of the State*, opened the Way to a fair Inquiry whether its original were not as well from *Revelation* as from natural Reaſon.

In the Introduction therefore to this Volume, I took the Advantage which that Open afforded me, of ſhewing that the univerſal Pretence to Revelation proves *ſome* Revelation muſt be true: That this *true* Revelation muſt have ſome *characteriſtic Marks* to diſtinguiſh it from the *falſe*: And that theſe Marks are to be found in the Inſtitution of *Moſes*. But thus far only by Way of *Introduction*, and to lead the Reader more eaſily into the main Road of our Inquiry; by ſhewing him that we purſued no deſperate Adventure while we endeavoured to deduce the Divinity of *Moſes's* Law from the Circumſtances of the Law itſelf.

I proceeded then to the Proof of the MINOR Propoſitions, *That the Jewiſh Religion and Society had no future State for their Support; and that their Lawgiver purpoſely omitted it.* To evince theſe Truths, with ſufficient Evidence, the *Nature* of that Inſtitution was to be well underſtood. But to form a right Idea of *that*, it was expe-

dient

dient we ſhould know the *Manners* and *Genius* of the *Hebrew* People, and the *Character* and *Abilities* of their Lawgiver. Now theſe having been entirely faſhioned on *Egyptian* Models, it was *further* expedient we ſhould know the *State of Egyptian Superſtition and Learning* in thoſe early Ages.

In order to this, therefore, I firſt advanced this Propoſition, That *the Egyptian Learning celebrated in Scripture, and the Egyptian Superſtition there condemned, were the very Learning and Superſtition repreſented by the Greek Writers, as the Honour and Opprobrium of that Kingdom.* Where, I firſt ſtate the Queſtion, and ſhew the equal Extravagancies of both Parties in unreaſonably advancing or depreſſing the high Antiquity of *Egypt*.

I then ſupport my *Propoſition*, firſt by *Fact*, the Teſtimony of holy Scripture, and of the ancient *Greek* Writers ſet together, and ſupporting one another.

Secondly by *Reaſon*, in an Argument deduced from the Nature, Origin, and various Uſe, of their ſo famed HIEROGLYPHICS. Where it is ſhewn, 1. That theſe were employed as the ſole Vehicle of *Egyptian* Learning even *after* the Invention of *Letters*. For which no good Reaſon can be aſſigned but this, that they were employed to the ſame Purpoſe, *before*. Now *Letters* were in uſe in the Time of *Moſes*. 2. Again, it is further ſhewn that the ONIROCRITICS borrowed their Art of Deciphering from *hieroglyphic Symbols*. But *hieroglyphic Symbols* were the myſterious Vehicle of the *Egyptian* Learning and Theology. Now *Onirocritic*, or the Art of Interpreting Dreams, was practiſed in the Time of *Joſeph*. 3. And again, that *hieroglyphic Symbols* were the true Original of ANIMAL WORSHIP in *Egypt*. Now *animal Worſhip* was eſtabliſhed before the Times of *Moſes*. From all this it appears that *Egypt* was of that high Antiquity, which Scripture and the beſt *Greek* Writers repreſent it. By which we come to underſtand what were the ſpecific Manners and Superſtitions of *Egypt* in the Time of *Moſes*; they being, as now appears, identically the ſame with

what the *Greek* Writers have delivered to us. In the Courſe of this Proof from *Reaſon*, in opening at large the Nature, Origin, and various Kinds of *Egyptian Hieroglyphics*, I interweave (as the neceſſary Explanation of my Subject required) a detailed Hiſtory of the various *Modes* of ancient *Information* by *Speech* and *Action*. As (on the ſame Account) in the Original of *Brute-Worſhip*, I give the Hiſtory of the various *Modes* of ancient *Idolatry* in the Order they aroſe out of one another. Now *theſe* I have not only made to ſerve in Support of the Queſtion I am *here* upon; but likewiſe in Support of a *future*, and a *paſt*. For, in this Hiſtory of *the various Modes of ancient Information* was laid, as the Reader will find, the Foundation of my Diſcourſe on the *Nature of ancient Prophecies*, in the *ſixth* Book; the Connexion of which Diſcourſe with my *main Subject*, and its high Importance to *Religion in general*, will be explained when we come to that Place: And, in the Hiſtory of *the various Modes of ancient Idolatry*, he may ſee my Reaſoning in the latter End of the *third* Book, againſt the Atheiſtic Origin of Religion, ſupported and confirmed. So ſtudious have we been to obſerve what a great Maſter of Reaſon lays down as the *Rule* and *Teſt* of good Diſpoſition, *that every former Part may give Strength unto all that follow; and every latter bring Light unto all before.*

But the *high Antiquity* of *Egypt*, though proved from *Antiquity* itſelf, ſeem'd not enough ſecured while the Authority of one great *Modern* remained entire and unanſwered. In the next Place, therefore, I ventured to examine Sir *I. Newton's Chronology of the Egyptian* Empire, as it is founded in the ſuppoſed *Identity* of *Oſiris* and *Seſoſtris*; which I ſhew not only contradicts all *profane*, but, what is more, all *ſacred* Antiquity; and, ſtill more, the very *Nature of Things*. In the Courſe of this Confutation, the *Cauſes* of that endleſs Confuſion in the ancient *Greek Hiſtory* and *Mythology* are inquired into and explained; which ſerves, at the ſame time, to confirm and illuſtrate all that hath been ſaid, occaſionally in the *firſt* Volume, concerning the Origin and Progreſs of Idolatry, the Genius

nius of Pagan Religion, their Modes of Worſhip, and their theological Opinions.

Thus far concerning *the high Antiquity of Egypt*. Which, beſides the *immediate* Purpoſe, of leading us into a true Idea of the *Jewiſh* Inſtitution, hath theſe *further* Uſes. We have ſeen, in the foregoing Volume, that *Egypt*, as it was moſt famed for the Arts of Legiſlation, ſo it moſt of all inculcated the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments. Now if *Egypt* were of the high Antiquity I contend for, the Doctrine was inculcated in the Time of the *Hebrew* Captivity: the *Iſraelites* therefore who lived ſo long in *Egypt*, and had ſo thorougly imbibed the religious Notions of the Place, muſt needs have been much prejudiced in favour of ſo reaſonable and flattering a Doctrine: and, conſequently, their Lawgiver, who had been bred up in all the Learning of *Egypt*, if he had acted only by human Direction, muſt needs, in Imitation of his Maſters, have taken Advantage of this favourable Prejudice to make the Doctrine of a future State the grand *Sanction* of his Religion and Law. Again, the Proof of the high Antiquity of *Egypt* was a neceſſary Vindication of Sacred Scripture; which all along declares for that Antiquity. But which the *Deiſt* having endeavoured to take Advantage of againſt *Moſes's* Claim to Inſpiration, *Believers* were grown not unwilling to explain away. And while this CHRONOLOGY offered itſelf to ſupport the Bible *Divinity*, they ſeemed little attentive to the Liberties it took with the Bible *Hiſtory*.

To proceed: In order to bring on this Truth of the *high Antiquity* of *Egypt nearer* to my Purpoſe, I next advanced this *ſecond* Propoſition, That *the* Jewiſh *People were extremely fond of* Egyptian *Manners, and did frequently fall into* Egyptian *Superſtitions: And that many of the Laws given to them by the Miniſtry of* Moſes *were inſtituted partly in Compliance to their Prejudices, and partly in Oppoſition to thoſe Superſtitions.* Through the Proof of the *firſt* part of the Propoſition was propoſed to be ſhewn the high *Probability* of an Inſtitution formed with Reference to *Egyp-*

tian

tian Manners; and through the Proof of the *ſecond*, a Demonſtration that it was, in *Fact*, ſo formed. In the Progreſs of this Argument is given an hiſtorical Account of the amazing Perverſity of the *Jewiſh* People, from the Time of *Moſes's* firſt Miſſion, to their Settlement in the Land of *Canaan*. Which ſerves not only to evince the Fact we are here upon, *their Fondneſs for* Egyptian *Manners*; but to prove (what will ſtand us in ſtead hereafter), that a People ſo obſtinate and headſtrong needed, in the Inſtitution of their civil Government and Religion, all poſſible Curbs to Diſorder; of which, for this end, the Doctrine of a *future State* was ever held the chief in ancient Policy.

But now, as it might be objected, that while I am endeavouring to get, this Way, into the *Interior* of the *Jewiſh* Conſtitution, I open a Door to the Ravages of Infidelity; it was thought neceſſary, in order to prevent their taking Advantage of the great Truth contained under the laſt Propoſition, to guard it by the two following,

Firſt, That Moſes's Egyptian *Learning, and the Laws inſtituted in Compliance to the People's Prejudices, and in Oppoſition to* Egyptian *Superſtitions, are no reaſonable Objection to the Divinity of his Miſſion*. Where, in anſwering an Objection to the Proof of the *firſt* Part of this Propoſition, I had Occaſion to explain the Nature and Origin of the *Schools of the Prophets*: Which, the Reader will find of this *further* Uſe, to give Strength and Support to what is ſaid, in the *ſixth* Book, of the *Nature of Propheſy*; and particularly to what is remarked of *Grotius's* Miſtakes in his Manner of interpreting them. And, after having eſtabliſhed the Proof of the *ſecond* Part, from the Nature of Things, I examine all the Arguments which have been urged to the contrary, by the learned *Herman Witſius*, in his *Ægyptiaca*, as that Book had been publicly recommended, for *a diſtinct and ſolid Confutation of* Spencer, *De Legibus Hebræorum ritualibus*.

But

But I go further in the *ſecond Propoſition*; and prove, that *theſe very Circumſtances of* Moſes's Egyptian *Learning, and the Laws inſtituted in Compliance to the People's Prejudices, and in Oppoſition to* Egyptian *Superſtitions, are a ſtrong Confirmation of the Divinity of his Miſſion*; For, that one, bred up in the Arts of *Egyptian* Legiſlation, could never, on his own Head, have thought of reducing an unruly People to Government on Maxims of Religion and Policy fundamentally oppoſite to all the Principles of *Egyptian* Wiſdom. And yet *Moſes* did this, in *enjoining* the Worſhip of the *true God* only; and, in *omitting* the Doctrine of a *future State*. And again, that One who *falſely* pretended to Inſpiration, and to receive the whole Frame of a national Conſtitution from God himſelf, would never have riſqued his Pretences by a ritual Law, which the People could ſee was politically inſtituted, partly in Compliance to their Prejudices, and partly in Oppoſition to *Egyptian* Superſtitions. And with this the *fourth* Book concludes.

V. What hath been hitherto ſaid was to let us, in *general* only, into the Genius of the *Jewiſh* Policy; in order to our judging more exactly of the *peculiar Nature* of its Government; that from thence, we might be enabled to determine, with full Certainty, on the Matters in Queſtion, as they are contained in the two MINOR Propoſitions.

The *fifth* Book, therefore, comes *ſtill nearer* to the Point, and conſiders this *peculiar Nature* of the *Jewiſh* Government. Which is ſhewn to have been a THEOCRACY, properly ſo called, where God himſelf became the ſupreme civil Magiſtrate. This Form of Government is ſhewn to have been *neceſſary* for the Times. In proving which, the Law of *puniſhing for Opinions*, under a *Theocracy*, is occaſionally explained. And as the *Deiſts* have been accuſtomed to object this Puniſhment againſt the divine Original of the Law, it is juſtified at large, on the Principles of natural Equity: Which ſerves, at the ſame time, both to confirm the *Reality* of a

Theocracy,

Theocracy, and alſo to give new Strength and Support to what had been ſaid on the Subject of *Toleration*, in the *firſt* Volume.

2. This Theocracy, which was *neceſſary*, was (as I then ſhew from the Notions and Opinions of thoſe Times concerning *Tutelary Deities*) of the moſt *eaſy Introduction* likewiſe. But here, ſpeaking of the Method of Providence in employing the *Prejudices* of Men to the great Ends of its Diſpenſations, I obſerve, that whenever divine Wiſdom thought fit ſo to do, it was always accuſtomed to inſert ſome characteriſtic Note of Difference, to mark the Inſtitution, it eſtabliſhed, for its own: which leading me to enumerate ſome of thoſe *Notes*, I inſiſted chiefly upon this, "that the *Moſaic* "Religion was *built upon a former*, namely, the *Patriarchal*: "Whereas the various Religions of the *Pagan* World were all *un-* "*related to*, and *independent of one another*." As this was a Circumſtance neceſſarily to be well underſtood for a perfect Comprehenſion of the *Jewiſh* Eſtabliſhment (the Subject in hand), I took the Advantage which the celebrated Author *of the Grounds and Reaſons of the Chriſtian Religion* had afforded me, (who, to diſcredit *Revelation*, has thought fit to affirm the direct contrary) of ſupporting it againſt him in an Examination of his *Facts* and *Reaſonings* on this Head.

3. I proceed, in the next Place, to ſhew, that thoſe Prejudices which made the *Introduction* of a *Theocracy* ſo *eaſy*, occaſioned as *eaſy a Defection* from the Laws of it. In which I had Occaſion to explain the Nature of the *Worſhip of tutelary Gods*, and of that *Idolatry* wherewith the *Jewiſh* People were ſo obſtinately beſotted. Both which Diſcourſes ſerve theſe further Purpoſes, the *former*, to ſupport and explain what had been ſaid, in the *firſt* Volume, concerning the Genius of Pagan *Intercommunity* of Worſhip: And the *latter* (beſides a particular Uſe to be made of it in the *third* Volume) to obviate a common Objection of Unbelievers; who, from this Circumſtance of the continual Defection of the *Jews* into Idolatry, would infer, that God's Diſpenſation to them could never have

have been ſo illuſtrious as their Hiſtory repreſents it: Theſe Men ſuppoſing that this Idolatry conſiſted in *renouncing* the Law of *Moſes*; and renouncing it as *diſſatisfied of its Truth:* Both which Suppoſitions are here ſhewn to be falſe.

Having explained the *Nature* of the *Theocracy*, and the *attendant Circumſtances* of its *Erection*; we then inquire concerning its *Duration.* A *Theocracy*, therefore, in ſtrict Truth and Propriety, we ſhew, continued throughout the whole Period of the *Jewiſh* State, even to the Coming of *Chriſt.* The Uſe to be made hereafter of this Truth, is to inforce the *Connexion* between the two Religions; a Circumſtance, though much neglected, incumbent on every rational Defender of *Revelation* to ſupport.

We come next to the *peculiar Conſequences attending the Adminiſtration of a Theocracy:* Which bring us *yet nearer* to our Point. Here, it is ſhewn that one *neceſſary Conſequence*, was an EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE. And agreeably to this, (as deduced from the *Nature of Things*) that holy Scripture does *in Fact* exhibit to us this very Repreſentation of God's Government: And further, that there are many favourable Circumſtances, in the *Character* of the *Jewiſh* People, to induce a candid Examiner to conclude this Repreſentation *true.* Though here the Reader ſhould obſerve, that my Argument does not require me to prove more, in this place, than that an *extraordinary Providence* is *repreſented* in Scripture, *to be* adminiſtered: The Proof of its *real* Adminiſtration it is the Purpoſe of this Work to give through the great MEDIUM of my Theſes, *the Omiſſion of the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments.* If therefore I clearly ſhew, from the whole *Jewiſh* Hiſtory, that the Matter is thus *repreſented*, the Inference from my *Medium*, which proves the Repreſentation *true*, anſwers all Objections, both as to our inadequate Conception of the Manner how ſuch a Providence could be adminiſtered; and as to certain Paſſages in holy Scripture that ſeem to claſh with this its general *Repreſentation.* And yet both theſe Objections (to leave no Shadow of Doubt unſatisfied)

are conſidered likewiſe: But as important as this Fact, of an *extraordinary Providence repreſented*, is, even to our preſent Purpoſe, it has a ſtill further Uſe when employed amongſt thoſe diſtinguiſhing *Marks* of the Truth of *Moſes's* divine Miſſion in *general*. For, from hence, we may obſerve, the unneceſſary Trouble and Hazard to which he expoſed himſelf, had that Miſſion been only pretended. Had he, like the reſt of the ancient Lawgivers, done no more than barely affected *Inſpiration*, he had then no occaſion to propagate the Belief of a *conſtant equal Providence*; a Diſpenſation, if only feigned, ſo eaſy to be confuted. But, by deviating from their general Practice, and perſuading the People, that the *inſpiring tutelary God* would become their *King*, he laid himſelf under a Neceſſity of teaching an *extraordinary Providence*; and perpetually inſiſting on it as the great Sanction of his Laws; a dead Weight, if he were an Impoſtor, that nothing but downright Folly could have brought him to undergo.

To proceed, after having laid this ſtrong and neceſſary Foundation, we come at length DIRECTLY to our Point. If the *Jewiſh* Government were a *Theocracy*, it was adminiſtered by an *extraordinary Providence*; the Conſequence of which is, that *temporal Rewards and Puniſhments* (the Effects of this Providence) and not *Future*, were the SANCTION of their Law and Religion. Thus far therefore hath the *very Nature* of the *Jewiſh* Government brought us. And this methinks is bringing us fairly up to the Proof of our two MINOR Propoſitions. So neceſſary, as the reader now ſees, was this *long* Diſcourſe *of the Nature of the* Jewiſh *Government*. But, to prevent all Cavil, I go further; and ſhew, that the Doctrine of a *future State* of Rewards and Puniſhments, which could not, from the Nature of Things, be the *Sanction* of the Law, *was not*, in fact, *taught in it at all*; but purpoſely omitted by their great Prophet. This is proved from ſeveral Circumſtances in the Books of *Geneſis* and the *Law*. Where, to ſhew, that *Moſes*, who, it is ſeen, *ſtudiouſly* omitted it, was well *appriſed* of its Importance, I prove that the *Puniſhment of Children for the Crimes of their Parents*

was

was brought into this Inſtitution purpoſely to ſupply ſome Advantages to Government, which the Doctrine of a *future State* affords. This, at the ſame time that it further ſupports the Opinion of *no future State* in the *Moſaic* Diſpenſation, gives me a fair Occaſion of vindicating the Juſtice and Equity of the *Law, of puniſhing Children for the Crimes of their Parents*; and proving the perfect Agreement between *Moſes* and the *Prophets* concerning it: Which had been, in all Ages, the Stumbling-block of Infidelity.

But we go yet further, and ſhew, that, as *Moſes* forbore to teach the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments, ſo neither had the ancient *Jews*, that is to ſay, the *Body* of the People, any Knowledge of it. The Proof is ſtriking, and ſcarce to be reſiſted by any Party or Profeſſion but the *Syſtem-maker's*. The Bible contains a very circumſtantial Hiſtory of this People from the Time of *Moſes* to the great Captivity. Not only of public Occurrences, but the private Adventures of Perſons of both Sexes, and of all Ages and Stations, of all Characters and Complexions; in the Lives of Virgins, Matrons, Kings, Soldiers, Scholars, Prieſts, Merchants, Huſbandmen. They are given too in every Circumſtance of Life, victorious, captive, ſick, and in Health; in full Security and amidſt impending Dangers; plunged in civil Buſineſs, or retired and ſequeſtered in the Service of Religion. Together with their *Story*, we have their *Compoſitions* likewiſe. Here they ſing their Triumphs; there their Palinodia: Here they offer up their Hymns of Praiſe and Petitions to the Deity; here they urge their moral Precepts to their Countrymen; and here again they treaſure up their Prophecies and Predictions for Poſterity: Yet in none of theſe different Circumſtances of Life, in none of theſe various Caſts of Compoſition, do we ever find them acting on the Motives, or influenced by the Proſpect of a *future State*; or indeed expreſſing the leaſt *Hopes* or *Fears*, or even common *Curioſity* concerning it: But every thing they do or ſay reſpects the preſent Life only; the Good and Ill of which are the ſole Objects of all

their Purſuits and Averſions *. And here I will appeal to my Adverſaries themſelves. Let them ſpeak, and tell me, if they were now firſt ſhewn ſome Hiſtory of an old *Greek* Republic, delivered in the Form and Manner of the *Jewiſh*, and no more Notice in it of a future State, whether they could poſſibly believe that that Doctrine was national, or generally known in it. If they have the leaſt Ingenuity, they will anſwer, *they could not.* On what then do they ſupport their Belief here but on *religious Prejudices?* Prejudices of no higher an Original neither than ſome *Dutch* or *German* Syſtem: For, as to the *Bible*, *one* half of it is ſilent concerning *Life* and *Immortality*; and the *other* half declares the Doctrines were *brought to light through the Goſpel*; which too is a Circumſtance in Support of our Concluſion from the *Jewiſh Hiſtory*, that would be wanting in the Caſe given of a *Grecian.*

The Strength of this Argument is ſtill further ſupported by a View of the general Hiſtory of Mankind: And particularly of thoſe Nations moſt reſembling the *Jewiſh* by their Genius and Circumſtances: In which we find the Doctrine of a future State was always puſhing on its Influence. It was their conſtant *Viaticum* through Life; it ſtimulated them to War, and ſpirited their Songs of Triumph; it made them inſenſible of Pain, immoveable in Danger, and ſuperior to the Hour of Death. But this is not all, we obſerve that even in the *Jewiſh Annals*, when this Doctrine was become national, it made as conſiderable a Figure in their Hiſtory, as in

* It is very remarkable, that nothing more ſtrongly evinces the deſperate Folly of thoſe who imagine the Bible has been adulterated by the *Jews* (unleſs it be their own Scheme of reforming it, by the Aſſiſtance of a *Jew*, who has accommodated it to the Taſte of *Paganiſm)* than this very Circumſtance of the profound Silence throughout, concerning *a future State.* For had the *Rabbins* ever tampered with it on any Head, it had certainly been on this, which they hold to be the very *Fundamental of Fundamentals* †. And which yet, after all their Sweat and Labour, to diſcover in the Bible, they could never get to; but are forced at laſt to take it upon Truſt or Tradition, as the *Indians* do their *fundamental Tortoiſe.*

† Maimonides.

that

that of any other People. In the laſt Place we ſhew, that it is not on the *negative Silence only* of the ſacred Writers, or of the Speakers they introduce, that we ſupport our Concluſion; but from their *poſitive Declarations*, by which they plainly diſcover, that there was no popular Expectation of a future State or Reſurrection. Such as theſe; *That he that goeth down to the Grave ſhall come up no more* *. —*That in Death there is no Remembrance of God, and in the Grave no one ſhall give him Thanks* †.—*That the Dead know not any thing, neither have any more a Reward* ‡.—*That they who go down to the Pit cannot hope for God's Truth* §.—*That thoſe who are dead, are not* ||. Where we find it to be the ſame popular Language throughout, and in every Circumſtance of Life; as well in the *cool Philoſophy* of the Author of *Eccleſiaſtes*, as amidſt the *Diſtreſſes* of the *Pſalmiſt*, the *Lamentations* of the Prophet, and the *Exultations* of good *Hezekiah*. But is it poſſible this could be the Language of a People inſtructed in the Doctrine of *Life and Immortality?* Or do we find one word of it, on any Occaſion whatſoever, in the Writers of the *New Teſtament*, but where it is brought in to be confuted and condemned? The People in *Jeremiah* ſay, that *thoſe who are dead, are not: Jeſus*, in the Goſpel, that *Abraham, Iſaac, and Jacob, are amongſt the Living*. Good Men amongſt the *Jews* ſaid, *that thoſe who go down to the Grave come up no more, know not any thing, have no Reward*, and therefore prayed for long Life here, to praiſe the God of their Salvation: St. *Paul*, on the contrary, devoutly wiſhed for his Diſſolution, in order to receive elſewhere the Reward of his Faith and ſpiritual Warfare. Here, therefore, let me admoniſh certain *Dealers* in *Syſtems*, for once to ſuſpend their *Trade*, and attend a Moment to the Arguments they write againſt. For it will not be thought enough that they prove, on the Principles of their Syſtems, that *the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments* OUGHT *to be in the Religion of Moſes, and therefore*

* 2 Sam. xiv. 14. † Pſal. vi. 5. ‡ Eccleſ. ix. 5.
§ Iſa. xxxviii. 18, 19. || Jer. v. 7.

IS *there*. The Public will now expect, that they directly apply themſelves to the Refutation of *theſe* Arguments; which, being founded on *no Syſtem*, proceed in a different manner; and, from the *Proof* of what *is not* there, *conclude*, what *ought not* to be there. But it is much eaſier to tell us *what ſhould be* in a Book, than to account for *what is* in it.

From the *Old* Teſtament, we proceed to the *New*; by which it appears, from the inſpired Writers of *this* likewiſe, that the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments did NOT make Part of the *Moſaic* Diſpenſation. Their Evidence we have divided into two Parts, the *firſt* proving that *temporal* Rewards and Puniſhments were the *Sanction* of the *Jewiſh* Diſpenſation; the *ſecond*, that it had *no other*. And thus, with the directeſt and moſt unexceptionable Proof of the two MINOR Propoſitions, the *fifth* Book concludes.

VI. But to remove, as far as I was able, all Grounds of *Prejudice* to this momentous Truth, I employed the *ſixth* and laſt Book of this Volume in examining thoſe Texts of the *Old* and *New* Teſtament, which had been commonly urged to prove that the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments *did* make part of the *Moſaic* Diſpenſation.

Amongſt thoſe of the *Old* Teſtament, the famous Paſſage in the XIXth Chapter of the Book of *Job* holding the principal Place, I judged it of Importance, for the Reaſons there aſſigned, to examine this Matter to the Bottom; which neceſſarily engaged me in an Enquiry into the *Nature* and *Genius* of that Book; *when* written, and to *what Purpoſe*; whereby not only a fair Account is given of the Senſe of that Paſſage, conſiſtent with my Propoſition; but a ſtrong Support is provided for what will be further ſaid in the *third* and laſt Volume, concerning the *gradual Decay* of the extraordinary Providence, from the Time of *Saul* to the Return from the great Captivity, and Reſettlement in the Land of *Judæa*.

But

But this Diſſertation has ſtill a further, and very important uſe, regarding *Revelation in general.* For ſhewing therein, how the Principles of the Goſpel Doctrine *opened by Degrees*, fully obviates the Calumnies of *Tyndal* and *Collins:* who pretend that the Prieſts and Leaders of the *Jews* refined their old Doctrines concerning the Deity, and invented new ones, juſt as they advanced in Knowledge or the People in Curioſity; or as both were better inſtructed in the Country to which they were led captive.

In examining the Texts of the *New* Teſtament, the famous *eleventh Chapter of the Epiſtle to the Hebrews* was not forgotten; the Senſe of which is cleared up from the ſtrongeſt and moſt inveterate Miſtakes of ſyſtematical Divines. In this Place is occaſionally explained and illuſtrated a Matter of the higheſt Moment for the underſtanding St. *Paul's* Epiſtles, namely, *the Nature of the Apoſtolic Reaſoning againſt the Errors of the* Jewiſh *Converts*; and this likewiſe contributes ſtill further to ſupport the Truth of our two MINOR Propoſitions.

As in all this I taught nothing contrary to the Doctrine of our excellent Church, my Profeſſion, in common *Decency*, not to ſay *Juſtice* both to myſelf and others, required I ſhould vindicate the Reality of my Conformity. Having therefore declared it as my unfeigned Opinion that, "though a future State of Rewards and "Puniſhments made no part of the *Moſaic* Diſpenſation, yet that "the Law had a *ſpiritual* Meaning, to be underſtood when the "Fullneſs of Time ſhould come, and hence received the *Nature*, "and afforded the *Efficacy* of *Prophecy*: And That in the *interim*, "the *Myſtery of the Goſpel* was occaſionally revealed by God to his "choſen Servants, the *Leaders* and *Fathers* of the *Jewiſh* Nation; "and the *Dawning* of it gradually opened by the Prophets to the "People:" Having, I ſay, declared this to be my unfeigned Opinion, I ſhew, from the Words of the *Seventh Article of Religion*, that it is the Opinion of our excellent Church likewiſe. And that I may not be ſuſpected of Tergiverſation, when I ſubſcribe to this *Article*, that *They are not to be heard which feign, that the old*

Fathers

Fathers did look only for tranſitory Promiſes, I attempt to illuſtrate the Words of *Jeſus*, where he ſays that *Abraham rejoiced to ſee* Chriſt's *Day, and ſaw it, and was glad*, by the nobleſt Inſtance that ever was given of the *Harmony* between the *Old* and *New* Teſtament, on the Principles before laid down in the Diſcourſe on the *Hieroglyphics*; and ſhew that the Command to *Abraham* to offer *Iſaac* was merely an Information (given at *Abraham's* earneſt Requeſt) in a *repreſentative Action*, inſtead of *Words*, of the Redemption of Mankind by the great Sacrifice of *Chriſt*. From whence we gain two other Advantages, beſides that more *immediate*, of juſtifying the Doctrine of our *national Church*. The *firſt* of which is the ſupporting a real and eſſential *Connection* between *Judaiſm* and *Chriſtianity*. The *other* is, diſpoſing the Deiſts to think more favourably of their Bible: For our Interpretation overthrows all Objections to this part of *Abraham's* Hiſtory. The Matter therefore being of this high Importance, it was proper to fix it on ſuch Principles as would leave no Room for Doubt or Objection. And this could be done only by explaining the Nature of thoſe various *Modes of Information* in uſe amongſt the Ancients; for which Explanation likewiſe a proper Foundation had been laid in the Diſcourſe on the *Hieroglyphics*. But this is not all; we get a yet further and much more conſiderable Benefit by it, and that is the clearing up and vindicating the logical Truth and Propriety of *Types in Action*, and *ſecondary Senſes in Speech*: whereon the Divinity of the ancient *Prophecies concerning Chriſt* are to be ſupported; and which, at this Time, moſt needed a Support. For though the greater part of theſe *Propheſies* relate to *Jeſus* only in a *ſecondary* Senſe, yet had ſome Men of Name and in the Intereſts of Religion, through Ignorance of the true Original and Nature of *ſecondary Senſes*, raſhly concurred with modern *Judaiſm* and *Infidelity*, to give up all ſuch as *illogical* and *enthuſiaſtic*, to the imminent Hazard of overturning the very Foundation of our Faith. In the Courſe of this Enquiry, I had an Opportunity of examining and confuting one of the moſt able and plauſible Books ever written againſt

againſt Revelation, *the Grounds and Reaſons of the Chriſtian Religion*, which goes entirely upon the illogical Fanaticiſm of a *ſecondary Senſe of Propheſies*.

The intelligent Reader will, I preſume, allow theſe Reaſons ſufficient to juſtify the Length of this *Diſſertation:* but there were two other more *immediately* relative to my Queſtion, that engaged me in the Enquiry. The *one* was to ſhew, that thoſe, who contend for the *Chriſtian* Doctrine of a *future State's* being revealed to the early *Jews*, deſtroy all *Reaſon* of a *ſecondary* Senſe of Propheſies; (a Matter, as we have ſhewn, of the utmoſt Importance to Revelation:) For how can it be *certainly* known, from the Propheſies themſelves, that they contain *double Senſes*, but from hence, that the *old* Law was preparatory to, and the Rudiments of, the *New?* How ſhall *this Relation* be *certainly* known, but from hence, *that no future State of Rewards and Puniſhments is to be found in the* Moſaic *Diſpenſation?* So cloſe a Dependence have all theſe momentous Principles on one another. The *other* more *immediate* Reaſon for this Diſſertation, on *Types and ſecondary Senſes*, was this: As I had ſhewn that a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments was revealed under no part of the *Jewiſh* Oeconomy any otherwiſe than by *thoſe Modes* of Information, it was neceſſary, in order to ſhew the *real* Connection between *Judaiſm* and *Chriſtianity* (the Truth of the latter Religion depending on that *real* Connection) to prove *thoſe Modes* logical and rational. For as on the one hand, had the Doctrine of Life and Immortality been *revealed* under the *Moſaic* Oeconomy, *Judaiſm* had been *more* than a *Rudiment* and *Preparation* of *Chriſtianity*; ſo had no *covert* Intimations at all been given of the Doctrine, it had been *leſs:* That is, the Dependency and Connection between the two Religions had not been ſufficiently marked out and aſcertained. With this *neceſſary* Diſſertation, therefore, this *ſixth* and laſt Book of the *ſecond* Volume concludes.

Thus the Reader ſees at length, how *regularly* and *intently* theſe two Volumes have been carried on: The *firſt* in proving the MAJOR, and the *ſecond*, the MINOR Propoſitions of the two *Syllogiſms*. In

which, though the Author (whoſe Paſſion is not ſo much a fondneſs for his own Argument as for the Honour and Support of Religion itſelf) has neglected no fair Occaſion of inforcing every Circumſtance, that might ſerve to illuſtrate the Truth of *Revelation in general*; yet he never loſes Sight of his End; but, as the Rule for conducting the moſt regular Works preſcribes,

Semper ad eventum feſtinat.

This Volume too I thought fit to publiſh *alone*, as I did the *Firſt*; though not *merely* for the ſame Reaſon, its being a perfect and entire *Whole* of itſelf, explaining the *Nature and Genius of the Jewiſh Conſtitution*; but for a much better—that *it fairly finiſhed the Argument*. For my Logic teaches me, that, *when the* MAJOR *and the* MINOR *are once proved, the* CONCLUSION *follows of courſe*. And this is, that THE JEWISH RELIGION AND SOCIETY WERE SUPPORTED BY AN EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE: For be this never ſo furious a PARADOX, it may be rendered as tame and harmleſs as any other Truth by the common Advantages of Argument; unleſs a Raiſer of *Paradoxes*, like a Raiſer of *Rebellion*, is to be *ipſo facto*, *outlawed*; and the *One* denied all Benefit of the *Logic*, as the *Other* is, of the *Law*, of his Country.

III.

VII. It may be aſked then, what I mean by a *third* Volume, if the Argument be *ended* in the *ſecond?* To this I anſwer, That it is one Thing to ſatisfy Truth; and another, her pretended Followers. He who engages for *Revelation*, has *many* Prejudices to encounter; but he who engages for it, under *Reaſon* only, has *many more*. I cannot then make too ſure of my Reader. And, luckily, the *Plan* of my Work obliging me to continue the *Hiſtory of the Religious Doctrines of the Jews*, from the Time of the firſt *Prophets*, to that of the *Maccabees*, when the Doctrine of a Future State of Rewards and Puniſhments firſt became *national*; this Hiſtory will afford abundant Proofs for the further Illuſtration of the

MAJOR

MAJOR Propoſitions of the two Syllogiſms. And this will make the Subject of the *ſeventh* Book of *The Divine Legation*, or the *firſt* Part of the *Third* Volume.

VIII. Having in this Manner gone through my *general Argument*, what remains is an Examination of the principal *Objections* that may be urged againſt it: And theſe being founded in the ſuppoſed Views and Objects of the *Jewiſh* Lawgiver, this Examination will be chiefly employed in explaining and vindicating the true CHARACTER of MOSES: From whence will ariſe a new Series of Arguments for the Support of the MINOR Propoſitions of the two *Syllogiſms*: and, particularly, a Demonſtration that ſhews the *Concluſion* of the *ſecond* Syllogiſm *, to have all the Force of the *firſt* †: the only thing it might ſeem to want. This Demonſtration may be reduced to this Syllogiſm.

None, but one ignorant of the World, or an Enthuſiaſt, who had received a Promiſe like that given to the *Jews*, and had lived to the Time marked for its Accompliſhment, could be miſtaken either about the Promiſe or its Completion.

But *Moſes* received ſuch a Promiſe, and lived to the Time marked for its Accompliſhment, and was neither ignorant of the World, nor an Enthuſiaſt.

Therefore *Moſes* not miſtaken either about the Promiſe or its Accompliſhment.

This will make the Subject of the *eighth* Book, or the *ſecond* part of the *third* Volume.

IX. But having, towards the Concluſion of the *eighth* Book, in anſwer to various infidel *Objections*, examined the *pretended Reaſons* of the *Omiſſion* of the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments in the *Moſaic* Diſpenſation; I am naturally and neceſ-

* Namely, that Moſes, who taught, believed likewiſe, that the Jewiſh Religion and Society were to be ſupported by an extraordinary Providence.

† Namely, that they were under an extraordinary Providence.

ſarily led to enquire, further, into the TRUE. For now it might be *finally objected*, that though, under an *extraordinary Providence*, there might be *no Occaſion* for the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments, in Support of Religion, or the Ends of Government; yet, as that Doctrine was *true*, and, conſequently, under every Regiment of Providence, *uſeful*; it ſeems hard to conceive that the Religious Leader of the *Jews*, becauſe, as a Lawgiver, he could do without it, that therefore, as a Divine, he would omit it. The Objection is of Weight in itſelf, and receives much additional Strength from what we have obſerved in the *fifth* Book concerning the *Reaſon* of the Law *of puniſhing Children for the Crimes of their Parents*. I hold it therefore not ſufficient barely to reply, *Moſes omitted it, that his* Law *might thereby remain throughout all Ages an invincible Monument of the Truth of his Pretences*; but proceed to explain the *great* and *principal Reaſon* of the Omiſſion. And now, *ventum ad* VERUM *eſt*. This leads me into one general View of the whole Courſe of God's univerſal Oeconomy from *Adam* to *Chriſt*, ending in a Diſſertation on the true Nature and Genius of the CHRISTIAN FAITH, and ſo adding new and irreſiſtible Force to the CONCLUSIONS of both my *Syllogiſms*. With this the *ninth* Book, or *third* Part of the laſt Volume, concludes.

This I purpoſe to give the Public without Delay: Not for any preſſing Neceſſity *my Argument* has of it, for I left it not, as was inſinuated, naked and ſupportleſs; but, as the Reader now ſees, ſurrounded with various *Outworks*, and ſtanding ſtrongly on its *Concluſion*; But, principally, that I may be at Liberty to addreſs myſelf to a much larger Work. *A full Defence of Revelation in general and of the Chriſtian Faith in particular, againſt Unbelievers of all Denominations*. A Work long projected, and which my Chriſtian Profeſſion, and ſtill more ſolemn Engagements in the Service of Religion, perſuaded me was my Duty, with the good Leave of my Brethren, to devote myſelf unto.——Not to ſpeak at preſent of the high Encouragement to all Attempts of this Nature from the

Felicity

Felicity of the Times, which is, or would be, always urging me on, in the Words of the Poet:

" —— Va pâlir ſur la Bible;
" Va marquer les écueils de cette mer terrible:
" Perce la ſainte horreur de ce Livre divin:
" Confons dans un Ouvrage et Tindal et Collin:
" Dêbrouille des vieux tems les querelles célèbres;
" Eclairci des Rabins les ſavantes ténêbres:
" Afin qu'en ta vieilleſſe, un livre en maroquin
" Aille offrir ton travail à quelque heureux Faquin,
" Qui, pour digne loïer de la Bible éclaircie,
" Te païe en l'acceptant d'un JE VOUS REMERCIE."

BOILEAU.

APPEN-

APPENDIX.

CONTAINING

The Judgments of GROTIUS, EPISCOPIUS, and Biſhop BULL;

SHEWING,

That a future State of REWARDS and PUNISHMENES was not taught to the People of the JEWS by the Law and Religion of MOSES.

GROTIUS.

" MOSES in Religionis Judaicæ Inſtitutione, ſi diſerta Legis reſpi-
" cimus, nihil promiſit ſupra hujus vitæ bona, terram, uberem,
" penum copioſum, victoriam de hoſtibus, longam & valentem ſenectu-
" tem, poſteros cum bona ſpe ſuperſtites. Nam, SI QUID EST ULTRA,
" in umbris obtegitur, aut ſapienti ac DIFFICILI ratiocinatione colligen-
" dum eſt."

EPISCOPIUS.

" In tota Lege Moſaica nullum vitæ æternæ præmium, ac ne æterni
" quidem præmii INDICIUM VEL VESTIGIUM extat: quicquid nunc Judæi
" multum de futuro ſeculo, de reſurrectione mortuorum, de vita æterna
" loquantur, & ex Legis verbis ea extorquere potius quam oſtendere co-
" nentur,

" nentur, NE LEGEM MOSIS IMPERFECTAM ESSE cogantur agnoſcere cum " Sadducæis ; quos olim (&, uti obſervo ex ſcriptis Rabbinorum, ho- " dieque) vitam futuri ſæculi Lege Moſis nec promitti nec contineri adfir- " maſſe, quum tamen Judæi eſſent, certiſſimum eſt. Nempe non niſi per " Cabalam ſive Traditionem, quam illi in univerſum rejiciebant, opinionem " ſive fidem illam irrepſiſſe aſſerebant. Et ſane opinionum, quæ inter Ju- " dæos erat, circa vitam futuri ſæculi diſcrepantia, arguit promiſſiones Lege " factas tales eſſe ut ex iis certi quid de vita futuri ſæculi non poſſit col- " ligi. Quod & Servator noſter non obſcure innuit, cum reſurrectionem " mortuorum colligit Mat. XXII. non ex promiſſo aliquo Legi addito, ſed " ex generali tantum illo promiſſo Dei, quo ſe Deum Abrahami, Iſaaci, " & Jacobi futurum ſpoponderat: quæ tamen illa collectio magis nititur " cognitione intentionis divinæ ſub generalibus iſtis verbis occultatæ aut " comprehenſæ, de qua Chriſto certo conſtabat, quàm neceſſaria conſe- " quentia ſive verborum vi ac virtute manifeſtâ, qualis nunc & in verbis " Novi Teſtamenti, ubi vita æterna & reſurrectio mortuorum proram & " puppim faciunt totius Religionis Chriſtianæ, & tam clarè ac diſertè pro- " mittuntur ut ne hiſcere quidem contra quis poſſit." Inſtit. Theol. lib. iii. ſect. 1. c. 2.

BULL.

" Primo quæritur an in Vet. Teſtamento nullum omnino extet vitæ " æternæ promiſſum? de eo enim a nonnullis dubitatur. Reſp. Huic quæ- " ſtioni optimè mihi videtur reſpondere Auguſtinus, diſtinguens nomen " Veteris Teſtamenti; nam eo intelligi ait aut pactum illud, quod in monte " Sinai factum eſt, aut omnia, quæ in Moſe, Hagiographis, ac Prophetis " continentur. Si Vetus Teſtamentum poſteriori ſenſu accipiatur, concedi " FORSITAN poſſit, eſſe in eo nonnulla futuræ vitæ non obſcura indicia ; " præſertim in libro Pſalmorum, Daniele, & Ezekiele: quanquam vel in " his Libris clarum ac diſertum æternæ vitæ promiſſum VIX AC NE VIX " quidem reperias. Sed hæc qualiacunque erant, non erant niſi præludia " & anticipationes gratiæ Evangelicæ, AD LEGEM NON PERTINEBANT.— " Lex enim promiſſa habuit terrena, & terrena TANTUM.—Si quis contra- " ſentiat ejus eſt locum dare, ubi æternæ vitæ promiſſio extat; QUOD " CERTE IMPOSSIBILE EST.—Sub his autem verbis [legis ipſius] Dei inten- " tione comprehenſam fuiſſe vitam æternam, ex interpretatione ipſius

" Chriſti

" Chriſti ejuſque Apoſtolorum manifeſtum eſt. Verùm hæc non ſufficiunt " ut dicamus vitam æternam in Foedere Moſaico promiſſam fuiſſe. Nam " primo promiſſa, præſertim Foederi annexa, debent eſſe clara ac diſerta, " & ejuſmodi, ut ab utraque parte ſtipulante intelligi poſſint. Promiſſa " autem hæc typica & generalia, non addita aliunde interpretatione, PENE " IMPOSSIBILE ERAT UT QUIS ISTO SENSU INTELLIGERET." Harmonia Apoſtolica, Diſſert. poſter. c. x. ſect. viii. p. 474. inter Op. Om. Ed. 1721.

1. Thus theſe three great Ornaments of the Proteſtant Religion. And what more has been ſaid or done by the Author of the *Divine Legation?* Only this, he hath ſhewn, that the Abſence or Omiſſion of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments in the *Moſaic* Religion is a certain Mark of its Divinity. *Forgive me this Wrong.* It has indeed been objected that Biſhop *Bull* talked very differently in an *Engliſh* poſthumous Sermon. All that I can ſay to this is, that, if he did ſo, it was not by my Direction; who hold it to be unlawful to ſay one thing to the People, and another to their Paſtors. But Biſhop *Bull*, it ſeems, might ſay what he pleaſed. He might, to ſupport his Opinion, ſay without Cenſure, nay, with Commendation, *that the Doctrine of a future State was amongſt the* Arcana *of the* Jews: *That there was a twofold manner of teaching amongſt them, one ſuited to vulgar Apprehenſions, the other to thoſe who had made ſome Proficiency in Knowledge* *. But if I venture to ſay ſo, a Legion of Bigots are in arms. And do I ſay any other, in affirming, that *during the early Ages of the* Jewiſh *Republick a future State was not a national Doctrine, but known only to ſome few of their Leaders?* Thus can the Writer quoted above abuſe me, throughout a whole Pamphlet, for holding the very ſame thing for which Biſhop *Bull* merited his Commendation; and this in an outrageous Manner too, as if I had ſaid ſomething moſt derogatory to the Honour and Attributes of God. But this is the *Hocus pocus* of Controverſy. When the Biſhop and I have paid him in the ſame Coin, that, from the Biſhop's Pocket, ſhall be true orthodox Sterling; which, from mine, comes out clipt, waſht, and counterfeit. But the Man's a Bungler; and neither underſtands clean Conveyance, nor has Aſſurance enough to outface the Fraud. For conſcious, as it were, of an ill-played Trick, he patches up the Cheat in this ſlovenly

* An Examination of Mr. Warburton's ſecond Propoſition, &c. in an epiſtolary Diſſertation addreſſed to the Author, p. 125, juſt now come to my Hands.

Manner,

Manner, *Surely*, (ſays he) *there is a great Difference between induſtriouſly keeping a thing out of Sight, and induſtriouſly propagating it amongſt all* WHO WERE ABLE AND WILLING TO RECEIVE IT *. Illuſtrious Diſtinguiſher! Does not the BISHOP'S *induſtriouſly propagating it amongſt all who are able and willing to receive it*, imply the *keeping it out of Sight* from the reſt? And does not MY *induſtriouſly keeping it out of ſight* from the reſt, imply *the propagating it amongſt all who were able and willing to receive it?* But, in this Caſe, I have done more than by Implication; I have ſaid over and over again, that it was communicated to the few *able* to receive it. I did not indeed add *willing*. That Diſcovery was reſerved for the wonderful Penetration of our Author. I had no Conception but that every *Jew* was *willing* enough to receive *not only the Promiſe of the Life that now is, but of that which is to come:* But it is a reaſonable Queſtion whether they were as *able*; and would not then have quitted both the School and *School-maſter that was to bring them to Chriſt* long before the good Time he had appointed. But theſe are Matters above our Author's Comprehenſion. He will needs know why God acted thus myſteriouſly. I will tell him when he informs me (and perhaps before) why *America* for ſo many Ages was debarred the Light of the Goſpel. Were not theſe his Offspring as well as the Sons of *Abraham?* But this is the Advantage that he and his Fellows take with the Ignorant. They cry out, What! a Religion from God without a future State? No. Rather than this, any thing. They will go a Text-hunting, lie at catch for an Ambiguity, divorce the Sentence from its Context, ſtrip it naked; and if, after all this Violence, it does but ſquint their way, ſee here, ſay they, as clear a Proof of it as from the preaching of *Jeſus*. Yet let theſe Texts but ſpeak for themſelves, or without any other Prompter than the Context, and we ſhall ſoon ſee that there is not one of all they have ever produced, in the Period in queſtion, that can by any Rules of good Critic be made to ſignify the leaſt Notice of a future State, otherwiſe than in a ſecondary and ſpiritual Senſe. In the mean time let no good Man be ſcandalized with their Clamour. All ſuch ſhall ſoon ſee this Tempeſt of Malice and Bigottry diſperſed, and the Scripture of God at laſt vindicated even from its worſt and moſt fatal Miſchief; the Virulence of falſe Zeal. But this and Bigottry have ſo blinded our Anonymous, that in another place he

* Page 125.

inſultingly aſks me *, WHERE *I learnt that Death doth not now reign?* and yet before he ends his Page he himſelf quotes theſe Words of the Apoſtle, *Jeſus Chriſt hath aboliſhed Death* †.

2. But now, if the bringing over ſuch kind of Writers, and leading them into the *Dawn of Senſe*, were any Matter of Merit, I had much to boaſt of. When I firſt adventured to fall upon their Syſtems, nothing was heard amongſt them but "that *Moſes did teach* a future State; and plainly "too; if not, the worſe for him; for he *ought to have taught it.*" This was then the Cry. But now their Note is altered. This Anonymous owns very frankly that *Moſes taught no future State*, nay more, *could not* teach it. *Moſes* (ſays he) *as an authorized Teacher could not declare the Doctrine of a future State* ‡. *This Doctrine was not in his Commiſſion* §. And ſo, in other Places, to the ſame Purpoſe. Thus, after having fought through all *their own* Weapons in vain, they will now try if they cannot ſilence me with *mine*; and make that very Principle on which I raiſed my *ſecond Propoſition* ſerve to the Subverſion of it. For the Reader muſt not fancy that they now begin to embrace any of my Principles in the Love of Truth, but of Contention only. But let us take him as we find him. He ſays, *Moſes had it not in Commiſſion to teach a future State*. Be it ſo. I aſk then, firſt, how he comes to *know* this? If he ſays, becauſe *Moſes did not* teach it, he will argue as becomes him. But I will ſuppoſe him to ſay, *becauſe it was reſerved for the Commiſſion of Jeſus*. Then thus I argue—That *traditional* Knowledge, which this Man ſays they had of the Doctrine, was either a *divine* or *human* Tradition. If he ſays, a *divine*, then ſome holy Man had it in *Commiſſion* to teach before *Moſes*, or God himſelf taught it. In either Caſe, I aſk why it could not have been intruſted to *Moſes*, when inſtituting a new Religion and civil Government, ſince it was of a *Nature to be intruſted?* If he will ſay, of *human Tradition*, it is then certain *Moſes's* Silence, in a Religion to which nothing was to be added, and from which nothing was to be taken, muſt have very ſoon eraſed all human Traditions from the Minds and Memory of the People; which indeed was the Caſe. Though human Traditions, in After-ages, they had enough. And when I come to ſhew why they took them up, and whence they had them, that they had them not in the Times in queſtion will be ſeen to a Demonſtration. I only mention this to ſhew, the wretched Fu-

* P. 70. † 2 Tim. i. 10. ‡ P. 5. § P. 7.

tility

tility of ſuch a Writer, who, when he ſteals a true Principle, knows ſo little what to make of it. It is very true, *This Doctrine was not in* Moſes's *Commiſſion*. And from this great Truth I ſhall prove, to the Shame of all ſuch Writers, that it *could not* be a national Doctrine amongſt the *Jews* in the Times I mention. But this in my *laſt* Volume. For I proceed very differently from theſe Writers. They, from what they imagine, *could not be*, would prove it *was not*. I, from what I prove *was not*, ſhew afterwards what *could not be*. But he ſaw not this, that the People's *not having* the Doctrine was a neceſſary Conſequence of *Moſes's not teaching* it. And no wonder, when we conſider how he came by his Principle, that he ſhould underſtand none of its Conſequences. Hence it is that he ſo ignorantly accuſes me of *having confounded theſe two things throughout my Book*. That is, of taking Advantage of, and, all the way, inforcing a neceſſary Conſequence from a certain Principle.

But, one Word more with him on this Head. He ſays, *Moſes had it not in Commiſſion*. What thinks he of the Book of *Job?* He ſays he thinks of it very *differently from me*. It is prudently ſaid, and enough to ſecure his Credit, and keep him orthodox. We will for once ſupport his Modeſty; and conceive him to hold, that the Book was written by *Moſes*; and that the famous Text, in the nineteenth Chapter, relates to the Reſurrection. But then what becomes of the *Principle* of *Moſes's no Commiſſion?* Or will he ſay *Moſes* did not write it, and that the Text in the nineteenth Chapter does not relate to a Reſurrection? What then becomes of his *Orthodoxy?* See now what it is to be ſherking the Principles of the Profane. Common Senſe cries out againſt this unſanctified Commerce,

Veto eſſe tale luminis commercium.

If the good Man will believe me, he is out of his way. I would adviſe him to return again as faſt as he can into the old *Dunſtable* Road of *Moſes and a future State for ever*. This was only an intemperate Fit of Zeal that hurried him half Seas over, before he knew where he was, or had time to look about him. For what is it he is doing? "*Moſes* "inſtituted the Whole of an entire new Religion: enjoins nothing to be "added to, nor taken from it: Purpoſely omits the Doctrine of a future "State, becauſe it was not in his Commiſſion, but reſerved for the great "Redeemer of Mankind; and yet the People, to whom he gave this

" Religion, *had* the Doctrine of a future State as of National Belief, all " along from his time, to the Captivity, though we can find no Foot-" ſteps or Traces of it in their Hiſtory."

Credat JUDÆUS Apella,

may, I believe, be given in anſwer to this Man's *Creed* with greater Propriety than ever it was applied ſince *Horace* firſt uſed it. After this, Is ſuch a Writer to be argued with? To talk of a Doctrine not being in the Commiſſion of a Miniſter of God, becauſe it was reſerved for a future Age; and yet that the People on whom his Miniſtry was employed had all along this very Doctrine, is a Mockery both of God and Man. For why was not *Moſes* permitted to teach it, but becauſe the Knowledge of it was reſerved for a future Age? Or if they were then taught it, or had it, what hindered but *Moſes* might have taught it? Be not deceived; as *God is not mocked*, ſo neither does he mock his Creatures. In ſhort, this Reaſoning of my Adverſary is, *verbis tollere, re ponere*, the Reverſe of the *Epicurean*: But perhaps he may like it the better for it, as 'tis paying thoſe *Jewiſh Epicureans*, the *Sadducees*, in Kind: And with this Claſs of Anſwerers the *Reverſe* of *Wrong* is always *Right*. But I am quite aſhamed of my Anonymous —Let the Reader only take notice, that this is the ſole Point now remaining in Diſpute between us.

3. As to the *Palmary* Argument, (of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments not being known to the *Jews*, or making part of their national Doctrine from *Moſes* to the Captivity) taken from the Conſideration of *their whole Hiſtory*, as delivered in the Bible; which the Reader has an Account of in p. 102, of this *Review*, our Anſwerer has not ſo much as attempted to touch upon it: Though againſt him, who owns *Moſes* neither did, nor could teach a future State, it comes with a redoubled Bound. Indeed at page 102, of his Pamphlet, he has the *Courage* to quote it in part, and ſtill greater neither to pretend to anſwer it, nor to confeſs its Force; but, to end all, he drops it in this manner.—*Why truly, Sir, there is a Difficulty in conceiving it: And yet were the Caſe as you have repreſented it, I ſhould not venture to call it a* DEMONSTRATION. *Mere negative Proofs are of all others moſt uncertain*, &c. *Venture!* Why I ſee you dare not *venture* ſo much as to look it in the Face. And what you may *call* it behind its Back, will be but the railing of a baffled Coward. No, your Genius has directed you to a fitter Taſk; and you go on to prove that the Body of the

the *Jews* had the Doctrine, from Texts nothing relating to the Matter, but such as have been forced into this Service by *Jews* and System-makers—as, *Days of Pilgrimage—being gather'd to their Fathers—giving up the Ghost—God's bringing every Work into Judgment—the Righteous having Hope in his Death*—David's *Hope being in God—his being a Stranger and Sojourner*———And the Joke of it is, he tells me I might have found out this Meaning in them too, had I but consulted his *Commentators*. And with this miserable *recocta crambe* his whole Pamphlet is stuffed out from Side to Side.

4. I had introduced my Evidence from the Writers of the New Testament in this manner. "But what is of greatest Weight, the inspired "Writers of the New Testament expressly declare the same. They assure "us that the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments did "*not* make part of the *Mosaic* Dispensation *." On which our Writer thus "remarks: The Christian Reader perhaps may be at a Loss to know why "the Testimony of the inspired Writers of the *New* Testament should "be of *greater* Weight in this Case than the inspired Writers of the *Old*. "But what is worse, Unbelievers (for whose Conviction I presume your "Demonstration is intended) may ask by what Right the Authors of the "New Testament came to be admitted as Evidence, who lived at the "Distance of so many hundred Years, &c. †." Which shall we here most admire? the charitable Insinuation in the first part? or the shrewd Remark in the second? Thou Flower of Divines! I did not say that the *Testimony* of the inspired Writers of the *New* Testament has greater Weight than an equal Testimony of the inspired Writers of the *Old*. But that their Testimony in the Case in hand had greater Weight, as (in the Opinion of such as you whom I am here endeavouring in vain to convince) a positive Proof by express Declaration, is stronger than a *Negative* arising from an Omission. It was but just before this very Man was quarrelling with *negative* Evidence. *But what is worse*, says he, *Unbelievers may ask*, &c. What! that which nothing concerns them? I had observed over and over that they all agreed to *this Truth*, and that therefore, *in this Part*, I addressed myself to *Believers*. But, ashamed himself of this Disingenuity, he retracts his own Objection:—*But as I am arguing*, says he, *with you on Christian Principles, I can have no Benefit from this Plea* ‡. And was not I

* Div. Leg. Book V. Sect. VI. init. † P. 66. ‡ P. 67.

arguing

arguing with him, as well as he with me? Can *he* bluſh for this, or muſt I?

5. In Sect. VI. of the Fifth Book of *The Divine Legation*, where I endeavour to prove the *minor* Propoſition from the New Teſtament, I introduce the Diſcourſe thus, "This Evidence may be divided into two Parts, "the *firſt* proving that temporal Rewards and Puniſhments were the "Sanction of the *Jewiſh* Diſpenſation; the *ſecond*, that it had no other *." Now let the Reader turn to this Writer, p. 67, *& ſeq.* and he will ſee how, by the vileſt Prevarication, he has argued againſt the *firſt* ſort brought by me to prove *temporal Rewards the Sanction*, as if I had brought them to the ſame Purpoſe with the *ſecond*, namely, to prove, that there wes *no other*.

6. With the ſame Spirit it is that he endeavours to make me contradict myſelf †, where in one place ‡, ſpeaking of the Patriarchs (who, I own, referred to *Heb.* chap. xi. ver. 13, and 14. *ſaw the Promiſes afar off and were perſuaded, &c.)* I ſay that *even they*, the ſacred Writer aſſures *us*, *had not received the Promiſes*, referring to ver. 39. And, in another place §, ſpeaking of the ſame 39th Verſe, I ſay the ſacred Writer is ſpeaking here of *the faithful* Iſraelites *in general*. Hence this great Critic ſays I am guilty of a manifeſt *Contradiction*, and laments in his kind way, *that theſe Paſſages are both ſuffered to ſtand to ſhame one another*, p. 97. They ſhall ſtand for a better Purpoſe, to *ſhame* all ſuch Scribblers as are not yet come to their Elements; and do not ſo much as know that *omne majus continet in ſe minus*. For if in Verſe 39 the ſacred Writer be ſpeaking of the faithful *Iſraelites* in general, had I not Reaſon to ſay from thence, *that EVEN the Patriarchs* were included? However, he might at leaſt have underſtood ſo much *Engliſh* as to know that the Conjunction *even* implies not *Excluſion*, but *Extenſion*.

7. He inſults me, and puzzles himſelf with this Queſtion, "If the an-"cient Heathen Legiſlators taught it [a future State] or if the main Body "of the *Jewiſh* Nation believed it before the coming of *Chriſt*, how was it "brought to *light by the Goſpel?* If this Text will ſtand with ſuppoſing "that the general Knowledge of a future State was generally re-"ceived amongſt the *Jews* from the Time of the *Maccabees* down to "*Chriſt*, will you be pleaſed to inform me why it will not as well "ſtand with ſuppoſing that they had this Doctrine for as many ages

* Divine Legation, vol. III. p. 155.
‡ Divine Legation, vol. III. p. 355.
† Page 97.
§ Page 591.

"back-

" backward."——And for fear I ſhould not anſwer him (as indeed he had Reaſon) he anſwers it himſelf. *To bring to Light does not here ſignify to diſcover what before was abſolutely unknown. It ſignifies* THEREFORE *the more open or public Manifeſtation of what before was known either imperfectly or but to a few* *. Egregious Divine! If it does not ſignify *that* (you ſay) it muſt ſignify *this*. Beat your Brains no further: For once I'll tell you, it ſignifies *neither*; but (what your Syſtems never dreamt of) that this was the firſt Time of its being *revealed by God*, either to the *Jewiſh* People as a Nation, or to Mankind in general. The ſacred Writer did not deign to call that, *bringing to light*, which was hatched in the boſom of Superſtition, and ſoon became polluted with a thouſand Fables in paſſing through the impure Hands of Syſtem-making *Jews* and *Gentiles*. From whence I reaſonably concluded it was never taught *by God* to the *Jewiſh* People throughout the Period in queſtion. What was taught *by Man* is another thing, and entirely out of the queſtion. But you do not underſtand this: I believe ſo: Nor, I will ſay that for you, ſcarce any one general Propoſition throughout my whole Book.

8. I ſaid that the Doctrine of a future Life and Reſurrection was not national till the Time of the *Maccabees*. He tells me, he *knows I will ſay that they had it from the Prophets, yet the Prophets were dead two hundred Years before. Why then* (ſays he) *could not the* Jews *learn this Doctrine from the very firſt, as well as their Poſterity at the Diſtance of Ages afterwards* †? This ſorely diſtreſſes our Theologaſter: Yet inſtead of humbling himſelf under the Weight of his own Dulneſs, he turns, as is his Way throughout, to inſult the Author of *The Divine Legation*. Now, though this Uſage deſerve no Favour, I will try to open his Underſtanding.—The Prophets had expreſſed a *temporal Deſtruction* and *Reſtoration* in the figurative Terms of *Death* and *Reſurrection*. This being agreeable to the Language of thoſe Times, the People, full only of Ideas of a temporal Nature, reſted in the *primary* Senſe. But when by the total withdrawing the *extraordinary* Providence of God, theſe People (who had right Notions of his Being and Attributes) had once begun to entertain the reaſonable Hopes of a future State; they would then as naturally ſearch their Scriptures for Support. And then it was they firſt began to underſtand that thoſe Prophecies had a *ſecondary* Senſe, and a ſublimer Meaning. In this Senſe, and on this Account it is that I ſay, *they receive the Doctrine of the Reſurrection from the*

* Page 72, 73.

† Page 112, 113.

Prophets.

Prophets. If he aſk me, with his uſual Inſolence, how I come to know that they received the Doctrine of the *Reſurrection* from the Prophets, I will tell him this too, which is more than his *Geneva* Syſtems could inform him of, that the Doctrine was no where elſe to be *had*. If all this will not ſatisfy him, let us turn the Tables, while *I queſtion* him. The Prophets propheſy of the Birth, Office, Death, and Paſſion of *Jeſus*. The *Jews* in general, till the coming of *Chriſt*, and ſome time after, miſtook this Propheſy for the Promiſe of a *temporal Deliverer*, quite different from the Meſſiah of Mankind; Yet, after the Reſurrection, they underſtood better. *How ſo?* I aſk in his own Words, *Is it likely that the Sons ſhould have learnt from the dead Prophets what the Fathers could not learn from the Living* *? He would be hard put to it, I believe, for a pertinent Reply, without condeſcending to uſe the Anſwer I have provided for him above.—What is here ſaid will ſerve for an Anſwer to the ſame kind of Objection urged again at page 50. where, from my owning that ſome Paſſages, which relate *literally* to temporal Things, had a *ſpiritual* and ſublimer Meaning, he ſuppoſes the *Jews* of thoſe Times muſt needs have found it out.

9. Again, "Though here (ſays he) you ſeem to be of Opinion that it "will in *nothing affect the Practice of Virtue whether a future State is be-* "*lieved or not, provided the Will of God is allowed to be the Foundation of* "*Morality*; yet, in your Preface to the *Jews*, you tell them that the "*Jewiſh Religion muſt want much of abſolute Perfection becauſe it wants a* "*Doctrine ſo eſſential to Religion*. It is inexplicable to me, Sir, how that "ſhould be eſſential to Religion, by the Want of which the Practice of "Virtue will in nothing be affected †."—And are you indeed ſo dull as you pretend? or is this only a Maſk for your Modeſty, to hide your Bluſhes, for ſo ſhameleſs a Prevarication? What Man living but your learned ſelf does not ſee, that where I ſpeak, in the firſt Caſe, of the Practice of Virtue, on, what *I call*, the true *Foundation of Morality* ‡, I am conſidering it under an *extraordinary* Providence amongſt the *Jews* of old: And where, in the *Preface*, of a future State as eſſential to Religion, I am conſidering it under an *ordinary and common* Providence, amongſt the § *Jews* of the preſent Times? Yet in this very Page || has this Man the modeſt Aſſurance to ſay, TRUTH IS WHAT I SEEK.—It may *poſſibly* be ſo; and therefore I will take a little more Pains with him. What then, let me

* Page 112. † Page 130, 131. ‡ Divine Legation, vol. III. p. 98.
§ Page 23. || Page 131.

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aſk him, has the *Purity* of Virtue to do with the *Perfection* of Religion, ſo as that they muſt neceſſarily imply one another; and I be accuſed of Contradiction, for ſaying, that the *Jewiſh* Virtue was *pure*, and yet their Religion *imperfect?* Will not this very Man himſelf ſay the ſame Thing, though, I ween, for different Reaſons? But do the different Reaſons of an Aſſertion, make the ſame Aſſertion a *Contradiction* in me, and a *plain Truth* in him? Allow him but a future State for his *Jews*, and their Virtue, then, becomes *pure:* But will he ſay their Religion is *perfect?* But, becauſe there can be no *perfect* Religion without *pure* Virtue, he concluded the other way, that there could be no *pure* Virtue without a *perfect* Religion; and ſo has catched me in his Contradiction-Trap, which he has laid, with the ſame Succeſs, I don't know how often, throughout the Courſe of this Debate.

And here the judicious Reader, I am ſure, cannot but ſmile to ſee him inſinuate *, with a Sneer, that Biſhop *Bull* muſt needs be a Stranger to my Scheme, as he thinks it, of *moral Obligation.* He ſuppoſed, in good earneſt, the Biſhop could read his Bible, as he has done, without ſeeing that the *Ground* of this *Obligation* is *there* made to be *the Will of God.* But this it is to have to do with a Head whoſe Senſe is all run to Syſtem.

10. Once more. In that miſerable ſophiſtical Shuffle with thoſe few of my Arguments, on the *Caſe of Abraham*, which he dares venture to encounter in his *Appendix*, he brings it as a *Contradiction*, that, after I had ſaid, the Information, conveyed in the Command to offer *Iſaac*, was for *Abraham's ſole Uſe*, I ſhould then ſuppoſe his *Family* knew of it. And in this he triumphs with his uſual Vivacity and Succeſs †. Here again I am at a Loſs, as things are ſo equally balanced, to know which was at Fault in this Place, his Head or Heart; but no matter: They are both paſt my mending. I will turn to the Reader.—Where I ſpeak of the Informations being given for *Abraham's ſole Uſe*, I am aſſigning a Reaſon for the Obſcurity of the hiſtorical Relation, ſo far as concerns the *Information*, which I ſuppoſed to be conveyed in the Command: conſequently, *his ſole Uſe*, is oppoſed to the *Jewiſh People, when the Hiſtory of the Command was written*; and not to his own *Family, Iſaac* and *Jacob, when the Command was given*; whom I all along reckon amongſt thoſe Patriarchs who had ſome Knowledge of the Redemption of Mankind—Suppoſe it ſhould be thought pro-

* Page 129. † Page 167, 168.

per to give this Man a *Dignity* for *his Works' Sake, in this Labour of Love*; and he ſhould be told it was for his *ſole Uſe*; he would be apt, I ſuſpect, to think that this rather excluded the Body of the Poor and Needy, than his own dear Family.

11. Again— "Nor (ſays he) will the *Pagan* Fable of *Diana's* ſubſtitut- "ing a Hind in the Place of *Iphigenia* at all help your Unbeliever. *This* "*did not*, ſay you, *make Idolaters believe that ſhe therefore abhorred human* "*Sacrifices*. But do not they themſelves, or have not you aſſigned a very "proper and ſufficient Reaſon why it did not, *viz.* that *they had been be-* "*fore perſuaded to the contrary?* Where human Sacrifices make a part of "the ſettled ſtanding Religion; the Refuſal to accept a human Sacrifice in "one particular Inſtance, may indeed rather be looked upon as a particu- "lar Indulgence than as a Declaration againſt the thing in groſs. But "where the thing was commanded but in one ſingle Inſtance, and the "Command revoked in that very Inſtance (which is our preſent Caſe) "ſuch Revocation in all reaſonable Conſtruction is as effectual a Condem- "nation of the thing as if God had told *Abraham*, in ſo many Words, that "he delighted not in ſuch Sacrifices *." I quote this out of mere Cha- rity, becauſe it looks like Senſe; and is the only thing that does ſo throughout the whole Pamphlet. But this fair Appearance is only in Pro- file. What it has on one Side, it wants on another; and betrays the groſſeſt Ignorance of Antiquity. At this very time human Sacrifices had overſpread the Superſtition of *Canaan*. And thence it is that the Deiſt's Argument receives its Force. The Family of *Abraham*, ſay they, who found the ſame Practice commanded him which they ſaw eſteemed by all the *Pagans* round about as the ſublimeſt Height of Piety, a Practice, as appears from Scripture, not *poſitively* forbidden but by the Law of *Moſes*, would, in the Caſe they put, be naturally tempted to think as favourably of it as thoſe *Pagans*, who underſtood that *Diana* required *Iphigenia*, though ſhe accepted a Hind in her ſtead.

12. After all theſe Victories, he may be well excuſed the interpoſing with his own Good Will and Pleaſure. "If it is your Intention (ſays he) "to proceed, and it were not too great a Preſumption in me to offer my "Advice; it ſhould be to lay the Weight of your Argument, not upon

* Page 161.

"*this*,

" *this*, that the *Jews knew nothing* of a future State; but upon *this*, that " the *Law of Moſes* had made *no Proviſion* for it. IF THIS PRINCIPLE IS " ALL YOU WANT, IT WILL STAND, and you will have nothing to anſwer " for, but the ill Judgment of advancing and taking ſo much Pains to " ſupport another Point with which your Concluſion has nothing to do *." Goodly and gracious! Here he ſhews how capable a *Reader* he is of *The Divine Legation*. He confeſſes not to know whether *this Principle is all I want* to eſtabliſh my Demonſtration; and yet he will turn *Anſwerer*. But what the Connexion of a long Chain of Reaſoning hindered him from ſeeing, I hope this ſhort *View* will bring to Light: And that the *ſecond Syllogiſm* will inform him, that WHAT HE GRANTS IS ALL I WANT. For if *Moſes* would leave his People to get or keep a Doctrine as they could, ſo neceſſary, and believed by him to be ſo neceſſary, under an *ordinary Providence*, to Religion and Society, we muſt needs conclude, he was well aſſured, that his Inſtitution could do without it; or, in other Words, that the Defect would be ſupplied by the Adminiſtration of an *extraordinary Providence*. The Diſpute, therefore, ſeems now to be at an End between us. He owns, I have gained my Point: That I have got to the Goal: All that he would now diſpute with me is the Road. I muſt take the Track he marks out to me; and *I have nothing to anſwer for but the ill Judgment of advancing and taking ſo much Pains to ſupport another Point with which my Concluſion has nothing to do*. Say you ſo, kind Sir! with what Face then could you tell the World, juſt before, that *I ought to make Amends for the Wrong I have done to Religion in the ſecond Volume of* The Divine Legation, *in which, inſtead of placing Chriſtianity on a ſurer Bottom, I have only furniſhed out more Handles to Unbelievers* †? What! Is proving the *Divinity* of *Moſes's* Religion, a Thing for which I ought to make *Amends* and repent, as a *Wrong* done to Chriſtianity? Suppoſe I was willing to ſupport the Proof in a Way you do not like; you confeſs that, in this, *I have nothing to anſwer for but the* ILL JUDGMENT *of taking Pains to ſupport another Point with which my Concluſion has nothing to do*. Am I therefore, for my *ill Judgment*, to be ranked amongſt the injurious Subverters of Revelation? What then will become of you? But ſuch as theſe ſeem to care little whether Religion be true or falſe, unleſs it can be ſupported on their Syſ-

* Page 134. † Page 132.

tems. They had been bred up in the Belief that the old *Jews*, as well as their *Law*, were *ſpiritual*, and then

—Turpe putant parere minoribus, & quæ
Imberbes didicere, ſenes perdenda fateri.

After this, it was in vain for the Apoſtle to tell them, in the Perſon of a *Jew*, *We know that the Law is* SPIRITUAL, *but I am* CARNAL. However let him ſet his Heart at reſt (if at leaſt the Conſcience of ſo unjuſt a Calumny will ſuffer him). For though this Principle, *that the Law of* Moſes *made no Proviſion for a future State*, be all I want to ſupport my Demonſtration; yet I mean, I can aſſure him, to ſecure it with this other, *that the Body of the* Jews *for ſome Ages knew nothing of it*. This I ſhould do, were it for nothing elſe but that it is a TRUTH offenſive to Bigots and their Syſtems; by which they have done their beſt to render both the *Word of God*, and Reaſon of Man, *of no Effect*. But I have weightier Motives: I ſhall make it ſerve for the nobleſt Purpoſes of religious Truth and Piety.

But why do I ſpeak of theſe Matters to him; who is ſo exceeding ignorant even of the very *Forms* of Argument, that, having given us to underſtand that he ſaw I had finiſhed the *major* Propoſition in the firſt Volume, and the *minor* in the ſecond, he goes on thus—" As your *Concluſion* is to " be the Subject of a future Book, I think I have no Right to meddle " with it at preſent. I will prejudge you in nothing, and ſhall therefore " leave you at full Liberty to CONNECT IT WITH YOUR PREMISSES, as you " ſhall find yourſelf able * ?" Here he plainly appears not to underſtand *what natural Connection* there is between the *Major*, *Minor*, and *Concluſion*. I had learnt that the CONCLUSION had been CONNECTED with the PREMISSES by *Ariſtotle* long ago; but it ſeems, ſo unhappy ſtill am I, that the thing is yet to do. Thanks indeed to this merciful Divine!—*I am left at full Liberty to do it, as I ſhall find myſelf able.*

13. But one Word more, and I have done. " Whether (ſays he) you " intend to proceed, or will ſuffer yourſelf to be wholly diverted from your " Purpoſe by Matters of another kind *leſs ſuitable to your clerical Function*, " *you beſt know*. But give me leave to ſay, Sir, you are a Debtor to the " Public; and I hope that in your next Volume you will make ſome

* Page 4.

" *amends*,

" *amends*, for the *Wrong you have done to Religion in this*; in which, in-
" ſtead of placing Chriſtianity upon a ſurer bottom, you have only fur-
" niſhed out *more Handles to Unbelievers* *." I ſcarce know whether I am not to take this for pure Kindneſs, and a ſort of friendly Impatience for my third Volume: Which certainly, if it would hold, he has contrived a very ſpeedy Way to obtain: And that is by proving it a *Debt*. And this at leaſt I will do him the Juſtice to ſay, that if I be a *Debtor to the Public*, it muſt be for the Reaſon he ſo candidly ſuggeſts, or none at all. But, alas! he has, as a good Friend in the like Caſe might have, his Doubts and his Fears. He queſtions whether I will not ſuffer myſelf to be wholly diverted from my Purpoſe by Matters of another kind *leſs ſuitable to my clerical Function*. Leſs ſuitable than what? why, according to him, than *writing to the Wrong* and Injury *of Religion*, and *giving more Handles to Unbelievers*. What I am then *diverted* by, muſt be very *unſuitable* indeed. But will the good Man be ſo kind to tell us what this *Diverſion* is? Thank you for that indeed. As Things are now carried, and left in the Dark, who knows but the Reader, in Exceſs of Charity, may take it to be a Whore, or a Horſe-race, or a good Job of Simony; a Party Pamphlet, or Levy-hunting, or Exchange Alley, or, in ſhort, twenty Things beſides; each of them ſufficient to diſcredit the mere unorthodox Man! With this good Luck, I make no Doubt but he would *wipe his Mouth* and applaud his innocent Addreſs. Well then, ſince the Meanneſs and Malignity of his Heart will not ſuffer *him* to tell, *I* will. The *Diverſion* he hints at, and yet dare not name, is a Critical Defence and Illuſtration of the Writings of one of the greateſt Geniuſes of this, or indeed of any Age, to convince the Prejudiced and Ignorant, that the incomparable Writer hath been always on the Side of Truth, Virtue, and Religion. And now the Secret is out. In the mean time, I dare ſuppoſe, that our *Anonymous* holds it as a Thing very *ſuitable to clerical Profeſſion*, to calumniate his Brother only for differing from him in Opinion, though in the Support of that very Cauſe which himſelf pretends to eſpouſe. I give *Handles to Unbelievers*, while I endeavour to prove an *extraordinary Providence*, adminiſtered in the *Jewiſh* Republic, a Fact, by the Truth or Falſhood of which, the Religion of *Moſes* muſt ſtand or fall. But this Man and his Fellows, it ſeems, give none, who, in writing againſt me, are ſo far from ſaying one Word in its *behalf*, that

* Page 132.

they

they ſeem rather to treat it as a Viſion of the Author of the *D. L.* This Writer particularly ſeems to have given no obſcure Intimations, up and down his Pamphlet, that he believes nothing of the Matter. But how has my ſaying, that the Doctrine was not national, but unknown to the Body of the *Jewiſh* People between the Times of *Moſes* and the Captivity, *given more Handles to Unbelievers?* Was I the firſt Broacher of the Opinion? Look upon the three great Teſtimonies above. Or would it have remained hid, had I not divulged it? Has this Man never heard of the preſent Overflow of Infidelity? Or has he ever heard of *one Deiſt* that believed a future State to be a national Doctrine amongſt the *Jews* within the Period aforeſaid? Or, to be plain with him, is there indeed more than a few Bigots like himſelf that now believe it? What was then to be done? Here was a very general Opinion, grounded upon common Senſe, ſuppoſed to be diſcreditable to Revelation. I examined it. On Examination it appeared to me a Truth. Was I to diſguiſe or hide it (according to the Principle and Practices of theſe Men) becauſe it gave Scandal? Far be thoſe Arts from every Miniſter of the Goſpel! I well knew, if it were a Truth, it would never hurt Revelation. I choſe then to give Glory to Truth; and, in that, to the God of Truth: and, by ſo doing, I became enabled to demonſtrate to Unbelievers that this, which they eſteemed a Diſcredit to the Religion of *Moſes*, was a convincing Mark of its Divinity. And for this, and this only, I am ſaid by this Writer to *have wronged Religion, and given more Handles to Infidelity.* But I forgive him, and pray that God, whoſe holy Religion I am defending, may forgive him too.

14. But the Reader, by this time, muſt needs be curious to know what it was that could provoke our *Anonymous* to write with ſo much Acrimony againſt his Brother, embarked with him in the ſame Cauſe of Religion, while there were ſo many *Infidel-writers* remaining unanſwered,

Cumque ſuperba foret Babylon ſpolianda trophæis.

And for what? a Viſion, nobody will thank him for, unleſs it be half a Dozen Bigots: Always excepting the venerable *Jewiſh Church*, of which he has ſhewn himſelf ſo zealous a Support. She ſurely owes him her beſt Acknowledgments for keeping her Children cloſe attached to her, and hardening them in their Infidelity. For, were it not for this inveterate

Error,

Error, they had long ſince come over to the Faith of *Jeſus*, there being then nothing to obſtruct their Sight in the manifeſt *Imperfection of the Law*: to prevent which, their Leaders, as the great *Epiſcopius* informs us, took ſo much Pains (ſo well ſeconded here by our *Anonymous*) to ASSERT THE FAITH OF THE ANCIENT JEWISH CHURCH; and to prove, that their Forefathers always had the Doctrine of a future State. *Quicquid nunc Judæi multum de futuro ſeculo de Reſurrectione mortuorum, de vita æterna loquantur, & ex Legis verbis ea extorquere potius quam oſtendere conentur,* NE LEGEM MOSIS IMPERFECTAM ESSE *cogantur agnoſcere* *. For he cannot ſure be ſo weak to think it poſſible, that, when he has agreed with them, that their *Church* always had a future State, they will agree with him, that *Moſes* did not teach it. All this conſidered, it would have been very difficult to divine his *Motive* for writing againſt me, had not he himſelf fairly, and without Diſguiſe, informed us of it, in the very Entrance on his Work. Not to mince the Matter, it was that *little* Reputation, (yet *more* than he could bear) which, it ſeems, the *Divine Legation* had accidentally beſtowed upon its Author.—"That you have given (ſays our *Anonymous*) great Proofs of "your Learning and Ingenuity I ſhall not diſpute: And you have had a "fair Time allowed you to receive the COMPLIMENTS OF THE PUBLIC on "that Score. It may now be ſeaſonable to call you to ſomething, which, "though perhaps leſs agreeable to you, may yet be more profitable; and "that is, to conſider how much Truth you have advanced, and what real "Service you have done, or are likely to do to Religion by this Under-"taking †." And why will he not *diſpute the great Proofs of my Learning and Ingenuity?* He has diſputed a more inconteſtable thing; the *Truth*, which that *Learning and Ingenuity* were employed to illuſtrate: and, if theſe appeared with any Diſtinction, it was ſolely owing to the Advantage of the *Subject*.

But *I have had a fair Time allowed me to receive the Compliments of the Public.* How allowed me? and by whom? certainly not by ſuch Writers as theſe. For if their Clamours could have prevailed, I had received the *public Odium* rather than its *Compliments*. And the Reader may ſee, by the ſhort Liſt given of them in the Beginning of this Pamphlet, that thoſe Clamours begun the very Moment the firſt Volume of *The Divine Legation*

* See the Quotation above. † Page 34.

ap-

appeared; and have continued ever ſince, without Interruption, to the Publication of our Author's *Epiſtolary Diſſertation*.

But, after all, what were theſe *Compliments?* And where have they lain hid? Nothing, from the Public, ever came to my Knowledge but the *Calumnies* of my Adverſaries. In ſome Senſe, indeed, theſe may be called *Compliments*, and ſubſtantial ones too. For, next to the *old* way of complimenting, *Laudari a laudato Viro*, I prize the *new*, now all in Faſhion, *vituperari a perditiſſimo quoque*. He, perhaps, may think the Sale of the Book a good ſubſtantial Compliment. But, for that, my Bookſeller muſt thank them; eſpecially if he gave them not their Pennyworth for their Money.

However, to take theſe *Compliments* in their obvious Senſe. I know of nothing for which I had more Reaſon to expect *the Compliments of the Public* than for *the Alliance between Church and State*, as it was a Defence (and I will preſume, from its being yet unanſwered, an *effectual* one) of the Juſtice and Equity of our preſent happy Eſtabliſhment; at a Time when the Enemies of all Church Eſtabliſhments were commonly ſuppoſed to have demonſtrated it to be indefenſible. Yet what *public Compliment* did I ever receive for this Service? unleſs it may be reckoned a Compliment, that thoſe, in whoſe Behalf it was particularly written, have never yet publickly diſavowed the free and moderate Principles on which it goes. But *that*, the honeſt Layman will perhaps ſay, is no bad Compliment to themſelves.

I am here all along pleading for my Adverſary. For had I *indeed* received the *Compliments* he talks of, he would find it very difficult to bring his *Modeſty* off unhurt. The *wrong Judgment of the Public* being, in *that* Caſe, the principal Object of his Pamphlet: the Drift of which is to ſhew that I *deſerved no Compliment*, as I had confounded and miſtaken the Queſtion, run into Contradictions, and done Injury to Chriſtianity: Nay, even in this very place, where he talks of the *great Proofs of my Learning and Ingenuity*, he cannot forbear inſinuating that I have *advanced no Truth, nor done any real Service to Religion*. Miſerable then, indeed, is that *Learning and Ingenuity!* Well does he ſay he would not *diſpute* them. For, for any thing they are worth, there they may lye; and he may ſafely truſt to Time to revenge his Quarrel on them.

From

From all this then, we muſt conclude that theſe *public Compliments* are but the *Mormos* of his own Brain: Things he rather *feared* than *ſaw*; and that through the falſe Conſciouſneſs of a ſuppoſed Worth he is no Judge of. In this troubleſome Situation, the only way he had of *eaſing himſelf* was to attempt to give *me Pain*; indeed the only *Eaſe* ſuch Writers are capable of, when they ſee, or imagine they ſee, a *Merit* in others. *It is time* (ſays he) *to call you to ſomething leſs agreeable.*

Well, but if it be, as he promiſes, *more profitable,* he makes me ſufficient amends. And there was no Danger of his not keeping his Word: For an Uſe is always to be made of the Calumnies of one's Enemies. Beſides, it muſt be a poor thing indeed that will not afford more *Profit* than the airy Compliments he talks of: Which were they as real as, for aught appears, they are imaginary, I ſolemnly aſſure him, I would give them all for the honeſt Satisfaction of having made one ſingle Convert; and I have Reaſon to hope I have made many by my Writings, from Irreligion to the Faith of *Jeſus.*

However, the *Profit I may get* by an Adverſary is one thing; and the *Profit he may propoſe* is another. Let us ſee then what our *Anonymous* aims at. *It is* (he tells us) *to conſider how much Truth I have advanced, or what real Service I have done, or am likely to do to Religion by this Undertaking.* Modeſtly intimating, that I have advanced no Truth; done no real Service, nor likely to do any to Religion. And now, methinks, I hear the equitable and indignant Reader crying out, *Sume ſuperbiam,* &c. And certainly if this Liberty may be allowed in any Caſe, it muſt in this, where a Man's honeſt Endeavours, in his proper Station, to ſerve his Country and Mankind, are blackened by the dull low Envy of an anonymous Slanderer. What! *Was it advancing no Truth, was it doing no Service to Religion,* to confute the Atheiſtic Principles of *Bayle,* the immoral Doctrine of *Mandevile,* and ſettling Morality on its true Baſis, and ſhewing it to be that on which Revelation hath placed it? To juſtify the Equity of an eſtabliſhed Religion; vindicate the Chriſtian from the Charge of a perſecuting Spirit; ſhew the abſolute Neceſſity of Religion for the Support of Society, and yet that it had its Original, neither from Prieſts nor Stateſmen, but from Truth, and Truth's great Author? Again, *Was it advancing no Truth, was it doing no Service to Religion,* to ſhew that the *Moſaic* had all the diſtinguiſhing Marks of Divinity; to vindicate the Bible

Hiſtory againſt the greateſt modern Philoſopher and Chronologer; to explain the Nature of the *Jewiſh* Theocracy, and, by that, to juſtify the Equity of thoſe two famous Laws, of *puniſhing for Opinions*, and *puniſhing Poſterity for the Crimes of their Forefathers*; to confute the moſt able Book ever wrote againſt Revelation, *the Grounds and Reaſons of the Chriſtian Religion*; and, above all, to explain, and to be the *firſt* who ever did explain, the Nature of *Types* in Action, and *ſecondary Senſes* in Speech, on which, depend altogether the rational Interpretation of ancient Prophecies, and the Truth of the Miſſion of *Jeſus?*—But for the further Confutation of ſo wretched a Calumny, the Reader need only turn back again to the *View* I have here given of the *Argument* of the *Divine Legation*. Yet none of theſe Matters, no, nor an hundred more, has he ſo much as touched upon, or pretended to confute. Will he ſay therefore that theſe are not what he meant, when he promiſed to ſhew, *that I had advanced no Truth, done no real Service to Religion?* But only my *peculiar* Argument for *The Divine Legation of* Moſes. Why then did he make his *Charge* ſo *general*, when his *Proof* was ſo *confined?* As his Modeſty will not ſuffer him to tell, it ſhall be helped out. The Reader then muſt know, that it is a fundamental Maxim with all the Writers of this Claſs (as it is amongſt the *Jeſuits*) never to acknowledge that an Adverſary can do any thing *well*, leſt the Public ſhould take it into their Heads that other things are not ſo ill as is repreſented. This is the wicked Spirit of Controverſy, and under the Poſſeſſion of it I leave him. For I am aſhamed of having waſted a Moment with ſo unprofitable a Writer.

The judicious Reader, I am ſure, would not excuſe me if he thought many were ſo miſemployed. The Truth is, the reading his Book (which is the firſt I ever read through, of all that have been hitherto wrote againſt me), and the writing this *Appendix*, took me up but a Part only of this one Evening. Though I have anſwered every thing in it worth Notice: or that had the leaſt Chance of miſleading a well-meaning Reader. However, if he will tell his Name, and ſhew his Face; and it appears that the one has been heard of, or the other ever ſeen in good Company, I do hereby promiſe to give his *Conſiderations on the Caſe of* Abraham, &c. a diſtinct Anſwer, Paragraph by Paragraph, in the Manner of *that*, to one much his Betters, the truly learned and worthy

thy Editor of the Book of *Job*. Nay, I will do more for his Encouragement: I will ſhew as particular a Reſpect to the *reſt* of his Pamphlet; but on this further Condition however, that he, at the ſame time, produce me ſome ONE competent Judge who ſhall ſay, on his Credit, that it deſerves any other Anſwer than what has been already given to it. But without this, a final Adieu to his *Nameleſs Nothing*; but with this Teſtimony however, that a duller, a more diſingenuous, or ignorant Book I never read.

December 17, 1743.

POSTSCRIPT.

I HAVE ſaid, that all this *Writer* has urged, from *Texts* of Scripture, to prove a *future State* in the *Jewiſh* Diſpenſation, is ſo utterly contemptible, and void of Senſe, as to deſerve no kind of Anſwer. But that he may not flatter himſelf in the Imagination of any other Cauſe of my Neglect of him, I ſhall here examine a ſingle *Objection* (ſent me in a private *anonymous Letter*), which has more Plauſibility of Reaſon than all his Arguments, on this Head, put together. And, as the Author's manner of communicating it has the Appearance of Candour and Love of Truth, he will always deſerve more Regard than a thouſand ſuch Writers as the *Examiner of the ſecond Propoſition*. The Objection is in theſe Words: "*Moſes* inforces the Obedience of the *Iſraelites* upon this Conſideration, "*Ye ſhall therefore keep my Statutes and Judgments, which if a Man do he* "*ſhall live in them* *. Here is a Promiſe of Life made to thoſe who ſhould "obſerve the Statutes and Judgments which God gave them by his Servant "*Moſes*; which cannot be underſtood of this temporal Life only, becauſe "the beſt Men were often cut off in the midſt of their Days, and frequently ſuffered greater Adverſities than the moſt profligate Sinners. "The *Jews* therefore have conſtantly believed that it had a reſpect to the "Life to come. When the Lawyer in the Goſpel had made that moſt "important Demand, *Maſter, what ſhall I do to inherit eternal Life* †, our "bleſſed Lord refers him to what was written in the Law; and, upon "his making a ſound and judicious Anſwer, approves of it; and for "Satisfaction to his Queſtion tells him, *This do, and thou ſhalt live.*"—

* Levit. xviii. 5. † Luke x. 25.

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The Objection is very ingenious; and, as we ſhall ſee, not leſs *artfully* managed.

The Objector would have the Promiſe of *Life* in *Leviticus* to ſignify *eternal Life*. But St. *Paul* himſelf has long ago moderated this Queſtion for us, and declared for the negative. A Diſpute aroſe between him, and the Judaizing Chriſtians, concerning *what it was that juſtified before God*, or intitled to that *eternal Life* brought to light by the Goſpel. They held it to be the *Works of the Law (believing*, perhaps, as the Objector aſſures us they did, that this Text, in *Leviticus*, *had a reſpect to the Life to come)*: St. *Paul*, on the contrary, that it was *Faith in Jeſus the Meſſiah*. And thus he argues—"But that no Man is juſtified by the Law in the Sight of God "it is evident: for *the juſt ſhall live by Faith*. And the Law is not of "Faith, but the Man that *doth* them ſhall live in them *."—As much as to ſay—That no Man can obtain *eternal Life* by virtue of the *Law* is evident from one of your own Prophets [*Hab.*] who expreſsly ſays, that *the juſt ſhall* LIVE *by* FAITH †. Now, by the *Law*, no Rewards are promiſed to *Faith*, but to *Works only*. *The Man that* DOTH *them* (ſays the *Law*, in *Levit.* ‡) *ſhall live in them*.—Here then we ſee that this very *Text* which the Objector brings to prove *eternal Life by the Law*, St. *Paul* urges, to prove it *not by the Law*. Let us attend to the Apoſtle's Argument. He is to ſhew, that *Juſtification*, or *eternal Life*, is by *Faith*. This he does, even on the Conceſſion of a *Jew*, the Prophet *Habakkuk*; who expreſsly owns it to be by *Faith*. But the *Law*, ſays the Apoſtle, attributes nothing to *Faith*; but, to *Deeds* only, "which if a Man *do* he ſhall live in them." Now, if, by *Life*, be here meant, as the Objector ſuppoſes, *eternal Life*, then St. *Paul's* Argument does not come out as he intended it; namely, *that Faith and not the Works of the Law juſtify*; but thus, that *both Faith and the Works of the Law juſtify*, which would have ſatisfied theſe *Judaizers*, (as reconciling, on their own Prejudices, *Moſes* and *Habakkuk*); but, by no means, our Apoſtle; whoſe *Concluſion* on this Queſtion (where diſcuſſed at large, in his Epiſtle to the *Romans*) is, *that a Man is juſtified by Faith* WITHOUT *the Deeds of the Law* §. The very Drift of his Argument therefore ſhews us, that he muſt neceſſarily underſtand the *Life*, promiſed in this Text of *Leviticus*, to be TEMPORAL *Life only*. But charitably

* Gal. iii. 11, 12. † ii. 4. ‡ xviii. 5.
§ Gal. iii. 28.

ſtudious,

ſtudious, as it were, to prevent all poſſible Chance of our miſtaking him on ſo important a Point, he immediately ſubjoins, *Chriſt hath redeemed us from the Curſe of the Law* *. Now we know that our *Redemption* by *Chriſt* was from that Death which the firſt Man brought into the World: This was the *Curſe* he entailed upon his Poſterity. The Apoſtle's transferring this Term from *Adam* to the *Law* ſhews, therefore, that, in his Sentiments, the *Law* had no more a Share in the Redemption of fallen Man than *Adam* himſelf had. Yet it is certain, that if the *Law*, when it ſaid, *He who keeps theſe Statutes and Judgments ſhall live in them*, meant *for ever*, it propoſed the Redemption of Mankind as certainly as the bleſſed *Jeſus* himſelf did, when he ſaid, *he that believeth in me ſhall have everlaſting Life*. This becomes demonſtrably clear if St. *Paul's* Reaſoning will hold, who ſurely had heard nothing of this *Prerogative* of the Law, when he ſaid, *If there had been a* LAW *given which could have* given Life, verily righteouſneſs ſhould have *been by the Law*. Where obſerve, I pray you, the Force of the Word ζωοποιῆσαι, which ſignifies to *quicken*, or to *make alive*; plainly intimating, the ſame he had ſaid in the Place before quoted, that thoſe in Subjection to the *Law* were under a *Curſe*, or in the State of *Death*.—Let me add only this further Obſervation, that if (as the Objector pretends) by *Life*, in the Text of *Levit.* be meant *eternal Life*; and if (as the Apoſtle pretends) by *Life* in the Text of *Habakkuk* be meant *eternal Life*: then will *Moſes* and *Habakkuk* be made directly to contradict one another; the Firſt giving *eternal Life* to *Works*; the Latter, to *Faith*.

But the Objector would inſinuate, that *Jeſus* himſelf ſeems to have fixed this Senſe to the *Text* in *Leviticus*; at leaſt that he has plainly inferred, that eternal Life was taught, if not obtained, by the Law.—"When the Lawyer in the Goſpel (ſays he) had made that moſt impor-"tant Demand, *Maſter, what ſhall I do to inherit eternal Life* †? our bleſſed "Lord refers him to what was written in the Law, and upon his making a "ſound and judicious Anſwer, approves of it; and for Satisfaction to his "Queſtion, tells him, *This do and thou ſhalt live.*"—Would not any one now conclude from the Senſe here put upon the Words of *Jeſus*, that the *ſound and judicious Anſwer* of the Lawyer muſt have been a Quotation of the Text in *Leviticus*, or at leaſt ſome *general* Promiſe made to the Obſervers of the *whole Law* of *Moſes*? Nothing like it. On the contrary, the Lawyer's Anſwer was a Quotation of only one Precept of the Law,

* iii. 13.

† Luke x. 25.

Thou

Thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy Heart, &c. *and thy Neighbour as thy ſelf.* Now how much ſoever we may differ about a future Life's being held out by the *Law* through a Meſſiah that was to come, I ſuppoſe we are both agreed that *Faith in the Meſſiah*, either actual or imputed, is neceſſary to obtain this future Life. There are but two ways then of underſtanding this Text of St. *Luke*, neither of which is to his Purpoſe. The firſt is ſuppoſing *Jeſus* included *Faith in himſelf* in this Precept of *loving God with all the Heart*, &c. which will appear no forced Interpretation to him who holds *Jeſus* to be *really and truly God*; as I ſuppoſe we both do; and may be ſupported by a Circumſtance in the Story, as told by St. *Matthew* *, though omitted by St. *Luke*, which is *Jeſus's* ſaying, *that on theſe two Commandments hang all the Law and the* PROPHETS. The ſecond and exacter Interpretation is, that *Jeſus* ſpoke to a profeſſing Follower, who pretended to acknowledge his *Miſſion*, and wanted only a *Rule of Life*. For *Jeſus* is here preaching the Goſpel to his *Diſciples*, *and a Lawyer ſtood up and tempted him*, that is, on the falſe footing of a Diſciple required a Rule of Life. Now in either Caſe, this Reference of *Jeſus* to the Law muſt imply this, and this only, *that without Righteouſneſs and Holineſs no Man ſhall ſee the Lord.* A Point in which, I ſuppoſe, we are agreed.—But ſtill the Objector will ſay that theſe Words of *Jeſus* allude to the Words of *Moſes*. Admit they do. It will not follow, as he ſeems to think, that they were given to *explain* them. How many Alluſions are there in the *New Teſtament* to Paſſages in the *Old*, *accommodated* to a *ſpiritual* Senſe, where the Texts alluded to are ſeen, by all but Fanatics, to have only a *carnal?* And even in this very Alluſion, if it be one, we find that the Promiſe made to the Obſervers of the whole Law is *tranſferred* to the Obſervance of one ſingle Precept in the *moral Part* of it. But let us grant him all he would have; and admit that theſe Words of *Jeſus* were given to *explain* the Words of *Moſes*. What would follow from thence, but that the Promiſe in *Leviticus* was *prophetical*, and had a *ſecondary* Senſe, of a ſpiritual and ſublimer Import? Will this give any Advantage to our Adverſaries? ſurely none at all. And yet the Abuſe of this Conceſſion is all they have for it, to ſupport their Syſtems. Thus the Reader has ſeen how the *Examiner* of the *ſecond Propoſition* triumphs on my Aſſertion, *that the later Jews excogitated the Doctrine of the Reſur-*

* Matt. xxii. 40.

rection

rection from the prophetic Language of former Ages; and aſks (with an Ignorance excuſable only in a Savage to his Catechiſt) how *theſe Jews* came to be more quick-ſighted than *thoſe* contemporary with the Prophets? I had in vain endeavoured to teach him that a *Carnal* and a *Spiritual* Senſe (both of which, we are agreed, the Law had, in order to fit *God's Word* to the uſe of *two* Diſpenſations) implied an *Ignorance* of the *Spiritual* Senſe during the *firſt* of them. But my Word ought to go for nothing, in this Caſe, when unſupported by Scripture. Let us hear then what the Apoſtles themſelves ſay to this matter: Who, in order to ſhew the ſuperior Excellence of the *Goſpel*, in their Reaſoning againſt *Jews* and judaizing Chriſtians, ſet the *Law* in Contraſt to it, under the Titles of *The Law of a carnal Commandment*; *The Miniſtration of Death*; *The Law of Works*: and call Subjection to it, *Subjection to the Fleſh*. Yet theſe very Writers at the ſame time own that *the Law was* SPIRITUAL, or had a *ſpiritual Senſe*. But if by this they meant, that *that Senſe* was generally underſtood during the *Law Diſpenſation*, their whole Argument had ended in the higheſt Futility. For then it was not *a Law of a carnal Commandment*, *a Miniſtration of Death*; but, indeed *a Law of the Spirit*, *a Miniſtration of Life*; only under a dead and carnal Cover; which, being clearly ſeen through, was no other than a Foil to ſet it the better off: and conſequently was of equal Dignity, and, though not of equal Simplicity, yet, indeed, eſſentially the ſame with the *Goſpel*.. Thus we ſee into how high a Degree of Contempt with Unbelievers, theſe Principles of my Adverſaries would naturally bring the holy Apoſtles, did not thoſe admirable Reaſoners take care themſelves to guard againſt ſo horrid a Perverſion of their Meaning. They owned, we ſee, that the Law had a *ſpiritual Senſe*: But *when*, and by whom *diſcovered*, the Apoſtle *Paul* informs us, by calling *that* Senſe the NEWNESS OF SPIRIT *; which he oppoſes to *the Oldneſs of the Letter*, that is, the *Letter* of the *Law*. In the former Part of the Verſe, he ſpeaks of the *Law being dead*; and, here, of its being *revived* again with a *new Spirit*, in Contradiſtinction to the *Oldneſs of the Letter*. So true was it, what, in another Place, he obſerves, that *the Law was a* SHADOW *of Things to come*; *but the* BODY *was of Chriſt* †. The *Shadow* not of a *Body* then to be ſeen or underſtood, as our Adverſaries imagine, but of a *Body that was to come*, and, by its Preſence, explain the Meaning and Reaſon of

* Rom. vii. 6.

† Col. ii. 17.

the

the *Shadow*. For the *Jews* being, as the Apoſtle ſays, *in Bondage under the Elements of the World* *, were as Men ſhut up in Priſon, with their Faces kept turned from the Light, towards the whited Wall of Ceremonies: on which indeed they ſaw many *Shadows*; but the *Body* or oppoſite Subſtance at their Backs, to which they could not turn, they ſaw not. And in this State, ſays the ſame Apoſtle, they were *kept ſhut up unto the Faith, which ſhould afterwards be revealed* †. Till *that time* therefore, it appears that the Body of the *Jews* had no Knowledge of this *Faith*; one of the eſſential Articles of which is *Life everlaſting*. This we muſt needs have concluded, even though he had not ſaid that till *that time* they *were in Londage under the Elemcnts of the World*. A proper Character truly of a People acquainted with the *revealed* Doctrine of *Life and Immortality!*

But, as the *Epiſtle to the Hebrews* is ſo much inſiſted on by my Adverſaries, I ſhall, in the laſt Place, produce a Text or two from it, ſufficient alone to determine the Controverſy between us; and to juſtify what I ſaid of it in the *Divine Legation, that in this Epiſtle there are more expreſs Declarations that Life and Immortality was not taught by nor known under the Law, than in all the other Books of the New Teſtament*. For which indeed a very good Reaſon may be given; as it was addreſſed ſolely to the *Jews*; amongſt whom this fatal Prejudice, that *a future State was taught by the Law*, was then, and has continued ever ſince, to be the ſtrongeſt Impediment to their Converſion. But to come to the Point. The inſpired Writer, in the ſecond Chapter and ſecond Verſe, hath theſe remarkable Words, *For if the Word ſpoken by Angels was ſtedfaſt, and every Tranſgreſſion and Diſobedience received a juſt Recompence of Reward; how ſhall we eſcape*, &c. By *the Word ſpoken by Angels* every one knows is meant the Law delivered to *Moſes* by them for his People: So that here is an expreſs Declaration, 1. *That the Sanctions of this Law* were of a temporal kind. He then goes on, Verſe the fifth, *For unto the Angels hath he not put in Subjection the World to come, whereof we ſpeak*. And this is as expreſs a Declaration, 2. *That the Law taught no future State*. Thus far then we are got. Let us next attend to the fourteenth and fifteenth Verſes; *he* [Chriſt] *alſo himſelf likewiſe took Part of the ſame* [Fleſh and Blood] *that, through Death, he might deſtroy him that had the Power of Death, that is, the Devil; and deliver them who, through Fear of Death, were all their Life-time ſubject to*

* Gal. iv. 3. † Gal. iii. 23.

Bondage. The *Devil* is here ſaid to have the *Power of Death,* as he brought it in by the Deluſion of the *firſt Man*; therefore, before Death can be aboliſhed, he muſt be deſtroyed. But his Deſtruction is the Work of the *ſecond Man.* Till then, we infer from hence, that Death reigned under the Devil. But this is not all; we are expreſsly told, that the *Jews, all their Life-time, were through Fear of Death ſubject to Bondage.* Which certainly can imply no other than, 3. *That they had no future State* to ſecure them from this Fear. See here then, for a Concluſion, the Principle of the *Divine Legation* juſtified on the plaineſt and moſt conſequential Reaſoning of the holy Apoſtle.

But now, ſay theſe Men, if the early *Jews* had no Knowledge of a Future State, the choſen People of God were in a much worſe Condition than the Gentiles who all had it.—To this Purpoſe let us hear our anonymous *Examiner,* who has not only ſpoken the full Senſe of his Party, but has urged it too with a Candour peculiar to himſelf.

"You conſider (ſays he) the Ignorance of the *Jews* as to the Doctrine "of a future State, as one of the moſt *momentous Truths* that Religion has "to boaſt of. I, on the other hand, look upon it as a DISGRACE to "Revelation; as, by the very Act of God himſelf, it ſhuts out his own "choſen People, for many Ages, from that ſingle Point of Knowledge, "which could be the Foundation of a reaſonable Worſhip; while by the "Directions of his Providence, all the World beſides were permitted to "have the Benefit of it *."

He ſays, *He looks upon no future State amongſt the* Jews *as a Diſgrace to Revelation.* Why ſo? *Becauſe by the very Act of God himſelf it ſhut out his own choſen People,* &c. Sure he has forgot what he ſo oft told his Reader, that *Moſes taught not, nor had it in his Commiſſion to teach, a future State to the* Iſraelites: Otherwiſe he would have ſeen that *this,* alone, went a great way towards *ſhutting out the choſen People.* And if they were *let in* at all, it certainly was not by this Prophet of God. Conſequently, if the holding, that *God ſhut them out,* be *diſgraceful* to Revelation, this very orthodox Gentleman, we ſee, is got as deep in the Mire as the Author of the *Divine Legation.* In truth, I pity the poor Man, who thus, at every Step, brings himſelf into theſe Diſtreſſes: And all, from a *falſe Modeſty.* He was aſhamed of the Abſurdity of his Party, in holding that *Moſes*

* Page 131, 132.

taught,

taught, or ought to have taught, a future State; and therefore, at this turn, leaves them in the lurch, and takes up the better Principle of his Adverſary, that *Moſes had no Commiſſion to teach it:* For he muſt have been dull indeed not to have collected that this was his Adverſary's Principle, after he had ſeen him write a Book to prove that *Moſes did not teach it*.—And be not offended, good Sir, that I call this a *falſe Modeſty*; for what is it elſe, to be ſhocked with *one* Abſurdity in your Party, and yet to defend all the *reſt?* Whoſe only plauſible Support, too, happens to be in that *one* which you reject. Indeed, indeed, my kind Friend,

——*Pudor te malus urget,*
Inſanos qui inter vereare inſanus haberi.

—But the Cauſe, though not the Advocate, demands a ſerious Confutation. And as the only Support of it, againſt the *Argument* of *The Divine Legation*, lies in theſe calumnious Appeals to vulgar Prejudices; which our *Anonymous*, in the Paſſage above, has inforced with his heartieſt Malice; I will here, once for all, examine their Pretenſions: and ſo as they ſhall never henceforward be conſidered, in the learned World at leaſt, as any other than mere vulgar Prejudices.

To begin then with the *Subject* of the *firſt* Propoſition, That *God ſhut out the* Iſraelites *from the Knowledge of a future State*; which (in the Caſe given) is throwing that upon *God* for which Man only is accountable. The *Iſraelites* were indeed *ſhut out*; yet, not as he dreams, *by the very Act of God himſelf*; but, if he will have the Truth who never ſeeks it as he ought, by the very Act of their Forefather, *Adam*. It was the *firſt Man* who *ſhut them out:* And the Door of Paradiſe was never opened again till the coming of the *ſecond Man, the Lord from Heaven*. But this, I own, is anſwering him in a ſtrange Language; the Language of Scripture. A Language his Syſtems will never enable him to underſtand.—But more of this Secret, for ſuch, I find, it is to our *Examiner*, in my next Volume.

But, to ſhew what infinite Loſs they ſuſtained in this Excluſion, he goes on, and ſays, that *a future State is the ſingle Point of Knowledge which can be the Foundation of a reaſonable Worſhip*. Here, Doctors differ. St. PAUL places *the Foundation of a reaſonable Worſhip* in another Thing. He ſaith, that HE THAT COMETH TO GOD MUST BELIEVE THAT HE IS, AND THAT HE IS A REWARDER OF THEM THAT DILIGENTLY SEEK HIM *. What is

* Heb. xi. 6.

Man's Purpoſe in *coming to God?* Why, certainly, to *worſhip* him. And what doth the Apoſtle tell us is the true, the *reaſonable Foundation of this Worſhip?* Why, *to believe that he is, and that he is a Rewarder of them that ſeek him.* What becomes then of our *Examiner's only Foundation of a reaſonable Worſhip?* The Apoſtle, we ſee, places it in the *Nature*, and not (as our *Examiner)* in the *inſſential Circumſtances*, of *Reward:* Conſequently a Reward given *here*, was as true a *Foundation of reaſonable Worſhip* to the early *Jews*, living under an *extraordinary* Providence, as a Reward given *hereafter* is to us Chriſtians, living under an *ordinary* one: And conſequently our Examiner muſt have been miſtaken, when he made a FUTURE STATE *the ſingle Point of Knowledge which can be the Foundation of a reaſonable Worſhip.*—But does not *common Senſe* ſay the ſame thing?

For to come a little cloſer to this formidable Man, now I have got an Apoſtle on my Side; I will undertake to *demonſtrate* (how much ſoever he diſlikes the Word) that a FUTURE STATE is ſo far from being *the only Foundation of a reaſonable Worſhip*, that, while *God is believed the Rewarder of them that diligently ſeek him* (and that is the Caſe of a People under an *extraordinary* Providence) the *Ignorance of a Future State* neither affects *Piety* nor *Morality*; the two things which conſtitute a *reaſonable Worſhip*, and perfect Mankind in *Virtue*.

Not *Piety*, becauſe that (in the Caſe given) depends ſolely on the *Belief that God is*.

Not *Morality*, becauſe that depends ſolely on the *Knowledge of what God commands*.

And this, which *right Reaſon* teaches, the *Law of Moſes* has promulged. We are commanded to *love God* for his Sake, that is, for the Excellence of his Nature, the moſt lovely of all Objects. We are commanded to *love our Neighbour*; and the preſcribed Meaſure, *as our ſelves*, points to the Equity of the Command; for, being all equal by Nature, we ſhould have but one Rule of acting, for ourſelves and others. This is reſolvable into the natural Relations of things; and thoſe *Relations* are the *Declarations* of God's *Will*, the only true Foundation of Morality; and, as ſuch, perpetually inforced by the *Law of Moſes*. Thus firmly eſtabliſhed are the Duties of the firſt and ſecond Table. Now, *on the Love of God and of our Neighbour hang all the Law and the Prophets*. That theſe therefore ſhould not be able at the ſame time to ſupport a *Reaſonable Worſhip*, when, to all this *Mojaic* Enforcement of the *Belief that God is*, it is added, that he is an exact

exact *Rewarder of them that diligently ſeek him*, would be a very hard Caſe indeed; eſpecially if we conſider, that, to our corrupt Nature, it is not the immeaſurable Reward at Diſtance, but that which is preſent, and underſtood by us, that moſt forcibly attracts us. And this it was, which the Law of *Moſes* held out.

In a Word then, ſince *pure Virtue*, under which Term I compriſe *Piety* and *Morality*, conſiſts in acting agreeably to thoſe Relations in which we ſtand to all Beings whatſoever; is it poſſible there can be any more forcible Inducement to our *reaſonable Nature* for the Practice of it, than that which is propoſed by the Law of *Moſes*, namely, that God commands it out of our Love and Fear and Duty towards him? Or any more forcible Inducement to our *corrupt Nature*, than that every Work ſhall receive its full Recompence of Reward, through the Adminiſtration of an *extraordinary* Providence? How then is it poſſible that a *long*, or *ſhort Duration*, the Rewards of *this*, or of *another* Life, ſhould in the leaſt *eſſentially* affect the Purity, or Integrity of human Virtue, ſo taught and recommended; that is, a *reaſonable Worſhip*, in the *Spirit* of Piety, and *Truth* of Morality?

To ſuppoſe that Virtue cannot be pure and perfect but when forced upon Men by the Immenſity of Puniſhment, is having no better an Idea of it than the Pagan Slave in the Poet,

Sum bonus ac frugi: renuit negitatque Sabellus.

Indeed, in the *ordinary* Diſtribution of Things, where the Rewards and Puniſhments of Religion lie at diſtance, I believe nothing leſs than the Promiſes and Terrors of the *Chriſtian* would be, generally, ſufficient to ſupport the Practice it enjoins. But here too, it is ſtill the Love and Fear of *God*, not of *Reward* and *Puniſhment*, that are held out to us, to perfect and ſublime our Virtue; though the *others* likewiſe be laid before us to raiſe and quicken it.

But here, let me not be again miſunderſtood, as I have been once already, by this ſuper-ſubtile *Examiner*. I deny indeed that the Want of a future State in the *Jewiſh* Religion, under an *extraordinary* Providence, could at all affect the Truth and Purity of human Virtue, as there founded and enforced: Yet, at the ſame time, I am very far from denying but that other Things did hinder that Religion from being perfect. Nay, in my Addreſs to the *Jews**, prefixed to the ſecond Volume of *The Divine*

* Ded. to the Jews, p. xxii.—In the preſent Edition, ſee vol. II. p. 276.

Legation,

Legation,. I have ſhewn what theſe Things were: As, firſt, *the whole Turn of their Ritual Law:* And, ſecondly, the *Want of a future State under the ordinary and common Providence of Mankind* *. For I am there applying, to theſe miſtaken People, a View of *Moſes's* Religion as it appears under their preſent Condition, in order to convince them of the Neceſſity of having its Imperfection ſupplied by the Religion of *Jeſus*; in which, I ſuppoſe, all Chriſtians are agreed. At leaſt, as many as are out of the thick Darkneſs of Controverſy will ſee theſe to be very different and diſtinct Poſitions. The one ſaying, that their Virtue might be pure and perfect, *during the Times of an extraordinary* Providence, for any thing that the Ignorance of a future State could affect to the contrary. The other, that a Religion without a future State, on the Suppoſition of its being to ſerve *for all Times*, muſt be very imperfect.

I might now expect, after ſo full a Confutation of this erroneous Opinion, concerning *the Foundation of a reaſonable Worſhip*, that our *Examiner* ſhould *bluſh* for his Raſhneſs in aſſerting, that *the Ignorance of the* Jews *concerning a future State is a* DISGRACE *to Revelation.* An Expreſſion, which, were there but a Chance of his being wrong, a ſober Divine would carefully have avoided; as altogether unſuitable to that Reverence we owe to God, while meaſuring his tremendous Providence by *our* ſcanty and uncertain Ideas of *fit* and *right.* I might ſay, indeed, that the *Jews'* Ignorance of a future State was a Truth of *ſo high Importance*, that, from thence, could be demonſtrated the Divinity of their Diſpenſation; and, I preſume, without Offence to any ſober Man; becauſe, if I were miſtaken, no Injury was done to Revelation; I left it whole and entire, juſt as I took it up. But ſhould the *Examiner* be miſtaken, his calling this Ignorance a DISGRACE TO REVELATION would be affording ſuch an Handle to the Enemies of Religion to blaſpheme, as he ſhould tremble to think of.

But, if I know him well, he is not a Writer of *Retractations.* He has another Reaſon for calling it *a Diſgrace to Revelation.* For, *It ſhuts up* (he ſays) *God's own choſen People from a future State, while by the Directions of his Providence all the World beſides were permitted to have the Benefit of it.* And now, good People, you have it all: And if this will not move you, why——The Author of *The Divine Legation*, for any thing I ſee, may go on.

This *ſecond* Propoſition we ſee is, that (in the Caſe given) "all the "Pagan World were by the divine Providence *permitted* to enjoy a *Benefit*

* Page xxiii. (Vol. II. p. 276.)

"which

"which was denied to the *Jews*." Examining the *Predicate* of this Propoſition, we ſhall firſt conſider the PERMISSION, and then the BENEFIT.

All the World beſides, ſays he, *were permitted*.——By what Inſtrument? By the Uſe of their Reaſon.—And had not the *Jews* the Uſe of theirs? Not the *free* Uſe: For their Prophet delivering to them, from God, a new Law and Religion, in which the Doctrine of a future State was not found, this would naturally lead them to conclude againſt it.—What, in Defiance of all the Deductions of Reaſon, which, from God's demonſtrable Attributes of Goodneſs and Juſtice, made the Pagan World conclude, that, as moral Good and Evil had not their Retribution *here*, they would have it *hereafter*? Yes indeed, ſo we find it was.—Strange! that this *Moſes* ſhould have ſuch an Influence over a People's Underſtanding! Why, if you will have it, he promiſed that Good and Evil ſhould have their Retribution *here*.—Ay, now the Secret is out. Well, indeed, might this *ſhut* them *up* from looking further; eſpecially if (as you pretend to *believe*) he not only *promiſed*, but *performed*, likewiſe. See then to what this PERMISSION amounts, ſo invidiouſly urged, not againſt me, for that is nothing, but againſt the Scriptures of God. Juſt to thus much, "That *all the World* "*beſides* were *permitted* to find out, by *Reaſon*, what his own choſen Peo- "ple were taught, by the practical Demonſtration of an *extraordinary Pro-* "*vidence*; namely, that God would act with Juſtice and Goodneſs towards "Man."

Come we now to the *Benefit*. The Benefit of the Doctrine of a *future State* is twofold. To *Society as ſuch*, as it is a Curb to *Vice* by ſupporting the Belief of a Providence, under the *unequal* Diſtribution of Things: And to *Religion as ſuch*, as it is an Incentive to *Virtue*, by ſhewing the Rate ſet upon it. The Doctrine of a *future State*, in the Pagan World, afforded indeed that *Benefit to Society*: But then, *that* Benefit the *Jewiſh* State did not want, as being under an *equal* Diſtribution of Things. *Benefit to Religion*, their *Doctrine* of a future State afforded none. It was over-run with Superſtitions; and generally gave the Rewards of another Life, not to *moral* but to *ritual* Obſervances. And when not ſo, as in the open teaching of the *Myſteries*, yet even there the ſevereſt Puniſhments in the Pagan Hell were allotted to the *Atheiſts*, or the Rejectors of the vulgar *Polytheiſm*; which, not only utterly depraved Religion, but riveted Men in its Depravity. So that, in the Senſe of our *Examiner* (who is here ſpeaking of the

Benefit

Benefit of a future State to *Religion, as ſuch)*, this *future State of all the World beſides* was indeed no *Benefit* at all. But he will ſay, I have ſhewn, that the ἀπόῤῥητα of the *Myſteries* removed theſe Errors. It is true, I have. But, at the ſame time, likewiſe, that theſe were revealed to very *few*. And, to ſet Matters even, has not he ſhewn from Biſhop *Bull* *, *that the hidden Myſteries of the Law were opened to fit Hearers, wherever they were found?* though, from the *total Silence* of a future State, in the old *Jewiſh* Hiſtory, I ſuſpect, *theſe* were *ſtill fewer*. Which Opinion I will be ready to retract, when he ſhall ſhew me, in the *Jewiſh Antiquities*, as plain Intimations of a *future State*, amongſt *the hidden Myſteries of the Law*, as I have ſhewn him in the *Grecian*, of the Doctrine of the *Unity, and the Detection of vulgar Polytheiſm* amongſt the *Myſteries of Paganiſm*. But had a future State afforded the *Pagans* never ſo much Benefit to *Religion as ſuch*: Yet neither this did the *Jewiſh* People want, and for the ſame Reaſon as above, becauſe they were under an *extraordinary Providence*. And now let us ſee to what the Benefit amounts.

The *Pagans had a future State* to ſupport their Society and Religion.
But then, ſo circumſtanced, that it was of Service to *Society* only, although *both* wanted it.
The *Jews had no future State* to ſupport their Society and Religion.
But then, *neither* wanted it.

And now, I pray you, on which Side lies the Balance of the *Benefit?* We commonly hear it ſaid, that *ſeeing is believing*: but I ſuſpect our Examiner has been impoſed on by a very different Aphoriſm, as abſurd in the Thought as the other is in the Expreſſion, that *believing his having* a Principle not unworthy of his School. Elſe how comes he to place ſo great a *Benefit* in the Point in Queſtion, if he did not ſuppoſe that the *Jews'* want of the *Doctrine* deprived them of the *Thing?*

But have I not been reckoning all this Time without my Hoſt, while I argued againſt theſe ſilly Prejudices, upon the Confeſſion of an *extraordinary Providence?* For, diſputing here with *Chriſtian Men*, I have *ſuppoſed* that they *believed* ſuch a Diſpenſation. And prudent was it in me ſo to do. For had I been called upon to prove my *Suppoſition*, I do not know whether what I could ſay would have ſatisfied the judicious Reader, who had obſerved that all the Arguments they uſe againſt me receive the little Force

* Page 123.

they

they have on a *contrary* Suppoſition. And even this *private* Letter-writer, one of the moſt candid of his kind, had ſtill a Reaſon in reſerve, to prove why the Promiſe of *Life*, in his favourite Text of *Leviticus*, muſt needs mean *eternal Life*, and not *temporal* only, which looks very much that way; it is, *becauſe the beſt Men* (he ſays) *were often cut off in the midſt of their Days, and frequently ſuffered greater Adverſities than the moſt profligate Sinners.* Who now that had even a Mind to let us ſee he believed nothing of the Matter, could have expreſſed his Meaning in ſtronger or more ſignificant Terms? I am not aſhamed to confeſs I read my Bible; and believed what it told me of this *extraordinay Providence*; and, in the Simplicity of my Heart, would needs try if I could make the Deiſt believe too. I found it was this that moſt revolted him: and therefore undertook to prove, from the very Conſtitution of their Oeconomy, that the *Repreſentation* muſt needs be true, and ſo, while I was removing his *Objections* to Revelation, give him a Demonſtration of its *Truth*. In the mean time, I little ſuſpected that a Set of Men, who call themſelves Believers, would, for the Sake only of combating the *Medium* of my Demonſtration, ever venture to call in Queſtion that very Fact for which I was contending with *their* Adverſaries; and in a way their Adverſaries (except it were perhaps *Spinoſa* and his Man *Toland)* had never attempted, namely, by a virtual Denial of the *Repreſentation*. If this was to be conteſted me, I could have wiſhed, for the Honour of *Revelation*, it had been done by the profeſſed Enemies of it: And then I could have expoſed their *Prevarication* without much Regret. As it is, I rather chuſe to draw a Veil over this *Infirmity of the Fleſh*; AND WAIT FOR *the Renewal of a right Spirit within them.*

REMARKS

ON SEVERAL

OCCASIONAL REFLECTIONS:

IN ANSWER TO

The REVEREND DOCTORS

STEBBING and *SYKES.*

Serving to explain and juſtify the Two DISSERTATIONS in the

DIVINE LEGATION,

CONCERNING THE

Command to ABRAHAM *to offer up his Son;*

AND THE

Nature of the JEWISH THEOCRACY;

Objected to by thoſe LEARNED WRITERS.

PART II. and Laſt.

Arcades ambo,
Et cantare pares, et RESPONDERE parati. VIRG.

Quid immerentes hoſpites vexas, Canis,
Ignavus adverſum Lupos?
Nam, qualis aut Moloſſus, aut fulvus Lacon,
Amica vis Pastoribus,
Agam per altas aure ſublata nives,
Quæcunque præcedet Fera.
Tu quum timenda voce compleſti Nemus,
Projectum odoraris Cibum. *Hor.*

PREFACE.

THE two SUBJECTS here debated will deſerve the Attention of every ſerious Believer; eſpecially, thoſe of my own Order. For the Sake of ſuch, I ſhall juſt hazard a few Obſervations, which I thought rather too good to be thrown away upon thoſe whom the following Sheets more immediately concerned.

I. The Reader finds here, what the Learned Dr. *Stebbing* has been able to object to my Interpretation of the COMMAND TO ABRAHAM: Which, I preſume, when fairly attended to, will be no light Confirmation of its Truth. But, as I have no Notions to advance, not founded in a ſincere Deſire to demonſtrate the Divinity of our Holy Religion, I would by no means take the Advantage of a weak Adverſary, to recommend them to the public Acceptance. I hold it not honeſt, therefore, to conceal an Objection to my Interpretation, by far more plauſible than any that zealous Gentleman has urged againſt it; which is This, "That it is difficult to con-
"ceive how a Circumſtance of ſo much Importance to Revelation,
"as the removing one of the ſtrongeſt infidel Objections againſt its
"Truth, and proving a real Connexion between the two Diſpen-
"ſations of it, ſhould never be clearly explained and inſiſted on by
"the Writers of the New Teſtament, though the Hiſtorian of the
"*Old* might have had ſufficient Reaſons for concealing it." To which I beg Leave to reply, that it is very certain, that many Truths of great Importance, for the Support of Religion againſt Infidelity,

Infidelity, were taught by *Jeſus* to his Diſciples (amongſt which, I reckon this Interpretation to be one) which never came down, by their Conveyance, to the Church. But being, by the Aſſiſtance of God's Holy Spirit, diſcoverable by thoſe who devote themſelves to the Study of the Scriptures with a pure Mind, have, for the wiſe Ends of Providence, inſcrutable to us, been left for the Induſtry of Man to find out, that, as occaſion required, every Age might ſupply new Evidence of God's Truth, to *put to Silence the Ignorance of fooliſh Men:* And that, in proportion as the Power of Darkneſs thickened, ſo might the Splendour of the Goſpel-light; that Light which was ordained, at laſt, entirely to diſperſe it. In ſupport of what is here ſaid, I beg the Reader to reflect on what is told us by the Evangeliſt, of the Converſation between *Jeſus* (after his Reſurrection) and the two Diſciples journeying to *Emmaus*; where their Maſter ſays unto them, O *Fools, and ſlow of Heart to believe all that the Prophets have ſpoken! Ought not* Chriſt *to have ſuffered theſe Things, and to enter into his Glory? And beginning at* Moses, *and all the Prophets, he expounded unto them the Things concerning himſelf**. Now who can doubt, but that many Things were here revealed, which would have greatly contributed to the Demonſtration of the Goſpel Truth? Yet hath it pleaſed Providence that this Diſcourſe ſhould never be recorded. But that the Apoſtles uſed, and made a good uſe too, of thoſe Inſtructions, we have the plaineſt Evidence from their amazing Succeſs in the Converſion of the World, by this Application of the Writings of *Moſes and the Prophets*. And if I be not greatly deceived, amongſt Truths inforced on thoſe Occaſions, that, which I preſume to have diſcovered in the *Command to Abraham*, was not forgotten. Let the unprejudiced Reader judge. St. *Paul*, making his Apology before King *Agrippa*, recapitulates his Defence in theſe Words: *Having therefore obtained help of God, I continue unto this Day witneſſing both to ſmall and great, ſaying none other Things than thoſe which the Prophets, and* Moses,

* St. Luke, chap. xxiv. ver. 26, 27.

DID

DID SAY SHOULD COME: *that* Chriſt *ſhould ſuffer, and that he ſhould be the firſt that ſhould riſe from the Dead* *. The *Greek* is rather ſtronger, in predicating this Circumſtance of *Moſes*——ὧν τε ὁ προφῆται ἐλάλησαν μελλόντων γίνεσθαι ΚΑΙ ΜΩΣΗΣ. Now where, let me aſk, in all his Writings, except in the *Command to Abraham*, is there the leaſt Trace of any ſuch Circumſtance, as *that Chriſt ſhould ſuffer, and that he ſhould be the firſt that ſhould riſe from the Dead?* Or in that Command either, if not underſtood according to our Interpretation?

But further, as the Apoſtles did not convey ſeveral illuſtrious Truths taught them by their Maſter to the Churches which they founded: So neither (and doubtleſs for the ſame wiſe Ends of Providence) did the Churches convey down to Poſterity ſeveral Truths revealed to them by the Apoſtles. An Inſtance of which we have in St. *Paul's* ſecond Epiſtle to the *Theſſalonians*, where, ſpeaking of *Anti-Chriſt*, or the *Man of Sin*, he reminds the Church of what it was he told them yet *lett* or hindered his Coming.—*Remember ye not, that, when I was yet with you, I told you theſe things? And now you know what withholdeth that he might be revealed in his Time.* But the Knowledge of this *lett* or *hindrance* the Church of God hath long loſt. And yet it is a Matter of very high Concernment. I have ever thought, the Propheſies relating to Antichriſt, interſperſed up and down the New and Old Teſtament, the moſt convincing Proof of the Truth of the Chriſtian Religion that any moral Matter is capable of receiving. That a *Roman* Power is meant, is ſo exceeding evident, that it is that Point in which all Parties are agreed. But to fix it to the individual Power (a Determination highly intereſting both the Truth and Purity of Religion) it muſt firſt be known whether the Power ſpoken of be *Civil* or *Eccleſiaſtical*. Proteſtants, in general, think they ſee all the Marks of the latter. The Catholics, as they are called, contend of Neceſſity for the former: And they have many great Names even among us on

* Acts, Chap. xxvi. ver. 22, 23.

their Side (by what odd Concurrence of Circumſtances, may be conſidered in another Place). This has long embarraſſed a Queſtion, on the right Determination of which alone, I am fully perſuaded, one might reſt the whole Truth of the Chriſtian Cauſe. Now the Knowledge of what it was that *lett* or *hindered* the Appearance of Antichriſt, which St *Paul* communicated to the Church of *Theſſalonica*, would at once determine the Queſtion. But this is the State in which it hath pleaſed Providence to place the Church of *Chriſt*: With abundant Evidence to ſupport itſelf againſt Infidelity; yet ſo much left to be diſcovered as may rightly exerciſe the Faith and Induſtry of all humble and ſober Adorers of the Croſs. Which however ſhews it was not the Intent of Providence that one of theſe Virtues ſhould thrive at the Expence of the other. Therefore when my learned Adverſary *, in order, I will believe, to advance Chriſtian Faith, would diſcourage Chriſtian Induſtry, by calumniating, and rendering ſuſpected, what he is pleaſed to call EXPERIMENTS in Religion, it is, I am afraid, at beſt, but a *Zeal without Knowledge*. Indeed, if Men will come to this Study with *unwaſhed Hands*, that is, without a due Reverence of the Dignity of theſe ſacred Volumes; or, what is as ill in the other extreme, with *unpurged Heads*, that is, ſtuffed full of Syſtems, or made giddy by Enthuſiaſm, it is not unreaſonable to expect the Succeſs which Dr. *Stebbing* pretends to have obſerved. But then, let him keep his Advice for thoſe whom it concerns.

II. The other Subject debated in this Pamphlet is of the THEOCRACY of the *Jews*. Having undertaken to prove the Divinity of the *Moſaic* Religion from the actual Adminiſtration of an extraordinary Providence over that State in general, and over private Men in particular, by the Medium of the Omiſſion of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments in their Oeconomy; what I had to do was to ſhew from Scripture, that ſuch a Diſpenſation of Providence was there *repreſented* to have been adminiſtered. This I did two

* Dr. Stebbing.

Ways

Ways, from the Nature of the thing; and from the expreſs Words of Scripture. Under the firſt Head, I ſhewed * that, from the Nature of a *Theocracy*, it neceſſarily followed, by as plain an Induction as that Protection follows Obedience to the Civil Magiſtrate, that there muſt be an extraordinary Providence over the State in general, and over all the Members of it in particular. And that though a Theocracy were only pretended, yet, if the Inſtitutor of it knew the meaning of his own Contrivance, he muſt, of courſe, pretend *this* extraordinary Providence likewiſe. In ſupport of which laſt Obſervation I have ſhewn *, in the ſecond Place, that ſuch a Diſpenſation of Providence is actually, and in expreſs Words of Scripture, ſaid to be adminiſtered. After this, what has an Unbeliever to do (for it is hard to think how any other ſhould have any thing to do in it) who would invalidate this *Repreſentation*, but either to deny that the *Jewiſh* Form of Government was *Theocratical*, and, by that means, endeavour to deprive me of the *firſt* of my Proofs, from the Nature of the thing: Or to allow this pretended *Theocracy*, yet ſhew from Fact, by Scripture Hiſtory, that ſuch a Diſpenſation of Providence was not adminiſtered; which would ſubvert *both* my Proofs. And this ſure none but an Unbeliever could deliberately do, becauſe it argues *Moſes* of Impoſture. For if an extraordinary Providence to the State and to Particulars neceſſarily follows a Theocracy, and yet ſuch a Providence was not actually adminiſtered, then this Theocracy was not real, but pretended only. Now Dr. *Sykes* has undertaken to prove that the extraordinary Diſpenſation of Providence did not extend to particulars. In this I blame him not. Every Man muſt think for himſelf; and the Objection is fairly urged. But what creates my Wonder is, that when, contrary to common Senſe and common Scripture, he pretends to admit an extraordinary Providence to the State in Conſequence of a *Theocracy*, while he oppoſes that to particulars, he ſhould yet think to paſs upon his Reader for an Advocate of the Bible. If he ſees the thing in the Light here ſtated, what an

* Both in *The Divine Legation* and in this Pamphlet.

Opinion muſt he have of the Public? If he ſees it not, what an Opinion muſt the Public have of him? But let him debate this Point with himſelf at leiſure. All the Advantage I have taken of his bad Reaſoning is not to diſcover, nor conſequently to diſcredit, his Opinions; but merely to ſupport my own.

III. In the laſt Place, it may be permitted me to obſerve, that theſe two learned Doctors, who imagine, that all the Time they have been writing againſt me, they were oppoſing the *Concluſion* of *The Divine Legation*, have, indeed, allowed all I wanted to make my Argument demonſtrative: Dr. *Stebbing*, by owning that *Moſes did not teach, nor had it in Commiſſion to teach, a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments*; and Dr. *Sykes*, by owning that *an extraordinary Providence was adminiſtered over the* Jewiſh *State and People in general.* If it be aſked then why I would clog my Argument, by inſiſting on *the Jewiſh People's Ignorance in general of a future State*, and the Adminiſtration of an *extraordinary Providence to particulars*; I reply, it was on the ſame Principle that *Moſes* clogged his Inſtitution with a *Theocracy*. He did it in Obedience to the Divine Command; and I, out of my Obſervance to Truth. But had he been of that Species of Lawgivers in which Dr. *Sykes* ſeems to rank him, I conclude he would not have unneceſſarily inſtituted a form of Government that muſt, at every ſtep, have detected his Impoſture. And had I wrote to advance my own Notions, the equitable Reader will conclude I ſhould never have given ſo many needleſs Provocations to this teſty Race of ANSWERERS.

April 14, 1745.

REMARKS

REMARKS

ON SEVERAL

OCCASIONAL REFLECTIONS.

PART THE SECOND.

THE Curious Reader of the many and various Anſwerers of the *Divine Legation* (if any ſuch there be) cannot chuſe but ſmile to ſee them ſo unanimouſly concur in repreſenting me as deſperately enamoured of Controverſy, and reſolute and determined for the laſt Word; eſpecially, when it is obſerved, that, of Ten or Twelve very ſizable Books, written againſt it, I have taken notice of a ſmall part only of Two or Three. What their Motives were, in this repreſentation, is neither worth mine, nor the Reader's while, to conjecture. The plain fact is, I would willingly avoid all controverſy, ſo far as is conſiſtent with a regard to the Public; to which I have thought fit to appeal; and, to which, conſequently, I have given a kind of right to expect, either an Anſwer to all material Objections, or a Confeſſion of their Force.

For ſuch as theſe I have ſtill waited; and now find I am likely to wait. In the mean time, I muſt either be ſilent, or take up with what Fortune ſends. And who could be long undetermined? For he muſt be very fond of Controverſy indeed, who would think of entering into a ſerious Diſpute, either with *him*, who holds *That natural Religion has not, and yet the Law of* Moſes *has, the Sanction of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments* *: Or with that *other*, who *cannot ſee*, and therefore, with a modeſt Boldneſs peculiar to the blind, affirms "there *is not* the leaſt connexion "between the two propoſitions, an *extraordinary Providence* and the "*Omiſſion of a future State* †." With the ſame quickneſs of Sight, I make

* An Eſſay on the Nature and Obligations of Virtue, by T. Rutherforth, B. D. Fellow of St. John's College in Cambridge, and of the Royal Society. Cambridge.

† The Belief of a future State proved to be a fundamental Article of the Religion of the Hebrews, &c. By John Jackſon, Rector of Roſington, &c. London.—p. 64. Where the Reader will ſee, that all his Objections, even to the very Blunders, have been obviated or anſwered by me long ago. An Inſtance of this, as it now happens to lye before me, will not be unentertaining.——"As a Future State (ſays he) may be demon-"ſtrably deduced from Principles of natural Reaſon, so IT IS CONTAINED in the Pro-"poſition laid down by St. *Paul*, *He that cometh to God* (as a Worſhipper of him) *muſt* "*believe that he is, and that he is a Rewarder of thoſe who diligently ſeek him*, Heb. xi. 6." P. 9. His Argument requires him to mean *neceſſarily contained*. But before that can be ſhewn, it muſt be proved that God *cannot*, in this World, *reward thoſe who diligently ſeek him*; And he who ſhould go about to prove that, would go near to contradict all which *Moſes* has ſaid, in the Sanction of his Law, "that God not only *could*, but "*would*, reward thoſe, *in this World*, who diligently ſeek him." But St. *Paul* knew what he ſaid, though this Man does not. He knew the Propoſition did not *neceſſarily*, but might, or might not, contain a future State, juſt as the Writer applied it: And he delivered it accordingly. Firſt, As he was an *exact* Reaſoner, Becauſe the ſupport of Religion depends not on Rewards *here* or *hereafter*; but on the *equal* Diſtribution of them, *whereſoever* they are conferred. Secondly, he was a *pertinent* Reaſoner, becauſe he would include the Sanction of the *Moſaic* as well as *Chriſtian* Religion; the firſt of which (as he tells us elſewhere) had *the Promiſe of the Life that now is*; the other, of *that which is to come*. This Blunder, as the Reader may remember, was expoſed in the *firſt Part* of theſe *Remarks*, p. 371. But I would recommend Mr. Jackſon's whole Pamphlet to his Peruſal as a Specimen of that illuſtrious Band, in which he has thought fit

I make no doubt he would affirm, *that there is not the leaſt Connection* between the old *Engliſh* Honour, and the long *Omiſſion* of a Qualification Law for Members of the Houſe of Commons: And is therefore to be referred to the Claſs of thoſe whom I ſend for an Anſwer, to the Story of *Bertrand* and his Reading Glaſſes.

But when, at preſent, no urgent Occaſion drove me to trouble the Reader in my own Vindication, an inviting Opportunity offered itſelf, of revenging Letters in general, on their very worſt and moſt relentleſs Enemy, the ANSWERER BY PROFESSION. Of whoſe Trade happening to ſpeak with the Contempt that it deſerves, I was accuſed by the *dull* Malice *of theſe Anſwerers* themſelves to mean the Gentlemen of the long-Robe; the moſt learned as well as uſeful Body in the State; and, by far, the moſt capable Part of that Public to whoſe Lay-judgment I had appealed: The only Men who ſpeak Senſe concerning MORAL OBLIGATION, and the beſt Judges of Truth, by their Knowledge of MORAL EVIDENCE: Their habitual Acquaintance with its Nature and with the proportioned Weight accompanying every varying Degree of Probability, (a Knowledge where Reaſon is in its Sovereignty) qualifying them to determine in all clear Queſtions of Religion. But as the plaineſt Deſcription could not ſecure me againſt ſo ridiculous a Calumny; it may be proper to preſent the Reader with the Originals themſelves. Two of which, Fortune hath juſt thrown into my Hands; and two the moſt curious of their kind. They had been *Anſwerers* from their early Youth; and, as the Heads of oppoſite Parties, never yet agreed in any one thing but in writing againſt the

fit to inliſt; and which indeed would have been imperfect without this *Anſwerer General*; who has all his Life-long oppoſed himſelf to whatever received the Public Approbation: And after having written againſt the *Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul*, does me too much Honour to be entirely overlooked. Which however, it is probable he had been, but for theſe Words in his *Title Page*,—*The Doctrine of the ancient Philoſophers concerning a future State ſhewn to be conſiſtent with Reaſon.* A vile Inſinuation! Intimating that I had written ſomething *againſt* the Reaſonableneſs of that Doctrine.

Divine

Divine Legation. Here they went to work as Brethren: and, indeed, not without Reaſon: The Book was manifeſtly calculated to ſpoil their Trade.

Theſe Reverend Veterans, whom one may, not improperly, call *Wardens of the Company*, had both, as we ſay, trod the ſame Path to Glory,

Ille pedum melior motu —
Hic membris et mole valens —

and ſtuck themſelves to the Fortunes and Principles of two truly great Men, to whom, the preſent happy Eſtabliſhment is exceedingly indebted; to the One, for his ſupport of our *Religious* Conſtitution; to the Other, for that of our *Civil*. In the Proſecution of which Services, juſt Reaſons of Church and State had drawn them into different Ways of thinking and engaged in a very warm Controverſy, where the Intereſts of both were capitally concerned.

Into this famous Diſpute, without any other Preparation than a willing Mind, and a ſtrong Deſire to be doing, our two Squires-Errant would needs thruſt themſelves, to bear the Wallet, for Salve and Lint, and the Bâlſam of *Fierabras*: Where they battled it, unaſked, with the broken Launces, that fell on each ſide, from the conflict of their Maſters. But let not the Reader imagine theſe were only Things they picked up in the Combat. For, though the Diſpute was, whether a pure Virgin Church ſhould be given up to the polluted and prophane Embraces of old Civil-Policy; yet our Squires, like honeſt *Sancho Pancha* at the Marriage-feaſt of the fair *Quiteria*, agreed not to quarrel with the *Scum* of good *Camacho's* Kitchen. In a word, not to diſhonour them by Compariſons, like *Homer's* Heroes, they did their Work, and din'd.

But now that both have been ſo much luckier than Men generally are after a drawn-battle, one would imagine they ſhould have been glad to give the poor remainder of their Lives a little Reſt; and

and not go out again ſeeking Adventures, where nothing was to be expected but dry Blows. For the golden Days of Controverſy had been long over. Here was no Church to be defended but that of *Moſes*; which would hardly bear its own Charges. A *Jewiſh* Theocracy was a barren Field, compared to an *Engliſh* Eſtabliſhment; and a Conflict in thoſe quarters was like a Battle in Fairy-land, which affords no Spoils but in Deſcription. The ſage *Sancho* might, here again, have been their Example, who was glad at laſt, even unknighted, to retire with the moderate gratification of a *Bill of exchange* for *three* Aſſes. But,

"Our Beavor'd Knights, who bear upon their Shield
"Three Steeples argent in a ſable Field,"

are ſtill reſtleſs and unſatisfied, and aſpiring after the GOLDEN HELMET OF MAMBRINO.

Since therefore they have thought fit once more to entertain the Public, I will do my part that they loſe not the laſt and only reward yet unpaid them, a Ceremonial and ſolemn *Plaudite:* that the Poſterity of thoſe whom they ſo well entertained in the laſt Age, may underſtand what good Judges their Fathers were of Merit. For Merit they laid claim to; and this ſearch after Adventures, they called *a ſearch after Truth.* For the eaſieſt of all things is to give a good Name; as the hardeſt is to deſerve one. Thus, (in the manner of theſe Moderators between Truth and Falſehood) the TOY-MAN OF BATH, with great Solemnity of Face informs you, that he is a *Factor between the Poor and the Rich.* Not that this Importance would be much amiſs, if it ſtopt there; as affording others (who take the thing right, in the ſenſe of *making the moſt of both*) a very innocent occaſion of mirth: But the miſchief is, It is apt to give them wrong Notions of themſelves: And the *Anſwerer* begins to think himſelf a Servant of Truth; and the Toy-man, an uſeful Member in the State.

But I ſhould be very unjuſt to my own Order, did I ſuffer the Reader to remain under a wrong Impreſſion, as if theſe were the

uſual

uſual ways of riſing to the Honours of the Gown. I have the Pleaſure of ſeeing, in the number of my Friends, many who have made their Fortune by ſupporting the Dignity of Scholars, and preſerving the Integrity of Churchmen. And it is with high Satisfaction I can take this occaſion of doing Juſtice to the Merit of two of them in particular, who have both greatly diſtinguiſhed themſelves, in the common Service of Religion, againſt Libertiniſm and Infidelity. In which, the one has ſo employed his great talents of Reaſoning, and profound Knowledge in true Philoſophy; and the other, his familiar Acquaintance with Antiquity, and his exact and critical Skill in the Languages; as to do all that can, in theſe Times, be expected from the ableſt Servants of Truth, to put Infidelity to ſilence: While at the ſame time, to approve their own Sincerity, they have been ſo far from looking with a jealous or ſuſpicious Eye on others engaged with them in the ſame Service, that it was with Pleaſure they ſaw new Lights attempted to be ſtruck out for its ſupport; and with Readineſs that they lent their beſt Aſſiſtance to put them in a way of being fairly conſidered. I need not tell the Reader, that in this Account I pay a very ſparing Tribute to the Merit of the worthy Deans of *Chriſt-Church* and *Winchester* *.

REMARK I.

BUT it is now time our Heroes ſhould *anſwer* for themſelves. The *Examiner of my ſecond Propoſition* leads the way: Who, at the time of writing my *Appendix* to the firſt part of theſe *Remarks*, I had not the leaſt conception to be Dr. *Stebbing*. And when afterwards I found the Pamphlet generally given to him, I had ſtill one very particular Reaſon not to credit the Report. But when (on the beſt Information) I could no longer doubt of the Author, I ſent him Word, that, if he would own his Book, I would give it a full Anſwer. He deſired to be excuſed: And ſtill hides

* Dr. John Conybear and Dr. Zach. Pearce.

his

his head; ſo that we muſt try to catch this Eel of Controverſy by the Tail; the only part which ſticks out of the Mud; more dirty indeed than ſlippery; and ſtill more weak than dirty: as paſſing through a Trap where he was forced, at every Step, to leave part of his Skin, that is, his Syſtem *, behind him. His *Appendix* therefore, the part yet untouched, ſhall be the Subject of our following Remarks: It is intituled, *Conſiderations on the Command to offer up his Son.* In this he oppoſes an Explanation, which, if true, will be owned by all to be of the higheſt Service to Religion. I ſhall therefore beg leave to quote and re-examine it Paragraph by Paragraph.

By which it will be ſeen, that, as *Cicero* ſays of *Velleius* the *Epicurean*, "He fears nothing ſo much as to appear to the Reader to "doubt of any thing †:" And hopes nothing ſo much as that the Reader will never doubt of him. Hence it is, that he, all the way, boldly denies what he does not underſtand; and prudently conceals what he is unable to confute. But ſoft! before this important APPENDIX ſhews itſelf, we are gradually brought on and prepared for its Appearance by this Inquiſitorial Sentence, which concludes his EXAMINATION. "Whether you intend *(ſays he)* to proceed, "or will ſuffer yourſelf to be wholly diverted from your Purpoſe "by Matters of another Kind, LESS SUITABLE TO YOUR CLERICAL "FUNCTION; you beſt know. But give me leave to ſay, Sir, you "are a Debtor to the Public; and I hope that in your next Volume "YOU WILL MAKE SOME AMENDS FOR THE WRONG YOU HAVE "DONE TO RELIGION in this; in which, inſtead of placing Chriſ-"tianity upon a ſurer Bottom, YOU HAVE ONLY FURNISHED OUT "MORE HANDLES TO UNBELIEVERS—Do you think ſuch an "Image of Revelation as this is likely to cure Unbelievers of their "Prejudices, and will not rather miniſter freſh OFFENCE? If any "thing hinders this Effect, it muſt be the ABSURDITY OF THE

* See my Remarks on Several Occaſional Reflections, p. 346, et ſeq.

† Nil tam metuens quam ne dubitare aliqua de re videretur.

" CONCEIT. But ENOUGH of this. If the Reader has a Mind to " ſee another very STRONG EXAMPLE OF THE SAME SORT OF MA- " NAGEMENT, he may find it in the APPENDIX *."

And in this manner has every honeſt Man been treated before me, whenever he did, or did but endeavour to ſerve Mankind. *Harvey* himſelf, who had more and much abler Examiners of the *Abſurdity of his Conceit* than I have had of mine, ſcarce got better off with one *Æmilius Pariſanus*, a Man of great name in *Italy*, who wrote a complete *Refutation* (as he called it) of the Doctor's Arguments for the Circulation of the Blood: A Diſcovery which appears to have given this *Italian* no leſs Diſturbance than *The Divine Lega-tion* has given our Examiner.—" Quamobrem nos aliter philoſophati " et ratiocinati de Harveii fidentia (ſays he) admirati; de clar. " Londinenſis Academiæ conſenſu et conſpiratione obſtupefacti, &c. " —Verum enimvero collecto ſpiritu, miſſa tandem maximæ novi- " tatis admiratione, melius nobis conſulti, ad vivum Harveii allata " reſecantes, ut commenticia et ficta excogitata colligentes, propria " noſtra ſententia permanſimus.—Semper in ore atque in animo " habere debemus, ut homines nos eſſe meminerimus, ea lege " natos, ut expoſita fortunæ telis omnibus et noſtra ſit vita, & noſ- " træ actiones cunctæ ſub Cenſoribus ſemper extent: Proindeque " PERPETUO PUGNANDUM SIT; & nunc quam maxime, quum " pro aris et focis atque etiam Lararіis (quippe *de Corde*, &c.) for- " titer decertandum."——Seriouſly, this was a ſad Story. The poor Gentleman was plainly frighted. But ſtill he laments like a Gentleman. Here are no Inſinuations that *Harvey* had ſuffered himſelf to be diverted *by matters leſs ſuitable to his medical Function*, while he was exploring the uſe of the *venal Valves*. Nor does he take the Liberty to tell him, that he *ought to make Amends for the Wrong he has done to Phyſic*; though he thought he had done a great deal: or that he had *furniſhed out more handles for Empirics*; though he thought they had already too many: But he politely lays the

* Exam. of Mr. *W's* ſecond Prop. p. 132, 133.

fault

fault upon the reſtleſs Temper of human Nature itſelf: which will never ſuffer us to enjoy our old Opinions in Quiet. But our Examiner is of another Caſt. And nothing can ſave you harmleſs, when once you have incurred the Danger of OFFENCE, but the *Abſurdity of your Conceits*: Though *Offence*, that fatal Enemy to Truth, be, of all *Conceits*, the moſt *abſurd* whenever it is taken before it be given. It is true, the good *Æmilius* comes a little to himſelf, and nearer to our Examiner, in the Language of his Concluſion. He had recovered Heart; his Victories had elated him; and *Harvey's* numerous Experiments upon all animal Nature afforded him as happy an Occaſion of Raillery, as the *Diſſertations* in *The Divine Legation* have given thoſe who took them for *Digreſſions*. "Jam "diu (ſays he) per dumeta, vepres, ſyrtes, ac ſcopulos, duxit nos "Harveius; diuque in ejus vivariis et piſcinis inter teſtudines, anguillas, cochleas, ranas, bufones, et ſerpentes, vagati ſumus; "omnia tamen evertimus, ejuſque perverſa veſtigia cuncta detexi"mus; omnia cum pulviſculo everrentes quàm longiſſime ablega"vimus. Quæ *in celebrium antiquorum recentiorumque omnium ab "Harveio immerito notatorum*, defenſionem dicta ſunto. Heic— "redeamus; ut quæ jam reprobata et ablegata ſunt, ratione, ſenſu, "AUTOPSIA, experimentis, in veritatis gratiam fortius obſtringan"tur—prædictæ opinionis omnia deſtruendo, et *inter ſeſe pugnantia* "ulterius oſtendendo," &c. &c. And in the ſame Strain, our Examiner. Who aſſures his Reader, that, if any thing can hinder the ill Effects which my Interpretation of *the Command to* Abraham muſt have upon Religion, it will be his expoſing the *Abſurdity of the Conceit*. This is confidently ſaid. But, what then? He can prove it. So it is to be hoped. If not—However let us firſt give him a fair hearing.

"I nunc, et verbis virtutem illude ſuperbis."

II.

He begins with telling me, "that my Account of the Command "to *Abraham* to offer up his Son *Iſaac*, has no Foundation in Truth; "and that in attempting to remove Objections, very well GUARDED "againſt by the common Interpretation, I have raiſed new ones "not to be anſwered upon mine. And of this *(ſays he)* let the "Reader judge *."—Agreed—"Your Poſition then (continues he) "is this: *That when God ſays to* Abraham, Take thou thy Son, thy "only Son *Iſaac*, &c. *the Command is merely an Information by Ac-* "*tion inſtead of Words, of the great Sacrifice of the Redemption of* "*Mankind, given at the requeſt of* Abraham; *who longed, impatient-* "*ly, to ſee* Chriſt's *Day*. The Foundation of your Theſis you lay "in that Scripture of St. *John* (*c.* viii. 56.) where *Jeſus* ſays to the "unbelieving *Jews, Your Father* Abraham *rejoiced to ſee my Day,* "*and he ſaw it and was glad*, p. 572. As this Text is your Cor- "ner-ſtone, your Interpretation ought to be very ſtrongly ſupport- "ed †." Well, as he doubts its Strength, and loves the ſolid Buttreſs of an Authority, let him even take before we go any further, this old ſeaſoned one from the famous *Hammond*; who when he had tranſlated ἠγαλλιάσατο ἵνα ἴδῃ τὴν ἡμέραν τὴν ἐμὴν, by—*Was exceeding glad* THAT HE MIGHT SEE *my Day*, proceeds to paraphraſe the *Text* in the following Words, which our Phariſaical Examiner may very naturally conſider as addreſſed to himſelf. *And becauſe you talk ſo much of* ABRAHAM, *I will now ſay of him that he, having received the Promiſe of the Meſſiah*, Gen. xi. 35. DID THEREUPON VEHEMENTLY *and with great Pleaſure and Exiliency of Mind* DESIRE TO LOOK NEARER INTO IT, *to ſee my coming into the World, and a* REVELATION *of it* WAS MADE UNTO HIM, *and in it of the State of the Goſpel, and he was heartily joyed at it* ‡. However, the force of

* Conſiderations on the Command to *Abraham* to offer up *Iſaac*, p. 137, 138.

† Ibid. p. 138.

‡ Paraph. on the New Teſtament, in loc.

our

our Examiner's concluding Remark will be ſeen when he comes to give us the Reaſon of it in it's place. In the mean time, let me obſerve, that, if he will needs make *this Text* my *Corner-ſtone*, he ſhould have ſhewn it fairly as it was laid in *The Divine Legation*; and not have taken it out of its Cement, to make it fit for nothing but the blind *Corner* of an incoherent Pamphlet. But it was not for the Credit of his Examination to acquaint the Reader that my Obſervations on the Text of St. *John* were introduced in this Manner. *If we conſider* Abraham's *perſonal Character, together with the Choice made of him for the Head and Origin of that People, which God would make holy and ſeparate to himſelf, from whence was to ariſe the Redeemer of Mankind, the ultimate end of that Separation, we cannot but conclude it probable that the Knowledge of this Redeemer would be revealed to him.* Shall I hide from *Abraham* the thing which I do? *ſays God, in a Matter that much leſs concerned the Father of the Faithful. And here in the Words of* Jeſus, Abraham rejoiced, *&c. we have this* PROBABLE FACT *made certain* *, *&c.* And then I went on to prove, that by the Word *Day*, in the Text, was meant the great Sacrifice of *Chriſt*—But let us take it as it lies in our Conſiderer. "You ſay then (continues he, addreſſing him-"ſelf to the Author of *The Divine Legation)* that by the Word *Day* "is meant *the great Sacrifice of* Chriſt; which is thus proved: "*When the figurative Word* DAY *is uſed not to expreſs in general the* "*Period of any one's Exiſtence, but to denote his peculiar* Office *and* "Employment; *it muſt needs ſignify, that very Circumſtance of his* "*Life, which is the Characteriſtick of ſuch Office and Employment.* "*But* Jeſus *is here ſpeaking of his peculiar Office and Employment,* "i. e. *his Office of Redeemer. Therefore, by the Word* DAY *muſt* "*needs be meant that characteriſtic Circumſtance of his Life. But that* "*Circumſtance was laying it down for the Redemption of Mankind.* "*Conſequently, by the Word* DAY *is meant the* GREAT SACRIFICE *of*

* *Div. Leg.* Vol. II. Ed. 2. [which is that from whence I make all the following Quotations; not having the firſt Edition by me] p. 564. [See Vol. III. p. 371. of this Edition.]

"Chriſt,"

"Chriſt," p. 593 *. This is indeed my Argument, fairly ſtated. And to that he replies. "Really, Sir, I ſee no manner of Conſe-
"quence in this reaſoning. That *Chriſt's* Day hath reference to
"his Office as Redeemer, I grant. The Day of *Chriſt* denotes the
"Time when *Chriſt* ſhould come, *i. e.* when HE ſhould come who
"was to be ſuch by Office and Employment. But why it muſt
"import *alſo* that when *Chriſt* came he ſhould be offered up as a
"Sacrifice, I do not in the leaſt apprehend: Becauſe I can very
"eaſily underſtand, that *Abraham* might have been informed that
"*Chriſt* was to come, without being informed that he was to lay
"down his Life as a Sacrifice. If *Abraham* ſaw that a Time would
"come when one of his Seed ſhould take away the Curſe, he ſaw
"*Chriſt's* Day. And this I ſay he might ſee, whether he ſaw by
"what Act the Curſe was taken away or not †."

The Reader ſees here, that, at firſt Sight, he would ſeem to grant my Premiſes.—"That *Chriſt's* Day (ſays he) hath reference to the "Office as Redeemer, I grant." Yet the very next Words which he uſes to explain it contradict it: *The Day of* Chriſt *denotes the* TIME *when* Chriſt *ſhould come.* All the Senſe therefore, I can make of the Conceſſion, when joined to the Explanation of it, amounts to this—"*Chriſt's* Day has reference to his *Office*: No, "not to his Office, but to his *Time*." But he may grow clearer as he runs. "But why it muſt import ALSO that when *Chriſt* came "he ſhould be offered up as a Sacrifice, I do not in the leaſt appre-
"hend." Nor I, neither. Had I ſaid, that the Word *Day* in the Text, imported the *Time*, I could have as little apprehended as he does, how that which imports *Time*, imports ALSO the *thing done* in Time. Let him take this Nonſenſe, therefore, to himſelf. I argued in a plain Manner, thus—When the Word *Day* is uſed to expreſs, in general, the Period of any one's Exiſtence, then it denotes *Time*; when to expreſs his peculiar *Office* and Employment, then it denotes, *not the Time*, but that Circumſtance of Life cha-

* Conſiderations, p. 138, 139. † P. 139.

racteriſtic

racteriſtic of ſuch *Office* and Employment. *Day*, in the Text, is uſed to expreſs *Chriſt's* peculiar *Office* and Employment. Therefore *—But what follows is ſtill better. His want of Apprehenſion, it ſeems, is founded in this, "That he can eaſily under-" ſtand, that *Abraham* might have been informed that *Chriſt* was " to come; without being informed that he was to lay down his " Life as a Sacrifice." Yes, and ſo could I likewiſe; or I had never been at the pains of making the Criticiſm on the Word *Day*: Which takes all its Force from this very Truth, that *Abraham* might have been informed of one, without the other. And, therefore, to prove he was informed of *that other*, I produced the Text in Queſtion, which afforded the Occaſion of the Criticiſm. He goes on—"If *Abraham* ſaw, that a Time would come when one " of his Seed ſhould take away the Curſe, he ſaw *Chriſt's* DAY." Without doubt he did. Becauſe it is agreed that *Day* may ſignify either *Time*, or *Circumſtance of Action*. But what is this to the purpoſe? The Queſtion is not whether the Word may not, indefinitely, ſignify *Time*; but whether it ſignifies *Time* in this Text. I have ſhewn it does not. And what has he ſaid to prove it does? Why that it may do ſo, in another Place. His whole Anſwer, therefore, to the Argument, we ſee, proceeds on an intire Inapprehenſion of the very Drift and Purpoſe of it.

III.

I had ſaid, That not only the Matter, *but the* Manner, *likewiſe, of this great Revelation, is delivered in the Text.*——Abraham rejoiced to SEE my Day, and he SAW it, and was glad. *ἵνα* ΙΔΗ *τὴν ἡμέραν τὴν ἐμὴν, καὶ* ΕΙΔΕ. *Which evidently ſhews it to have been made, not by* Relation *in Words, but by* REPRESENTATION *in Action. That*

* But the Reader may ſee this Truth very well inforced, from Obſervations on the Context, by a learned and ſenſible Writer, in a Pamphlet ſigned *L. U. P.* and intituled, A Letter to the Author of a late Epiſtolary Diſſertation, addreſſed to Mr. Warburton, p. 38 to 41.

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the Verb εἶδω *is frequently uſed, in the New Teſtament, in its proper Signification, to* ſee ſenſibly. *But whether literally or figuratively it always denotes a full Intuition. That the Expreſſion was as ſtrong in the* Syrian *Language, uſed by* Jeſus, *as here, in the* Greek *of his Hiſtorian; which appears from the Reply the* Jews *made to him.*—— Thou art not yet Fifty Years old, and haſt thou SEEN Abraham? *Plainly intimating, that they underſtood the Aſſertion, of* Abraham's ſeeing Chriſt's Day, *to be a real beholding him in Perſon. That we are therefore to conclude, from the Words of the Text, that the Redemption of Mankind was not only revealed to* Abraham, *but was revealed likewiſe by Repreſentation* *. This Argument our punctual Examiner repreſents in the following Manner. "You are not more "ſucceſsful in your next Point, *Abraham rejoiced to ſee my Day, and "he ſaw it and was glad.* ἵνα ΙΔΗ τὴν ἡμέραν τὴν ἐμὴν καὶ ΕΙΔΕ.—— "*This* (ſay you) *evidently ſhews it* [the Revelation] *to have been "made not by Relation in Words, but by Repreſentation in Action.*" "How ſo? The Reaſon follows. *The Verb* εἶδω *is frequently uſed in "the New Teſtament in its proper Signification to ſee ſenſibly.*——In "the New Teſtament do you ſay? Yes, Sir, and in every *Greek* "Book you ever read in your Life. What you SHOULD have ſaid "is, that it is ſo uſed here; and I ſuppoſe you would have ſaid ſo, "if you had known how to have proved it †."

"The Reaſon follows" (ſays he). Where? In *The Divine Legation* indeed, but not in his imperfect Quotation; which breaks off *before* he comes to my Argument. One who knew him not ſo well as I do, would ſuſpect this was done to ſerve a Purpoſe. No ſuch Matter: 'Twas all pure Innocence. He miſtook the *Introduction* of my Argument for the Argument *itſelf*. The Argument itſelf, which he omits in the Quotation (and which was all I wanted for the Proof of my Point), was, *That the Verb* εἶδω, *whether uſed literally or figuratively, always denotes a full intuition.* And this Argument, I introduced in the following Manner, *The Verb*

* Divine Legation, Vol. II. p. 595, 596. [Vol. III. p. 388. Ed. 4to.]

† Conſiderations, p. 139, 140.

εἶδω

εἶδω *is frequently uſed in the New Teſtament in its proper Signification, to ſee ſenſibly.* Unluckily, as we ſay, he took this for the Argument itſelf, and thus corrects me for it: "What you SHOULD "have ſaid, is, that it is ſo uſed here; and I ſuppoſe you would "have ſaid ſo, if you had known how to have proved it." See, here, the true Origin both of *preſcribing* and *divining!* His IGNORANCE of what *I did ſay*, leads him to tell me what *I ſhould have ſaid*; and to *divine* what *I would have ſaid.* But, what I ſaid, I'll ſtand to, *That the Verb* εἶδω *always denotes a full Intuition.* This was all I wanted from the Text; and on this Foundation, I proceeded, in the Sequel of the Diſcourſe, to prove that *Abraham ſaw ſenſibly.* Therefore, when my Examiner takes it (as he does) for granted, that becauſe, in *this Place*, I had not proved that the Word implied to *ſee ſenſibly*; I had not proved it *at all*; he is a *ſecond* Time miſtaken.

He goes on, "One Thing needs no Proof, which is, that, in "all Languages, ſeeing and knowing are frequently uſed as equiva-"lent Terms *." As I don't know what he means by this one *Thing*, I can only requite him with another, that needs as little; which is, that, in all Churches, *ſeeing* and *believing* are *frequently uſed*, by Bigots, as *equivalent Terms.* Here's my Obſervation for his Obſervation; and, I think, a good deal more to the Purpoſe.

IV.

But our Examiner will now ſhew, that, ſeeing *Chriſt's Day*, and ſeeing the *Promiſes afar off*, are one and the ſame Thing. "We "have an Inſtance *(ſays he)* directly to the Point in hand, *Heb.* "xi. 13. *Theſe all died in Faith, not having received the Promiſes*; "ἀλλὰ πόῤῥωθεν αὐτὰς ΙΔΟΝΤΕΣ, *but having* SEEN *them afar off.* "You will remember, Sir, that *Abraham* ſtands in this Catalogue, "amongſt the reſt; and the Apoſtle ſays of them all indifferently,

* Coſid. p. 140.

" that they ſaw the Promiſes, *i. e. that Bleſſing* which was the Sub-
" ject of theſe Promiſes. How did they ſee them? By Repreſen-
" tation, in Action will you ſay? I ſuppoſe not. But the Apoſtle
" tells you how. They ſaw them by Faith, a great way off: And
" why may not this be all that our Saviour intended? What Dif-
" ference, in Senſe, is there between ſaying, that he *ſaw the Pro-*
" *miſes afar off*; and that he *ſaw Chriſt's Day* * *?*"

" We have an Inſtance *(ſays he)* directly to the Point in hand." Of what? Why, that the Verb εἶδω ſignifies the ſame in this Place of the Epiſtle to the *Hebrews* as in the Text in queſtion. Now, there it is applied to *Promiſes*, ſo cannot be literal: And here it is applied to *Day*, and ſo, very well, may. Yet this he calls " an inſtance directly to the Point in Hand."

" You will remember, Sir *(ſays he)* that *Abraham* ſtands in " that Catalogue amongſt the reſt." And you will remember, Sir, ſay I, That *Abraham ſtands alone* in the Words of *Jeſus*. But your Logic, I ſuppoſe, concludes thus: If *Abraham* knew as much as the reſt; why, then the reſt knew as much as *Abraham*. Otherwiſe you would have obſerved, that the ſeeing the Promiſes afar off related to that Time of the Life of each Patriarch in which he performed the Act of Faith there celebrated. For the Argument ſtands thus: By Faith, *Abel*, *Enoch*, *Noah*, *Abraham*, did ſo and ſo; yet, as illuſtrious as thoſe Acts of Faith were, they had then only ſeen the *Promiſes afar off:* Therefore you Chriſtians, *&c.* And it is remarkable that the Acts of Faith, for which *Abraham* is here celebrated, were prior in Time to the Command to offer up his Son. Now, after this, what hinders our concluding, from the Words of *Jeſus*, that *Abraham* had a ſtill more illuſtrious Manifeſtation of the Promiſe? However, if I ſhould fail in reconciling *Jeſus* and the Author of the Epiſtle to the *Hebrews*, let the Reader remember, that it is our Examiner who has ſet them at Variance. And he only makes the Breach wider, where he tries to bring them

* Confid. p. 140.

to

to a Temper. "The Apoſtle *(ſays he)* tells you, they ſaw the "Promiſes, by Faith, a great way off: And why may not this be "all that our Saviour intended? What Difference IN SENSE, is "there between ſaying, that he ſaw the Promiſes afar off, and, "that he ſaw *Chriſt's* Day?" What Difference do you aſk? Why, about as much as between your Sight and *Chilingworth's*. Or as much as between an Object ſeen, at a Diſtance, through a Miſt; and one, at Hand, in broad Day-light.

V.

"But, *he owns*, that, if this was all, perhaps *I ſhould* tell *him*, "that it was a very ſtrange Anſwer of the *Jews*, *thou art not yet* "*fifty Years old, and haſt thou ſeen Abraham* *." He is very right. He might be ſure I would. In anſwer therefore to this Difficulty, he goes on and ſays, "No doubt, Sir, the *Jews* anſwer our "Saviour, as if he had ſaid, that *Abraham* and *He* were *Contempo-* "*raries*; in which, they anſwered very fooliſhly, as they did on "many other Occaſions; and the Anſwer will as little agree with "your Interpretation as it does with mine. For does your Inter- "pretation ſuppoſe that *Abraham* ſaw *Chriſt* in Perſon? No; you "ſay it was by Repreſentation only †."

"The *Jews* anſwer our Saviour as if he had ſaid, that *Abraham* "and he were Contemporaries." Do they ſo? Why then, 'tis plain, *the Expreſſion was as ſtrong in the* Syrian *Language, uſed by* Jeſus, *as in the* Greek *of his Hiſtorian*, which was all I aimed to prove by it. But "in this *(ſays he)* they anſwered very fooliſhly." What then? Did I quote them for their Wiſdom? A little *Common-ſenſe* was all I wanted of them: And that, 'tis plain, they had. For the *Folly* of their Anſwer ariſes from it. They heard *Jeſus* uſe a Word in their vulgar Idiom, which ſignified to *ſee corporeally*; and Common-ſenſe led them to conclude he uſed it in the vulgar Meaning. In this they were not miſtaken. But, from

* Confid. p. 140. † Ibid. p. 140, 141.

thence, they inferred, that he meant it in the Senſe of *ſeeing perſonally*; and in this, they were. And now let the Reader judge whether the *Folly* of their *Anſwer* ſhews the *Folly* of my Argument, or of my Examiner's. Nay further, he tells us, they anſwered "as fooliſhly on many other Occaſions." They did ſo; and I will remind him of one. *Jeſus* ſays to *Nicodemus*, *Except a Man be born again, he cannot ſee the Kingdom of God* *, *&c.* Suppoſe now, from theſe Words, I ſhould attempt to prove that *Regeneration* and Divine *Grace* were Realities, and not mere Metaphors. For that *Jeſus*, in declaring the Neceſſity of them, uſed ſuch ſtrong Expreſſions that *Nicodemus* underſtood him to mean the being phyſically *born again, and entering the ſecond Time into the Womb.* Would it be ſufficient, let me aſk my Examiner, to reply in this manner, "No doubt, Sir, *Nicodemus* anſwered our Saviour as if he "had ſaid, that a Follower of the Goſpel muſt *enter a ſecond Time* "*into his Mother's Womb and be born:* in which he anſwered very "fooliſhly; and the Anſwer will as little agree with your Inter-"pretation as it does with mine. For does your Interpretation ſup-"poſe he ſhould ſo enter? No; but that he *ſhould be born of* "*Water and of the Spirit.*" Would this, I ſay, be deemed, by our Examiner, a ſufficient Anſwer? When he has reſolved me this, I ſhall, perhaps, have ſomething farther to ſay to him. In the mean time I go on. And, in returning him his laſt Words reſtored to their Subject, help him forward in the Solution of what I expect from him.—"The Anſwer *(ſays he)* will as little agree "with your Interpretation as it does with mine. For does your "Interpretation ſuppoſe that *Abraham* ſaw *Chriſt* in Perſon? No; "you ſay, it was by Repreſentation only." Very well. Let me aſk then, in the firſt Place, whether he ſuppoſes what I ſaid on this Occaſion, was to prove that *Abraham ſaw Chriſt* from the reverend Authority of his *Jewiſh* Adverſaries; or to prove that the Verb εἶδω ſignified to *ſee literally*, from their miſtaken Anſwer? He thought me here, it ſeems, in the way of thoſe Writers, who are quoting

* St. John iii. 3.

Authorities,

Authorities, when they ſhould be giving *Arguments*. Hence, he calls the Anſwer the *Jews* here gave, a *fooliſh one*: As if I ſtood Sponſor for its Orthodoxy.

But our Examiner is ſtill farther miſtaken. The Point I was upon, in ſupport of which I urged the Anſwer of the *Jews*, was not the ſeeing *this*, or *that Perſon*: But the ſeeing *corporeally*, and not *mentally*. Now, if the *Jews* underſtood *Jeſus*, as ſaying that *Abraham* ſaw *corporeally*, I concluded, that the Expreſſion, uſed by *Jeſus*, had that Import: And this was all I was concerned to prove. *Difference*, therefore, between their *Anſwer* as I quoted it, and my *Interpretation*, there was none. Their Anſwer implied that *Abraham* was ſaid to ſee corporeally; and my Interpretation ſuppoſes that the Words uſed had that Import. But to make a Diſtinction where there was no Difference, *ſeeing in Perſon, and ſeeing by Repreſentation*, are brought in, into a Queſtion, where they have nothing to do.

VI.

Our Examiner, after all theſe Feats, now ſtops and looks about him; as waiting modeſtly for his Reader's Approbation and Applauſe; and to ſhew how well he deſerves it, purpoſes, out of pure Love of Juſtice, to reſume his Taſk, and kill me over again. "To "do you full Juſtice *(ſays he)* I will take in one Obſervation more, "by which, you have endeavoured to ſtrengthen yourſelf, and "which relates to the former Part of the Text. That *Abraham* "had a general Promiſe, that in him *all the Families of the Earth* "*ſhould be bleſſed*, which general Promiſe comprehends or contains "the Promiſe of the Redemption, is agreed between us. And this "general Promiſe, I ſuppoſe, might be the Subject of the Pa-"triarch's Joy. You (in Favour of your Hypotheſis) ſuppoſe, that, "ſubſequent to this general Promiſe, *Abraham* had, upon his ear-"neſt Requeſt, ſome ſpecial Promiſe made to him of a more diſ-"tinct Communication of the Manner how, and the Means by

"which

" which this great Work ſhould be accompliſhed; and that this " ſpecial Promiſe was the Matter of his rejoicing. *This Hiſtory of* " Abraham (ſay you) *had plainly three diſtinct Periods. The firſt* " *contains God's Promiſe to grant his Requeſt, when* Abraham *rejoiced* " *that he* SHOULD SEE.—*Within the Second, was the Delivery of the* " *Command to ſacrifice his Son.—And* Abraham's *Obedience, through* " *which he* SAW Chriſt's *Day and was glad, includes the third.* The " Promiſe, which you ſay God made to *Abraham* to grant his Re- " queſt, cannot be the general Promiſe, that he ſhould be a Bleſſing " to all Nations; for this was given upon his firſt Vocation with- " out his Requeſt. Therefore it muſt be a ſpecial ſubſequent Pro- " miſe. But there is not one Word in the Hiſtory of the Old Teſ- " tament to juſtify this three-fold Diſtinction; as you confeſs your- " ſelf. For you ſay that *Moſes's* Hiſtory begins with the ſecond " Period; and that the firſt was wiſely omitted by the Hiſtorian. " If there never was any ſuch Period, never any ſuch ſpecial Pro- " miſe requeſted or made; it was very honeſt in the Hiſtorian to " ſay nothing about it: And YOU WILL BE THE WISE MAN, WHO " CAN SEE WHAT IS NOT TO BE FOUND *."

" The general Promiſe made to *Abraham*, that in him *all the* " *Families of the Earth ſhould be bleſſed*, it is agreed *(he tells us)* " comprehends the Promiſe of the Redemption: And this general " Promiſe, he ſuppoſes, might be the Subject of the Patriarch's " Joy," mentioned by *Jeſus*, in the Text in queſtion. Which Obſervation, he is ſo fond of, that he repeats it again in p. 145. " *Abraham*, ſeeing a Redemption to come through his Seed, RE- " JOICED at the Bleſſing." But now, if *Abraham* was ignorant that this *general Promiſe* comprehended in it the *Promiſe of Redemption*, how could that Redemption be the *ſubject of the Patriarch's Joy?* That he was ignorant, I prove from the beſt Authority with our Examiner; I mean his own. This *general Promiſe*, as a

* Conſid. p. 141, 142.

Prophefy

Propheſy of the Meſſiah or Redeemer, is agreed, on all hands, to be obſcure. Now our Examiner has laid it down as a Maxim, that "ſo far as Propheſy is obſcure (and it is in the Nature of Propheſy to "be obſcure more or leſs) ſo far it was obſcure to the Prophets "themſelves *." This, in Satisfaction to himſelf. But in Satisfaction to his Reader, I go further; and ſhew, that the *general Promiſe*, mentioned by *Moſes*, could not be the Occaſion of the Patriarch's *Joy*, mentioned by *Jeſus*; even on our Examiner's own contradictory Conception of Things. I will ſuppoſe, for once, that *Abraham did* underſtand, that, in the *general Promiſe*, was contained a *Promiſe of Redemption*. But will he ſay the *Time*, too, was contained in it? Now he owns, that the Occaſion of *Abraham's Joy* was the Knowledge of the TIME when *Chriſt* ſhould come. "The Day of *Chriſt (ſays he)* denotes the Time when *Chriſt* ſhould "come †." I conclude, therefore, from his own Words, that "the Subject of the Patriarch's Joy COULD NOT be this general "Promiſe." And, by this Concluſion, expoſe the Injuſtice of his following Remark, that it "was in favour of my HYPOTHESIS "that I ſuppoſed there was a *ſpecial* Promiſe made to *Abraham* at "his earneſt Requeſt, ſubſequent to the general one." If it was in favour of any thing but *Truth*, it was in favour of *Common-ſenſe*, which always leads to it. And which pointed out to me the *three Periods* I diſcovered in this *ſpecial Promiſe*. "But *(he tells me)* "there is not one Word, in the Hiſtory of the *Old* Teſtament, to "juſtify this threefold Diſtinction." And that I myſelf CONFESS as much. It is true, that I confeſs not to find in the Old Teſtament what is not there. And had the like Modeſty been in him, he would have been content to have found a *future State* in the *New* Teſtament only. But where is it, I would aſk, that, "I "confeſs there is not one Word, in the Hiſtory of the Old Teſta"ment, to juſtify this three-fold Diſtinction?" For this is News.

* Conſid. p. 156. † Ibid. p. 130.

So

So far was I from any Thoughts of ſuch Confeſſion, that I gave a large critical Epitome * of *Abraham's* whole Hiſtory, to ſhew that it *juſtified this threefold Diſtinction*, in every part of it. But his manner of proving my *Confeſſion*, will clearly convict him of the Falſhood of his *Charge*. For, inſtead of doing it from *my own* Words, he will argue me into it from *his own* Inferences. "You "confeſs it *(ſays he)* FOR you ſay, that *Moſes's* Hiſtory begins with "the ſecond Period, and that the firſt was wiſely omitted by the "Hiſtorian." See, here, the Perverſity of our Examiner! When the Point is a Queſtion of *Right*, he gives his Reader an Authority: When a Queſtion of *Fact*, a Reaſon. But what ſort of Reaſon let us now ſee, by applying it to a parallel Caſe. I will ſuppoſe him to tell me, (for, after this, he may tell me any thing) "that "I myſelf confeſs there is not one Word in the Iliad of *Homer*, "to juſtify the being three Periods in the Deſtruction of *Troy*, "(the firſt the Robbery of *Helen*; the ſecond, the Combats before "the Town; and the third, the ſtorming of it by the *Greeks*) "for that I ſay, that *Homer's* Poem begins at the ſecond Period; "wiſely omitting the firſt and laſt." Now will any one conclude, from *this Reaſon*, that I had made *that Confeſſion?*—He is ſo far from owning that I had given any Reaſons (though I had given many) of *Moſes's* Wiſdom in omitting the mention of the firſt Period, that his following Words, if they have any Meaning, inſinuate I had given none. "If there never was any ſuch Period; it was "very honeſt in the Hiſtorian to ſay nothing about it." The Reader ſees, I queſtion his having a *Meaning*; and my Reaſon is, becauſe, I find, it was to introduce a Piece of *Wit*. For, as the Town-Poet frequently compounds for the *Rhime*, with one half of his Diſtich; ſo the Town-proſe-Man for the *Wit*, with one half of his Sentence.—"And you *(ſays he)* will be the WISE MAN who can "ſee what is not to be found." Now the two Members of his Wit do not agree.—"It was very honeſt in the Hiſtorian—and you

* From p. 598, to 603, of *The Divine Legation*, Vol. II. [Vol. III. 378—383, ed. 4to.]

"will

" will be the wiſe Man."—The careleſs Reader may think he only meant, here, to call me *Fool*. But, indeed, it was my *Knavery* that was to ſtand in Oppoſition to *Moſes's Honeſty*. This, therefore, is to be conſidered as one of thoſe *diſguiſed Sentences*, which the Critics ſo much admire, in the Works of the greateſt Writers. However I here call upon him firſt to prove that I did *confeſs* what he charges upon me, in Pain of being deemed a falſe Accuſer.—And this for the FIRST TIME.

VII.

He proceeds—" But what is wanting in *Hiſtory*, it ſeems, *Criticiſm* is to ſupply. *The Words in the Original are*, ἠγαλλιάσατο ΙΝΑ ΙΔΗ; i. e. (ſay you) *he rejoiced that* HE MIGHT SEE; *which implies that the Period of this Joy was in the Space between the Promiſe that the Favour ſhould be conferred, and the actual conferring it, in the Delivery of the Command.—The* Engliſh *Phraſe*, to ſee, *is equivocal; and means either the preſent Time, that he did then ſee; or the future, that he ſhould ſee. But the Original ἵνα ἴδῃ has only the latter Senſe: ſo that the Text plainly diſtinguiſhes two different Periods of Joy: the firſt, when it was promiſed he ſhould ſee; the ſecond, when he actually ſaw: And it is to be obſerved, that in the exact Uſe of the Word, ἀγαλλιάομαι ſignifies that tumultuous Pleaſure which the certain Expectation of an approaching Bleſſing, underſtood only in the groſs, occaſions; and χαίρω that calm and ſettled Joy, that ariſes from our Knowledge in the Poſſeſſion of it.* Where are your Authorities for all this? You produce none. Wherever you had your *Greek*, I am very ſure you had it not from the *New Teſtament*, where theſe Words are uſed indiſcriminately *."—" Where are your Authorities? You produce none." No. I wrote to thoſe who underſtood their Grammar, and read *Greek*: And ſuch

* Conſid. p. 142, 143.

want none in a Caſe ſo clear and notorious. But this is to inſinuate, that I had none to produce. He dare not, indeed, ſay ſo. And in this I commend his Prudence, as he knew nothing of the Matter. However, in *this*, he is poſitive, that "wherever I had "my *Greek*, I had it not from the *New Teſtament*." The Gentleman is hard to pleaſe: Here he is offended that I had it not; and, before, that I had it from the *New Teſtament*. Here I impoſe upon him; There I trifled with him. But, in all this Diverſity of Acceptance, 'tis ſtill the ſame Spirit; of an *Anſwerer by Profeſſion*.

I had ſaid, the two *Greek* Words, *in their exact Uſe*, ſignify ſo and ſo. Which ſurely implied an Acknowledgment, that this Exactneſs was not, *always*, kept up to; eſpecially by the Writers of the *New Teſtament*; who, whatever ſome may have dream'd, did not pique themſelves upon a claſſical Elegance. Now, this Implication, our Examiner takes upon him to confirm, but by way of Confutation. "In the *New Teſtament (ſays he)* theſe Words are uſed "indiſcriminately." I had plainly inſinuated the ſame; and he had better have let it reſt on my Acknowledgment: For the Inſtances he brings, to prove the *Words uſed indiſcriminately in the* New Teſtament, are even enough to perſuade the Reader that they are *not*. His firſt Inſtance is, 1 *Pet.* iv. 13. "*Rejoice* [χαίρετε] "*inaſmuch as ye are Partakers of* Chriſt's *Sufferings*; *that when, his* "*Glory ſhall be revealed* [χαρῆτε ἀγαλλιώμενοι] *ye may be glad with* "*exceeding Joy*. See you not here *(ſays he)* the direct Reverſe of "what you ſay; that χαίρω ſignifies the Joy which ariſes upon "Proſpect, and ἀγαλλιάομαι that which ariſes from Poſſeſſion *." No indeed. I ſee nothing like it. All the *Reverſe* here, is the *Reverſe* of common Senſe. Yet in that *Reverſe*, (a Feat none but himſelf could have brought about) the Confirmation of my own Remark.—Amazing! The Followers of *Chriſt* are bid to *rejoice*, χαίρετε. For what? *For being Partakers of* Chriſt's *Sufferings*. And was not this a *Bleſſing in Poſſeſſion?* But ſome Divines, it ſeems,

* Conſid. p. 143.

have

have no notion how *Suffering* can be a *Bleſſing*. Yet St. *Paul* reckons the *Fellowſhip of* Chriſt's *Sufferings* amongſt the great Privileges of the Goſpel, ſuch as *the excellency of the Knowledge of* Chriſt *and the Power of his Reſurrection* *. And St. *John* couples it with *Chriſt's* Kingdom †;—*the Kingdom and Patience of* Jeſus Chriſt. And how great a *Bleſſing* St. *Peter* (in the Examiner's Text) eſteemed it, appears by what follows,—*that when his Glory ſhall be revealed,* χαρῆτε ἀγαλλιώμενοι, *ye may be glad with exceeding Joy.* But I have other Buſineſs with theſe laſt Words. For as he quoted the foregoing to prove that χαίρω ſignifies the Joy which ariſes upon *Proſpect*; ſo he quotes theſe to prove that ἀγαλλιάομαι ſignifies that which ariſes on *Poſſeſſion.* And with equal Succeſs. They are bid to *rejoice* now in Sufferings, that they might rejoice and be exceeding glad at *Chriſt's* ſecond Coming. And is this a Rejoicing at a Good in *Poſſeſſion?* Is it not for a Good in *Proſpect?* The Reward they were going to receive. For I ſuppoſe the Appearance of *Chriſt's Glory* will precede the Reward of his Followers. Unleſs our Examiner has another Myſtery to ſhew us, which St. *Paul* left untold, That the Reward is to come firſt, and the Glory follow. So that now the Reader ſees he has himſelf fairly proved, by a good ſubſtantial Text, the Truth of my Obſervation, *That in the exact Uſe of the Words,* ἀγαλλιάομαι *ſignifies that tumultuous Pleaſure which the certain Expectation of an approaching Bleſſing occaſions; and* χαίρω *that calm and ſettled Joy that ariſes from our Knowledge in the Poſſeſſion of it.*

His other Inſtances are, Rev. xix. 7. "*Let us be glad and rejoice* "[χαίρωμεν καὶ ἀγαλλιώμεθα]—*for the Marriage of the Lamb is come.* "Where both Words refer to Bleſſings in Poſſeſſion. Again, *Matt.* "v. 12. *Rejoice and be exceeding glad* [χαίρετε καὶ ἀγαλλιᾶσθε] *for great* "*is your Reward in Heaven*: where both refer to Bleſſings in "Proſpect ‡." His villainous old Luck ſtill purſues him. The firſt Text from the *Revelations*; *Be glad and rejoice* FOR *the Marriage of*

* Phil. iii. 8—10. † Rev. i. 9. ‡ Conſid. p. 143, 144.

the Lamb is come; bids the Followers of *Chriſt now* do that, which they were bid to *prepare* for in the Words of St. Peter, *that, when his Glory ſhall be revealed, ye may be glad with exceeding Joy.* If, therefore, where they are bid to *prepare* for their rejoicing, the Joy is for a good in Proſpect (as we have proved it was), then, certainly, where they are told that this time of rejoicing *is come*, the Joy muſt ſtill be for a good in Proſpect. And yet he ſays, *the Words refer to Bleſſings in Poſſeſſion.* Again, the Text from St. *Matthew.*—*Rejoice and be exceeding glad*, FOR *great is your Reward in Heaven*, has the ſame Relation to the former part of St. *Peter's* Words, [*Rejoice inaſmuch as ye are Partakers of* Chriſt's *Sufferings*] as the Text, in the *Revelations* has to the latter. *Bleſſed are ye* (ſays *Jeſus* in this Goſpel) *when Men ſhall revile you and perſecute you, and ſhall ſay all manner of Evil againſt you falſly for my ſake. Rejoice and be exceeding glad*, FOR *great is your Reward in Heaven.* Rejoice! For what? Is it not for the Perſecutions they ſuffer for his ſake? A *preſent Bleſſing* ſure; though not, it may be, to our Author's Taſte. The *Reaſon* why they ſhould rejoice, follows, *for great is your reward in Heaven.* And yet here, he ſays, *the Words refer to Bleſſings in Proſpect.* In truth what led him into all theſe croſs purpoſes, of reaſoning, was a very pleaſant Miſtake. The one Text ſays—*Be glad and rejoice*, FOR ὅτι—The other, *Rejoice and be exceeding glad*, FOR ὅτι—Now he took the Particle, in both Places, to ſignify *propter, for the ſake of*; whereas it ſignifies, *quoniam, quia*, and is, *in proof of ſomething going before.* So that he read the Text—*Rejoice for the Marriage of the Lamb is come*;—as if it had been—*Rejoice for the Marriage of the Lamb*, which *is come:* And—*rejoice, for great is your Reward in Heaven*; as if it had been,—*Rejoice for your great Reward in Heaven.*

But now let us conſider all theſe Texts in another view, in order to do Juſtice to his *Delicacy of Judgement.* I had ſaid that, in the *exact Uſe* of the two *Greek* Words, they ſignified ſo and ſo; and applied that Obſervation to a *Fact*; where a Perſon *was ſaid to have rejoiced, &c.* In order to diſprove this Criticiſm, he brings three Paſſages,

Paſſages, in which thoſe *Greek* Words are uſed, where no *Fact* is related; but where Men are, in a rhetorical manner, *called upon, and bid to rejoice, &c.* In which Caſe, the Uſe of one Word for another, is an elegant Converſion. Thoſe, in Poſſeſſion of a Bleſſing, are bid to rejoice with that exceeding Joy, which Men generally have in the certain Expectation of one approaching; and thoſe in Expectation, with that calm and ſettled Joy, that attends full Poſſeſſion. And now who but our Examiner would not ſee that all his Inſtances fall ſhort and wide of the Point in Queſtion: The *uſe* of Words being *one thing*, in an Hiſtorical Aſſertion; and *another*, in a rhetorical Invocation *?

VIII.

However, having ſo ably acquitted himſelf of one Criticiſm, he falls upon another. "But what then *(ſays he)* ſhall we do with "ἵνα? To rejoice *that he might* ſee the Bleſſing which he already "*had*; in the *Engliſh* Language, is not Senſe. I grant it. And "therefore our Tranſlators avoid it, and render the Paſſage thus; "*Abraham rejoiced* TO SEE *my Day*; which Rendering will very "well ſtand with the *Greek*; where ἵνα is often put for ὅτε or ὅτι; "POSITIVE AS YOU ARE THAT IT ALWAYS REFERS TO A FUTURE "TIME †.

"What ſhall we do with ἵνα?"—What indeed! But no ſooner ſaid than done. He fathers it upon me. And having ſtript it of all its Relations will needs make me maintain it. "Ἵνα *(ſays "he)* is often put for ὅτε or ὅτι, poſitive as you are, that it always "refers to a future Time ‡." Now, ſo far from being *poſitive* of this, I poſitively deny that I ever ſo much as gave the leaſt Hint of ſuch a Thing. And here I again call upon him to prove it, as

* See what the Letter Writer, quoted above, has ſaid concerning the Uſe of theſe two *Greek* Verbs, p. 62 to 65, with much Learning and Judgment.

† Confid. p. 144. ‡ Ibid.

He

he values his Character of an *Answerer by Profession*; and this for the SECOND TIME *. I said, indeed, that ἵνα ἴδῃ, in the Text *refers only to a future Time.* And this I say still, though the Translators have rendered it, equivocally, *to see*; whether for the Reason assigned by me, or my Examiner, is left to the Judgment of the Reader. Yet he affirms, that I say, "ἵνα always refers to "a future Time." That I am positive of it, nay very positive, "positive as you are," says he. And to cure me of this Fault, he proceeds to shew, from several Texts, that ἵνα is often put for ὅτε or ὅτι. "Thus *John* xvi. 2. *The Time cometh* THAT [ἵνα] *whosoever* "*killeth you will think he doth God good Service.* Again: 1 *Cor.* iv. "3. *With me it is a small Thing* THAT [ἵνα] *I should be judged of* "*you.* And nearer to the Point yet 3 *John* 4. *I have no greater* "*Joy* [ἵνα ἀκούω] than THAT I hear, or than TO *hear that my Chil-* "*dren walk in the Truth.* And why not *here*, Sir; *Abraham re-* "*joiced* [ἵνα ἴδῃ] WHEN he saw, or, THAT he saw, or, which is equi- "valent, TO SEE my Day †." In Acknowledgment of which Kindness, all I can do is, to return him back his own Criticism; only with the *Greek* Words put into *Latin.* The Translator of the *vulgar Latin* has rendered ἵνα ἴδῃ by *ut videret*, which Words I will suppose him to say (as indifferent a *Latinist* as he appears to have been) *refer only to a future Time.* On which I will be very arch and critical: *Positive as you are, Sir, that* ut *always refers to a* future Time, *I will shew you that it is sometimes put for* postquam, *the* past,

Ut vidi, ut perii, ut me malus abstulit Error!

and, nearer to the Point yet, sometimes for quanto,—Ut quisque op-

* Here the learned Writer abovementioned is justly scandalized at his Man. "Pray, "Sir, *(says he)* what Authority have you for this, that Mr. *W.* is positive ἵνα always "refers to a future Time?——What he saith is, that ἵνα ἴδῃ in the Text signifies "the future Time: And this, Sir, it does, and needs must, for abundance of Rea- "sons."——p. 59.

† Consid. p. 144.

time

timê Græcè ſciret, ita eſſe nequiſſimum. "And why not here, "Sir, *Abraham* rejoiced [*ut videret*] WHEN HE ſaw, or THAT he "ſaw, or, which is equivalent, TO SEE my Day.

IX.

And now he tells us, "There is but one Difficulty that ſtands "in the Way." And what is *one* to a Man who can ſurmount them with the ſame Eaſe he makes them? The Difficulty is this;— "That according to his [*the Examiner's*] Interpretation, the latter "Part of the Sentence is a Repetition of the former. Abraham *re-* "*joiced to ſee my Day, and he ſaw it and was glad*; i. e. Abraham "*rejoiced to ſee, and then ſaw and rejoiced.* But ſuch kind of Repe- "titions are frequent in the ſacred Dialect; and, in my humble "Opinion, it has an Elegance here; Abraham *rejoiced to ſee my Day*; "χ᾽ εἶδε, χ᾽ ἐχάρη, HE BOTH SAW and WAS GLAD *."

I had talked much of Repetitions in the ſacred Style; and he will do ſo too; but without knowing the Difference between a *Pleonaſm* and a *Tautology*; the firſt of which is, indeed, often a Beauty; the other, always a Blemiſh in Expreſſion: And in this Number is the *elegant Repetition* of our Examiner's own making. But, for the Reader's better Information, I ſhall tranſcribe what I ſaid on this Subject in *The Divine Legation*. *The* Pleonaſm *evidently aroſe from the Narrowneſs of a ſimple Language: The* Hebrew, *in which this Figure abounds, is the ſcantieſt of all the learned Languages of the Eaſt:* Amant *(ſays* Grotius) Hebræi verborum copiam; itaque rem eandem multis verbis exprimunt. *He does not tell us the Reaſon; but we have given it above, and it ſeems a very natural one: For when the Speaker's Phraſe comes not up to his Ideas (as in a ſcanty Language it often will not) he endeavours, of courſe, to explain himſelf by a Repetition of the Thought in other Words; as he, whoſe Body is ſtraiten'd in room, is always diſſatisfied with his preſent*

* Conſid. p. 144, 145.

Poſture.

Poſture *. A Repetition of this kind, made in different Words, is called a *Pleonaſm*: But when in the ſame Words, (as it is in the Text in queſtion, if there be any Repetition at all) it is then a *Tautology*; which, being without *Reaſon*, our Examiner will find a Beauty in it. "In my humble Opinion *(ſays he)* it has an Ele-"gance." This is not ill expreſſed. *Humility of Opinion* well becomes him who *begs* his Queſtion; and ſtill better, him who is about to *ſteal* it; which we ſhall ſee under the next *Remark*, he was juſt now projecting—But the only Pretence to *Elegance*, nay even to Senſe, in his Tranſlation of the Text, ariſes from our being able to underſtand the equivocal Phraſe *to ſee* in my Meaning of, *that he might ſee*; as will appear to the Reader, by confining it to the Examiner's Meaning; thus, Abraham *rejoiced when he had ſeen my Day, and he ſaw it and was glad.* The Abſurdity of which Expreſſion ariſes from hence, that the latter Part of the Sentence, beginning with the Conjunction *Completive*, καὶ, naturally implies a further Predication. Yet there is no further. But our Examiner, willing to avoid ſo glaring an Abſurdity, artfully drops the *Senſe* of καὶ in the *Sound* of BOTH. I call it the Sound, for Senſe there is none. Abraham *rejoiced to ſee my Day*; *he both ſaw and was glad*, ſays our elegant Tranſlator. As if, when *he rejoiced to ſee*, there could be any Doubt whether he did not BOTH *ſee and rejoice*. Therefore I ſhould adviſe him not to deſpiſe the Aſſiſtance the learned Letter Writer gives him, who tells him here, that the beſt Senſe, he will ever be able to make of it, will be this, Abraham *rejoiced to ſee my Day*; *ay, that he did* †. But then as for the Elegance of it, he muſt look to that himſelf.

* See Divine Legation, Vol. II. p. 147, 148. [Vol. II. p. 444. ed. 4to.]

† Letter to the Author of a late Epiſt. Diſſ. p. 66.

X. Having

X.

Having now ſo happily got through his Criticiſm on my Text, he draws one concluding Argument; with which he runs a muck at my *whole* Diſſertation. "I ſuppoſe, Sir, it may now be granted "that it is not clear from theſe Words of our Saviour; that *Abra-*"*ham* had any ſuch Notice of *Chriſt's* Sacrifice as you contend for.— "Here THEN, Sir, your Argument muſt neceſſarily have its Pe-"riod. For this Text ſtands as the FOUNDATION of all that fol-"lows *." Fair and ſoftly, good Sir, for, (though your Argument, be already anſwered, in a Confutation of your *Premiſſes)* I would not have you run away with the Opinion that there is any Relation between *them* and your *Concluſion*; further than what ariſes from an Equivocation, which is a very bad Bond of Connexion. The Word FOUNDATION, when applied, figuratively, to a *Theſis*, ſignifies either the *Support* of it; or the *orderly Introduction* to it. That I uſed it in the latter Senſe, appears, not only from the Nature of the Thing, but from my own *expreſs Words*, in the very Place where I ſpeak of this *Foundation*. *The* Foundation *of my Theſis I lay in that Scripture of St.* John, *where* Jeſus *ſays to the unbelieving* Jews, Your Father *Abraham* rejoiced to ſee my Day, and he ſaw it and was glad. *If we conſider* Abraham's *perſonal Character, together with the Choice made of him for Head and Origin of that People which God would make holy and ſeparate to himſelf, from whence was to riſe the Redeemer of Mankind, the ultimate End of that Separation,* WE CANNOT BUT CONCLUDE IT PROBABLE *that the Knowledge of this Redeemer ſhould be revealed to him.* Shall I hide from *Abraham* the Thing which I do, *ſays God, in a Matter that much leſs concerned the Father of the Faithful. And here, in the Words of* Jeſus, *we have this* PROBABLE FACT, ARISING FROM THE NATURE OF THE THING, *made certain and put out of all reaſonable Queſtion* †."

* Confid. p. 145. † Div. Leg. vol. II. p. 594. [Vol. III p. 374. Ed. 4to.]

Here the Reader ſees that I uſe the Words of *Jeſus* which I call the *Foundation*, as the orderly Introduction to and *Confirmation* only of a Theſis which I call *probable*, and prove by other *Media*. And as I ſhew, both from the Words of *Jeſus*, and *the Nature of the Thing*, that *Abraham* ſaw *Chriſt's Day*: So, from both, I prove that this Truth muſt be recorded ſomewhere or other in the Old Teſtament. From thence I proceed to the Proof of theſe two Points, "1. That "there is no Place in the whole Hiſtory of *Abraham*, but that "where he is commanded to offer up his Son, which bears the "leaſt Marks or Traces of the Revelation of *Chriſt's* Day. 2 That "this Command has all the Marks of it, and is, indeed, that very "Revelation *." In doing this, amongſt the various Arguments employed, I ſhew that, at the Time of *Abraham*, Information by Action was the moſt familiar Mode of Converſation;—that the Hiſtory of the *Command* has all the Marks of ſuch a Converſation;—that, if it be not ſo underſtood, the Story of *Abraham* is abrupt and unconnected;—and the Hiſtory of the Command attended with inſuperable Difficulties. Yet for all this, my Examiner tells you, That my Theſis "muſt neceſſarily have its Period," when he has taken away the *Foundation* in my Text †.

'Tis true, he gives a Reaſon for this definitive Sentence, which is this: "That the Tendency of all that follows is ONLY TO SHEW "THAT ADMITTING, OR ALLOWING THAT ABRAHAM WAS AC-"QUAINTED WITH THE GREAT SACRIFICE OF CHRIST, that then "it is reaſonable to expect an Account of it in his ‡ Hiſtory," *&c. &c.* The Reader obſerves from my own Words, in *The Divine Legation*, quoted above, that I thought we might *from the Nature of the Thing, expect an Account of it in his Hiſtory.* This is therefore the THIRD TIME I am obliged to call ſolemnly upon him, to ſhew that all my Proofs of the *Command's* being the

* Divine Legat. Vol. II. p. 598. [Vol. III. p. 378. Ed. 4to.]

† See this Point well argued by the learned Writer of the Letter before-mentioned, in which, from p. 3 to 12, he very ably confutes the Examiner's Concluſion.

‡ Conſid. p. 145.

Reve-

Revelation of *Chriſt's* Day, reſt upon "the Admiſſion or Allowance "that *Abraham* was acquainted with the great Sacrifice of *Chriſt*, "*as it is to be collected from the Text in St.* John." The laſt Words I have added; and thereby hangs a Tale. The Reader is now to be let into a Secret. The Examiner, in giving the finiſhing Stroke to the *Diſſertation on the Caſe of* Abraham, had reſerved, as was fit, one of the neateſt Tricks of his Trade to be played off on this Occaſion. And thus he does the Feat. "Your Foundation *(ſays he)* "is ſubverted; therefore all that follows is overthrown." Why ſo?—Why ſo! Becauſe "the Tendency of all is to ſhew, that, "admitting or allowing that *Abraham* was acquainted—then it is "reaſonable to expect"—Well, but may it not be *admitted or allowed*, from other Arguments produced in *The Divine Legation* beſides the Text in Queſtion, that *Abraham was acquainted with the great Sacrifice of* Chriſt? Your humble Servant, Sir, ſays he for that. The Force of my Conſequence depends upon the honeſt Reader's taking it, as I deſign he ſhould; that it could only be *admitted or allowed* from the Text in Queſtion: For if once he conceives that it might be *allowed* from other Arguments in *The Divine Legation*, there is an End of my *Conſequence*; and yet you would put me upon explaining.

XI.

However, our Examiner, as if not quite ſatisfied himſelf, with *this Period he hath put to my Argument*, goes on thus: "But to make "good the Defect in this conſequential Reaſoning, you offer at "one direct Proof, to ſhew that the Command, and the Tranſaction "conſequent upon it, was indeed as a repreſentative Information to "*Abraham* of the Redemption of Mankind, by the Sacrifice of "*Chriſt*; which is, That the Author of the Epiſtle to the *Hebrews* "has plainly hinted that he conſidered it in this Light. Your "Proof is from theſe Words, Chap. xi. ver. 17—19. *By Faith*, "Abraham *offered up* Iſaac—*accounting that God was able to raiſe* "*him from the Dead; from whence alſo he received him in a Figure*,

" ΕΝ ΠΑΡΑΒΟΛΗ, in a Parable: *A Mode of Information by* Words
" *or* Actions, *which conſiſts in putting one thing for another. Now*
" *in a Writer* (ſay you) *who regarded this commanded Action, as a*
" *repreſentative Information of the Redemption of Mankind, nothing*
" *could be more fine or eaſy than this Expreſſion. For though* Abra-
" ham *did not, indeed, receive* Iſaac *reſtored to Life after a real Diſ-*
" *ſolution; yet the Son being, in this Action, to repreſent* Chriſt *ſuf-*
" *fering Death for the Sins of the World, when the Father brought*
" *him ſafe from Mount* Moriah, *after three Days, during which*
" *he was in the State of Condemnation to Death; he plainly received*
" *him under the Character of* Chriſt's *Repreſentative, as reſtored from*
" *the Dead. For as his coming to the Mount, and binding, and laying*
" *on the Altar, figured the Sufferings and Death of* Chriſt; *ſo his being*
" *taken from thence alive, as properly figured* Chriſt's *Reſurrection*
" *from the Dead. With the higheſt Propriety, therefore, and Elegance*
" *of Speech, might* Abraham *be ſaid to receive* Iſaac *from the Dead in*
" *a Parable, or in Repreſentation* *."

Let us ſee now what our Examiner has to object to this Criticiſm.—" By your Leave, Sir," ſays he—which, by the Way, he never aſks, but to abuſe me; nor never takes, but to miſrepreſent me—" If the Apoſtle had meant by this Expreſſion, to ſignify, that
" *Iſaac* ſtood as the *Repreſentative* of *Chriſt*, and that his being
" taken from the Mount alive was the Figure of *Chriſt's* Reſurrec-
" tion; it *ſhould* have been ſaid, that *Abraham* received CHRIST
" from the Dead in a Figure †." See here, ye little Critics; that Νᾶς, that *Soul of Criticiſm*, which *Bentley* ſo much lamented he could find no where, out of himſelf. The Writer of the *Epiſtle to the Hebrews* is giving an Inſtance of *Abraham's* Faith, *who, againſt Hope, believed in Hope*, where his only Son (through whom he was promiſed to be the Father of a mighty Nation) was commanded to be offered up in Sacrifice. In which Account, the ſacred Writer hath uſed an Expreſſion which I ſuppoſed doth intimate that he underſtood

* Conſid. p. 146, 147.

† Ibid. p. 147.

derſtood the Nature of the Command to be, what I have attempted to explain it. To this our Examiner ſays, *No.* Had he thus underſtood it, he SHOULD have ſaid, not that *Abraham* received ISAAC, but that he *received* CHRIST *from the Dead in a Figure.* What? where the Diſcourſe was not concerning *Chriſt*, but *Iſaac?* Had, indeed, the ſacred Writer been ſpeaking of *Abraham's Knowledge of Chriſt*, ſomething might have been ſaid; but he is ſpeaking of a very different Thing, his *Faith in God*; and only *intimates*, by a forceable Term, what he underſtood that Action to be, which he gives, as an Inſtance of the moſt illuſtrious Act of Faith. I ſay, had this been the Caſe, *ſomething* might have been ſaid; *ſomething*, I mean, to keep him in Countenance; yet ſtill, nothing to the Purpoſe, as I ſhall now ſhew. The *Tranſaction of the Sacrifice of Chriſt*, related to *God.* The *Figure* of that Tranſaction, in the Command to offer *Iſaac*, related (according to my Interpretation) to *Abraham.* Now, it was *God* who received *Chriſt:* As it was *Abraham* who received *Iſaac.* To tell us then, that (according to my Interpretation) it SHOULD *have been ſaid, that* Abraham *received* CHRIST *from the Dead in a Figure*, is only ſhewing us that he knows juſt as much of Logical Expreſſion, as of Theological Argumentation *. It is true, could he ſhew the Expreſſion improper, in the Senſe I underſtand it, he would then ſpeak more to the Purpoſe; and this, to do him Juſtice, he would fain be at. For thus it follows, "For *(ſays he)* "*Chriſt* it was (according to your Interpretation) that "was received from the Dead *in a Figure*, by *Iſaac* his *Repreſenta-*
"*tive*, who *really* came alive from the Mount. If the Reading had "been, not ἐν παραβολῇ, but εἰς παραβολήν, it would have ſuited "your Notion; for it might properly have been ſaid, that *Iſaac* "came alive from the Mount *as* a Figure, or *that he might be* a "Figure, of the Reſurrection of *Chriſt* †." Miſerable Chicane! As, on the one Hand, I might ſay with Propriety, that CHRIST

* See here again the learned Writer of the Letter abovementioned, p. 43.

† Conſid. p. 147.

was

was received from the Dead in a Figure, i. e. BY a *Repreſentative:* So could I not as well ſay, on the other, that ISAAC *was received from the Dead in a Figure, i. e.* AS a *Repreſentative?* For he, ſuſtaining the *Perſon* of *Chriſt*, who was raiſed from the Dead, might *in a Figure, i. e.* as *that* Perſon, be ſaid to be received: Yet this our Examiner denies, and ſays, the Apoſtle SHOULD *have ſaid that* Abraham *received* CHRIST, and not ISAAC. "But *(ſays he)* if the "reading had been not ἐν Παραβολῇ, but εἰς Παραβολὴν, it would have "ſuited YOUR Notion." And the Reaſon he gives is this: "For "it might properly have been ſaid that *Iſaac* came alive from the "Mount as a Figure, or THAT HE MIGHT BE a Figure, of the Re-"ſurrection of *Chriſt.*" Amazing! he ſays this would have ſuited my Notion; and the Reaſon he gives ſhews it ſuits only his own, which is that the *Exactneſs of the Reſemblance*, not *the Declaration of the Giver* of the Command, made it a Figure. This is the more extraordinary, as I myſelf had ſhewn that the old Latin Tranſlator had turned the Words into IN PARABOLAM inſtead of *in Parabola* for this very Reaſon, that he underſtood the Command in the Senſe our Examiner contends for; *viz.* That *Iſaac*, by the Reſemblance of the Actions, MIGHT BE, or might become a Figure, *&c. But the Nature* (ſay I) *of the Command being unknown, theſe Words of the* Epiſtle *have been underſtood to ſignify only that* Iſaac was a Type of *Chriſt, in the ſame Senſe, that the* Old Tabernacle *in this Epiſtle is called a Type*——ἥτις ΠΑΡΑΒΟΛΗ, *that is, a Thing deſigned by the holy Spirit, to have both a* preſent *Significancy and a* future. *Which amounts but juſt to this, that* Abraham *receiving* Iſaac *ſafe from Mount* Moriah, *in the Manner Scripture relates, he, thereby, became a* Type. *An ancient Interpretation, as appears by the reading of the vulgate Latin.* Unde eum IN PARABOLAM accepit, *for* in Parabola, *as it ought to have been tranſlated, conformably to the* Greek *.

* Divine Legat. Vol. II. p. 613. [Vol. III. p. 394. Ed. 4to.]

XII. But

XII.

But to return to our Examiner; who, after all this Expence of Criticiſm, owns, at laſt, that "a *Reaſon* will be wanting, why in-"ſtead of ſpeaking the Fact as it really was, that *Iſaac* came alive "from the Mount, the Apoſtle choſe rather to ſay (what was not "really the Caſe) that *Abraham* received him *from the Dead* *." Well; and have not I given a Reaſon?—And what then? For what did I commence Examiner, if I mayn't have Reaſons of my own?—They follow thus, "If *Iſaac* did not die (as it is certain "he did not) *Abraham* could not receive him from the Dead. And "yet the Apoſtle ſays, he received him *from the Dead.* The clear-"ing up this Difficulty, will ſhew the true Senſe of the Paſſage †." What, will the clearing up a Difficulty of his own making diſcover the true Senſe of another Man's Writing? This is one of his new Improvements in Logic; in which, as in Arithmetic, he has intro-duced a *Rule of Falſe*, whereby an unknown Truth is to be ferretted out by a known Untruth. For there is none of this Difficulty in the ſacred Text; it is not there, as in our Examiner's Expreſſion, ſaid by the Apoſtle, ſimply, that Abraham *received* Iſaac *from the Dead*, but that he received him, from thence, IN A FIGURE, or under the aſſumed Perſonage of *Chriſt.* Now if *Chriſt* died, then he, who aſſumed his Perſonage, in order to repreſent his Paſſion and Reſurrection, might, ſurely, well be ſaid to be *received from the Dead in a Figure.* A wonderful Difficulty truly! and as won-derfully ſolved, by a Conundrum! But with Propriety ſufficient: For as a real Difficulty requires Senſe and Criticiſm, an imaginary one may well enough be managed by a Quibble. Becauſe the Tranſlators of St. *Mark's* Goſpel have rendered ἐν ποίᾳ παραβολῇ, by—*with what Compariſon ſhall we compare it*, therefore ἐν παραβολῇ, in the Text in Queſtion, he ſays, ſignifies COMPARATIVELY SPEAKING. But no Words can ſhew him equal to his own—

* Conſid. p. 147, 148. † Ibid.

"The

" The Apoſtle does not ſay *ſimply* and *abſolutely*, that *Abraham* re-
" ceived *Iſaac* from the Dead; but that he received him from the
" Dead, ἐν παραβολῇ, *in a Parable.*" See here now! Did not I tell you ſo? There was no Difficulty all this while: The Sentence only opened to the Right and Left to make Room for his Objection: And now cloſes again. " It was not ſimply ſaid"—No. " But that he received him—ἐν παραβολῇ, *in a Parable*, i. e. *in a* " *Compariſon*, or *by Compariſon*. Thus the word is uſed *Mark* iv. 30. " *Whereunto ſhall we liken the Kingdom of God, or with what* COM-" PARISON [ἐν ποίᾳ παραβολῇ] *ſhall we compare it.* The Meaning " then may be, that *Abraham's* receiving *Iſaac* alive (after his Death " was denounced) by the Revocation of the Command, was AS IF " HE HAD received him from the Dead. Thus ſeveral Interpreters " underſtand the Place. Or it may be, as others will have it, that " the Apoſtle here refers to the Birth of *Iſaac*; which was [ἐν πα-" ραβολῇ] COMPARATIVELY SPEAKING, a receiving him from the " Dead; his Father being old, and his Mother paſt the Age of " Child-bearing, on which Account the Apoſtle ſtyles them both " *dead.* Which Interpretation, I the rather approve, becauſe it ſug-" geſts the proper Grounds of *Abraham's* Faith *."

He ſays, ἐν παραβολῇ ſignifies *in or by Compariſon*; and that the Word is ſo uſed in St. *Mark*; to prove which, he quotes the *Engliſh* Tranſlation. Now I muſt take the Liberty to tell him, that the Tranſlarors were miſtaken; and he with them. Παραβολῇ, in St. *Mark*, is not uſed in the Senſe of a *Similitude* or *Compariſon*, but of a *Parable*. The Ancients had two Ways of illuſtrating the Things they inforced; the one was by a *Parable*, the other by a ſimple *Compariſon* or *Simile*. How the latter of theſe aroſe out of the former I have ſhewn in *The Divine Legation* †. Now, I ſay, that both theſe Modes of Illuſtration are referred to in the Text of St. *Mark*; which ſhould have been tranſlated thus, *To what ſhall we* COMPARE *the Kingdom of God, or with what* PARABLE *ſhall*

* Conſid. p. 148, 149. † Vol. II. p. 93. [Vol. II. p. 411. Ed. 4to.]

we

we illuſtrate or parabolize it—ὁμοιώσωμεν—παραβάλωμεν.—So that the latter Part of the Verſe is not a Repetition, as the Tranſlators ſeem to have thought, of the former; ſo frequent in the Scripture Style; but, both together, expreſs two different and well-known Modes of Illuſtration.

But now ſuppoſe, ἐν ποίᾳ παραβολῇ had ſignified *with what Compariſon*: How comes it to paſs the ἐν παραβολῇ ſhould ſignify *by Compariſon*, or *as it were*, or COMPARATIVELY SPEAKING? In plain Truth, his critical Analogy has terminated in a pleaſant Blunder. How ſo? ſays he.—Nay 'tis true there's no denying, but that *ſpeaking by Compariſon* is *comparatively ſpeaking*: And, if Men will needs put another Senſe upon it, who can help that? Was it a Time for our Author, when he was writing *Examinations*, to ſpoil a good Argument by nicely enquiring into the *Senſe* of an Expreſſion? He left it to thoſe whom it more concerned, to tell the Reader, that *comparatively ſpeaking* does not at preſent (whatever it might heretofore) ſignify, *ſpeaking by a Compariſon*; but ſpeaking looſely and incorrectly; which Senſe of the Phraſe, I ſuppoſe, aroſe from the *Compariſons* of ſuch Kind of Writers as our Examiner; that were generally obſerved to be lame and inaccurate. However, though I am no great Friend to the *Innocence of Error*, I ſhould have been ready enough to think it a ſimple Blunder, had I not obſerved him to go into it with much artful Preparation; a Circumſtance by no Means characteriſtic of that *genuine Turn of Mind*, which is quick and ſudden, and over Head and Ears in an Inſtant: But he begins with explaining, *in a Compariſon*, by—*by Compariſon*: In which, you juſt get the firſt Glimpſe, as it were, of an enaſcent Equivocation; and this [*by Compariſon*] is preſently, afterwards, turned into, *as it were*, or, *as if he had*; and then, *comparatively ſpeaking* brings up the Rear, and cloſes the Criticiſm three deep. But he "approves of the Interpretation" which makes the Author of the Epiſtle to the *Hebrews* "refer to the Birth of "*Iſaac*, becauſe it ſuggeſts *(he ſays)* the PROPER grounds of *Abra*-"*ham's* Faith." Till now I thought the *proper grounds* of *Abra*-

ham's Faith (as of every other Man's) had been his Knowledge of the Nature of the Godhead, one of whoſe Attributes is Veracity. No, ſays this great Philoſopher and Divine; his *proper grounds* were theſe, that God had told him Truth once already.—And now had he not Reaſon, after all this, to turn to me, and with an Air of Triumph and Gaiety to accoſt me in the following Manner? "It "is not to be ſuppoſed, Sir, that you are a Stranger to theſe In- "terpretations, which are in every body's Hands; but as if nothing "of this Sort had ever been thought of, you paſs it over with ab- "ſolute Neglect; and will needs have it, that the Apoſtle was *full* "*of* YOUR *Ideas*; for no other Reaſon that I can ſee, than becauſe "you are full of them yourſelf *." Indeed, Sir, *comparatively ſpeaking*, I was much a Stranger to them. For what were they, till ſeen in the pleaſant Light in which you have placed them? I will only ſay one Thing to your Argument (as I now haſten to your Wit); which is, that, had you known the Force of the Word ἐκομίσαλο, in the Text, you had known that the *Deadneſs of* Sarah's *Womb could not be meant*. But, ſince you love the Authority of Interpreters †, I will give you what the great *Scaliger* ſays on the Words ἐν παραβολῇ, "*In imagine* quadam reſurrectionis: quia qui "immolationi addictus erat, & poſtea liberatus, videtur tanquam "reſurrexiſſe. Hæc eſt *Calvini* expoſitio, longe omnium optima."

But, ſays our Examiner, "you will needs have it that the Apoſ- "tle was full of YOUR Ideas." *My Ideas*, intimates Ideas diſcovered by me; and to ſuppoſe the Apoſtle *full* of theſe, would have been, I confeſs, a little extraordinary. The Truth is, I ſaid nothing ſo ſilly. I ſaid, THESE *Ideas*. But what then? It was neceſſary, perhaps, to the Wit that follows—"for no other Reaſon that I can "ſee, than becauſe you are full of them yourſelf." And ſhall I be angry with him for this? Surely, no. I can eaſily forgive the

* Conſiderations, p. 148, 149.

† The learned Letter Writer abovementioned gives another good Reaſon, and produces another good Authority againſt this Fancy. See p. 48.

falſe

falſe Quotation for the Sake of ſo much Wit. For, as *Stephano* ſays to his Viceroy on the like Occaſion, "I thank thee for that Jeſt; "'tis an excellent Paſs of Pate: and Wit ſhall not go unrewarded "while I am King of this Iſland."

XIII.

Our Examiner goes on: "The laſt Step *(ſays he)* you take in "this Argument is to raiſe Objections againſt the common Account "of this Hiſtory; in order to draw an Inference from thence, that "your Account muſt be the true one; and this is what I ſhall next "conſider *." He had ſaid before, that having ſtruck my *Corner-ſtone*, and unſettled my *Foundation*, he had ſtopt me ſhort, and put a *Period to my Argument*. But it ſeems, ſomehow or other, I had recovered myſelf, and puſhed it forward. For now he talks of *another Step* I had *taken in this Argument*. Happily indeed, both for himſelf and me, it is the *laſt*. "You tell us then *(ſays he)* that "*the Command, as it hath been hitherto underſtood—occupies a Place* "*in* Abraham's *Hiſtory, that, according to our Ideas of Things, it* "*cannot properly have. The Command is ſuppoſed to be given as a* Trial "*only. Now when the great Searcher of Hearts is pleaſed to* try *any* "*of his Servants, either for Example-ſake, or for ſome other End—* "*as in this he condeſcends to the Manner of Men—ſo, we may be* "*aſſured, he would accommodate himſelf to their Manner likewiſe*, in "the moſt material Circumſtance of the Trial. *But amongſt Men*, "*the Agent is always tried* before *he is ſet on Work, or rewarded*, "*and not* after—*On the contrary*—this *Trial was made after all* Abra-"ham's *Work was done; and all God's Mercies received—nay, what* "*is ſtill more ſtrange, after he had been* once *tried already.—We muſt* "*needs conclude therefore, that the Command was not* (*according to* "*the common Notion*) *a* Trial *only, becauſe it comes* after *all God's* "*Diſpenſations. Yet, as the ſacred Text aſſures us*, it was *a* "Trial, *and as a* Trial *neceſſarily precedes the* Employment *or*

* Conſiderations, p. 149.

" Reward *of the Perſon tried*; *we muſt needs conclude*, *that as* no Em-
" ployment, *ſo* ſome Benefit *followed this Trial. Now on our Inter-*
" *pretation*, *a* Benefit, *as we ſhall ſee*, did *follow. We have Reaſon*
" *therefore to conclude this Interpretation to be the true* *." To this he anſwers, " You lay it down here as the common Interpretation,
" that the Command to *Abraham* to offer up his Son was given as a
" Trial ONLY; WHICH IS NOT TRUE." Why? Becauſe " the
" common Opinion is, that God's Intention in this Command was
" not only to try *Abraham*, but alſo to PREFIGURE the Sacrifice of
" *Chriſt* †." Excellent! I ſpeak here of the *Command's* being *given*. But given to whom? To all the *Faithful*, for whoſe Sake it was *recorded?* or to *Abraham* only, for whoſe Sake it was *revealed?* Does not the very Subject confine my Meaning to this latter Senſe? Now, to *Abraham*, I ſay (according to the common Opinion) it was *given as a Trial only*. To the *Faithful*, if you will, as a *Prefiguration*. If, to extricate himſelf from his confuſed or ſophiſtical Reaſoning, he will ſay it *prefigured* to *Abraham* likewiſe; he then gives up all he has been contending for, againſt my Interpretation, *viz.* that *Abraham knew* this to be a Repreſentation of the great Sacrifice of *Chriſt*: I call his Reaſoning *confuſed* or *ſophiſtical*. See, if he be not obliged to me for my Indeciſion. Where I ſpeak of the common Opinion, I ſay, *the Command is ſuppoſed to be* GIVEN *as a Trial only*. He thinks fit to tell me, *I ſay not true*. But when he comes to prove it, he changes the Terms of the Queſtion thus, " For the common Opinion is that GOD'S INTENTION in this Com-
" mand was," &c. Now the Purpoſe of God's *giving a Command to Abraham*, for his Sake, might be one Thing; and his general *Intention*, in that Command, as it concerned the Whole of his Diſpenſation, another. I leave it therefore to the Reader to determine, whether our Examiner changed the Terms of the Queſtion by

* Conſid. p. 149, 150.

† Conſid. p. 150. Here again the learned Writer in his Letter to our Examiner, p. 14. very clearly expoſes this Sophiſm.

Deſign

Deſign or Ignorance. But I have another Reaſon why he ſhould have allowed me, in this Place at leaſt, not to have been miſtaken. And that is, becauſe a great Man (whoſe Authority is deſervedly the higheſt in the learned World, and which our Examiner has more Reaſons than one to pay a due Regard to) is in the ſame Sentiments; and takes it for granted, as we ſhall ſee by the Words that follow, that the *common Opinion* is that God's *giving* this Command was "only to try *Abraham*. I was (ſays he) under a Difficulty "(a Caſe, which, I dare ſay, never happened to our Examiner) to "account for this Action on the Foot of its being a Trial only *:" But to prove further that I ſaid *not true*, when I ſaid, that, *according to the common Interpretation the Command was given for a Trial only*; he obſerves, that I myſelf had owned that the *Reſemblance to* Chriſt's *Sacrifice was ſo ſtrong, that Interpreters could never overlook it.* How much this is to the Purpoſe, unleſs we allow *Abraham's Knowledge* of the Figure, has been ſeen already. Nor does he appear to be leſs conſcious of its Impertinence; therefore, inſtead of attempting to inforce it to the *Purpoſe* for which *he quotes it*, he turns, all on a ſudden, to ſhew that it makes nothing to the Purpoſe for which *I employed it.* But let us follow this *Proteus* through all his Windings.—"The Reſemblance *(ſays he)*, no doubt, is *very* "ſtrong: but how this *corroborates* your Senſe of the Command, I "do not ſee. Your Senſe is, that it was an *actual Information* "given to *Abraham*, of the Sacrifice of *Chriſt*. But to *prefigure*, "and to *inform*, are different Things. This Tranſaction *might pre-*"*figure*, and *does prefigure*, the Sacrifice of *Chriſt*; whether *Abra-*"*ham knew* any thing of the Sacrifice of *Chriſt* or no. For it does "not follow, that becauſe a Thing is *prefigured*; therefore it muſt "be *ſeen* and *underſtood*, *at the Time* when it is *prefigured* †." Could it have been believed that theſe Words ſhould immediately follow an Argument, whoſe Force, that little it has, is founded on the Principle, *That to prefigure and to inform are* NOT *different Things?*

* Divine Legation, Vol. II. p. 614, note f. [See Vol. III. p. 372, Ed. 4to.]

† Conſid. p. 150, 151.

But

But Retroſpects, with bad Reckoners, are troubleſome Things. At this Rate, I ſhould ſoon find my Taſk double. I ſhall therefore take his Accounts as they lie. And if they betray themſelves, why ſo. He ſays then, "he does not ſee how this CORROBORATES "my Senſe, *becauſe* to prefigure and to inform are different Things." It was that very *Difference* which made me call it a *Corroboration* of my Senſe. Had there been *no Difference*, I ſhould not have called it a *Corroboration* of my Senſe, but my very Senſe itſelf. As to the Obſervation that follows, and the Explanation of it, all he ſays is very true. But a Truth the moſt unlooked for; 1. Becauſe it is a Truth I myſelf had much inculcated throughout *The Divine Legation*. 2. Becauſe it is a full Anſwer to all he has himſelf urged in the Body of his Pamphlet for a future State's being known or taught to the *Jewiſh* People. 3. Becauſe (as is hinted at above) it is as full an Anſwer to the very Queſtion we are upon, *viz.* Whether, according to the common Opinion, the Command was given *only to try* Abraham; or whether *both to try and to prefigure*, &c. Now I was there ſpeaking of the Command, as given to *Abraham*. Therefore *to prefigure* could not be one End, becauſe it was not to *inform*.

XIV.

But we are yet only in the Skirts of his Argument, on which, indeed, I have ſat too long. "Thus much *(ſays he)* being obſerved "to PREVENT Confuſion*." This puts me in Mind of the *Conſtable*, who being called in to appeaſe a Quarrel, firſt knocked down every one he met; and then ſaid, "Thus much to prevent Diſ-"order." For the Reader ſees all the *Confuſion* is of his own making; and that, I have Reaſon to fear, will keep riſing by every new *Obſervation*. "Let us now *(ſays he)* attend to your Argu-gument†." Indeed it is time; and ſo, without more Ceremony

* Conſid. p. 151. † Ibid.

take

take it. One of my Proofs againſt the common Interpretation was, that according to *that* there was no Reward ſubſequent to the Trial. To which he anſwers, "But how can you prove that, "according to the common Interpretation, there was no Reward "ſubſequent to the Trial *?" How ſhall I be able to pleaſe him? Before he was offended that I ſuppoſed the Author of the Book of *Geneſis* might omit relating the *Mode* of a Fact, when he had good Reaſon † ſo to do. Here, becauſe I ſuppoſe *no Fact*, from there being none recorded, when no Reaſon hindered, he is as captious on this Side. "How will you prove it? *(ſays he)*. From the Silence of the Hiſtorian, ſay I, when nothing hindered him from ſpeaking. Well, but he will ſhew it fairly recorded in Scripture, that there *were Rewards ſubſequent to the Trial.* This, indeed is to the Purpoſe: "*Abraham (ſays he)* lived a great many Years "after that Tranſaction happened. He lived to diſpoſe of his Son "*Iſaac* in Marriage, and to ſee his Seed. He lived to be married "himſelf to another Wife, and to have ſeveral Children by her; "he had not THEN received all God's Mercies, nor were all God's "Diſpenſations towards him at an End; and it is to be remem-"bered that it is expreſſly ſaid of *Abraham, Gen.* xxiv. 1. (a long "Time after the Tranſaction in Queſtion) *that God had bleſſed him in "all Things* ‡." The Queſtion here is, of the *extraordinary* and uncommon Rewards beſtowed by God on *Abraham*; and he decides upon it, by an Enumeration of the *ordinary and common.* And, to fill up the Meaſure of theſe Bleſſings, he makes the marrying of *another Wife* one. Though unluckily, this Wife at laſt proves but a *Concubine*; as appears plainly from the Place where ſhe is mentioned. But let me aſk him ſeriouſly; Could he, indeed, ſuppoſe me to mean (though he attended not to the Drift of the Argument) that God immediately withdrew all his Favours from the

* Conſid. p. 151.

† See the Reaſon aſſigned, Div. Leg. Vol. II. p. 610. [Vol. III. Book VI. § 5.]

‡ Conſid. p. 151, 152.

Father

Father of the Faithful, after the laſt great Reward he conferred upon him, though he lived many Years after? I can hardly, I confeſs, account for this, any otherwiſe than from a certain Turn of Mind which I don't care to give a Name to: But which, the Habit of anſwering has made ſo common that nobody either miſtakes it, or is much ſcandalized at it. Though I, for my Part, ſhould eſteem a total Ignorance of Letters a much happier Lot than ſuch a learned Depravity. "But this is not all," *(ſays he.)*—No? I am ſorry for it! 'Twas enough in Conſcience!—"What ſurprizes "me moſt is, that you ſhould argue ſo WEAKLY, as if the Reward "of good Men had Reſpect to this Life only. Be it, that *Abraham* "had received all God's Mercies; and that all God's Diſpenſations "towards him, in this World, were at an End; was there not a "Life yet to come, with Reſpect to which the whole Period "of our Exiſtence here is to be conſidered as a State of Trial; and "where we are all of us to look for that Reward of our Virtues "which we very often fail of in this *?" Well, if it was NOT ALL, we find, at leaſt, 'twas all of a Piece. For as before he would ſophiſtically obtrude upon us *common*, for extraordinary *Rewards*; ſo here, (true to the Genius of his Trade) he puts *common* for extraordinary *Trials*. The Caſe, to which I applied my Argument, was this;—God, determining to ſelect a choſen People from the Loins of *Abraham*, would manifeſt to the World that this Patriarch was worthy of the Diſtinction ſhewn him, by having his Faith found ſuperior to the hardeſt Trials. In ſpeaking of theſe *Trials*, I ſaid, that the Command to offer *Iſaac* was the *laſt*. "No, "*ſays the Examiner*, that cannot be, for, with Reſpect to a Life to "come, the whole Period of our Exiſtence here, is to be conſidered "as a State of Trial." And ſo again, (ſays he) with Regard to the *Reward*; which you pretend, in the Order of God's Diſpenſations, ſhould follow the Trial: Why? We are to "look after it "in another World."—Holy Scripture records the Hiſtory of one,

* Conſid. p. 152.

to

to whom God only promiſed (in the clear and obvious Senſe) temporal Bleſſings. It records, that theſe temporal Bleſſings were diſpenſed. One Species of which were extraordinary Rewards after extraordinary Trials. In the moſt extraordinary of all, no Reward followed: This was my Difficulty. See here, how he has cleared it up.—I would willingly believe the beſt: Yet the bringing in *a future State* (no more to clearing up the Difficulty than a *future Parliament)* looks ſo very like, what the Logicians call, *Argumentum ad invidiam*, that I don't know whether I ſhall bring the Reader to believe with me. "What ſurprizes me moſt *(ſays he)* is, that you ſhould argue ſo weakly."—*Weakly*, does he ſay? Let him ſpeak out, and rather ſay *wickedly*; which is indeed what he would have the Reader underſtand, though in Tenderneſs he prefers a ſofter Word: For he roundly aſſerts, that *I have argued as if the Reward of good Men had reſpect to this Life only*. I had ſaid, indeed, frequently ſaid, that many good Men had no Reſpect to any other Reward; *but that the Reward of good Men had reſpect to this Life only*, I not only never ſaid, but even abhor the Thoughts of. I muſt therefore call upon my Examiner, for this FOURTH TIME, to prove that I ever argued in that Manner, on Pain of paſſing for a Calumniator.

XV.

But he ſeems to be ſenſible of his bad Argument; whatever might be his Intention in uſing it; and would ſave all by another Fetch: For the weakeſt are ever moſt moſt fruitful in Expedients. "And what *(ſays he)* if, after all this, the Wiſdom of "God ſhould have thought fit, that this very Man, whom he "had ſingled out to be an eminent Example of Piety to all Ge-"nerations, ſhould, at the very Cloſe of his Life, give Evidence "of it, by an Inſtance that exceeded all that had gone before; "that he might be a Pattern of patient Suffering, even unto the "End? Would there not be SENSE in ſuch a Suppoſition * ?"

* Conſid. p. 153.

In Truth, I doubt not, as he has put it: And I will tell him, why. *Abraham* was not a *mere Inſtrument* to ſtand for an Example only, but a *moral Agent* likewiſe; and to be dealt with as ſuch. Now, though, as he ſtands for an *Example*, we may admit of as many *Trials* for *patient Suffering* as our good-natured Examiner thinks fitting; yet, as a *moral Agent*, it is required (as I have proved from the Method of God's dealing with his Servants, recorded in ſacred Hiſtory) that each Trial be attended with ſome Work done, or ſome Reward conferred. But theſe two Circumſtances in *Abraham's* Character, our Examiner perpetually confounds. He ſuppoſes nothing to be done for *Abraham's own Sake*; but every Thing for the *Example's Sake*. Yet, did the good Cauſe of *anſwering* require, he could as eaſily ſuppoſe the contrary. And that I do him no Wrong, I will here give the Reader a remarkable Inſtance of this Dexterity, in the Counter-exerciſe of his Arms. In p. 150, of theſe *Conſiderations*, *(he ſays)* "IT DOES NOT FOLLOW, "that, becauſe a Thing is prefigured, therefore it muſt be ſeen "and underſtood AT THE TIME when it is prefigured." Yet in the Body of the Pamphlet, p. 112, 113, having another Point to puzzle; he ſays (on my obſerving that a future State and Reſurrection were not national Doctrines till the Time of the *Maccabees*) "he knows I will ſay they had theſe Doctrines from the Prophets— "yet the Prophets were dead two hundred Years before."——But if the Prophets were dead, their Writings were extant—"And "what then? is it LIKELY that the Sons ſhould have learnt from "the dead Prophets, what the Fathers could not learn from the "Living?—Why could not the *Jews* learn this Doctrine from "THE VERY FIRST, as well as their Poſterity at the Diſtance "of Ages afterwards." In the firſt Caſe we find he expreſsly ſays, *it does not follow*; in the ſecond, he as plainly ſuppoſes, that *it does*.

XVI.

XVI.

" But there are other Objections beſides this *(he ſays)* to my " Interpretation of the Command: As firſt it doth not *appear* how " *Abraham could* collect from this Tranſaction, that *Chriſt* was to " be offered up as a Sacrifice. I can eaſily underſtand that *Converſe* " may be maintained by *Actions* as well as by *Words*. What you " have ſaid upon that Subject, p. 81 *, *&c.* no doubt is very juſt; " and the Inſtances you have produced from Scripture, where Ac- " tions have been uſed as foreſhewing the Determinations of Pro- " vidence, are beyond all Exception. But whereas you have con- " ſidered the Action of *Abraham* in offering up his Son as a Caſe " parallel to theſe; it differs from them all in a very material Cir- " cumſtance, *viz.* that nothing is here added by Way of *Explana-* " *nation* to *ſhew* the *Import* of it. When *Zedekiah made him horns* " *of Iron*, he ſaid,—THUS *ſhalt thou puſh the* Syrians, 1 *Kings* xxii. " 11. When *Jeremiah* was bid to *take a Linen Girdle* and *hide it* " *in the Hole of a Rock*, *&c.* the Explanation immediately follows:— " *Thus ſaith the Lord*, AFTER THIS MANNER *will I mar the Pride* " *of* Judah, *&c. Jeremiah* xiii. 1—9. And ſo it is in *every* Inſtance " you have produced; which I need not particularly prove becauſe " you have confeſſed it, p. 609 †. And no doubt ſuch Explanations, " attending the Tranſaction, were always neceſſary for the Infor- " mation of the Prophet; becauſe though *Actions* are as expreſſive " of *Ideas* as *Words* are; yet it is on Suppoſition that there is ei- " ther *common Uſe*, or *ſpecial Intimation*, to determine *what* Ideas " *ſuch* or *ſuch* Actions import; otherwiſe nothing can be under- " ſtood. You will not pretend, I ſuppoſe, that by any *common* " *Uſage* of thoſe Times, this Tranſaction was *ſignificative* of the " Sacrifice of *Chriſt*; therefore there muſt have been ſome *ſpecial* " *Intimation* attending the Tranſaction, and determining it to this " Meaning, if it was the Intention of Providence, hereby to give " *Abraham* any ſuch Information; of which ſpecial Intimation ſince

* Ed. 4to. vol. II. p. 405.

† Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 392.

" *nothing appears*, it can *never appear* that any ſuch Information " *was* intended. The Preſumption lies the other Way: Becauſe " if any ſuch Information *had* been intended; it is natural to think " that the *Explanation* would have been *recorded* with the *Tranſ-* " *action*, as it is in all other ſuch like Caſes *." This, indeed, ſtands unequalled, even by himſelf. In *The Divine Legation*, I had ſhewn the Nature of this ſignificative Action here *commanded*;—I had ſhewn how it *agreed*, and how it *differed*, from others of the ſame Kind—I had ſhewn how *Abraham* muſt neceſſarily underſtand the Import of it. Yet here, the Examiner comes over me with an Objection, that implies a profound Ignorance of every thing I had ſaid. I would fain inſtruct him; but if he chuſes rather to be ſhamed; why, every Man to his Taſte. He ſays, I conſider the Information by Action *in the caſe of* Abraham *as parallel* to the Information given to, or by the Prophets *Zedekiah* and *Jeremiah*, for the Inſtruction of the People: " Whereas it differs from them in a very material " Circumſtance; namely, that nothing is here added by Way of " Explanation, to ſhew the Import of it." Hear, now, whether I conſider it as *parallel* or *different*—having ſpoken of thoſe ſignificative Actions done by the Prophets, at God's Command, for the People's Information, I go on thus, *By theſe Actions the Prophets* inſtructed the People *in the Will of God—but where God* TEACHES THE PROPHET, *and, in Compliance to the Cuſtom of that Time, condeſcends to the ſame Mode of Inſtruction, then the ſignificative Action is generally changed into a Viſion, either natural or extraordinary—I ſay generally, but not always. Sometimes, though the Information was* only for the Prophet, *God would* SET HIM UPON *an expreſſive Action, whoſe obvious Meaning conveyed the Intelligence propoſed or ſought* †. I therefore call upon him here again, the **FIFTH TIME**, to prove that I conſidered them as *parallel*; or elſe to make his Retractation. He ſays, " he ſuppoſes, I will not " pretend that, by any common Uſage of thoſe Times, this Tranſ-

* Conſid. p. 153, 154.

† Divine Legation, Vol. II. p. 83, 84. [Vol. II. p. 406, 407, ed. 4to.]

" action

" action was ſignificative of the Sacrifice of *Chriſt*." All that I *pretended to*, I delivered in very plain Terms, in the following Manner. *From the View given of* Abraham's *Hiſtory, we ſee, how all God's Revelations to him, to this laſt* [*of the* Command] *ultimately relate to that myſtic fundamental Promiſe, made to him on his firſt Vocation, that* in him ſhould all Families of the Earth be bleſſed. *God opens the Scheme of his Diſpenſations, by exact and regular Steps—— We ſee, throughout, a gradual Opening and fit Preparation for ſome further Revelation, which—could be no other than that of the Redemption—the Completion of the Whole of God's Oeconomy—But the only remaining one recorded—is the* Command *to offer* Iſaac.—*Now the Happineſs or Redemption of Mankind, promiſed to come through* Abraham, *could not but make him more and more inquiſitive into the Manner of its being brought about, in Proportion as he found himſelf to be more and more perſonally concerned, as the Inſtrument of ſo great a Bleſſing.—We have ſhewn it to be the Cuſtom of Antiquity to inſtruct by Actions as well as Words—that God himſelf, in Compliance to a general Cuſtom, uſed this Way of Information.—Nothing could be conceived more appoſite to convey the Information than this very Action*; ABRAHAM DESIRED EARNESTLY *to be let into the Myſtery of the Redemption, and God, to inſtruct him—ſaid,* Take now thy Son, *&c. The Duration of the Action was the ſame as between* Chriſt's *Death and Reſurrection*, &c *.—Could *Abraham* now, after this, be any more in Doubt, that this Command was to prefigure the Sacrifice of *Chriſt*; than *Ezekiel*, that what he ſaw in the *Chambers of Imagery* was to repreſent the Idolatries of his Countrymen? But our Examiner artfully concealed, that I had, all along, ſuppoſed from the Proofs given, that this Revelation was " made at *Abra-*" *ham's* earneſt Requeſt:" And then aſks, Whether " by any " common Uſage this Tranſaction was ſignificative of the Sacrifice " of *Chriſt*." If not, he ſays, there muſt have been ſome ſpecial " Intimation determining it to this Meaning: Of which, ſince no-

* See Divine Legation, Vol. II. p. 606, & ſeq. [Vol. III. p. 385. ed. 4to.]

" thing

" thing appears, it can never appear that any ſuch Information " was intended. The Preſumption lies the other Way, becauſe if " any ſuch Intimation had been intended, it is natural to think, the " Explanation would have been recorded with the Tranſaction, as " it is in ALL other ſuch like Caſes." Here again, he honeſtly conceals from his Reader, that I had given *two Reaſons*, why the *Explanation was not recorded.* The *one* ariſing from this Species of Information; the other, from the Nature of the Thing informed of. The firſt was, that *the Narrative of ſuch a Converſe by Action was not, in its Nature, ſo intelligible or obvious, as that where God is ſhewn converſing by Action to the Prophets, in the ſeveral Inſtances before given. And the Reaſon is this: Thoſe Informations, as they are given to the Prophets for the Inſtruction of the People, have, neceſſarily, in the Courſe of the Hiſtory, their Explanations annexed. But the Information to* Abraham *being ſolely for his own Uſe, there was no Room for that formal Explanation; which made the commanded Actions, performed by the Prophets, ſo clear and intelligible* *. And, to illuſtrate the Truth of the Obſervation, I gave an Example, in the Relation of *Jacob's wreſtling with the Angel.* Which (like this of the *Command)* was an Information by Action, for *Jacob's* ſole Uſe: And therefore has the ſame Obſcurity, as not having its Explanation annexed. I have ſhewn what that Information was. And will he *ſay*, becauſe the Explanation was not recorded, that this was the Hiſtory of a *ſimple Wreſtling*, as that was of a *commanded human Sacrifice?* Or will he rather chuſe to retract what he *had ſaid*, that where it is an Information by Action, the *Explanation is always recorded in ſuch like Caſes?*

The *ſecond* Reaſon I gave why the Explanation was not recorded, aroſe from the *Nature of the Thing informed of. The Knowledge of God's future Diſpenſation, in the Redemption of Mankind, by the Death of his Son, revealed as a ſingular Favour to the Father of the Faithful, was* (ſay I) *what could, by no Means, be communicated to the* Hebrew

* Divine Legation, Vol. II. p. 611. [Vol. III. p. 392, ed. 4to.]

People,

People, when Moſes *wrote his Hiſtory for their Uſe; becauſe they being then to continue long under a carnal Oeconomy, this Knowledge of the* End of the Law *would have greatly indiſpoſed them to that Diſpenſation with which God, in his infinite Wiſdom, thought fit to exerciſe them*.*"

XVII.

But he has learnt his Trade for nothing. Catch an Anſwerer without his Salvo if you can. You may truſt him to take Care that it ſhall never be ſaid, he had paſſed over, in abſolute Silence, the Anſwer given above; he therefore ſubjoins—" To this you re-
" ply, *that the Information to* Abraham *being ſolely for his own*
" *Uſe, and which could, by no Means, be communicated to the* He-
" brew *People when* Moſes *wrote his Hiſtory; there was no room for*
" *the formal Explanation which made the commanded Actions per-*
" *formed by the Prophets ſo clear and intelligible* †." —To this *(ſays*
" *he)* you reply." To what? To his Objections againſt my Interpretation; which are theſe—" That nothing is added by way of
" Explanation—that this Tranſaction was not, by any common
" Uſage of thoſe Times, ſignificative of the Sacrifice of *Chriſt*—
" that if any ſuch Information had been intended, it is natural to
" think that the Explanation would have been recorded with the
" Tranſaction."—Had he given but a common Attention to what I wrote, he would have ſeen, that the Anſwer, he here quotes from me, was a *Reply* to quite a *different* Thing; namely, *Why the ſacred Writer did not, for the Information of the* Jewiſh *Church, give an Explanation of the ſignificative Action.* In the mean Time, the Reply I made to his three Objections, he ſtill reſerves in profound Silence. I have quoted it above, and it is in Subſtance this, *That where the commanded Action is for the Information of the Prophet only, there no*

* Div. Leg. Vol. II. p. 610. [Vol. III. p. 391, ed. 4to.]
† Coſid. p. 155.

Ex-

Explanation accompanies it.—That the Command being given at Abraham's earneſt Requeſt *to be further acquainted with the Myſtery of the Redemption, he muſt needs ſee* (though the Tranſaction was not, by any common Uſage of thoſe Times, ſignificative of the Sacrifice of *Chriſt) the true and real Import of it.*—I had ſaid, that our Examiner could not have been thus groſly miſtaken had he given a common Attention to what he ſaw written. But the Reader may have Reaſon to ſuſpect ſomething worſe, when he obſerves, that, in quoting this, which he calls my *Reply*, he makes me ſay, that, "as the "Information was given ſolely for *Abraham's* Uſe, there was no "Room for that formal Explanation, WHICH MADE THE COM-"MANDED ACTIONS PERFORMED BY THE PROPHETS SO CLEAR "AND INTELLIGIBLE." Words ſo devoid of all Purpoſe, to the Argument he pretends I was there upon, that, had I uſed them, or any other like them, I ſhould have been aſhamed, after ſuch Impertinence, to have appeared again in Print: Yet we find they were to our Examiner's *Purpoſe* to beſtow upon me; in order to perſuade the Reader, that this was really a *Reply* to his Objections.

But be the *Reply* what you pleaſe, if it will but give him an Opportunity to *anſwer*, to *examine*, to force a Trade, it is enough for him. He goes on, therefore, in this Manner, "But this which "you offer, as a Solution of the Difficulty, is, WITH ME, A NEW "OBJECTION." See here now, do I belye the Man?—"For if the "Knowledge of *Chriſt's* Sacrifice was not to be communicated; to "what Purpoſe was it clearly revealed to *Abraham?* You ſay, "that the *Jews, being to continue long under a carnal Oeconomy*; "*this Knowledge—would have greatly indiſpoſed them to this Diſ-*"*penſation.* But why was it then communicated to *Abraham?* "*For his ſole Uſe* *, you ſay."—Here he aſks me a Queſtion, then quotes my Anſwer to it: And, not liking that, aſks the Queſtion over again; and then makes an Anſwer for it himſelf, which, he thought, he could manage better. For let the Reader take Notice,

* Conſid. p. 155.

that

that the laſt Anſwer is not mine. I had talked very impertinently indeed, had I given it as a Reaſon why the Revelation was made to *Abraham*, and not given to the *Jews*, that it was *for* Abraham's *ſole Uſe*. I had proved, indeed, from *Fact*, that it was *for his ſole Uſe*: But the *Reaſon* I gave, for its not being communicated, was the unfit Circumſtances and Diſpoſition of the *Jewiſh* People to receive it. But what then? this which he calls the *Anſwer* does its Buſineſs; as that which he called the *Reply* had done before it; and ſerves him for a Handle to a NEW OBJECTION.

And thus he proceeds—"What Uſe? Will you be pleaſed to tell "us? Was there any good Uſe that *Abraham* could make of this "Knowledge, which the reſt of the People of God might not have "made of it as well as he? Or if it was unfit for every Body elſe, "was it not unfit for *Abraham* too *?" Amazing! Had not I given it as the Reaſon why it could not be communicated to the *Jewiſh* People, that they were to continue long under a burthenſome carnal Oeconomy; which, this Knowledge would have tempted them to throw off before the appointed Time? And did this Reaſon extend to *Abraham*, who was never under that Oeconomy?

XVIII.

But he goes on—"In ſhort, Sir, I do not underſtand this Doc-"trine (with which your whole Work much abounds) of revealing "Things clearly to Patriarchs, and Prophets, and Leaders, as a "ſpecial Favour to themſelves; but to be kept as a Secret from the "reſt of Mankind."—It is but too plain (as he ſays) "he does not "underſtand it:" For which I can give no better Reaſon than its being *Scripture-Doctrine*; and not that of *Sums* and *Syſtems*. Yet what he cannot *underſtand*, his Client Biſhop *Bull* could, however: who (as he himſelf informs us) aſſerts, "that there were "Arcana in the *Jewiſh* Theology, and conſequently a twofold

* Conſid. p. 155.

" manner of teaching amongſt them; one ſuited to vulgar Appre-
" henſions; the other to thoſe who had made ſome Proficiency in
" Knowledge." *Exam. of Mr.* W's *ſecond Propoſition, p.* 125. So that I aſcribe this rather to a want of *Memory* than want of *Underſtanding*.

" I have been uſed *(ſays he)* to conſider Perſons under this Cha-
" racter, as appointed, not for themſelves, but for others; and
" therefore to conclude that WHATEVER was clearly revealed to
" them, concerning God's Diſpenſations, was ſo revealed, in order
" to be communicated to others *." This is the old hacknied Sophiſm; that, becauſe Perſons act and are employed for *others*; therefore they do nothing, or that nothing is done for *themſelves*. When God ſaid, *Shall I hide from* Abraham *that Thing which I do?* was not this ſaid to, and for himſelf? But he ſinks and flounders unders this falſe Bottom, That *whatever was clearly revealed* to the Prophets, *was ſo revealed, in order to be communicated to others.* Here then a little *Scripture-Doctrine* will do him no Harm. Did *Moſes* (and this is a Caſe in Point) communicate all he knew to the *Jews*, concerning the *Chriſtian Diſpenſation*; which the Author of the *Epiſtle to the* Hebrews tells us was *clearly revealed* to him in the Mount?—*Prieſts* (ſays he) *that offer Gifts according to the Law, who ſerve unto the Example and Shadow of heavenly Things, as* Moſes *was admoniſhed of God when he was about to make the Tabernacle* †. Again, we find that *Ezekiel*, on his being called upon his Miſſion, ſaw, what the Author of *Ecclus* calls *the glorious Viſion*; and had (as appears from the Allegory of the Roll of a Book) a full Interpretation thereof. Yet, notwithſtanding all his Illumination, he was directed by God to ſpeak ſo obſcurely to the People, that he at length found Cauſe to complain, *Ah, Lord, they ſay of me, Doth he not ſpeak Parables* ‡*?* And now let him *aſk* the Prophets with the ſame Pertneſs he is accuſtomed to *examine* me, *Was there any good Uſe you could make of your Knowledge, that the People of God might*

* Conſid. p. 155, 156. † Heb. viii. 4, 5. ‡ Ezek. xx. 49.

not

not have made of it as well as you?—But the ſame Diſpenſation is *alluded* to, and *continued*, under the Kingdom of *Chriſt*—And his Diſciples aſked him ſaying, *What might this Parable be?* And he ſaid, *Unto you it is given to know the Myſteries of the Kingdom of God: But to others, in Parables; that ſeeing they might not ſee, and hearing they might not underſtand* *. And now, Reader, ſhall I claim his Promiſe? "If you can ſhew *(ſays he)* that I am miſtaken in "this, pray do it, and I ſhall be obliged to you †." For, you ſee, I have taken him at his Word. And 'twas well I did; for it was no ſooner out of his Mouth, than, as if he had repented (not of his Candour, but his Confidence) he immediately cries, Hold—and tells me "I might have ſpared myſelf in aſking another Queſtion, "*Why, if Revelations cannot be clearly recorded, are they recorded at all* ‡." But, great *Defender of the Faith—of the ancient* Jewiſh *Church!* I aſked that very *Queſtion*, becauſe the Anſwer to it ſhews how much you *are miſtaken*; as the intelligent Reader, by this Time, eaſily perceives. But why does he ſay I might have ſpared that *Queſtion?* becauſe, "if a Revelation is not clearly given, it cannot "be clearly recorded §." Did I ſay it could? Or will he ſay, that there are no Reaſons why a Revelation, that is clearly given, ſhould be obſcurely recorded? To what Purpoſe then, was the Obſervation made? Made! why to introduce *another*. For, with our *equivocal* Examiner, the *Corruption* of Argument is the *Generation* of Obſervation.—"And yet *(ſays he)* as you intimate, there may be "Reaſons why an OBSCURE REVELATION ſhould be recorded, to "wit, for the Inſtruction of future Ages, when the Obſcurity being "cleared up by the Event, it ſhall appear, that it was foreſeen and "fore-ordained in the Knowledge and Appointment of God ‖."

What I *intimated*, was not concerning an *obſcure Revelation*, but a *Revelation obſcurely recorded*. Theſe are two very different Things, as appears from hence, that the latter may be a *clear Revelation*, the

* Luke viii. 9, 10.
† Conſid. p. 156. ‡ Ibid. § Ibid. ‖ Ibid.

Word being relative to him to whom the Revelation was made; but this is a Peccadillo only. However, he approves the Reaſon of *recording*; for that, thereby, "it ſhall appear, that IT was fore-"ſeen and foreordained by God." IT—what? the *obſcure Revela-tion*, according to grammatical Conſtruction: But, in his *Engliſh*, I ſuppoſe, IT ſtands for the Fact revealed. Well then; from the recording of an obſcure Revelation, he ſays it will appear, when the foretold Fact happens, that it was foreſeen and preordained by God. This too he tells the Reader I *intimated*; but, if the Reader will take my Word, I never intimated any thing ſo fooliſh. For every Fact, whether prefigured and foretold, or not prefigured and foretold, muſt needs have been foreſeen and preordained by God. Now, whether we are to attribute this to *Exactneſs*, or to *Inaccu-racy* of Expreſſion, is hard to ſay. If to the former, it is to be conſidered as one of his Arts, to get to a Conſequence which he immediately afterwards endeavours to deduce from it; which is, "that, as well on his Senſe of the Command, as on mine, a De-"pendency between the two Diſpenſations may be deduced." And it is certain, that if that Dependency ariſes from God's Foreknow-ledge of the Fact, he is much in the right; but that will be ſeen by and by. On the other hand, if it be an *Inaccuracy*, as I am rather inclined to think; then it is plain he muſt mean *ſomething elſe*; and that *ſomething* might, perhaps, be this; that, from ſuch a *Record*, a real Connexion might be proved between the Old and New Teſtament, ariſing from the EVIDENCE that God, in this commanded Action, did INTEND to prefigure the Sacrifice of *Chriſt*. —Juſt before, he had ſaid, "he deſired not to be miſtaken *." But this, let me tell him, is an unreaſonable Requeſt, unleſs he *deſired* too to be *underſtood*. And that he deſires not this, is evident from his perpetual Equivocations. However, we preſume, we have here inſinuated ourſelves into his Meaning. But if the Reader now ſhould aſk how this makes for the point to be proved, namely, that

* Conſid. p. 156.

"I might

"I might have ſpared myſelf in aſking the Queſtion, *Why, if Reve-*
" *lations cannot be* clearly *recorded, are they recorded* at all?" I muſt tell him, and let him not be ſurpriſed, that it was not deſigned to have any thing to do with the Point to be proved, at all; but only to *produce* or give Birth to another OBSERVATION; begot, as he well expreſſes it, UPON the foregoing putrid Argumentation.— "UPON this Principle *(ſays he)* you muſt give me leave to OBSERVE, " that the Tranſaction in Queſtion will have the ſame Efficacy to " ſhew *the Dependency between the two Diſpenſations.* Whether " *Abraham* had thereby any Information of the Sacrifice of *Chriſt* or " not *." This, indeed, is ſaying ſomething. And, could he prove it, would be depriving my Interpretation of one of its principal Uſes. Let us ſee then how he goes about it. "FOR this " does not ariſe from *Abraham's* KNOWLEDGE, or any body's " KNOWLEDGE, at the Time when the Tranſaction happened, but " from the Similitude and Correſpondency between the Event and " the Tranſaction, by which it was prefigured; which is exactly " the ſame upon either Suppoſition †." To this I anſwer and ſay, 1. That I myſelf never ſuppoſed that the Dependency between the two Diſpenſations did "ariſe from *Abraham's* Knowledge, or any " body's Knowledge," at that or any other *Time*; but from GOD's INTENTION that this commanded Action ſhould import or repreſent the Sacrifice of *Chriſt:* And then comes in the Queſtion whether that *Intention* be beſt diſcovered from God's Declaration of it to *Abraham*, or from a Similitude and Correſpondency between this commanded Action and the Sacrifice of *Chriſt*. Therefore, 2. I anſwer and ſay, that a SIMILITUDE and CORRESPONDENCY *between the Event and the Tranſaction which prefigured it*, is not enough to ſhew this DEPENDENCY to the Satisfaction of Unbelievers: Who ſay, that a Likeneſs between two Things of the ſame Nature; ſuch as the offering up two Men to Death, though in different Ways, and tranſacted in two very diſtant Periods, is not ſufficient alone to

* Conſid. p. 156. † Ibid. p. 156, 157.

ſhew

ſhew that they had any Relation to one another *. With the ſame Reaſon they will ſay, you might pretend that *Jephtha's* Daughter, or the King of *Moab's* Son, whom the Father ſacrificed on the Wall †, were the Types of *Chriſt's* Sacrifice. Give us, ſay they, a Bible-Proof that God declared or revealed his Intention of prefiguring the Death of *Jeſus*; or ſome better Authority at leaſt than a modern Typifier, who deals only in *Similitudes* and *Correſpondences*. Now whether it be our Examiner, or I, who have given them this Satisfaction, or whether they have any Reaſon to require it of us, is left to the impartial Reader to conſider.

XIX.

We now come to the UTILITY of my Interpretation of the Command, having got through all his Objections to its TRUTH. And here, the ſame Civility and Candour which ſo poliſhed and enlivened the foregoing Part, ſhine out again, in the very firſt Words of this. "And now, Sir *(ſays he)* give me Leave to aſk, what "Service have you done to Religion by your Interpretation? We "were prepared for it, p. 84. by an Intimation that ſomething was "to ariſe from it *to the Confuſion of Infidelity*: As how? why firſt, "as by your Manner of explaining this Tranſaction of *Abraham*, you "ſhould *illuſtrate God's Truth by the nobleſt Inſtance that ever was "given of the Harmony between the Old and New Teſtament.*" And 2dly, "as *by its Aid you ſhould be enabled to give the true Solution of "thoſe inexplicable Difficulties which have been ſo long the Stumbling-Block of Infidelity* ‡."

And now he addreſſes himſelf to ſhew, that my Interpretation has neither of theſe Advantages. "Firſt, as to the Harmony *(he ſays)* "he has juſt above ſhewn that the Tranſaction will be equally "prophetic of *Chriſt's* Sacrifice, whether my Interpretation be ad-

* See what the Letter-Writer abovementioned ſays, p. 53, 54. much to the ſame Purpoſe.

† 2 Kings iii. 27. ‡ Confid. p. 157.

"mitted

" mitted or not *." He hath ſhewn it indeed! as the *Iriſhman* ſhewed his——. And it is freſh in the Reader's Memory. Come we, then, to the ſecond. "As to the ſecond *(ſays he)* the *Difficul-*
" *ties* which have been ſo long the Stumbling-block of Infidelity,
" which upon the Foot of the common Interpretation you call *in-*
" *ſuperable*; I greatly marvel that you ſhould call them ſo, when
" you acknowledge, in the very ſame Page, that *the Arguments*
" *hitherto brought to ſupport the Hiſtory of this Command are of great*
" *Weight and Validity* †." He *marvels!* Why let him marvel. I ſuppoſe he never heard that there are *inſuperable Difficulties* even to ſome demonſtrable Propoſitions. But he, of all Men, ſhould have accepted my Conceſſion upon fair Terms, ſince it was made to humour Divines like himſelf; who think it enough for Religion if the Objections to it be, as he warily expreſſes it, GUARDED AGAINST ‡: Which, God knows! they often are, by Arguments of no *great Weight or Validity*.

XX.

However *(ſays he)* "whether you had owned this or not, I
" SHOULD HAVE TAKEN UPON MYSELF THE PROOF that theſe in-
" ſuperable Difficulties may be very effectually and ſubſtantially re-
" moved, without borrowing any Aid from your Interpretation.
" The Subſtance of the Objection to the hiſtoric Truth of this Re-
" lation, as collected by yourſelf, p. 614 §, is this, *That God could*
" *never give ſuch a Command to* Abraham, *becauſe it would throw*
" *him into inextricable Doubts concerning the Author of it; as whether*
" *it proceeded from a good or evil Being*—[*becauſe*] *it would miſlead*
" *him in his Notions of the Divine Attributes, and of the fundamental*
" *Principles of Morality. For though the revoking the Command pre-*
" *vented the Homicide; yet the Action being commanded, and, at the*
" *Revocation, not condemned*; Abraham *and his Family muſt needs*

* Conſid. p. 157. † Ibid. p. 157, 158. ‡ Ibid. p. 137.
§ Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 397.

" *have*

" *have thought human Sacrifices grateful to the Almighty. For a ſim-*
" *ple revoking was no Condemnation; but would be more naturally*
" *eſteemed a peculiar Indulgence for ready Obedience. Thus the* Pagan
" *Fable of* Diana's *ſubſtituting a Hind in the Place of* Iphigenia, *did*
" *not make Idolaters believe that ſhe therefore abhorred human Sacri-*
" *fices, they having before been perſuaded of the contrary* *." The Objection, the Reader ſees, conſiſts of two Parts: The *one*, that *Abraham* muſt doubt of the Author of the Command: The *other*, that he would be miſled concerning his Attributes; or in the Gratefulneſs of human Sacrifices to him.

To the *firſt*, our Examiner anſwers †, partly from what I myſelf had obſerved might be urged by Believers, as of *great Weight and Validity*, and partly from what he had picked up elſewhere. But here I ſhall avoid imitating his Example, in endeavouring to ſhew the Invalidity of Arguments profeſſedly brought in Support of Religion: An Employment by no Means becoming a Chriſtian Divine. If they have any weak Parts, I ſhall leave them to Unbelievers to find out. I have the more Reaſon too to truſt them to their own *Weight*, both as they are none of his, with whom only I have here to do, and as I have acknowledged their *Validity*. All I ſhall obſerve is, that, as I had made that Acknowledgment, I ſee not to what End they are urged againſt me; unleſs it were to entertain us with his Common-Place: Which I ſhould have received in Silence, had he not affected to introduce it with ſo much Pomp——
" Whether you had owned this or not *(ſays he)* I ſhould have taken
" upon myſelf the Proof." Whereas, all that he has *taken* is the Property of others: Made his *own*, indeed, by a weak and an imperfect Repreſentation.

But now he comes to the *ſecond* Part of the Objection. " As to
" the latter Part of the Objection *(ſays he)* that from this Com-
" mand, *Abraham* and his Family muſt needs have thought hu-
" man Sacrifices acceptable to God; the revoking the Command at

* Conſid. p. 158. † Ibid. p. 159, 160.

" laſt,

" laſt, was a ſufficient Guard againſt any ſuch Conſtruction. To " this you make the Unbeliever anſwer: No; becauſe the Action " having been *commanded* ought to have been *condemned*; and a " ſimple *Revocation* was no *Condemnation.* But why was not the " Revocation of the Command, in this Caſe, a Condemnation of " the Action? If I ſhould tempt you to go and kill your next " Neighbour, and afterwards come and deſire you *not* to do it; " would not this *After-declaration* be as good an Evidence of my " Diſlike to the Action, as the firſt was of my Approbation of it? " Yes, and a *much better*, as it may be preſumed to have been the " Reſult of *maturer* Deliberation. Now though *Deliberation* and " *After-thought* are not incident to God; yet as God in this Caſe " condeſcended (as you ſay, and very truly) to act after the *Man-* " *ner* of Men; the ſame *Conſtruction* ſhould be put upon his Actions, " as are uſually put upon the Actions of *Men* in like Caſes *." Now, though, as was ſaid above, I would pay all decent Regard and Reference that becomes a Friend of Revelation, to the common Arguments of *others* in its Defence, yet I muſt not betray my *own.* I confeſſed they had great *Weight and Validity*; yet, at the ſame Time, I aſſerted, they were attended with *inſuperable Difficulties.* And while I ſo think, I muſt beg Leave to inforce my Reaſons for this Opinion. And, I hope, without Offence; as the Arguments, I am now about to examine, are purely this Writer's own. And the Reader has, by this Time, ſeen too much of him to be apprehenſive, that the leſſening his Authority will be attended with any great Diſſervice to Religion.

I had obſerved, that the Reaſonings of Unbelievers on this Caſe, as it is commonly explained, were not devoid of all Plauſibility, when they proceeded thus—That as *Abraham* lived amongſt Heathens, whoſe higheſt Act of Divine Worſhip was Human Sacrifice; if God had commanded that Act, and, on the point of Performance, only remitted it as a Favour (and ſo it is repreſented);

* Conſid. p. 160, 161.

without declaring the Iniquity of the Practice, when addreſſed to Idols; or his Abhorrence of it, when directed to himſelf; the Family muſt have been miſled in their Ideas concerning the moral Rectitude of that Species of Religious Worſhip: Therefore, God, in theſe Circumſtances, had he commanded the Action as a *Trial only*, would have explicitly condemned that Mode as immoral. But He is not repreſented as condemning, but as remitting it in *Favour:* Conſequently, ſay the Unbelievers, God did not command the Action at all.—Now what ſays our Examiner, in *anſwer* to all this? He ſays,—"But why? Was not the Revocation of the Command "a Condemnation of the Action? If I ſhould tempt you to go and "kill your next Neighbour, and afterwards come and DESIRE you "not to do it, would not this After-declaration be as good an Evi-"dence of my Diſlike to the Action, as the firſt was of my Appro-"bation of it?" To this I reply; That the Caſes are, by no means, parallel; either in themſelves, or in their Circumſtances: 1ſt, Not *in themſelves.* The Murder of our next Neighbour was, amongſt all the Gentiles of that time, eſteemed a high Immorality; but, on the contrary, human Sacrifices a very holy and acceptable Part of Divine Worſhip. 2dly, Not in *their Circumſtances.* The *Deſire* to forbear the Murder tempted to is (in the Caſe *he* puts) repreſented as *Repentance:* Whereas the Stop put to the Sacrifice of *Iſaac* is (in the Caſe *Moſes* puts) repreſented as *Favour.*

But what follows I could wiſh (for the Honour of modern Theology) that the Method I have obſerved would have permitted me to paſs over in Silence. "Now, though Deliberation and After-"thought *(ſays he)* are not incident to God, yet, as God, in this "Caſe, condeſcended (as you ſay, and very truly) to act after the "Manner of Men; the ſame Conſtruction ſhould be put upon "his Actions, as are uſually put upon the Actions of Men in like "Caſes *:" *i. e.* though *Deliberation* and *After-thought* are not incident to God; yet you are to underſtand his Actions, as if they

* Conſid. p. 155, 156.

were

were incident. A horrid Interpretation! And yet his Repreſentation of the Command and his decent Illuſtration of it, by a *Murderer in Intention*, will not ſuffer us to interpret it in any other Manner. For God, as if in Haſte, and before due Deliberation, is repreſented as commanding an immoral Action; yet again, as it were by an *After-thought*, ordering it to be foreborn, by reaſon of its Immorality. And in what is all this impious Jargon founded? If you will believe our Examiner; on the Principle I laid down, *That God condeſcends to act after the Manner of Men.* I have all along had Occaſion to complain of his miſrepreſenting my *Principles.* But they were Principles he *diſliked.* And this the modern Management of Controverſy has ſanctified. But here, though the Principle be approved, he yet cannot forbear miſrepreſenting it. So bad a Thing is an evil Habit. Let me tell him therefore, that by the Principle of *God's condeſcending to act after the Manner of Men*, is not meant, that he ever acts in Compliance to thoſe Vices and Superſtitions, which ariſe from the Depravity of human *Will*: But in Conformity only to Men's indifferent Manners and Cuſtoms; and to thoſe Uſages which reſult only from the finite Imperfections of their Nature. Thus though, as in the Caſe before us, God was pleaſed, in Conformity to their Mode of Information, to uſe their Cuſtom of revoking a Command; yet he never condeſcended to imitate (as our Examiner ſuppoſes) the Irreſolution, the Repentance, and Horrors of Conſcience of a *Murderer in Intention.* Which (gracious Heaven!) is the Parallel this Divine brings to illuſtrate the Command to *Abraham.* But he had read that God is ſometimes ſaid to *repent*; and he thought, I ſuppoſe, it anſwered to that Repentance which the Stings of Conſcience ſometimes produce in bad Men. Whereas it is ſaid, in Conformity to a good Magiſtrate's or Parent's Correction of Vice, firſt to threaten Puniſhment; and then, on the Offender's Amendment, to remit it.

XXI.

But he goes on without any Signs of Remorſe. "Nor will the "Pagan Fable of *Diana's* ſubſtituting a Hind in the Place of *Iphige-* "*nia* at all help your Unbeliever. This did not, ſay they, OR "YOU FOR THEM, make Idolaters believe that ſhe therefore ab- "horred human Sacrifices. But do not they themſelves, or have "not you aſſigned a very proper and ſufficient Reaſon why it did, "*viz.* that they had been *before perſuaded of the contrary?* Where "human Sacrifices make a Part of the ſettled ſtanding Religion; "the Refuſal to accept a human Sacrifice in one Inſtance may, "indeed, be rather looked upon as a particular Indulgence, than as "a Declaration againſt the Thing in groſs. But where the Thing "was commanded but in one ſingle Inſtance, and the Command "revoked in that very Inſtance (which is our preſent Caſe), "ſuch Revocation in all reaſonable Conſtruction is as effectual a "Condemnation of the Thing, as if God had told *Abraham*, in ſo "many Words, that he delighted not in human Sacrifices *." To come to our Examiner's half-buried Senſe, we are often obliged to remove, or at leaſt to ſift well, the Rubbiſh of his Words. He ſays, the *Revocation* was an *effectual Condemnation*. This may either ſignify, that *Men now* free from the Prejudices of Pagan Superſtition may ſee that human Sacrifices were condemned by the Revocation of the Command: Or, that *Abraham's Family* could ſee this. In the firſt Senſe, I have nothing to do with his Propoſition; and in the ſecond, I ſhall take the liberty to deny it was an *effectual Condemnation*. With how good Reaſon let the Reader judge.

Abraham, for the great Ends of God's Providence, was called out of an idolatrous City, infected, as all ſuch Cities then were, with this horrid Superſtition. He was himſelf an Idolater, as appears from the Words of *Joſhua—Your Fathers dwelt on the other ſide of*

* Conſid. p. 161.

the

the Flood in old Time, even Terah *the Father of* Abraham, *and the Father of* Nachor: *and* THEY *ſerved other Gods. And I took your Father* Abraham *, &c. God, in the Act of calling him, inſtructed him in the Unity of his Nature, and the Error of Polytheiſm: as the great Principle, for the ſake of which (and to preſerve it in one Family amidſt an univerſal Overflow of Idolatry) he was called out. That he muſt be prejudiced in favour of his Country Superſtitions, is not to be doubted; becauſe it is of human Nature itſelf to be ſo: And yet we find no particular Inſtruction given him, concerning the Superſtition in queſtion. Further, the noble Author of the *Characteriſtics* obſerves, that "it appears that he was under no extreme Surpriſe on this trying Revelation; nor did he think of expoſtulating in the leaſt on this occaſion; when at another time he could be ſo importunate for the Pardon of an inhoſpitable, murderous, impious, and inceſtuous City †." Inſinuating hereby, that this kind of Sacrifice was a thing he had been accuſtomed to: Now the noble Author obſerves this, upon the *Examiner's*, that is, the *common* Interpretation. And I believe, on that footing, he, or a better Writer, would find it difficult to enervate the Obſervation. Whereas I have ſhewn (in the Place from whence I have here quoted it) that it falls together with *that* Interpretation.

Well; *Abraham* is now in the Land of *Canaan*; and again ſurrounded with the ſame idolatrous and inhumane Sacrificers. Here he receives the Command: And, on the point of Performance, has it countermanded as a FAVOUR. A Circumſtance, in the Revocation, which I muſt beg the Examiner's leave to inſiſt upon; eſpecially when I find him ſo ſlippery as, at every turn, to forget it; that is, to paſs it over in ſilence, without either owning or denying. As indeed, the little Support his general Argument has, in any place, is only by keeping Truth out of ſight. But further, the *Favour* was *unaccompanied* with any Inſtruction concerning the

* Joſh. xxiv. 2, 3.

† Divine Legat. Vol. II. p. 624. Note [m] [Vol. III. p. 403. 567. Ed. 4to.]

moral

moral Nature of this kind of Sacrifice; a Practice never positively forbidden but by the Law of *Moſes*. Now, in this caſe, I would aſk any candid Reader, the leaſt acquainted with human Nature, whether *Abraham* and his Family, prejudiced as they were in favour of human Sacrifices; (the one, by his Education in his Country Religion; the other, by their Communication with their Pagan Neighbours, and, as appears by Scripture, but too apt to fall into Idolatry) would not be naturally tempted to think as favourably of human Sacrifices as thoſe Pagans were, who underſtood that *Diana* required *Iphigenia*; though ſhe accepred a Hind in her ſtead. And with ſuch Readers, I, finally, leave it.

XXII.

Our Examiner having now ſhewn, firſt, That my Interpretation is not founded in *Truth*. Secondly, That it is productive of no *Utility*: He comes, in good time, to the third and laſt Part of his *Herculean* Labour, to ſhew, that it makes *matters worſe than I found them*: Which, in other Words, we ſhall find, will amount to this —That the *common* Interpretation agrees with *his Syſtem*; but that *mine* does not: which *Syſtem*, by the known Courteſy of Controverſy, you are to permit him to call the *Word of God*.

"This, Sir *(ſays he)* is the Subſtance of what has been or may "be offered, in Anſwer to the Objections propounded upon the "common foot of Interpretation. Let us now ſee what *your* In- "terpretation affords that is better. You ſay then; That *the Com-* "*mand could occaſion no Miſtakes concerning the divine Attributes, be-* "*cauſe it was only the Conveyance of an Information by Action inſtead* "*of Words; in Conformity to the common Mode of converſing in early* "*Times. This Action therefore being mere* Scenery, *and, like Words,* "*only of arbitrary Signification; it had no* moral Import; *but the* "*Formality of that Action, which has no moral Import, is ſeen no* "*way to affect the moral Character of the Author.*—All this, Sir, is "admitted."

" admitted." Very well, proceed. " In your way of reckoning, " the Command had no moral Import; for nothing was intended " to be done to *Abraham's* Hurt or Prejudice; who, as you tell us, " very well *underſtood—how the ſcenical Repreſentation was to end*;— " *and muſt needs conclude—either that God would ſtop his Hand when* " *he came to give the ſacrificing Stroke*; *or that—his Son, ſacrificed* " *in the Perſon of* Chriſt, *was* IMMEDIATELY *to be reſtored to Life.* " This Solution, no doubt, clears up every thing as to *Abraham*; " and conſequently removes *one* Part of the Objection, which ſays; " that God could not give ſuch a Command, becauſe it inferred a " Violation of the natural Law *."

Here certainly I can complain of nothing but my ill Fortune. This is the firſt time the Examiner has pleaſed to own that I *have* removed an Objection. And now, inſtead of rejoicing in the Honour he does me, I have a Scruple of Conſcience about accepting it. And my Caſe is this. He ſays I have *removed* it upon this Principle of mine, *that the Command had no moral Import.* But alas! in croſſing the Proverb, and *looking*, as it were, *into his Mouth*, (for there his Words have their birth, and not from his *Heart*) I find he foully miſtakes the Meaning of the *Principle*; and, what is worſe, ſeems to give his own wrong Meaning to me. " In YOUR " way of reckoning, the Command had no moral Import; FOR no- " thing was intended to be done to *Abraham's* Hurt or Prejudice." But as near as he thinks himſelf to me, he is a Mile from the Reaſon. The Reaſon why I ſay it had no moral Import, was, not becauſe *nothing was done to* Abraham's *Hurt or Prejudice*; Alas! No: but becauſe the Act commanded was, both in the *Intention* of God, and in the *Knowledge* of *Abraham*, a mere *ſcenical Repreſentation*, and not a *Religious Sacrifice*: For that a *ſcenical* Repreſentation has nothing of that *moral Import* which belongs to the *thing* repreſented. Let the Gift, then, go current or not, juſt as the Reader pleaſes. I find I have little Reaſon to be anxious about its

* Conſid. p. 161, 162.

Value,

Value, and leſs to be proud of the Honour: For he immediately ſubjoins, "But as this Solution removes one Difficulty, it creates "another." What, another in favour of Infidelity! No. But concerning *Abraham's Merit in Obedience*. Yet his Purpoſe is here to ſhew, that *my Interpretation* can do nothing againſt an infidel *Objection*; which, were it not for *his Anſwers*, that, as he well expreſſes it, ſtand *guard* over them, might run nobody knows whither. So that ſtill, by his own Confeſſion, my Interpretation has removed one of the ſtrongeſt Infidel Objections. However, as I would not before accept this Honour at the Expence of Truth; ſo neither will I now at the Expence of *Abraham's* Character. Let us enquire, therefore, into this new-created Difficulty. "It is *(ſays he)* "that the Command will not ſtand with the Notion of a Trial, in "*one* Point, in which the Hiſtory itſelf intimates it was intended as "ſuch. You tell us; that *Abraham, in expreſſing his extreme Rea-* "*dineſs to obey, declared a full Confidence in the Promiſes of God*; "which is very true. But you ſay nothing of his *Virtue, i. e.* of "his *Patience* and *Self-denial*; of which yet this Command was in-"tended as a Trial. The very Words of the Command ſhew "this. *Take now thy Son, thine* ONLY *Son* Iſaac, WHOM THOU "LOVEST. Here are two things pointed at, as ſtanding in the "Way to hinder *Abraham* from obeying this Command. 1. The "Aſſurances which God had given him, that *Iſaac* ſhould be the "Heir of the Promiſes; for *Iſaac* was *Abraham's* ONLY Son, not "by *Birth* but by *Promiſe*. 2. His *natural paternal* Affection. The "firſt difficulty his *Faith* was to remove; the *ſecond* was to be con-"quered by his *Reſolution* and *Fortitude*. But where, I aſk, was "*Abraham's Reſolution*; if he knew, either that God would not "ſuffer the Command to be put in Execution; or if he did, that "he ſhould *inſtantly* be reſtored to him? *Reſolution* is ſhewed by "bearing *hard* Things; but on neither of theſe Suppoſitions "had *Abraham* any Thing in Expectation, by which he could be "a Sufferer *." And now we ſee how *willingly* he was miſled,

* Conſid. p. 163.

when

when he miſtook my Reaſon, why the Action had no moral Import; and ſaying, it was becauſe nothing was intended to be *done to* Abraham's *Hurt or Prejudice*. For it was preparatory to what he here undertakes to ſhew, that, according to my Interpretation, *Abraham* had no room to exerciſe his paternal Affection; that being what he drives at by all his round-about Words. But to proceed. He ſays, "You tell us that *Abraham*, in expreſſing his extreme "Readineſs to obey, declared a full Confidence in the Promiſes of "God. But you ſay nothing of his Virtue; *i. e.* of his PATIENCE "and SELF-DENIAL, of WHICH THIS COMMAND WAS INTENDED "AS A TRIAL." He ſays very true I ſaid nothing of it, and the Reaſon was (not that I thought he had them not, but) becauſe Holy Scripture *ſays nothing of them* *. But he tells me, though Scripture *ſaid nothing*, it *pointed* to them. And ſo did I, if he goes to that. Indeed, I neither *ſaid* nor *pointed at* any thing ſo abſurd, as that *the Command was intended as a Trial of his Patience and Self-denial*, becauſe Scripture repreſents it as a Trial of his Faith only. BY FAITH ABRAHAM WHEN HE WAS TRIED *offered up Iſaac*, ſays the Author of the *Epiſtle to the Hebrews*. But I won't promiſe what I ſhall not do for the future. I think it deſerves to be *pointed at*. But he ſays I ſpeak of *Abraham's Faith*, and ſay nothing of his *Virtue*. It is commonly ſaid, indeed, that *Patience is a Virtue*; but it is as true that *Faith* is one alſo. Though he may be in the number of thoſe ſubtile Schoolmen the Poet ſpeaks of, for aught I know,

"Who *Faith* and *Virtue*, Senſe and Reaſon ſplit,
With all the raſh Dexterity of Wit."

Yet, for all this, I own, that the great *Merit* of *Abraham's Faith* implied in it *Patience* and *Self-denial*. Let us hear then how I have leſſened theſe Virtues. Why then "hear *(ſays our Examiner)* what "the Author of the Epiſtle to the *Hebrews* ſays; who beſt un-

* See what the Letter-Writer has very pertinently replied to this Purpoſe, p. 72.

" derſtood this Matter. *By Faith*, Abraham *when he was tried*,
" *offered up* Iſaac; *and he that had received the Promiſes, offered up*
" *his only begotten Son*; *of whom it was ſaid, that in* Iſaac *ſhall thy*
" *Seed be called*; *accounting, that God was able to raiſe him up even*
" *from the Dead.* Heb. xi. 17, 18, 19. It is in the Nature of
" the Thing, neceſſary to be ſuppoſed; that *Abraham* was firmly
" perſuaded, *either*, that God would revoke the Command; *or*,
" that he would raiſe up his Son from the Dead; for otherwiſe
" the Promiſe could never ſtand. The Apoſtle tells you *preciſely*,
" which of theſe he believed; *viz.* that it was, that God would
" raiſe *Iſaac* from the dead. And this agrees with the Character
" that the Scripture gives of *Abraham's* Faith; his believing
" AGAINST HOPE, *i. e.* againſt all the Appearances or Probabilities
" of human Things. When *Iſaac* was born, he received him *from*
" *the dead*; *i. e.* from *a dead Womb.* Suppoſing him ſlain, he be-
" lieved that he ſhould again receive him *from the dead*; and this
" again was believing AGAINST HOPE; for one was as much againſt
" the natural Courſe of Things, as the other, But pray obſerve
" this, Sir; the Apoſtle does not ſay, that *Abraham* accounted that
" God would raiſe his Son INSTANTLY. He might (for aught
" *Abraham* knew, or had any Reaſon to hope to the contrary) be
" FOR EVER loſt TO HIM; though he was aſſured he could not be
" ſo loſt as that the Promiſe of God ſhould fail; upon which Foot,
" there will be room left for all that Diſturbance from Paſſion and
" natural Affection, which every Father feels upon the loſs of a
" beloved Child; and conſequently, Matter left for the Exerciſe
" of his Virtue. It ſuits beſt indeed, with your Hypotheſis, to
" ſay, that *Abraham* believed that his Son ſhould be raiſed IN-
" STANTLY. For if this whole Tranſaction was a ſcenical Re-
" preſentation, to inform *Abraham* of the Sacrifice of *Chriſt*; and
" if this (as you ſay, *p.* 612 *) was the *principal Deſign of the Com-*
" *mand*; the *Information* once given, the *Scenery* ought to be at an
" End. And this is one Reaſon, among others, why I cannot

* Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 395.

" believe

" believe your Account to be the true one; becauſe it deſtroys " the Force and Virtue of the Command, conſidered as a Trial of " *Abraham's Reſolution* and *Self-denial*; which nevertheleſs, the " very Hiſtory plainly intimates to us, it was intended to be *." But now when I thought he was going to prove that *Abraham* had theſe Virtues of *Patience* and *Self-Denial*, he is got upon quite another Scent; and has ſtarted two other Virtues, his *Reſolution* and his *Fortitude*.—" The firſt Difficulty his Faith was to remove; the " ſecond was to be conquered by his RESOLUTION and FORTI- " TUDE." But what muſt be *my Difficulty* all this while, who have to do with ſuch a Writer! Shall I examine what he ſays to *Abraham's Patience and Self-denial?* Come on then. But now they are of a ſudden turned to *Reſolution* and *Fortitude?* Shall I ſeize upon his *Reſolution* and *Fortitude?* In vain. Before he gets to the End of his Argument, they are changed into *Reſolution* and *Self-denial*. " The Command *(he ſays)* is to be conſidered as a Trial " of *Abraham's* RESOLUTION and SELF-DENIAL." And ſo the two Pair of Virtues, *Patience* and *Self-denial*, and *Reſolution* and *Fortitude*, have fairly compromiſed the matter. And at laſt it is agreed, as in a Whig and Tory Election, that *Reſolution* and *Self-denial* ſhall ſtand each for the other's Repreſentative. Matters therefore being now well ſettled, here we ſhall leave them. For there is the ſame Reverence due to the *Nonſenſe* of great Writers, as the honeſt Tranſlator of *Salluſt* has taught us to be due to the *Corruption* of great Miniſters. Therefore, what he ſays of this latter Quality may not be unfitly applied to the former, that " what ſounds like Nonſenſe may not be Nonſenſe: and it is not " ſo much the Act, as the Characters of Men that conſtitute it †." —But as I can make nothing of his Words, I will try to pick out

* Conſiderations, p. 163—5.

† " What ſounds like Corruption may not be Corruption; and it is not ſo much " the Act, as the Characters of Men that conſtitute it." Gord. Tranſl. of Sall. Pol. Diſc. p. 97.

his Meaning; which, after all, ſeems to accuſe me of leaving *Abraham* neither *Patience* nor *Self-denial:* And is founded in this, that, according to the common Interpretation, as *Abraham* did *not know when Iſaac* would be reſtored to him, "there was room left for all "that Diſturbance from Paſſion and natural Affection, which every "Father feels upon the loſs of a beloved Child; and conſequently "Exerciſe for his Virtue." But on my Interpretation (that *Abraham* knew his Son muſt be *ſoon reſtored* to him) there was no room, it ſeems, for the Exerciſe of theſe Virtues. And now, what is here worth anſwering? In both Caſes *Abraham's Faith* had the ſame Trial. And this is allowed. And had not his *Paternal Affection?* In neither caſe did he know, but that his Son was to receive the ſacrificing ſtroke. And was not the Paternal Affection, as much intereſted in receiving him to Life after three Days, as after three Years? Suppoſing, (as is granted) that his *Faith* in God's Promiſes was exactly the ſame in both Caſes. How then does the Reader think our Examiner ſupports his Chicane? How? but in that way all Chicane is ſupported. By repreſenting *both Caſes* falſely. Under the common Interpretation, he repreſents it thus,—"*Iſaac* might (for aught *Abraham* knew, or had any Rea-"ſon to hope to the contrary) be FOR EVER LOST TO HIM." And he tells me, "it ſuits beſt with my Hypotheſis, to ſay that *Abra-*"*ham* believed that his Son ſhould be raiſed INSTANTLY *." I know of nothing that *ſuits* ſo well *with my Hypotheſis* as Truth; nor nothing ſo ill with it, as our Examiner's Underſtanding. What ſhall I ſay! Or rather what ſhall I not ſay. O *Patience!* I feel thou art a *Virtue*, as our Examiner truly calls thee?—What? do not thoſe very Words of Scripture, of which the Examiner ſerves himſelf in ſupport of the common Interpretation, *accounting that God was able to raiſe him up even from the Dead*, imply, in all common Conſtruction, that *Abraham accounted*, or believed, or had

* Conſid. p. 164, 165.

Reaſon

Reaſon to hope, that *Iſaac* was NOT FOR EVER LOST TO HIM? But it could not be otherwiſe even upon our Examiner's own Interpretation, who in p. 148, makes the *receiving from the Dead* an Alluſion to the dead Womb of *Sarah*; For, according to this Senſe, which, he tells us, he *prefers* to any other, the Writer of the *Epiſtle to the Hebrews* could never ſuppoſe (whatever our Examiner does) that *Abraham* might fear that *Iſaac* would be *for ever loſt to him*. For the Argument, according to his Conception of the Apoſtle's Senſe, runs thus,—*Abraham* received *Iſaac* out of *Sarah's* dead Womb; ſo he hoped to receive him again from the Aſhes of the Sacrifice. Thus does this Examiner, at every turn, forget his own Principles: or, rather, having no Principles of his own, he perceives not that he takes the contradictory Principles of others. Again, does not my Interpretation, which ſuppoſes that *Abraham* well underſtood that this commanded Action was a ſcenical Repreſentation of *Chriſt's* Sacrifice on the Croſs, neceſſarily imply that *Abraham* knew no more than that, as the Redeemer of Mankind could not lie under the Power of the Grave; ſo, his Repreſentative, even though he received the ſacrificing Stroke, would not? Should he, therefore, have ſo prevaricated as to inſinuate, that I uſed the Word *inſtantly* in the Senſe of momentaneouſly; when my Argument ſhews I uſed it in oppoſition to a diſtant Time? If the Stroke had been given, we know, it could not have been till the third Day at leaſt. And in this time I hope there was "room "enough left for all that Diſturbance from Paſſion and natural "Affection which every Father feels upon the Loſs of a beloved "Child *."

After all this, could the *candid* or *ſenſible* Reader conceive it poſſible that our Examiner ſhould end his Argument in the following Strain? "So that in taking one Handle away from Unbelievers, you have "given them another. For if, upon the Foot of the common In-"terpretation, they think they ſee a Violation of the natural Law;

* Conſiderations, p. 164, 165.

"they

" they may, upon your Interpretation, alledge an Inconſiſtency of " the Scriptures with themſelves: and I apprehend, Sir, that it is " a much eaſier Thing to ſhew that the Command carries no Vio- " lation of the natural Law, the common Interpretation admitted; " than it will be to reconcile your Hypotheſis to the Scripture Ac- " count of this Matter. So much has Chriſtianity *gained* by your " Interpretation * !"—But I leave him to the Reader's Mercy.

XXIII.

" But this is not the greateſt Difficulty you have to account for " *(ſays he)*. The Objection relates not to *Abraham* only, but alſo " to his *Family*; who (as you have made your Unbeliever ſay) " MUST NEEDS *have thought human Sacrifices acceptable to God*; " becauſe the Action was not *formally condemned* at the *Revocation* " of the Command. I do think, Sir, that it would be a very con- " ſiderable objection to this Hiſtory; if it did give any reaſonable " Encouragement to the Belief, that human Sacrifices were accept- " able to God; and I have given my Reaſon why I think it can- " not give any ſuch Encouragement; which is that, in this Caſe, " the Revocation of the Command, without any formal Condem- " nation of the Action, is ſufficient to guard againſt any ſuch Abuſe. " Whether you agree with me in this Principle, or whether you are " of the infidel Side of the Queſtion in this particular Point, you have " not told us; nor ſhall I take upon me to gueſs. But you are fully " perſuaded, that, upon your Hypotheſis, the Objection is entirely " removed. Your Words are theſe; *There was not the leaſt Occa-* " *ſion, when God remitted the Offering of* Iſaac, *that he ſhould formally* " *condemn human Sacrifices, to prevent* Abraham, OR HIS FAMILY'S " *falling into an Opinion, that ſuch Sacrifices were not diſpleaſing to* " *him—For the Command, having, as we ſaid, no moral Import;* " *being only an Information by Action, where one Thing ſtood for the*

* Conſid. p. 165.

" *Repre-*

" *Repreſentative of another*; *all the Conſequence that could be deduced*
" *from it was only this*; *that the Son of God ſhould be offered up for*
" *the Sins of Mankind: Therefore the Conceptions* THEY [Abraham,
" *viz.* AND HIS FAMILY] *had of human Sacrifices* after *the Command,*
" *muſt needs be juſt the ſame which they had before*; *and therefore,*
" *Inſtruction concerning the execrable Nature of human Sacrifices was*
" *not only needleſs, but quite beſide the Queſtion*; *p.* 618, 619 *. I
" can eaſily underſtand, Sir, how the Matter ſtood with *Abra-*
" *ham*; and that HE was in no Danger of being miſled, as to the
" Nature of human Sacrifices, who knew the Secret of the whole
" Affair; and that it was nothing elſe but *Scenery*. But how this
" Anſwer will ſerve for *his Family*; who are to be preſumed to have
" known nothing of this *ſcenical Repreſentation*, is utterly paſt my
" Comprehenſion. I ſay that the *Family* of *Abraham muſt be pre-*
" *ſumed* to have *known nothing* of this ſcenical Repreſentation;
" becauſe you have told us from the very firſt, that the Informa-
" tion to be conveyed by it was intended for *Abraham's* SOLE
" USE; and I do not ſee how *Abraham* could open to his Family
" the *Scenery* of the Tranſaction, without explaining the *Myſtery*.
" Accordingly, your Anſwer, in this very Paſſage, imports, that
" *Abraham's Family*, as well as himſelf, *were* acquainted with this
" Myſtery; for you ſay that *all the Conſequence that* COULD *be de-*
" *duced from this* Tranſaction was, *that the Son of God ſhould be of-*
" *fered up for the Sins of Mankind.* All the Conſequence that could
" be deduced! *By whom?* Why, by the *Family of Abraham*; for
" to *them*, as well as to *Abraham*, does the *Inference*, which you
" immediately ſubjoin, belong——THEREFORE *the Conceptions* THEY
" *had of human Sacrifices muſt needs be juſt the ſame*, &c. But is not
" your putting the *Family* of *Abraham* in *Poſſeſſion* of this Conſe-
" quence a very plain Declaration, that they *knew* the Myſtery
" of *Chriſt's* Sacrifice! Now therefore, Sir, take your Choice, and
" give up *one* Part of your Hypotheſis, or the *other*, as beſt pleaſes

* Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 400.

" you

" you; for to hold *both* is impoſſible. If you ſay that the Family " of *Abraham* WERE acquainted with the Myſtery of *Chriſt's* Sacri- " fice; it will overturn all you have ſaid concerning their Igno- " rance of a future State: For to what Purpoſe the Son of God " was to be offered up for the Sins of Mankind, if no Life is to be " expected after this, it is impoſſible to comprehend. It likewiſe " overturns the *ſingle* Reaſon you have given why the *Explanation* " (uſual in all ſuch Caſes) to ſhew the *Import* of the Tranſaction " was not added, *viz.* that it was a Point *not fit* for *common Know-* " *ledge*. But if you ſhall chuſe to ſay, that the Revelation of this " Myſtery, was for the SOLE Information of *Abraham*, and that *his* " *Family* knew nothing of it (which I think you *muſt* ſay, to make " your Interpretation good), the Objection will lie full againſt you, " unanſwered. For upon this ſuppoſition, *they* muſt have con- " ſidered this Tranſaction, not in your *artificial*, *hidden* Light, but " in its *apparent*, *natural* Light; and the Conſtruction in favour " of human Sacrifices muſt have been the *very ſame*, as if no ſuch " Repreſentation as you ſpeak of had been intended *."

" Whether *(ſays he)* you agree with me, or ARE OF THE INFI- " DEL SIDE OF THE QUESTION." A dire Dilemma! to which he reduces all his Adverſaries. *Agree* not with him, and you are at once on the *Infidel Side of the Queſtion*.

" Qui mepriſe Cotin, n'eſtime point ſon Roi,
" Et n'a, ſelon Cotin, ni Dieu, ni foi, ni loi.

But if this be my Alternative, *ſit anima mea cum philoſophis*, as was ſaid on the like occaſion; they are much the better Company.—I believed that an Infidel Objection to the Command to *Abraham*, on the common Interpretation of it, had weight; and I explain the Force of it, in order to remove it; and to excite other Defenders of Revelation to conſider it: For which, it ſeems, I am *of the Infidel ſide of the Queſtion*.

* Conſid. p. 165—168.

I had

I had ſaid, that the Command was for *Abraham's ſole uſe*; and "therefore *(he ſays)* that the Family of *Abraham* muſt be preſumed "to know nothing of this ſcenical Repreſentation." Notwithſtanding this, *I preſume* they *did know* it. Here he takes me in a flagrant Contradiction. But did he indeed not ſee that where I ſpoke of its being given for *Abraham's ſole Uſe*, I was oppoſing it, (as the courſe of my Argument required), not to the Family which lived under his Tents, but to the *Jewiſh* People, when the Hiſtory of the Tranſaction was recorded *?——And now having expoſed his wrong Concluſion from *my* Words, let us conſider next the wrong Concluſion he draws from *his own*. "I do not "ſee *(ſays he)* how *Abraham* could open to his Family the "Scenery of the Tranſaction without explaining the Myſtery." What does he mean by, "open the Scenery of the Tranſ-"action?" There are two Senſes of this ambiguous Expreſſion; it may ſignify, either *explaining the Moral of the Scenery*; or ſimply, *telling* his Family *that the Tranſaction was a ſcenical Repreſentation*. He could not here uſe the Phraſe in the firſt Senſe, becauſe he makes *explaining the Myſtery* a thing different from *opening the Scenery*. He muſt mean it then in the latter. But could not *Abraham tell his* Family, that this was a *ſcenical Repreſentation* without *explaining the Myſtery?* I don't know what ſhould hinder him, unleſs it were a Charm. If he had the free uſe of Speech, I think, he might, in the Tranſports of his Joy, on his return

* Here the Letter Writer, ſo often mentioned before, is quite ſcandalized; and cannot forbear [breaking out, at p. 77.——"I declare it, if you be Dr. *S*——, I am per-"fectly aſtoniſhed at you." But ſo am not I. The good Man knows nothing of the Contagion of Controverſy. He ſeems to have ſtudied his Profeſſion with an Intent only of coming to the Truth; and he ſpeaks from the Heart. His whole Pamphlet is a learned and well-argued Performance: And if he has been more attentive to the Force of his Reaſoning than to the Ornaments of his Language, the Lovers of Truth have the more to thank him for, as he gives her to them undreſſed, and puts a Gloſs upon nothing.

home, tell his Wife, "that God had ordered him to ſacrifice his "Son, and that he had carried him to Mount *Moriah*, in Obedience "to the Divine Command, where a Ram was accepted in his "ſtead. But that the whole was a mere ſcenical Repreſentation, or "Figure, of a myſterious Tranſaction which God had ordained to "come to paſs in the latter Ages of the World." And I ſuppoſe when he had once told his Wife, the Family would ſoon hear of it. Now could they not underſtand, what was meant by a *ſcenical Repreſentation*, as well when he told them it was to prefigure a *Myſtery*, as if he had told them it was to prefigure the *Crucifixion of Jeſus*? The Explanation, here given, had I no other way of blunting his Dilemma (for if I eſcape his *Contradiction*, he has ſet his *Dilemma*, which, he ſays, 'tis impoſſible I ſhould avoid) had I nothing elſe, I ſay, 'tis very likely I ſhould have inſiſted upon this: But there are more ways than one of taking him by his Horns. "Now therefore *(ſays he)* take your Choice, and give up one Part "of your Hypotheſis or the other, as beſt pleaſes you; FOR TO "HOLD BOTH IS IMPOSSIBLE. If you ſay that the Family of *Abra-*"*ham* were acquainted with the Myſtery, it will overturn all you "ſaid concerning their Ignorance of a future State.—But if you "ſhall chuſe to ſay that the Revelation of the Myſtery was for the "ſole Information of *Abraham*, and that his Family knew nothing "of it, then—the Conſtruction in favour of human Sacrifices muſt "have been the very ſame as if no ſuch Repreſentation, as you "ſpeak of, had been intended." I deſire to know where it is that I ſpoke ANY THING *concerning* Abraham's *Family's Ignorance of a future State*; and therefore call upon him, for the SIXTH AND LAST TIME, to name the Place. But, I am afraid, ſomething is wrong here again: and that, by *Abraham's Family*, he means the *Iſraelites under Moſes's Policy*. For, with regard to them, I did indeed ſay that the groſs Body of the People were ignorant of a future State. But then I ſuppoſed them equally ignorant of the true Import of the Command to *Abraham*. But, if, by *Abraham's Family*,

Family, he means, as every Man does, who means honeſtly, *thoſe who reſided with him under his Tents*, I ſuppoſe them indeed acquainted with the true Import of the Command; but then, at the ſame time, not ignorant of a future State. Thus what our Examiner had pronounced IMPOSSIBLE, was, it ſeems, all the while very poſſible. And, in ſpite of his Dilemma, *both Parts of the Hypotheſis* were at peace. I can hardly think him ſo groſsly immoral as to have put this Trick upon his Reader with Deſign; I rather think it was ſome confuſed Notion concerning the Popiſh Virtue of TRADITION (that truſty Conveyancer of Truth) which led him into all this Abſurdity; and made him conclude, that what *Abraham's* Family once knew, their poſterity could never forget. Though the *Written Word* tells us, that when *Moſes* was ſent to redeem this Poſterity from Bondage, they remembered ſo little of God's *Revelations* to their Fore-fathers, that they knew nothing even of his *Nature*.

XXIV.

Our Examiner now concludes his Conſiderations (which we have quoted Word for Word in order as they lye, without curtailing or abridging) in this manner. "Thus, Sir, it appears; that what was "*well* before comes out *bad*, from under your Hands. Which "confirms to me, what I have often thought; that *Experiments* in "Religion are ſeldom good for any thing. The Truth of this "whole Caſe, appears to me in this plain Light. God called "*Abraham* to this great Trial; to make him an Example of *Faith* "and *Reſignation*. *Abraham* obeys God's Call; under a full Per-"ſuaſion that his Son was *loſt* to him; and yet as fully aſſured that "the Promiſes of God ſhould not fail. In this View he *is* an Ex-"ample of *both*; and thus much the Scriptures *warrant*. We, "who ſee the *Reſemblance* between this Caſe, and God's requiring "his only Son to be offered up as a Sacrifice for the Sins of the "whole World, rightly ſay, that the *one* was intended to be the

" *Figure* of the *other*. But whether *Abraham* knew any thing at " all of *Chriſt's Sacrifice*; or whether he knew *nothing*; the Scrip- " ture is *wholly ſilent*; and YOU ought to have been ſilent too. It " is fit for *us* to ſtop where the *Scripture* ſtops——and let *Infidelity* " do its worſt *."

" What was well before, comes out bad, it ſeems, " under my " hands;" which *confirms* him in a " Thought he often had, THAT " EXPERIMENTS IN RELIGION ARE SELDOM GOOD FOR ANY " THING." By the way though this ſeems but an odd Compliment to the many fine *Experiments*, which a great Prelate of his Acquaintance has made in Religion. However, that he *often had this Thought*, I do not at all doubt. The thing I leaſt expected was, that he ſhould venture to *tell* his *Thoughts*. But, in the Paroxyſm of *Anſwering*, out it came; and from a Man not the beſt formed by Nature *aperto vivere voto*. Writers, indeed, have differed much how theſe EXPERIMENTS ſhould be made. Some would have *Scripture alone* employed in making them: others were for taking in *Fathers* and *Councils*; and ſome again for applying *Raillery* and *Ridicule* to the Work. But I know of no Proteſtant till our Examiner, who ever talked againſt the thing itſelf. That Language had been now, for near two hundred Years, confined to the Walls of the Inquiſition. For what is *making Experiments in Religion*, but illuſtrating it by new Arguments, ariſing from new Diſcoveries made of the Harmony in God's various Diſpenſations to Mankind; juſt as Philoſophers unfold Nature, by new Enquiries into the Contents of Bodies? No EXPERIMENTS, is the Language indeed of POLITICIANS (for in ſome things Bigotry and Politics agree; as Extremes run eaſily into one another, by their very Endeavour to keep at diſtance) becauſe, according to the Politician's Creed, *Religion* being uſeful to the State, and yet not founded in Truth, all *Inquiries* tend, not to confirm, but to unſettle, this neceſſary Support of Civil Government. But can a Man who believes Religion to have come from

* Conſid. p. 169.

God,

God, uſe this Language! If he pretends to believe, and will yet talk at ſo ſcandalous a rate, let me aſk him, how it comes to paſs, that *Experiments*, which do ſuch Service in our Advancement in the Knowledge of *Nature*, ſhould ſucceed ſo ill in Religion? Are not both equally the Works of God? Were not both given to be the Subject of human Contemplation? Have not both, as proceeding from the Great Maſter of the Univerſe, their Depths and Darkneſſes? And does not the unveiling the Secrets of his *Providence* tend equally with the unveiling the Secrets of his *Workmanſhip*, to the Advancement of his Glory? Have not the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God been wonderfully diſplayed, in theſe latter Ages, to the Confuſion of *Atheiſm*, by ſome noble Experiments made in Nature? And why ſhould not the ſame Wiſdom and Goodneſs be equally diſplayed, to the Confuſion of *Deiſm*, by Experiments made in Religion? I believe I ſhould not be accuſed of Vanity, even by our Examiner himſelf in his better Mood, ſhould I venture to appeal to *The Divine Legation* itſelf, for the POSSIBILITY of the thing: For he has been graciouſly pleaſed to allow, that "what I have ſaid of Converſe being maintained by "Actions as well as by Words, is very juſt; and that the Inſtances "I have produced from Scripture, where Actions have been uſed "as foreſhewing the Determinations of Providence, are beyond all "Exception *." Now here, I preſume, his Modeſty will confeſs, that I have taught him ſomething *New*; both in the Principle, and in the following Application of it to the Primary and Secondary Senſe of Prophecies. But if ever there was an *Experiment* made in Religion, this was one; it being deduced from a careful *Analyſis* of the ſeveral various Modes of human Communication. In a word, had no *Experiments* been made in *Nature*, we had ſtill ſlept in the Ignorance and Error of *School-Philoſophy*: And had *none* been made in *Religion*, we had ſtill been groping about, and ſtumbling in the Darkneſs and Superſtition of *School-Divinity*. For,

* Confid. p. 153.

what:

what were they, but *Experiments in Religion*, made by a *Wickliff*, a *Cranmer*, a *Calvin*, an *Eraſmus*, a *Hooker*, that reſcued us from that Darkneſs and Superſtition? Or is making Experiments, like making Gunpowder, a Monopoly? that none are to be intruſted with it, in *Religion*, but great Names, and Fathers of the Church; and none, in *Nature*, but *Fellows of the Society*. The worſt Miſchief they ever do is, now and then, blowing up an indiſcreet Divine, when he comes too near, and tramples upon them with Security and Contempt. To repay our Examiner, therefore, one Secret for another; I will tell him what I have *often thought*, and what his own Words *confirm*, "That he who can talk in this "manner, whatever face he may put on, muſt needs have his "Doubts and Fears about the Truth of that Religion which he ſo "peeviſhly defends."—"*Abraham (ſays he)* obeys God's Call under "a FULL PERSUASION that his Son was loſt to him." So! the Doubt is now determined. Before, it was only "That *Iſaac* might, "for aught *Abraham* knew, be for ever loſt to him." But this it is for a Writer to have *a full Perſuaſion* both of himſelf and his Reader.

"WE who SEE *(ſays he)* the RESEMBLANCE between this Caſe "[*the Action commanded*] and God's requiring his only Son to be "offered up as a Sacrifice, for the Sins of the whole World, RIGHT-"LY ſay, that the one was intended to be the Figure of the other." Theſe *Seers* by *Reſemblance* into Facts, are like the *Seers* by *Second-ſight* into Futurity: That is to ſay, equally under the Power of the Imagination; which, whatever light it may afford to them, yet leaves their *Readers* ſtill in the dark. As to this *ſeeing by Reſemblance* in particular, the Reader may, if he pleaſes, conſult the XVIIIth *Remark* for all that is neceſſary to be ſaid on that Subject.

"But whether *Abraham (ſays he)* knew any thing at all of "*Chriſt's* Sacrifice, or whether he knew nothing, the Scripture is "wholly ſilent: AND YOU OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN SILENT TOO." To this I reply, in the *firſt* place, that the Reaſon why I was *not ſilent* was, becauſe Scripture itſelf was *not ſilent*; but, in the Words of

of *Jeſus*, declared, that *Abraham* did know of *Chriſt's* Sacrifice. *Secondly*, I do not ſee why, even though Scripture had been *ſilent*, *I ought to have been ſilent too.* Scripture is ſilent concerning the *Subſtance* of the *Son.* But ſo are not you; who, I make no doubt, declare at leaſt, that he is of *one Subſtance with the Father.* And why do you ſo? Becauſe (you will ſay, and you will ſay true) that, although this Propoſition be not expreſſed in the Bible, in ſo many Words; yet it is to be deduced from *Scripture Doctrine*, by the moſt known Principles of Philoſophy and Logic. Why then will you not allow *me* the Benefit of the ſame Anſwer, in the preſent Caſe.—But in another Mood he can be angry with me for being ſilent where Scripture is ſilent. And for not ſpeaking out when that only gives a Sign. "You ſay nothing *(ſays he)* of *Abraham's* "Virtue, his Patience and Self-denial, yet Scripture POINTS AT "them."

But "It is fit *(he ſays)* for us to ſtop where the Scripture ſtops." —With how good a grace, and how pertinently too, this Maxim may be, ſometimes, applied; I ſhall beg leave to obſerve; that, with regard to the *fundamental* Points of the *Chriſtian* Faith, it is, indeed, fit we ſhould ſtop where the NEW TESTAMENT ſtops; becauſe that is able to *make us wiſe unto Salvation*; and becauſe there is now no reaſonable Expectation of any further Revelation of God's Will to us, that ſhall refer to this, and be explanatory of it. But with regard to an *hiſtorical* Paſſage, told obſcurely (for the wiſe Ends of God's Diſpenſations, which opened gradually upon Mankind) in the OLD TESTAMENT, to which the *New* refers and is explanatory; There, I hope, we may *go on*, without Preſumption, to ſhew how, from ſuch a Paſſage, may be demonſtrated the real Connexion and Dependency between the two Covenants. Yet, by the ſtrangeſt Perverſity, there are Men who will not ſtop in the firſt Caſe; and, in the ſecond, will not go forward. But whatever our Examiner's *Notions* be; it is plain, he took his *Expreſſions* from ſomebody who applied the Maxim to a *Maker of New Fundamentals.* For ſuch a one, only, it is ſeen to fit. "In Con-

"cluſion

"cluſion *(ſays he)* LET INFIDELITY DO ITS WORST." And ſo it may, for what our Examiner or his Fellows ſeem inclined to oppoſe to its Progreſs. They keep *guard*, as our Author ſays; they perform Watch and Ward as the Law requires: and let ſuch as like it go to blows for them. One of my moſt abuſive Adverſaries, in a Book he wrote againſt me, intituled, *A Reply to Mr. W.'s Appendix in his ſecond Volume of The Divine Legation*, has a long Digreſſion (for it has nothing to do in the Diſpute between him and me) of Seventy Pages, to prove that the *Miracles* and *Morality* of *Paganiſm* equal *thoſe* of *Judaiſm* and *Chriſtianity*: In which he has made a very elaborate Collection of Paſſages from Claſſic Writers, drawn up and ſet in battle array againſt parallel Places of Scripture. Eight or Ten Clergymen of the Church of *England* have found Leiſure and Inclination to write againſt *The Divine Legation*, nobody knows for what; and yet not one of them has taken the leaſt notice of this open bare-faced Inſult and Defiance of Revelation. Bnt what then? Mr. *Tillard*, no doubt, was conſidered by them as a Fellow-labourer in a good Cauſe. Or was it, for that he is an active Member of the Society for the *Propagation of the Goſpel in Foreign Parts?* of which, indeed, in theſe Paſſages he has given a Proof. For finding it was for ſtaying at home, he, like a good Member as he is, does his beſt to ſend it packing!—But ſtill, ſays our Examiner, "let Infidelity do its worſt." And does he indeed think it could do worſe than what himſelf has here attempted? I had wrote a *Diſſertation*; which, if it has any *Reality* or *Foundation*, in *Reaſon* or *Scriptture*, is of the higheſt Service to *Religion*: And, principally, on theſe Two Accounts, firſt, as reſcuing a Paſſage out of the hands of Libertines, which was more obnoxious to the Objections of Infidelity than any in the whole Bible: And ſecondly, as diſcovering a real and ſubſtantial Circumſtance of *Connexion* and *Dependency* between the *Old* and *New* Teſtament; not ſubject to any of thoſe Objections which ariſe from Typical or Allegorical Interpretations. Now, againſt ſuch a Diſcourſe, ſo directed, was it natural to conceive, that a Divine of Name ſhould addreſs himſelf,

himſelf, with much Haughtineſs and Malice, to write an elaborate Confutation? Would not a good Man, who had a real Regard for the Intereſts of Religion, and was perſuaded of the Weakneſs of my Diſcourſe, have left it to ſome unthinking, unbelieving Scribler, to expoſe? And here, let me call, ſerioufly, upon this learned Man, to lay his Hand upon his Heart, and to acquit himſelf of his Intentions, before the *Public*; who finding nothing in this *Diſſertation* (how erroneous ſoever it may be deemed) either of Hereſy or Libertiniſm, will needs be at a loſs to diſcover any good Purpoſe, in an Attempt ſo ſeemingly inconſiſtent with his Character and Profeſſion. For the Public ſees he has taken the Unbelievers' Taſk out of their hands, and executed it with ſuch a Spirit, as cannot chuſe but give them the higheſt Satisfaction.

" Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridæ."

SOON after the Publication of Dr. *Stebbing's Examination*; another Book came out againſt me, as much larger in Bulk as honeſter in its Production: For it carried the Name of its Author, Dr. *A. A. Sykes*, in the Front. To this Gentleman, likewiſe, I ſent a civil Meſſage; To inform him, that I had ſeen his Book, in which he likewiſe profeſſes to "examine my Account" (for they are all *Examiners*, and would be *Inquiſitors*) "of the Conduct of the "Ancient Legiſlators—Of the Double Doctrine of the Philoſo-"phers—Of the THEOCRACY OF THE JEWS—and of Sir *I. New-*"*ton's* Chronology:" That I ſuppoſed he would think himſelf neglected to have *no* Notice taken of him: That I was not at leiſure to go through the Whole; but that if he would point out to me which of the Four Parts he choſe to truſt to, I would endeavour to give him the Satisfaction he ſeemed to want. To this, he ſent me word back, "That he ſhould not be, in the leaſt, concerned, were I to "forbear all Notice of him: but, if I took any, that he hoped I "would keep to the Merits of his Book: That he was not to chuſe "for me; but that he thought, One or Two of the Parts were "more immediately to the Purpoſe to clear up: But expected that "this ſhould be done in ſuch a manner as every good Man wiſhes; "in the Love of Truth, and in the Spirit of one that ſeeks it: "And that then I ſhould find, in him, a Mind open to Convic-"tion." All this was very well: And, from the *Reaſonableneſs* of the Demand, who would not believe, but his Book was a Standard of Candour, Politeneſs, and Ingenuity? at leaſt, who would have ſuſpected the contrary? So that his civil Preliminary, when interpreted

interpreted on the Principles of the *Double-Doctrine*, is in plain *Engliſh* this,—That the Liberties, which he and old honeſt Mr. *P.* have ſo freely taken with my Book and Character, ſhould be entirely overlooked, or received as Compliments: And that I ſhould addreſs myſelf to their Conviction, as to the Service of my Two beſt Friends, who wrote only to *recommend* the Truths I had advanced; by putting me in a way to remove all Doubts and Difficulties concerning them. "And therefore, that I ſhould keep to the Merits "of his Book;" that is, be tender of his bad Logic, and worſe Criticiſm; overlook his ill Expreſſion; and find out his Meaning if I can. And, indeed, who would not engage in any Labour for the ſake of finding ſo rare a Curioſity, as a "Mind open to Conviction," in an Anſwerer by Profeſſion? Well then, be it ſo. Since they profeſs to *lye ſo open*, let them be received with good Humour at leaſt, and ſuffered only to expoſe themſelves;

"Laugh where we muſt, be candid where we can,
But vindicate the WAYS OF GOD to Man."

However, this is a mere Act of Good-will; and what the Doctor has not the leaſt Claim to; as may be ſeen by the preliminary Converſation between him and his old Friend Mr. *P.* Part of which I ſhall here beg leave to tranſcribe for the Reader's Entertainment:

"You know very well *(ſays Dr.* Sykes *to the Rev. Gent. to whom he addreſſes his Examination)* "our old Friend Mr. *P****; He calls "Mr. *Warburton's* Book a learned Romance; and he ſays, WITH "SOME HUMOUR, that the Digreſſions in it about the Myſteries, "the Hieroglyphics *, the Book of *Job*, are, or may be deemed, "ſo

* Foreigners ſeem to have a different Opinion of *The Divine Legation*, from theſe Two learned Friends. The *Journal des Sçavans*, *Mars* 1744, in an Abſtract of a *French* Tranſlation of Part of *The Divine Legation*, ſpeaks thus of the Diſcourſe on the *Hieroglyphics*: "Il regne une ſi belle analogie dans le ſyſteme de M. Warburton, & "toutes ſes parties tiennent les unes aux autres par un lien ſi naturel, qu'on eſt "porté à croire que l'origine & les progreſs de l'Ecriture & du Language ont été tels "qu'il les a decrits. Le Public doit avoir bien de l'obligation au Traducteur de lui avoir "fait

" ſo many ingenious Novels, which ſerve to relieve or divert the " Reader. But then he goes ſo far as to doubt whether Mr. *War-* " *burton* writes for Utility or for Truth. For he has told us ſo " much *(ſays he)* about the Practices of thoſe old Philoſophers, and " how much they were wont to *lie for the Public good*—and he de- " clares himſelf to have come from the *Schools* of thoſe Heathen " Philoſophers, THAT I CANNOT BUT THINK HE MAY BE REA- " SONABLY SUSPECTED—to have received an Infection from them, " and *to have learnt to lie for the Public good*, as his Maſters did " before him. It is true *(ſays our Friend)* that Mr. *Warburton* does " not think thoſe Men to be *altogether free from Blame*; and it may " be ſaid in his favour, that what he blames a *little* in them, he " would not do himſelf: But yet his Cenſure of *them* is ſo very " ſoft, and he is ſo tender of their moral Character, while he " is ſo ready to flame out againſt, and to ſhew no Mercy to " others, who do not think as he does, that one cannot help ima- " gining, that in his Opinion, the good End they had in view, did " ſanctify the Means they uſed, and that it was no great Fault

" fait connoitre un Ouvrage ſi curieux. Mais il auroit été à ſouhaiter, pour rendre la " lecture de ſa traduction plus agreable, qu'il ne ſe fut pas ſi fort attaché à rendre mot a " mot le texte Anglois."

The Judgment of the Jeſuits of *Trevoux*, in their Journal of *July* 1744, differs not much from that of *Paris*. " M. Warburton n'a pu, ſans une erudition profonde, une " lecture murement digerée & des reflexions infinies traiter avec tant de preciſion, de " juſteſſe, & de netteté, un ſujet de lui même ſi difficile à mettre en œuvre——Les plus " ſavans hommes ſe ſont laiſſé ſeduire ſur l'origine des Hieroglyphes, & la plupart ont " regardé un effet du peu d'experience des Egyptiens, comme un rafinement de la plus " myſterieuſe ſageſſe. C'eſt cette erreur que M. Warburton s'applique particulierement " à detruire dans la premiere partie. Il le fait de la maniere la plus naturelle——ce " n'eſt point un Syſteme fondé SUR DES IMAGINATIONS VAGUES. Ses raiſonnemens, ſes " preuves, ſont appuiées ſur des FAITS, ſur la NATURE des choſes, & ſur les prin- " cipes les plus lumineux du SENS COMMUN." But as to this laſt Teſtimony, I ſhall not chuſe to inſiſt upon it; leſt it ſhould be now ſaid, that theſe famous modern Practicers of the *Double Doctrine*, and the Apologiſt for the ancient Inventors of it, had too cloſe an Underſtanding with one another.

" in

" in them to have external and internal Doctrines * ;" *&c. &c.* Now a Man ſo apt *to flame out* would have been as apt to call this a piece of dull ſcurrilous Buffoonry, in another Writer ; but in ſo candid a Diſputant as Dr. *Sykes*, who writes, we ſee by his own Words, " in the Love of Truth, and in the Spirit of one who ſeeks it," I can conſider it only as the Effect of a *pious Zeal* for the Intereſts of Revelation, which is apt to warm itſelf in a Converſation between two ſuch Friends ; and a *charitable Fear* that the Author of the *Divine Legation* was indeed artfully undermining the Foundation, while he pretended to new-fortify the Structure of Religion : and they, good Men, as faithful Centinels, thought it their Duty to give the Alarm. But here, their candid Simplicity of Manners, which makes them utter Strangers to all the Tricks of *Free-thinking*, has put them upon a falſe Cry. It would be *Charity* therefore to ſet them right ; and, as they have *Minds ſo open to Conviction*, indeed but *Juſtice*. And, for this, all the return I aſk, is only to ſhare with them in the *Pleaſure*, which a clear Conviction, that their Suſpicions were groundleſs, muſt needs give them.

In order, therefore, to this, it would ſeem ſufficient to obſerve, that if indeed the *Divine Legation* were written to undermine Revelation, and (as is ſaid) by an Author initiated in " the Cabinet " Councils of Old Lawgivers," and juſt come " from School, from " Heathen Philoſophers," he muſt have learnt very little of his Maſters : For it is certainly the moſt bungling, ill-contrived Attempt that was ever made againſt Revelation. But if this be not enough, let us go further, and conſider, how an artful Freethinker would probably have executed ſuch a Deſign as is here laid to my Charge. And the ſame Intimacy in the Cabinet-Councils of Old Lawgivers, and in the Schools of Pagan Philoſophers, which makes it ſo unlikely that I could have done no better on ſo good a ground ;

* An Examination of Mr. *Warburton's* Account of the Conduct of the Ancient Legiſlators, of the Double Doctrine of the Old Philoſophers, of the Theocracy of the *Jews*, and of Sir *Iſaac Newton's* Chronology, 1744.

may

may enable me to ſhew how well a Scheme of this Nature might be executed by another: As the many unhappy Examples we have amongſt us, of real Attempts againſt Religion, will enable the Reader to judge how near I keep to Probability. And thus qualified, I take the liberty to ſet our *Underminer* to work.

In the firſt place, I will ſuppoſe it not unlikely, that, in order to conceal his Purpoſe, as well as to carry on his Attacks more regularly, he ſhould begin with an *Outwork* of Religion, on Pretence of ſome Defect in its Conſtruction, that might prejudice the Defence of the *Fort* itſelf. For inſtance, let us ſuppoſe it to be that illuſtrious Teſtimony of Paganiſm, recorded by *Phlegon*, for the unnatural Darkneſs at the Crucifixion *. Where ſome Mathematical Unbeliever might very fitly ſerve him in the Poſt of *Engineer*. When he had tried what could be made of this, he might then come cloſer to his Work.

And, as MIRACLES and PROPHECIES are the two great Credentials of the *Divine Legation* of *Jeſus*, he might now proceed directly to the Sap.

And firſt, of the *Miracles*. The Diſtempers cured by *Jeſus* were of two Sorts; Natural, and Supernatural. When the latter are removed, the other (as the Freethinkers tell us) are eaſily dealt with. The *Force of Imagination*, in the *Patient*, might be ſuppoſed to go a great way; and *Natural Virtue*, in the *Agent*, a great way farther. Thus long ſince (ſay they) Diſtempers fled at *Veſpaſian's* Touch; and very lately at Abbé *Paris's* Tomb: But, in the ſtill more famous Caſe of *Greatrakes* the *Iriſh Stroker*, both Cauſes ſeem'd to concur to produce the moſt extraordinary Effects. But neither *Natural Virtue*, I wiſt, nor *Force of Imagination*, could fright the Devil. Here now is a Difficulty worthy of him,

"Nunc animis opus, Æneа! nunc pectore firmo.

* See a Diſſertation on the Eclipſe mentioned by *Phlegon*.—By A. A. Sykes, D. D. 1732.

What

What has he then to do, but, under pretence of freeing the Goſpel-Hiſtory from Superſtition, to write the *Scripture Doctrine* of *Demoniacs* *; that is, to perſuade us that there never was any? For you muſt know, the *Scripture Doctrine* of a thing, is the Phraſe in faſhion, to prove—nothing. And in this Service he would have the hardy and valiant *Hobbes* for his Precurſor in the *Kingdom of Darkneſs* †; or his Captain of Light-horſe *à batre l'eſtrade*.

We have now only one Stroke more to perfect our Mine; and that Stroke is at *Prophecies*. Now Theology has divided the Prophecies, that relate to *Jeſus*, into Two Sorts; ſuch as foretel his Miſſion in a primary and literal Senſe, and ſuch as foretel it only in a ſecondary and figurative: But the Freethinkers aſſure us there was no need of this Diviſion; for that all the Prophecies, which relate to *Jeſus*, relate to him only in a ſecondary and figurative Senſe. At this Open, then, comes in our Underminer; and ſhews ‡, that all Pretence of Prophecies to a *double Meaning* is ſenſeleſs and fanatical. And here he approaches under the Cover of the great *Collins*; who had ſo deeply intrenched himſelf before the place, that he *could* not of a long time be forced; and our Underminer may be excuſed if he too haſtily § concluded, that therefore he never *would*.

I might now turn to the learned Doctor, as little concerned as he is in all this; and aſk him whether this would not be doing like a Workman. I own him indeed a very incompetent Judge in ſuch Matters. His Singleneſs of Heart, his Simplicity of Manners, his Zeal for Religion, his total Eſtrangement from Free-

* See An Enquiry into the Meaning of the Demoniacs in the New Teſtament, 1737.

† The Title given by Hobbes to the Fourth Part of his Leviathan.

‡ See The Principles and Connexion of Natural and Revealed Religion diſtinctly conſidered. By A. A. Sykes, D. D. 1740. p. 221, & ſeq.

§ See Divine Legation, Vol. II. p. 643, & ſeq. [Vol. III. Book VI. § 6. Ed. 4to.]

thinkers

thinkers and their Arts, make him very unfit to be appealed to on this Occaſion. Yet methinks there is ſomething ſo ſtriking in the Sketch here chalked out, that the moſt unexperienced Man muſt feel both its natural and moral Fitneſs for its End. Here we ſee a cautious, indeed, but a regular, a ſteddy, and determined Purpoſe. The Approaches are made in form; The Trenches opened; the Battery played; the Breach ſtormed; and at laſt the old hollow Fortreſs of Religion blown up into Air. If ever this ſhould happen, my main Concern would be for old Mr. *P.* For what muſt be that good Man's Sorrows to ſee the *Abomination of Deſolation ſtanding in the* Holy Place; while he could ſtart thus at *his own* Shadow? For it muſt be his own and not *mine* if he ſaw Infidelity ſo near a Book, whoſe Purpoſe was to ſhew the uſe of Religion in general, to human Society; and the ſuperior fitneſs of Revealed Religion in particular: The Truth of the *Jewiſh*, from the Adminiſtration of an equal Providence; and the Truth of the *Chriſtian*, from the Completion of *Jewiſh* Prophecies concerning it.

But now I talk of *Prophecies*, let me aſk the learned Doctor; but, gently in his Ear, how it comes to paſs, that when it was the Subject of Prophecies only which occaſioned all this Hoſtility, he ſhould leave my Confutation of his Diſcourſe on *Double Senſes* unanſwered; and turn his Pen to the Four Subjects above-mentioned? Did this Forbearance ſuit a hand ſo accuſtomed to Slaughter? or did this Reſerve indicate a *Mind ſo open to Conviction?* But perhaps in this he would emulate the great *Scipio*; who, when he had loſt his own, had the Courage to carry the War into his Enemy's Country. I muſt purſue him therefore with the ſame Diſadvantage that the *Carthaginian* left the rich Campania of *Italy*, to follow his Adverſary through the barren Sands of *Afric*. For the true Explanation of the Nature of the *Double Senſe* of Prophecies (of which I had ſhewn he had given a Notion deſtructive of the Connexion between the Old and New Teſtament, through his Ignorance of the very Terms of the Queſtion)

tion) is of the higheſt Importance to Religion: whereas the Subjects, for the ſake of which he hath forſaken this, are of infinitely leſs Importance. And theſe too he has handled in ſo unuſual a manner, that all we can collect from the firſt of them, *on the Conduct of the ancient Legiſlators*, is, that, in his Opinion, *Moſes* was but of the ſame Species with the Pagan Lawgivers *: As to the *Double Doctrine of the old Philoſophers*, he has fairly ſhewn that he knew no more of it than of the *Double Senſe of Prophecies*: And with regard to *Sir I. Newton's Chronology*, he miſtakes the very Queſtion; imagining that I diſputed the Truth of his *Greek*, inſtead of his *Egyptian* Chronology. So that indeed there was nothing left that I could, in conſcience, ſeize upon but his Diſcourſe of the THEOCRACY *of the Jews*. And this, I ſuppoſe, was the *thing*, which, in his Anſwer to my Meſſage, he alluded to, when he ſaid, "that he thought One or Two of the Parts were more immediately "to the Purpoſe to clear up."

I have another Reaſon, too, to believe that he may eſteem this the Forte of his new Excurſions. An *extraordinary Providence to*

* That I do Dr. Sykes no wrong, when I ſay he regards *Moſes* as of the ſame Species, and puts him upon the very ſame footing with the Heathen Legiſlators, appears from his own Words: "This Doctrine [of a future State] was univerſally believed. Now "*Moſes*, as a Legiſlator, was to lay down Laws to the *Jews*, and he was to incorporate "their National Religion into their Civil Law. This was done, *not by inculcating what* "*was univerſally received and believed by them*; but *by inculcating ſuch Points as were to* "*make the National Religion of the* Jews. An in this he did EXACTLY what other Legiſ-"lators did: what was USEFUL TO THE STATE, he admitted into the Body of his Laws; "and ſo FAR as it was uſeful to the State, BUT FURTHER THAN THAT NEITHER HE NOR "ZALEUCUS CONCERNED THEMSELVES," p. 59, 60. In which ſhort Period are contained theſe Four Propoſitions——*That it is not the Practice of Legiſlators to inculcate what is univerſally believed—That a future State does not make One Point of National Religion*—[And for a good Reaſon. Becauſe]—*That a future State is not uſeful to Society—That, further than the good of the State*, Moſes *concerned himſelf no more than* Zaleucus, *or any other Heathen Legiſlator*.——How much now has this Author to thank me for; when, inſtead of expoſing the other Three Parts of his Book, which abound with theſe Beauties in every Page, I confined myſelf to this, where the natural Obſcurity of the Subject hides both his Blunders and his Bluſhes?

Particulars, though expreſsly promiſed by, and, as I have ſhewn, a neceſſary Conſequence of, the Law of *Moſes*; yet, partly from the Nature of the thing, and partly from miſtaken Paſſages of miſunderſtood Books of Scripture, is not entirely free from Objections. Here then he thought he could do ſomething; though it were but retailing the Objections of others. And truly, as ill as he has managed theſe Advantages, he was not miſtaken in his Choice. For the reſt—it is all over ſuch Argument! and ſuch Criticiſm! as one might well conceive ſhould be reſerved to cloſe the Scene of Letters in an Age like this; when every Science was retiring from its *Profeſſors*, to DICTIONARY-MAKERS and BOOKSELLERS.

REMARK I.

He begins his *Examination of the Nature of the Jewiſh Theocracy* in this manner:—"This Form of Government of the *Jews*, being "properly called a Theocracy, there are two Points which Mr. "*Warburton* has largely conſidered. The firſt is, in relation to the "Origin, Continuation, and Duration of this Theocracy. The "other is in relation to the Exerciſe of an extraordinary Providence "over particular Perſons, as well as over the State in general. In "relation to the former of theſe Points he tells us, *That moſt* "*Writers ſuppoſe it to have ended with the Judges, but ſcarce any* "*bring it lower than the Captivity: On the contrary, I hold that in* "*ſtrict Truth and Propriety it ended not till the coming of* Chriſt, *p.* "404*. Here it is that he attacks Dr. *Spencer's* Diſſertation on the "*Jewiſh* Theocracy, *a Treatiſe by no means in the number of thoſe* "*on which* Spencer *raiſed his Reputation: He goes on a wrong Hy-* "*potheſis*; *he uſes weak Arguments*; *and he is confuſed and inconſiſ-* "*tent in his Aſſertions*, p. 414†. Are we not now, from hence, to "imagine, that Dr. *Spencer* was one of thoſe Writers that ſuppoſed "the Theocracy to have ended with the Judges, or, at furtheſt, "with the Captivity? And yet Mr. *Warburton* is forced to own

* Ed. 4to. Vol. III. p. 69. † Ibid. p. 77.

"that

" that *Spencer* "*ſuppoſes*" [I ſay he poſitively *aſſerts*] " *that ſome* " *obſcure Footſteps of it remained to the Time of* Chriſt. Yes, and " longer too, for his Words are, *ad extrema uſque politiæ ſuæ tem-* " *pora*, i. e. *quite to the latter Times of their Policy*, even to the *laſt* " *Times* of expiring *Judaiſm* *." I had obſerved, *that moſt Writers ſuppoſe the* Theocracy *to have ended with the Judges*; ſcarce *any bring it lower than the Captivity*; *I myſelf ſuppoſe it continued to the Time of* Chriſt: *that Dr.* Spencer *wrote a weak and inconſiſtent Treatiſe on this Subject.* Well, and what ſays our *Anſwerer* to this? " Are we not now *(ſays he)* from hence to IMAGINE that " Dr. *Spencer* was one of thoſe Writers that ſuppoſed the Theo- " cracy to have ended with the Judges?" What Demands of *Imagination* his Trade may have upon him is hard to ſay. But, from my Words, a Reaſoner would *conclude* nothing but that I meant to prove what I ſaid; namely, that Dr. *Spencer's* Book of the Theocracy was *weak* and *inconſiſtent*. Few *Anſwerers* have ſtuck at a Miſrepreſentation; but then it was to carry on their Buſineſs, the Manufactory of falſe Argument. Our Examiner, on the contrary, ſeems to do it only to keep his hand in uſe; for Argument he could make none, though he had the laying together of his own Premiſſes. In a word, the whole is a ſtudied Miſrepreſentation of all I ſaid on this Subject. The Method of which was as follows: *Firſt* to ſhew [from p. 405 to 407 †], that the Theocracy continued to the Time of *Chriſt*. *Secondly*, to confute *Le Clerc's* Arguments [from p. 407 to 414 ‡] for its ceaſing with the Judges. And this makes up the body of the Diſcourſe concerning the *Duration of the Theocracy*. Having done this, I proceeded in theſe Words—*Thus the Diſpute ended* [namely between *Le Clerc* and *P. Simon*]; *and for further Satisfaction* Le Clerc *refers us to a Book of* Spencer's, *written profeſſedly upon this very Subject. It is his Tract* De Theocratia Judaica. *What is to be found there, beſides the Arguments*

* An Examination of Mr. Warburton's Account, &c. 168——170.

† Ed. 4to. Vol. III. p. 69—71. ‡ Ibid. p. 71—77.

Le Clerc *borrowed from it, and which have been conſidered already, I ſhall now, with ſome Reluctancy, inform the Reader* *. Then I go on to give a Character of this Tract, as quoted by the Examiner. And to juſtify this Character, I conſider what is there ſaid that may ſeem to contradict what I had before obſerved concerning the *Duration of the Theocracy*. Now the Reader ſees that this is only an Acceſſory to the body of the Diſcourſe, given, partly, to enervate the Authority which *Le Clerc* built upon it; and partly, to ſtrengthen and confirm what had been advanced by myſelf. Yet our ſimple-minded Doctor, after having concealed all this, ſays (quoting p. 404 †.) "HERE it is that he attacks Dr. *Spencer's* Diſ-
"ſertation;" whenas the very mention of Dr. *Spencer* does not commence till Fourteen Pages afterwards: And, as if that were not enough, goes on in this manner:—"Are we not now from
"hence to imagine that Dr. *Spencer* was one of thoſe Writers that
"ſuppoſed the Theocracy to have ended with the Judges? *&c.*—
"And yet Mr. *W.* is FORCED to own that *Spencer* ſuppoſes," *&c.* I ſhould not have been ſo long in laying open ſo immaterial a Cheat, but as it was convenient the Reader ſhould, on his firſt Acquaintance with our Doctor, be let a little into his Manners.

II.

But he will not only ſhew, that my arraigning *Spencer* was abſurd; but that the Charge againſt him is unjuſt. "His firſt Charge
"againſt him is, that he thought the Theocracy was eſtabliſhed
"by degrees, and abrogated by degrees. *A Conceit highly abſurd*
"(ſays Mr. Warburton) *as God was Legiſlator.* But wherein lies
"the Abſurdity of this gradual Progreſs and gradual Declenſion,
"even in Caſes where God was Legiſlator? I ſuppoſe he will ſay
"that the Theocracy began at the inſtant of the *Horeb* Covenant;
"and not when the Children of *Iſrael* were delivered from *Egypt*,

* Divine Legat. Vol. II. p. 414. [Vol. III. p. 77. Ed. 4to.]
† Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 69.

"and

"and were first under the immediate Protection of God. But "*Spencer* INTENDED BY HIS WORD THEOCRACY, all the time that "the *Jews* were under the direct Power and immediate Domi- "nion of God; which certainly began at the Deliverance of the "*Jews* from *Egypt*, and was compleated in the highest and fullest "Sense at the *Horeb* Covenant, when God was constituted their "King *." I called *Spencer*'s Notion of *the gradual Progress and gradual Declension of a Theocracy, an* ABSURDITY. He says, no: and how does he prove it is not? By shewing, that, by the Word *Theocracy*, *Spencer* meant a *Thing which gradually arose and gradually declined*. But is not this the very *Absurdity* I complain of? I call an Opinion absurd: and He, to free it from this Censure, tells us—what that Opinion is. But as I do not suppose he will be ever able to answer my Question, I will try if I can answer his— "Wherein lies the Absurdity of this gradual Progress and gradual "Declension even in the Cases where God was Legislator?" The Absurdity, learned Sir, lies here: When God is pleased to assume the Character of Civil Magistrate, he must, like all other Magistrates, enter on his Office *at once*; and (as common Sense requires) leave it *at once*. Now the Government, under such a Magistrate, is, what we properly call a THEOCRACY: therefore to talk of the *gradual Progress and gradual Declension* of this Mode of *Civil* Relation, is the same Absurdity as to talk of the *gradual Progress* and *gradual Declension* of Paternity or any other Mode of *Natural* Relation. Whether this was a *Blunder* or a *Sophism*, is of no Consequence; if the Detection of it does but shew the Reader what good Reason I had to suppose, *that the Theocracy began at the Instant of the* Horeb *Covenant*; and how much *Spencer* was mistaken in the use of the Term, if he intended by it, *all the Time that the* Jews *were under the direct Power and immediate Dominion of God*. For, in that Case, he should have used the Word *Legislature*, and not

* Exam. of Mr. W's Account, &c. p. 170, 171.

Theocracy

Theocracy.—But I had beſt ſtop here, leſt this new Diſtinction ſhould ſtill further embarras this able Advocate of Dr. *Spencer*.

III.

However, he goes on to ſupport his Reaſoning in this manner :—
" So when Dr. *Spencer* ſpeaks of its *declining gradually—of the*
" *Government of God being leſſened—of its making a nearer Approach*
" *to its ceaſing*, I think, if there be any *Abſurdity* or *Inconſiſtency*
" in this manner of ſpeaking, it may be juſtified by Mr. *Warburton's*
" own Authority. He himſelf tells us, that *indeed in the Period*
" *immediately preceding their* [the Jews] *Captivity, on the gradual*
" *withdrawing the extraordinary Providence from them—they began*
" *to entertain Doubts concerning God's further peculiar regard to them*
" *as his choſen People*, p. 400 *. So that he here expreſsly owns a
" GRADUAL WITHDRAWING of the extraordinary Providence from
" the *Jews*. And where is the Abſurdity of Dr. *Spencer's* gradual
" Declenſion or Imminution of the Theocracy, which Mr. *Warbur-*
" *ton's* gradual withdrawing of the extraordinary Providence is not
" liable unto? or was not the gradual withdrawing of the extra-
" ordinary Providence a proper Imminution of the Theocracy † ?"
He is ſo fond of this Argument that he repeats it again at p. 218.
" Dr. SPENCER and Mr. WARBURTON ſeem to expreſs themſelves
" ſo exactly alike about the Imminution OF THE THEOCRACY, that
" one would wonder how it ſhould happen that Dr. *Spencer's* No-
" tion is a Conceit highly abſurd, and Mr. *Warburton's* ſhould be ſo
" conſiſtent, and eaſy, and natural." To all this I anſwer, that our Advocate has here fairly convicted himſelf of a degree of Ignorance that I never would have ventured to ſuſpect of him, which is, the not knowing the Difference between the FORM OF GOVERNMENT and the ADMINISTRATION of it. Now Dr. *Spencer* talked of a gradual Decline of *the Form of Government*; which I thought abſurd. I, of the gradual Decline of the *Adminiſtration of it*; which,

* Ed. 4to. Vol. III. p. 51, 52.

† Exam. of Mr. *W's* Account, &c. p. 171, 172.

whether

whether it be equally abſurd, may be ſeen by a parallel Inſtance.—For though, not long ſince, I ſpoke of Parallels, Similitudes, and Reſemblances, as weak Inſtruments for the Diſcovery of Truth; yet they are often of more uſe than better things for the Detection of Falſhood. If I ſhould ſay then, that there was, during the Reigns of *James* the Firſt and *Charles* the Second, a gradual withdrawing the *Protection* of the People, and the equal *Adminiſtration* of Juſtice; I ſhould ſpeak, I preſume, both Senſe and Truth: Yet if *Oldmixon* himſelf ſhould affirm that there was, during this Period, a gradual withdrawing of the *Monarchy*; I ſhould go near to ſay, he talked as much like a Fool in this, as he talks like a Knave in moſt other Parts of his Hiſtory.

IV.

Well, but our Advocate will go further; and ſhew, that though Dr. *Spencer* be conſiſtent, yet I am not.—"I will obſerve further *(ſays he)* "Dr. *Spencer* maintains *that ſome obſcure Footſteps of the* "*Theocracy remained even to the Time of* Chriſt. And Mr. *Warbur-*" *ton* holds it *ended not till the coming of* Chriſt, p. 404. 417*. Dr. "*Spencer* is conſiſtent; but it is far from being clear that Mr. *War-*" *burton* is ſo. For He hath told us, that in the Period immedi-" ately preceding the Captivity, there was a gradual withdrawing " of the extraordinary Providence, p. 400 †. In another Place he " tells us, that *after their perfect Settlement on their return from Cap-*" *tivity (when we know, from the Courſe and Progreſs of God's Oe-*" *conomy, the extraordinary Providence would ceaſe) we hear no more* " *of it amongſt them, nor did they make the leaſt Pretence to it, though* " *they now adhered much more ſtrictly to their Religion, than they had* " *ever done before. They pretended not—to either Prophets, Oracles,* " *or extraordinary Diſpenſations*, p. 440 ‡. Here Mr. *Warburton* men-" tions the Misfortune at *Bethſura, cauſed by the Sabbatical Year; a* " *Misfortune of which we have no Inſtance before the Captivity, and* " *therefore a plain Proof, that the extraordinary Providence was in-*

* Ed. 4to. Vol. III. Book V. § 2. † Ibid. p. 52. ‡ Ibid. p. 118.

" *deed*

" *deed withdrawn*, p. 440 *. Again; *The extraordinary Providence* " *kept gradually decaying, till on their full Settlement after their Re-* " *turn it entirely ceaſed*, p. 445 †. From theſe aſſertions of Mr. *War-* " *burton* I argue, that if the EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE *en-* " *tirely ceaſed* on the full Settlement of the *Jews* after their Return, " it ceaſed ſome Centuries at leaſt before the Days of *Chriſt*; and " CONSEQUENTLY the THEOCRACY muſt have ceaſed ſome Centu- " ries before the Days of *Chriſt*. How then is Mr. *Warburton* more " conſiſtent about the Duration of the Theocracy than others are, " ſince he pleads for its Continuance till *Chriſt's* Time, and yet " maintains that it entirely ceaſed ſo long before his Time ‡?"

The Argument, we ſee, gathers as it rolls. In the beginning, The *ceaſing* of an *extraordinary Providence* only implied, in *conſe-quence* the ceaſing of the *Theocracy*. But, before we get to the end of the Sentence, an *extraordinary Providence* and a *Theocracy* are one and the ſame thing. Mr. *Warburton* pleads for its [a Theo- " cracy's] Continuance till *Chriſt's* Time, and yet maintains that " IT entirely ceaſed ſo long before his Time." Thus again to the ſame purpoſe at p. 178. " Or by what Rule does he form a Judg- " ment that WHAT was gradually decaying to the Captivity, was " entirely to ceaſe after their Return and full Settlement; and yet " WAS to continue till *Chriſt's* Time?"—Nay, if he begins to talk of *Rules*, let me aſk him by what *Rule* he found out, " that a *Mo-* " *narchy* and an exact *Adminiſtration of Juſtice* are one and the ſame " thing?" I ſuppoſe by the *Genus generaliſſimum* of the Schools; and might be borrowed, for aught I know, of a certain Predeceſ- ſor of his in the Church of *Sarum*, who, when the Biſhop (to whom he was conſtruing in the *Latin* Teſtament) aſked him what the Word *Argentum* was governed of, replied, " Of God Almighty, who governs all things." But Times are changed, and now *Argen-tum* governs in its turn. The truth is, our Examiner was thus

* Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 118. † Ibid. vol. III. p. 122.

‡ Exam. of Mr. *W's* Account, &c. p. 173, 174.

grievouſly

grievouſly miſled by the Ambiguity of the *Engliſh* Word THE GOVERNMENT; which ſignifies either the MODE of Civil Policy, or the ADMINISTRATION of it. But was this to be expected in a Man who had been all his Life-long writing ABOUT *Government?*

Yet thus he runs along, puſhing his own Blunder before him, from Page to Page. And ſtill, as if unwilling to leave it, is at laſt hardly content to recapitulate his Argument in the following manner. "What now is the difference between theſe TWO GREAT "MEN? Dr. *Spencer* has dated the Abatement of the Theocracy "from the End of the Time of the Judges: Mr. *Warburton* allows "that *Under the Judges* IT *was perfectly equal.* Dr. *Spencer* ſays "that the Theocracy ſuffered ſome Imminution under *David* and "*Solomon:* Mr. *Warburton* ſays, *when the People demanded a King*— "*there was a great Abatement in the Vigour of* THIS *extraordinary* "*Providence.* At laſt Mr. *Warburton* owns a total ceſſation upon "the return of the Jews from Captivity; and to the time of the "Captivity, a gradual Decay. Dr. *Spencer* ſays, there was a gra-"dual Imminution of the Theocracy; but as for a total Ceſſation "before *Chriſt's* Time, he was not INCONSISTENT ENOUGH to main-"tain that *." What muſt we do with our Doctor under this ſtrange Idioſyncraſy? The general Caſe of ſuch kind of Writers, when they ſtumble, is to run inſtinctively, as it were, from their own Blunders. But our *Doctor* delights to dwell upon his, affects to enjoy them, though but for a Moment, returns again and again to them, as if enamoured of his own Image, in them.

V.

But now for a Maſter-ſtroke; worthy an *Anſwerer by Profeſſion.*

"It [the extraordinary Providence] had ceaſed *(ſays he)* ſome hun-"dred of Years before *Chriſt* came; as Mr. *Warburton* over and "over confeſſes. The Difficulty then is to ſhew that the *Theocracy* "continued, or, *ended not till the coming of* Chriſt; p. 404 †."

* Exam. of Mr. *W's* Account, &c. p. 177.
† Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 69.

" Perhaps Mr. *Warburton* will diſtinguiſh between the ceaſing of " the *Theocracy*, and the ceaſing of the *Extraordinary Providence*: " He may ſay that the *Theocracy* continued till the *coming of Chriſt*; " the *Extraordinary Providence* entirely ceaſed at the full Settlement " after the return of the *Jews* from their Captivity. Let us then " grant that the *Theocracy revived after the return from the Captivi-* " *ty*, as he tells us, p. 416 *. And that *that Diſpenſation of Provi-* " *dence ſoon ceaſed after the Re-eſtabliſhment*; *ibid.* We are ſtill as " much in the Dark as ever; nor will this Diſtinction help the Mat- " ter, or free Mr. *Warburton* from great Self-contradiction. For " he tells us, *one* NECESSARY *Conſequence* [of a Theocracy] *was an-* " EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE. For the Affairs of a People " under a Theocracy being adminiſtered *by* GOD *as* KING; *and his* " *peculiar and immediate Adminiſtration in human Affairs being what* " *we call an* Extraordinary Providence, *it follows that an Extraor-* " *dinary Providence muſt* NEEDS *be exerciſed over ſuch a People. My* " *Meaning is, that if the* Jews *were really under a* Theocracy, *they* " *were really under an* Extraordinary Providence.—*In a Word, they* " *muſt be either both true or both falſe, but ſtill* inſeparable; *p.* 419 †.

" If this be the Caſe, then it is plain that a *Theocracy* cannot be " without an *Extraordinary Providence.* But then Mr. *Warburton* " has ſhewn, and at large inſiſts upon it, that the *Extraordinary* " *Providence* ENTIRELY CEASED ſeveral hundred Years *before Chriſt's* " *coming*: Nay he ſays, that he knows from the Courſe and Pro- " greſs of God's Oeconomy, that the *Extraordinary Providence* " WOULD ceaſe at the *full Settlement of the* Jews *after their return* " *from the Captivity*; *p.* 440 ‡. He has likewiſe proved by ſeveral " Arguments, *that the* Theocracy *continued even to the coming of* " Chriſt; *p.* 417, 418 §. By this means we are left in inextri- " cable Difficulties: For firſt we have a *Theocracy* ſubſiſting " many hundred Years without an *extraordinary Providence*,

* Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 79.
† Ibid. p. 98.
‡ Ibid. p. 118.
§ Ibid. p. 80.

" viz.

" viz. from the Settlement of the *Jews*, after their return,
" to the time of *Chriſt*: And conſequently, Secondly, a *Theo-*
" *cracy* wherein an *Extraordinary Providence* NEEDS not be ex-
" erciſed. Thirdly we have a *Theocracy* without a NECESSARY
" CONSEQUENCE of a Theocracy, *i. e.* without an extraordinary
" Providence. And whereas he aſſerts that *the* Theocracy *and* ex-
" traordinary Providence *muſt be either Both true or Both falſe, but*
" *ſtill* inſeparable, He himſelf has ſhewn them to be *ſeparable*, by
" ſhewing that the one did in fact ſubſiſt without the other for ſo
" many hundred Years as were between the Settlement of the *Jews*
" after their return from Captivity and the coming of *Chriſt* *."

The firſt thing I ſhall obſerve is, that the *Theocracy* and the *Extraordinary Providence* are now become *two* again, after they had been ſo long *one*. But who can help it! The Author of *The Divine Legation* would needs have them, *two*. However he will ſtill ſhew they are *inſeparable*; and that, from the Author's own Confeſſion.—I have here quoted him Word for Word, without the omiſſion of a Syllable; that when we ſee what he was reſolved not to ſee, we may the better judge of what he meant, by a *Mind open to Conviction*: no more, I dare ſay, than *a Man who had been often convicted*; though never perhaps before in ſo flagrant an Inſtance. —The Truth is, I had expreſsly and particularly conſidered and confuted this very Objection, in the 420th † Page of the ſecond Volume of *The Divine Legation*, where (on the Words.——*They* [the Theocracy and extraordinary Providence] *muſt be either both true or both falſe, but ſtill inſeparable*, Words which our Examiner has twice quoted) I have this Note at the bottom of the Page—*The Thing here aſſerted has been miſunderſtood, as contradicting what I afterwards obſerve concerning the gradual Decay and total Extinction of the* extraordinary Providence, *while the* Theocracy *yet exiſted. But when I ſay* an extraordinary Providence was one neceſſary Conſequence of a Theocracy, *I muſt needs mean that it was ſo in its original Conſtitu-*

* Exam. of Mr. *W*'s Account, p. 180—182.

† Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 98.

tion, and in the eſtabliſhed Nature of Things: Not that in this, which was matter of Compact, the contravening Acts of one Party might not make a Separation. *For as this* extraordinary Providence *was, beſides, a Reward for Obedience to the Theocracy, it became ſubject to a Forfeiture by Diſobedience and Rebellion, though Subjection to the Government ſtill continued. To illuſtrate this by a domeſtic Inſtance: A Voice in the ſupreme Council of the Kingdom is the neceſſary Conſequence of an* Engliſh *Barony; yet they may be ſeparated by a judicial Sentence; and actually have been ſo, as in the Caſe of the famous Lord* Bacon, *who was deprived of his Seat in the Houſe of Lords, and yet held his Barony. This was the ſpecific Puniſhment of the rebellious* Iſraelites. *They were deprived of the* extraordinary Providence; *and yet held ſubject to the* Theocracy, *as appears from the Sentence pronounced upon them by the Mouth of the Prophet* Ezekiel: "*Ye pollute yourſelves with your* "*Idols even unto this Day: and ſhall I be enquired of by you, O Houſe* "*of* Iſrael? *As I live, ſaith the Lord God,* I will not be enquired "of by you. And that which cometh into your Mind ſhall not "be at all, that ye ſay, we will be as the Heathen, as the Fami- "lies of the Countries to ſerve Wood and Stone. *As I live, ſaith* "*the Lord,* with a mighty Hand, with a ſtretched-out Arm, and "with Fury poured out, will I rule over you. And I will bring "you out from the People, and will gather you out of the Coun- "tries wherein ye are ſcattered, *with a mighty Hand, and with a* "*ſtretched-out Arm, and with Fury poured out. And I will bring* "*you into the Wilderneſs of the People, and there will I plead with* "*you Face to Face.* Like as I pleaded with your Fathers in the "Wilderneſs of the Land of *Egypt, ſo will I plead with you, ſaith* "*the Lord. And* I will cauſe you to paſs under the Rod. *And* I "will bring you into the BOND OF THE COVENANT." *Chap.* XX. ver. 3—37. *It is here, we ſee, denounced that the extraordinary Providence ſhould be withdrawn; or, in Scripture Phraſe,* that God would not be enquired of by them; *that they ſhould remain in the Condition of their* Fathers in the Wilderneſs, *when the extraordinary*

Providence,

Providence, for their ſignal Diſobedience, was for ſome time ſuſpended. But for all that, though they ſtrove to diſperſe themſelves amongſt the People round about, and projected in their Minds to be as the Heathen, and the Families of the Countries to ſerve Wood and Stone, *yet they ſhould ſtill be held under the Government of a* Theocracy: *which, when adminiſtred without its naturally attendant Bleſſing of an extraordinary Providence, was, and was juſtly called, the* ROD *and* BOND OF THE COVENANT *. He is now fairly and openly *convicted.* What ſhall be his Puniſhment? That, which hath proved, hitherto, his Reader's; *To write on.*

VI.

He proceeds, "Mr. *Warburton's* ſecond Objection againſt Dr. "*Spencer* is—in his Arguments for the Abolition of the Theocracy, "*inſtead of attempting to prove it on the great Principles of Civil* 'Policy, *the only way of determining the Queſtion with Certainty, he* "*inſiſts much on the Diſuſe of* Urim *and* Thummim, *&c. He brings* "*the Deſpotic Power of the Kings, as another Argument, which I* "*think proves the very contrary. For were theſe Kings the Viceroys* "*of God, whoſe Power was Deſpotic, theirs muſt neceſſarily be the* "*ſame; not ſo, if Monarchs in their own right*; p. 415 †.—*In his Ar-*"*guments for the* Abolition of the Theocracy.—Has Dr. *Spencer* any "Arguments for the *Abolition* of the Theocracy before the Days "of *Chriſt?* He has no ſuch Arguments; nor, I dare ſay, never "thought of ſuch a Topic; becauſe he tells us it continued to the "laſt Times of their Policy. He has indeed a Section about the "Duration of the Theocracy, in which he lays down four Theſes, "about the gradual declining of the Theocracy: And in one of "them he ſhews it was not at an End in *Saul* and *David's* Days, "becauſe in their Time the divine Oracle was conſulted; that in "*Solomon's* Time, there was a diſuſe of *Urim* and *Thummim*, which

* Divine Legat. Vol. II. Part II. p. 420, 421. Note °. [Vol. III. p. 98—100, ed. 4to.]

† Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 78.

"was

" was a moſt eminent Pledge and Indication of the divine Govern-
" ment: From this he concludes it nearer ἀφανισμῷ, to a diſap-
" pearing. But ſince he allows it to continue for a thouſand or
" eleven hundred Years after this, how is it POSSIBLE for him to
" bring Arguments for the Abolition of the Theocracy from the
" *Urim* and *Thummim?* He could MEAN only an Abatement *."
Hear now, *my own Words*, fairly printed together, in *The Divine Legation*; and let the Reader believe it, if he can. *This Treatiſe is by no Means in the number of thoſe on which* Spencer *raiſed his Reputation. He goes on a wrong Hypotheſis; he uſes weak Arguments; and he is confuſed and* INCONSISTENT *in his Aſſertions.* 1. *He thinks the Theocracy was eſtabliſhed by* Degrees *and abrogated by* Degrees. *A Conceit highly abſurd, as God was Legiſlator. He thinks the firſt Step to its Introduction was the delivery at the* Red-ſea; *and the firſt Step to its Abolition, the* Iſraelites *demand of him a King: That it was more impaired when* Saul *and* David *got Poſſeſſion of the Throne: That it approached much nearer its End when it became hereditary, under* Solomon: *And yet, for all this, that ſome obſcure Footſteps of it remained even to the time of* Chriſt. 2. *In his* ARGUMENT *for the* ABOLITION *of the Theocracy, inſtead of employing the great Principles of civil Policy, the only Means of determining the Queſtion with certainty, he inſiſts much on the Diſuſe of* Urim *and* Thummim, *&c. He brings the deſpotic Power of the Kings as another Argument; which, I think, proves juſt the contrary. For were theſe Kings the Viceroys of God, whoſe Power was deſpotic, their Power muſt neceſſarily be ſo too: not ſo, if Monarchs, in their own Right.* 3. *Though as we obſerved,* Spencer, *in the* ſecond Section of the fourth Chapter, *ſuppoſes a* gradual Decay *of the Theocracy; and that even ſome obſcure Footſteps of it remained to the Time of* Chriſt; *yet in the* following Section *he all the way* ARGUES UPON THE SUPPOSITION OF AN ABSOLUTE AND ENTIRE ABROGATION *by the eſtabliſhment of the Kings* †.

* Examination of Mr. *W's* Account, p. 182, 183.

† Div. Leg. Vol. II. p. 415, 416. [Vol. III. p. 77—79, ed. 4to.]

And

And in evidence of this laſt Aſſertion, I quote at the bottom of the Page theſe following Words of Dr. *Spencer*.—"Regiminis hujus "MUTATI vel ABROGATI cauſa principalis—De regiminis hujus "ABROGATI effectu vel eventu breviter differendum eſt."——*Op. Spen. p.* 241. 243. Vol. I.

This then is the whole of what I ſaid of Dr. *Spencer* on this occaſion. Where the Reader ſees, my ſole Purpoſe was to prove my Aſſertion, that Dr. *Spencer* argued *weakly* and *inconſiſtently*. In the firſt Paragraph, I ſhew his Arguments for a *gradual Decay* are weak. In the ſecond that his Arguments for an *Abolition* are as weak. And in the third, that he was *inconſiſtent*, talking one while of the continuance of it to the time of *Chriſt*; and another, of its Abrogation under the Kings. Now what ſays our learned Doctor to all this? Why in the firſt place, he detaches the ſecond Paragraph from the firſt and third; though they all relate to, and connect with one another; and quotes it alone as if intire and independent. With ſuch a Liberty the Reader would reaſonably think he might have made ſome ſhew at leaſt of an Argument: But, by the good Proviſion of Nature, his Head was made an exact Tally to his Heart. I had ſaid that *Spencer* talked inconſiſtently in, firſt, ſuppoſing a *gradual Decay and Continuance* to the Time of *Chriſt*; and yet ſaying that it was *abrogated* under the Kings. What is his Anſwer? "Since *Spencer* allows it to continue for a thouſand or eleven hun-"dred Years after *Solomon's* Time, how is it POSSIBLE for him to "bring Arguments for the Abolition of the Theocracy from the "diſuſe of *Urim* and *Thummim?* He COULD MEAN only an Abate-"ment." That is in plain *Engliſh*—How is it *poſſible* a Man ſhould contradict himſelf? Or in ſtill plainer—Your Charge of INCONSISTENCY muſt be falſe, otherwiſe Dr. *Spencer* would be INCONSISTENT.

VII. "The:

VII.

" The third Objection of Mr. *Warburton* (ſays our Doctor) is, " that though *Spencer* in one place *ſuppoſes a gradual Decay of the* " *Theoracy, and that even ſome obſcure Footſteps of it remained to the* " *Time of* Chriſt, *yet in the following Section he all the way argues upon* " *the Suppoſition of an abſolute and entire Abrogation by the Eſtabliſh-* " *ment of the Kings, p.* 416 *. Here again is Dr. *Spencer* MUCH " MISREPRESENTED, from not conſidering what he MEANT by the " ABROGATION of God's Government. Not that the Theocracy " entirely ceaſed; but the Government received an ALTERATION " and ABATEMENT. And therefore he uſes more than once the " Phraſe of *Regiminis mutati*, in this very Section, and tells us that " when the *Iſraelites* deſired a King—*hac in re Deus ab arte regis* " *politici non receſſit.* God DID NOT RECEDE FROM THE ART of a " political Governor, but conſented to their Requeſts in order to " avoid a greater Evil. Where is the Abſurdity or Inconſiſtency " of this Way of reaſoning, unleſs Abrogation is made to ſignify a " total Abolition; and Duration is to be conſtrued Ceſſation † ?

" *Spencer (ſays he)* is much miſrepreſented; he did not mean by " ABROGATION a CEASING, but an ALTERATION and ABATE- " MENT." In the *firſt* place then, it ſeems that when one charges an Author with Contradiction in his Expreſſions; if he had a *Meaning*, that was conſiſtent, he is much *miſrepreſented.* A good commodious Principle for the whole Claſs of Anſwerers! *Secondly*, he ſays that *Abrogation* [*regimen abrogatum*] *does not ſignify ceaſing.* Where did he get his *Latin? Cicero*, *Livy*, and all the *Roman* Writers, Lawyers as well as Philoſophers, uſe it only in the Senſe of Diſſolution, Abolition, and the entire ceaſing of an Office or Command. What then does it ſignify? why it ſignifies an ALTERATION AND ABATEMENT. But now, Where did he get his

* Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 79.

† Exam. of Mr. *W's* Account, p. 185, 186.

Engliſh?

Engliſh? What! Is an *Alteration* of Government only an *Abatement* of it? The *Alteration* of a *Theocracy* we underſtand: But what is the *Abatement* of it? That indeed I cannot tell. But this I know, that we have here a ſufficient Proof of what I laid to his Charge, that he perpetually confounds the *Mode* of Government with the *Adminiſtration* of it: *Alteration* being applicable to the former; and *Abatement*, only to the latter. *Thirdly* he ſays—"and THEREFORE *Spencer* uſes more than once the Phraſe of *regi-*"*minis* MUTATI in this very Section."—*Therefore!* Wherefore? why, becauſe, by *abrogati* he meant only *abated*; therefore he uſes *mutati*, more than once, to explain himſelf; that is to ſay, becauſe, by *totum*, I mean *pars*; THEREFORE I uſe *omne*, more than once, to explain my Meaning. Well, if he did not ſatisfy us before; he has done it now. But *Abrogation* muſt not only ſignify *Prorogation*, but, what is more, *mutati* muſt ſignify *immutati*. Till now we thought that *mutatus* had ſignified *changed*; a groſs *Miſrepreſentation*, ſays he; it ſignifies *unchanged*, though indeed abated or diminiſhed.

Fourthly, he ſays that *Spencer* tells us, when the *Iſraelites* deſired "a King—*hac in re Deus ab arte regis politici non receſſit*; God did "not recede from the Art of a Political Governor." This the Reader is to take as a Proof of *Spencer's* holding that *God did not give up his Office*; and conſequently, that there could be no *Abrogation*; for we have here to do with a very ſubtile Reaſoner.—Seriouſly, the Blunder is a delightful one! *ab arte regis Politici non receſſit*, according to our Critic, ſignifies, that God did not recede from the Art or Exerciſe of Governing; or did not throw up his Office. He has tranſlated the Words, we ſee, *verbatim*; ſo that it is a little hard when he ſtuck ſo cloſe to his Text, he ſhould be thrown ſo wide from its Meaning: which is, indeed, no more than this, that *God condeſcended to uſe the Addreſs of Political Monarchs*, who, when they cannot ſtop or repel a Torrent, contrive to elude it. And "where *(ſays he)* is the Abſurdity or Inconſiſtency of this "way of reaſoning?"—Nay, for that matter, the Reaſoning is full

as good as the Tranſlation. But here he ſhould have ſtopp'd. For ſo fatal is his Expreſſion, when the Fit is upon him, that he cannot aſk quarter for one Blunder without committing another—"unleſs ABROGATION is made to ſignify a total ABOLITION, and "DURATION is conſtrued to be CESSATION?" I can find *(ſays he)* no Abſurdity or Inconſiſtency in Dr. *Spencer* without perverting the common Signification of Words.—This is his Argument—*Without calling Duration, Ceſſation*—ſo far is well. But he goes on—*and, Abrogation, Abolition.* And here he ſinks again. For *Abrogation* was *Abolition*, in all Nations and Languages, till Dr. *Sykes* firſt pleaded in ABATEMENT.

In a word, the Charge againſt *Spencer* was of *Abſurdity* and *Contradiction* in one Inſtance amidſt a thouſand Excellencies. Dr. *Sykes* aſſumes the Honour of his Defence. But with what Judgment he ſoon lets us underſtand, when he can find no other Part of that immortal Book to do himſelf the Credit of ſupporting than his Treatiſe of the *Theocracy*. Like the ancient Advocate of *Cicero*, who, while that great Man's Character was torn in pieces by his Enemies, the Flatterers of *Octavius*, would needs vindicate him from the *Wart* upon his Noſe, againſt his Friends.

Hitherto the Controverſy was unnatural. Dr. *Sykes* became Advocate for *Spencer* againſt an Accuſation brought by the Author of *The Divine Legation.* But Both ſoon return again to their proper Buſineſs: He to objecting againſt the *extraordinary Providence* of Heaven; I, to a Defence of this certain and neceſſary Conſequence of a *Theocracy*.

VIII.

"Let us now proceed *(ſays the learned Doctor)* to the ſecond Point, "which relates to the Exerciſe of an extraordinary Providence over "*particular Perſons* as well as over the *State* in general. The Scrip-"ture Repreſentation of the Theocracy, as Mr. *Warburton* aſſures us, "*was*, 1. *over the State in general: and* 2. *over private Men in parti-*"*cular*,

" *cular, p.* 434 *. I have no Doubts about the former of theſe " Caſes: For where a Law was given by God, and he condeſcended " to become King of a Nation, and a ſolemn Covenant was en- " tered into by the People, and by God, as their King, and where " Bleſſings were ſolemnly promiſed upon Obedience to the Law, " or Curſes were denounced upon Diſobedience: and this by one " who was able to execute whatever he engaged; no Doubt can " be about the reciprocal Obligations, or about God's performing " his Part of the Obligation, ſince it is his Property not to lie nor " deceive. Temporal Rewards and Puniſhments being then the " Sanction of the *Jewiſh* Law, theſe muſt be diſpenſed by God ſo " as to make the State happy and flouriſhing if they kept the " Law, or elſe miſerable if they diſobeyed it. If they obſerved and " did all the Commandments, which God commanded them, God " had engaged to make them *high above all Nations which he had* " *made, in Praiſe, and in Name, and in Honour*; and *if Enemies roſe* " *up againſt them, the Lord would cauſe them to be ſmitten.* On the " other hand, if they grew negligent of the Law, or *went aſide* " *from any of the Words commanded them—to ſerve other Gods*, then " the Lord was to ſend *Curſing, Vexation, and Rebuke in all* THOU " *ſetteſt* THINE *Hand unto for to do, until* THOU *be deſtroyed and until* " THOU *periſh quickly.* The Bleſſings and Curſes were general " and national, agreeable to the Character of a King, and a legal " Adminiſtration: Such as related to them as a People; and not " to particular Perſons †."

Here, he aſſures us, " he has no Doubts about the extraordinary Providence over the State in general." And he tells us his Reaſon,—Becauſe " the Law was given by God, and he condeſcended " to become the King of the Nation, by a ſolemn Covenant made " with the People." This, I ſay, is his Reaſon, when taken out of the Verbiage of his Expreſſion. Now if it can be proved that

* Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 112.

† Exam. of Mr. W's Account, &c. p. 186, 187.

this very Reaſon holds equally ſtrong for an extraordinary Providence over *Particulars*, this *ſecond Point*, as he calls it, will be ſoon decided between us. In order to this, let me aſk him what thoſe Reaſons are whereby he infers that, from *God's becoming King of a Nation*, he muſt adminiſter an extraordinary Providence over the *State in general*, which do not equally conclude for God's adminiſtring it over *Particulars?* Is not his Inference founded upon this, That where God condeſcends to aſſume a Civil Character, he condeſcends to adminiſter it in a Civil Manner? Which is done by extending his Care over the Whole. If our Doctor ſays, his Inference is not thus founded; I muſt then beg leave to tell him, that he has no Foundation at all to conclude, from God's being King, that there was an extraordinary Providence exerted over the State in general. If he ſays, it is thus founded; then I infer, upon the ſame grounds, an extraordinary Providence over *Particulars*. For the Juſtice of the regal Office is equally concerned in extending its Care to *Particulars* as to the *State in general*. It may be aſked then, what hindered our Examiner from ſeeing ſo ſelf-evident a Truth? I reply, an old inveterate Blunder, with which he firſt ſet out; and which yet ſticks to him. I have obſerved above what Confuſion he ran into by not being able to diſtinguiſh between the *Form of Government* and the *Adminiſtration of it*. Here again he makes the ſame blind work from not ſeeing the Difference between a *Legiſlator* and a *King*. "For where a LAW *(ſays he)* was given "by God, and he condeſcended to become the KING of a Na-"tion, *&c.*" implying that, in his Opinion, the *giving a Law*, and the *becoming a King*, was one and the ſame thing. Hence it was, that as the *Legiſlative Power*, in the Inſtitution of good Laws, extends its Providence only over the State in general, he concluded, that the *executive Power*, in the Adminiſtration of thoſe Laws, does no more. Which brings him to a *Concluſion* altogether worthy the Abilities exerted in the Dilucidation of his *Premiſſes*—"The "Bleſſings and Curſes *(ſays he)* were general and national, AGREE-

"ABLE

"ABLE TO THE CHARACTER OF A KING AND A LEGAL ADMI-"NISTRATION."—What! Is it only agreeable to the Character of a King and a legal Adminiſtration to take Care of the *State in general*, and not of *Particulars?* So, according to this new Syſtem of Policy, it is agreeable to the Conſtitution of *England* to fit out Fleets, to protect the Public from Inſults, and to enact Laws to encourage Commerce; but not to erect Courts of Equity, or to ſend about itinerant Judges. What makes our Examiner's Ignorance in this matter the more inexcuſable is, that I had pointed out to him this *Diſtinction*, in the following Paſſage; the former Part of which he has quoted, but dropt the latter, as if determined that neither himſelf nor Reader ſhould be the better for it. My Words are theſe: *It* [the extraordinary Providence] *is repreſented as adminiſtred,* 1. *over the State in general.* 2. *Over private Men in particular. And ſuch a Repreſentation we ſhould expect to find from the Nature of the Republic*; BECAUSE AS AN EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE OVER THE STATE NECESSARILY FOLLOWS GOD'S BEING THEIR TUTELARY DEITY [in which Capacity he gave them Laws]; SO AN EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE TO PARTICULARS FOLLOWS AS NECESSARILY FROM HIS BEING THEIR SUPREME MAGISTRATE*. Here then I might fairly leave him, having proved my Poſition on the very ſame Principles, and in the very ſame manner, he has proved his own. But let us hear him out.

IX.

He proceeds to tell his Reader what is the Queſtion between us. But we now know enough of him to be upon our guard whenever he begins to tell his Story. And, in truth, it is no more than needs. For here he tops his Part. "The Queſtion then *(ſays he)*, "that now is to be conſidered is, whether an extraordinary Pro-"vidence was adminiſtred to Particulars in ſuch a manner, that

* Divine Legation, Vol. II. p. 436. [See Vol. III. p. 112, Ed. 4to.]

"no

" *no Tranſgreſſor eſcaped Puniſhment, nor any Obſerver of the Law* " *miſſed his Reward.* This was the State of the *Jews* under an " equal Providence, as Mr. *Warburton*tells us, p. 452 *, and by this " means *human Affairs might be kept in good order without the Doc-* " *trine of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments.* That God did " bleſs particular Perſons amongſt the *Jews*, as well as now he does " in all Nations, is certain ; But that he ſo diſpenſed his Favours, " as that *no Obſerver of the Law miſſed his Reward, nor did any* " *Tranſgreſſor eſcape Puniſhment*, is far from being clear. The Na- " tion, conſidered as a Nation, had this peculiar to it, that when " they did evil in the ſight of the Lord, they were delivered into " the Hands of their Enemies. When they repented and put away " the ſtrange Gods from amongſt them and ſerved the Lord, they " were delivered. Inſtances of this are frequent in the Book of " *Judges*, and in the Hiſtory of the Kings of *Iſrael.* But if " we deſcend to an extraordinary Providence over Particulars, " even in thoſe Times, I do not remember what will amount to " Proof †."

He ſays the Queſtion between us is, " Whether an extraordinary " Providence to Particulars was adminiſtred IN SUCH A MANNER, " that no Tranſgreſſor eſcaped Puniſhment, nor any Obſerver of the " Law miſſed his Reward." On the contrary, he himſelf owns, in the very preceding Paragraph, that the Queſtion between us is ſimply this, whether the extraordinary Providence was only over the State in general ; or whether it extended to Particulars. And on that occaſion fairly quotes the Paſſage where I ſtated the Nature of this extraordinary Providence. Nay, in the very Paragraph juſt quoted from him, he owns, in Concluſion, that the Queſtion is about an extraordinary Providence over Particulars ; without confining or extending it to this or that Mode ; for he denies the very

* Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 136, 137.

† Exam. of Mr, W's Account, &c. p. 187, 188.

thing

thing itſelf. What then are we to ſuppoſe was his Drift in changing the State of the Queſtion; and telling us now, that it is, whether "the extraordinary Providence was adminiſtred IN SUCH A MANNER "*that no Tranſgreſſor eſcaped Puniſhment, nor any Obſerver of the* "*Law miſſed his Reward?*" What think you? But to introduce a commodious Fallacy under an ambiguous Expreſſion; that ſhould be always at hand to anſwer his Occaſions? Which, we ſhall find as we go along, *this* always is. And indeed the cautious Reader (and I would adviſe no other to have to do with him) will ſuſpect no leſs, when he obſerves that the Words, [*no Tranſgreſſor eſcaped Puniſhment, nor any Obſerver of the Law miſſed his Reward*] quoted from me, are not to be found in that place where I ſtated the Nature of the extraordinary Providence; but in *another*. Where I ſpeak of the Conſequences of it, in theſe Words.—*We have ſhewn at large in the firſt Volume, that under a common or unequal Providence, civil Government could not be ſupported without a Religion, teaching a future State of Reward and Puniſhment. And it is the great Purpoſe of this Work to prove, that the* Moſaic *Religion wanting that Doctrine, the* Jews *muſt neceſſarily have enjoyed an equal Providence under which holy Scripture repreſents them to have lived.* AND THEN, *no Tranſgreſſor eſcaping Puniſhment, nor any Obſerver of the Law miſſing his Reward, human Affairs muſt be kept in good order without the Doctrine of a future State* *. What now has this *Anſwerer by Profeſſion* done? He has taken the Words [*no Tranſgreſſor eſcaping Puniſhment, nor any Obſerver of the Law miſſing his Reward*] from their natural place, miſrepreſented their Purpoſe, and given them to the Reader as my DEFINITION of an extraordinary Providence to Particulars; and, not content with that, has put this falſe and ſophiſtical Senſe upon them, THAT NO ONE SINGLE PERSON, WITHOUT EXCEPTION, ever eſcaped Puniſhment, or ever miſſed his Reward. And in this monſtrous Senſe he, by the worſt Prevari-

* Div. Leg. Vol. II. p. 454. [Vol. III. p. 136, Ed. 4to.]

cation,

cation, repeats, and applies them, on every following Occaſion, as the ſole anſwer to all my Reaſonings on the Subject of an extraordinary Providence. To prepare the Reader thefore, for a proper Reception of all the miſerable Chicane that ariſes out of this his ΠΡΩΤΟΝ ΨΕΥΔΟΣ, I ſhall here ſhew, that the Words [*no Tranſgreſſor eſcaping Puniſhment, nor any Obſerver of the Law miſſing his Reward*] could not mean by any Rules of juſt Conſtruction, that every *ſingle Perſon, without Exception*, was thus puniſhed and rewarded; but only that this very extraordinary Providence over particulars was ſo exactly adminiſtred, as that no one could hope to eſcape it, or fear to be forgotten by it.

Firſt then, Let it be obſerved, that the Words are no *abſolute* Aſſertion; but a *Conſequence* of ſomething aſſerted.—AND THEN *no Tranſgreſſor eſcaping*, &c. which illative Words the honeſt Examiner omitted. Now what had been aſſerted * was ſimply this, that the extraordinary Providence over the *Jews* was, in Scripture, repreſented as Adminiſtered over Particulars; but that this very Adminiſtration would of Neceſſity be attended with ſome Inequalities †. Muſt not then the Conſequence I draw from theſe Premiſſes be as reſtrained as the Premiſſes themſelves? *Secondly*, I ſaid, that God had promiſed an equal Providence to Particulars, but that he had declared at the ſame time how it ſhould be adminiſtered, *viz.* in ſuch a manner as would occaſion ſome few Exceptions. If therefore Doctor *Sykes* would not allow me, he ought to have allowed God, at leaſt, the right of explaining himſelf. *Thirdly*, had the Words been abſolute, as they then might have admitted of two Senſes, did not common Ingenuity require, that I ſhould be underſtood in that which was eaſieſt to prove, when it was equally to my Purpoſe? Which is an extraordinary Providence over Particulars in the manner here explained. But there was ſtill more than this to lead an ingenuous Man into my meaning; which was, that he might obſerve, that I uſed, through-

* Div. Leg. Vol. II. p. 436. [Vol. III. p. 112. Ed. 4to.]

† Id. Ib. p. 445. [Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 121.]

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out my whole Diſcourſe of the *Jewiſh* Oeconomy, the Words *extraordinary Providence* and *equal Providence*, as equivalent. By which he would underſtand that I all along admitted of Exceptions. *Fourthly*, If ſuch rare Caſes of Exception deſtroyed an equal Providence to *Particulars* (which Providence I hold), it would deſtroy with it the equal Providence to the *State* (which Doctor *Sykes* pretends to hold). But if not for the ſake of Truth in Opinion, yet for fair-dealing in Practice, Doctor *Sykes* ſhould have interpreted my Words not abſolutely, but with Exceptions. For thus ſtood the Caſe. He quoted two Poſitions from the *Divine Legation*. 1. That there was an extraordinary Providence over the State in general. 2. Over private Men in particular. He grants the firſt; and denies the ſecond. But is not the Extent of that Providence underſtood to be, in both Caſes, the ſame? Now in that over the *State*, he underſtands it to have been with *Exceptions*, as appears from his own mention of the Caſe of *Achan* p. 190; and of *David*, p. 197. Ought he not then, by all the Rules of honeſt Reaſon, to have underſtood the Propoſition-denied, in the ſame Senſe he underſtands the Propoſition-granted? If in the Adminiſtration over the State in general, there were ſome few Exceptions, Why not in that over private Men in particular?

But if now the candid Reader will aſk me why I employed Expreſſions that, when divorced from the Context, might be abuſed by a Caviler to a perverſe meaning, I will tell him: I uſed them in Imitation of the Language of the Apoſtle, who ſays that, under the *Jewiſh* Oeconomy, EVERY *Tranſgreſſion and Diſobedience received a juſt Recompence of Reward* *. And if he be to be underſtood with *Exceptions*, why may not I?

Having now expoſed, as it deſerves, this Maſter Fallacy, the Rabble of Sophiſms, which follow it, and pretend to make their Fortune by it, are eaſily diſperſed. But before we come to that, we have ſomething further to ſay to the Paragraph in Hand. We

* Heb. ii. 2.

obſerved, that, in concluding it, he returns again to the true State of the Queſtion.—Theſe are his Words.—" But if we deſcend to " an extraordinary Providence over Particulars even in thoſe Times " [the Judges and Kings of *Iſrael*], I do not remember what will " amount to Proof." To aſſiſt his bad Memory, or long Abſence from his Bible, I ſhall quote again from *The Divine Legation*, the following Paſſages.—*In the Dedication of the firſt Temple* Solomon *addreſſes his Prayer to God that the Covenant between him and the People might remain for ever firm and inviolate, and the old Oeconomy be ſtill continued. And after having enumerated divers Parts of it, he proceeds in theſe Words:* When the Heaven is ſhut up, and there is no Rain, *becauſe they have ſinned* againſt thee; yet if they pray towards this Place, and confeſs thy Name, and turn from their Sin when thou doſt afflict them: Then hear thou from Heaven, and forgive the Sin of thy *Servants*, and of thy People *Iſrael*, when thou haſt taught them the good way, wherein they ſhould walk; and ſend Rain upon the Land, which thou haſt given unto thy People for an Inheritance. If there be Dearth in the Land, if there be Peſtilence, if there be Blaſting or Mildew, Locuſt or Caterpillars; if their Enemies beſiege them in the Cities of their Land; whatſoever Sore or whatſoever Sickneſs there be: Then what Prayer or what Supplication ſhall be made *of any Man*, or of all thy People *Iſrael*, *when every one ſhall know his own Sore, and his own Grief*, and ſhall ſpread forth his Hands in this Houſe; then hear thou from Heaven and forgive, and *render unto every Man* according unto all his Ways, whoſe Heart thou knoweſt *. *The Pſalmiſt bears his Teſtimony to the ſame Oeconomy*; I have been young *(ſays he)* and now am old: yet have I not ſeen the Righteous forſaken, nor his Seed begging their Bread †. GOD *himſelf declares it by the Prophet* Iſaiah: Say ye to the Righteous that it ſhall be well with him: for they ſhall eat the Fruit of their Doings. Wo unto the Wicked, it ſhall be

* 2 Chron. vi. 28. et ſeq.

† Pſal. xxxvii. 25.

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ill with him: for the Reward of his hands ſhall be given him*. *And again:* He that walketh righteouſly and ſpeaketh uprightly, *etc.* he ſhall dwell on high: his place of Defence ſhall be the Munitions of Rocks, Bread ſhall be given him, his Waters ſhall be ſure †. *And we learn from a parabolical Command in* Ezekiel *how exactly theſe Promiſes were fulfilled:* And the Lord ſaid unto him, Go through the Midſt of the City, through the Midſt of *Jeruſalem*, and ſet a Mark upon the Foreheads of the Men that ſigh, and that cry for all the Abominations that be done in the midſt thereof. And to others he ſaid in mine hearing, Go ye after him through the City, and ſmite: let not your Eye ſpare, neither have ye Pity. Slay utterly old and young, both Maids and little Children, and Women; *but come not near any Man upon whom is the Mark*; and begin at my Sanctuary ‡, *&c.* *But* GOD, *by the Prophet* Amos, *deſcribes this Adminiſtration of Providence in the fulleſt manner:* Alſo I have witholden the Rain from you, when there was yet three Months to the Harveſt, and I cauſed it to rain upon one City, and cauſed it not to rain upon another City: one Piece was rained upon, and the Piece whereupon it rained not, withered. So two or three Cities wandered into one City to drink Water; but they were not ſatisfied: yet have ye not returned unto me, ſaith the Lord. I have ſmitten you with Blaſting and Mildew, *&c.* §. *And again:* Lo I will command, and I will ſift the Houſe of *Iſrael* amongſt all Nations, like as Corn is ſifted in a Sieve, yet ſhall not the leaſt Grain fall upon the Earth ||. Yet all this he had overlooked as *not amounting*, I ſuppoſe, *to Proof.*

* Chap. iii. v. 10, 11.
† Chap. xxxiii. v. 15, 16.
§ Chap. iv. v. 7—11.
‡ Chap. ix. v. 4, 5, 6.
|| Chap. ix. v. 9.

X.

At laſt he owns I had allowed, "*that the ſacred Writings themſelves freely ſpeak of the Inequality of Providence to Particulars in ſuch a manner as Men living under a common Providence are accuſtomed to ſpeak* *." Which ſhews it was impoſſible I ſhould mean the Propoſition of *No Tranſgreſſor ever eſcaping Puniſhment*, &c. in the Senſe he has put upon it. But this is ſo far from ſhaming him for his Prevarication, that, after having given Examples to confirm my Obſervation of the *Sacred Writers ſpeaking of the Inequalities of Providence*, he goes on thus: "This Objection taken from the "Complaints made by the Sacred Writers was ſo full and ſtrong, "that, though Mr. *Warburton* promiſes to prove *hereafter* that an "equal Providence was actually adminiſtered, yet, for his Reader's "*preſent Satisfaction*, he will ſhew, that *theſe Repreſentations of* "*Inequality are very conſiſtent with that before given of the Equality* "*of Providence*. I will examine with as much brevity as I can, "what he has ſaid; and leave you to judge whether he has ſaid "enough to give his Reader *preſent Satisfaction* †."

The firſt Remark I ſhall make on this Paſſage is, that it repreſents me forced to make an Acknowledgement, not out of any regard to Truth, but through Neceſſity. Secondly, where he ſays that I promiſe *to prove hereafter that an equal Providence was actually adminiſtered*, he miſtakes, as uſual, my Senſe, and ſuppoſes I meant, in the *third* Volume of *The Divine Legation*. Whereas all, who underſtand that Book, know I meant, in the latter part of the *Second*, then in my Hands. And even he himſelf may *now* ſee as much by the ſhort view I have given of it, in the firſt part of theſe *Remarks*: where ſpeaking of this Matter, I expreſs myſelf in the following Terms.—*Here the Reader ſhould obſerve that my Argument does not require me to prove more than that an extraordinary Provi-*

* Exam. of Mr. *W's* Account, &c. p. 188. [See alſo Div. Leg. Vol. III. p. 120. of this edition.]

† Exam. &c. p. 191.

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dence is REPRESENTED *in Scripture to be adminiſtered: The Proof of its* REAL *Adminiſtration it is the Purpoſe of this Work to give through the great* MEDIUM *of my Theſes, "The Omiſſion of the Doctrine of a "future State of Rewards and Puniſhments." If therefore I clearly ſhew from the whole Jewiſh Hiſtory that the matter is thus* repreſented, *the Inference from my* Medium, *which proves the Repreſentation* true, *anſwers all Objections, both as to our inadequate Conception of the Manner how ſuch a Providence could be adminiſtered; and as to certain Paſſages in holy Scripture that ſeem to claſh with this its* GENERAL REPRESENTATION. *And yet both theſe Objections (to leave no ſhadow of doubt unſatisfied) are conſidered likewiſe* *. Theſe *Conſiderations* our Examiner has now attacked. Let us ſee with what ſucceſs.

XI.

He tells the Reader, my firſt Conſideration is, "*That when the* "*Sacred Writers ſpeak of the Inequality of Providence, and the unfit* "*Diſtribution of Things, they ſometimes mean that State of it amongſt* "*their* Pagan *Neighbours, and not in* Judea, *as particularly in the* "*Book of Pſalms and Eccleſiaſtes*, p. 443 †." To this he replies,— "*Aſaph*, or whoever was the Author of the Pſalm before cited, "complains heavily at the Proſperity of the Wicked. Theſe wicked "Men were, it ſeems, not *Jews*, but his *Pagan* Neighbours ‡," *&c.* Would not any one, now believe, that this *Pſalm before cited* was one I had cited, to prove that, in the *Book of Pſalms the Writers of it ſometimes mean that State of Providence amongſt their* Pagan *Neighbours?* So far from it, I had cited it to the very contrary purpoſe; as a Proof of the extraordinary Providence to the *Jewiſh* People, who are there all along ſpoken of. But what then? *He* had *cited* it a Page or two before: And his *Trade* required him to *cite* it again. Or did he, indeed, imagine, that when I ſaid,

* Remarks on Several Occaſional Reflections, Part I. p. 99, 100. [See alſo Vol. VI. p. 329, of this Edition.]

† Ed. 4to. Vol. III. p. 120.

‡ Exam. of Mr. *W's* Account, p. 191, 192.

The

The Writers of the Book of Pſalms ſometimes ſpoke of that State of Providence amongſt their Pagan *Neighbours*, I meant in every Pſalm? It is hard to tell. I have ſometimes catched him at a worſe Inference. However, as he loves to be encouraged, I ſhall ſay no more to him of the Pſalms, till he has *cited*, and of courſe miſinterpreted, every one of them: And then he may hear further from me.

In the other Caſe of *Eccleſiaſtes* (thanks however to the Nature of the Book) he has argued fairer at leaſt. "Much leſs ſtill (ſays "he) is the Reflection of the Preacher in *Eccleſiaſtes* deſigned to re-"late to his *Pagan* Neighbours. It is an univerſal Obſervation, "that the *Work of God* is inſcrutable even to a *Wiſe Man*. On "which Account the Author propoſes to declare, that no Man could "judge of either *Love or Hatred* by what was before him, *ſince all* "*Things come alike to all, there is one Event to the Righteous and to* "*the Wicked*, &c. *This was an* Evil *among all Things done under* the "Sun, *that there is one Event to all.* Has he made any Exception "for *Iſrael?* No: but he maintains, *that the Race is not to the* "*Swift*; *nor the Battle to the Strong*; *neither yet Bread to the Wiſe*; "*nor yet Riches to the Men of Underſtanding*; *nor yet Favour to Men* "*of Skill*; *but Time and Chance happeneth to them all*, *Eccleſ.* ix, 11. "Could a Wiſe Man, under an *Extraordinary Providence* himſelf, "talk in this Manner, thus Univerſally, and make no Exceptions "for his own Nation? Did he not ſee a *Difference* betwixt the "People of *Iſrael*, and all other People? Or if there was ſuch a "Difference as Mr. *Warburton* contends for, could he fail taking No-"tice of it? Would not his own People be led into wrong Notions "by ſuch univerſal Aſſertions? I cannot therefore but think, that "this Solution given by Mr. *Warburton* is not only not ſufficiently "*well grounded*, but that it has no *Foundation* at all, *viz.* that the "*Pſalmiſt*, and the *Son of David*, ſpoke of their *Pagan Neighbours*, "and not of the *Jews*, when they expreſſed themſelves ſo ſtrongly "about the Proſperity of the Wicked and the Misfortune of good "Men."

"Men *." I now begin to think, he had ſome reaſon to lament, that *a right good Critical and Grammatical Comment has never yet been wrote upon the Bible* †. Till then I ſhall beg leave to ſupply his Wants with a ſhort Account of the general Plan and Purpoſe of this famous Book. It is a Philoſophical Enquiry into the *Chief Good* or *Summum Bonum*, ſo univerſal a Subject of Diſpute, amongſt the Ancient Sages; and managed much in their way; *i. e.* chiefly employed in detecting the falſe Notions of Happineſs. And that it was not unuſual for *Solomon* to perſonate the Garb and Manners of the *Gentile* Sages we underſtand by *Joſephus*, in the Story he tells of *Solomon* ſending Riddles to the King of *Tyre* as Tryals of the Abilities of his wiſe Men; whoſe Sagacity, at that time, lay chiefly, as we find by *Herodotus*, towards ſuch kind of decyphering.

This alone is ſufficient to ſhew us, that the ſacred Writer addreſſed himſelf to his Countrymen, not ſo much under the Idea of a ſelected Nation, as to Part of the Poſterity of *Adam* and of the human Race at large. Otherwiſe, to what Purpoſe was this Philoſophical Inquiry? For as the Choſen People, their Law expreſsly pointed out, and led them *directly* to, the *ſupreme good*: Which, indeed, the Sacred Writer, at laſt ends with: And he could do no other, both as he was a *Jew*, and as he addreſſed himſelf to his Countrymen, neither of whom could long diveſt themſelves of their peculiar Character. *Let us hear the Concluſion of the whole Matter* (ſays he); *Fear God and keep his Commandments, for this is the whole Duty of Man* ‡.

But to be a little more particular. The BOOK OPENS in this manner:—*Vanity of Vanities, all is Vanity. What Profit has a Man of all his Labour which he taketh under the Sun?—All Things are full of Labour. Man cannot utter it: The Eye is not ſatisfied with ſeeing, nor the Ear filled with hearing. The thing that hath been is that*

* Examination of Mr. *W's* Account, p. 195, 196.

† Princip. and Connex. of Nat. and Rev. Relig. p. 217.

‡ Chap. xii. 13.

which

which ſhall be—and there is no new thing under the Sun. Is there any thing whereof it may be ſaid, See this is new?—There is no Remembrance of former things; neither ſhall there be any Remembrance of things that are to come, with thoſe that ſhall come after *? The Propoſitions are here all general; and plainly relative to Mankind at large: For ſome of them are not true with reſpect to the choſen Nation; ſuch as the Aſſertion that *nothing was new under the Sun, &c.* But the following Words more expreſsly declare his Meaning to be general, *And I gave my Heart to ſeek and ſearch out by Wiſdom, concerning all things that are done under Heaven—I have ſeen all the Works that are done under the Sun* †. In the SECOND Chapter he ſtill more profeſſedly aſſumes the Character of an ancient Sage; and inquires whether happineſs be to be found in Mirth and Jollity; in Magnificence; in Luxury; in Wealth; in Power, or in Wiſdom. All, but the laſt, he gives up. This indeed had ſome Pretenſions to it: For *he found Wiſdom exceeded Folly as far as Light exceedeth Darkneſs* ‡. Yet, when he obſerved that the *ſame thing happened both to the Fool and the Wiſe* §; he rejected this likewiſe with the reſt: And, now floundering deeper and deeper in his *Philoſophical* Enquiries, he ſinks at laſt into groſs *Epicuriſm, There is nothing better for a Man, than that he ſhould eat and drink* ||, *&c.* But then adding, *and of ſuch good who can enjoy more than I* **? This recalls his *real* Character, and affords him an Opportunity of ending the *Enquiry* in a decent manner, *For God giveth to a Man that is good in his Sight, Wiſdom, and Knowledge, and Joy, but to the Sinner he giveth Travel* ††, *&c.* Which was done with the fineſt Addreſs; and prevented what he had ſaid juſt before, in his perſonated Character, from giving Scandal, or being miſunderſtood. Let me obſerve too, that there is no way of reconciling this laſt Verſe with the 14th, where he declares, that *one Event happeneth to all*, than by ſuppoſing, he there ſpoke of the State of Mankind in general;

* Chap. i. 2—12. † Ib. 13, 14. ‡ Chap. ii. 13. § Ver. 14.
|| Ver. 24. ** Ver. 25. †† Ver. 26.

and

and here of the *Jewiſh* Nation in particular. On this Principle, ſeveral other contradictory Paſſages, to the ſame Purpoſe, muſt needs be interpreted. In the THIRD Chapter, having reſumed his perſonated Character, he ſeeks for Happineſs, and finds nothing but *Vanity*, in the natural Conſtitution of things. In the FOURTH Chapter, he ſeeks it, and finds the ſame, in the *moral Conſtitution* of things. And here he, all along, ſpeaks of Mankind in general. *I have ſeen the Travel which God hath given to the Sons of Men, to be exerciſed in it. He hath made every thing beautiful in his Time: alſo he hath ſet the World in their Heart* *.—Nay, there are ſome Places where his Thought muſt be confined to other Countries, as where he ſays, chap. vi. ver. 2. *A Man to whom God hath given Riches, Wealth, and Honour—yet God giveth him not Power to eat thereof, but a* STRANGER *eateth it.* This could not happen under *Solomon* in the Land of *Judæa*, when Inheritances never went out of the Twelve Tribes. Again, *And moreover I ſaw under the Sun the Place of Judgment that Wickedneſs was there, and the Place of Righteouſneſs that Iniquity was there* †. Are we to think that *Solomon* was *afraid* of ſaying, this was in *Judæa*, which he governed abſolutely; and ſo diſguiſed his Expreſſion to make us believe he meant it of the World at large? Or could the Civil Adminiſtration of the Land, which he governed with ſo much Wiſdom and Equity, be in the miſerable Condition here deſcribed? The *Fourth* Chapter begins—*So I returned and conſidered all the Oppreſſions that are done under the Sun.*—*Returned!* from whence? From a Contemplation of the *natural* State of Things (ſpoken of in the preceding Chapter) to the *moral*, every where over the whole Face of the habitable Globe;—*all the Oppreſſions that are done under the Sun.* But the 13th and 14th Verſes certainly allude to ſome fact *out of* Judæa. *Better is a poor and wiſe Child than an old and fooliſh King: For out of Priſon he cometh to reign; whereas alſo he that is born in his Kingdom becometh poor.* In the ſame manner we muſt interpret

* Chap. iii. 10, 11. † Ver. 16.

the 14th and 15th Verſes of the ixth Chapter; and the 5th, 6th, and 7th Verſes of the xth Chapter. From hence, that is, from the End of the *Fourth* Chapter, to the Concluſion of the Book, the ſacred Writer employs himſelf in miſcellaneous Reflections illuſtrating and ſupporting his main Queſtion: partly abſtracted, in his aſſumed Character of *Sage*; and partly *practical and didactic*, in his Character of *Preacher:* Till he comes to the Concluſion of his Enquiry after Happineſs, which he places in God. *Remember thy Creator, &c.* And in this Part, agreeable to the Character in which he ſpeaks, he ſometimes aſſerts an *equal* Providence, and ſometimes an *unequal.* As where he ſays, in behalf of the firſt—*It is good that thou ſhouldſt take hold of this, yea alſo from this withdraw not thine Hand, for he that feareth God ſhall* COME FORTH *of them all* *. *Whoſo keepeth the Commandments ſhall* FEEL NO EVIL THING †.—*But it ſhall not be well with the Wicked, neither ſhall he* PROLONG HIS DAYS, *which are as a Shadow, becauſe he feareth not before God* ‡.—On the contrary he ſays, in the very following Verſe: *There is a Vanity which is done upon the Earth, that there be juſt Men unto whom it happeneth according to the Work of the Wicked:* Again, *there be wicked Men to whom it happeneth according to the Work of the Righteous* §. This is worthy our Obſervation. When, in the preceding Verſe, he had aſſerted an *equal* Providence; and by the Words, *prolong his Days*, marked it to be ſuch a one as we are told in the Law, was adminiſtred over the Land of *Judæa*; when he comes to ſpeak in this Verſe of an *unequal* Providence, he as plainly intimates that he meant it in the World at large, by the introductory Expreſſion of, *There is a Vanity which is done upon the Earth.*

But, how the Book of *Eccleſiaſtes* came to be written; and how it came to be caſt into this Form; though ſuch an Enquiry might tend to illuſtrate and ſupport our Interpretation; I ſhall not at preſent, nor, perhaps, ever hereafter, think fit to inform our *Examiner.* What has been already ſaid is more than ſufficient to juſtify

* Chap. vii. 18. † Chap. viii. 5. ‡ Ver. 13. § Ver. 14.

my

my Aſſertion, *That when the Writer of* Eccleſiaſtes *ſpeaks of the Inequality of Providence, he means that State of it amongſt his Pagan Neighbours*:—The Argument ſtands thus; There are ſeveral Places in the Book of *Eccleſiaſtes* where an *equal* Providence is aſſerted; ſeveral, where an *unequal*. Theſe can be only *reconciled* by ſuppoſing, that, in the firſt Caſe, he ſpeaks of it as adminiſtred in the Land of *Judæa*; in the ſecond, as in the World at large. The *Suppoſition* is juſtified in this manner: 1. by ſhewing, that the very Expreſſion, in both Caſes, ſupports this Diſtinction: 2. that the Author ſometimes ſpeaks in the perſonated Character of a Sage or Philoſophic Enquirer after Truth; in which, he tranſports himſelf into the World at large: Sometimes, in his own Character of a Preacher, where he confines himſelf to the *Jewiſh* People.—But to go on now with our Examiner.

VIII.

"Mr. *Warburton (ſays he)* has given us a ſecond Solution of "this Difficulty, no better, I think, than the former. *We ſome-*
"*times find particular Men complaining of Inequalities in Events,*
"*which were indeed the Effects of a moſt equal Providence. Such as*
"*the Puniſhment of Poſterity for the Crimes of their Forefathers, and*
"*of Subjects for their Kings.* Theſe are indeed remarkable Inſtances "of an extraordinary equal Providence, where NO TRANSGRESSOR "COULD ESCAPE PUNISHMENT, NOR GOOD MAN ESCAPE REWARD, "to tell us of tranſgreſſing Forefathers eſcaping, and their INNO-"CENT CHILDREN BEING PUNISHED; of wicked Kings under no "Misfortunes, and innocent Subjects ſuffering on their Account*!" And thus he goes on, repeating his πρῶτον ψεῦδος, for eight Pages together. For now this *Myſtery of Iniquity* begins to work. He muſt be content therefore to be reminded (for the FIRST TIME) that he here ſtands charged with putting a FALSE Senſe upon, *no Tranſgreſſor eſcaping Puniſhment, &c.* by which alone

* Exam. of Mr. *W's* Account, p. 196, 197.

his Argument is ſupported. And we ſhall have frequent occaſion, as we go along, to repeat his Crime, and ſet this black Mark upon him. But ſo groſs a Miſrepreſentation does not ſtand ſingle. It is accompanied with another as groſs, which, however, ſeems rather to be the Fault of his Underſtanding. He expreſsly repreſents me as affirming, that, by the Law of God, INNOCENT CHILDREN WERE PUNISHED FOR THEIR GUILTY PARENTS; *in a manner that cannot be reconciled to Juſtice, or Goodneſs, or Impartiality in an extraordinary Providence* *. An atrocious Accuſation! and without a Poſſibility of Proof. For in this Diſcourſe, which our Author refers to, and underſtands not, I had ſhewn, 1. That where the Poſterity of guilty Parents were deprived of any of their *natural unconditional* Rights for their Parents' Crimes, There, the Poſterity were *not innocent*. Which, I obſerved, might be underſtood, from the Law itſelf; where, *although God allowed capital Puniſhment to be inflicted for* Leſe Majeſty *on the* Perſon *of the Offender, by the delegated Adminiſtration of the Law; yet concerning his Family or* Poſterity *he reſerved the Inquiſition to himſelf; and expreſsly forbad the Magiſtrate to meddle with it in the common Courſe of Juſtice* †. For why was the Magiſtrate forbid to imitate God's Method of puniſhing, but becauſe no Power leſs than omniſcient could, in all Caſes, keep clear of Injuſtice in ſuch a Perquiſition? But I obſerved further, that God had expreſsly declared *why* he reſerve dthis Method of Puniſhment to himſelf, in the Place where he informs us, *how*, or in what manner, he was pleaſed to adminiſter it. *Your Iniquities* (ſays he) *and the Iniquities of your Fathers together* ‡, *&c.* 2. I had ſhewn, that where an *innocent* Poſterity ſuffered for the Crimes of guilty Parents, it was only in the Deprivation of their *Civil Conditional* Rights. For the *Iſraelites*, as Scripture informs us, were ſupported in *Judæa* by an extraordinary Adminiſtration of Providence; the Conſequence of which were great temporal Bleſſings

* Exam. of Mr. *W's* Account, p. 197.

† Divine Legat. Vol. II. p. 458. [Vol. III. p. 140. Ed. 4to.]

‡ Iſa. lxv. 7.

given

given them on Condition; and to which they had no natural Claim. Nothing therefore could be more equitable than, on the Violation of that Condition, to withdraw thoſe extraordinary Bleſſings from a Father thus offending. To confirm which, I ſhewed, that it exactly correſponded with the Practice of all States, in Attaint of Blood and Confiſcation *." And now, was it poſſible for the moſt arrant *Anſwerer* by *Profeſſion*, had he underſtood what was ſaid, to charge me with holding, that by the Law of God, *Innocent Children were puniſhed for their guilty Parents in a manner that cannot be reconciled to Juſtice, or Goodneſs, or Impartiality in an extraordinary Providence?* Not but we muſt think that he had *read* that Diſſertation. For there is ſcarce any Part of it which, under this Head, he does not quote: but in ſo abſurd a manner, and to ſo abſurd Purpoſes, as evidently ſhew, that he underſtood not what he read. Of which take the following Inſtances.

To prove that the Importance of the Doctrine of a *Future State* was well underſtood by *Moſes*, I ſhew, that the Law of *puniſhing the Iniquities of the Fathers upon the Children*, was a Proviſion oppoſed to the inconvenient Conſequences of its *Omiſſion*. For that the Violence of irregular Paſſions would make ſome ſort of Men, of ſtronger Complexions, ſuperior to all the Fear of perſonal temporal Evil. To lay hold therefore of theſe, and to gain a due aſcendant over the moſt determined, the Puniſhments, in this Inſtitution, are extended to the *Poſterity* of wicked Men; which the inſtinctive fondneſs of Parents for their Off-ſpring would make terrible, even to thoſe who had hardened themſelves into an Inſenſibility of perſonal Puniſhment †. Now this, Dr. *Sykes*, expreſsly repreſents as ſaid to "get rid of this Difficulty, *viz.* How innocent Children "being made to ſuffer for their ſinning Parents can be conſiſtent "with the Law of an equal Providence ‡." This is ſcarce indeed to be believed, though we ſee his end in his Prevarication. For now

* Divine Legat. vol. II. p. 459. [Vol. III. p. 141. Ed. 4to.]
† Ibid. p. 454. [Vol. III. p. 137. Ed. 4to.]
‡ Exam. of Mr. *W's* Account, &c. p. 199.

the

the Anſwer comes out eaſy in a mere denial.—"This is not conſiſtent with the Law of an equal Providence." Whereas had he told the Reader Truth concerning my Purpoſe, in the Obſervation, then, in order to anſwer it, he muſt have proved, that the Puniſhment on the Poſterity of a wicked Man *did not* lay hold of his inſtinctive Paſſions; which, I ſuppoſe, would have not been ſo eaſy. But indeed I am always ready to ſuſpect, that I attribute more to Deſign in this Writer, than I ought. And, in his Repetition of this falſe Repreſentation, there is ſomething ſo *natural*, that I am almoſt ready to acquit him of all *Practice*.—"'It is certain *(ſays* "*he)* the inſtinctive Fondneſs of Parents will reſtrain, *&c.*—But "this is NOT THE CASE in hand. The PREVIOUS SUPPOSITION is, "that *no Tranſgreſſor is to eſcape Puniſhment*, &c. The QUESTION "THEN IS, upon this Suppoſition, how a guilty Parent's Crimes can "*be viſited upon his innocent Children* *." For is it poſſible he ſhould knowingly venture the being detected in ſo groſs a Miſrepreſentation by any one who will but turn to Page 454†, of the Second Edition of the Second Volume of *The Divine Legation?*

His next Obſervation collects his ſcattered Abſurdities together; and ſo frees us at once from the trouble of any further Quotations from him on this Head.

He ſays, the Author of *The Divine Legation* goes on and obſerves "that *this Puniſhment* [of viſiting the Iniquities of Fathers upon "Children] *was only to ſupply the want of a Fature State.* But "how will this *extraordinary Oeconomy* SUPPLY this want? The "Children at preſent ſuffer for their Parents Crimes; and are ſuppoſed to be puniſhed when they have no guilt. Is not this a "plain Act of HARDSHIP? And if there be no future State or "Compenſation made, the Hardſhip done muſt continue for ever "a Hardſhip on the unhappy Sufferer ‡." 1. The Queſtion is,

* Examination of Mr. *W's* Account, &c. p. 201.

† Ed. 4to. Vol. III. p. 136, 137.

‡ Exam. of Mr. *W*'s Account, &c. p. 202, 203.

whether

whether this Law of puniſhing, was a SUPPLY to the want of a future State? If it laid hold of the Paſſions, as he owns above it did, it certainly was a SUPPLY. However, he will here prove it was none. And how? Becauſe it was a HARDSHIP. 2. He ſuppoſes that when Children were puniſhed, in the proper Senſe of the Word, they were innocent, which is abſolutely falſe, for then they were always guilty. When the *innocent* were affected by their Parents' Crimes, it was by the deprivation of Benefits, in their Nature forfeitable. 3. He ſuppoſes, that if *Moſes* taught no future State, it would then follow that there was none.—Which puts me in Mind of the ſame ſort of Confutation which the *firſt* Volume of *The Divine Legation* underwent. Where ſpeaking of the true Foundation of Morality, I obſerved, (to the diſcredit of Atheiſm, which I thought deſtructive of Society) that an Atheiſt could not, on *his Principles*, find any grounds of Moral Obligation. Hence it was inferred that, on *my reaſoning*, an Atheiſt, who tranſgreſſed the Rule of Right, would not deſerve Puniſhment. A Concluſion founded in the ſame Logic with our learned Doctor's, that, if an Atheiſt thought there were no God, then there was none. Otherwiſe, how the right Conſequences drawn by him, from Premiſſes which he never could have embraced but through a criminal Negligence or Partiality, ſhould be faultleſs, I then had not, nor yet have Penetration enough to diſcover *.

But he ends his falſe reaſoning on this Subject, as all falſe reaſoning muſt end, when drawn out to that comfortable length with which Dr. *Sykes* always regales his Reader, in compleat unintellectual Abſurdity. "Mr. *Warburton (ſays he)* had before him the

* I would not here be ſuppoſed to hint at a very ingenious Writer, who ſeems to have fallen into this miſtake, in a Diſcourſe printed in the *Works of the learned for Auguſt* 1743, intituled, *Remarks upon ſome Writers concerning the Foundation of Moral Obligation.* A Writer by no Means to be ranked with the Riffraff now upon my Hands. The Diſcourſe here mentioned being one of the moſt polite, candid, rational Performances, I ever ſaw on that Side the Queſtion; and enlightened with a Spirit of ſublime and unaffected Piety, ſuperior to all Reaſoning.

"Practice

" Practice *of Modern States in attaint of Blood and Confiſcation*, and " he allows this to be done with the higheſt Equity: and ſays, " *thus it muſt needs be under a* Theocracy; *God ſupported the* Iſrae- " lites *in* Judea *by an* extraordinary *Adminiſtration of his Providence:* " *The Conſequence of which was* great temporal Bleſſings *given them* " on Condition *and to which they had* no natural Claim. *Could any* " *thing be more equitable, than on the Violation of that* Condition *to* " *withdraw thoſe* extraordinary *Bleſſings from the Children of a Father* " *thus offending? p.* 457, 458 *.

" It is true, that the *Jews* had *no natural Claim* to great tem- " poral Bleſſings. But then they had a Claim to them from expreſs " *Promiſe*; which is as good a Claim in the preſent Caſe as any " natural Claim whatever. They had this Claim indeed *on Condi-* " *tion*; A Condition of certain Behaviour, which if they complied " with, no Obſerver was to *miſs his Reward.* The Caſe is put of " an *innocent* Child ſuffering on account of a *guilty* Father. The " innocent Child has a right to *temporal Bleſſings* by virtue of ex- " preſs *Promiſe*; and no Sin of the Father can deprive him of theſe " Bleſſings without a Violation of the Covenant: For if it would, " an *Obſerver* of the Law would *miſs his Reward.* It would there- " fore in the preſent Caſe be ſo far from *equitable to* withdraw *thoſe* " *extraordinary Bleſſings from the Children of an offending Parent,* " that it would be a direct Violation of Contract and Engagement: " It would be a Breach of Promiſe in God, and conſequently a thing " impoſſible in itſelf †." What is it that our Anſwerer drives at? He grants the *Jews* had no natural Claim to great temporal Bleſſ- ings. He grants, theſe were given on condition of Obedience. He grants, that a Puniſhment was denounced on Poſterity for the Crimes of their Parents. Theſe three things he grants. Yet he affirms " that it would be ſo far from equitable to withdraw thoſe " extraordinary Bleſſings from the Children of an offending Parent,

* Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 141.

† Exam. of Mr. *W's* Account, &c. p. 203, 204.

" that

" that it would be a direct Violation of Contract, and Engagement." And does not this great Legiſt ſee, that a conditional Grant, when conveyed through Parents to Children, if forfeited by the Parent, does not deſcend, of right, to the Children; and conſequently, may at any time, with the utmoſt juſtice, be reſumed? For when a thing is given to Parents and their Poſterity, on Condition of Obedience; and, at the ſame time, the Puniſhment of offending Parents threatened on their Poſterity, is not the Parents' good Behaviour part of the Condition? What is it then, that could thus confound the Underſtanding of our learned Doctor? *His own* ſophiſtical Prevarications. Which generally reward their Inventors as the Devil does a Witch, after having ſerved them in many juggling Tricks, at length draws them into a Rope, and there leaves them. I had ſaid that *an innocent Poſterity were ſometimes puniſhed for the Crimes of their wicked Fathers.* I had likewiſe ſaid *that no Tranſgreſſor eſcaped Puniſhment, nor any Obſerver of the Law miſſed his Reward.* Now, inſtead of interpreting the firſt Propoſition as I explained it, in the very Place where I uſed it, to ſignify no more than that an innocent Poſterity were deprived of civil Bleſſings which their Fathers had legally forfeited; he repreſents me as ſaying, that by the Law of God, " innocent Children were puniſhed " for their guilty Parents in a manner that cannot be reconciled to " Juſtice or Goodneſs or Impartiality in an extraordinary Provi- " dence *." Inſtead of interpreting the ſecond Propoſition in the ſenſe of the Apoſtle, from whence I borrowed the Expreſſion, who ſays that under the *Jewiſh* Oeconomy *every Tranſgreſſion and Diſobedience received a juſt Recompence and Reward,* he will have it to be my Meaning that no one ſingle Perſon, without Exception, ever eſcaped Puniſhment, or ever miſſed his Reward: Though, as I have ſhewn, it contradicts all Logical Rules of Interpretation. And now ſee what comes of it. By applying theſe Prevarications to the place in Queſtion, he argues in ſuch a manner as if he never

* An Examination of Mr. Warburton's Account, p. 197.

had the leaſt Conception of what others call the common Principles of Senſe or Juſtice.

XIII.

My "third Solution of the Difficulty (he tells us) ſtands thus, "*admitting the Reality of an equal Providence to Particulars, in the* "Hebrew *State, the Adminiſtration of it muſt needs be attended with* "*ſuch Circumſtances as ſometimes to occaſion thoſe Obſervations of Ine-* "*quality*, i. e. in plain Terms, an *equal* Providence MUST NEEDS "be *unequal.* Is not this a plain Acknowledgment, that an equal "Providence cannot be adminiſtred at all ſince it muſt needs be "attended with ſuch Circumſtances as muſt appear unequal.* ?"— I ſay, *an equal Providence muſt needs be attended with ſuch Circumſtances as to occaſion Men's Obſervations of Inequality.* This Propoſition he affirms is, *in plain Terms*, equivalent to this other, *that an unequal Providence muſt needs be unequal.* Which may perhaps be true when he has proved theſe three Points: 1. That his Senſe of *no Tranſgreſſor eſcaping Puniſhment* is no Prevarication. 2. That ſome Inequalities, in an equal Providence, is the ſame thing as the common Providence. 3. That the Obſervations of Men muſt needs be infallible. But to ſhew his anſwer in its full ſhame, let us conſider only the laſt of them. The Reader may take notice that the Words, immediately preceding theſe, [of Men's *Obſervations of Inequality*] ſpeak of the *Falſhood* of ſuch Obſervations, even in the Caſe of *David* himſelf, *Who owned that he was ſometimes too haſty in judging of theſe Matters. And that he underſtood not the courſe of God's Juſtice till he had conſidered the way in which an equal Providence muſt neceſſarily be adminiſtred under a Theocracy and the Conſequences of ſuch an Adminiſtration* †. Having ſaid this, I join it to the Propoſition in Queſtion, by the Conjunction *For*; [*For even admitting*]

* Exam. of Mr. *W*'s Account, &c. p. 205.

† Div. Leg. Vol. II. p. 445. [Vol. III. p. 121. Ed. 4to.]

admitting] and refer to it by the Pronoun *thoſe*, [*thoſe Obſervations of Inequality*]. But we have here to do with a Doctor, as little like *David* in his Piety, as his Senſe: Who if the Adminiſtration of an equal Providence, under a Theocracy, muſt needs be attended with the *Appearances* of Inequality, will ſhew that God could not adminiſter it at all: Without doubt, upon this Principle, that God either ought not, or cannot *do*, what Man, with the Degree of light God has been pleaſed to give him, cannot *comprehend*. An Argument worthy this great Advocate for the Light of Nature.—But he is not a Man to be ſerious with. Having done me the Honour of giving me this Propoſition, *that an equal Providence muſt needs be unequal*; he will then tell the Reader what I muſt needs infer from it.—"Is not this *(ſays he)* a plain Ac- "knowledgment that an equal Providence cannot be adminiſtred at "all, ſince"—Since what? The Reader may imagine his Premiſſes require him to conclude thus,—"Since it muſt needs be at- "tended with ſuch Circumſtances *as occaſion an unequal Providence*." But this would be concluding like other Men. No, he ſays— "ſince it muſt needs be attended with ſuch Circumſtances as to oc- "caſion MEN'S OBSERVATIONS of Inequality." And thus he himſelf at length betrays his own Sophiſtry. The Truth is, it was ſo hardy in the *Propoſition*, that he was even aſhamed to repeat it in the *Inference*. And ſo became the Dupe, not of his returning Honeſty, but of his deſerted Courage. His whole Argument indeed is one complicated Sophiſtry. Firſt, he takes what is there ſaid of Men's *Obſervations of Inequality* to be *true* Obſervations; whereas, they are there ſaid to be *falſe* ones. Secondly, he makes them to ſignify that Men obſerved *an unequal Providence*; whereas they mean that Men obſerved *ſome Inequalities in an equal Providence:* which (whether he underſtands it or no) is a very different thing.

He goes on thus: "But the Inſtances he brings to SOLVE this "Difficulty [namely the Appearances of Inequality] are ſo many "clear Proofs againſt the thing itſelf*." How unlucky! The *In-*

* Exam. of Mr. *W*'s Account, p. 205.

ſtances I brought were to ſhew from whence the Difficulty *aroſe*, not to *ſolve* it. But with this Writer, to ſolve or to raiſe a Difficulty is indeed much the ſame. Well, the *Inſtances* however are theſe. 1. *It appears from the reaſon of the thing that this Adminiſtration did not begin to be exerted in particular Caſes, 'till the civil Laws of the Republic had failed of their Efficacy. Thus where any Crime, as for Inſtance, Diſobedience to Parents, was* public, *it became the Object of the civil Tribunal, and is accordingly ordered to be puniſhed by the Judge* *. *But when private and ſecret, then it became the Object of Divine Vengeance* †. *Now the Conſequence of this was, that when the Laws were remiſſly or corruptly adminiſtred,* good *and* ill *would ſometimes happen unequally to Men. For we are not to ſuppoſe that Providence in this caſe generally interfered, 'till the corrupt adminiſtration itſelf, when ripe for Vengeance, had been firſt puniſhed.* 2. *In this extraordinary Adminiſtration, one Part of the wicked was ſometimes ſuffered as a Scourge to the other.* 3. *The extraordinary Providence to the State might ſometimes claſh with that to Particulars, as in the Plague for numbering the People.* 4. *Sometimes the extraordinary Providence was ſuſpended for a Seaſon to bring on a national Repentance: But at the ſame Time this Suſpenſion was publickly denounced* ‡. *And a very ſevere Puniſhment it was, as leaving a State, which had not the Sanction of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments, in a very diſconſolate Condition. And this was what occaſioned the Complaints of the impatient* Jews §, *after they had been ſo long accuſtomed to an extraordinary Adminiſtration* ‖.

Now what is our Doctor's Anſwer to all this? Why ſtill the old Song.—" If he is obliged in Virtue of the Theocracy to ſee " that *no Tranſgreſſor eſcapes Puniſhment* **". And again,—" becauſe

* Exod. xxi. 15. and 17.

† Deut. xxvii. 16. and Prov. xxx. 17.

‡ Iſaiah iii. 5. Chap. lix. 2. Chap. lxiv. 7.

§ Iſaiah v. 19. Jerem. xvii. 15. Amos v. 18. Zeph. i. 12. Malac. ii. 17.

‖ Divine Legat. Vol. II. p. 445, 446. [Vol. III. p. 121, 122. Ed. 4to.]

** Exam. of Mr. *W's* Account, p. 206.

" otherwiſe,

" otherwiſe, ſome *Tranſgreſſors would eſcape Puniſhment* *." —And " again, whether an extraordinary Providence over Particulars was " then engaged ſo as that *no Tranſgreſſor ſhould eſcape Puniſhment, no* " *Obſerver of the Law ſhould miſs preſent temporal Bleſſings*, is the " Point to be proved †." And again—" The great Point was firſt " to have proved, that ever there was ſuch an extraordinary Provi- " dence to Particulars as that *no Tranſgreſſor ever eſcaped Puniſh-* " *ment, nor did any Obſerver of the Law miſs his preſent Reward* ‡." This therefore being all his Anſwer, I had given him his Reply before-hand. And have now nothing to do but to arraign him again, for a SECOND ATTEMPT of putting off his falſe Ware.

But his Logic is ſo very entertaining, that he will allow us to divert ourſelves with it a little; eſpecially as he has given us ſo much leiſure, by truſting all to one pitiful Sophiſm. It is where he ſays, " *It appears from* the Reaſon of the thing, *that this Admi-* " *niſtration did not begin to be exerted in particular Caſes, till the Civil* " *Laws of the Republic had failed of their Efficacy. Thus, where any* " *Crime, as for Inſtance, Diſobedience to Parents, was* public, *it be-* " *came the Object of the Civil Tribunal, and is accordingly ordered to* " *be puniſhed by the Judge. But when* private *and ſecret, then it be-* " *came the Object of divine Vengeance.* Let this be admitted. Now, " ſays Mr. *Warburton, the* Conſequence *of this was, that when the* " *Laws were* remiſsly *or corruptly adminiſtred, Good and Ill* would " *ſometimes happen* unequally *to Men.*

" On the contrary, I ſay, that this is no Conſequence at all: " For upon Suppoſition of an extraordinary Providence, *equally* ad- " miniſtred, the guilty Perſons ought to ſuffer by *Divine Vengeance*, " and the corrupt and remiſs Magiſtrate too, as being guilty of a " Crime in not doing his Duty §." Here we ſee our Diſputant miſtook, which part of the Syllogiſm he was to oppoſe: And ſo

* Exam. of Mr. *W's* Account, p. 207.
† Ibid. p. 210.
‡ Ibid. p. 216.
§ Ibid. p. 205, 206.

inſtead

inſtead of the *Premiſſes*, denied the *Concluſion*. For if he will *admit* that the *Adminiſtration did not begin to be exerted till the civil Laws had failed*, the *Conſequence* is neceſſary, that, *when the civil Laws were remiſsly executed, Good and Ill would ſometimes fall unequally.*—*No Conſequence at all*, ſays Dr. *Sykes*. Why? becauſe "upon Sup-"poſition of an extraordinary Providence equally adminiſtred, the "guilty Perſons ought to ſuffer by divine Vengeance, *&c.*" A Man is to be tried by the common Commiſſion of Oyer and Terminer. *Let this be admitted*, ſays our Diſputant. Why then, ſay I, the Conſequence is, that he muſt ſtay till that Time comes. *This is no Conſequence at all*, replies he; *for, upon Suppoſition* that he ought to be hanged ſooner, he ought to be tried ſooner. But then, good Doctor, if you had this *Suppoſition* in reſerve, why did you admit *my Premiſſes*, which, when admitted, exclude *your Suppoſition?*—I thought I had done with him on this head when I had laughed at him; but there is ſomething ſo malignant againſt the Law itſelf, in his Anſwer to what I ſay of the *Suſpenſion of an extraordinary Providence*, that the Reader muſt bear a little longer with us both. "This *Suſpenſion* (he tells the Reader) I ſay *was pub-*"*lickly denounced.* But (he ſays) not one Proof is produced of ſuch "a public Denunciation of the Suſpenſion of the extraordinary "Providence to Particulars. The only Paſſages referred to for "this Public Denunciation,—are *Iſaiah* iii. 5. lix. 2. lxiv. 7.—"Here is certainly a great Evil threatened to *Jeruſalem* and *Judah*; "but as for a Suſpenſion of an extraordinary Providence, HERE IS "NOT ONE WORD.—It is as true now as it was then, that Iniqui-"ties will ſeparate between us and God; and it has no relation to "any Suſpenſion of an extraordinary Providence for a particular "Time *." Was there ever ſuch a Reaſoner! Suppoſe from a Paſſage in *Livy*, which ſpeaks of the Creation of a *Dictator*, I ſhould infer that the Conſular and Senatorial, the Tribunitial and Popular Powers were all for a time ſuſpended; would it be ſufficient

* Exam. of Mr. *W*'s Account, &c. p. 211, 212.

to

to ſay,—No; all which that Paſſage proves is the erection of a ſupreme Magiſtrate; And erecting a ſupreme Magiſtrate, which is a thing that may be done now, does not infer the Suſpenſion of thoſe particular Powers. If to this fine reaſoning, it be replied, that the Inference was fair, becauſe, from other Parts of *Livy*, we learn there were ſuch power in the *Roman* State; which conſequently on the erection of an higher muſt needs be ſuſpended; would not that teach the Reader a ready Anſwer to our Doctor? Is not an extraordinary Providence as clearly declared by the Law of *Moſes*, as the Conſular and Tribunitial Power by the Law of *Rome*? And conſequently, when God tells his People that he will withdraw his Face from them for their Sins, and return to them on their Repentance, is not this as plain a Denunciation of the Suſpenſion of that extraordinary Providence, as the Creation of a Dictator was a Suſpenſion of all the other Magiſtracies? But ſo perverſe are theſe *Anſwerers*, and ſo much Strangers to their Bible, that an *extraordinary Providence to Particulars*, which is a Scripture Doctrine they diſpute with me as if it was my own; and a *Future State* amongſt the *Jews*, which is their own, they would have not diſputed, as if it were a Scripture Doctrine.—This being premiſed, let the Bible now ſpeak for itſelf. *Iſaiah* iii. *For behold the Lord of Hoſts doth take away from* Jeruſalem *and from* Judah *the Stay and the Staff, the whole Stay of Bread and the whole Stay of Water,—Thy Men ſhall fall by the Sword, and thy Mighty in the War*, v. 1—25. Chap. lix. *Behold the Lord's Hand is not ſhortened that it cannot ſave; neither his Ear heavy that it cannot hear. But your Iniquities have ſeparated between you and your God, and your Sins have hid his Face from you, that he will not hear*, &c. v. 1, 2. Ch. lxiii. *In all their affliction he was afflicted, and the Angel of his Preſence ſaved them: In his Love and his Pity he redeemed them, and he* BARE THEM, AND CARRIED THEM ALL THE DAYS OF OLD. *But they* REBELLED, *and vexed his holy Spirit; therefore he was turned to be their Enemy, and he fought againſt them*, v. 10, 11. Ch. lxiv. *And there is none that calleth upon thy Name, that ſtirreth up himſelf*

to

to take hold of thee: for thou haſt hid thy Face from us, and haſt conſumed us becauſe of our Iniquities, v. 7.

Well, ſays he, "But let us admit that a Suſpenſion of the extraordinary Providence was publickly denounced, in theſe Paſſages of the Prophet. *It was a very ſevere Puniſhment*. To whom? Why to all the *Jews*—ALL of that Nation, the Virtuous and Wicked, the Good and the Bad *.—Again, "The *Jews* had been much accuſtomed to an extraordinary Diſpenſation, and now this extraordinary Providence is ſuſpended and publickly known to be ſo. This was a *ſevere Puniſhment* certainly to ALL good Men, becauſe God was wont, and had engaged himſelf to grant particular Bleſſings to all ſuch; WHEREAS BY THIS SUSPENSION "THEY WERE NO LONGER INTITULED TO ANY OF THEM †." This is his Repreſentation of the State of the Caſe: and from this he forms all his Difficulties againſt my Reaſoning. Where he got it, I know not: But certainly not from the Bible; the Book of all others he ſeems the leaſt acquainted with. Had he looked into *That*, he would have found that he had given the moſt falſe and injurious, becauſe moſt contrary Repreſentation of this whole matter. For the Bible tells us, that the *Severity of the Puniſhment*, in this *Suſpenſion*, fell, as it ought, not upon the *Good*, but upon the *Evil* only. Hear God's own expreſs Declaration in the very Place, where this *Suſpenſion* is denounced, *viz.* the third Chapter of *Iſaiah*; which, too, our Examiner pretends to have read. SAY YE TO THE RIGHTEOUS THAT IT SHALL BE WELL WITH HIM: FOR THEY SHALL EAT THE FRUIT OF THEIR DOINGS. WO UNTO THE WICKED, IT SHALL BE ILL WITH HIM; FOR THE REWARD OF HIS HANDS SHALL BE GIVEN HIM, 10, 11. And we learn, from a Parabolical Command in *Ezekiel*, how exactly theſe Promiſes were fulfilled—*And the Lord ſaid unto him, Go through the midſt of the City, through the midſt of* Jeruſalem, *and ſet a Mark upon the Foreheads of the Men that ſigh, and that cry for all the Abominations*

* Exam. of Mr. *W's* Account, p. 213. † Ibid. p. 214,

that

that be done in the midſt thereof. And to others he ſaid in mine hearing, Go ye after him through the City and ſmite: Let not your Eye ſpare, neither have you Pity. Slay utterly old and young, both Maids and little Children and Women; but come not near any Man upon whom is the Mark; and begin at my Sanctuary, &c. chap. ix. 4—6.—And now, will our learned Doctor be pleaſed to take this for an Anſwer likewiſe to the concluding Words of his Paragraph? "The great Point was firſt to have been proved that ever there "was ſuch an extraordinary Providence to *Particulars*—This, I "ſay, ſhould firſt have been proved; which, I apprehend, has not "been done. Nor, in courſe, will any of theſe Paſſages from "the Prophets prove a Suſpenſion of that equal Providence over "*Particulars*, which SEEMS never to have been exerted *."

I ſhould not leave the Paſſage, here quoted, without obſerving, that, where I have made the Break, it went on with the old Sophiſm, in this manner,—"As that *no Tranſgreſſor ever eſcaped Puniſhment*, "*nor did any Obſerver of the Law miſs his preſent Reward.*"—But I wave it, as beginning now to pity him. It has been obſerved of your notorious Story-tellers, that, by often repeating a favourite Tale, they have at laſt come to believe themſelves. And thus it ſeems to be with our good Doctor. He has urged *His own Senſe* of the Propoſition ſo often to all my Arguments (not leſs, I dare ſay, than twenty Times) that he now ſeems in good earneſt, to take it for *mine*.

XIV.

But we are drawing towards a Concluſion with him. The Author of *The Divine Legation* (ſays he) "proceeds, in the laſt Place, to "give a full and general Solution of the Difficulty. It ſtands thus: "*The common Cauſe of theſe Complaints aroſe from the gradual with-*"*drawing the extraordinary Providence. Under the Judges it was*"*perfectly equal. When the People had rebelliouſly demanded a King,*

* Exam. of Mr. *W*'s Account, &c. p. 214.

" *and—God ſuffered the Theocracy to be adminiſtered by a Viceroy,*
" *there was—a great Abatement in the Vigour of this extraordinary*
" *Providence—From hence to the Time of the Captivity the extraordi-*
" *nary Providence kept gradually decaying; till, on their full Settle-*
" *ment after their Return, it entirely ceaſed.*—This leaves us as much
" in the dark as any of the Solutions before given. For the ex-
" traordinary Providence over Particulars (by which IS ALWAYS
" MEANT ſuch a Providence that *no Tranſgreſſor eſcaped Puniſhment,*
" *nor Obſerver of the Law miſſed his Reward)* kept gradually de-
" caying to the Captivity. After *Samuel's* Time there was a great
" Abatement in its Vigour; and, from this Time, it gradually de-
" cayed. Its *Abatement* then muſt be in not inflicting conſtantly
" temporal Evils on the one, or in not giving conſtantly temporal
" Evils to the other: or elſe"—Well, to ſtop him ſhort, it did con-
ſiſt *in not giving conſtantly.* What then? Why then (ſays he) " it
" cannot be the former of theſe Notions, becauſe if the equal Pro-
" vidence was not conſtant, it would come to be the ſame as unequal.
" For what is the common Providence, or not extraordinary, but
" where Tranſgreſſors are often not puniſhed here, but go on and
" proſper in their Wickedneſs; and good Men are often not re-
" warded but ſometimes ſuffer * ?" A moſt admirable Argument! and, as well expreſſed. *It cannot* (ſays he) *be the former of theſe Notions*—Meaning, I ſuppoſe, that if the former of theſe Notions be mine, he will ſhew it to be a falſe one. Well, but his Reaſon: " BECAUSE if an EQUAL Providence was not conſtant, it would come " to be the ſame as UNEQUAL." Very well quibbled again. What is not *perfectly* equal muſt needs be *unequal.* Therefore, as more than Ten may be either Eleven or Eleven Thouſand; ſo *unequal* may ſignify, as well the higheſt Degree of Inequality, ſuch as that Providence exerciſed at preſent, or ſome ſmall Deviation only from Equality. And this being ſo, he only deſires you, in courteſy to his Argument, to underſtand it in the firſt Senſe. And then with

* Exam. of Mr. *W's* Account, &c. p. 217—9.

the

the ſame ſucceſs, he will diſpute againſt the Moon's equal or regular Motion round the Earth. You Aſtronomers, ſays he (for, to do him Juſtice, nothing comes amiſs to him; he has confounded all Men in their Turns, and put every Science out of Countenance) you contend for the Moon's equal or regular Motion; and yet you are *forced* to confeſs that there are ſome Inequalities or Irregularities in that Motion, ariſing from the Sun's Attraction, the elliptical Figure of its Orbit, and its not moving in the plain of the Earth's Motion. Now if your equal Motion *be not conſtant, it would come to be the ſame as unequal.* For what is regular Motion but that which has no Irregularities? In ſhort, you have *a great Difficulty to ſurmount when you attempt upon your Scheme of Equality to account for the Repreſentations of Inequality*, which Nature ſo plainly makes. As *great Authors* as you are, *what has been hitherto publiſhed is all Confuſion, and full of inextricable Difficulties.*

But, to make his Argument wear the better, he has lined his Quibble with an Equivocation. Obſerve his Words: *If an equal Providence* (ſays he) *was not conſtant,* IT WOULD COME *to be the ſame as unequal.* But *when?* Why the Quibble encourages you to underſtand *preſently*; which is to the Purpoſe: But if that fail, the Equivocation authorizes you to underſtand *many Ages afterwards*, though it be nothing to the Purpoſe.—This equal Providence of Heaven kept gradually declining in its Vigour, till it became at laſt the preſent Common unequal Providence; and ſo could be no longer called equal or extraordinary. Thus again, the regular Motion of the Moon, as our great Philoſopher, who has ſo well accounted for its preſent Irregularities, tells us, will probably, for the Reaſons he aſſigns, grow more and more irregular, till it become at laſt ſo unconſtant, that it will be no longer a regular but an irregular Motion.

But we are not got to the ſtreſs of the Affair. The old Sophiſm lies yet at the bottom of the Inkhorn: But now indeed ſo worn and hacknied, that it is ſcarce able to ſupport a miſerable Quibble.

Yet it ſtill puts its beſt Foot forward. This choice Reaſoning being introduced as uſual, "The extraordinary Providence over Particu-
"lars; by which IS ALWAYS MEANT ſuch a Providence that *No*
"*Tranſgreſſor eſcaped Puniſhment, nor Obſerver of the Law miſſed*
"*his Reward.*"——ALWAYS MEANT! Yes, truly, I can't but ſay he is conſtant enough in *this Meaning*. For which Reaſon I muſt here, for the THIRD TIME, remind him whom it belongs to.—"Mr. *Warburton (ſays he)* produces ſome Evidence that an
"extraordinary Providence revived after the return from the Capti-
vity. He cites *Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi*. But none of theſe
"Places prove any thing more than a promiſed Bleſſing to the
"*Jews* nationally conſidered *." Indeed? Why then had he not the Honeſty to quote thoſe Places in *The Divine Legation* which do *prove more?* particularly from the Prophet AMOS, where this extraordinary Providence is conſidered as adminiſtred to Particulars. The Words quoted in Page 438 of Vol. II. † of *The Divine Legation* are theſe—*Alſo I have withholden the Rain from you, when there was yet three Months to the Harveſt*, AND I CAUSED IT TO RAIN UPON ONE CITY, AND CAUSED IT NOT TO RAIN UPON ANOTHER CITY, ONE PIECE WAS RAINED UPON, AND THE PIECE WHEREUPON IT RAINED NOT, WITHERED ‡.—But he goes on—"It proves a very
"ſtrong Promiſe to bleſs the Nation of the *Jews*—But as to a
"Proof of an extraordinary Providence in the Senſe that NO TRANS-
"GRSSSOR WAS TO ESCAPE PUNISHMENT, NOR NO OBSERVER OF
"THE LAW MISS HIS REWARD, I cannot ſee the force of his Ar-
"gument §." But I can ſee the Force of *His*, though: And therefore here again accuſe him, for the FOURTH and laſt Time, of a very vile Prevarication that has run through all his Reaſoning upon this Subject.

* Exam. of Mr. *W's* Account, &c. p. 220.
† Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 114.
‡ Amos, chap. iv. ver. 7.
§ Exam. of Mr. *W's* Account, &c. p. 221.

And

And now we are happily got through his whole *Examination of my Account of the Nature of the* Jewiſh *Theocracy*. A very ſingular Compoſition truly! One Part *Blunder*, and two Parts *Fallacy!* Which though it may ſometimes make, as a great Writer aſſures us, a *good* Man of the World, has here however made a very bad Pamphlet. And no wonder. For this kind of Compoſition requires, in both Caſes, a very nice Adjuſtment. Otherwiſe, in playing the Knave (whether it be on Paper or in Public) Folly is ſo apt to get the upper Hand, that very often the firſt Dupe a deſigning Man makes, is himſelf: As, not to mince the Matter, in the Caſe of our *Examining* Doctor, whoſe Wantonneſs in undertaking a Subject he did not underſtand, has ſo far outſtript his Art in managing it, that, before his Fallacy had Time to impoſe upon others, his too frequent and indiſcreet Repetition of it had ſo worked upon himſelf, that he became no longer able to judge of any thing I had written: And therefore confeſſes (and I dare ſay truly) that what I have HITHERTO PUBLISHED IS ALL CONFUSION, to him, AND FULL OF INEXTRICABLE DIFFICULTIES *.

" But 'tis the Sport to have the Engineer
" Hoiſt with his own Petar."

WE have now paſſed through our Two Examining Doctors. Happy for them had they but known or underſtood that Maxim of a certain celebrated *French* Writer, DE PRENDRE POUR VRAI CE QUE DIT UN AUTEUR, SANS REJETTER COMME FAUX CE QU'IL NE DIT PAS. In theſe we find ſo great a Similitude of Talents, that Dr. *S.* might very well be miſtaken for Dr. *S.* were it not for ſome minuter Differences; a kind of Polemic Badges, that juſt ſerve to tell us to what Party either Wearer belongs.

But adjuſting the Merits of ſuch kind of Authors, is now the leaſt of my Concern. I here bid a final Adieu to Controverſy, unleſs ſome very groſs Provocation draw me back. For though I have

* Exam. of Mr. *W's* Account, &c. p. 222.

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not overloaded the Public with Writings of this ſort, nor attempted to engage its Attention but on Subjects of high Importance; yet even theſe will receive their beſt Defence and Support, by being carefully conſidered together, in the Order I firſt delivered them. For, as Lord *Bacon* ſays excellently well, THE HARMONY OF A SCIENCE, SUPPORTING EACH PART THE OTHER, IS AND OUGHT TO BE THE TRUE AND BRIEF CONFUTATION AND SUPPRESSION OF ALL THE SMALLER SORTS OF OBJECTIONS.

But in taking a formal leave it may perhaps be expected, that I ſhould ſay ſomething why I ever anſwered *at all*: And why I anſwered *in this manner*.

To the firſt of theſe Queſtions I muſt needs confeſs, that I have never yet ſeen any thing which, in my own opinion, deſerved my notice. But I was willing to ſubmit to better Judgments. *The Public* (ſays a Friend) *by what I can perceive, thinks there is ſomething in this Pamphlet—thinks there may be ſomething in that.* Well, I ſubſcribe to the public Judgment. I examine, I write, I confute. And what do I get by it? The Mortification of being told, that now, forſooth, *the Public wonders why I ſhould ſpend my Time upon ſuch Writers.* And in this manner I have been ſerved—more than once.—The Public ſays *this*; the Public ſays *that*: In ſhort, the Public's a Wag, and loves to divert itſelf at the Expence of us poor Authors. Of which Diverſion, having ſo fairly contributed my Quota, I ſhall now beg leave to retire—*Luſiſti ſatis.*—

As to the *Manner* in which I have anſwered ſome of my Adverſaries: Their inſufferable Abuſe, and my own Love of Quiet, made it neceſſary. I had tried all ways to ſilence an iniquitous Clamour; by Neglect of it; by good Words, by an Explanation of my Meaning; and all without Effect. The *Firſt* Volume of this obnoxious Work had not been out many Days, before I was fallen upon by a furious Eccleſiaſtical News-writer, with the utmoſt Brutality. All the Return I then made, or then ever intended to make, was a *Vindication* of my moral Character, wrote with ſuch Temper and Forbearance as ſeemed Affectation to thoſe who did not know that I only

only wanted to be quiet. But I reckoned without my Hoſt. The angry Man became ten times more outrageous. What was now to be done? I tryed another Method with him. I drew his Picture; I expoſed him naked; and ſhewed the Public of what Parts and Principles this Tumour was made up. It had its Effect; and I never heard more of him. On this Occaſion, let me tell the Reader a Story. As a *Scotch* Bag-piper was traverſing the Mountains of *Ulſter*, he was, one Evening, encountered by a *hunger-ſtarved Iriſh* Wolf. In this Diſtreſs, the poor Man could think of nothing better than to open his Wallet, and try the Effects of his Hoſpitality. He did ſo: and the Savage ſwallowed all that was thrown him with ſo improving a Voracity, as if his Appetite was but juſt coming to him. The whole Stock of Proviſion, you may be ſure, was ſoon ſpent. And now, his only Recourſe was to the Virtue of the Bap-pipe; which the Monſter no ſooner heard, than he took to the Mountains with the ſame Precipitation that he had come down. The poor Piper could not ſo perfectly enjoy his Deliverance, but that, with an angry Look at parting, he ſhook his Head, and ſaid, *Ay! are theſe your Tricks?—Had I known your Humour, you ſhould have had your Muſic before Supper.*

But though I had the *Caduceus of Peace* in my Hands, yet it was only in Caſes of Neceſſity that I made uſe of it. And therefore I choſe to let paſs, without any Chaſtiſement, ſuch impotent Railers as Dr. *Richard Grey*, and one *Bate*, a Zany to a Mountebank. On the other hand, when I happened to be engaged with ſuch very learned and candid Writers as Dr. *Middleton* and *The Maſter of the Charter-houſe*, I gave ſufficient Proof how much I preferred a different manner of carrying on a Controverſy, would my Anſwerers but afford me the Occaſion. But alas! as I never *ſhould* have ſuch learned Men long my Adverſaries, and never *would* have theſe other my Friends, I found that, if I wrote at all, I muſt be condemned to a manner, which all, who know me, know to be moſt abhorrent to my natural Temper. So, on the whole, I reſolved to quit my hands of them at once: And turn again to nobler Game, more

ſuitable, as Dr. *Stebbing* tells me, *to my Clerical Function*, that peſtilent Herd of libertine Scriblers, with which the Iſland is over-run; whom I would hunt down, as good King *Edgar* did his Wolves; from the mighty Author of *Chriſtianity as old as the Creation*, to the drunken blaſpheming Cobler, who wrote againſt *Jeſus and the Reſurrection* *.

To conclude, then, if hitherto, in the Courſe of my juſt Vindication, any thing has eſcaped me, offenſive to the candid Reader, I heartily wiſh it unſaid. Not for the ſake of thoſe, the ſo proper Subjects of it, for *Si indignus qui facerem, at illi digni hac contumelia ſunt maxime:* but for the ſake of the Public, to whom I have Obligations for their fair and generous Reception of my Writings. Not but the Candour and Equity of their Judgment will, I know, always carry along with it what I am now about to ſay, in Alleviation of any Harſhneſs that may have eſcaped me, under all the Calumny that Envy, in the Diſguiſe of falſe Zeal, has ſo liberally poured out upon me: Which is this: That my ſole Motive in writing *The Divine Legation* was the Diſcovery and Advancement of Truth, and (in that) the Support and Eſtabliſhment of Revelation. And if I needed a Voucher, I have the *Pleaſure* to obſerve, that the *Encouragement* given to this Attempt, is ſufficient to ſhew, that no conſiderable Man, either in Church or State, did, indeed, ever think that I had any other Motive.

* In a Pamphlet, intituled, *The Reſurrection of Jeſus demonſtrated to have no Proof. In anſwer to a late Pamphlet, called,* the Reſurrection of Jeſus cleared, *&c. London, printed for J. Jackman, in Fleet Street. Price One Shilling* ——But ſome ſay this was no Cobler, but Dr. *Morgan's* own Apothecary; who now writes by his Maſter's Receipts. Indeed, he is of ſo ſtrong a Complexion as to make it very probable he muſt be one whoſe Trade it has been to apply himſelf only to the wrong End of Human Kind. But whether he be of this, or the other cleaner Trade, I would recommend it to the fine Gentlemen to conſider, if it will not ſoon be neceſſary, for their Honour, to profeſs themſelves on the Side of Religion, ſince *Infidelity* is thus fallen into Attainder, and can now deſcend no lower.

A LETTER

ERRORS OF THE PRESS IN VOL. VI.

P. 7. *l.* 20. after *ſuffer*, inſert *me.*
21. *l.* 19. for *Gods*, r. God's.
34. *l.* 4. from the bottom, for ſtte, r. *ſtate.*
44. *n. l.* 1. for dominum, r. dominium.
181. *l.* 20. for *b*y reach, r. *m*y reach.
188. *l.* 9. from the bottom, for *w*ould, r. *c*ould.
269. *l.* 2. for charitable office, r. charitable *an* office.
350. *l.* 11. for w*e*s, r. w*a*s.
376. *l.* 25. for believing *his* having a principle, read and point—*believing is having*, a principle—
439. *l.* 6. for he has learnt, r. he has *not* learnt.
522. *l.* 14. for *un*equal providence, r. equal providence.
527. *l.* 6. for power, r. power*s*.
530. *l.* 14. for *evils*, r. rewards.
533. *l.* 10. for *in*, r. is.