THE

WORKS

OF THE

RIGHT REVEREND

WILLIAM WARBURTON,

LORD BISHOP OF GLOUCESTER.

IN SEVEN VOLUMES.

VOLUME THE FOURTH.

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BISHOP WARBURTON'S

WORKS.

VOLUME THE FOURTH:

CONTAINING

A L L I A N C E.

J U L I A N.

D O C T R I N E OF G R A C E.

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THE

THE
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AND
A TEST LAW
DEMONSTRATED.

IN THREE BOOKS.

True *Faith*, true *Policy* UNITED ran;
That was but love of God, and this, of Man. POPE.

PREFACE

TO THE

FIRST EDITION

IN MDCCXXXVI.

IF the *Form* or *Matter* of the enſuing Diſcourſe may be thought to ſtand in need of further Apology than that general one of the Author's weakneſſes and imperfections, which is always decent, and almoſt always neceſſary, to make to the Reader, I deſire this following Advertiſement may paſs with him for ſuch. As to the Form, the ſubject being of the greateſt weight and gravity in itſelf, and here treated abſtractedly, I have aimed at nothing, in the ſtyle, but exactneſs in the expreſſion, and clearneſs in the conſtruction: Content to have it without further ornament than what Truth beſtows upon it; and it being capable of affording Science; I have not only preſerved ſtrictneſs of method, but have not been over ſtudious to decline even the Formality of it. Now theſe are Circumſtances which, though they aſſiſt the gentle *Reader* in the Intelligence of the Diſcourſe, yet render his employment leſs agreeable and amuſing. But this is not the worſt. For, relying on the ſtrength of my demonſtration, I have laboured to contract the Diſcourſe within ſuch a compaſs as that the whole may be commodiouſly read at once. But it treating of a great variety of particulars, I was neceſſitated to be very brief in many points of im-

portance: which had been inexcuſable had not my ſubject confined me to qualified Readers, and my choice led me to ſuch as a great Ancient requeſted for judges of his Writings, *Tales meorum ſcriptorum velim judices qui reſponſionem non ſemper deſiderent, quum, his quæ leguntur, audierint aliquid contradici.*

As to the *Matter*; Writing in an age that, of all others, ſeems moſt to be attentive to diſengage itſelf from prejudices, enlarge its views, and follow truth and nature whitherſoever they lead; to ſo juſt, ſo generous, and prevalent a ſpirit, I ſhall have the leſs occaſion to apologize for the latitude of my theory. But this is the peculiar happineſs of our own times. It was not always ſo. When Dr. Taylor, about a century ago, compoſed his liberty of propheſying in defence of Religious Toleration (the firſt book on that ſubject wrote on reaſonable principles), though he had ſo ſtrongly vindicated the Right, and that in favour of the *Eſtabliſhed Church* under oppreſſion and perſecution; which had been overthrown for the want of a *Teſt-Law* to ſecure her; yet ſuch was the ſtrange perverſity of *ſome men*, at that time, that the great Author was accuſed and calumniated for having vindicated their right of ſerving God according to their Conſciences; becauſe he did it on Principles which made that Right extenſive to all the reſt of mankind. They would accept of Toleration on no other terms but becauſe they were the *true Church*. I find my engagement to be much the ſame with this excellent Writer's. When attempts had been, and are ſtill making, to violate the immunities of the *Eſtabliſhed Religion*, which have proved ſo far ſucceſsful as to induce a very prevailing opinion that *it*, with its attendant, a *Teſt-Law*, was a violation of the law of nature and nations, I preſumed, very unworthy as I am, to ſtand up in its defence. And to do this to more advantage, I have all along reaſoned, on the principles of our adverſaries themſelves, to prove that an *Eſtabliſhed Church* and a *Teſt* are agreeable to thoſe Laws, whether ſuch Church be the true one or no. So far, I ſay, we are alike. But as greatly as that Author has the

advantage

advantage of me in the noble elegance, learning, and force of his compoſition, which, I truly think, is as great as can well be; ſo greatly have I the advantage of him in the felicity of the times I write in. That narrow, ſour, ignorant ſpirit of bigotry, bleſſed be God, is now no more. A learned one, of liberty, and Chriſtian charity, univerſally prevails. So that that freedom of thought, which then gave ſo much offence, now creates a prepoſſeſſion altogether favourable to the Writer. But if, after all, I ſhould chance to be miſtaken in the humour of the times, as it would be no great wonder if I ſhould, the words of this illuſtrious Writer, with a little alteration, will be my beſt apology.—"When a perſecution (ſays he, in "his general Epiſtle to his Polemical diſcourſes) did ariſe againſt the "Church of *England*, and that I intended to make a defenſative "for my Brethren and myſelf, by pleading for a liberty to our "conſciences to perſevere in that profeſſion which was warranted "by all the laws of God and our Superiors, ſome men were angry "and would not be ſafe that way, becauſe I had made the roof of "the ſanctuary ſo wide that more might be ſheltered under it than "they had a mind ſhould be ſaved harmleſs: men would be ſafe "alone or not at all, ſuppoſing that their truth and good cauſe was "warranty enough to preſerve itſelf. And they thought true, it "was indeed warranty enough againſt perſecution, if men have be-"lieved it to be the truth. But becauſe we were fallen under the "power of our worſt enemies, they looked upon us as men in miſ-"perſuaſion and error; and therefore I was to defend our perſons "that whether our cauſe was right or wrong (for it would be "ſuppoſed wrong) yet we might be permitted in liberty and im-"punity. But then the conſequent would be this, that if we, "when we were ſuppoſed to be in error, were yet to be in-"dempnified, then others alſo, whom we thought as ill of, were "to rejoice in the ſame Freedom, becauſe this equality is the "great inſtrument of juſtice. Of this, ſome men were im-"patient; and they would have all the world ſpare them, and

"yet

" yet they would ſpare nobody. But becauſe this is too un-
" reaſonable I need no excuſe for my writing to other pur-
" poſes.—I CANNOT REPENT ME OF SPEAKING TRUTH, OR
" DOING CHARITY."

DEDI-

DEDICATION TO THE EDITION OF 1748.

TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

P H I L I P

EARL OF CHESTERFIELD.

MY LORD,

THE only ſubjects worth a wiſe Man's ſerious notice, are RELIGION and GOVERNMENT; ſuch Religion and Government, I mean, as exclude not (which too often they do) MORALITY and POLITICKS; and theſe are ſubjects that, at the ſame time, moſt need his attention. For though they be ordained to one end, to perfect HUMANITY; yet, as they purſue it by different means, they muſt act in conjunction, leſt the diverſity of the means ſhould retard or defeat the attainment of the concurrent end.

BUT then, the object of Religion being Truth, which requires liberty; and the object of Government, Peace, which demands ſubmiſſion; they ſeem naturally formed to counteract one another's operations.

HOWEVER, though their Natures, and conſequently their Agency, be thus different, yet their Views being the ſame, there ſeems to be

be no more reaſon againſt their POLITIC ALLIANCE than we ſee there was againſt the *phyſical union* of the Soul and Body, for whoſe diſtinct benefit each of thoſe Inſtitutions was ſeverally ordained. For though theſe two conſtituent parts of Man run counter, and frequently defeat each other's purpoſe; yet Reaſon can eaſily reconcile their jars, and teach them how to draw together; ſo as beſt to put in uſe and improve each other's Faculties: the Body ſupplying the Mind with organs of ſenſation; and the Mind, the Body with the active principle of ſpontaneous motion.

The chief deſign of the following Diſcourſe is to ſhew, that the like important uſes may be derived from an UNION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE: and to explain upon what Principles theſe ſervices are beſt procured. In doing this, I have ſtill kept our own happy Conſtitution in my eye: and ſo, have eſcaped the danger which ſpeculative Writers, intent only on their philoſophic ideas, have incurred in framing their Utopian Societies.

And now, my Lord, being willing to leave behind me a Monument of my love to my Country, I have taken the privilege, ariſing from the principles here laid down, to appeal, from the Eccleſiaſtical, to a Lay-Tribunal, under the protection of a Character which is going down to poſterity in the full luſtre of thoſe amiable qualities of humanity which Nature delights to throw round the Names of her diſtinguiſhed Favourites.

It is an uncommon happineſs when an honeſt man can congratulate a Patriot on his becoming Miniſter *: and what one would not, in conſcience, overlook. When Miniſters turn Patriots into Courtiers, it is a loſs, to the Public, of a *good name*, at leaſt: But when Patriots teach Courts public ſpirit, the loſs of a *word* is well repaid by the good that word was ſuppoſed to imply. And now if ſuch a one ſhould be aſked where is his Patriotiſm? he

* Secretary of State in the year 1748.

might

might well anſwer in the Spaniſh proverb,—*The* KING *has enough for us all.* What Subjects have thrown off is not loſt, but lodged in ſafer hands, the Crown; the old, the natural, the legal Guardian of Britiſh Liberty.

But Your Lordſhip has now a nicer part to manage. The PEOPLE are much more reaſonable in their demands on their PATRIOTS than on their MINISTERS. Of their Patriots they readily accept the Will for the Deed; but of their Miniſters, they unjuſtly interpret the Deed for the Will. Our great Engliſh Poet, who honoured Your virtues, as much as he loved Your perſon, was more candid. He underſtood the delicate ſituation of a Miniſter; and in this fine apology, as I have it under his hand, does juſtice to their good intentions:

> Our Miniſters like Gladiators live;
> 'Tis half their buſineſs blows to ward or give:
> The good their VIRTUE would effect, or SENSE,
> Dies between Exigents and Self-defence.

Beſides, my Lord, the dead weight of long deſuetude upon good intentions ſeems not to have been enough conſidered. Of all the ſtrange connexions which the revolutions of Time bring about, the rareſt and moſt accidental is that between MERIT and REWARD. So that when things have taken their plye, a Miniſter may be well allowed to anſwer with him, in the comic Poet, to one who complained he had *been cruelly ſcratched by Fortune, That it was now too late to think of paring her nails.*

Nor are the miſtakes of Expectants far ſhort of the difficulties of *Men in power.*

Scholars (to ſpeak the Court ſenſe of them) who know but little of practicable Life, are apt to fancy that ſuperior diſtinction in Letters, or ſuperior ſervices in their Profeſſion, may entitle them to the honours of it. But things are not ſo carried. High Stations, even of the more ſpiritual kind, require a *knowledge of Affairs.* The

 purſuit

purſuit of Letters keeps men from the ſight of *Buſineſs:* And learned impreſſions make them unapt and aukward in the diſcharge of it. The Mind muſt be unburthened before it will be able to move there, either with eaſe or grace. Nothing is more unqueſtioned, nor, *conſequently, *truer* than theſe Court-Maxims. And the moſt that can be ſaid for ſo helpleſs a Tribe is, *That Letters never made a Blockhead.* But I go no farther. For indeed it muſt be owned, That as they find him, ſo they always leave him.

But perhaps, my Lord, I am all this while giving an example of that very ignorance I would endeavour to excuſe. For, if what we daily hear be true, I am pleading for the Decorations of Society, at a time, that the Foundations of it are thought to be inſecure. Which certainly would be as bad œconomy as his, who buſied himſelf in white-waſhing his manſion-houſe, when the walls wanted both ſupport and repair.

It is true, I had a view to *Uſe* as well as Ornament; for I hinted at *Religion* as well as Letters. But it is not of that wood (I mean the wood of the Croſs) of which the public ſupports are now made. So that a great Miniſter will find many things to do, before he comes to embelliſh and adorn. And if the temper of the times will but ſuffer Your Lordſhip to be inſtrumental in ſaving Your Country by a reformation of the general manners, men of ſenſe would be unjuſt to complain, though they might lament, that the work of poliſhing our genius was denied to you, and reſerved for ſome happier Succeſſor.

I am, my LORD,

Your LORDSHIP's moſt obliged and faithful ſervant,

W. WARBURTON.

ADVER-

ADVERTISEMENT

TO THE

EDITION OF 1766.

A VERY able and judicious *French* Writer * not long ſince tranſlated the following Treatiſe (amongſt the other Works of this Author) into his native Language. His purpoſe in it was to open a way for appeaſing the commotions of *Janſeniſm*, at that time in a high ferment. He addreſſed it, in a private Letter †, to the late Cardinal FLEURY, to whom he was well known. And to give the concluſions, I have deduced, the more credit with his countrymen, he ſupported them all along with quotations (which are here inſerted) from the two famous Works of DE MARCA and BOSSUET; the one the wiſeſt, and the other the moſt ſenſible Divine that Nation ever produced: And although their Religion kept them ſtrangers to the principles here laid down, as appears from their ſuppoſing, all along, that both Church and State continue ſovereign and independent, even after *aid* and *protection* have been mutually given and repaid: yet the love of their Country led them to the concluſions ariſing from them; which they readily embraced from obſerving their uſe to Mankind, without underſtanding the grounds on which they ſtood.

* M. *de Siloubette.*

† A copy of which follows this Adverti ſement.

The Tranſlator's ſucceſs was ſuch as might be expected from every attempt to eaſe or ſoften POPERY, though directed to its firmer Eſtabliſhment. For, the politic directors of that Superſtition having long ſince filled up their meaſure of unrighteouſneſs, Providence will not ſuffer them to be *wiſe even in their own Generation.* The Miniſter was jealous of principles, and plans of policy, which came from the ſchools of Liberty and Reaſon: Neither could he reliſh or underſtand them, though dreſſed up and recommended by ſome of the ableſt Doctors of his own Church. It is a trite obſervation, that Divines make bad Politicians; I believe it is more generally true, that Politicians are but bad Divines; and eſpecially, ſecularized Politicians, ſuch as our Cardinal. Yet had this great Man been in the Direction, under a Government like ours, are we to think he would then have ſlighted a Work which only profeſſes to ſhew on what ſolid grounds the fundamental Conſtitutions of it are erected? By no means. Though his maxims of Policy might not ſuffer him to countenance Innovations, how juſt and beneficial ſoever; yet the dictates of Common ſenſe would have led him, to encourage all attempts of ſupporting the eſtabliſhed Syſtem of things, on reaſonable principles.

Copie

Copie d'une Lettre écrite à Mgr. le Cardinal de FLEURY, en lui envoyant les *Diſſertations ſur l'Union de la Religion, de la Morale, & de la Politique ; tirées d' un Ouvrage de Mr. Warburton.*

PERMETTEZ moi, Mgr. de preſenter à votre Eminence des Diſſertations ſur l'Union de la Religion, de la Morale, & de la Politique, tirées de l'Ouvrage d'un ſavant Anglois. Je preſumerai d'en parler avec d'autant plus de liberté que je n'a gueres fait que traduire & qu'extraire. Ce n'eſt pas ſans de puiſſans motifs que j'ai entrepris cet ouvrage, & que je prens la liberté de vous le preſenter. Frapé des progrès de l'irreligion, & de la decadence des mœurs, qui en eſt toujours une ſuite infaillible, inſtruit par l'hiſtoire de toutes les nations, & EN PARTICULIER PAR MON SEJOUR EN ANGLETERRE, DES MAUX FUNESTES QUE PRODUIT, DANS TOUTES LES BRANCHES DU GOUVERNEMENT, LE RELACHEMENT DES PARTICULIERS DANS LA PRATIQUE DE LA VERTU & DES DEVOIRS RELIGIEUX ; trop perſuadé que l'*Angleterre* n'eſt pas le ſeul pays où l'irreligion ait repandu ſon poiſon contagieux, j'ai cru que l'ouvrage le plus utile au quel un bon citoyen put s'appliquer, étoit de tacher d'arrêter le cours d'un libertinage ſi pernicieux, d'expoſer les chimeres ainſi que l'ignorance des eſprits forts, & de demontrer alternativement l'utilité de la Religion par ſa verité, & ſa verité par ſon utilité. Pour mettre cette grande verité dans tout ſon jour, j'ai aprofondi autant qu'il m'étoit poſſible la conduite de tous les Legiſlateurs & les ſentimens de tous les Philoſophes ; diſcutions qui ouvrent d'elles-mêmes un beau champ à la literature.

MAIS,

MAIS, Mgr. j'oſe dire que ce n'eſt point aſſez que de s'opoſer aux excès de l'irreligion, ſi l'on ne s'opoſe en même tems aux abus de la Religion même. L'hiſtoire de preſque toutes les nations modernes de l'Europe offre des tableaux bien touchans des maux qu'a produit l'abus de la Religion : Et pour ne ſe point faire d'illuſion, que ne doit-on poit craindre du feu que couvent les diſſenſions qui diviſent encore aujourd'hui les eſprits, & dont l'eclat n'eſt retenu que par la ſageſſe & la moderation de votre Eminence ? J'ai toujours été extrémement frapé d'un paſſage de St. Chryſoſtome, que je vous demande la permiſſion de raporter ici. HÆC EST CHRISTIANISMI REGULA, HÆC ILLIUS EXACTA DEFINITIO, HIC VERTEX SUPRA OMNIA EMINENS, PUBLICÆ UTILITATI CONSULERE. C'eſt le caractere eſſentiel de la Religion que de s'allier avec l'utilité de l'Etat. Et cependant de combien de calamitez la religion n'a-t-elle pas été la ſource, elle que n'eſt deſtinée qu'à produire des fruits ſalutaires ? On abuſe des meilleures choſes, & c'eſt l'abus, que l'on fait de la RELIGION, contre lequel je me ſuis propoſé d'elever une barriere qui marque tout l'uſage que l'on en peut, & que l'on en doit faire, & qui fixe le point où l'on doit s'arrêter. Je n'ai travaillé ſur les principes d'aucun parti : je n'ai abſolument ſongé qu'à trouver le point critique de reunion où ſe concentrent LA VERITE & L'UTILITE ; Quoique je me ſuis aidé du ſecours de quelques uns de nos Theologiens les plus reſpectables, j'ai moins ſongé à puiſer dans leurs ouvrages, que dans les ſources primitives d'un raiſonnement fondé ſur la nature & l'eſſence même des choſes. Un long ſejour dans des pays où la diverſité des religions ne produit aucun deſordre a contribué à me mettre ſur la voye du vrai, & m'y a enſuite affermi : j'ai marché avec d'autant plus de ſureté que je me ſuis trouvé guidé par l'experience des autres nations : j'ai même trouvé ces matieres ſavament & profondement diſcutées par des Theologiens de l'Egliſe *Anglicane* : un nombre infini d'ecrits ont paru ſur ce ſujet : la liberté de tout dire a fait, qu'aucune

qu'aucune dificulté n'a été ſupprimée, & aucune n'a été propoſée qu'elle n'ait été clairement & ſolidement expliquée.

Je laiſſerois à la lecture de ces Dissertations à devoiler ſe ſeul remede qu'il convienne, & que l'on puiſſe appliquer eficacement & ſalutairement aux deſordres de religion, ſi les ocupations importantes & multipliées de votre Eminence pouvoient lui permettre une lecture auſſi longue. Ce remede, c'eſt l'etabliſſement d'un Acte par lequel l'Etat s'aſſure que tous ceux qui rempliſſent des poſtes publics, ſoit civils ou religieux, ſe conforment à la Religion dominante : c'eſt, en d'autres mots, la requiſition ou d'un Serment, ou de la ſignature d'un Formulaire. J'eſpere en avoir demontré la juſtice & la neceſſité, ſans inſiſter ſur d'autres principes que ſur ceux de l'Equité naturelle & de la prudence univerſelle de tous les Etats polices : genre de demonſtration que je ne ſache pas que perſonne eut encore entrepris, & qui cependant eſt eſſentiel.

Je ſais que je dois m'attendre à eſſuyer un orage violent de la part d'un Parti * qui ne s'eſt rendu que trop populaire, & dont tout le credit eſt fondé ſur l'illuſion & le cagotiſme. Mais j'ai tout lieu d'eſperer que cet orage ſe deſſipera de lui-même, lorſque l'on verra que la requiſition de la ſignature d'un formulaire, bornée, comme je le propoſe, aux perſonnes qui veulent occuper des emplois publics, n'attaque en rien la liberté des conſciences, & qu'elle ſe trouve entierement exemte de tous les reproches de perſecution. C'eſt là je crois le ſeul moyen de rendre inutiles toutes les ruſes d'un parti extrémement habile à s'emprevaloir ; car pour peu que l'on examine avec attention, il n'eſt pas difficile de decouvrir ce qui lui attire un ſi grand nombre de proſelytes. La plupart des particuliers ne ſont pas capables de juger des matieres theologiques qui ſeparent les deux partis. Le François a naturellement l'ame noble & genereuſe, en ſorte que le parti qui peut faire accroire qu'il eſt perſecuté, ce parti, ſoit bon ou mauvais, ne peut manquer d'avoir un grand

* Les Janſeniſtes.

nombre

nombre de partiſans. Rien ne le prouve mieux qu'un trait fort remarquable raporté par Brant, dans ſon Hiſtoire de la Reformation des Pays Bas, Livre qui fait l'admiration de tous les Hollandois compatriotes de l'Auteur ; eſtimé par tous les Etrangers qui le connoiſſent, & qui, quoique l'ouvrage d'un Proteſtant, renferme bien des connoiſſances utiles & inſtructives pour un Lecteur Catholique. Cet Hiſtorien raporte qu'avant la revocation de l'Edit de Nantes, quelques Religionaires du Poitou paſſerent en Angleterre, où interrogez ſur leur foi, & en particulier ſur le nombre des ſacramens, ces bonnes gens, ſouverainement ignorans, repondirent qu'il y en avoit trois, le Pere, le Fils, & le St. Eſprit. Comment ſe peut-il que des gens euſſent tant de zele que d'abandonner leur patrie, et tout ce qui leur étoit cher, pour une Religion qu'ils ne connoiſſoient certainement pas ? Rien de plus naturel : ils croyoient que l'on vouloit contraindre leurs Opinions ; & ils ne s'imaginoient pas que la Force & la Verité puſſent aller de concert. Avec combien d'art les Janſeniſtes ne cherchent-ils pas à perſuader qu'ils ſont perſecutez ? Ils ſavent bien que cette opinion, bien loin de decourager leur ſecte, eſt tout ce qu'il y a de plus capable de l'augmenter. Je ſuis perſuadé que l'on trouvera que c'eſt là le cas de la plupart de leurs partiſans.

C'eſt dans cette vue qu'en m'atachant à prouver la juſtice & la neceſſité d'un formulaire dont la profeſſion ſeroit requiſe de toutes les perſonnes qui voudroient des emplois publics, je n'ai pas inſiſté avec moins de force ſur la Tolerance de Opinions, à l'egard de ceux qui ne ſont dans aucun emploi. C'eſt même en vain qu'on voudroit les contraindre : les Opinions ſont libres, & le pouvoir des hommes n'a aucune priſe ſur elles. Il n'a d'autre moyen d'introduire l'uniformité que l'expulſion, expedient qu'il faudroit renouveller ſans ceſſe, parce qu'il renait ſans ceſſe des Opinions nouvelles ; expedient par conſequent trop dangereux ; & qui ne s'acorde pas avec la maxime de St. Chryſoſtome ſur l'utilité de la Religion pour l'Etat. J'oſe d'autant plus volontiers avancer, que

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la Violence & la Religion ſont incompatibles ; que rien n'eſt plus oppoſé que la violence au caractere & aux ſentimens que toute l'Europe reconnoit dans votre Eminence.

Toute ſecte privée des dignitez de l'Etat fut-elle appuyée ſur la verité, ne peut faire de grands progrès dans ce ſiècle corrompu. On en a un exemple ſenſible dans les Catholiques de Hollande & d'Angleterre, & ſurtout dans ceux de cet dernier pays, où leur nombre diminue tous les jours, uniquement parce qu'il y a un plus grand nombre de dignitez à diſtribuer, & qu'elles y ſont plus faciles àobtenir, qu'en Hollande, où elles ſont preſque entierement confinées aux familles des Magiſtrats des Villes. Les progrès ſeroient encore bien moindres à l'egard des ſectes qui auroient le malheur d'être dans l'erreur. Les Catholiques de Hollande n'y cauſent aucun trouble, non plus que les Preſbyteriens en Angleterre. Exclus de tous les emplois, ils n'ont point aſſez de pouvoir pour introduire aucune diviſion dans le Gouvernement ; & jouiſſant en même tems de la liberté de profeſſer tranquilement leur religion, rien ne les excite à ſe ſoulever contre un Gouvernement juſte & équitable. Les Catholiques d'Angleterre ſont, à la verité, moins bons ſujets ; mais d'où provient cette difference d'avec ceux de Hollande, ſi non que les Loix penales, qui en Angleterre ont lieux contre eux, leur donnent toujours lieu d'apprehender la violence, & les reduiſent, en quelque maniere, dans un état de perſecution.

Me permettrez-vous, M^gr.^, de dire avec ingenuité, que je ſus convaincu tant par l'étude que je puis avoir faite de la nature humaine, que par le témoignage unanime qu'en rend l'Hiſtoire de toutes les nations floriſſantes, que l'Union de la PROFESSION D'UN FORMULAIRE d'une part, avec la TOLERANCE de l'autre, eſt le ſeul moyen de prevenir les maux que l'on a lieu d'apprehender d'une SECTE qui s'accroit plus qu'elle ne diminue ; & qui jette de jour en jour des racines plus profondes ; qui ne peut être detruite par tout autre moyen, qu'en même tems l'on n'affoibliſſe infiniment l'Etat, & qui, en ce cas même, ſeroit ſurement ſuccedée par quelque

ſecte nouvelle. Une rigidité exacte à exiger la profeſſion d'un Formulaire commun, de tous ceux qui entrent dans quelque poſte ou dans quelque ſocieté publique que ce puiſſe être, & une indulgence entiere à l'égard des opinions des ſimples particuliers, aſſureroient la tranquillité de l'Etat contre les efforts non ſeulement des ſectes actuelles, mais encore de toutes celles qui pourroient ſe former par la ſuite.

Je ſoumets toutes ces reflexions, M^gr., aux lumieres de votre Eminence, & j'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

THE

THE

NECESSITY AND EQUITY

OF AN

ESTABLISHED RELIGION

AND

A TEST LAW

DEMONSTRATED.

BOOK I.

Of the Nature and End of CIVIL *and of* RELIGIOUS SOCIETY.

CHAP. I.

The Occaſion and Nature of this Diſcourſe.

AN ESTABLISHED RELIGION and a TEST LAW, the two great ſoleciſms, as we are told, in modern politics, are the ſubject of the following Diſcourſe. A ſubject that hath not only, in common with moſt others of importance, been much perplexed by the bringing in, on both ſides, mens' civil and religious prejudices into the queſtion; but likewiſe, which is almoſt peculiar to this controverſy, by their concurring in one and the ſame erroneous principle: for where the two parties go on different grounds, they

naturally begin with examining one another's principles, which leads to the diſcovery of the true, and conſequently to the timely determination of the controverſy. But where a *falſe* principle has the luck to be unqueſtioned, the diſputants may wrangle for ever, and be, after all, no nearer to the truth. This hath been the fate of the ſubject in queſtion; while both parties placed their arguments on the ſame miſtaken foundation, the one defended a Teſt on ſuch reaſonings as deſtroyed a *Toleration*; and the other oppoſed it on ſuch as conclude equally againſt the very eſſence and being of a *National Religion*.

Inveterate miſtakes, therefore, upon a ſubject of ſuch importance, would be a ſufficient apology for the Expediency of this Diſcourſe at any time, although ſome late occurrences had not made it particularly ſeaſonable at the preſent. Our unhappy diviſions in the ſtate have, it ſeems, amongſt the various intrigues of parties, afforded opportunity and encouragement to the Proteſtant Diſſenters to enter upon meaſures for the Repeal of the *Teſt-Law*; that is, as we ſhall prove, for throwing the ſtate into convulſions, by a diſſolution of the original union between the two Societies. In the mean time it hath unhappily befallen, that ſome, to whom this kingdom is greatly indebted for their reaſonings in defence of public liberty, have thought hardly of a *Teſt-Law* and of an *Eſtabliſhed Religion* ſo ſecured. From what their miſtake hath ariſen will be ſhewn in its place. However, the authority of theſe great names hath induced many unprejudiced perſons to ſhew too much countenance to this deſtructive project; and hath emboldened the promoters of it to appeal to the abſtract principle of Right. I ſhall therefore attempt to ſhew THE NECESSITY AND EQUITY OF AN ESTABLISHED RELIGION AND A TEST-LAW FROM THE ESSENCE AND END OF CIVIL SOCIETY, UPON THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS.

This being our ſubject, I do not propoſe to defend an *Eſtabliſhed Religion* and a *Teſt*, by the laws of this or that ſtate, or on the principles of this or that ſcheme of religion, but on the great and unerring

unerring maxims of the law of nature and nations: and when, on occaſion, I may happen to apply the reaſoning here inforced, to this or that church or ſtate, it will be only ſo far forth as they are conformable to that law.

And this is all now wanting to determine this long controverſy. For the adverſaries of eſtabliſhments having been beaten off from their attacks of the *Teſt-Law*, on the frame and principles of our own conſtitution, by many excellent vindications *of the Corporation and Teſt-Acts*, have left this partial queſtion, and appealed to the law of nature and nations. To that tribunal we now propoſe to follow them.

The *Principles* of Society, Civil and Religious, here delivered, will ſerve to lay open the abſurd reaſonings of thoſe, who, thinking an *Eſtabliſhment* of divine right, defend it on the doctrine of intolerance, which makes a church, an inquiſition; and the neceſſary *conſequences* deduced from thoſe principles will as plainly expoſe the miſchievous reaſonings of thoſe, who, holding a *Teſt* to be againſt all human rights, oppoſe it on a doctrine of licentiouſneſs, which makes the church a rope of ſand. Having done this, from thoſe clear principles, and theſe neceſſary conſequences, we ſhall demonſtrate the perfect concord and agreement between *Religious Liberty* and a *Teſt Law*; and, in the laſt place, detect the deluſive Principle, above-mentioned, upon which both parties have gone, and ſhew how it hath led both, as extraordinary as it may ſeem, to quite contrary concluſions. From all this it will appear, which is one of the principal purpoſes of this Diſcourſe, that our preſent happy Conſtitution, both of Church and State, is erected on ſolid and laſting Foundations.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of the State of Nature; and the Eſtabliſhment of Society.

TO lay my foundation therefore with ſufficient ſtrength, it will be neceſſary, though in as few words as may be, to conſider the nature of man in general, and of that civil community which he invented with ſo much benefit to himſelf and fellows: that, ſeeing his wants, and the remedies he applied to them, we may better judge of their fitneſs to, and operations on, each other.

The appetite of ſelf-preſervation being indiſpenſably neceſſary to every animal, nature has made it the ſtrongeſt of all. And though, in rational animals, reaſon alone might be ſuppoſed ſufficient to anſwer the end for which this appetite is beſtowed on others, yet, the better to ſecure that end, nature has given man likewiſe a very conſiderable ſhare of the ſame inſtinct with which ſhe has endowed brutes ſo admirably to provide for their preſervation. Now, whether it were ſome *plaſtic nature* that was here in fault, which, Lord Verulam ſays, *knows not how to keep a mean* *, or that it was all owing to the perverſe uſe of human liberty, certain it is, that, borne away with the luſt of gratifying this appetite, man, in a ſtate of nature, ſoon ran into very violent exceſſes; and never thought he had ſufficiently provided for his own being, till he had deprived his fellows of the free enjoyment of theirs. Hence all thoſe evils of mutual violence, rapine, and ſlaughter, that, in a ſtate of nature, muſt needs abound amongſt equals. Becauſe, though man, in this ſtate, was not without a law which exacted puniſhment on evil doers, yet the adminiſtration of that law, not being in common hands, but either in the perſon offended, who being a party would be apt to inforce the puniſhment to exceſs; or elſe in the hands of every one, as the offence was againſt mankind in general

* Modum tenere neſcia eſt.

and

and affected the good of particulars not immediately or directly, would be executed remiſsly. And very often, where both theſe executors of the law of nature were diſpoſed to be impartial and exact in the adminiſtration of juſtice, they would yet want power to inforce it. Which, altogether, would ſo much inflame the evils abovementioned, that they would ſoon become as general and as intolerable as the *Hobbeiſts* repreſent them in that ſtate to be, was it not for the reſtraining principle of RELIGION that kept men from running into the confuſion which the appetite of inordinate ſelf-love neceſſarily produces. But yet religion could not operate with ſufficient efficacy for want, as we obſerved before, of a common arbiter, who had impartiality enough fairly to apply the rule of right; and power to inforce its operations: So that theſe two PRINCIPLES were in endleſs jar; in which juſtice generally came by the worſt. It was therefore found neceſſary to call in the CIVIL MAGISTRATE, as the ally of Religion, to turn the balance.

Jura inventa metu injuſti fateare neceſſe eſt,
Tempora ſi faſtos velis evolvere mundi.

Thus was *Society* invented for a Remedy againſt Injuſtice: and a *Magiſtrate* by mutual conſent appointed, to give a ſanction to "that common meaſure to which, reaſon teaches us that, crea-"tures of the ſame rank and ſpecies, promiſcuouſly born to the "ſame advantages of nature, and to the uſe of the ſame faculties, "have all an equal right*." Where it is to be obſerved, that though ſociety provides for all thoſe conveniencies and accommodations of more elegant life, which man muſt have been content to have done without, in a ſtate of nature, yet it is more than probable that theſe were never thought of when ſociety was firſt eſtabliſhed †: but that they were the mutual violences and injuſtices,

at

* Locke.

† Though the judicious Hooker thinks thoſe advantages were principally intended when man firſt entered into ſociety: *This was the cauſe* (ſays he) *of men's uniting themſelves*

at

at length become intolerable, which ſet men upon contriving this generous remedy. Becauſe evil felt has a much ſtronger influence on the mind than good imagined: and the means of removing the one is much eaſier diſcovered than the way to procure the other: and this by the wiſe diſpoſition of nature; the avoiding evil being neceſſary to our exiſtence; not ſo, the procuring pleaſure. Beſides, the idea of thoſe unexperienced conveniencies would be, at beſt, very obſcure: And how unable men would be, before trial, to judge that ſociety could beſtow them, we may gueſs by obſerving how little, even now, the generality of men, who enjoy thoſe bleſſings, know or reflect that they are owing to ſociety, or how it procures them; becauſe it doth it neither immediately nor directly. But they would have a lively ſenſe of evils felt; and would know that ſociety was the remedy, becauſe the very definition of the word would teach them how it becomes ſo. Yet becauſe *civil ſociety* ſo greatly improves human life, this *improvement* may be called, and not unaptly, the *ſecondary end* of that convention. Thus, as *Ariſtotle* accurately obſerves in the words quoted below, that which was at firſt conſtituted for the *ſake of living*, is carried on for the *ſake of happy living*.

This is further ſupported by fact. For we ſee that thoſe ſavage nations which happen to live in peace out of civil ſociety, never think of entering into it, though they feel all the advantages of that improved condition in the neighbouring colonies round about them.

at firſt into politique ſocieties. Eccl. Pol. L. i. § 10. His maſter Ariſtotle, though extremely conciſe, ſeems to hint, that this was but the *ſecondary* end of civil ſociety; and that *that*, which we here make to be ſo, was the firſt. His words are: γινομένη μὲν ἕνεκεν τοῦ ζῆν ἔσχεν, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν. Pol. L. i. c. 2.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of the natural Defects of Civil Society; and the Neceſſity of applying Religion to remedy thoſe Defects.

CIVIL Society thus eſtabliſhed; from this time, as the Poet ſings,

——*abſiſtere bello,*
Oppida cœperunt munire, et ponere leges,
Ne quis Fur eſſet, neu Latro, neu quis Adulter.

But as before, bare RELIGION was no preſervative againſt civil diſorders; ſo now SOCIETY alone would be equally inſufficient.

I. 1. For, firſt, its laws can have no further efficacy than to reſtrain men from open tranſgreſſion; while what is done amiſs in private, though equally tending to the public prejudice, eſcapes their cenſure. And man, ſince his entering into ſociety, would greatly have improved his practice in this ſecret way of malice. For now an effectual ſecurity being provided againſt *open violence*, and the inordinate principle of ſelf-love being ſtill the ſame, *ſecret craft* was the art to be improved; and the guards of ſociety inviting private men to a careleſs ſecurity, what advantages it would afford to thoſe hidden miſchiefs, which civil laws could not take notice of, is eaſy to conceive.

2. But, ſecondly, the influence of civil laws cannot, in all caſes, be extended even thus far, namely, to the reſtraining of open tranſgreſſion. It cannot *then*, when the ſevere prohibition of one irregularity threatens the bringing on a greater: and this will always be the caſe, when the irregularity is owing to the violence of the ſenſual paſſions. Hence it hath come to paſs, that no great and flouriſhing community could ever puniſh *fornication*, or vague luſt, in ſuch a ſort as its ill influence on ſociety was confeſſed to

deſerve: Becauſe it was always found that a ſevere reſtraint of this forced open the way to more flagitious luſts.

3. Thirdly, The very attention of civil laws to their principal object occaſions a further inefficacy in their operations. To underſtand this, we muſt conſider, that the care of the ſtate is for the Whole, under which *individuals* are conſidered but in the ſecond place, as acceſſaries only to that whole; the conſequence of which is, that, for the ſake of the body's welfare, ſome individuals are often left neglected. Now the care of *Religion* is for Particulars, and a *Whole* has but the ſecond place in its concern *. This is only touched upon to ſhew, in paſſing, the natural remedy for the defects, I am here endeavouring to account for.

4. But this was not all: There was a further inefficacy in human laws. The Legiſlator, in enquiring into the mutual duties of citizens ariſing from their equality of condition, found thoſe duties to be of two kinds. The firſt, he intitled the duties of PERFECT OBLIGATION, becauſe civil laws could readily and commodiouſly, and were of neceſſity required, to inforce their obſervance. The other he called the duties of IMPERFECT OBLIGATION; not that morality doth not as ſtrongly exact them, but becauſe civil laws could not conveniently provide for the obſervance of them; and becauſe they were ſuppoſed not ſo immediately and eſſentially to affect the welfare of ſociety. Of this latter kind are *gratitude*, *hoſpitality*, *charity*, &c. Concerning ſuch, civil laws, for theſe reaſons,

* Regium Imperium a Sacerdotali in eo maxime diſtat, quod illi non ſolæ ſingulorum civium rationes commiſſæ ſint, ſed totius reipublicæ ſalus; unde fit ut in cives etiam invitos ad fovendum totius reipublicæ corpus, jus illi competat—Quod aliter ſe habet in epiſcopali miniſterio, cui eccleſiæ ſollicitudo ita eſt commiſſa, ut ſingulorum ſaluti præcipue invigilare debeat, nec curare poſſit univerſum corpus aliquorum membrorum pernicie. Petrus de Marca, *De concordia ſacerdotii et imperii. Epiſtola ad Cardinalem de Richelieu:* Nous aurons occaſion de citer ſouvent ce fameux ouvrage, écrit à la requiſition du Cardinal de Richelieu. Nous l'indiquerons par le nom de l'Auteur, prelat auſſi zélé pour ſa religion que pour ſon prince. Il mourut peu de tems après ſa nomination à l'Archevêché de Paris, où il étoit parvenu par ſon mérite et par le diſcernement de ſon Roi. *French tranſlator.*

are

are generally ſilent. And yet, though it may be true, that theſe duties, which human laws thus overlook, may not ſo directly affect ſociety, it is very certain, that their violation brings as ſure, though not ſo ſwift deſtruction upon it, as that of the duties of *perfect obligation*. A very competent judge, and who, too, ſpeaks the ſentiments of antiquity, in this matter, hath not ſcrupled to ſay—" Ut ſcias per ſe expetendam eſſe GRATI ANIMI ADFECTIO-" NEM, per ſe fugienda res eſt INGRATUM eſſe: quoniam nihil " æque concordiam humani generis diſſociat ac diſtrahit quam hoc " vitium *."

5. Still further, beſides theſe duties both of *perfect* and *imperfect* obligation, for the encouraging and enforcing of which, civil regimen was invented; SOCIETY itſelf begot and produced a *new ſet of duties*; which are, to ſpeak in the mode of the legiſlature, of *imperfect obligation*: the firſt and principal of which is, that antiquated forgotten virtue called the LOVE OF OUR COUNTRY.

6. But, laſtly, SOCIETY not only introduced a new ſet of duties, but likewiſe increaſed and inflamed, to an infinite degree, thoſe inordinate appetites for whoſe correction it was invented and introduced; like ſome kinds of powerful medicines, which, at the very time they are working a cure, heighten, for a time, the malignity of the diſeaſe. For the appetites take their birth from our real or imaginary wants. Our *real* wants are unalterably the ſame; and, ariſing only from the imbecillity of our nature and ſituation, are exceeding few, and are eaſily relieved. Our *fantaſtic* wants are infinitely numerous, to be brought under no certain meaſure nor ſtandard; and, are always increaſing in exact proportion to our improvements in the arts of life. But the arts of life owe their original to ſociety: and the more perfect the policy is, the higher do thoſe improvements riſe; and, with them, are our wants, as we ſay, proportionably increaſed; and our appetites inflamed: for thoſe appetites which ſeek the gratification of our imaginary wants

* Seneca de Benef. Lib. iv. c. 18.

are much more violent than what are raiſed by our real wants: not only becauſe the imaginary are more numerous; which gives conſtant exerciſe to the appetites: and more unreaſonable; which makes the gratification proportionably difficult; and altogether unnatural; to which there is no meaſure: but principally becauſe vicious cuſtom hath affixed a *kind of reputation* to the gratification of the fantaſtic wants, which it hath not done to the relief of the real ones. So that, on the whole, our wants increaſe in proportion as the arts of life advance and perfect.—In proportion to our wants, is our uneaſineſs—to our uneaſineſs, our endeavours to remove it—to our endeavours, the weakneſs of *human reſtraint*. Hence it appears, that, in a ſtate of nature, where little is conſulted but the ſupport of our exiſtence, our wants muſt be few, and our appetites in proportion weak; and that, in civil ſociety, where the arts of life are cultivated, our wants muſt be many, and our appetites in proportion ſtrong.

II. Thus far concerning the imperfection of civil ſociety, with regard to the adminiſtration of that power which it hath, namely, of *puniſhing* the refractory. We are next to conſider its much greater imperfection with regard to that power which it wanteth; namely of *rewarding* the obedient.

The two great ſanctions of law and civil regimen are Reward and Punishment. Theſe are generally called the two hinges, on which government turns. And ſo far is certain, and apparent to the common ſenſe of mankind, that whatever laws are not enforced by both theſe ſanctions, will never be obſerved in any degree ſufficient to carry on the ends of ſociety.

Yet, I ſhall now ſhew, from the original conſtitution and nature of civil ſociety, that it neither had, nor could enforce, the sanction of reward.

But, to avoid miſtakes, I deſire it may be obſerved, that, by *Reward*, muſt needs here be meant, *ſuch as is conferred on every one for obſerving the laws of his country*; not ſuch as is beſtowed on particulars, for any eminent ſervice: as by *Puniſhment* we underſtand

underſtand *that which is inflicted on every one for tranſgreſſing the Laws*; not *that* which is impoſed on particulars, for neglecting to do all the ſervice in their power.

I make no doubt but this will be put into the Number of my paradoxes; nothing being more common in the mouths of politicians *, than *that the ſanctions of reward and puniſhment are the two pillars of civil government*; all the modern *Utopias*, and ancient ſyſtems of ſpeculative politics, deriving the vigour of their laws from theſe two ſources. Let the proof therefore of the two following propoſitions be conſidered.

I. That, by the *original conſtitution* of civil government, the ſanction of rewards *was not* enforced.

II. That, from the *nature* of civil government, they *could not* be enforced.

I. In entering into ſociety, it was ſtipulated, between the magiſtrate and people, that *protection* and *obedience* ſhould be reciprocal conditions. When, therefore, a citizen obeys the laws, that debt on ſociety is diſcharged by the protection it affordeth him. But, in reſpect to diſobedience, the proceeding is not analogous (though protection, as the condition of obedience, implies the withdrawing it on diſobedience) and for theſe Reaſons: The effect of withdrawing protection muſt be either expulſion from the ſociety, or expoſing the offender to all kinds of inſult from others, in it. Society could not practiſe the firſt, without bringing the body politic into a conſumption; nor the latter, without throwing it into convulſions. Beſides, the firſt is no puniſhment at all, except by accident; it being only leaving one Society to go into another: And the ſecond is an inadequate puniſhment; for though all obedience be the ſame; and ſo, *uniform protection* a proper return for

* Neque ſolùm ut SOLONIS dictum uſurpem, qui & ſapientiſſimus fuit ex ſeptem, & legum ſcriptor ſolus ex ſeptem. Is *rempublicam duabus rebus contineri* dixit, PRÆMIO ET POENA. Cic. ad Brutum, Ep. 15.

it;

it; yet diſobedience being various both in kind and degree, the withdrawing protection would be too great a puniſhment for ſome crimes, and too ſmall for others.

This being the caſe, it was ſtipulated that the tranſgreſſor ſhould be ſubject to pecuniary mulcts, corporal caſtigations, mutilation of members, and capital inflictions. Theſe were the ſanction, and *only* ſanction of civil laws. For, that protection is no reward in the ſenſe that theſe are puniſhments, is plain from hence, that protection is of the eſſence of ſociety itſelf; penal inflictions an occaſional adjunct. But this will farther appear by conſidering the oppoſite to protection, which is *expulſion*, or baniſhment; for this is the *natural* conſequence of withdrawing protection. Now this, as we ſaid, is no puniſhment but by accident: and ſo the State underſtood it; as we may collect, even from their manner of employing it *as a puniſhment* on offenders: for baniſhment is of univerſal practice, with other puniſhments, in all ſocieties. Now, where withdrawing protection is inflicted as a puniſhment, the practice of all ſtates hath been, to retain their right to obedience from the baniſhed member; though, according to the nature of the thing, conſidered alone, that right be really diſcharged; obedience and protection, as we obſerved, being reciprocal. But it was neceſſary all States ſhould act in this manner when they inflicted exile as a puniſhment; it being no puniſhment but by accident, when the claim to ſubjection was remitted with it. They had a *Right* to act thus; becauſe it was inflicted on an *Offender*; who had wilfully forfeited all claim of advantage from that *reciprocal condition* *.

II. But ſecondly, from the nature of civil government, *the ſanction of rewards could not be enforced by it*: becauſe ſociety could neither diſtinguiſh the objects of its favour; nor reward them, though they were diſtinguiſhed.

* See note [A], at the end of this Book.

1. Firſt,

1. First, *Society could not diſtinguiſh the objects of its Favours.* To inflict puniſhment, there is no need of knowing the Motives of the offender; but judicially to confer reward, on the obedient, there is.

All that civil judicatures do in puniſhing is to find whether the act was *wilfully* committed. They enquire not into the intention or motives, any further, or otherwiſe, than as they are the marks of a voluntary act; and having found it ſo, they concern themſelves no further with the motives or principles of acting, but puniſh, without ſcruple, in confidence of the offender's demerit. And this with very good reaſon; becauſe no one of a ſound mind can be ſuppoſed ignorant of the principal offences againſt right, or of the malignity of thoſe offences, but by ſome ſottiſh negligence that hath hindered his information; or ſome brutal paſſion that hath prejudiced his judgment; both which are highly faulty, and deſerve civil puniſhment.

It is otherwiſe in rewarding the abſtaining from tranſgreſſion. Here the *motive* muſt be conſidered: becauſe as *merely doing ill*, i. e. without any *particular* wrong motive, deſerves puniſhment, a crime in the caſe of wrong judgment being ever neceſſarily inferred; ſo *merely abſtaining from ill* cannot, for that very reaſon, have any merit.

In *judicially rewarding*, therefore, the *Motives* muſt be known: but human Judicatures can know them but by accident: It is only that tribunal, which ſearches the heart, that penetrates thus far. We conclude, therefore, *that reward cannot, properly, be the ſanction of human Laws.*

If it ſhould be ſaid, that though rewards cannot be equitably adminiſtered like puniſhments; yet nothing hinders but that, for the good of ſociety, all who obſerve the laws may be rewarded, as all who tranſgreſs the laws may be puniſhed: the anſwer will lead us to the proof of the ſecond part of this propoſition.

2. That

2. That *ſociety could not* reward, *though it ſhould* diſcover *the objects of its favour*; the reaſon is, becauſe no ſociety can ever find a fund ſufficient for that purpoſe, without raiſing it on the people as a tax, to pay it back to them as a reward.

But the univerſal practice of ſociety confirms this reaſoning, and is explained by it; the ſanction of *puniſhments* only, having, in all ages and places, been employed to ſecure the obſervance of civil laws. This was ſo remarkable a *fact*, that it could not eſcape the notice of a certain excellent wit, and ſtudious obſerver of men and manners; who ſpeaks of it as an univerſal defect: *although we uſually*, ſays he, *call reward and puniſhment the two hinges, upon which all government turns, yet I could never obſerve this maxim to be put in practice by any nation except that of* Lilliput*. Thus he introduceth an account of the laws and cuſtoms of an *Utopian* conſtitution of his own framing; and, for that matter, as good, perhaps, as any of the reſt: And, had he intended it as a ſatire againſt ſuch chimerical common-wealths, nothing could have been more juſt: for all theſe political romancers, from *Plato* to this author, make civil rewards and puniſhments *the two hinges of government.*

I have often wondered what it was, that could lead the reformers of laws from fact, and univerſal practice, in ſo fundamental a point: But, without doubt, it was this: the deſign of ſuch ſort of writings is to give a perfect pattern of civil government; and to ſupply the fancied defects in real ſocieties. The end of government coming firſt under conſideration; and the general practice of ſociety ſeeming to declare this end to be only, what, in truth, it is, *ſecurity to our temporal liberty and property*; the ſimplicity of the plan diſpleaſed, and appeared defective. They imagined, that, by enlarging the bottom, they ſhould ennoble the ſtructure: and, therefore, formed a romantic project of making civil ſociety ſerve for all the good purpoſes it was even accidentally capable of produc-

* Gulliver's Travels, vol. I. p. 97.

ing.

ing. And thus, inſtead of giving us a true picture of government, they jumbled together all ſorts of ſocieties into one; and confounded the *religious*, the *literary*, the *mercantile*, the *convivial*, with the CIVIL. Whoever reads them carefully, if indeed they be worth reading carefully, will find that the errors, in which they abound, are all of this nature, and ariſe from this ſource, from the loſing, or never having had, a true idea of the ſimple plan of civil government: a circumſtance, which, as we ſhall ſhew occaſionally, in the courſe of this work, hath been productive of many wrong judgments concerning it. No wonder then, that this miſtake, concerning the *end* of civil ſociety, drew after it others, concerning the *means*; and this, amongſt the reſt, that *reward was one of the ſanctions of human laws.*

On the whole, then, it appears, that civil ſociety hath not, in itſelf, the *ſanction of rewards*, to ſecure the obſervance of its own laws. So true, in *this* ſenſe, is the obſervation of St. *Paul*, that THE LAW WAS NOT MADE FOR THE RIGHTEOUS, BUT FOR THE UNRULY AND DISOBEDIENT.

But it being evident, that the joint ſanctions of rewards and puniſhments are but juſt ſufficient to ſecure the tolerable obſervance of right (the common falſe opinion that theſe are the two hinges of government ariſing from that evidence), it follows, that, as RELIGION, ONLY, CAN SUPPLY THE SANCTION OF REWARDS, WHICH SOCIETY WANTS, AND HATH NOT, RELIGION IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

Thus, on the whole, we ſee,

I. That ſociety, by its own proper force, cannot provide for the obſervance of above one third part of moral duties; and of that third, but imperfectly. We ſee likewiſe, how, by the peculiar influence of its nature, it enlargeth the duty of the citizen, at the ſame time that it leſſens his natural ability to perform it.

II. We ſee further, which is a thing of far greater conſequence, that ſociety totally wants one of thoſe two powers which are owned by all to be the neceſſary hinges on which government turns, and without which it cannot be ſupported.

To ſupply theſe wants and imperfections, ſome other coactive power muſt be added, that hath its influence on the mind of man, to keep ſociety from running back into confuſion. But there is no other than the power of RELIGION; which teaching a governing Providence, who hath given laws for the perfecting of Man's nature, and ſo becomes the rewarder of good men, and the puniſher of ill, this religion can oblige to the Duties of *imperfect obligation*, which human laws overlook: and teaching, alſo, that this Providence is omniſcient, that it ſees the moſt ſecret actions and intentions of men, will oblige to thoſe duties of *perfect obligation*, which human laws cannot reach, or ſufficiently enforce.

Thus we have explained, in general, the mutual aid which *religion* and *civil policy* lend to one another: not unlike what two parties in the ſame cauſe, and engaged in the ſame encounter, may reciprocally receive and give againſt a common enemy: While one party is cloſely preſſed, the other comes up to its relief; diſengages the firſt; gives it time to rally, and repair it's force: By this time the aſſiſting party is puſhed in its turn, and needs the aid of that which is relieved; which is now at hand to repay the obligation. From henceforward, the two parties ever act in ALLIANCE; and, by that means, keep the common enemy at a ſtand.

THIS USE OF RELIGION TO THE STATE was ſeen by the learned, and felt by all men of every age and nation. The ancient world particularly was ſo firmly convinced of this truth, that their greateſt ſecret of the ſublime art of legiſlation conſiſted in this, how religion might be beſt applied to the ſervice of ſociety. The particular methods they employed, and the ſeveral artful detours they contrived to arrive at this end, are in the ſecond book of *The Divine Legation of* MOSES explained at large.

Religion

Religion being thus proved neceſſary to ſociety, that it ſhould be ſo uſed and applied, in the beſt way, and to moſt advantage, needs no proof. For it is as inſtinctive in our nature to improve a good, as to diſcover or inveſtigate it. And with regard to the improvement of this particular good, there is a ſpecial reaſon why it ſhould be ſtudied. For the experience of every place and age informs us, that the coactivity of *civil laws* and *religion* is but juſt enough to keep men from running into diſorder and mutual violence. But this improvement is the effect of art and contrivance. For all natural good, every thing conſtitutionally beneficial to man, needs man's induſtry to enable him to reap that benefit. We receive it all at the provident hand of heaven, rather with a capacity of being applied to our uſe, than immediately fit for our ſervice. We receive it, indeed, in full meaſure, but rude and unprepared. The efficient cauſe of this, in natural goods, is the intractability and innate ſtubbornneſs of matter; and in moral goods, the malice and perverſity of man. The final cauſe ſeems to be, that man, of all God's creatures the moſt incapable of a ſtate of inactivity and idleneſs, may be ſet to work; and by this means made to cultivate, what would elſe lye fallow, the faculties both of his mind and body.

Now concerning this technical improvement of moral good, it is, in artificial bodies, as in natural: *Two* may be ſo eſſentially conſtituted as to be greatly able to adorn and ſtrengthen each other. But then, as in the one caſe a mere juxta-poſition of the parts is not ſufficient, ſo neither is it in the other; ſome union, ſome coalition, ſome artful inſertion into each other will be neceſſary.

But now again, as in natural bodies, the artiſt is unable to ſet about the proper operation, till he hath acquired a reaſonable knowledge of the nature of thoſe bodies which are the ſubject of his ſkill; ſo neither can we know in what manner religion may be beſt applied to the ſervice of the ſtate, till we have learned the real and eſſential natures both of a *ſtate* and a *religion*. The

obvious qualities of both ſufficiently ſhew that they muſt needs have a good effect on each other, when properly applied *; as our artiſt, by his knowledge of the obvious qualities of two natural bodies, we ſuppoſe diſcerns as much; though he hath not yet gotten ſufficient acquaintance with their nature, to make a proper application.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Nature and End of Civil Society: And the cauſes of the common miſtakes concerning it, diſcovered and explained.

IT behoves us, therefore, in the next place, to examine the nature of CIVIL SOCIETY and RELIGION more at large. Of whoſe *natures* to be truly informed, the way is to find out their *ends*. And this will be the more neceſſary on account of the wonderful extravagances that the ſeveral ſects amongſt us have run into, concerning one and the other ſociety; while ſome ſtrike at the *adminiſtration*, ſome at the *nature*, and ſome at the very *Being* of both. The PAPIST makes the ſtate a creature of the church; the ERASTIAN makes the church a creature of the ſtate: the PRESBYTERIAN would regulate the ſtate on church ideas; the HOBBEIST, the church, on reaſons of ſtate: And, to compleat the farce, the QUAKER aboliſhes the very being of a church; and the MENNONITE ſuppreſſes the office of the civil magiſtrate.

But to begin with *Civil Society*. It was inſtituted either with the purpoſe of attaining all the good of every kind, it was even accidentally capable of producing; or only of ſome certain good, which the inſtitutors, unconcerned with, and unattentive to, any other, had in view. To ſuppoſe its end the vague purpoſe of ac-

* Non natura, ſed hominum vitio factum, ut ambæ illæ poteſtates, quæ amico fœdere conjungi debuerant, in dedecus Chriſtiani nominis aliquando divellantur ab invicem. *Marca, Epiſtola ad Cardinalem de Richelieu.* F. T.

quiring

quiring all poſſible accidental good, is, in politics, a mere ſolecifm; as hath been ſufficiently ſhewn by the writers * on this queſtion. And how untrue it is in fact, may be gathered from what we have ſaid above, of the Origin of Society. Civil Government then, I ſuppoſe, will be allowed to have been invented for the attainment of ſome certain end or ends, excluſive of others: and this implies the neceſſity of diſtinguiſhing this end from others. Which diſtinction ariſes from the different properties of the things pretending. But, again, amongſt all thoſe things which are apt to obtrude, or have in fact obtruded, upon men, as the ends of civil government, there is but one difference in their properties, as ends; which is this, *That one of theſe is attainable by civil ſociety only; and all the reſt are eaſily attained without it.* The thing then, with that ſingular property, muſt needs be the genuine end of civil ſociety. And that is no other than SECURITY TO THE TEMPORAL LIBERTY AND PROPERTY OF MAN. For this end, as we have ſhewn, civil ſociety was invented; and *this*, civil ſociety alone is able to procure. The great, but ſpurious rival of this end, THE SALVATION OF SOULS, or the *ſecurity* of man's future happineſs, belongs, therefore, to the other diviſion. For *this*, not depending on outward accidents, or on the will or power of another, as the body and goods do, may be as well attained in a ſtate of nature, as in civil ſociety; and therefore, on the principles here delivered, cannot be one of the cauſes of the inſtitution of civil government; nor conſequently one of the ends thereof †.

But if ſo, the promotion of it comes not within the peculiar province of the magiſtrate ‡. For he who has nothing to do with the

* See Locke's Defence of his Letters of Toleration. This appears too to have been Ariſtotle's opinion from theſe words—φύσει μὲν ἓν διώρισται τὸ θῆλυ, καὶ τὸ ἄῤῥεν· ἀδὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ τοιοῦτον, οἷον χαλκοῖ τύποι τὴν [Δελφικὴν] μάχαιραν, ποικίλως, ἀλλ' εἰς ἕν· &c. Polit. l. i. c. 1.

† See note [B], at the end of this Book.

‡ Summa divini numinis benignitate duobus maximis præſidiis inſtructa eſt humani generis ſocietas ad felicitatem conſequendam, Sacerdotio et Imperio; quorum alterum divinis

the *end*, can have no concern with the *means*. Theſe means are DOCTRINE AND MORALS, which compoſe what is called RELIGION, in the largeſt ſenſe of the word—That *opinions* are not in his reſſort, I again refer the reader to Mr. *Locke's* diſcourſes on *Toleration*; where it may be ſeen, how, from the principles here laid down, the whole doctrine of religious liberty is demonſtrated: and that even *morals* are not, when conſidered only in a religious ſenſe, how ſtrange ſoever this aſſertion may appear, is evident both from the reaſon of things, and from the fundamental practice of all governments.

We have ſhewn they were the *bodies*, not the *ſouls* of men, of which the magiſtrate undertook the care. Whatever therefore refers to the *body*, is in his juriſdiction; whatever to the *ſoul*, is not. But, and if there be *that* which refers equally to both (as *morals* plainly do) ſuch thing muſt needs be partly within and partly without his province; that is, it is to be *partially* conſidered by him; his care thereto extending ſo far only as it affects ſociety. The other conſideration of it, namely as it makes part of religion, being in the hands of thoſe who preſide in another kind of ſociety; of which more hereafter.

Again, with regard to civil practice; if we caſt our eye on any *digeſt* of laws, we ſhall find that evil actions have their annexed puniſhment denounced, not as they are VICES, *i. e.* not in proportion to their deviation from the eternal rule of right: nor as they

divinis myſteriis ſe impendit, alterum componit reipublicæ ſtatum, et humanæ vitæ tranquillitatem procurat; ita ut ex utriuſque concordia Chriſtiana reſpublica cumulatiſſimis incrementis augeatur. Utraque poteſtatum ſuis limitibus eſt circumſcripta, et in diſſitis omnino negotiis exercetur; cum illa ſpiritualibus addicatur, hæc publicis occupata ſit—certæ quidem regulæ in genere aſſignari poſſunt, quibus invicem diſtermi-nentur.—Et en parlant des difficultez qui peuvent ſurvenir entre ces deux puiſſances, l'Auteur ajoûte—Quæ locum habent non in controverſiis fidei, quæ longo intervallo remotæ ſunt e cognitione principum, nec in rerumpublicarum adminiſtrationibus, quæ alienæ ſunt a cura paſcendi gregis. Marca in præfatione prima. F. T.

are

are SINS, *i. e.* not in proportion to their deviation from the revealed will of God; which two things indeed coincide: But as they are CRIMES, *i. e.* in proportion to their malignant influence on civil ſociety.

But the view in which the *ſtate* regards the practice of morality is evidently ſeen in its recognition of that famous maxim by which, in all communities, penal laws are faſhioned and directed, THAT THE SEVERITY OF THE PUNISHMENT MUST ALWAYS RISE IN PROPORTION TO THE PROPENSITY TO THE CRIME. A maxim evidently *unjuſt*, were actions regarded by the ſtate as they are in themſelves; becauſe the *law of nature* enjoins only in proportion to the ability of the ſubject; and human abilities abate in proportion to the contrary propenſities:—evidently *impious*, were actions regarded by the ſtate as they refer to the *will of God*, becauſe this ſtate-meaſure directly contradicts his method and rule of puniſhing. But ſuppoſe the magiſtrate's office to be what is here aſſigned; his aim muſt be the SUPPRESSION of *crimes*, or of thoſe actions which malignantly affect ſociety; and then nothing can be more reaſonable than this proceeding. For then, his end muſt be the good of the *whole*, not of *particulars*; but as they come within that view. But the good of the whole being to be procured only by the *prevention of crimes*; and thoſe, to which there is the greateſt propenſity, being of the moſt difficult prevention, the full ſeverity of his law muſt, of neceſſity, be armed againſt theſe *.

* "A law there is mentioned amongſt the Grecians whereof *Pittacus* is reported to "have been author: and by that law it was agreed, that he, which being overcome "with drink did then ſtrike any man, ſhould ſuffer puniſhment double as much as if he "had done the ſame being ſober. No man could ever have thought this reaſonable "that had intended thereby only to puniſh the injury committed according to the "gravity of the fact. For who knoweth not that harm adviſedly done is naturally leſs "pardonable, and therefore worthy of the ſharper puniſhment. But for as much as "none did ſo uſually this way offend as men in that caſe, it was for the public good to "frame a poſitive law for remedy thereof accordingly." *Hooker*, Eccl. Pol. L. i. § 10.

But

But now it is to be obſerved, in order to clear this queſtion from the confuſion to which the want of theſe conſiderations has ſubjected it, that though *Religion*, or the *Care of the Soul*, be not within the province of the magiſtrate, and conſequently matters of *doctrine* and *opinion* are without his juriſdiction; yet this muſt always be underſtood with an exception to the three fundamental principles of Natural Religion; namely—THE BEING OF A GOD—HIS PROVIDENCE OVER HUMAN AFFAIRS—and THE NATURAL ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE OF MORAL GOOD and EVIL. Theſe doctrines it is directly of his office to cheriſh, protect, and propagate; and all oppugners of them it is as much his right and duty to reſtrain as any the moſt flagrant offender againſt civil peace. Nor doth this at all contradict our general poſition, that the ſole end of civil ſociety is the conſervation of body and goods. For the magiſtrate concerns himſelf with the maintenance of theſe THREE FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES, not as they promote our *future* happineſs, but our preſent: as they are the very foundation and bond of civil policy. To underſtand this, we muſt remember what hath been ſaid above of its original.

The progreſs and increaſe of mutual violence in the ſtate of nature, till it became general and intolerable, was owing to the *natural equality* of power amongſt men. The remedy of which was ſeen to be civil ſociety. But that equality of power, which occaſioned the evil, prevented the remedy, any otherwiſe than by the will and free conſent of every one. The entrance therefore into ſociety was by free convention and ſtipulation. But then again, that ſame equality which made every man's conſent neceſſary, prevented his giving any other ſecurity for the performance of his compact than his mere word: and how feeble a ſecurity that is, all men know. Some means therefore were to be contrived to ſtrengthen the obligation of his word. Now nothing, in the caſe here imagined of perfect equality (and ſuch was the real caſe on mens' entering into ſociety) could give this ſtrength, but RELIGION. An OATH then, riſing on the *three great principles* above-mentioned,

mentioned, was that ſanction to his word which was univerſally employed in all conventions. For an oath is an invocation to heaven, whoſe providence is believed to regard mens' actions; juſtice being the object of his delight, and injuſtice of his diſpleaſure; and that he will puniſh and reward accordingly: all which neceſſarily imply an eſſential difference between good and evil, prior to human decrees. Thus an old *Grecian* ſage quoted by *Clemens*, ſpeaking of the office of the ancient Lawgiver, ſays: "He firſt of "all trained the race of mankind to juſtice by the invention of an "oath *."

Again, when ſociety was eſtabliſhed, it was neceſſary that human laws ſhould be inforced on a principle of RIGHT as well as *power*; that is, on a principle which would make them *obeyed for conſcience ſake*. But the preſerving theſe *three* great articles of natural religion could alone ſubſiſt that principle. Therefore was the magiſtrate to provide for their ſupport. But theſe being all that were neceſſary to this end, Religion, as ſuch, was no farther under his direction. The conſequence is, that no particular ſcheme or mode of religion was under his care as a magiſtrate, till he had covenanted and compacted to that purpoſe; as we ſhall ſee hereafter. But for a fuller proof of the neceſſity of theſe *three great principles* to a ſtate, I refer the Reader to the firſt book of *The Divine Legation of Moſes*; where he will find the cavils of Mr. *Bayle* againſt that neceſſity confuted at large.

Thus it is ſeen, that though the conſervation of theſe principles belong to the magiſtrate, it is not becauſe they make a part of the civil inſtitute (for this would be violating the unity of its end), but as they are the very rock and foundation on which the edifice of a common-wealth is built. Nor is it, for that, the leſs within the province of the magiſtrate. It was equally the concern of the antient *Ædiles* at *Rome* to ſee to the ſupport of the foundations as well as

* Πρῶτος ἔτος εἰς δικαιοσύνην ἀνθρώπων ἤγαγεν, δείξας ὅρκον. Strom. lib. i.—See alſo note [C], at the end of this Book.

to the repair of the public buildings erected on them. Nor is this diſtinction made without reaſon. For if the care of theſe principles were within the magiſtrate's juriſdiction, as making part of the civil inſtitute, his office would extend to the *care of ſouls*; and then I can ſee no reaſon but that more, with equal pretence, might enter in, till the whole of religion devolved upon him. And how miſchievous this would be to the ſtate, and how much more miſchievous to religion, the following diſcourſe will amply demonſtrate. But if theſe principles are within his care only as they are the Rock on which ſociety is erected, there is then abundant reaſon why it ſhould not be enlarged. And yet many policies, both ancient and modern, by a prepoſterous kind of architecture, that enlarges the foundation at the ſame time that it narrows the ſuperſtructure, have ſo ſurrounded the commonwealth on all ſides with this rock, that it puts one in mind of the old puniſhment of immuring malefactors within four walls. For a miſtaken regard to virtue and religion hath, in all ages, diſpoſed the magiſtrate to deviate from his proper office; till at length the care of the ſoul got the upper hand of that of the body, in his adminiſtration; to the infinite damage of mankind in all his intereſts.

Though one may eaſily conceive the magiſtrate induſtriouſly propagating this flattering deluſion, in order to add power to his office, and veneration to his perſon; yet, I am perſuaded, miſtake firſt introduced this miſchief: though fraud might, perhaps, contribute to ſupport it. Becauſe I find the error to have ſpread itſelf even into thoſe communities where public liberty, and conſequently where public good, have been moſt aimed at, and effected. Which hath ſo riveted the miſtake, in the minds of ſome, concerning the magiſtrate's real office, that they have even ventured to accuſe the wiſeſt adminiſtrations of injuſtice: for, borne away with the common notion that his office extended to the care of ſouls, and finding the beſt inſtitutes of civil laws framed with a manifeſt diſregard to that care, they have raſhly cenſured them for carnality and irreligion.

To

To vindicate ſuch conſtitutions, and to remove this only objection to the principles here laid down, it may be proper to trace up, from their original, the ſeveral cauſes that have concurred to the miſtake of the magiſtrate's real office; by which it will be ſeen, that what makes moſt for it, its *antiquity*, only proves the *inveteracy* of the miſtake.

I. The firſt ground of this error was the confuſed mixture of civil and religious intereſts, to which the magiſtrate, in the execution of his office, had his regard attached. This ſeveral cauſes had in ſeveral ages contributed to effect.

As FIRST, In the infancy of civil ſociety, fathers of families (who were wont to execute the office of the prieſthood) when they advanced, or were called up, to the adminiſtration of public affairs, carried that ſacred character with them into the magiſtracy: and continued to execute both functions in perſon. So that the *care of religion*, which was thus by *accident* attached to the *perſon* of the magiſtrate, would naturally in time be thought inherent in his *office*.

Secondly, Moſt of the antient law-givers, and inſtitutors of civil policy, having found it neceſſary, for the carrying on their reſpective eſtabliſhments, to pretend to inſpration, and the extraordinary aſſiſtance of ſome God *, unavoidably mingled and confounded civil and religious intereſts with one another; ſo as to animadvert on actions not only as *crimes* againſt the *ſtate*, but as *ſins* againſt that *God* who patronized the foundation; and conſequently, ſometimes, to make their adjuſtments and proportions between the action and the puniſhment rather according to this latter eſtimate.

Thirdly, PAGAN RELIGION had for its *ſubject* not only each individual, the *natural man*; but likewiſe the *artificial man*, Society; for whom, and by whom, all the *public* rites and ceremonies of it were inſtituted and performed †. So that here the care of religion

* See The Divine Legation of Moſes, book II. § 1.

† Ibid.

became the care of the republic: The conſequence of this was, that religion held the government in partnerſhip; and nothing was conſulted or executed without the advice of the oracle. Prodigies and portents were as common as civil edicts; and bore as conſtant a ſhare in the public adminiſtration.

Fourthly, In after-ages, when the Roman emperors became Chriſtian, agreeably to the zeal of new converts, they made the *civil* inſtitutes *religious*, by introducing laws againſt *ſin*; in which, as they were told by their teachers they were not only authorized, but directed, by the examples and precepts of that SCRIPTURE which they profeſſed to believe. This greatly contributed to confound the diſtinction between a church and ſtate. However, this falſe judgement did not owe its birth to the *Chriſtian* Religion, where this diſtinction is ſo marked out and inforced, as not eaſily to be miſtaken; but to the *Jewiſh*, in which thoſe ſocieties were conſolidated, and, as it were, incorporated. For there they ſaw, in a civil policy inſtituted by God himſelf, and therefore to be eſteemed moſt perfect, and, of courſe, worthy the imitation of all magiſtrates who profeſſed themſelves the ſervants of that God, they ſaw, I ſay, *ſins* and *crimes* eqally within the magiſtrate's juriſdiction. They did not reflect that *that* juriſdiction was the neceſſary conſequence of a THEOCRACY*, a form of government different in kind from all human policies whatſoever.

Fifthly, in theſe later times, when the great ſeparation was made from the church of Rome, in the fifteenth and ſixteenth centuries; the people, in moſt places, except in England, procured for themſelves their national reformation, ſupported by their miniſters, whoſe heads were full of the Jewiſh diſpenſation ill underſtood. And, in ſome places, it being the fortune of the ſtate, as well as church, to be new modeled, it was no wonder that, under ſuch artificers, a ridiculous imitation of the Jewiſh ſtate ſhould be affected; and, conſequently, that the magiſtrate ſhould ſhew a

* Divine Legation, book V.

greater

greater attention to reſtrain *ſins* than *crimes*. And here I cannot but, with much grief, obſerve, that this wrong judgement was not only pernicious to civil ſociety, but highly injurious to the intereſts of the *Proteſtant Religion*. It did indeed contribute more than any thing beſides to re-eſtabliſh *Popery*, which was then ſhaken even to what itſelf calls, its very CENTRE OF UNITY. It put a ſudden ſtop to the glorious progreſs which the *reformed Religion* was then making throughout Europe, from Eaſt to Weſt. For the well-diſpoſed princes on the continent finding, in the *reformed* miniſters, a pragmatic ſpirit, which was for modeling the ſtate as well as church, on their own theologic ſtandard, adhered, or fell back, to the Papal power: as preferring an eccleſiaſtic tyranny they had been uſed to, before a new one, whoſe principles threatened an entire ſubverſion of the eſtabliſhed policies. The excellent *Grotius* ſhall be my warrant that I have given no injurious account of the conduct of the *reformed* miniſters: who, in the hiſtory of his own country, has exhibited to us a very lively repreſentation of this whole ſcene. Speaking of the *Eſtabliſhment* of the *reformed Religion* by the *States of Holland* he ſays:—"Recepta PUBLICE diſciplina, "quæ Genevæ et in Palatinatu Germaniæ paſſimque alibi docebatur: "hoc tamen intereſt, quod ejuſdem religionis ALII *diverſas minus* "*tolerant*: QUIPPE NON IN HOC TANTUM ORDINATAS A DEO "CIVITATES AC MAGISTRATUS DICTANTES UT A CORPORIBUS ET "POSSESSIONIBUS INJURIÆ ABESSENT, SED UT, QUO MORE IPSE "JUSSISSET, EO IN COMMUNE COLERETUR; CUJUS OFFICII NEGLI-"GENTES MULTOS POENAM, ALIORUM IMPIETATI DEBITAM, IN "SE ACCERSISSE. Contra, iſtæ nationes non modo, &c *."

Nor was *England* altogether free from the effects of this diſorder. For thoſe amongſt us who were called *puritans*, having, during the diſtreſſed ſtate of religion at home, been obliged to reſide abroad amongſt theſe new modelers of church and ſtate, imbibed their ruinous notions of reformation: and returning home, on the ap-

* Annales de Rebus Belgicis, lib. ii. Anno 1572.

proach

proach of better times, began early to inforce their whimſies to the diſturbance of their own country, 'till *Hooker*, in his immortal book of *Eccleſiaſtical Policy* *, put a ſtop to this religious frenzy. So that the ſpirit of *purity* ſeemed now to be ſubdued: When, towards the concluſion of our laſt unhappy civil wars, the famous Mr. *Baxter* took advantage, on the ruins of the conſtitution, to write his book *of the Chriſtian Commonwealth*.

II. A ſecond cauſe of this error aroſe from what is called the *eſtabliſhment of religion* in the ſtate. There never was a civil ſociety, ancient or modern, but what had a RELIGION BY LAW ESTABLISHED. Which ariſing from a league or union between the civil and religious intereſts, it receives a delegated coercive power from the ſtate; which, inſtead of applying to the promotion of their joint intereſts, as was the intention of the truſt, it is too apt to divert to the ſupport and increaſe of it's own. But of this, more hereafter. Now, one error ariſing from ſuch *eſtabliſhment* was, that theſe powers of the civil kind, which the religious ſociety in ſuch circumſtances exerciſed, were inherent in it: and thoſe who fell not into this, but ſaw it was an intruſted power, borrowed from the ſtate, yet ran into an oppoſite; namely, that the reſtraining of *ſin*, which was aimed at in the right application of this *borrowed* power, was one of the natural, eſſential tendencies to which the civil magiſtrate, as ſuch, ſhould *himſelf* direct that power. Whereas, indeed, ſuch application was only the reſult of that union between the civil and religious intereſts.

III. A third cauſe of this error was, that, though in many caſes, the malignity of an action varies, according as it is applied to civil or to religious intereſts; and that the direction of civil laws is generally regulated on the degree of evil the action occaſions to the ſtate; yet, very often, too, the degrees are the ſame, and the malignity of the *ſin* and *crime* is equal. In this caſe, therefore, it

* See note [D], at the end of this Book.

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could not be ſeen, which was in the legiſlator's intention to puniſh; the *crime*, or the *ſin*. And ſo the people concluded that both were in his view. Add to this, that theſe two complex modes, having, in their compoſition, many ſimple ideas, common to both, were not eaſily ſeen to be, what, in reality, they are, two diſtinct modes, but thought, only two terms of one and the ſame: Which would very much help forward the error whoſe original we are here deducing.

IV. But the laſt general cauſe we ſhall aſſign of this error, was the magiſtrate's puniſhing, and by a juſt exertion of his power, ſome immoral actions, *as ſins*: and even reſtraining *ſpeculative opinions*. We have obſerved, that the only bond of ſociety amongſt equals is the ſanction of an *oath*, as it is an appeal to heaven, the avenger of falſhood and injuſtice. And *common ſwearing* directly tending to deſtroy the reverence due unto it, all ſtates have concurred to puniſh that impiety. But an oath derives it's force and virtue from thoſe three great principles of natural religion, *The being of a God,—his providence,—and the eſſential difference of good and evil*: which therefore come within the office of the civil magiſtrate to ſupport. Now the people ſeeing moral actions, as they regard the Deity, and ſpeculative opinions, as they regard truth, (the two parts which make up religion, in the largeſt ſenſe of the word) under the magiſtrate's juriſdiction, and not conceiving the reaſon, as here explained, concluded that the whole of religion was under his care and direction *.

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Of the Nature and End of Religion.

HAVING thus explained the nature and end of CIVIL SOCIETY, together with the origins of thoſe errors which men and even ſtates, in every age, have been apt to entertain concerning it; I come in the next place, as I propoſed, to treat concerning RELIGION;

Whoſe end is firſt, *to procure the favour of God*; and ſecondly, *to advance and improve our own intellectual nature.*

As to the *firſt* end, the *favour of God*, this, common ſenſe informs us, one man cannot procure for another; nor hinder him from procuring for himſelf; for as integrity of heart is what alone recommends us to his favour, every one hath this in his own power. It is evident, then, that man, in his *religious* capacity, had no occaſion to conſtitute a ſociety for procuring for himſelf the *favour of God*; as he had occaſion in his *ſocial*, to ſecure to himſelf the enjoyment of his liberty *. If, therefore, as a religioniſt, he entered into ſociety, it was for a reaſon different from that for which, as a civiliſt, he conſtituted a commonwealth; that is, it was not to guard himſelf againſt the malice of man.

And this leads us to conſider the *ſecond* end of religion, namely *the advancement and improvement of our* INTELLECTUAL NATURE. Now this, we can as eaſily conceive how a number of *religious* beings conſociated may advance, as we can how a number of *ſecular*

* Regium imperium quietem publicam, epiſcoporum ſollicitudo felicitatem æternam hominibus procurat, teſtante apoſtolo. Reges ſæcularibus, pontifices ſpiritualibus ordinandis ſe impendunt. Quamdiu neutra poteſtatum in alienos limites inſiliet, mutua concordia res Chriſtiana amplificabitur.—Soli principi poteſtas in hæc terrena & temporalia imperandi aſſeritur, ut eccleſiæ ſacra & ſpiritualia procurandi. Marca, lib. 2. c. 1. F. T.

beings

beings conſociated may advance and improve our ANIMAL NATURE, the *ſecondary* end of civil ſociety.

To ſee the neceſſity of forming this ſociety, we are to conſider how the *intellectual nature* is improved by religion.

Religion, as an act or exerciſe regarding its object, is a commerce and intercourſe with the ſupreme cauſe of all things. Which conſiſting, on our parts, in ſuitable ſentiments, raiſed in us by *contemplation on his nature, and on the relations we ſtand in towards* HIM, the proper and adequate object of all dependent beings, muſt needs advance and improve our *intellectual nature* to its utmoſt height.

But now it may be aſked, whether this intercourſe, as it begins, ſo likewiſe, it ſhould not end in mental exerciſe; and, conſequently, whether religion be not, what *many* ſeem now diſpoſed to think it, *but a kind of divine philoſophy in the mind*; which compoſes only a *ſpiritual and myſtic body* of its followers? For if this be indeed the caſe, there is an end of all *religious ſociety*; this ſpecies of a religion neither ſtanding in need, nor being capable of ſuch a community.

To reſolve this queſtion, we are to conſider, that, as RELIGION is an intercourſe with the Creator and Governor of all things, it is the object of all rational dependent beings. Now we can eaſily conceive how a mere *mental religion* may fit the nature of pure immaterial ſpirits, of which doubtleſs there are innumerable degrees within the vaſt limits of the univerſe. But man being compounded of two contrary, though, by the divine ſkill, united natures, *ſoul* and *body*, it ſeems neceſſary, at firſt ſight, that religion *here* ſhould partake of the character of its ſubject, and be compoſed equally of *internal meditations*, and *outward acts and offices*. This will appear on conſidering his *nature* as reſulting from this compoſition; and the *ſituation* in which Providence hath been pleaſed to place him. To fit us for the ſtation here aſſigned us, it was ſeen proper, as we find by experience, that the paſſions of the mind ſhould be greatly influenced by the temper of the body; in which covering likewiſe, the intellectual faculties ſhould be ſo inveloped as to render vain

all attempts of emancipating ourſelves from the body, while our buſineſs was in this groſs material world. Now how unfit ſuch beings are for a mere *mental religion* appears evident from the very ſtate of the caſe. Experience likewiſe hath conſtantly confirmed theſe obſervations. For whenever men, by a miſtaken aim at perfection, have endeavoured, in their religious exerciſes, to defecate the groſſneſs of ſenſe, and ſoar up into the region of pure ideas, it has been found that juſt as the temper and conſtitution was, ſo has been the conſequence and iſſue: If *cold* and *phlegmatic*, their religion has ſunk into quietiſm; if *bilious* or *ſanguine*, it has flamed out into all the frenzy of enthuſiaſm.

But further, our ſtation and circumſtances here contribute to render our natural incapacity, for ſuch a mental religion, ſtill more invincible. The ſupply of the neceſſities and conveniences of life, through all our intercourſes for the ſatisfaction of thoſe neceſſities and conveniencies, ſubjects us to perpetual converſe with the moſt ſenſible and material objects. But often repeated converſe produces HABITS. And of what force habits are in keeping the mind bent their way; and how obſtinately they adhere, when we endeavour to get free of them, is as well known, as it is with difficulty remedied. Now theſe habits are ſo oppoſite, ſo averſe to, ſo incompatible with mental contemplation, that, to do even ſo much this way, as the very eſſence of religion requires, we muſt bribe ſenſe and matter, and draw them againſt themſelves, to aſſiſt us in the rational offices of religion. If we add to this, that the common people, who compoſe the groſs body of mankind, and for every individual of which, religion is intended, are, by their ſtation and employments, moſt immerged in matter, we ſhall need no further proof, that a mere mental intercourſe with God, which makes religion only a *divine philoſophy in the mind*, is altogether unfit for ſuch a creature as man in his preſent ſtation upon earth.

But ſuppoſing all theſe impediments of ideal devotion to be away; yet if men be not ſo far ſpiritualized as to give and receive

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an intuitive knowledge of one another's mental acts of religion, ſtill ſuch a religion would not properly fit them. Becauſe, to the due exerciſe of religion it is required that open profeſſion of it be made by each individual, ſo as to be ſeen by others. For, that reaſon which tells us it is our duty to acknowledge all the relations in which we ſtand towards God: the ſame tells us, it is equally our duty to make thoſe acknowledgements public. Again, of the bleſſings, Providence beſtows upon us, ſome are particular to the individual, and others common to the ſpecies. Now, as return of thanks is due from each man for the bleſſings he has received in particular; ſo reaſon tells us, that for thoſe beſtowed on mankind in common, a joint return ſhould be made, by as many of the kind together as can conveniently aſſemble for this purpoſe.

From what has been ſaid then, it appears, that ſuch a religion as is ſuitable to the nature of man, HERE, muſt have *our meditations on the divine nature* drawn out into ARTICLES OF FAITH; and *our meditations on the ſeveral relations in which we ſtand towards him* digeſted into ſuitable and correſpondent ACTS OF RELIGIOUS WORSHIP; and both of them to be profeſſed and performed in COMMON. Which things, as we ſhall now ſhew, require the aid of a SOCIETY to regulate and eſtabliſh.

1. Opinions concerning the nature of the Deity ſo entirely influence all religious *practice* that *this* invariably takes its character from *thoſe*; and becomes more or leſs perfect as *thoſe* are nearer to, or further from the truth *. On which account the greateſt care is to be taken to preſerve opinions pure and untainted. But this cannot be done but by a SOCIETY; as we may underſtand from the very mention of thoſe two ways which all ſuch ſocieties have ever put in practice. 1. By reducing men's belief into one common formulary. And 2. By making the profeſſion of that formulary the term of communion. For by this means there is a *ſummary of belief* in aid of the ignorant; and a *common repoſitory* that men

* See Plato's Euthyph.

may always have recourſe to for information. Where it is to be obſerved, that the wider the bottom is made, and the more general the terms of communion (conſiſtent with the being of a Society), the wiſer and juſter is that religious inſtitution.

2. The ſeveral *acts of religious worſhip* are correſpondent to the ſentiments ariſing in us from our meditation on the ſeveral relations we ſtand in towards God; and inſtituted with deſign to aid and improve thoſe ſentiments. Now, as meditations, not tempered with theſe outward acts, are apt, as we have ſhewn, to fly out into *enthuſiaſm*; ſo outward acts not regulated by, nor adapted to thoſe meditations, are as ſubject to degenerate into a childiſh unmeaning *ſuperſtition*. And, how much enthuſiaſm depraves all the faculties of the mind, how much ſuperſtition diſhonours the ſervice of our Maker, is diſputed by no one acquainted with the nature and effects of theſe direful evils. The greateſt care therefore is to be taken, that the *ſolemn acts of religion* be preſerved *ſimple*, *decent*, and *ſignificative*. But then this can be done only by providing perſons ſet apart for this office; whoſe peculiar employment it ſhall be to preſide in, direct, and ſuperintend the *ritual of worſhip*, leſt any thing childiſh, profane, or ſuperſtitious ſhould (as it certainly would, if left to every one's fancy) obtrude itſelf into *religious ſervice*. Now public officers and miniſters muſt act by ſome *common policy*, which may regulate and ſettle their ſeveral employments, powers, and ſubordinations. But that *policy* is no other than the laws of a ſociety properly ſo called.

What hath been here ſaid is ſufficient to manifeſt the Divine Wiſdom of the *Author and Finiſher of our Faith*, who, revealing the will of his heavenly Father to mankind, actually formed our holy religion into a ſociety, on a common policy, with public rites, proper officers, and a ſubordination of the miniſtry. So that though we had not proved that religion forms a ſociety by *nature*, from whence ariſes the equity of an *eſtabliſhed religion* at large: yet we now find it doth ſo by *inſtitution*, which juſtifies an *eſtabliſhment* wherever the religion profeſſed is the Chriſtian. But, how certain

certain ſoever it be that *religion compoſes a ſociety by nature*; nevertheleſs we may at the ſame time ſee, from a remarkable circumſtance, in the riſe and progreſs of the people called *Quakers*, how little the plaineſt truths are ſecure from contradiction. Theſe men, in ſpite of the records of ſacred hiſtory which aſſure us, that *Jeſus* inſtituted a rule and government, and formed his Followers into a *church* or ſociety, yet regard *Chriſtianity* as only a kind of divine philoſophy in the mind, it being the fundamental principle of this ſect, *That there is no other reaſon or meaſure of compliance or conformity, in matters relating to God, than the conviction of the light and ſpirit of* Chriſt *in every conſcience.* But here lay the miſchief; the very *principle* on which this wiſe ſect was formed, had a neceſſary tendency to its immediate deſtruction, reducing all aggregate bodies to a mere heap of ſand. And in fact it was running into all the confuſion which is neceſſarily produced by ſuch a principle, when PENN and BARCLEY aroſe to lick this abortion into ſhape. *Penn* ſoon perceived that no ſect could ſubſiſt on ſuch a principle; and therefore ſet upon convincing his *friends* of the neceſſity of ſome common policy: but perceiving that if he ſhould inſiſt on that neceſſity for the ſake of *religion*, he ſhould too openly contradict their darling principle; he argues for this common policy from the benefits reſulting from it to *civil life:* and thus, inſtead of a *church*, he hath helped to make *Quakeriſm*, conſidered in its diſcipline, a *civil community* or *corporation:* and ſuch indeed it is at preſent in much perfection. A memorable inſtance, that truth rarely fails of requiting its oppoſers: while theſe very men, the moſt averſe to every Thing that looks like a church, or church-policy, have by their uſe of it, under another name, borne, before they were aware, the ſtrongeſt *teſtimony* for its neceſſity.

I. RELIGION thus compoſing a ſociety, we are now to conſider what kind of ſociety it is. Firſt then it muſt needs be SOVEREIGN, AND INDEPENDENT ON THE CIVIL *. Natural dependency of one ſociety

* Regnum & ſacerdotium diſtinctas poteſtates in ſuo quamque ordine ſupremas eſſe — omnia

ſociety on another, muſt ariſe either from the *law of nature* or of *nations*.

Dependency by the *law of nature* is from *eſſence*, or *generation*. Dependency from *eſſence* there can be none. For a dependency ariſing from thence is a mode of natural union and coalition; and coalition only there exiſts where an agreement is found *in eodem tertio*; but there being no ſuch agreement to be found between two ſocieties eſſentially different as theſe are, there can poſſibly be no dependency: now this eſſential difference is evident from their having *different ends and means*; the ultimate end of religion being the care of ſouls; and the ultimate end of civil ſociety the care of bodies; and the means of that being by *external* application; and of this by *internal*. Dependency which ariſes from *generation*, is where one ſociety ſprings up from another, as corporations, colleges, companies, and chambers in a city. Theſe, as well by the conformity of their ends and means, as by their charters of incorporation, betray their original and dependency. But *religious ſociety*, by ends and means entirely different, gives *internal* proof of its not ariſing from the ſtate; and we have ſhewn *, by *external* evidence, that it exiſted before the ſtate had any being.

Again, no dependency can ariſe from the *law of nations* or the civil law. Dependency by this law is, where one and the ſame people compoſing two different ſocieties, the *imperium* of the one claſhes with the *imperium* of the other: for, in ſuch caſe, the leſſer ſociety, by that law, becomes dependent on the greater; becauſe the not being dependent, would make that great abſurdity in politics called *imperium in imperio*. But now civil and religious ſociety having ends and means entirely different; and the means of *civil* ſociety being *coercive power*; which power, therefore, the *religious*

omnia monumenta clamant, &c. Defenſio declarationis celeberrimæ quam de poteſtate eccleſiaſtica ſanxit clerus Gallicanus 19 Martii, 1682, ab Illuſt. ac Reverend. Jacobo Benigno Bossuet, Meldenſi Epiſcopo, ex ſpeciali juſſu Ludovici Magni Chriſtianiſſimi Regis ſcripta & elaborata, l. 5. c. 3. F. T.

* See The Divine Legation of Moses, Book iii. § 6.

hath

hath not*; it follows that the adminiſtration of each ſociety is exerciſed in ſo remote ſpheres that they can never meet to claſh; and thoſe ſocieties which never claſh, neceſſity of ſtate can never bring into dependency on one another.

Indeed, were the common opinion true, which we have been at ſome pains to confute, *That the magiſtrate's office extended to the care of ſouls*, it would then follow, from what hath been ſaid of dependency from *eſſence* and *generation*, that the religious ſociety was ſubſervient to, and a creature of, the ſtate: for then it could not be reaſonably thought conſtituted but by the magiſtrate: and conſtituted by him to ſerve and help him out in the diſcharge of his office; who might have endowed his creature, the church, in its firſt conſtitution, with what powers he thought proper. *Hobbes* and his followers puſhed this matter home. They ſuppoſed that, if indeed there were any ſoul to be taken care of, the care naturally devolved upon the civil magiſtrate; who, by delegation, might transfer it on proper officers, commiſſioned by him to model, and bear rule in, a church. And becauſe ſomebody or other at that time chanced to think, that the people were the keepers of the king's conſcience †: he, who, above all things, loved contradiction, would needs have it that the king was the keeper of the people's.

On the other hand, *did the care of the religious ſociety naturally extend to the body* and its concerns, then would the *ſtate* run the riſque of becoming dependent, and a creature of the church. For *religious ſociety* having the nobleſt province, the care of ſouls; and the moſt extenſive, when the care of bodies is joined to it; and pretending for the moſt part, and ſometimes really having, a *divine*,

* Verum dominatum eſſe penes Reges, non autem penes Sacerdotes—in Legibus Eccleſiaſticis locum non habere ſummum imperium, in quo ordo imperandi & parendi id exigit, ut ſubditi dominorum mandatis cedant, quemadmodum Apoſtoli diſertiſſime docuerunt.—Dominus Eccleſiaſticam poteſtatem & regiam componendo, Apoſtolos allocutus hæc verba protulit, "Reges gentium dominantur eorum, vos autem non "ſic." Marca, in præfatione ſecunda. F. T.

† See the Story of the Earl of Strafford.

while

while the ſtate has only a *human original*; as greatly as the *ſpiritual* excels the *corporal*; and the *whole* is more than a *part*; and *divine* authority is above *human*, ſo high would men deem the *religious* ſociety to be above the *civil*: and that ſuperiority which the church would thus aſſume as of *right*, ſhe would find within herſelf a *power* to maintain. For the care of bodies neceſſarily implies an inherent *coercive* power in whatever ſociety that care is found.

And, in effect, theſe concluſions have been long ago reduced to practice under the *Chriſtian* religion. For the church of *Rome* having entertained this extenſive idea of a religious ſociety, ſhe has, conſentaneouſly thereto, exalted *the chair apoſtolic* far above the thrones of mere earthly potentates*; of whom ſhe has required and received homage; and once bid fair for making that homage univerſal. For ſhe would perſuade us, as it ſhould ſeem, that when *Jeſus* ſaid, *His kingdom was not of this world*, that he had before transferred it, with the keys of the other, to St. *Peter*.

But this, however, is worthy our obſervation, that, as different ways as the *Hobbeiſt* and *Papiſt* look, in ſpeculation, they tend to the ſame point in practice. For though the *one* would have the magiſtrate diſcharge his office only as executioner of the church; and the *other* authorizes him to uſe his power as the maker and creator of it; yet they equally concur in teaching it to be his right and office to domineer over conſcience. What they differ in, is only a point of ceremony.

II. We come now, in the ſecond place, to ſhew *that this independent religious ſociety*, HATH NOT, IN AND OF ITSELF, ANY COERCIVE POWER OF THE CIVIL KIND †; its inherent juriſdiction being in its nature and uſe entirely different from that of the ſtate. For if, as hath been proved, *civil ſociety* was inſtituted for the

* See note [F], at the end of this Book.

† Hoc præcipuum eſt diſcrimen inter canonum decreta & Leges publicas, quod illa unicuique Chriſtiano felicitatem æternam parent, & ad eum finem inſtrumenta accommodata ſubminiſtrent; hæc vero reipublicæ pacem & ſingulorum civium, quatenus ſunt partes reipublicæ, promoveant, &c. Marca, l. ii. c. 10. F. T.

attainment

attainment of one ſpecies of good, all other good, requiſite to human happineſs, being to be attained without it; and that civil ſociety attains the good for which it was ordained by the ſole means of coercive power, then it follows, that the good which any other kind of ſociety ſeeks may be attained without that power: conſequently, coercive power is unneceſſary to a *religious ſociety*. But that means, which is *unneceſſary* for the attainment of any end, is, likewiſe, *unfit*; in all caſes, but in that where ſuch means are rendered unneceſſary by the uſe of other means of the ſame kind or ſpecies. But religious ſociety attains its end by means of a *different kind*; therefore coercive power is not only unneceſſary, but unfit. Again, *ends* in their nature different can never be attained by one and the ſame *means*. Thus in the caſe before us, coercive power can only influence us to outward practice; by outward practice only is the *good*, which civil ſociety aims at, immediately effected; therefore is coercive power peculiarly fitted to civil ſociety. But the *good* which religious ſociety aims at cannot be effected by outward practice; therefore coercive power is altogether *unfit* for that ſociety.

1. But it may be objected, "That though indeed *outward practice* doth not affect religion, as it is the object of each individual, yet it does affect a religious ſociety; *ſalvation of ſouls* being the end of religion, but *purity of worſhip* the end of religious ſociety: now *purity of worſhip* is affected by outward practice; and to outward practice is coercive power fitly applied."

To this I reply, that *purity of worſhip* is the immediate end of religious ſociety, and *ſalvation of ſouls* the ultimate end thereof. Conſider then religious ſociety, with regard to its ultimate end, and all we have ſaid above of the unfitneſs of coercive power ſtill holds good. Conſider it with regard to its immediate end, purity of worſhip; and then, indeed, there will appear no unfitneſs in the application of coercive power. Thus we gain by the objection, a conceſſion, which we muſt otherwiſe have demanded, as the foundation of a claim, we always reſerved to ourſelves, to make in favour of religious ſociety, which is, that it hath in itſelf the

power of expelling refractory members from its body; or, in other words, *a right of excommunication.* Nor is this recalling any thing, we had before given up: for if excommunication may be properly called a coercive power, it is yet no coercive power *of the civil kind*, or what the ſtate could exerciſe; the ſole power here confeſſed not to be inherent in a church. It only then remains to prove, *that this power is uſefully and neceſſarily applied,—that it is all which religious ſociety ſtands in need of,—and that more is unfit and unjuſt.*

As the immediate end of religious ſociety is purity of worſhip; and as a neceſſary means of preſerving that purity is *uniformity of worſhip*; which cannot be maintained but by expelling from the community all who refuſe to comply with what is publickly eſtabliſhed, therefore *this power of expulſion in every religious ſociety is moſt fit and uſeful.* But we go further, and ſay, that every kind of ſociety, whatever be its end or means, muſt neceſſarily, as it is a ſociety, have this power of expulſion: it is a power inſeparable from the very being of ſociety, which can ſubſiſt only in the conformity of the will of each natural member to the will of that artificial body which ſociety produces: this being violated, as it muſt be unleſs all contraveners be expelled, the ſociety diſſolves, and falls back again into nothing. Juſt as would be the caſe of the natural body, ſhould not nature, whoſe conduct ſocieties, in this caſe, imitate, evacuate noxious and malignant humours.

But then, ſecondly, this ſo uſeful and neceſſary power is *all which a religious ſociety ſtands in needs of.* For by the exerciſe of this power, conformity in belief and worſhip is preſerved; which ſecuring the eſſence and end of a church, is all that is neceſſary to the well-being of Society.

In the laſt place, *more* coercive power than this *is both unfit and unjuſt* to be exerciſed by a religious ſociety. That it is *unfit* appears from hence: the immediate end of religious ſociety being purity of worſhip, it requires outward conformity, to what is publickly eſtabliſhed: and, at the ſame time, its ultimate end being the ſalvation of ſouls, it requires

requires likewiſe that this outward conformity be accompanied with a ſuitable diſpoſition of mind; but any further power than *ſimple expulſion* tends naturally to make a divorce between theſe two things. For ſuch further power *forces*, more or leſs, to *outward* compliance with the community; but as the will cannot at the ſame time be forced, here is likely to be only outward compliance, without an inward diſpoſition ſuitable thereunto: ſo that by this means the ultimate end of religious ſociety becomes defeated: further power therefore than ſimple expulſion is unfit. That further power is *unjuſt*, appears from hence: by the law of nature every man hath a right of worſhipping God according to his own conſcience. Now when it ſo happens that a member of a religious ſociety cannot conſcientiouſly join in the public worſhip, and be on that account expelled by the ſociety, in order to preſerve its eſſence and end, ſuch member is ſo far from being debarred, by that expulſion, of his right of worſhipping God according to his own conſcience, that he is thereby put into a way of exerciſing his right without moleſtation. But if any further power be allowed, either of keeping ſuch member within the ſociety againſt his will; or of annexing, to expulſion, any mulct on his perſon, goods, or reputation; in ſuch caſe, the right of nature is ſcandalouſly violated *: a force being put upon his conſcience, either by direct reſtraint, or by obliquely biaſſing the determination of his will. All coercive power therefore, other than *ſimple expulſion*, is unjuſt.

2. But it will be again urged perhaps, that, in thus removing one objection, we have made way for another; which is, "That by granting a coercive power to the church, for ſuch (they will ſay) is the right of excommunication, we deſtroy the argument of her independency by the *law of nations*, founded on her having no coercive power; which power claſhing with the ſtate's, brings in

* Cum ergo & Chriſtus & Apoſtoli, quo loco explicant eccleſiaſticæ poteſtatis cenſuræque vim ſummam, nihil de adimendis temporalibus juribus aut rebus edicant ſatis profecto conſtat non id ad poteſtatem Eccleſiaſticam pertinere. Boſſuet, l. v. c. 23. F. T.

power of expelling refractory members from its body; or, in other words, *a right of excommunication.* Nor is this recalling any thing, we had before given up: for if excommunication may be properly called a coercive power, it is yet no coercive power *of the civil kind*, or what the ſtate could exerciſe; the ſole power here confeſſed not to be inherent in a church. It only then remains to prove, *that this power is uſefully and neceſſarily applied,—that it is all which religious ſociety ſtands in need of,—and that more is unfit and unjuſt.*

As the immediate end of religious ſociety is purity of worſhip; and as a neceſſary means of preſerving that purity is *uniformity of worſhip*; which cannot be maintained but by expelling from the community all who refuſe to comply with what is publickly eſtabliſhed, therefore *this power of expulſion in every religious ſociety is moſt fit and uſeful.* But we go further, and ſay, that every kind of ſociety, whatever be its end or means, muſt neceſſarily, as it is a ſociety, have this power of expulſion: it is a power inſeparable from the very being of ſociety, which can ſubſiſt only in the conformity of the will of each natural member to the will of that artificial body which ſociety produces: this being violated, as it muſt be unleſs all contraveners be expelled, the ſociety diſſolves, and falls back again into nothing. Juſt as would be the caſe of the natural body, ſhould not nature, whoſe conduct ſocieties, in this caſe, imitate, evacuate noxious and malignant humours.

But then, ſecondly, this ſo uſeful and neceſſary power is *all which a religious ſociety ſtands in needs of.* For by the exerciſe of this power, conformity in belief and worſhip is preſerved; which ſecuring the eſſence and end of a church, is all that is neceſſary to the well-being of Society.

In the laſt place, *more* coercive power than this *is both unfit and unjuſt* to be exerciſed by a religious ſociety. That it is *unfit* appears from hence: the immediate end of religious ſociety being purity of worſhip, it requires outward conformity, to what is publickly eſtabliſhed: and, at the ſame time, its ultimate end being the ſalvation of ſouls, it requires

requires likewiſe that this outward conformity be accompanied with a ſuitable diſpoſition of mind; but any further power than *ſimple expulſion* tends naturally to make a divorce between theſe two things. For ſuch further power *forces*, more or leſs, to *outward* compliance with the community; but as the will cannot at the ſame time be forced, here is likely to be only outward compliance, without an inward diſpoſition ſuitable thereunto: ſo that by this means the ultimate end of religious ſociety becomes defeated: further power therefore than ſimple expulſion is unfit. That further power is *unjuſt*, appears from hence: by the law of nature every man hath a right of worſhipping God according to his own conſcience. Now when it ſo happens that a member of a religious ſociety cannot conſcientiouſly join in the public worſhip, and be on that account expelled by the ſociety, in order to preſerve its eſſence and end, ſuch member is ſo far from being debarred, by that expulſion, of his right of worſhipping God according to his own conſcience, that he is thereby put into a way of exerciſing his right without moleſtation. But if any further power be allowed, either of keeping ſuch member within the ſociety againſt his will; or of annexing, to expulſion, any mulct on his perſon, goods, or reputation; in ſuch caſe, the right of nature is ſcandalouſly violated *: a force being put upon his conſcience, either by direct reſtraint, or by obliquely biaſſing the determination of his will. All coercive power therefore, other than *ſimple expulſion*, is unjuſt.

2. But it will be again urged perhaps, that, in thus removing one objection, we have made way for another; which is, "That by granting a coercive power to the church, for ſuch (they will ſay) is the right of excommunication, we deſtroy the argument of her independency by the *law of nations*, founded on her having no coercive power; which power claſhing with the ſtate's, brings in

* Cum ergo & Chriſtus & Apoſtoli, quo loco explicant eccleſiaſticæ poteſtatis cenſuræque vim ſummam, nihil de adimendis temporalibus juribus aut rebus edicant ſatis profecto conſtat non id ad poteſtatem Eccleſiaſticam pertinere. Boſſuet, l. v. c. 23. F. T.

an *imperium in imperio*; to remove which, *that* law preſcribes her dependency." This too admits an eaſy ſolution. We ſay that civil ſociety having no right to reward any of its members by admiſſion into a religious ſociety; and no right to puniſh by excluding from it; the church's exerciſe of this power can never poſſibly claſh with the ſtate; and conſequently the argument for its independency ſtill holds good.

We are now come round; and have at length proved, what in the beginning of this chapter had been aſſerted, that RELIGIOUS SOCIETY HATH NO COERCIVE POWER OF THE CIVIL KIND: for we have ſhewn that this power of expulſion from a religious ſociety, is not a power which the ſtate can exerciſe.

Nor doth the denial of a coercive power make the church an enervated, defenceleſs body, expoſed either to the injuries of thoſe without, or to the inſults of thoſe within: it hath ſtill all the power and authority, that, as a religious body, it can exerciſe; all that is neceſſary to preſerve it a regular well-ordered ſociety; in which are rites and ceremonies, miniſters with degrees of ſubordination, and judiciary aſſemblies: for the power of conſtituting a diſcipline and a formulary of communion, both enforced by excommunication, will ſtill remain unto it. What hath made ſome men apprehend ſad conſequences from the church's being thus left without the guard of coercive power, is their ſeeing it ſtand poſſeſſed of ſome advantages, by them ſuppoſed eſſential to a church, which coercive power only can ſecure. But theſe may be eaſed of their apprehenſions by being told, that thoſe advantages are only adventitious *, and beſtowed upon it by the ſtate, in conſequence of an

* Nempe utriuſque poteſtatis ſancta ſocietas poſtulabat, ut altera alterius munia in ſpeciem uſurparet, ex jure quo amici amicorum rebus utuntur.—Quo demonſtratur non eſſe ſemper pro vero innatoque Eccleſiæ jure reputandum id quod ea egerit, habuerit, decreverit, tacentibus Regibus; ſed diligentiſſime ſecernenda quæ a Chriſto conceſſa ſunt, ab iis quæ Regum autoritate, conſenſu, permiſſu, conniventia, ſilentio denique juſſerit aut habuerit.—Ac tamen ſi nullæ conceſſiones producuntur, valere tamen ea omnia ex conceſſione tacita facile demonſtrabunt. Quid ita? Quia ſcilicet ipſa rerum natura

an UNION; and as the ſtate granted theſe, it granted coercive power likewiſe to defend them; and that, when the *union* is diſſolved, they both fall together, without any eſſential damage to the church, as a Religious Society.

Thus have we endeavoured to eſtabliſh theſe *two great eſſential Characters* of a Religious Society, its INDEPENDENCY, and its DISCLAIM OF COERCIVE POWER: where, it is worth obſerving, that the arguments employed to prove that each of theſe characters do indeed belong to it, are ſtrongly inforced by the neceſſary connexion there is between them. For admit the Religious Society to be *independent*, and you invincibly deſtroy all pretence *to coercive power*; becauſe coercive power introduces an *imperium in imperio*, which is removed only by deſtroying the independency. Admit again, that Religious Society has *no coercive power*, and you ſuperſede all the ſtate's claim of *dependency*: a claim ſolely founded on the evil of an *imperium in imperio*, which evil can ariſe no otherwiſe than by the church's exerciſe of an inherent coercive power: and yet theſe plain, and almoſt ſelf-evident, principles have had ſo ill reception in the world, that They have been overlooked and neglected; while two very different ſyſtems of church-government have divided the general ſuffrage between them. Different, I ſay, not only from what is here delivered and explained, but from each other; yet agreeing in this, to make an unnatural divorce between the two eſſential characters, which are here ſhewn to have an inſeparable connection in nature, *independency* and *no coercive power*: the one giving to the church this independency together with coercive power; and the other ſtripping and depriving it of both one and the other.

I. The firſt of theſe ſyſtems is that of THE HIGH-CHURCH CLERGY *, which contends for the abſolute independency of the church,

natura docet eccleſiaſtica non niſi per Eccleſiam haberi poſſe. Sic ubi Eccleſia feudos adimit, concedit, aut aliud quid ex civili poteſtate decerpit; ea civilis poteſtatis conſenſione ſaltem tacita accepta referemus. Boſſuet, Defenſio Declarationis, &c. l. viii. c. 4. F. T.

* See note [G], at the end of this Book.

with

with all the prerogatives and powers it is found to ſtand poſſeſſed of, under an eſtabliſhment. If this error be not ſufficiently detected already, the ſhewing, as I ſhall do in the next book, how the church became poſſeſſed of ſeveral of its prerogatives and powers, now legally enjoyed by it, will abundantly expoſe it. I will only obſerve, that this model, if indeed it be not the true POPISH ſyſtem a little diſguiſed, is infinitely more irrational than that: Becauſe a church with inherent coercive power, which, with a falſe modeſty, ſtops at mere independency, obtrudes a ſcheme attended with all the evil of an *imperium in imperio*; when going one ſtep further, and taking the ſtate into pupilage and protection, would effectually remove it. Backwards or forwards this ſyſtem muſt needs go: for a church ſo circumſtanced, in order to avoid that evil, muſt fall into the ſtate; or the ſtate into it. This the COURT OF ROME plainly ſaw; and therefore *choſe the better part.* And a pretence was not wanting. For an inherent coercive power, in the church, neceſſarily implying a care of bodies, as one of the ends of that ſociety (for to bodies only can coercive power be rationally applied) all ſtates when employed in this care, might be fairly underſtood as only doing journey-work for the church. Thus that refined court chalked out no idle plan of power, when, together with the brute thunder of the *vatican*, it forged real fetters for the proſtrate and ſervile WEST *.

II. The other ſyſtem is that invented by, and (I wiſh I could ſay) peculiar to THE ENEMIES OF OUR HOLY FAITH; at the head of which ſtand the two famous authors of THE RIGHTS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH, and of THE INDEPENDENT WHIG. The *true* deſign of theſe books is evidently this, to perſuade us that the Chriſtian and all other churches, in their natural ſtate, without coercive power, are creatures of the civil magiſtrate. For while the *pretended* drift be to ſhew from whence an Eſtabliſhed Church receives its coercive powers, the arguments they employ conclude

* See note [H], at the end of this Book.

againſt

againſt a church's natural independency in any condition whatſoever. But it is curious to obſerve the different routs this noble pair of athletes have taken to arrive at the ſame place:

The author of THE RIGHTS comes firſt.

At, quum aſpicias triſtem, frugi cenſeas.

He hath taken up the argument of Hobbes; and affects the tendereſt concern for the good and happineſs of the ſtate. So that whenever a church comes in his way, he falls upon it with the old battery of *imperium in imperio*. But, in this, leſs honeſt than that unlucky philoſopher. Hobbes * owned the tendency of his argument; and inforced it for the ſake of that very tendency. But this writer ſeems willing you ſhould believe that it concludes only againſt a *High Church Clergy*.

The Writer of THE INDEPENDENT WHIG, who appears to have more vivacity than his formal brother, is for quicker diſpatch. His ready road led him on to the deſtruction of all *Church Officers*, and the very being of a *Miniſtry*: which that he might the eaſier bring about, he has repreſented all public rites, and aſſemblies for worſhip, as impertinent; by ſhewing the natural *inefficacy of prayer* for obtaining our petitions; which again (for, to do him juſtice, he is very conſequential), he eſtabliſhes on *the doctrine of fate*. This he well ſaw would bring on a thorough dependency: a dependency that was like to laſt; as being produced by the deſtruction of the ſociety itſelf. And yet, after all this, he hath the honeſt confidence to talk of the church as of a *ſociety*. But a ſociety without officers, degrees of ſubordination, and powers adapted to its nature, being as inconſiſtent, unintelligible an idea as a houſe without walls, roof, or apartments; we muſt conclude that he who ſo talks, intends to give us a ſociety in words, but to deprive us of it in reality.

In earneſt, I do not know a greater inſult ever put on the underſtandings of men than by theſe two writers; while it was pre-

* See note [I], at the end of this Book.

ſumed

ſumed that the gloom of equivocation, which ſpreads itſelf through the formal *chapters* of the one; and the glare of puerile declamation, that tinſels over the trite *eſſays* of the other, could hide their true end from the obſervation of thoſe whoſe deſtruction they were conſpiring. For, as Tully ſays of the two aſſaſſin gladiators, *Par eſt improbitas, eadem impudentia, gemina audacia; & ubi, Quirites, multa audacter, multa improbè, multa perfidiosè facta videtis, ibi* SCELUS *quoque latere inter illa tot flagitia putatote**.

Let the reader then but attentively conſider what hath been here ſaid of the different natures of civil and religious ſociety, and he will need nothing more than the plain principles, deduceable from thence, to unravel all the ſilly ſophiſtry which makes up the bulk of theſe two famous performances; though the firſt of them, the parent of the other, hath impoſed upon a great writer †; and, as it is pretended, was planned by the aſſiſtance of one ſtill greater ‡.

On the whole, how different ſoever theſe *High-church* and *Free-thinking* ſyſtem-makers would have their notions thought from *Popery* and *Infidelity*, they are unavoidably drawn, by the alacrity of their own heavineſs, into the very centers of *Malmſbury* and *Rome*; from whence indeed they derived their birth; but are, I know not how, ungraciouſly aſhamed of their progenitors.

* Orat. pro Sex. Roſ. Amer. † Le Clerc. ‡ Mr. Locke.

NOTES

NOTES TO BOOK I.

P. 30. [A]. THIS will aid us to reſolve a doubtful queſtion; namely, *Whether a baniſhed man be a ſubject of the ſtate from which he hath been been expelled?* Hobbes and Puffendorf hold the negative; and Tully, with the excellent Lord Chancellor Hyde, the affirmative. The former, in ſupport of their opinion, ſay, that, by the very act of expulſion, the ſtate gives up and renounces all right of ſubjection: the latter only appeal to the practice of ſocieties; the reaſon of which practice, as here given, ſeems to determine the queſtion in their favour.

P. 37. [B]. Whoever reads what is here ſaid of the different views and ends which God and men had in inſtituting the two ſeveral communities, *Civil* and *Religious*, cannot but be ſurpriſed at the extreme ignorance or inattention of *J. J. Rouſſeau, Citizen of Geneva*, who, in his *Contract Social*, ſpeaking of the means employed by the ancient law-givers to procure ſubmiſſion to their laws, concludes his obſervations in theſe words—" Il ne " faut pas, de tout ceci, conclurre avec WARBURTON que la politique et " la religion aient, parmi nous, UN OBJECT COMMUN; mais, dans l'origine " des nations l'une ſert d'inſtrument à l'autre." p. 59. " But from all this " we are not to conclude with WARBURTON, that civil policy and religion " have, amongſt us, one COMMON OBJECT; but in the origin of nations, " one was made an inſtrument to the other."—Now this whole chapter of the *Alliance* is written for no other purpoſe than to prove that Civil Policy and Religion had not ONE COMMON OBJECT, but TWO, entirely different and diſtinct. The very thing which poſſibly miſled him (viz. the title of my book, *The Alliance between Church and State)* had he duly attended to it, would have ſet him right: for the word *Alliance*, when uſed, as here,

in a civil ſenſe, and applied to *Church* and *State*, ſhews that, in my opinion, *Policy and Religion* HAD NOT ONE COMMON OBJECT: becauſe an *Alliance* between two communities implies the independency of each: but had the Church and State *one common object*, this would deſtroy the independency of one, in order to avoid, what of neceſſity muſt be avoided, an *imperium in imperio*. If Mr. Rouſſeau, by *the common object held by Warburton*, means, *the good of mankind*, he either triſles or prevaricates. In this ſenſe, all the ordinances of God, all the legitimate inſtitutions of man, have *one common object*. The conſequence of all this is, that either Warburton or Rouſſeau was here upon a ſubject which he did not underſtand. Yet this is the man who ſays to Chriſtophe de Beaumont Archeveque de Paris, "Monſeig-"neur, J'ai cherché la verité dans les livres; je n'y ai trouvé que le men-"ſonge & l'erreur—C'eſt ſouvent un petit mal de ne pas entendre un "auteur qu'on lit: mais c'en eſt un grand quand on le refute, et un tres "grand quand on le diffame."

But if this writer be conſequent, the principle, that *Civil Policy and Religion have one common object*, is his own: for he holds, that though the Magiſtrate ought to tolerate Religions already introduced and ſpread abroad in the community, yet he is under no obligation to ſuffer new ones to be introduced; and that in policy he ſhould not do it.—"Quant aux "religions une fois etablies ou tolerées dans un pays, Je crois qu'il eſt in-"juſte et barbare de les y detruire par la violence, et que le ſouverein ſe "fait tort a lui-même en maltraitant leurs ſectateurs. Il eſt bien different "d'embraſſer une religion nouvelle, ou de vivre dans cette où l'on eſt "né; *le premier cas ſeul eſt puniſſable*. On ne doit ni laiſſer etablir une "diverſité de cultes, ni proſcrire ceux qui ſont une fois etablis." Now if M. Rouſſeau ſays this upon principles, and does not merely copy Bolingbroke, as Bolingbroke is copied by Voltaire, he muſt needs eſpouſe the opinion which he falſly charges upon the Author of the ALLIANCE, *that Civil Policy and Religion have one common object*, for this opinion making Religion a Creature of the State, ſhe may always be ſo treated as beſt ſerves the ends of the civil magiſtrate.

P. 41. [C]. From hence we may collect how pernicious it would be to *Society*, and how deſtructive of its end, to multiply the uſe of oaths to inferior purpoſes: for if the ſanction of an oath be the great fundamental cement of civil ſociety, and the multiplying of them doth unavoidably tend to

to diſſolve (as it is clear it does) all their force and efficacy, ſuch miſtaken politics muſt prove very fatal to the ſtate. Hence too we may ſee, it would be as bad policy, in a contrary extreme, to diſpenſe with the religion of an oath in matters of higheſt moment, out of indulgence to tender conſciences. But that which ſhews ſuch indulgence to be pernicious to ſociety, ſhews the claim to it to be vain and ill founded; there being no exemption, on pretence of conſcience, from the neceſſary demands of ſociety. And for politicians to let one part of their fellow-citizens looſe from the religion of an oath on the moſt indiſpenſable occaſions, and to tye up the reſt ſo cloſely by it, and even for trifles, looks as if they had the ſame notion of the *moral* world, that certain philoſophers have had of the *natural*: and that the quantum of oaths in ſociety was like the quantum of motion in the univerſe, always to be kept the ſame: and a want in one place to be made up by an abundance in another.

P. 46. [D]. It is very true that the new modeling *eccleſiaſtical* Government was the principal point debated in that famous diſpute: but then the *Puritans* contended for that Reformation on principles that equally concluded for a Reformation in the Civil likewiſe: and this Mr. Hooker well underſtood, when he took ſo much pains to overthrow their fundamental maxim, the *head theorem*, as he calls it, of their ſcheme:—*That the ſcripture of God is in ſuch ſort the rule of human actions that ſimply whatſoever we do and are not by it directed thereunto, the ſame is ſin.* Now who ſees not that this principle purſued, brings on, directly and neceſſarily, a Reformation of the civil government upon Jewiſh ideas? The very error of the reformed miniſters of that time. This, as we ſay, was not hid from the penetration of this great man. *The reaſon* (ſays he, in his preface), *wherewith you would perſuade that Scripture is the only rule to frame all our actions by, are in every reſpect as effectual for proof, that the ſame is the only law whereby to determine all our Civil Controverſies:* and therefore to root it out for ver was the main reaſon, I ſuppoſe, why, in a particular diſpute, he goes ſo far back as to give a long account of the original of laws in general, their ſeveral kinds, and their diſtinct and contrary natures.—But the beſt comment on this *puritan* principle are their actions, when in power. They once had that power —Their uſe of it is well known.

P 47. [E]. After all this, one would not have expected to find the following paragraph, in the fourth volume of the late biſhop of London's

Sermons, as the laſt reſult of his thoughts on this queſtion, though they were the firſt in which he had been brought up.—"If the FATHER OF A "FAMILY has his authority from God, and rules not only over his own "children, but the ſervants and creatures of the Almighty, and ought "therefore to have a concern for God and religion; is the caſe of the "MAGISTRATE different? Are not his ſubjects alſo the ſervants and creatures "of God? And is he not the miniſter and vicegerent of God, and there-"fore bound, IN THE FIRST PLACE, to have a regard to his honour, who "is the common maſter of him and his ſervants." p. 377, 378.

All this is ſo looſely expreſſed, that without returning to the biſhop's original principles, one can hardly divine what he would be at. For did any magiſtrate, who believed a God and his government, ever heſitate *to have in the firſt place a regard to God's honour?* Our duty to God ever taking place of the two other branches of morality, thoſe which regard our neighbour and ourſelves. Or did any ſubject ever quarrel with the magiſtrate on account of that preference? We muſt conclude therefore, that the biſhop, in this paragraph, would inſinuate (for, at this time of day, no man, who had regard to his own character, would venture to do more) *that religion, as ſuch, is properly within the juriſdiction of the magiſtrate, as ſuch.* A long conteſted queſtion; and which, this chapter is employed to confute.

Taking this to be the biſhop's meaning, let us ſee how he ſupports his poſition. THE FATHER OF A FAMILY (ſays his lordſhip) *having his authority from God, to rule not only over his own children but the ſervants and creatures of the Almighty, ought to have a concern for God and religion.* THE MAGISTRATE'S COMMISSION IS THE SAME: *therefore the magiſtrate is in the firſt place to take care of their religion.* The argument, we ſee, ſuppoſes, that the office of *father* and *magiſtrate* is the ſame, and derived from the ſame root and original. If this be not true, the argument falls to the ground. But no man, unleſs he be a follower of *Folmar*, and a maintainer of the *divine hereditary right* of kings, will pretend to ſay that PATERNITY and MONARCHY are equally derived from the ſame ſource. Thoſe who have exploded the doctrine of *paſſive obedience and non-reſiſtance* tell another ſtory. They ſay, that fathers and patriarchs muſt remain fathers and patriarchs; and can never either ripen or degenerate into kings, as coming from a very different ſtock: that theſe latter aroſe from compact, and were the creatures of the people: that the will of God, diſcoverable by natural

natural reaſon, gave the immediate right to FATHERS; and that the will of man, diſcoverable by human actions, gave the immediate right to KINGS: that both, indeed, are the *ordinance of God*, as all things are which have a natural tendency to better and improve humanity. But, to infer from thence, that the rights annexed to one *ordinance of God* belong to another of his ordinances, (though of quite a different nature and original,) is illogical and inconcluſive. Nay even ſuppoſing that *paternity* and *monarchy* were both the *ordinance of God* in the ſame and ſupreme ſenſe of an ordinance, immediately and extraordinarily revealed from God, it would by no means follow, that the offices of *father* and of *king* were the ſame; nor conſequently the adminiſtration of thoſe offices. The Engliſh monarch, by the ſelf-ſame *ordinance*, commiſſions a chief-juſtice and a captain-general. Has the chief juſtice therefore a right to preſide in a court-martial, or the captain-general, in the king's bench? With juſt as much reaſon as the ſupreme magiſtrate directs and orders the religion of *God's creatures*, amongſt his ſubjects, becauſe a father of a family directs and orders the religion of *God's creatures*, amongſt his children. As in God's houſe in heaven there are many manſions for thoſe who deſerve them; ſo in God's houſhold here on earth there are many offices for thoſe who are capable of diſcharging them; in which, each has his diſtinct, and not one common buſineſs, though the end of all be the ſame, the benefit of mankind. But to ſuppoſe this end may be beſt obtained by each ſociety's aiming at all the good they are, by any means, capable of promoting, is ſo idle a fancy, that it would be the ready way to do no good at all. Since each ſociety would claſh with another, and all of them remain unfit for what they undertake.

P. 56. [F]. In the quarrel between Boniface the VIIIth and Philip the Fair of France, concerning the bounds of civil and eccleſiaſtical juriſdiction, the Pope roundly affirms that to deny the *temporal* to be ſubject to the *ſpiritual* is falling into the Manichean hereſy, or the admiſſion of its *two principles*. But his holineſs might truſt to his logic at a time when the learning of the whole body of the French nobility was in ſo deplorable a ſtate, that the College of Cardinals, writing to them on this occaſion in Latin, adviſes them (with a true Iriſh kindneſs) to get ſome honeſt man to tranſlate the letter, for them, into French.

P. 61. [G]. Archbiſhop Laud may be called the father of this ſect: and though he made a notable uſe of the King's ſupremacy to carry on his ſchemes, yet that he held the ſupremacy to be no better than an uſurpation, appears pretty plainly from theſe words of his DIARY, where ſpeaking of his having procured the Lord High Treaſurer's Staff for Juxton, Biſhop of London, he goes on thus—No *churchman had it ſince Hen. VII. time. I pray God bleſs him, to carry it ſo that the church may have honour, and the king and the ſtate ſervice and contentment by it. And now* IF THE CHURCH WILL NOT HOLD UP THEMSELVES UNDER GOD *I can do no more.*— A remarkable paſſage in Sir Philip Warwick, who wrote altogether in favour of Laud and his party, will juſtify the interpretation I have put on theſe words of the diary.—" He [Laud] was a great aſſertor of church-autho-
" rity, inſtituted by Chriſt and his Apoſtles and as primitively practiſed;
" (which notwithſtanding he really and freely acknowledged ſubject unto
" the ſecular authority:) therefore he carefully endeavoured to preſerve the
" juriſdiction *which the church anciently exerciſed, before the ſecular autho-*
" *rity owned her.* At leaſt ſo much thereof as the law of this our realm
" had applied to our circumſtances; which our common lawyers dayly
" ſtruck at." Memoires, p. 79.

P. 62. [H]. The SARACEN CALIFES, from ſovereign princes, became, as their *empire decayed*, only ſovereign pontiffs. The ROMAN POPES, from ſovereign pontiffs, became, as their *religion degenerated*, ſovereign princes. The reaſon of this contrary rout was this. Chriſtianity, as it degenerated, partook more and more of the ſpirit of Mahometaniſm: but Mahometaniſm never admitted of the ſpirit of Chriſtianity; which ſeparates the two characters of PRINCE and PRIEST; aſſigns to each his diſtinct province; and gives to each his lawful due.

P. 63. [I]. Hobbes is commonly ſuppoſed to be an enemy to all religion, eſpecially the *Chriſtian*. But it is obſervable, that in his attacks upon it (if at leaſt he intended his chapter of the *Chriſtian Common-wealth* in the LEVIATHAN, for an attack) he has taken direct contrary meaſures from thoſe of Bayle, Collins, Tyndal, Bolingbroke, and all the other writers againſt *Revelation*. They endeavoured to ſhew the GOSPEL-SYSTEM as *unreaſonable* as their extreme malice could make it; he as *reaſonable* as his admirable wit could repreſent it. The ſchemes of CHURCH DISCIPLINE likewiſe, which they and he ſeverally recommended, were by an odd fatality

tality as different as their repreſentations of the DOCTRINE; but in the reverſe as to their qualities. They, all of them contended for the moſt unbounded *toleration*: He, for the moſt rigorous *conformity*. He ſeems, indeed, to have formed his plan of *eccleſiaſtical government* before he turned his thoughts to the *Chriſtian doctrine*: and therefore as his politics had inforced an abſolute ſubmiſſion to the Civil Magiſtrate in ſpirituals, he contrived, in order to make it go down the better, to make the object of this ſubmiſſion as reaſonable as poſſible. Whereas the others, beginning with the *Chriſtian doctrine*, which they aimed to render as abſurd as poſſible, very equitably contrived to make it ſit eaſy on their followers, by a licentious kind of toleration deſtructive of all *Church Diſcipline*.

BOOK

BOOK II.

OF AN

ESTABLISHED CHURCH.

CHAP. I.

Of the Nature of that Union between Church and State, which produces a Religion eſtabliſhed by Law.

HAVING now diſpatched the firſt part of this enquiry, and ſhewn,

I. The Origin of Civil Society; the natural deficiency of its plan; and how the influence of religion only can ſupply that defect:

II. How all natural and moral good, and conſequently *this* of Religion to the State, may be improved by human art and contrivance; together with the neceſſity there is of *ſeeking* this improvement: And,

III. As the *finding* it depends on an exact knowledge of a civil and of a Religious Society, their *diſtinct* natures and ends have been ſhewn and explained:

We are at length enabled to diſcover how this improvement is to be brought about.

For having, by a diligent enquiry, found,

I. Firſt, *That the care of Civil Society extends only to the Body and its concerns*; *and the care of Religious Society only to the Soul*; it neceſſarily follows, that the civil magiſtrate, if he will improve this natural influence of Religion by human art and contrivance, muſt ſeek ſome UNION or ALLIANCE with the Church. For his office not extending to the care of ſouls, he hath not, in himſelf, power to inforce the influence of religion: and the church's province not extending to the body, and conſequently being without coercive power, ſhe has not, in herſelf alone, a power of applying that influence to civil purpoſes. The concluſion is, that their joint powers muſt co-operate, to apply and inforce the influence of religion, in ſuch a manner as may beſt ſerve the true intereſts both of church and ſtate. But they can never act conjointly but in *union* and *alliance* *.

II. Secondly, Having found, that *each ſociety is ſovereign, and independent on the other*, it as neceſſarily follows, that ſuch union can be produced *only* by FREE CONVENTION AND MUTUAL COMPACT: becauſe whatever is *ſovereign* and *independent* can be brought to no act without its own conſent: but nothing can give birth to *a free convention*, but a ſenſe of mutual wants which may be ſupplied, or a view of mutual benefits which may be gained, by it. *Such*, then, is the nature of that UNION which produceth a CHURCH BY LAW ESTABLISHED; and which is indeed no other than a *politic*

* Ambas poteſtates, eccleſiaſticam et civilem, ita eſſe divino numine conſtitutas, ut in ſuo genere & ordine unaquæque ſub uno Deo proxime collocata prima ac ſuprema ſit: collatæ vero invicem, ſociæ fœderatæque ſunt—ergo ambæ poteſtates ſupremæ ac principes in ſuo ordine, conjunctæque & amicæ, non una alteri per ſeſe ſubdita, ſubordinataque eſt—ſatis enim claruit duas quidem poteſtates eſſe oportere, eccleſiaſticam & civilem, quæ principales ac ſupremæ, & tamen ſociæ, conjunctæ & amicæ, ne ſocietas humana diſtrahatur. Mutuam ſibi operam debent, præſtantque, & ſeſe mutuo non tantum adjuvant, verum etiam temperant. Boſſuet, l. v. c. 31, 32, & 33. F. T.

league

league and alliance for mutual ſupport and defence. For the ſtate not having *the care of ſouls*, cannot, of itſelf, inforce the influence of religion; and therefore ſeeks *aid of the church*: and the church having *no coercive power* (the conſequence of its care not extending to bodies) as naturally flies *for protection to the ſtate* *. This being of the nature of that alliance which Grotius calls, FOEDUS INAEQUALE. "Inæquale fœdus *(ſays he)* hic intelligo quod ex ipſa vi "pactionis *manentem prælationem* quandam alteri donat: Hoc eſt "ubi quis tenetur alterius imperium ac majeſtatem conſervare UT "POTENTIORI PLUS HONORIS, INFERIORI PLUS AUXILII DEFE-"RATUR †."

From whence it is ſeen, that, were thoſe common notions true, which we have been at ſo much pains to confute, concerning the nature of a *church* and *ſtate*, there could be neither *room* nor *motive* for this *alliance*. Were they not *independent on each other*, there could be no ROOM; becauſe *freedom of will*, the very eſſence of this alliance, would be wanting on one part; and had the *ſtate the care of ſouls*, *or the church the care of bodies*, there could be no mutual MOTIVE; for, in the firſt caſe, the ſtate, by its own authority, might apply religion to civil purpoſes: in the latter, the church, having, in conſequence of the care of bodies, an inherent coercive power, might, by its authority, provide for its own ſecurity.

An ALLIANCE then, by *free convention*, being in its nature *ſuch* that each party muſt have its motives for contracting; our next enquiry will be, firſt,

I. What thoſe motives were, which the ſtate had for *ſeeking*, and the church for *accepting* the offers of an *Union*. And, ſecondly,

* Hæc extant prædicta Arnulfi Lexovenſis Epiſcopi verba, "Dignitas eccleſiaſtica "regiam provehit potius quam admimit dignitatem, et regalis dignitas eccleſiaſticam con-"ſervare potius conſuevit quam tollere libertatem. Equidem quaſi quibuſdam ſibi "invicem complexibus dignitas eccleſiaſtica & regalis concurrent; cum nec reges ſalu-"tem ſine eccleſia, nec eccleſia pacem ſine protectione regia conſequatur." Marca, l. ii. c. 12. F. T.

† De Jure Belli & Pac. Lib. i. cap. iii. § 21.

II. What were the mutual benefits and advantages arising therefrom.

By the *first* part of which enquiry, we hope to make it appear, THAT THIS ALLIANCE WAS INDISPENSABLY NECESSARY FOR SECURING THE WELL BEING AND HAPPINESS OF CIVIL SOCIETY: And by the *second*, THAT NO COMMON RIGHT OF MAN, CIVIL OR RELIGIOUS, IS IMPEACHED BY IT. To demonstrate *which* is one of the principal ends of this discourse.

CHAP. II.

Of the Motives the State had to seek, and the Church to accept, an Alliance.

THE motives the magistrate had to *seek* this alliance were these:

I. To preserve the essence and purity of Religion.

II. To improve its usefulness, and apply its influence in the best manner.

III. To prevent the mischief which, in its natural independent state, it might occasion to civil society.

I.

I. The Magistrate was induced to seek it,

1. *As the necessary means of preserving the very* BEING *of Religion.* For though, as hath been shewn, Religion constitutes a Society; and that this society will indeed, for some time, support Religion, which, without it, would soon vanish from amongst men: yet, if we consider, that this society is made up of the same individuals which compose the civil; and destitute likewise of all coercive power; we must needs see, that a society, thus abandoned to its own

own fortune, without ſupport or protection, would, in no long time, be ſwallowed up and loſt. Nor can we reaſonably hope that this danger might be averted, by that inherent power, we have ſhewn, to be in the ſtate of reſtraining the oppugners of the *three fundamental principles of natural religion*; becauſe that power could only prevent theſe principles from being directly depraved or ſubverted; not from gradually decaying and falling into oblivion. Of this opinion was an able writer, whoſe knowledge of human nature will not be diſputed: "Were it not, ſays he, for that ſenſe of "virtue which is principally preſerved, ſo far as it is preſerved, by "NATIONAL FORMS AND HABITS of Religion, men would *ſoon "loſe it all*, run wild, prey upon one another, and do what elſe the "worſt of ſavages do *."

2. But of whatever uſe an alliance may be thought, for preſerving the *being* of religion; the neceſſity of it, for preſerving its PURITY, is very evident. For if TRUTH and PUBLIC UTILITY coincide, the nearer any religion approaches to the truth of things, the fitter that religion is for the ſervice of the ſtate. That they do coincide, that is, that truth is productive of utility, and utility indicative of truth, may be thus proved. That truth is *productive* of utility, appears from the nature of the thing. Obſerving truth, is acting as things really are: He who acts as things really are, muſt gain his end; all diſappointment proceeding from acting as things are not; juſt as in reaſoning from true or falſe principles, the concluſion which follows muſt be, as the principles, neceſſarily right or wrong. But gaining the end of acting is utility or happineſs; diſappointment of the end, hurt or miſery. If then truth *produce* utility, the other part of the propoſition, that utility *indicates* truth, follows of courſe. For not to follow, ſuppoſes two different kinds of general utility relative to the ſame creature, one proceeding from truth, the other from falſhood; which is impoſſible; becauſe the natures of thoſe utilities muſt then be different;

* Wollaſton's Religion of Nature Delineated, p. 124.

that

that is, one of them muſt, and, at the ſame time, muſt not, be utility. Wherever then we find UNIVERSAL UTILITY, we may certainly know it for the PRODUCT OF TRUTH, which truth it indicates. Let us then conſider the danger which religion runs, of deviating from truth, when left, in its natural ſtate, to itſelf. In theſe circumſtances, the men of higheſt credit are ſuch as are famed for greateſt ſanctity. This ſanctity hath been generally underſtood to be then moſt perfect when moſt eſtranged from the world, and all its habitudes and relations. But this being only to be acquired by ſeceſſion and retirement from human affairs; and that ſeceſſion rendering man ignorant of civil ſociety, of its rights and intereſts; in place of which will ſucceed, according to his natural temper, the deſtructive follies either of ſuperſtition or fanaticiſm; we muſt needs conclude that Religion, under ſuch directors and reformers (and God knows theſe are too commonly its lot) will deviate from truth; and conſequently from a capacity, in proportion, of ſerving Civil Society. I wiſh I could ſay, we had not fact to ſupport this ſpeculation. The truth is, we have ſeen, and yet do ſee, Religious Societies, ſome grown up, and continuing unſupported by, and *ununited* with the ſtate; others that, when ſupported and *united*, have by ſtrange arts brought the ſtate into ſubjection, and become its tyrants and uſurpers; and thereby defeated all the good that can ariſe from this alliance; ſuch ſocieties, I ſay, we have ſeen, whoſe religious doctrines are ſo little ſerviceable to civil government, that they can proſper only on the ruin and deſtruction of it. Such are thoſe which teach the ſanctity *of celibacy* and *aſceticiſm*; the *ſinfulneſs of defenſive war*, of *capital puniſhments*, and even of *civil magiſtracy* itſelf.

On the other hand, when religion is in ALLIANCE with the ſtate, as it then comes under the magiſtrate's direction, thoſe holy leaders having neither credit nor power to do miſchief, its purity muſt needs be reaſonably well ſupported and preſerved *. For,

* Imminuta eſſet libertas eccleſiæ, ſi a principum ſecularium imperio libera, ab epiſcopis iniqua ſervitute premeretur. Marca, l. iii. c. 1. F. T.

truth

truth and public utility coinciding, the civil magiſtrate, as ſuch, will ſee it for his intereſt to ſeek after, and promote TRUTH in religion: and, by means of public UTILITY, which his office enables him ſo well to underſtand, he will never be at a loſs to know where ſuch truth is to be found. So that it is impoſſible, under this civil influence, for religion ever to deviate far from truth; always ſuppoſing (for on ſuch ſuppoſition this whole theory proceeds) a LEGITIMATE government, or civil policy eſtabliſhed on the principles of the natural rights and liberties of mankind. For an unequal and unjuſt government, which ſeeks its own, not public utility, will always have occaſion for error; and ſo muſt corrupt religion both in principle and practice, to ſerve its own wrong intereſts *.

II. Secondly, the magiſtrate was induced to ſeek this alliance *as the neceſſary means of improving the uſefulneſs; and of applying the influence of religion to its ſervice.* And this an alliance doth by ſeveral ways.

1. *By beſtowing additional reverence and veneration on the perſon of the civil* MAGISTRATE, *and on the* LAWS *of the ſtate.* For in this alliance, where the religious ſociety is taken under the protection of the ſtate, the ſupreme magiſtrate, as will be ſhewn hereafter, is acknowledged HEAD *of the religion.* Now nothing can be imagined of greater efficacy for ſecuring the obedience of the people. Thoſe two conſummate maſters in politics, *Ariſtotle* and *Machiavel* †, thought it of ſo great, as to be ſufficient to gain reverence and ſecurity to a tyrant. What then muſt we ſuppoſe its efficacy on a

* See note [A], at the end of this Book.

† Ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὰς θεὰς φαίνεσθαι ἀεὶ σπουδάζοντα διαφερόντως, ἥτιόν τε γὰρ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ παθεῖν τι παράλογον ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, ἐὰν δεισιδαίμονα νομίζωσιν εἶναι τὸν ἄρχοντα καὶ φρονίζειν τῶν θεῶν. Καὶ ἐπιβουλεύσειν ἧττον, ὡς συμμάχους ἔχοντι καὶ τὰς θεάς. Polit. lib. v. c. 12.—Et non è cosa più neceſſaria à parere d'havere, che queſta ultima qualita [religione] perche gli huomini in univerſale giudicano più à gli occhi che alle mani, perché tocca à vedere à ciaſcuno à ſentire à pochi. Del Principe, cap. xviii.

legitimate

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truth

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† Ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὰς θεὰς φαίνεσθαι ἀεὶ σπουδάζοντα διαφερόντως, ἥτιόν τε γὰρ φοβᾶσθαι τὸ παθεῖν τι παράλογον ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, ἐὰν δεισιδαίμονα νομίζωσιν εἶναι τὸν ἔχοντα καὶ φιλοῦντα τῶν θεῶν. Καὶ ἀντιβουλεύσουσιν ἧτιον, ὡς συμμάχους ἔχοντι καὶ τὰς θεάς. Polit. lib. v. c. 12.—Et non è coſa più neceſſaria à parere d'havere, che queſta ultima qualità [religione] perche gli huomini in univerſale giudicano più à gli occhi che alle mani, perché tocca à vedere à ciaſcuno à ſentire à pochi. Del Principe, cap. xviii.

legitimate

legitimate magiſtrate *? The ſame veneration will extend itſelf over the *laws* likewiſe. For while ſome of them are employed by the ſtate for the *ſupport of the church*; and others *lent* to the church to be employed in the *ſervice of the ſtate*, and all of them enacted by a *legiſlature in which church-men have* a conſiderable *ſhare*; all theſe things, as we ſhall ſee preſently, being amongſt the conditions of *alliance*; *laws*, under ſuch direction, muſt needs be obeyed with the greateſt reverence.

2. *By lending to the church a coactive power.* It may be remembered that, in ſpeaking of the innate defects in the plan of civil ſociety, we obſerved, that there were ſeveral ſorts of duties which civil laws could not inforce: ſuch as the duties of IMPERFECT OBLIGATION; which, a religious ſociety, when endowed with *coactive power* to invigorate the influence of religion, is capable of exacting; and SUCH likewiſe of the duties of PERFECT OBLIGATION, whoſe breach is owing to the intemperance of the ſenſual appetites. The ſevere prohibition of which threatens greater and more enormous evils. For while theſe unruly paſſions overflow, the ſtopping them in one place is cauſing them to break out with greater violence and diſorder in another. As the rigorous puniſhment of fornication hath been generally ſeen to give birth to unnatural luſts. The effectual correction therefore of ſuch evils muſt be begun by moderating and ſubduing the paſſions themſelves. But *this*, civil laws are not underſtood to preſcribe; as *puniſhing* thoſe paſſions, only when they have riſen into *act*: and not *rewarding* the attempts to ſubdue their firſt irregular motions. It muſt be a tribunal regarding bad intentions as criminal, which can moderate and regulate the paſſions. And this is no other than the tribunal of religion. When this is done, a coactive power of the civil kind may have a good effect; but not till then. And

* Cives in officio ſuo erga ſe & erga principem religionis cultu, veluti vinculo quodam, adſtringuntur, ut de Romanis obſervavit Auguſtinus. Marca, l. ii. c. 10. F. T.

who

who ſo fit to apply this coactive power in ſuch caſes, as that ſociety which fitted and prepared the ſubject for its due reception and application *? Again, we have obſerved, that the ſtate puniſhes deviations from the rule of right, as *crimes* only; and not as they are *ſuch* deviations; nor as they are *ſins*: and on that firſt idea proportions its puniſhments: by which means ſome very enormous deviations from the rule of right, which do not *immediately* affect ſociety, and ſo not conſidered as *criminal*, are overlooked by the civil tribunal. Yet theſe being, *mediately*, pernicious to the ſtate, it is for its intereſts that they ſhould be brought before ſome capable tribunal. But beſides the civil there is no other than the eccleſiaſtical endowed with coactive power. Hence may be inferred *the true and only end and uſe of* SPIRITUAL COURTS. A church-tribunal then, with coactive power, being neceſſary in all theſe caſes; and a religious ſociety having, in itſelf, no ſuch power, it muſt be borrowed from the ſtate: but a ſtate, as we ſhall ſee, cannot lend it, without danger, *but* on the terms of an alliance; a ſtate therefore will be induced to ſeek this alliance, in order to improve the natural efficacy of religion.

3. *By conferring on the ſtate the* application *of this efficacy of religion; and by putting it under the magiſtrate's direction.* There are peculiar junctures when the influence of religion is more than ordinary ſerviceable to the ſtate; and theſe the civil magiſtrate beſt knows. Now while a church is in its natural ſtate of independency, it is not in his power to improve thoſe conjunctures to the advantage of the ſtate, by a timely application of religion; but when the *alliance* is made, and conſequently the church under his direction, he hath then authority to preſcribe ſuch public exerciſes of religion, in ſuch manner, and at ſuch ſeaſons, as he finds the exigencies of ſtate require †.

* See note [B], at the end of this Book.

† See the ſcandalous ſquabbles between the civil magiſtrate and the church, concerning the exerciſe of this power, in the hiſtories of the *preſbyterian* church of *Scotland*.

4. *By engaging the church to apply its utmoſt endeavours in the ſervice of the ſtate.* For an *alliance* laying an obligation on the ſtate to protect and defend the church, and to provide a ſettled maintenance for its miniſters, ſuch benefits muſt needs produce the higheſt attachment to the benefactor; which will be ſhewn from motives both of gratitude and intereſt, in the moſt zealous labours for the ſervice of civil government *.

III. *Laſtly, the magiſtrate was induced to ſeek this alliance as the only means of preventing the miſchiefs that the church, in its natural independent condition, might occaſion to civil ſociety.* 1. For, in this ſituation, the church having, of itſelf, a power of aſſembling for religious worſhip, *factious men* may conveniently, under that cover, hatch and carry on deſigns againſt the peace of ſociety; and the influence which popular and leading men gain over the conſciences of ſuch aſſemblies, by the frequency of public harangues, may eaſily ripen theſe contrivances into act; when ſtrengthened with the ſpecious pretext of religion. That unhappy prince, Charles I, when he was now become better inſtructed by misfortunes, and able enough to underſtand, that the intereſt of his country and his own were the ſame, delivers himſelf in theſe words: "Touching "the government of the church by biſhops, the common jealouſie "hath been, that I am earneſt and reſolute to maintaine it, not ſo "much out of piety, as policy, and reaſon of ſtate. Wherein "ſo far indeed reaſon of ſtate doth induce me to approve that go-"vernment above any other, as I find it impoſſible for a prince to "preſerve the ſtate in quiet, unleſs he hath ſuch an influence upon "churchmen; and they ſuch a dependence on him, as may beſt "reſtraine the ſeditious exorbitancies of miniſters tongues; who "with the keys of heaven, have ſo far the keys of the peoples

* Carolus Magnus, præter cauſas pietatis, motus etiam fuit ad diſtribuenda liberali manu bona eccleſiis ob utilitatem reipublicæ, exiſtimans nimirum epiſcopos ſanctius obſervaturos fidem promiſſam. Marca, l. viii. c. 19. F. T.

"hearts,

" hearts, as they prevail much by their oratory to let in, or ſhut " out, both peace and loyalty *." Now all theſe evils are ſpeedily remedied by this *alliance*. For now the civil magiſtrate being become protector of the church, and, conſequently, ſupreme head and director of it, the miniſtry is much in his power; that mutual dependency between the clergy and people, ſo pernicious to the ſtate, being, by means of a ſettled revenue, broken and deſtroyed. He admits and excludes to the *exerciſe* of their function as he ſees fit; and grants it to none but ſuch as give a previous ſecurity for their allegiance to the ſtate. By which means, all that power and influence, which the miniſters and leaders in a church had over it before the alliance, *as the protectors of religion*, is now drawn off from them, and placed, more properly, in the civil magiſtrate †.

The view of theſe miſchiefs, from a church in its natural ſtate of independency, ſo terrified *Hobbes* and his followers, that they denied there ever was ſuch a ſtate; for that the magiſtrate had a *natural right* of dominion and ſupremacy over the church, as his ſervant and creature: which was arguing juſt as reaſonably as that community would act, who, alarmed at the growing power of a neighbour, from which a likely miſchief might be ſuſpected, ſhould endeavour, on a principle of right, to bring that people which gave them umbrage under vaſſalage. Whereas reaſon and juſtice both point out a different remedy, which is to obviate the miſchief by *league* and *alliance*. The ſame ſhould be done in the affair before us: and were not men unreaſonably prejudiced againſt a *church*, they would ſee the caſes to be exactly alike. Indeed when there is, during the independency of two different ſocieties compoſed of one and the ſame people, a natural and direct tendency,

* ΕΙΚΩΝ ΒΑΣΙΛΙΚΗ, chap. xvii.

† Ex hoc tuitionis & patrocinii jure quod reges exercent, illud commodi in eccleſiam totamque rempublicam Chriſtianam redundat, ut eccleſiaſtica & civilis poteſtas amico & perpetuo fœdere invicem conjunctæ mutuis auxiliis ad comprimendos improborum conatus & juvanda bonorum ſtudia inter ſe conſpirent. Marca, l. ii. c. 12. F. T.

in the LEGITIMATE exercise of *one* dominion, to the damage of the *other*, then the *law of nations* prescribes the less to be dependent on the greater. But as religious society hath been shewn to have nothing in the *legitimate* exercise of its sovereignty that can clash with civil power, though it be, indeed, so liable to be *abused* * as to make it of infinite interest to the state to prevent the abuse, we conclude, that its dependency on the state, the only means of preventing the evil, can be brought about no otherwise than by an *alliance* between the two societies, on the footing of a *free convention*.

But secondly, as a *Hobbeian claim* would be unjust in itself, so would the *prosecution* of it be mischievous to civil liberty. To exchange that temperate, conditional subordination of the clergy, here laid down, for the slavish dependency which *Hobbes* and his followers prescribe, would prove a very ill bargain for the state. An entire independency of the clergy might in time, indeed, overturn a free government; but so, more certainly, would a slavish dependence. The noble author of *The Account of Denmark*, saw clearly the destructive consequences of *both these conditions*, where, in the conclusion of his book, he delivers himself in these words: "It "hath been a great mistake amongst us that the *Popish* religion is "the only one of all the *Christian* sects proper to introduce and "establish slavery in a nation; insomuch that popery and slavery "have been thought inseparable.—I shall make bold to say, that "other religions have succeeded as effectually in this design as ever "*Popery* did.—For in *Denmark*, as well as other protestant coun-"tries in the north, *through the entire dependence of the clergy upon* "*the prince*, through their principles and doctrine, which are those "of unlimited obedience, through the authority they have with "the common people, &c. slavery seems to be more absolutely "established than it is in *France*." If then, in the opinion of this famed politician, an *absolute independence* and an *absolute dependence*

* See note [C], at the end of this Book.

are

are equally pernicious to ſociety, what remains, but to confeſs that the clergy's condition in *alliance*, which takes off their independency, and makes them the *free ſubjects*, but not the *tools* of civil power, is that very circumſtance in which only they can be uſeful to ſociety, in the manner they were deſtined by God and nature. What obligations, therefore, lye on every lover of his country to protect from *innovations* our preſent happy conſtitution, which hath actually placed the clergy in this very condition; from which the churches of the *north* and *ſouth* have ſo fatally deviated, though into contrary extremes!

2. Another miſchief there is in this *unallied* condition of the church, ſtill more certain and fatal, whenever more than one religion is found in a ſtate. For, in theſe latter ages, every ſect, thinking itſelf alone the *true* church, or, at leaſt, the moſt *perfect*, is naturally puſhed on to advance its own ſcheme upon the ruins of the reſt; and where argument fails, *civil power* is made to come in; as ſoon as ever a party can be formed in the *public adminiſtration*: and we find they have been but too ſucceſsful in perſuading the magiſtrate that his intereſts are much concerned in theſe religious differences. Now the moſt effectual remedy to thoſe dangerous and ſtrong convulſions, into which ſtates are ſo frequently thrown by theſe ſtruggles, is an *alliance*; which *eſtabliſhes one church*, and gives a full *toleration to the reſt* *; only keeping ſectaries out of the *public adminiſtration*; from a heedleſs admiſſion into which, theſe diſorders have ariſen.

Having now ſhewn the principal motives which induced the ſtate to *ſeek* an ALLIANCE with the church:

II.

We come next to conſider the motives which the church had to *accept* it. For, this being, as we obſerved, a FREE CONVENTION; unleſs the church, as well as ſtate, had its views of advantage, no

* See note [D], at the end of this Book.

alliance

alliance could have been formed. To diſcover theſe motives, we muſt recollect what hath been ſaid of the nature and end of a *religious ſociety*; for the benefits adapted to that nature and end, muſt be her legitimate motive: but if ſo, this benefit can be no other than SECURITY FROM ALL EXTERIOR VIOLENCE. The ſtate indeed could not juſtly offer it, had an alliance never been made. But this is no reaſon why the church ſhould not think it for her intereſt to ſecure her natural right by *compact*, any more than that one ſtate ſhould not bind another, in the ſame manner, nor to do it violence, though *that other* were under prior obligations, by the law of nature and nations, to abſtain.

But, by this alliance between the two ſocieties, the ſtate doth more; it not only promiſeth not to injure the church confederated, but to ſerve it; that is, to protect it from the injuries of other religious ſocieties, which then exiſt, or may afterwards ariſe in the ſtate. How one religious ſociety may be injuriouſly affected by another, we have ſhewn juſt before: how great theſe injuries may prove, will be ſhewn hereafter. It muſt needs then be the firſt care of a church, and a reaſonable care, to preſerve herſelf, by all lawful ways, from outward violence. A ſtate then, as we have ſaid, in order to induce the church's acceptance of this offer, muſt propoſe ſome benefit to her, by it; and becauſe this is the only *legitimate* benefit the church can receive, it muſt propoſe *this*; which, therefore, being conſiderable, will be the church's *motive for alliance*.

There are only two other conſiderations which can be deemed *motives*: The one, *to engage the ſtate to propagate the eſtabliſhed religion by force*: and the other, *to beſtow honours, riches, and powers upon it*. Now, on recurring to the nature and end of the two ſocieties, the *firſt* motive will be found *unjuſt*; and the *ſecond*, *impertinent*. It is *unjuſt* in the church to require the engagement; becauſe the peforming it would be violating the natural right every man hath of worſhipping God according to his own conſcience: It is *unjuſt* in the ſtate to engage in it; becauſe, as we have ſhewn, its

its juriſdiction extendeth not to opinions: it is *impertinent* in a church to aim at riches, honours, powers; becauſe theſe are things which, as a Religious Society, ſhe can neither uſe, nor profit by. To imagine theſe fit accommodations for ſuch a ſociety, is as ſenſual a fancy as theirs who were for building ſumptuous tabernacles for the three great meſſengers of God, at the Transfiguration. It is very true, that theſe things which, for the ſake of the ſtate, followed an alliance, might be in the private views of ambitious churchmen, when that alliance was projected; and might not a little help forward the completion of it. But what motives the *clergy* of a church might have, is nothing to the purpoſe of our enquiry; we are only to conſider what the *church* had, which, as a Religious Society, conſiſts of the whole body of the community, both laity and clergy *: and her motive, we ſay, could not be riches, honours, and power, becauſe they have no natural tendency to promote the *ultimate* end of this ſociety, *ſalvation of ſouls*; or the *immediate* end, *purity of worſhip*. We conclude therefore, that the only legitimate motive ſhe could have, *was ſecurity and protection from outward violence*. This the Reader would do well to keep in mind, becauſe much will be found to depend upon it, in the ſequel of this diſcourſe.

On theſe *mutual* inducements then, was formed this FREE ALLIANCE; which gave birth to a CHURCH BY LAW ESTABLISHED: and theſe being ſo prevalent, we are not to wonder that the civil communities of all ages had an ESTABLISHED RELIGION, which was under the more immediate protection of the civil magiſtrate; and ſo, diſtinguiſhed from thoſe that were only TOLERATED. How cloſely theſe two intereſts were united in the *Egyptian* policy, which afterwards became the model of civil wiſdom to the reſt of mankind, is notorious to all who are the leaſt acquainted with an-

* —Longe a propoſito aberrant, qui eccleſiam clero coercent. Latior eſt illius ſignificatio quæ Laïcos ipſumque regem comprehendit.—Eccleſiæ corpus quod ex fidelium omnium compage conſtituitur, in duas præcipuas perſonas, ſacerdotalem ſcilicet & regiam, diviſum eſt. Marca, l. ii. c. 1. F. T.

tiquity,

tiquity. Nor were the polite republics of *Rome* and *Athens* leſs ſolicitous for the common intereſts of the two ſocieties than that ſage and powerful monarchy, the nurſe of arts and virtue. But an *Eſtabliſhed Worſhip*, as we ſay, is the univerſal voice of nature, and not confined to certain ages, people, or religions. That great voyager, and ſenſible obſerver of the various manners of men, *John Baptiſt Tavernier*, ſpeaking of the kingdom of *Tunquin*, ſays, "I "come now to the political deſcription of this kingdom, under "which I comprehend the Religion, which is almoſt *every where* "*in concert with the civil government for the mutual ſupport of each* "*other* *." It is true, there are exceptions to this, as there are to all the general practices of mankind. *Ovington* tells us, p. 278. that, amongſt the Bannians of India, this *alliance* is not between religion and the ſtate, but BETWEEN RELIGION AND TRADE; every profeſſion differing from another as much in its modes of worſhip, as in its ways of traffic. The enemies of our alliance may perhaps improve upon this hint; for as unwilling as they ſeem to be, that the *church* ſhould profit by an *alliance* with the ſtate, they would not, I ſuppoſe, be averſe to *trade's* profiting by an *alliance* with the church.—Now, if the foregoing account may explain the true origin of this general practice, *the practice*, we preſume, will corroborate what hath been ſaid of the force of the *motives* here delivered; the wiſeſt and moſt experienced law-givers, as we ſee, concurring to act upon them.

But when I ſay that *all* regular policied ſtates had *an eſtabliſhed religion*, I mean no more than he would do, who, deducing civil ſociety from its true original, ſhould, in order to perſuade men of the benefits it produces, affirm, that all nations had a civil policy. For as this writer could not be ſuppoſed to mean, that every one inſtituted a free ſtate, on the principles of public liberty; which

* Je viens à la deſcription politique de ce royaume, dans laquelle je comprens la religion, qui eſt *preſque en tous lieux de concert avec le gouvernement civil pour l'appuy reciproque de l'un & de l'autre*. Relation Nouvelle de la Royaume de Tunquin, cap. x. à la fin.

yet

yet was the only ſociety he purpoſed to prove was founded on truth, and productive of public good; becauſe it is notorious, that the far greater part of civil policies are founded on different principles, or abuſed to different ends; ſo neither would I be underſtood to mean, when I ſay all nations concurred in making this *alliance*, that they all exactly diſcriminated the natures, and fairly adjuſted the rights of the two ſocieties, on the principles here laid down; though an *eſtabliſhment* reſulting from this diſcrimination and adjuſtment be the only one I would be ſuppoſed to recommend. On the contrary, I know this union has been generally made on miſtaken principles; or, if not ſo, hath degenerated by length of time; whence it hath come to paſs, that the national religion in the Pagan World hath been moſt commonly a ſlave to the ſtate; and in the Chriſtian, the ſtate ſometimes a ſlave to the church. And, as it was ſufficient for that writer's purpoſe, that thoſe ſocieties, good or bad, proved the ſenſe all men had of the benefits reſulting from civil policy in general, though they were oft miſtaken in the means; ſo it is for ours, that this univerſal concurrence in the two ſocieties to *unite*, ſhews the ſenſe mankind had of the uſefulneſs of ſuch an *union*. And laſtly, as that writer's ſpeculative principles are not the leſs true on account of the general deviation from them in the actual forming of civil ſocieties; ſo may not theſe plain principles of *alliance*, though ſo few ſtates have ſuffered themſelves to be directed by them in practice; nor any one before, that I know of, delivered them in ſpeculation: eſpecially if, as in that caſe, ſo in *this*, we can derive ſuch *miſtake* and *degeneracy* from their cauſes. It would draw me too far out of my way to explain diſtinctly the cauſes of the *miſtake*; and the intelligent reader, who carefully attends to the whole of this diſcourſe, will not be at a loſs to diſcover the moſt conſiderable of them; ſome of which I have already hinted at; and others, I may poſſibly, in the ſequel, take occaſion to mention. As for the *degeneracy*, it hath been obſerved, that the *alliance* is of the nature of the FOEDERA INÆQUALIA: Now,

the common effect of ſuch, Grotius informs us of, in theſe words: *Interim verum eſt accidere plerumque, ut qui ſuperior eſt in fœdere,* SI IS POTENTIA MULTUM ANTECELLAT, PAULATIM IMPERIUM PROPRIE DICTUM USURPET: PRÆSERTIM SI FOEDUS PERPETUUM SIT *.

CHAP. III.

Of the reciprocal Terms and Conditions of this Alliance.

AS, from the natures of the two ſocieties, we diſcovered what kind of union only they could enter into; ſo from their natures, together with the *motives* they had in uniting, may be deduced, by neceſſary conſequence, the reciprocal TERMS and CONDITIONS of this union.

From the mutual motives inducing thereunto, it appears, that the great *preliminary and fundamental article* of ALLIANCE is this, THAT THE CHURCH SHALL APPLY ITS UTMOST INFLUENCE IN THE SERVICE OF THE STATE; AND THE STATE SHALL SUPPORT AND PROTECT THE CHURCH.

1. But, to enable the two parties to perform this agreement, there muſt needs be a MUTUAL COMMUNICATION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE POWERS. For the province of each ſociety being naturally diſtinct and different, each can have to do in the other's, only by mutual conceſſion †.

* De Jure Belli & Pacis, lib. i. cap. iii. § 21.

† Hæ ambæ poteſtates inter ſe ut duo apices comparantur. His ſua in utraque ſubſtantia, terrena ſcilicet & cœleſti, aſſignantur officia. Eæ ut principes ſuoque in ordine ſupremæ ſociali tantum fœdere conjunguntur, non altera alteri in ſuis quidem rebus ſubditur: & quo jure regi permittitur, ut ſuper animarum ſalute, ſed ex canonum auctoritate, decernat; eodem jure permittitur pontifici, ut delinquentes etiam pœnis temporalibus, ſed forenſi lege, non innata ſibi poteſtate, coerceat. Boſſuet, l. vi. c. 29. F. T.

2. But

2. But again, theſe ſocieties being likewiſe as naturally independent one on the other, a mutual conceſſion cannot be ſafely made unleſs one of them give up its INDEPENDENCY to the other. From whence ariſes what Grotius, we ſee, calls MANENS PRÆLATIO; which, in his *Fœdus inæquale*, the more powerful ſociety hath over the leſs, by the ceſſion of its INDEPENDENCY.

Now from the two concluſions, which neceſſarily ſpring from *this fundamental article of union*, we deduce all the terms, conditions, mutual grants, and conceſſions *, which complete this *alliance*.

For, from this obligation on the church *to apply its influence to the ſervice of the ſtate*, proceed a SETTLED MAINTENANCE FOR THE MINISTERS OF RELIGION, and an ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICTION with coactive power; which things introduce again, on the other ſide, the DEPENDENCY OF THE CLERGY ON THE STATE. And from the ſtate's obligation *to ſupport and protect the church*, proceeds the ECCLESIASTICAL SUPREMACY OF THE CIVIL MAGISTRATE; which again introduceth, on the other hand, the right of CHURCHMEN TO A SHARE IN THE LEGISLATURE.

Thus are all theſe rights and privileges cloſely interwoven, and mutually connected by a neceſſary dependence on one another. We have here, in a ſuccinct manner, deduced each of them in the order in which they reciprocally ariſe: but the importance of the ſubject requiring a more minute examination into the reaſon and foundation of each GRANT and PRIVILEGE, we ſhall go over them again in a different order; and put together all that belong to the CHURCH under one head; and all that belong to the STATE under

* Chriſtianæ politiæ antiſtites a ſummo jure recedebant, ut concordiæ litarent. Attamen cum remiſſio illa niſi certis limitibus concludatur, in abjectionis vitium deſciſcat, neceſſariæ ſunt regulæ quædam, intra quas prudentia, quæ omnino in his negotiis adhiberi debet, ſe contineat. Porro regulæ illæ in eorum axiomatum cognitione conſtitutæ ſunt, quæ communi utriuſque reipublicæ ſuffragio ſunt recepta; ex æquo & bono unitatis & concordiæ alendæ ſtudio, ex utraque parte quamplurima remiſſa. Marca, in præfatione ſecunda. F. T.

another: the firſt order being the propereſt for a *general* view; the ſecond for a *particular*; but both neceſſary, to give a true idea of that mutual connexion with, and neceſſary dependence on, one another.

Let us then examine,

I. What the Church RECEIVES from the State.

II. What the Church GIVES to it.

Which will preſent us with a *new view of the two ſocieties as they appear under an eſtabliſhment*; and leave nothing wanting to enable us to judge perfectly of their natures.

I.

I. What the Church *receives* from the State by this alliance, is,

I. Firſt, A PUBLIC ENDOWMENT FOR ITS MINISTERS: a ſeparate and certain ſhare of the national property being aſſigned for the maintenance and ſupport of the clergy; portioned out into diſtinct benefices; and collated to by the ſtate. The reaſons of this endowment are: 1. To render the religious ſociety, whoſe aſſiſtance the ſtate ſo much wants, more firm and ſtable. 2. To invite and encourage the clergy's beſt ſervice to the ſtate, in rendering thoſe committed to their care, virtuous. But, 3. and principally, in order to deſtroy that mutual dependency, between the clergy and people, which ariſes from the miniſter's ſupport by voluntary contribution; the only maintenance that could be claimed or given before the two ſocieties were allied; which dependence, we have ſhewn to be productive of great miſchiefs to the ſtate. Add to all this, that as the clergy are then under the ſovereign's direction, and conſequently become a public order in the ſtate, it is but fit and decent, that a public maintenance ſhould be provided for them. Which moſt nations have done by way of TYTHES.

From this account of a public and fixed proviſion for the clergy, may be deduced theſe COROLLARIES.

1. *That*

1. *That though the payment of tythes to the Jewiſh prieſthood ſhould give the Chriſtian Clergy no right to them, till beſtowed by the ſovereign, yet the example of this mode of proviſion, under the Moſaic Oeconomy, may be fairly and properly urged by Chriſtian miniſters in favour of them as a proper civil donation.* Under the *Moſaic* œconomy, God *himſelf* made the union between church and ſtate; as he had before planned the form of civil government. From his very choice of the *Hebrew* people we may collect, that his diſpenſation to them was as well relative to the reſt of mankind as to themſelves. Now as amongſt the various ends which he had for erecting that ſociety, we muſt conclude, *one* was to teach mankind, by his example in the HOREB CONTRACT, to form civil policies on the principles of natural right and public liberty; ſo we may be equally aſſured, that one of his ends *in uniting the two ſocieties*, was to give them the ſame general leſſon of *union* and *alliance*: If an union, in general, then conſequently all thoſe fundamental terms of union which ariſe (not from the peculiar nature of the Jewiſh church and ſtate, but) from the common nature of a civil and a religious ſociety united, muſt be intended likewiſe for our imitation. But a fixed maintenance in the Moſaic œconomy, for the prieſts, being one of thoſe fundamental terms which depends not on the frame of that peculiar policy, but, of a church and ſtate in general, we may fairly conclude, that the mode of it by *tythes*, as a mode in itſelf equitable, is not improper for our imitation. For though the eſtabliſhment of this mode of proviſion in Judea confers no divine right, yet it ſtrongly ſupports every *civil conſtitutional* appointment of them.

2. A Second Corollary is, *That it is* ABSURD *in any member of the eſtabliſhed church to ſuſpect, that a ſettled revenue may be injurious to the ſtate, as making the clergy too powerful: and that it is* UNJUST *in any who are not of the eſtabliſhed church to refuſe payment of tythes, on pretence of their contributing to the maintenance of opinions different from their own.* The ſuſpicion of church-men is *abſurd*; becauſe it appears, from what we have but now obſerved, that this policy hath

hath a very contrary effect; a ſettled maintenance deſtroying that mutual dependency between clergy and people, from whence only can ariſe the power of churchmen to do miſchief. In the church of Rome, beſides the endowed clergy, there are ſeveral orders of religious which poſſeſs nothing, but depend on the charity of the people. And yet, for many ages, theſe *wens* and *botches* of a corrupted church got all the power and influence of churchmen to themſelves, from the endowed clergy, notwithſtanding the immenſity of their poſſeſſions. And the ſtate throve accordingly.—The refuſal of diſſenters is *unjuſt*; becauſe this maintenance is not aſſigned by the public for the *ſupport of opinions*, but for *the uſe and ſervice of the ſtate*, as ſuch. With as good reaſon, therefore, might they refuſe to pay other taxes which, in their ſeveral applications, are for the ſame civil purpoſe. The difference is only accidental: *Church-officers* happen to have religious opinions; and *civil officers*, ſometimes, have none*.

3. A Third Corollary is: *That as a fixed and public maintenance began with an eſtabliſhed church, ſo it muſt end with it.* For the members of a church uneſtabliſhed have no right, let their aſſociation, for that purpoſe, be as extenſive as it will, to ſupport their miniſters by an appropriated endowment. All they can do for them is by voluntary contribution; a fixed maintenance being ſolely in the power of the ſtate to beſtow, both as it is a common tax, and as it requires a public ſanction for its exaction: and the ſtate could neither *wiſely* nor *juſtly* affix a ſettled maintenance on the clergy of a church with which it was not in alliance. Not *wiſely*, becauſe the advantage in breaking the dependency between clergy and people, which the ſtate gains by a fixed maintenance, would be greatly over-balanced by the inconvenience of giving ſo conſiderable a ſhare of its property to a ſociety independent of it. Not *juſtly*, becauſe no contribution to a public maintenance could be lawfully demanded of thoſe who are not members of an uneſtabliſhed church

* See note [F], at the end of this Book.

ſo

ſo pretending. For in this caſe it would indeed be for *maintenance of opinions*, which they think erroneous; and to which no man can be obliged to contribute; as all men juſtly may, to that which, by *covenant and compact*, is expreſsly directed to promote the good of that civil policy of which they are members.

II. The ſecond privilege the church *receives* from this alliance is, *a place for her ſuperior members in the court of legiſlature*; which, with us, is THE BISHOPS SEAT IN PARLIAMENT. For as it neceſſarily follows (as we ſhall ſee preſently) from that *fundamental article of alliance* of *the State's ſupporting and protecting the Church*, that the church muſt, in return, *give up its independency to the ſtate*, whereby the ſtate becomes empowered to determine in all church-matters, ſo far as relates to it as a ſociety; as this, I ſay, neceſſarily follows, the church muſt needs have its *ſuperior members in the court of legiſlature*, to prevent that power, which the ſtate receives in return for the protection it affords, from being perverted to the church's injury: for the church's giving up its independency to the ſtate, without reſerving ſome ſhare in the legiſlature, would be making itſelf, inſtead of a *ſubject*, a *ſlave*, to the ſtate. Beſides, without theſe eccleſiaſtics, no laws could be reaſonably made in the court of legiſlature concerning the church; becauſe no free man, or body, can be bound by laws to which they have not given their conſent. So that as the church, when ſhe entered into alliance, cannot *juſtly*, we muſt preſume ſhe did not *willingly* give up her independency, without the reſervation of ſuch a privilege. This ſhews the neceſſity of their ſitting and acting in the legiſlature, in all affairs *eccleſiaſtical*. That they ſhould act too, when they are there, like the other members, *in civil matters*, is very uſeful to the community: as giving additional ſanction to its laws, when the people ſee that church and ſtate have concurred in their enacting.

From this account of the grounds and original of this privilege may be deduced the following COROLLARIES:

1. "That

1. "That churchmen who ſit in the higher houſe of legiſlature "in conſequence of this *alliance*, are to be conſidered firſt, not as "REPRESENTATIVES indeed, but yet as GUARDIANS OF THE "CHURCH: the qualification for the exerciſe of this office being "their *baronies*. They are in the ſecond place to be conſidered as "BARONS like the other members of that houſe." For not to allow that biſhops ſit as guardians, would be to take away the moſt uſeful, and even the neceſſary end of their ſitting, *which is, to watch over the intereſts of the church.* Beſides, this office implies, that the church ſtill continues a *diſtinct*, though an *allied* ſociety; whereas to ſit only as *barons* ſuppoſes the CHURCH not only *united* to, but incorporated with, and *diſſolved* in, the STATE, while lay fees alone are ſeen to give one and the ſame privilege both to the ſecular and ſpiritual lords.

2. "That yet, notwithſtanding, theſe churchmen (though they "ſit as *guardians* as well as *barons*) do not, on the other hand, by "virtue of this alliance, conſtitute or compoſe any diſtinct or THIRD "ESTATE in parliament." For this would be attended with all the miſchiefs of a contrary extreme, by putting the allied church again in poſſeſſion of its *independency*, while it had a *negative* on the acts of the ſtate. And this evil, which no management could prevent, ſo neither could time itſelf remedy: for the union, which is in its nature diſſolvable, would by churchmen's ſitting as a *third eſtate* become perpetual; every eſtate of legiſlature being eſſential to that government whereto it belongs. But whatever is eſſential can never be ſeparated or taken away, without a change in the government itſelf.

Theſe are the two extremes ſo hurtful both to religion and civil government, ſo deſtructive of that benefit which a rightly formed *alliance* is fitted to produce. Yet the common ſyſtem hath joined theſe two diſcordant parts together; and made the biſhops, at once, *guardian-barons* and a *diſtinct eſtate*.

3. A Third corollary is, "That as the biſhops' right to ſit in "parliament began with the *alliance*, ſo it muſt end likewiſe with "it."

" it." It hath been ſhewn that the biſhops ſit there, *ne quid eccleſia detrimenti capiat*: For the church, by this alliance, having given up its *ſupremacy* to the ſtate, which had now, whenever the grant ſhould be abuſed, opportunities to do her injury, the principal churchmen are placed in a court of legiſlature, as watchmen to prevent the miſchief, and to give the church's ſentiments concerning laws eccleſiaſtical. But when the *alliance* is broken, and the eſtabliſhment diſſolved, the church recovers back its ſupremacy, and from thenceforth the ſtate loſing the means of injuring, by having no longer a right of making laws for the exterior government of it, the church hath no longer a pretence of having *guardians* in the legiſlature: nor will the biſhops' *baronies* remain, to keep them there; for theſe tenures will exiſt no longer than while the church continues *eſtabliſhed*; it being part of that public maintenance which the ſtate aſſigns to the clergy of a church in *alliance*: and which, on the diſſolution of that union, reverts back again to the ſtate. So neither the office nor title of *guardian-barons* remaining, biſhops of the univerſal church have no further buſineſs in any particular civil court of legiſlature.

Having thus, in a ſummary way, conſidered the nature of that ſtation which churchmen hold in parliament, as it is DE JURE, deducible from the principles of this theory, I ſhall now, the ſubject being both important and curious, conſider it DE FACTO, under the ſeveral forms it aſſumed, as the CONSTITUTION kept improving and refining, till it arrived to that perfection, in which we hope long to enjoy it.

What I have to obſerve on the ſubject will be beſt digeſted in a reſolution of theſe three queſtions.

I. Whether the biſhops in parliament now make one of the ESTATES there?

II. Whether they be BARONS of parliament?

III. Whether they be PEERS of parliament?

I. As to the firſt queſtion, it hath been held as a conſtitutional point, by many of great name, amongſt which are Lord Chancellor Hyde, Biſhop Stillingfleet, and Archbiſhop Wake, that the Biſhops even now compoſe an *eſtate* in parliament. "Learned and unbiaſſed "men (ſays the firſt of theſe eminent perſons), who know the "frame and conſtitution of the kingdom, know that the biſhops "are no leſs the repreſentative body of the clergy than the Houſe "of Commons is of the people *." And again, ſpeaking of the Biſhops' expulſion from their houſe, he ſays, "They who loved "the church, and were afraid of ſo great an alteration as the taking "away *one of the three eſtates*, of which the parliament is com-"pounded, were infinitely provoked †."——He who looks no further than into the preſent face of the conſtitution, will wonder how ſuch a doctrine ever came to be received; ſince every circumſtance relating to, and, at preſent, attendant on, the biſhops' ſeat in parliament, manifeſts the falſehood of it. They have no *negative* voice, which is eſſential to an ESTATE: they have no *ſeparate* houſe for conſultation, which hath been long the eſtabliſhed uſage of an ESTATE: they are not in numbers ſufficient, on the *feudal* ſyſtem, to conſtitute an ESTATE.

If we would know from whence this venerable error hath ariſen; for venerable it is both for the antiquity of it, and for the eminence of thoſe who hold it; we muſt go up to the very cunabula of the Engliſh conſtitution.

As in the infancy of letters there was no accurate ſeparation of ſcience; ſo in the infancy of the *Northern Policy* there was no diſtinct ſeparation of ESTATES.

Till the Norman Conqueſt, the BISHOP and the ALDERMAN ſat together on the bench, in one common judicatory. *William* made a fit and proper ſeparation of the magiſtracy, as the terms of an *alliance*, between the two ſocieties, require. Which, had it not been for an accident of the times, the accumulating ſuperſtition

* Hiſt. of the Rebellion, B. iv.

† Life of Edward earl of Clarendon, p. 101, 102, 8vo edit.

and

and the rapacious ſpirit of uſurpation in the church of Rome, would have been of great advantage to the community, by marking out and aſcertaining the proper bounds and limits of each SOCIETY. For churchmen were very improper miniſters of the crown, to judge in cauſes merely civil, both from the peculiar nature of their office, and the implied prohibition of their maſter; who himſelf diſclaims all temporal juriſdiction. Beſides, the practice of the BISHOP's ſitting with the ALDERMAN rendered the original of the former's *coercive power*, there exerciſed in a coequality, very doubtful and uncertain. As the *Alderman's* authority was ſeen to be from the *ſtate*, men would be naturally miſled to think that the *biſhop's* was from the *church*; at a time too, when churchmen allowed ſo little to the civil magiſtrate; whereas all *coercive power* being derived from the ſtate, and to be exerciſed only for its uſe, it is of the higheſt moment not to have it miſunderſtood. From henceforward the CHURCH became, in a more juſt and proper ſenſe than before, ONE OF THE THREE ESTATES OF THE REALM. But it was not till long after that they became, as properly, AN ESTATE IN PARLIAMENT.

For, though the biſhops and prelates ſat in Parliament as BARONS, and as GUARDIANS of the church, in ſpiritual matters, even from the Conqueſt, yet it was not till the twenty-third year of Edward I. that churchmen conſtituted an ESTATE IN PARLIAMENT. They and the *Commonalty* receiving this quality or condition of eſtates together, from the mode of granting their aids in Parliament; which was by taxing themſelves diſtinctly; and ſupporting themſelves in this right (as appears from all the records) by the exertion of a *negative voice*; a privilege which conſtitutes, and is eſſential to *an eſtate in Parliament* *. And the way of ſummoning the clergy thither,

* When the *Eſtates General* of France, a body moſt reſembling our *Parliaments*, had received its moſt perfect form and ſtability under John II, his famous declaration concerning its nature and rights (which ſome have compared to the *Magna Charta* of his nameſake, King of England) begins with an inviolable law, that nothing propoſed

ther, as *an eſtate*, was by adding the *præmunientes* clauſe to the biſhop's writ: in conſequence of which, the whole body of the clergy appeared, partly in perſon, and partly by proxy; the biſhops, prelates, and the *procuratores cleri*, compoſing this *eſtate*. But as their principal and almoſt only buſineſs was granting ſubſidies to the crown, it happened, as much on this account, as becauſe the *three eſtates* ſat all together in one place, that the exerciſe of their *negative*, otherwiſe than in eccleſiaſtical matters, is not ſo clearly delivered down to us. For, till the latter end of Edward III. the eſtates of Parliament ſat together in one houſe. Till then, they debated in common and granted apart: as now, they ſit apart and grant in common.

But againſt this account of the FIRST ESTATE, it may be objected, "That even while the clergy gave ſeparate aids in Parliament, the lower clergy, at times, were not ſummoned." I anſwer, that this makes nothing againſt their quality of an *eſtate*; for in thoſe irregular ſeaſons of the conſtitution, the Commons themſelves were ſometimes neglected, as in the nineteenth year of Edward III.

It may be further objected, that, "according to this ſyſtem, the SECOND ESTATE, conſiſting of the temporal peers, ſhould have taxed themſelves, ſeparately from the THIRD, conſiſting of the *Commons*; in the manner of the FIRST." This is true. And in fact they ſometimes did thus tax themſelves: though ſometimes they did not: and there was ſufficient reaſon for both theſe practices. The PROPERTY of the kingdom might be conſidered in two lights, as ſeparated either by their different TENURES; or by their ſuppoſed different ORIGINALS. When conſidered in the firſt light, the *tenures* of the Lords and Commons were ſo very unlike, that it was no wonder they ſhould (as they ſometimes did) grant

poſed there ſhould be held of validity that had not the concurrence of three orders, of the *Clergy*, *Nobles*, and *Commons*, and that the concurrence of any two only ſhould not bind the third, which had refuſed it's conſent.

their

their ſubſidies ſeparately and diſtinct from one another. But when PROPERTY was conſidered according to its ſuppoſed *original*, one part founded in *human* right, and the other in *divine*, it then divided itſelf into *lay property* and *clerical*; and the property of the Lay Lords and the Commons fell into one of the diviſions. Hence they found it reaſonable to tax themſelves together. But, as was eſſential to *eſtates*, the Lords and Commons had a negative on one another, in the common propoſal.

Thus was this change in the conſtitution (by the ADDITION of a *clerical eſtate in parliament*) ſilently and inſenſibly introduced. It returned as ſilently and inſenſibly to its former model, by a gradual and unperceived EXCLUSION of this *eſtate*. For the clergy, in that corrupt ſeaſon of religion, ever aiming at an independency on the civil magiſtrate, began, in good time, to break in upon this *new eſtabliſhment*; firſt by contriving, for the ſake of pretended *regularity*, to have their grants in Parliament CONFIRMED in their SYNODS. This was eaſily indulged them, being conſidered only as a matter of form. When they had ſo ſoon gained their point, it was not long ere they grew ſcrupulous and uneaſy about GRANTING at all in *Parliament*; and contended warmly for having this buſineſs carried, in the firſt inſtance, into their *Synods*. But this was a more ſerious matter. Our kings did not care to truſt churchmen out of their ſight; and the wiſeſt of themſelves began to foreſee how it might effect their new quality of an *eſtate* in parliament. So this pretenſion, for a time, was coolly puſhed. But the frequent and urgent neceſſities of the crown (of which they never failed to make their advantage) encouraged them, at ſuch junctures, to urge this laſt demand with freſh vigour: and the monarch, in ſuch ſtraits, was more intent to get their ſubſidies, than to watch over their encroachments: ſo that this, likewiſe, was occaſionally ſuffered; as in eaſier times, it was occaſionally denied. However, the clergy having been ſo far ſucceſsful in their aims, as *always to confirm*, and *ſometimes to give*, their ſubſidies in ſynod, the crown found it neceſſary that theſe *church-aſſemblies* ſhould

ſhould be ever at hand to attend *parliament*, leſt ſcruple or pretence ſhould afford this *firſt eſtate* a handle to retard the public ſupplies: and therefore at the ſame time that the Parliament-writs were iſſued, a writ of ſummons was now directed to the clergy, to aſſemble in ſynod, under the new name of a CONVOCATION, as they now treated of *civil* matters; to diſtinguiſh it from a *provincial ſynod*, which treated only of *ſpiritual*. And to manifeſt more clearly the change in the nature of theſe eccleſiaſtical aſſemblies, from the time of Edward II. provincial Parliamentary writs were iſſued to the two arch-biſhops, or in a vacancy to the prior and chapter, requiring them to ſend their mandates to the clergy of the province, to ſummon them to Convocation, *to aſſiſt in the difficult and urgent neceſſities of the church and* REALM. On which account, doubtleſs, it was, that in after-times theſe *Convocations* were thought to be irregular if aſſembled out of Parliament-time: and the opinion appears to be founded. But the clergy were able fencers. They knew as well how to take advantage of an adverſary (for ſuch they almoſt always eſteemed the CIVIL POWER) when he was on, as when he was off his guard. The *Convocation* now conſtantly ſitting in Parliament-time, it gave them a pretence more obſtinately than before to inſiſt on ALWAYS granting their ſubſidies in *Convocation*; ſince that aſſembly was always at hand to enable them to ſerve the crown with expedition.

How ſoon they ſucceeded in this likewiſe, may be gueſſed at, from what paſſed in parliament ſo early as the fourth year of Richard II. The *Commons* having offered a certain ſum, on condition the *clergy* would give their proportion; the churchmen bravely anſwered, *That their grants* NEVER HAD BEEN *nor ought to be made in parliament*. Without doubt, applauding themſelves for their dexterity in ſecuring the honour of their word, by giving the name of *grant*, to the *confirmation* of it. A covering, ſlight as it was, yet ſuiting, well enough, this ſummer-ſeaſon of the church. But the prelates of thoſe times never obtained a favour, which they did not employ for a ſtep to procure a greater. Thus we have

have ſeen how they uſed the indulgence, of *ſometimes confirming* their grants in Convocation, to extend their claim of *always confirming them*: And, from this latter allowance, how they were encouraged to aſk the privilege of *ſometimes making* their grants in Convocation: which when imprudently connived at, they proceeded, in a little time, to claim the right of *always making* them there. With what ſucceſs they accompliſhed all this may be ſeen above, where they declare, as if they had ingroſſed to themſelves the gift of memory as well as languages, *that their grants never had been, nor ought to be made in parliament.*

But, ſo the clergy *granted*, the indigent monarch was little delicate about the manner how. He thought he had fully ſecured the main point, by always ſummoning a Convocation along with a parliament. But he was out in his reckoning: the clergy were not to be ſo ſerved. They appear to have been ill at eaſe while labouring under this badge of civil dependency, the neceſſity of granting when the other *eſtates* did. They therefore at length aſſumed, not only, that they ought to grant no where *out of* Convocation, but that, *in it*, they ſhould grant but when they themſelves pleaſed, as their own conſent, they pretended, was neceſſary to bring this Convocation together. In the weak reign of *Richard* II. *Courtney*, archbiſhop of Canterbury, plainly tells the King himſelf—*Credimus quod Clerus convocari non valeant, niſi ſcripſimus pro eodem* *. By a dextrous paſs of hand, trying to eſtabliſh this *uſurped* right on a former *conteſted* one; by counfounding the new provincial *Convocation*, called for civil matters, with the old provincial *ſynods*, convened only for ſpiritual.

It is true, that by this conduct, they loſt as much of their *legal* ground on one ſide, as they had gained of their *uſurped*, on the other. For when they had poſſeſſed themſelves of the power of granting only in Convocation; and claimed to aſſemble that Convocation when they themſelves thought fit, they had no longer

* See note [F], at the end of this Book.

a pre-

a pretence of being an *eſtate in parliament*. But their canoniſts had warned them of the danger of parting with any thing they had once got. So that truſting to what ſtood them in more ſtead than their own clerkſhip, the ignorance of the laity, when in the fourth year of Richard II. they had, as we have ſeen, affirmed IN VERBO SACERDOTIS, *that their grants never had been, nor ought to be, made in parliament*, and thereby fairly aboliſhed their *eſtateſhip in parliament*, they did not ſcruple, in the twenty-firſt of the ſame reign,—*to pray the King, that ſince divers judgments were undone* HERETOFORE *for that the clergy were not preſent, they might appoint ſome common proctor with ſufficient authority for that purpoſe.* They confided in their logic, and were not deceived. They deſire they may be ſtill acknowledged an *eſtate in parliament*, becauſe they had been one, HERETOFORE. And the demand was granted: for what *court* could reſiſt the force of ſuch an argument?

By what hath been ſaid, the reader may now underſtand, that ſince the time of Edward I. there have paſſed three periods, in the courſe of which, the clergy exerciſed this right of *taxing themſelves*. The firſt was when they did it in Parliament only. The ſecond, when they did it ſometimes in Parliament and ſometimes in Convocation. The third, when they did it in Convocation only. Under the two firſt they were, without all queſtion, *a civil eſtate in Parliament*: under the laſt, *a civil eſtate only in Convocation*, which they continued to be all the time they taxed themſelves in that place. But when they had given up this right to the community, they ceaſed to be a *civil eſtate* even in *Convocation*: and from thenceforth were no other than repreſentatives of the church in their *ſynods* for ſpiritual matters. And in quality of a *civil eſtate*, were reduced back to what they were before the time of Edward I. AN ESTATE OF THE KINGDOM. Very properly diſtinguiſhed from an *eſtate in parliament* or in *convocation*, notwithſtanding biſhop Stillingfleet's reaſoning to the contrary: Who ſays,—"That "then the *three eſtates are not* REPRESENTED *in parliament*." For this is a miſtake. No *eſtate* can ſit in parliament but for their

their TEMPORALS: and the clergy, ſince they ceaſed to tax themſelves, have been repreſented for their *temporals*, by the COMMONS; whoſe members are choſen by the clergy and lay-people promiſcuouſly, according to their reſpective properties. It is true, this anſwer would be defective, were the *temporalities* of the clergy of a diſtinct nature from thoſe of the laity, as was the doctrine in the times of ſuperſtition, when a certain conſecration of one part of them, and a divine deſignation of the other, ſanctified their property, as it did their perſons. But the clergy have long ſince become both wiſer and honeſter. They own their poſſeſſions to be a property derived to them from the ſame civil ſource with that of the laity; that it is all of the ſame *ſpecies*; and conſequently may have the *ſame repreſentation*. But the learned prelate's phraſe is curious——*An eſtate* REPRESENTED *in parliament*, for, *an eſtate ſitting in parliament:* but the impropriety was unavoidable. The churchmen in parliament were, at this time, too few to be called *an eſtate*, he therefore chuſes to call them *the repreſentatives of an eſtate*.

AGAIN: I cannot ſee (ſays biſhop Stillingfleet) how it can be "avoided but the biſhops in parliament muſt be one of the *three* "*eſtates*, unleſs a Convocation ſit." And then I ſuppoſe his meaning is, that not the biſhops alone, but they, with the reſt of the clergy, make the *firſt of the three eſtates in parliament*. His whole reaſoning being founded on this miſtaken principle, that it is now eſſential to the Britiſh conſtitution that its parliaments ſhould be compoſed of THREE ESTATES. At leaſt, he muſt ſuppoſe, that ſince there was once *three eſtates* in it, no change has been made in the conſtitution; no ſuch change having been proclaimed. But this change, we ſay (as important as it is) is a matter which may be done in ſilence, and by degrees, as well as ſuddenly, and with much noiſe.

To return: the time when the clergy ceaſed to be *a civil eſtate in Convocation* is well known; for the Æra of their giving up the right to tax themſelves is in every man's memory. But the preciſe

time of their ceasing to be an *estate in parliament* cannot be so well fixed. It was certainly at the time when they no longer gave in *parliament*, but in *convocation* only. Yet, when this was, is not easy to be found. For they gained their point, as we observed above, gradually, and step by step. First, they grew importunate to have their grants in parliament, *confirmed* in convocation. When they had got thus far, they tried for the privilege of *granting* in convocation. This was not so easily obtained: however, occasionally, it was indulged. So that, for a course of years, they sometimes *granted* in one place, and sometimes in another. At length they gained the point they were ever aiming at from the first; to be allowed to give their subsidies *always in convocation*. From thenceforth the clergy, no longer granting in *parliament*, were no longer any *estate* there. This precise time, for the reasons just given, is not likely to be ascertained; yet one would think that the small number of the clergy which afterwards came to parliament, would have pretty well marked it out. And so indeed it would, but for that perverseness and wayward ambition in the clergy, who would needs continue an *estate* in parliament, though, by persisting to grant only in *Convocation*, they had transferred their *estateship* (together with their submission) from *parliament* to that other place: and the *præmunientes* clause continuing (as it still does) to run the same, in the bishop's writs of summons to parliament, supported them in this absurd idea. However though, occasionally, they sat in numbers like an *estate*, some think, as late as Henry VI. yet from the time (as well as we can guess) that the clergy granted *only in convocation*, they gradually paid their attendance in *parliament*, in fewer and still fewer numbers; till at length none came thither except the bishops and greater prelates. But, indeed, it was no wonder the clergy should indulge this notion of their being still an *estate* in parliament, even after they had refused that submission and service of granting in parliament, which was the only thing that made them so; it is no wonder, I say, they should be fond of this notion, since the *two other estates* appear to have been long under the same delusion,

deluſion, with regard to theſe prelatical deſerters. For the clergy, as we ſaid, coming from thenceforth (except when their uſurped claims were in danger) in ſmall numbers to parliament, the ſpeaker of the Houſe of Commons 21 of Richard II. required that the clergy ſhould conſtitute a proxy to parliament; becauſe, ſays he, "Divers "judgments and ordinances have been repealed and annulled, for "this reaſon, that the STATE of the clergy was not *preſent* in par-"liament at the making of them *." The ſpeaker's political logic not reaching to this truth, that when the King and Parliament had conſented that the clergy ſhould grant their parliamentary ſubſidies in *convocation*, they were no longer a STATE in *parliament*, but a STATE in *convocation only*. On the ſame miſtaken principle, it continued a cuſtom long after, for the Houſe of Lords to adjourn themſelves on thoſe days when the biſhops and prelates were to be abſent in Convocation, as wanting, at ſuch times, this imaginary ESTATE. Nay, the whole LEGISLATURE, the King and parliament, even down to the time of Elizabeth, continued, in their public acts, to give the name of an *eſtate* to the clergy in parliament.

THAT the NAMES and FORMS of things ſhould remain the ſame, long after the things themſelves have ceaſed or been aboliſhed, will appear nothing ſtrange to us, when we reflect, how adherent and tenacious the people, in all times and places, have ever been of old modes and faſhions. Eſpecially when we obſerve further, that their governors have generally found it for their intereſts to comply, in this matter, with the people's humours and tempers. So that when a *conſtitution* hath undergone a change, not by violence, but by ſlow and inſenſible degrees, OLD NAMES AND FORMS have ſtill continued; and kept their ground ſo long that, at length, for this very reaſon, the *change* itſelf hath been called in queſtion.

* Archbiſhop Wake obſerves, that to the 5th of this King the writs to the clergy ran to *do* as well as to *conſent*; from the 5th only to *conſent*, *reducing* (ſays he) *their power to a mere matter of conſent*. But is not *conſenting* and diſſenting, *doing*; and does it not imply that their conſent was thought neceſſary, as an *eſtate*?

Nay, when the *conſtitution of a ſtate* hath been totally changed, and even by ſudden violence, as was that of the republic of Rome to an imperial tyranny, ſo fond were that people of *old names*, and ſo apt are all people to take *names* for *things*, that the uſurpers found a neceſſity, and found their account in that neceſſity, of having NOMINAL *Conſuls*, *Prætors*, *Tribunes*, &c. according to the old republican forms.

We need not wonder then, that when the clergy, ſo lately as Elizabeth, were called, by the ſeveral ſtatutes of her reign, an *eſtate in parliament*, there ſhould have been ever ſince ſeveral particulars of great name, both amongſt the clergy and laity, ſome with good faith, and ſome without, who have perſevered in contending for this imaginary *eſtate*. Not all, for the ſake of the clergy: The conſtitution has engaged the care of many, who finding the records ſpeak ſo frequently of THREE ESTATES in parliament, and ſeeing from many of the circumſtances, occaſionally enforced above, that the *clergy* could no longer be one of them, they have, in order to make out *three eſtates in parliament* (eſſential, as they falſely ſuppoſed, to the conſtitution) made the King himſelf the FIRST ESTATE, in direct oppoſition to the very nature and genius of all FEUDAL governments.

Thus have I endeavoured, by a plain hiſtorical deduction of facts, to clear up a very embroiled affair: in itſelf of importance; but neceſſary to be explained, if we would diſcourſe intelligibly on the two next queſtions, which I promiſed to diſcuſs.

II. The firſt is, in what capacity the Biſhops now ſit in the Houſe of Parliament, when they are no longer an ESTATE there? Whether as PRELATES of the church, or as BARONS of the realm, or both?

The Houſe of Lords compoſe two ſovereign aſſemblies; a ſupreme COURT of judicature with the king at the head; and an ESTATE of legiſlature. The biſhops ſit in this ſupreme court of judicature as BARONS OF THE REALM. In the Saxon times, indeed, they held their

their temporalities in *frank almoigne*: but the Conqueror, much againſt their will, changed that tenure into *baronage*, by ſubjecting them to all the ſervices of lay-baronies. The conſtitutions of Clarendon go upon this principle, and declare that the biſhops ſit as *barons* in the ſupreme court of judicature. "ARCHIEPISCOPI, EPIS-"COPI (ſay the Conſtitutions) et univerſæ perſonæ regni, qui de "rege tenent in capite, habent poſſeſſiones ſuas de rege, ſicut "BARONIAM, et inde reſpondeant et ſicut *cæteri barones* debent "intereſſe judiciis curiæ regis."—On theſe *Conſtitutions*, NAT. BACON obſerves, and rightly, *that they were made by the Lords in their judicial capacity*. The *Conſtitutions* are formed upon the principles of the FEUDAL LAW, which directs, that *barons* of the realm only ſhall compoſe this court. Indeed, according to the nature of civil government in general, as well as of the *Feudal* in particular, none but *barons* for their temporalities, whether lay or eccleſiaſtical, can ſit in ſuch a court of juſtice.——As miniſters of Chriſt, or as ſucceſſors to the apoſtles in the government of the church, no biſhop has any *civil juriſdiction* belonging to his office. *Who made me a judge or divider amongſt you?* ſays their divine maſter. So that whatever *civil juriſdiction* churchmen have, they derive it all from the *civil power*: and from this power of the *Feudal* kind, *eccleſiaſtical barons* are inveſted with right of judgement in that ſupreme court.

It is otherwiſe in the legiſlative part of this high aſſembly. There, the biſhops ſit as PRELATES OF THE CHURCH, in behalf of religion; nothing being more conſonant to right reaſon, in a Chriſtian country, or more eſſential to an *alliance between church and ſtate*, than, that certain of the ſuperior clergy ſhould be of the higher court of legiſlature: not as *repreſentatives* of the *church*, any more than lay lords are *repreſentatives* of the *ſtate*, but as members ſimply of each ſociety, yet, at the ſame time, as GUARDIANS of each, reſpectively. But with this difference, that as the temporal lords are ordained to watch over the civil intereſts primarily, and the religious intereſts in the ſecond place; ſo the ſpiritual lords are to intend the religious intereſts primarily, and the civil, only in the ſecond place.

place. *Lay* and *ſpiritual* lords belonging to both ſocieties; but belonging to them in the varying modes of relation above explained: the indiſpenſable qualification both of the MAGNATES and the PRELATI to bear this ſhare in legiſlation, being their BARONIES.

That this is the ſenſe in which the Engliſh conſtitution conſiders the biſhops' ſeat in this high court of legiſlature appears from the old cuſtom, in the vacancy of a ſee, to ſend writs to the GUARDIAN OF THE SPIRITUALITIES to attend parliament: a plain declaration, that government conſidered the biſhops in parliament as *eccleſiaſtical prelates* ſitting in behalf of religion, rather than as *barons*: for, the barony, at this period, is, as it were, in *abeyance*. While churchmen made a third eſtate in parliament, the biſhops ſat as BISHOPS, properly ſo called, and BARONS: ever ſince, they have ſat under the more general idea of PRELATES, or ſuperior churchmen, and BARONS; as biſhops now do in the Germanic diets, where they ſit as prelates and princes of the empire.

This will aſſiſt us to appreciate the value of Lord Chief Juſtice HALE's opinion concerning biſhops in parliament, as we find it in a manuſcript treatiſe *touching the right of the crown*, communicated to me by a friend. By which it appears, that his not properly diſtinguiſhing between the *court of judicature*, and the *eſtate of legiſlation*, in the HOUSE OF LORDS, hath ſpread over his diſcourſe much inaccuracy and confuſion. His words are theſe:——"The "biſhops ſit in the Houſe of Peers by *uſage* and *cuſtom*, which I "therefore call uſage, becauſe they had it not by expreſs charter, "for then we ſhould find ſome. Neither had they it by tenure; "for, regularly, their tenure was in *free-alms*, and not *per baro-* "*niam*, and therefore it is clear they were not *barons* in reſpect of "their poſſeſſions, but their poſſeſſions were called baronies, becauſe "they were the poſſeſſions of cuſtomary barons. Beſides, it is "evident that the writ of ſummons uſually went *electo & confirmato*, "before any reſtitution of the temporalties; ſo that their poſſeſ- "ſions were not the cauſe of their ſummons [as it was in part, and "but in part, in the caſe of ſome abbots.] Neither are they

"*barons*

" *barons* by preſcription; for it is evident that as well the lately " erected biſhops, as *Glouceſter*, *Oxon*, *&c.* had voice in parliament, " and yet created within time of memory, and without any ſpecial " words in the erection thereof to entitle them to it. So that it is " a privilege by uſage annexed to the epiſcopal dignity within the " realm; not to their order, which they acquire by conſecration; " nor to their perſons, for in reſpect to their perſons they are not " barons, nor to be tried as barons, but to THEIR INCORPORATION " and dignity epiſcopal."—*The biſhops ſit in the Houſe of Peers by uſage and cuſtom.* This is obſerved, to ſhew a difference between their right, and the right of the Lords-temporal. He gives two reaſons for his aſſertion. 1. *Becauſe it is not by expreſs charter.* 2. *Neither by tenure; for that*, REGULARLY, *their tenure was in* FREE ALMS, *and not* PER BARONIAM. His firſt reaſon is allowed; but then it includes many Lords-temporal, who ſit by *uſage and cuſtom.* His ſecond reaſon is more to his point, but not true; for though during the Saxon times they held their poſſeſſions in *free alms:* yet, as the learned Chief Juſtice well knew, this tenure was changed by the Conqueror (along with the conſtitution itſelf) into the tenure *per baroniam.* Now, becauſe they once ſat, and not for their tenures, does it follow, that they cannot ſit at preſent for their tenures, which give a right by uſage and cuſtom? The clergy were once the *firſt eſtate in parliament.* Would the great man have allowed it to follow, that they are ſo now? It is with regret that I take notice of a piece of management and argumentative *finèſſe*, in the moſt candid of all writers.—REGULARLY (ſays he) *their tenure* WAS *in free alms.* If inſtead of, *regularly*, he had ſaid, *anciently*, the phraſe had been exact, and the propoſition true. But then it would not have ſerved his purpoſe. *Regularly* (ſays he) *their tenure was*—this, though a kind of jargon, is to inſinuate however, that *regularly their tenure is.* Yet this being viſibly falſe (becauſe the Conqueror changed what *regularly was*—free alms; into what *regularly is*—per baroniam), the good man choſe rather to *inſinuate*, by an obſcure phraſe, what he would not *affirm* in a plain one.

But

But further, to ſupport his ſecond argument, he obſerves, that *the biſhops' writ of ſummons* USUALLY *went electo & confirmato, before any reſtitution of the temporalities.* And for a good reaſon; but a reaſon which makes nothing for his point; though this he did not ſee, from his not chuſing to diſtinguiſh between the lords' *juridical* and *legiſlative* capacity. In the *latter*, we have ſhewn, that the biſhops ſit as *prelates* and *guardians* of the church, and not as *barons*; though their *qualification* to ſit in a court of legiſlature is their baronies: in the *former*, they ſit as *barons.* But the principal branch of parliamentary buſineſs being the *legiſlative*, the *juridical* being only occaſional, we eaſily underſtand how it came to paſs, that the ſummons USUALLY went *electo & confirmato.* This leads me to obſerve (as it tends more clearly to explain this matter) that the practice of the great officer of ſtate, who iſſues theſe writs, has been, ſometimes to ſend them *before the reſtitution of the temporalities*; ſometimes *after*; juſt as each happened to conceive of the biſhops' right in general; or to diſtinguiſh concerning the exerciſe of it, in the two diſtinct courts, in particular.

The learned Chief Juſtice gives his ſecond argument this further ſupport. *Neither are the biſhops, barons by preſcription, for the lately erected biſhops, as Glouceſter, Oxon, &c. had voice in parliament, and yet, created within time of memory.* But ſurely, if the temporalities of the ORDER be *baronies by preſcription*, as his argument ſeems to allow, then, in all reaſon and common ſenſe, thoſe members of the ORDER, lately formed, are, by the very erection of their biſhopricks, partakers of all the rights of *barons by preſcription*, enjoyed by their elder brethren: and this, on the very principles of the learned Chief Juſtice himſelf: who, in concluſion, tells us, they derive all from *their* INCORPORATION *and epiſcopal dignity.* But we know that all the *members* of an *incorporated body* enjoy the ſame rights and privileges in common. This ſhews the true reaſon of a fact which the learned Judge ſeems to lay ſome ſtreſs upon, where he obſerves that in the creation of the new erected biſhops, *there are no ſpecial words in their erection to intitle them to the rights of barons*

barons by prescription: for now, we see, even on the learned Lawyer's own principles, there was no need.

From all this defective reasoning he thus concludes.—*So that it is a privilege by usage annexed to the episcopal dignity within the realm, not to their order, which they acquire by consecration.* He means, they sit as *bishops of the church of England*, not as *bishops of the universal church.* This is true when meant of their seat in the court of legislature only.——He goes on—*the privilege is not annexed to their persons, for in respect to their persons, they are* NOT BARONS. It hath been here evidently shewn, that THEY ARE, unless personality be separable from office or title; and that the *privilege* of sitting in the high court of judicature is annexed to their *baronies*; which *baronies* are a QUALIFICATION for their sitting in the court of legislature; though in this court, the *privilege* of the bishops (to speak in the chief justice's own language) *be* IMMEDIATELY *annexed to episcopal dignity within the realm.*

III. The last question is concerning the PARLIAMENTARY PEERAGE of the bishops. For such is the perversity of opposing parties, and their equal propensity to fall into contrary extremes, that while some churchmen, on the one hand, will still have the bishops an ESTATE in parliament, although it hath been extinguished long since; so on the other, some laymen seem unwilling to allow, that the bishops are even PEERS in that place, though long possessed of this uninterrupted title; at all times, recognized by our *kings* and *parliaments* themselves. By these, they are declared to be—PEERS *of the land*—PEERS *of parliament*—PEERS *of the realm.* In the 15th of Edward II. when the parliament reversed the judgement of the *Spencers*, one cause by them assigned was, *Because the Lords Spiritual, who were* PEERS, *assented not to it.* In an act of 25 Edward III. intituled, *A Bishop's Temporalities shall not be seized for a contempt*, this reason is given——"Sith they be PEERS of the land, the king, "&c." In the 21st of Richard II. they are called *Peers of the Realm, Peers in Parliament, and Peers of the Realm in Parliament.*

And when the Commons prayed, that archbiſhop Arundel might be put in ſafe-cuſtody, the king's anſwer was, *That he would be adviſed, becauſe the impeachment touched a* PEER *of the kingdom* *.

But perhaps it will be ſaid, "That ſome change in the conſtitution may have deprived the biſhops in particular of their PEERAGE; as it did churchmen collectively, of their ESTATE in parliament: although the NAME of *peer* (like that of *eſtate*) might be long in uſe, even after the thing itſelf was loſt and aboliſhed." To this I anſwer, that the change in the conſtitution, whereby churchmen loſt their *eſtate* in parliament, has been fully explained: It will be incumbent therefore on the enemies of the biſhops' *peerage* to ſhew what change it was in the conſtitution which deprived them of this latter title †. As they are not likely to do this, I ſhall proceed; and firſt, it may be aſked, what mighty reaſoning it was which diſpoſed them to conclude, *that biſhops were not peers in parliament*. For as to the late offer of an argument, "that PEERAGE belongs only to HEREDITARY *baronies*," it was urged under an entire forgetfulneſs of the nature of *feudal tenures*. The greater lay fiefs, long before they became *hereditary*, were only PERSONAL, for term of years or life. But the authentic argument is this, "That in capital caſes, the biſhops are not tried by the *Peers*, but by a Jury of the *Commoners*: and that they themſelves cannot ſit

* See, for further proof of this point, Selden's Privileges of the Baronage. Wilkins's edit. p. 1538.

† For I do not ſuppoſe that a *declaration* of the Lords not long before the confuſions of the civil wars in the time of Charles I. to be found at preſent (I do not know by what confuſion of ideas) amongſt the *ſtanding orders* of the Houſe, will be judged of force to make ſuch a change. Mr. Selden, who, by order of the Houſe of Lords, drew up *a collection touching the privileges of the peers of parliament*, ſeems to refer to, and to confute that *ſtanding order*, in his ſecond chapter, concerning privileges of the *ſecond kind*, in the following words—"It hath been doubted whether the ſame law (by which temporal "barons are to be tried by their peers in parliament) be in caſe of trial of ſpiritual "barons or no. And in that doubt *one ſpecial argument*, amongſt others, hath been "made from the name of *peers*. *Some* concluding thus, *ſpiritual barons are no peers*; "*therefore not to be tried by their peers*. But it is plain and true, the ſpiritual barons *are* "*peers*; the teſtimonies juſtifying them to be ſo are very frequent."

"in

" in judgement upon the *Peers*, when it proceeds to the loſs of life " or members."

The reaſoning, we ſee, ſtands on this falſe PRINCIPLE, *that the title of Peer in Parliament depends on their judging and on their being judged.* Now granting, for the preſent, that the *principle* is true, it will by no means follow, that theſe premiſſes infer the concluſion, that therefore the biſhops are *not peers* in parliament. For though, in *capital caſes and of blood*, they try not, neither are they tried, in the manner which theſe men imagine to be *eſſential to peerage*, yet in *miſdemeanours* they have the common right and privilege of trying and being tried like the lay lords. If therefore the argument hath any ſtrength, which concludes that the biſhops *are not peers*, becauſe they neither try nor are tried in capital caſes of blood; it is equally ſtrong when it concludes, on the other hand, that they *are peers*, becauſe they try and are tried in caſes of *miſdemeanour*. From all this, my logic teaches me to infer, that the reaſoning which concludes both ways can conclude neither.

But, a truth laid down under the ſecond head, and inforced by *the laws and conſtitutions of Normandy*, might teach men to reform their logic on this occaſion.

Barones (ſay theſe Conſtitutions) autem per PARES ſuos debent judicari *. I argue then in this manner—All BARONS (according to the feudal law) have a right to be tried by their PEERS. The biſhops are acknowledged to be BARONS; therefore they have a right to be tried by their PEERS. This is common ſenſe. But what name now ſhall we give to this diſtorted reaſoning. *The biſhops are not tried by barons, therefore they are not peers!* The rules of good reaſoning require that our adverſaries' premiſſes ſhould have a very different concluſion.—*The biſhops are not tried by barons therefore they are not barons.* But the misfortune was, their *baronies* were acknowledged; and therefore they had only that mis-ſhapen ſyllogiſm to truſt to. In a word, it was not the *trial*, it was the

* Jur. et Conſt. Norm. c. ix.

barony which made the PEER. But why ſhould we ſtand quarreling with the *form* of the *argument*, while the argument itſelf is deſtitute of all *ſubſtance*. The vanity of it may be ſhewn in very few words. It is only deſiring the learned Reader to recollect, how it came to paſs that the biſhops' right of trying, and being tried by their peers, in capital caſes, fell into diſuſe.

In the times of church tyranny and ſuperſtition, the clergy, now become all powerful, amongſt their many uſurpations, claimed this, an exemption from the civil tribunal: for, ſerving *two maſters*, and both unfaithfully, they ſoon learned the trick of eſcaping the KING's juſtice by ſheltering themſelves under their ſpiritual head, the POPE. The clergy had provided largely for lay-rogues of all kinds; who, in old pagan aſylums, new-chriſtened, *ſanctuaries*, and ſpread over the whole land, might ſafely defy the juſtice of the laws: and they thought it hard not to have one *place of refuge* for themſelves. This, partly through the ignorance, partly through the ſuperſtition of the ſtate, though it had long ſtruggled againſt this new ſpecies of treaſon, was, by the time of Henry IV. become a legal doctrine. This king would have had Sir W. Gaſcoine, a man of great probity, and knowledge in the laws, arraign archbiſhop Scroope; whom the ſovereign had taken in arms, fighting againſt him. But the Chief Juſtice told his maſter, "that, by the conſtitution, neither his highneſs, nor any one by virtue of his commiſſion, could be authorized to ſit upon the life of a biſhop." However, the king procured another judge who was leſs ſcrupulous; and by his aſſiſtance this metropolitical rebel was condemned and executed. Though he is ſaid to be the firſt biſhop who ſuffered death in England by the ſentence of civil judges. And the POPE did all he could that the firſt biſhop ſhould be the laſt; for he excommunicated thoſe who were concerned in the impiety of that ſentence. Thus the matter ſtood till the dawnings of the Reformation. And when afterwards the biſhops returned to their obedience, and a willing ſubjection to the civil power, the lay peers, once irritated, never ſince thought fit to forget this inſult on their peerage;

peerage; but left them to apply for juſtice where they could. Though I am inclined to think, that when Henry VIII. had extinguiſhed the papal authority in England, he would have reſtored the biſhops to that high privilege of peerage, the being hanged by the LORDS, had not the firſt epiſcopal criminal been biſhop FISHER, his moſt inveterate and perſonal enemy. And when once there was a precedent to try a ſpiritual peer by commoners, the old reſentment ſtill freſh in the HOUSE would do the reſt.

The other epiſcopal claim of exemption, *the not ſitting on their peers in capital caſes*, has a more certain and determined original: although it aroſe from the ſame treaſonable principle, which encouraged them to deſert the civil laws, and adhere to the eccleſiaſtical. Archbiſhop *Lanfrank* had, in a ſynod at London, procured the following canon of the council of Toledo, to be received amongſt the eccleſiaſtical laws of this realm: a canon founded in hypocriſy, and a feigned ſhew of ſuperior *mercy* and *purity*.—"Ut nullus "epiſcopus vel abbas ſeu quilibet ex clero hominem occidendum vel "membris truncandum judicet, vel judicantibus ſuæ authoritatis "favore commendet." Henceforth the biſhops, in ſuch caſes, to prevent the danger of incurring what, in the language of canoniſts, is called an IRREGULARITY, begged leave to withdraw. This at firſt was hardly granted, and with much reluctance, both by king and parliament, as it was a declining of the ſervice of their tenures; a miſdemeanour, on the feudal ideas, of a very high nature. Yet here again they got another triumph over the ſtate; and the *Conſtitutions* of *Clarendon* eſtabliſhed them in this uſurped privilege likewiſe. "Archiepiſcopi et epiſcopi, *ſicut cæteri barones*, debent "intereſſe judiciis curiæ regis quouſque perveniatur ad diminu-"tionem membrorum vel ad mortem."—However, this conſtitution (we ſee) in its firſt and principal intention is *poſitive*; and *negative*, only in its ſecond and inferior. They are *required* to ſit in judgement, and only *indulged* to withdraw when the ſentence proceeds to loſs of life or member. But we may be ſure, it was not in the intention of the biſhops, while they were extending their *eccleſiaſtical*

tical privileges, to give way to the loſs of any of their *civil*. They took care therefore, when ſuch *judgement* was to be given, to offer (together with their *requeſt* to withdraw) a PROTEST that their withdrawing was an INDULGENCE, not an EXCLUSION. And that this might be kept in perpetual memory, they required it to be regiſtered. In this they call themſelves *pares regni*; and their right to SIT STILL, *jus paritatis*. So little did they foreſee, after all this caution, that their PEERAGE could ever be called in queſtion, from their aſking leave to obſerve the canon of Toledo.

This is a fair and true account of matters of fact; from whence aroſe the cuſtom of biſhops to withdraw, on the trial of peers, when the ſentence came to loſs of life or member; and of their being ſent themſelves to an inferior tribunal, when charged with a capital delinquency. Which yet, is not given to inſinuate the juſtice or equity of reſtoring them now, in theſe happier times of Goſpel light and liberty, to thoſe rights, which they themſelves had abandoned. Perhaps true policy may require that that deſertion of the ſervice of the ſtate, and that refuſal of civil ſubjection, ſhould, for example's ſake, be branded with a laſting puniſhment, to deter bad churchmen, in all future times, from wantonly inſulting the powers and prerogatives of ſociety *. Yet ſtill, this reaſonable juſtice ſhould not be abuſed, by extending the puniſhment to a deprivation of that dignity which the biſhops never gave up, but always claimed, and, what is more, was, by ſovereign authority, always acknowledged.

This account opens our way (which is all that is intended by it) to the diſcuſſion of the laſt queſtion; Of the biſhops' PEERAGE; by ſhewing, in the firſt place, that theſe JUDICIAL RIGHTS in part loſt, and in part conteſted, were not of eſſential concern to their *peerage*, in the original Feudal Conſtitution, but acceſſary only to it; and occaſionally ariſing from it. Spelman, who went upon theſe ideas, diſtinguiſhes very rightly, the PARES (as they were,

* See note [G], at the end of this Book.

at

at firſt) generically conſidered, from the PARES CURIÆ, as they were afterwards ſpecifically underſtood. The former, he thus defines, "PARES dicuntur qui acceptis ab eodem domino, puta rege, feudis PARI LEGE VIVUNT." The other, thus, "PARES CURIÆ ſunt qui in eadem curia PARI FUNGUNTUR POTESTATE.—EJUSDEM CURIÆ JUDICES"—But, *pari lege vivere*, he makes of the very eſſence of the PEERAGE in all feudal conſtitutions. If ever, therefore, our prelates endangered their *peerage*, it was when, ſubmitting to canons againſt laws, they acknowledged the POPE for their *Seigneur Suverain*; and ſo, were not, like the lay-peers, *ſub pari lege*. But when they returned to their obedience, and that obedience was ACCEPTED, their right of *peerage* was again *rectum in curia*.

Nay ſhould we admit, that the rights, privileges, and prerogatives of the *Engliſh peerage* (both legiſlative and juridical) ſtood all upon one original and equal footing; yet the loſs of one or two, out of many (if that indeed were, as it is not, the caſe) could never deprive theſe partial ſufferers, of their *peerage*.

Indeed, in that other kind of *peerage*, amongſt the *equal people of a vicinage*, where they derive their title from the common exerciſe of a ſingle right only, viz. the trying, and being tried by, one another, whoever loſes this right, loſes his *rural peerage*. But where the title is derived, as in this *ſovereign peerage*, from the exerciſe of many common rights and prerogatives, the loſs of one (eſpecially if the TITLE, as here, was not derived from that *one*) cannot, while he enjoys all the reſt, deprive him of the name of *peer*, any more than the loſs of an arm can deprive the loſer, of the name of *man*; which was derived to him from the donation of many *eſſential* parts, which he ſtill poſſeſſes; analogous to thoſe *eſſential* parts in legiſlation, ſtill enjoyed by the *lords ſpiritual*. For the rights exerciſed by the ſupreme court of legiſlature are the *eſſential prerogatives of the peerage*, not thoſe rights exerciſed in a ſupreme court of judicature, annexed to parliament. On this plain diſtinction, ariſing from the firſt principles of common ſenſe, it was, that our incomparable SELDEN apparently went, when he declared

declared it as his opinion, that the biſhops' ceaſing to claim or to exerciſe any part of their *juridical* power did not deprive them of their PEERAGE.

But the DENIAL of the biſhops' *peerage*, for the reaſon here aſſigned, is a novel concluſion, how reſpectable ſoever become by the quality of thoſe who lately deduced the concluſion, and of thoſe who more lately ſupported it. The *peerage* of the biſhops hath, by all the ANCIENT PARLIAMENTS, been invariably and inconteſtably acknowledged, even then, when their right, and the exerciſe of that right, *in trials by peers*, ſtood juſt as it doth at preſent. So little conception had thoſe ancient barons (who beſt knew the nature and privileges of their own tenures) that the biſhops' claim of exemption from the civil tribunal, and licence to follow a canon againſt law (though the barons diſputed both) could at all effect their prerogative of *peerage*. To give one example out of many. In the *proteſtation* of the clergy, 2 Richard II. they call themſelves *pares regni—cum cæteris dicti regis paribus*—meaning the lay-lords. This *proteſtation* was enrolled in full parliament by the king's command, with the aſſent of the lords temporal and commons; and ſo became a compleat STATUTE. It is further to be obſerved that, in this parliament, the lords temporal were all-powerful.

What hath been hitherto ſaid hath gradually opened to us the true principles on which this queſtion muſt be finally decided: To ſpeak out, The argument employed (and no other has been yet advanced) for this DENIAL of the biſhops' *peerage*, ſtands on a mere EQUIVOCATION. The term PEER is ambiguous: it ſignifies either, the *equal* inhabitants of a certain diſtrict, who enjoy, in common, a right of trying one another, by a ſelect number, called a *jury*; which ſort of PEERAGE aroſe out of the old GERMANIC conſtitution; or elſe it ſignifies, the *magnates*, the *patricii*, who ſit in the ſupreme court of parliament, as the great council of the ſovereign; and this PEERAGE aroſe out of the later FEUDAL conſtitutions. Now the denial of the biſhops' *peerage*, which is of the *feudal*

feudal kind, is only ſupported by an argument drawn from the nature of the *peerage* of the *Germanic* kind; in which no other privilege than the *right of trial* gave the title. Whereas in the *feudal peerage*, the matter of juridical trial did not ſo much as come into the original idea of it: as we ſhall now ſhew.

Feudal Peerage aroſe from the common enjoyment of the privileges belonging to a BARONY; the firſt and moſt eſſential of which was the right of ſitting in the great council of the ſovereign, convened for the diſcuſſion of public affairs, and aſſembled in the high court of parliament, with the monarch at their head. *Dicuntur* PARES CURIÆ [ſenatoriæ] (ſays *Spelman*) *quod in curia domini illius cujus ſunt vaſalli, parem habent poteſtatem.* But the King being the fountain of JUSTICE, as well as HONOUR, he conſtituted in this aſſembly his ſupreme court of *judicature* as well as of *legiſlation.* Yet that this did not come into the firſt ideas of theſe ſovereigns, who created the FEUDAL PEERAGE, appears from the more early definitions of the title.

The word *peer* or *par*, in the feudal language, when applied to the *Magnates*, ſignifies, in its original, men who hold of the ſovereign, by one common tenure, and under the ſame ſervices, thoſe higher fees, called baronies. In the parliament of Northampton, held by Henry II. the biſhops challenge their *peerage* under this idea only; and under this idea it was allowed them. "Non ſedemus hic epiſcopi, ſed barones. NOS BARONES, VOS BARONES (ſay they to the Lords temporal) PARES HIC SUMUS." This was no new logic. For in the old Engliſh and French writers, BARON and PEER or *par*, are always uſed as ſynonymous * or convertible terms. And with what good reaſon, *Du Cange* tells us, where he ſays, PARES EXINDE APPELLATI UNIUS DOMINI CONVASSALLI. Hence, in

* What much contributed to their being anciently uſed as *ſynonymous terms* was that a *feudal peerage* and a *feudal tenure* were diſtinctly liable to the ſame ſervice, namely, *homage.* Thus hiſtory tells us, that Philip Duke of Burgundy performed three homages to Charles VI. of France: the one for his peerage, the other for Burgundy, and the third for Flanders.

the feudal law, *par integer* is he who holds a whole fee: and *semi-par*, he who holds but half. That this was the eſſence of the *feudal peerage*, and the thing in which it originally conſiſted, appears likewiſe from the ancient oath of a *peer* of France, given us by *Ducange*, where nothing elſe was exacted but "fidelity to the "King and crown of France; a promiſe to give him faithful "counſel when aſked, and to keep *his* ſecrets and *their own* *." Theſe were the *pares convaſſalli*. Afterwards, when their court of judicature received a more regular and ſettled form, the oath was enlarged; and then, as he tells us, theſe words were added to it—to render—*la juſtice au pauvre comme au riche*. And now the barons became PARES CURIÆ [juridicæ] as well as PARES CONVASSALLI; the *King's equal judges*, as before his *equal vaſſals*.

A *ſupreme court of judicature*, in its firſt and eſſential idea, includes the duty (as the oath exacts) of *rendering juſtice* to others, *the poor as well as rich*. But the members of this court being themſelves, like others, obnoxious to juſtice; and it being unſuitable to their dignity to come juridically before their inferiors; it was thought moſt agreeable to equity, that they ſhould be tried by their *peers*, in their own court: juſt as, by the *Germanic* conſtitution, all the inhabitants of the vicinage of equal rank did try, and were tried by, their *fellows*; for whoſe uſe and credit, the *feudal* term of PEERS was borrowed; and is thus transferred to them, in this law of Henry I. *Unuſquiſque per* PARES *ſuos judicandus eſt, et* EJUSDEM PROVINCIÆ. But it was not that circumſtance of *trial* amongſt the Lords, (a *conſequence* of their equality) but the *equality itſelf*, ariſing from their *baronies*, which gave the title of PEERS to lords of parliament. So that the definition of PEERAGE formed from the circumſtance of trying one another, is a mere modern notion, ſprung from men's confounding the *feudal peerage* with the *Germanic*.

DUCANGE had ſo little conception that the PEER and BARON were different dignities, that he calls thoſe men *peers*, indifferently,

* Art. PARES, in his Gloſſary.

who

who were either ſummoned to the *great council of the King*, or thoſe who ſat in judgment in the *ſupreme court of judicature*. "Vox "utraque (ſays he) eadem notione paſſim uſurpata legitur pro *ma-* "*joris dignitatis vaſſallis*, qui VEL IN CONSILIUM adhibentur *a* "*domino* AUT rege, vel *cum eo*, PARIUM LITES DIJUDICANT *." Conformably to this uſage, the common name for a *baron*, as we have obſerved, was *peer*, both amongſt the old French and Engliſh writers.

In concluſion, what is here ſaid will inſtruct us, (which was the point aimed at) to judge of the accuracy of that diſtinction, which ALLOWS THE BISHOPS TO BE LORDS OF PARLIAMENT BUT NOT PEERS: ſince it hath been ſhewn, "that none but *barons* in parliament are *lords* there; and that *barons* and *peers* are the ſame."

III. To return. The third and laſt privilege the church gains by this ALLIANCE, is the being intruſted with *juriſdiction aſſiſted by co-active power*, FOR REFORMATION OF MANNERS. It follows from one of the *preliminary* articles of this alliance, *that the church ſhould apply its beſt influence in the ſervice of the ſtate*. But there is no way in which this influence can be ſo effectually applied as by a juriſdiction of this kind. In ſpeaking (in the firſt book) of the natural defect in the original plan of civil power; and (in this book) of the motives the ſtate had to ſeek an *alliance*; it hath been ſhewn, that there is a numerous ſet of duties of *imperfect obligation*, which human laws could not reach; and ſeveral of *perfect obligation*, which, by reaſon of the intemperance of the ſenſual appetites, (from whence the breach of thoſe duties proceeds) thoſe laws could not effectually inforce; as their violence yielded only to the influence of religion. Now the good of ſociety requires that *theſe* ſhould be reached and inforced: but the endeavours of *civil courts* (for of private *ſocieties for the reformation of manners*, the mention is too abſurd) have always proved ineffectual: it was neceſſary

* Gloſſ. p. 137.

therefore, that, in an eſtabliſhment, *an eccleſiaſtical juriſdiction* intruſted with coactive power ſhould be erected by the ſtate, for a *ſuccedaneum* to the civil judicatures. And indeed the ſenſe of thoſe wants and defects which theſe courts do ſupply, was the principal motive of the ſtate's ſeeking this alliance. So that the abolition of SPIRITUAL COURTS (as they are called) would ſhake the very foundation on which the eſtabliſhment is erected. On the other hand, the church having now given up her ſupremacy, ſhe would, without the acceſſion of this authority, be left naked and defenceleſs, and reduced to a condition unbecoming her dignity, and dangerous to her ſafety.

FROM hence we deduce theſe COROLLARIES,

1. THAT *no matters of opinion; nor any civil matters, which the temporal courts can conveniently inſpect, come within this ſpiritual juriſdiction.*

NOT *matters of opinion.* Becauſe the church cannot lawfully exerciſe (though it were given her) coactive power over conſcience. And becauſe, what is thus given, the ſtate had no right to beſtow. 1. We have ſhewn in the former book, that all coactive power is unfitly and unjuſtly applied by the church to its own ſervice. But, puniſhing opinions is ſo applying it: And we have ſhewn, in this book, that the ſtate lent this coactive power to be employed in the ſtate's ſervice: For the church therefore to employ it in puniſhing opinions, which is uſing it in her *own ſervice*, is defeating the end for which it was communicated. 2. The ſtate had no ſuch power to beſtow: *For no one can give that to another which he hath not himſelf.* And we have proved, that the ſtate hath nothing to do with *opinions*. In both caſes, indeed, we admit an exception: the church hath an adherent power of expulſion for not complying with its formulary of communion: and the ſtate the ſame power of coercion for oppoſing any of the *three great principles of natural religion*, mentioned in the firſt book of this diſcourſe. But then theſe exceptions affect not the reality of the poſition, *that an eccleſiaſtical court, endowed with coactive power, hath nothing to do with*

with opinions. For, ſo far as reſpects the church's inherent power of expulſion, when not attended with civil detriment, it is the ſame it was before the union. On other accounts there is a difference; for, ſince the union, no one can be expelled for not complying with its formulary of communion without the ſtate's conſent, as will be ſhewn in its place. And, with regard to thoſe opinions which concern the *fundamental principles of natural Religion* which the ſtate hath an inherent power to reſtrain, the exerciſe of that power is of ſo great moment and importance to the ſtate, that it would not be ſafe to intruſt it in any other hands: beſides, it is very liable to abuſe when exerciſed by *ſpiritual* courts; a danger not likely to be incurred while in the *civil*: For the *former* have many temptations to confound theſe principles with thoſe of their peculiar modes of religion; the *latter* ſcarce any at all. Nor ought eccleſiaſtical courts to *expect* this power, becauſe it is what temporal courts can commodiouſly exerciſe. Which comes in with the other part of the diviſion of thoſe matters that belong not to eccleſiaſtical juriſdiction: namely, *civil matters, which temporal courts may conveniently inſpect.* Theſe, we ſay, can never belong to an eccleſiaſtical juriſdiction. It hath been ſhewn, that this court was erected as a *ſuccedaneum* to the civil, to take cognizance of ſuch actions as the civil could not reach, or could not remedy. And we may be aſſured that nothing leſs could have induced the ſtate to conſent to its erection. For the parting with a ſhare of its juriſdiction is not a matter of indifference; but, indeed, conſidering how liable it is to abuſe in other hands, a real evil; which, before the ſtate could be perſuaded to incur, it muſt be ſatisfied a greater evil would be thereby avoided: and the ſuffering thoſe tranſgreſſions, which itſelf could not conveniently and effectually reſtrain, to go unpuniſhed, was that greater evil. A *leſs* therefore was providently choſen. From hence it is very evident, that the ſtate could never intend to put thoſe things under eccleſiaſtical juriſdiction, which fell moſt conveniently under its own. Becauſe here was an evil incurred: and no greater, yea none at all, avoided.

avoided. Apparently, it was on this principle that the famous Bracton went when he ſaid, "Non eſt laicus conveniendus "coram judice eccleſiaſtico, de aliquo quod in foro ſeculari deter- "minari poſſit & debeat *." Beſides, for eccleſiaſtical courts to engroſs matters which belong to the civil juriſdiction †, as it can poſſibly have no good uſe, may very poſſibly be attended with this further evil of inviting and encouraging the church to aim at more power than is conſiſtent either with her own good or the good of the ſtate. But if *criminal cauſes*, as they are called, which civil courts can commodiouſly take notice of, belong not to the church's juriſdiction; what pretence hath ſhe to the inſpection of *civil cauſes*, or the determination of private property? The great founder of her religion ſaid, WHO MADE ME A JUDGE OR DIVIDER BETWEEN YOU? And what he would not aſſume to himſelf, he would hardly beſtow upon his miniſters. And that the ſtate ſhould ever intend to give the church what was the peculiar right of the temporal courts, is as difficult to ſuppoſe. We muſt conclude then, that ſuch cuſtom, wherever it is found, was derived, not from the reaſonable laws of this alliance, but from the authority of old papal uſurpations. And in this light it was regarded by that great and wiſe legiſlature under Edward VI. when it took MATRIMONIAL and TESTAMENTARY cauſes from eccleſiaſtical courts, and RESTORED them to the civil. How the uſurpation of ſo extenſive a juriſdiction firſt began is not difficult to apprehend, on reflecting upon what hath been before ſaid concerning the methods the ſtate made uſe of, by the aid of *allied* religion, to add a ſanction to its civil

* 45. c. 2.

† Supereſt ultima appellationum ſpecies, quæ locum habet cum jura regis et regni aut juriſdictionem ſecularem in exercendis litibus de actione reali, etiam adverſus clericos, & de omnibus omnino actionibus adverſus laicos, præter mere ſpiritualia, aliqua judicum eccleſiaſticorum interlocutione & judicio violari contingit. Plane æquum eſſe concilium Lateranenſe ſub Innocentio III. exiſtimavit, ne ambæ juriſdictiones præſcriptos terminos egrederentur, neu, prætextu libertatis eccleſiaſticæ, epiſcopi ſecularium jura invaderent. Marca, l. iv. c. 21. F. T.

inſtitutes.

inſtitutes. For thus *marriage*, a *civil compact*, being of the higheſt importance to ſociety, was, in order to give it the greater ſanctity, made *a religious one*, by being confined to the adminiſtration of the clergy. And ſo far all was well. But from thence, the clergy, by degrees, took occaſion to draw into the church's juriſdiction every civil matter which aroſe between the two ſexes from that compact, the rites of which they adminiſtered. And from this example may be ſeen, what bad work *ſpiritual courts* cut out, (not for themſelves, indeed, but for their neighbours) when they uſurp the determination of *civil cauſes*. For here, though the voice of nature and the oracles of God concurred to pronounce, in ſome caſes, as in adultery, a DIVORCE; yet, on the idle fancy, or crafty pretence, that marriage was a SACRAMENT, they boldly ventured to contradict both, and to pronounce the contract, when not void *ab initio*, indiſſoluble.

Eccleſiaſtical juriſdiction, therefore, with coactive power, neither extending to *matters of opinion*, nor yet to *mere civil concerns*; we muſt conclude that it was given SOLELY FOR REFORMATION OF MANNERS *. From hence it appears with how juſt policy our conſtitution hath ſubjected all ſorts of diſſenters from the eſtabliſhed church, to this juriſdiction. For the ſtate's care of *reformation of manners* extending to all its members of whatever denomination, no ſect can pretend conſcience for ſuch an exemption.

2. Another corollary is, *that the erection of theſe courts does not exempt the clergy from civil juriſdiction.* For as to what is purely epiſcopal, that is, ſpiritual, in the prelate's office, his ſuperintendency over the clergy of his dioceſe, there is no need of a court of judicature to aſſiſt him in the diſcharge of it. A very unfit inſtrument of paſtoral care, in the opinion even of the canon-law itſelf, which ſays, "EPISCOPI ſe debent ſcire PRESBYTEROS, non dominos,

* N. Bacon, in his *Diſcourſes*, p. 44, holds that eccleſiaſtical courts were in their original, only *pro reformatione morum*.

"nec

" nec debent in clerum DOMINARI : epiſcopus ſe ſedente non per-
" mittet preſbyterum ſtare. Epiſcopi noverint ſe magis *conſuetudine*
" quam *diſpenſatione* preſbyteris majores *." 1. It hath been ſhewn, that eccleſiaſtical courts were not erected for the ſake of the church, but of the ſtate. They cannot therefore take cognizance of the civil affairs of the clergy; becauſe *that* would be employing their juriſdiction to their own purpoſes. 2. It hath been ſhewn they were erected to take care of thoſe things which civil courts were incapable of inſpecting: but all cauſes that relate to the clergy, whether criminal or civil †, civil courts may inſpect: and not to bring the firſt of theſe before the temporal courts, but to allow them a juriſdiction diſtinct from the reſt of their fellow-ſubjects, would be the occaſion of much miſchief to the ſtate: As not to bring the other before the ſame common tribunal (the chief of which cauſes concern their eccleſiaſtical revenues) would in time create miſtakes about the original of theſe revenues; which being derived from the ſtate, there ſeems to be no other way to preſerve the memory of that derivation, than by providing that all diſputes concerning *them* be determined by the civil judicature ‡.

3. A third corollary is, *that eccleſiaſtical courts go invariably by the rules and maxims of the municipal laws of that ſtate to which the church is united; that the forms of proceſs and judiciary proceeding be borrowed from the civil courts; and that appeals to theſe, from the courts eccleſiaſtical, be allowed, in all caſes.* The ſtate muſt needs intend, when it preſcribes and defines the power it communicates, that that power ſhould be exerciſed according to the RULES and MAXIMS

* See note [H], at the end of this Book.

† Enimvero quia clerici, non tantum qua clerici, ſed etiam qua cives ſunt, ſpectantur in republica, legibus principum tenentur—poteſtatem regiam a clericis, qua ſunt clerici, et a rebus omnino ſpiritualibus et mere eccleſiaſticis arcemus, præterquam ſi ad tuendos canones exerceatur. Marca, l. ii. c. 7. F. T.

‡ Quæ de bonorum eccleſiaſticorum poſſeſſione, fructibus, & plerumque etiam de proprietate oriuntur lites, apud magiſtratus ſeculares diſceptantur. *Marca, in præfatione ſecunda.* F. T.

itſelf

itſelf obſerves in the civil courts; and obſerved there, as moſt conducive to juſtice, equity, and the eaſe of the parties. For this care of its ſubjects in civil courts, it could never be ſuppoſed to throw off when it ſent them to an eccleſiaſtical juriſdiction.

It muſt likewiſe be ſuppoſed to intend, that this power ſhould be exerciſed by the ſame FORMS OF PROCESS and *judiciary proceeding* which itſelf employs in the civil courts: becauſe this is the ſureſt way of preſerving the memory of the original and dependency of the eccleſiaſtical *. On which account too, there is a propriety in the judge of this court's being a LAYMAN by civil appointment †. On the contrary, for eccleſiaſtical courts to adminiſter their power and regulate their proceedings on *foreign forms, rules, and maxims*, is acting as if independent on the NATIVE, or ſubject to a FOREIGN, JURISDICTION.

That there ſhould *be appeals from theſe courts to the civil, in all caſes*, is as evident. 1. Becauſe it is of the nature and condition of all inferior courts to be appealed from, to a ſuperior. 2. Becauſe *eccleſiaſtical courts*, not ſo ſubjected, would effect an independency on the civil power. And, 3. Becauſe they would ſoon erect themſelves into tyrannies ‡. And it is obſervable, that, even in the moſt unfriendly

* By the parliament called in the firſt year of Edward VI. it was enacted, that all proceſſes eccleſiaſtical ſhould be made in the king's name, as in writs at the common law; and that all perſons exerciſing eccleſiaſtical juriſdiction ſhould have the king's arms in their ſeals of office.

† See 26 Hen. VIII. c. 3.

‡ Ac primo quidem de appellationibus, quæ vulgo abuſu dicuntur—quæ tractatio cæteras antecedere debet; quia tuitio regia otioſa eſſet & reliqui libertatum articuli facile labefactarentur, niſi connecterentur hoc uno vinculo—Non omittendum eſt reges noſtros aliquando, etſi nullis precibus eccleſiæ Gallicanæ interpellati eſſent, novitates a Romana curia adverſus aliquos mores introductas, legibus ſuis & magiſtratuum executione repuliſſe, ob detrimentum quod inde regni tranquillitati inferri poterat—Apud Hiſpanos obtinet, ut epiſcopi & clerici, qui mandatis regiis non obtemperant, ſeu ad impertiendam tuitionem contra vim judicum eccleſiaſticorum in cauſa eccleſiaſtica latis, ſive ad repellendam invaſionem, quæ fit a clericis adverſus juriſdictionem ſecularem, aut ob quamcunque aliam graviorem contumaciam, jure civitatis, ſeu naturalitatis regni

 priventur,

friendly ſeaſons of our conſtitution, theſe appeals had a free courſe, till obſtructed by the ſtatute of *circumſpecte agatis* in the time of Edward the Firſt.

Theſe are the privileges, which, through the conceſſion of the ſtate, the church gained by this alliance.

II. Let us ſee next, what privileges, through the conceſſion of the church, the ſtate gained by it. Theſe, in a word, may be compriſed in its SUPREMACY IN MATTERS ECCLESIASTICAL *. *The church reſigning up her independency, and making the magiſtrate her* SUPREME HEAD, *without whoſe approbation and allowance ſhe can adminiſter, tranſact, or decree nothing* †. For the ſtate, by this *alliance*, having undertaken the protection of *the church*; and protection not being to be afforded to any community, without power over it, in the community protecting; it neceſſarily follows, that the *civil magiſtrate muſt be ſupreme.* Protection is a kind of guardianſhip: and guardianſhip, in its very nature, implies ſuperiority and rule. The charge therefore of protection, without a right of SUPREMACY, is giving the ſtate no better an office, than that of PUBLIC EXECUTIONER OF THE DECREES OF THE CHURCH: In which high ſtation we find thoſe ſtates to be advanced that are moſt enſlaved to the papal power. But further, when the ſtate, by this convention, covenanted to afford the church protection, that contract was made with a particular church of one denomination, and of ſuch determined doctrine and diſcipline. But now that protection, which

priventur, & ſtatim a regno expellantur, ſuiſque reditibus ſpolientur. Non quidem, inquiunt illi, per modum juriſdictionis ordinariæ quæ in clericos regibus non competit, ſed poteſtate quadam politica & œconomica, ut docent Covarruvias & Bodavilla, & omnes Scriptores Hiſpani. Marca, in præf. prima, & l. iv. c. 9, & ſeq. F. T.

* Ex Theodoſii Imperatoris litteris ad Synodum Epheſinam patet ſocietatem & cognationem quandam intercedere inter religionem et rempublicam; ad principis ſtudium pertinere eccleſiaſtici ſtatus æque ac imperii pacem; regii muneris eſſe ut eum firmum & inviolatum præſtet ex omnium conſenſu, pietatis religioniſque ſinceritatem tueatur, curetque ut eorum qui clero adſcripti ſunt emendata ſit caſtigataque vita. Marca, l. iii. c x. F. T.

† See note [I], at the end of this Book.

might

might be advantageous to a ſtate in union with ſuch a church, might be diſadvantageous to it in union with one of a different doctrine and diſcipline: therefore, when protection is given to a church, it muſt be, at the ſame time, provided, that no alteration be made in it, without the approbation and allowance of the ſtate *. Laſtly, the ſtate having *endowed* its clergy, and beſtowed upon them a *juriſdiction* with coactive power, theſe privileges would create an *imperium in imperio*, had not the civil magiſtrate, in return, this *ſupremacy of the church* †.

The three principal branches of which are theſe; and becauſe they have been often diſputed, we ſhall now endeavour to explain and ſupport them. The firſt is,

I. *That no eccleſiaſtic of the eſtabliſhed church can exerciſe his function without the magiſtrate's approbation and allowance.* Becauſe the doing otherwiſe is an act of ſovereignty in the church, and of independency in the clergy. But here we muſt be careful how we think the magiſtrate, by virtue of this branch of the *ſupremacy*, can *make or confer the character of prieſt or miniſter*; or even himſelf exerciſe that office ‡. This was not, nor *could* be, given him by the convention: 1. Becauſe it anſwers no reaſonable end or purpoſe. All the poſſible advantages ariſing to the magiſtrate by his ſupremacy, being ſecured by his having the EXERCISE of the miniſterial function abſolutely under his direction. So that to interfere in MAKING the character, would be *impertinent*. 2. Becauſe this power directly tends to the deſtruction of a church as a ſociety:

* See note [K], at the end of this Book.

† Carolus Magnus, præter cauſas pietatis, motus etiam fuit ad diſtribuenda liberali manu bona eccleſiis, ob utilitatem reipublicæ, exiſtimans nimirum epiſcopos ſanctius obſervaturos fidem promiſſam—Ex quibus probatur quoddam jus novum regibus quæſitum fuiſſe ob naturam bonorum quibus eccleſia fruebatur. Marca, l. v ii. c. 19. F. T.

‡ Imperatorem præſidere humano generi dignitate, ſed in perceptione ſacramentorum ſacerdotibus ſubdi; legibus principis, quantum attinet ad ordinem publicæ diſciplinæ, parere religionis antiſtites, ſed in erogandis myſteriis & in cœleſtibus ſacramentis principem ordine religionis a ſacerdotum judicio pendere, &c. Marca, l. ii. c. 1. F. T.

the eſſence of which, as we have ſhewn, is, to have officers and miniſters of its own creation. Therefore, the giving up this right to the magiſtrate would not be a convention of *alliance*, but an act of *incorporation*, abſorbing and diſſolving the church into the ſtate. This conſequence, the enemies of a church, as a ſociety, are ſo well aware of, that, in order to bring on its diſſolution, they principally labour to inforce this point, *that the magiſtrate may confer and exerciſe the ſacred function and character*. So that to interfere in making the character would be *unjuſt*. 3. Becauſe this power would in thoſe religious ſocieties, where the founders themſelves have directed the manner of conferring the ſacred character, be eſteemed the violation of a divine right: ſo that to interfere in *making* the character would be *impious*.

On the whole then we muſt conclude, that the office and character of the clergy is made and conferred in the very way it was, before the alliance; whether the method was of divine appointment, or of human: *The exerciſe only* of that office, when thus made, being under the magiſtrate's direction.

The opinion of Chief Juſtice HALE, in the tract before quoted, will, I ſuppoſe, add weight to what is here delivered. "1. The "power (ſays he) of eccleſiaſtical order *is not derived from the crown*; "neither is it ſo conceived to be; but ſo much as is not ſuperſti- "tious, is derived from *Chriſt*. Hence it is that the powers of "order are not in themſelves, nor, as to the efficacy of them, con- "fined to any dioceſe or precinct. 2. The determination of the "exerciſe of thoſe powers of order to time, place, perſon, manner "of performance, *is derived from the crown*; *ex. gr.* the pre- "ſcribing who ſhall be a biſhop; the extent of his dioceſe; the "circumſcription of him under pain of contempt to act his powers "of order within thoſe limits; theſe are powers originally inherent "in the crown. 3. The power of the keys, *in foro conſcientiæ*, "*which is not properly a juriſdiction*, becauſe it is without any exter- "nal coercion or change in the party. This is *not derived from*

"*the*

"*the crown*, but from a higher commiſſion. 4. All power of ex-
"ternal juriſdiction is *originally in the king*, either formally to exer-
"ciſe, or at leaſt virtually to derive; which is evident *." Under this head is to be referred the king's right of nominating to the greater benefices, which, before the alliance, were elective, and in the body of the church †.

II. The ſecond branch of this *ſupremacy* is, *That no convocation* ‡, *ſynod, or church aſſembly, hath a right to ſit without the expreſs permiſſion of the magiſtrate: nor, when they do ſit by virtue of that permiſſion, to proceed in a judiciary or legiſlative manner, without a ſpecial licence* § *for that purpoſe; nor to impoſe their acts, as authoritative, till they have received his confirmation* ||: Whether it be for decreeing matters of diſcipline; or for condemning, by expulſion, for matters of doctrine; or laſtly, for correcting manners. That the church cannot aſſemble in ſynod, under the magiſtrate's ſupremacy,

* MS. Treatiſe touching the Right of the Crown; communicated ut ſupra.

† See note [L], at the end of this Book.

‡ See the Stat 25 Hen. VIII. c. 19.

§ Alio etiam, eoque eximio jure, utebantur principes in præſcribendo judiciorum ordine, quæ in ſynodis a ſe indictis peragenda erant. Hinc profectum eſt, ut præcipuos magiſtratus delegarent qui conciliis intereſſent, non ſolum ut vis publica & tumultus arcerentur, ſed etiam ut ab epiſcopis cognitionum ordo ſervaretur—Tantâ autem ſeveritate hac in parte a conciliis obedientiam principes exigebant, ut ſi præſcriptum ſibi judiciorum ordinem egreſſa fuiſſent, quicquid neglecta cognitionis lege decretum foret, in irritum mitterent, ut patet ex Theodoſii reſcriptis adverſus ſynodum Epheſinam latis—Principes aliquando ſuſpendebant prioris ſynodi judicatum nova ſynodo indicta, quod factum eſt a Theodoſio in cauſa Neſtorii.—Neque acta ſynodorum reciderunt niſi ad aſſerenda mandata quæ dederant, quorum contemptus lædebat auctoritatem publicam: neque executionem rerum judicatarum ſuſpenderunt, niſi ob canonum violationem, e qua ſcandala & diſſentiones oriebantur. Marca, l. iv. c. 3, 4. F. T.

|| Sufficiunt, opinor, ea quæ diximus, ut difficilibus & moroſis ingeniis perſuaderi poſſit, magnam regibus auctoritatem competere ad convocanda concilia—Confirmatio canonum decernenda eſt a principe, cum cognitione cauſæ; quandoquidem ei vim legis publicæ in regno tribuit acceptatio & conſenſus principis, tanquam capitis populorum, & confirmatio etiam, tanquam principis qui ſuperiorem non agnoſcit. Marca, l. vi. c. 17—22. F. T.

without

without his permiſſion, is evident. Becauſe, before the alliance, the power that follows the ſupremacy and independency of the church, was exerciſed in thoſe aſſemblies. To ſuffer ſuch therefore to meet, after the union, without licence, would be virtually giving up his ſupremacy, and acknowledging it to be now, as before, in the church. That when aſſembled it cannot proceed in a judiciary or legiſlative manner without expreſs and particular licence to act, and without confirmation of its decrees, is plain from hence: 1. Becauſe, in its *judiciary* capacity, the church hath already one juriſdiction, with coactive power, granted to it, called the *biſhop's court*. To give it other fixed and ſtanding judicatories would be both unneceſſary and unfit. *Unneceſſary*, becauſe the biſhop's courts are ſufficient for the common uſes of the ſtate; and, for rare and uncommon caſes, an OCCASIONAL JURISDICTION is ſufficient. *Unfit*, becauſe the giving two fixed and perpetual judicatories with coactive power, would be intruſting the church with more temporal authority than, even under the magiſtrate's SUPREMACY, would be conſiſtent with the ſafety of civil government. 2. Becauſe in its *legiſlative* capacity, the decreeing matters of diſcipline, and condemning, by expulſion, for matters of doctrine, cannot be done in alliance without the conſent of the ſtate *.

But it appears, on the other hand, a great error to imagine ſuch aſſemblies, when legally convened, to be either uſeleſs or miſchievous. For all churches, except the Jewiſh and Chriſtian, being *human* policied ſocieties, of the nature of which, even the Chriſtian, *in part*, partakes †; and all ſocieties, without exception, being adminiſtered by human means, it muſt needs happen that

* —Nimirum ad regem pertinere jus convocandi eccleſiam Gallicanam, proponendi materiam quam in conventu agitari voluerit, examinandi res in eo decretas, eaſque, ſi vitium fuerit expedite, approbandi, earumque executionem jubendi—Nunquam diſcedere oportet ab hac certiſſima regula, deliberationes Eccleſiæ Gallicanæ conſiderari non poſſe aliter quam velut conſilium regi datum, eaſque executioni non poſſe mandari abſque conſenſu & confirmatione ejus. Marca, l. vi. c. 34. F. T.

† See Hooker's Eccl. Pol.

religious

religious ſocieties, as well as civil, will have frequent occaſion to be new regulated, and put in order. Now though by this *Alliance of Church and State*, no new regulations can be made for church government, but by the ſtate's authority; yet ſtill there is reaſon that the church ſhould be previouſly conſulted, which we muſt ſuppoſe well ſkilled (as in her proper buſineſs) to form and digeſt ſuch new regulations, before they come before the conſideration of the civil legiſlature*. Acting otherwiſe is changing this, which is a *federate alliance*, into an *incorporate union*; where, indeed, the practice is different; For in an incorporate union of two ſocieties, one of them is loſt and diſſolved in the other; by which means, all the power in queſtion devolves upon the ſurvivor †. But, in a *federate alliance*, the two ſocieties ſtill ſubſiſt intire; though in a ſubordination of one to the other: in which caſe, it ſeems agreeable to natural equity, that no alterations in church government be made without the joint conſent of both. If it ſhould be ſaid, that eccleſiaſtics are placed in the civil court of legiſlature for that purpoſe, I muſt beg leave to diſſent. It hath been ſhewn, they

* Quæri poteſt an ex eo quod ſuprema canonum protectio ad regem pertinet, ſequatur eum jubere poſſe ut obſerventur, non expectata etiam ſententia eccleſiæ Gallicanæ. Certum quidem eſt earum conſtitutionum obſervationem fore ſanctiorem, ſi conſiderentur cum generali cleri conſenſu—Nihilominus æque certum eſt regem ex ſententia concilii ſui, quod auget & minuet prout ei lubet, poſſe latis edictis decernere ut canones obſerventur, ac circumſtantias & modos neceſſarios addere ad faciliorum eorum executionem ſive etiam ad veram eorum mentem explicandam, eoſque accommodare ad utilitatem regni. Ad probationem autem hujus auctoritatis extant exempla omnium imperatorum chriſtianorum—Utuntur adhuc eo jure reges chriſtianiſſimi. Nam licet tomos deliberationum cleri Gallicani recipiant, eæ tamen tantum ſpectantur velut conſilium & oratio ad principem, vulgo appellata *remonſtrances*. Dein rex decernit id quod lubitum ipſi fuerit, ſive reſpondendo in margine tomi, ut vulgo fieri conſuevit; ſive etiam per edictum. Præterea reges noſtri condunt conſtitutiones pro condenda politia eccleſiaſtica ad executionem canonum; neque ullam cujuſlibet cœtus ſententiam rogant quam ſui concilii, quod ex perſonis eccleſiaſticis & ſecularibus conſtat. Marca, l. vi. c. 36. F. T.

† See note [M], at the end of this Book.

make

make no distinct ESTATE there: and, consequently, are not *representatives*, but *guardians* only of the church; to watch over its welfare, and to be always at hand to carry on a mutual intercourse of good offices between two societies so closely allied. And therefore, there was no absurdity in that custom, which continued during the *Saxon* government, and some time after, which admitted the laity into ecclesiastical synods; there appearing to be much the same reason for laymen's sitting in convocation, as for churchmen sitting in parliament.

As for the mischiefs arising from synodical assemblies, by their heats, quarrels, and divisions, it is owned they are great. So as to have occasioned the civil magistrate to suspend them for a long time together. Nor is this a late exertion of the prerogative. We find Archbishop *Anselm* complaining that *William Rufus* would not allow any ecclesiastical synod to be called for thirteen years together: which, upon the matter, took in that king's whole reign. But then we must consider, that these quarrels have all arisen from not having had their original and end, under an establishment, precisely determined. As appears from the constant subject of their quarrels; which have always been about the power and extent of their privileges and jurisdictions. And we may venture to affirm, that synods convened, and meeting, on the principles here laid down, cannot possibly be pernicious to the state, or fruitless to the church. I say, we may venture to affirm this, when such a man as *Hooker* characterises religious councils and synods in the following manner; "A thing whereof God's own blessed spirit was the "author, a thing practised by the holy apostles themselves, a thing "always afterwards observed and kept throughout the world, a "thing never otherwise than most highly esteemed of, till pride, "ambition, and tyranny, began by factions and vile endeavours to "abuse that divine invention, unto the furtherance of wicked pur-"poses. But as the just authority of civil courts and parliaments "is not therefore to be abolished because sometime there is cun-"ning used to frame them according to the private intents of men "over-

"over-potent in the commonwealth: ſo the grievous abuſe which "hath been of counſels ſhould rather cauſe men to ſtudy how ſo "gracious a thing may again be reduced to that firſt perfection, "than in regard of ſtains and blemiſhes ſithens growing to be held "for ever in extreme diſgrace *."

III. The third conſequence of this ſupremacy is, *That no member of the eſtabliſhed church can be excommunicated, or expelled the ſociety, without the conſent and allowance of the magiſtrate* †. For expulſion being an act of ſupremacy, it muſt needs be authoriſed by him with whom the ſupremacy is now lodged. Beſides, did the church retain this power under an eſtabliſhment, nothing could hinder but that it might extend to the ſupreme magiſtrate himſelf: and how abſurd it would be for the *body* to expel the *head*, any one may judge. That our ancient conſtitution thus reſtrained the exerciſe of this power appears from the old writ of *quare excommunicavit* ‡. But then it is to be obſerved, that excommunication for *doctrines* and matters of *opinion*, even when authoriſed by the ſtate, muſt ſtill (the ſtate having nothing to do with the care of ſouls, nor the church with the care of bodies) as before the union, be free from civil cenſures or inconveniencies; other than *accidentally* befal the expelled perſon from a *Teſt-law*, in thoſe ſtates where the protection of the church, and the peace of the ſtate, require its aſſiſtance. Different in this, from excommunication for *immoralities*; which, under an eſtabliſhment, hath reaſonably and juſtly civil cenſures annexed to it §.

From

* L. 1. f. 10.

† In contentionibus de juriſdictione eccleſiaſtica & ſæculari, ultimum judicium aſſeritur ſupremæ curiæ regni, licentia adempta epiſcopis jus ſibi cenſuris & excommunicationibus dicendi—Unde ſequitur regem nec regios magiſtratus aut officiales excommunicationibus vel aliis cenſuris eam ob cauſam inflictis obnoxios eſſe. Alioqui majeſtas imperii minueretur, & a judicum eccleſiaſticorum arbitrio penderet. Marca, l. iv. c. 21. F. T.

‡ See note [N], at the end of this Book.

§ Quod autem inter chriſtianos excommunicati, niſi reſipiſcant, ſint infames, & ad

From this account of the *ſupremacy* may be deduced this COROLLARY.

That the conferring on the ſupreme magiſtrate, the TITLE OF HEAD OF THE CHURCH, *is by no means inconſiſtent with the nature of our holy religion.* This *title* hath been miſrepreſented by the enemies of our happy eſtabliſhment, as the ſetting up a LEGISLATOR, in *Chriſt's kingdom*, in the place of CHRIST. But it hath been ſhewn, that no other juriſdiction is given to the civil magiſtrate by this *ſupremacy* than the church, as a mere political body, exerciſed before the convention. This, with regard to the title of *Head of the Church*, the famous act 26 Hen. VIII. c. 1. explicitely declares, "The King, his heirs and ſucceſſors, ſhall be taken and reputed "the only SUPREME HEAD in earth, of the CHURCH OF ENGLAND.— "And ſhall have full power, from time to time, to viſit, reform, "correct, and amend, all ſuch errors, hereſies, and enormities "whatſoever they be, which BY ANY MANNER OF SPIRITUAL "AUTHORITY OR JURISDICTION ARE OR LAWFULLY MAY BE "REFORMED, ordered, corrected, or amended." That is, which the church, as a ſociety, or political body, concerned only about SPIRITUAL things, was before empowered to do. From hence it follows, that if the magiſtrate's juriſdiction be an uſurpation on the rights of *Chriſt's kingdom*, ſo likewiſe was the church's. That the church's was no uſurpation, but perfectly conſiſtent with the rights of *Chriſt's kingdom* may be thus proved; *judaiſm* was, in every ſenſe, as ſtrictly, at leaſt, and properly the *kingdom of God*, as *chriſtianity* is the *kingdom of Chriſt:* yet this did not hinder, but that there was, by God's own approbation and allowance, an inferior juriſdiction in the Jewiſh ſtate. What then ſhall make the ſame unlawful in the chriſtian church? *This*, both had in common, to be political ſocieties by

quædam vitæ civilis officia inhabiles, ita ex eo ortum eſt, quod chriſtiani principes, quoad fieri poteſt, leges ſuas ad bonos mores atque evangelicam diſciplinam aptent; non quod excommunicatio per ſe ullo temporali jure bonoque privet. Boſſuet, l. v. c. 22. F. T.

divine

divine appointment; but different in *this*, that God, for wiſe ends, minutely preſcribed the whole mode of *Jewiſh* policy: and *Chriſt*, on the contrary, with the ſame divine wiſdom, only conſtituted the church a policied ſociety in *general*; and left the mode of it to human diſcretion *. But I ſuſpect the matter ſticks here: theſe men will not allow the church, or kingdom of *Chriſt*, to be a ſociety in any proper ſenſe. This indeed is the darling notion of the enemies of eſtabliſhments. It is certain, the argument of uſurping in *Chriſt's* kingdom hath no force but on the ſuppoſition that the church is no proper ſociety. However, this ſubterfuge we have totally overthrown; having proved at large that the church indeed compoſes a ſociety.

Thus have I ſhewn and explained the mutual privileges GIVEN and RECEIVED by church and ſtate, in entering into this famous CONVENTION. The aim of the ſtate being, agreeably to its nature, UTILITY: and the aim of the church, agreeably to her's, TRUTH. From whence we may obſerve, that as theſe privileges all took their riſe, by neceſſary conſequence from the fundamental article of the convention, which was, *that the church ſhould ſerve the ſtate, and the ſtate protect the church*; ſo they receive all poſſible addition of ſtrength, from their mutual dependency on one another. This we have reaſon to deſire may be received as a certain mark that our *plan of alliance* is no precarious arbitrary hypotheſis, but a theory founded in reaſon, and the unvariable nature of things. For having, from the real eſſence of the two ſocieties, and their different natures, collected the *neceſſity* of allying, and the *freedom* of the compact; we have, from the *neceſſity*, fairly introduced it; and, from its *freedom*, conſequentially eſtabliſhed every mutual term and condition of it. So that now if the reader ſhould aſk, "Where this charter, or treaty of convention for the union of the "two ſocieties, on the terms here delivered, is to be found?" We

* See Hooker's Eccl. Pol.

are enabled to give him a ſatisfactory anſwer. It may be found, we ſay, in the ſame *archive* with the famous ORIGINAL COMPACT between magiſtrate and people, ſo much inſiſted on, in vindication of the common rights of ſubjects. Now when a ſight of this compact hath been required of the defenders of civil liberty, they held it ſufficient to ſay, that it is enough for all the purpoſes of fact and right, that ſuch original compact is the only legitimate foundation of civil ſociety; that if there were no ſuch thing *formally* executed, there was *virtually*; that all differences between magiſtrate and people ought to be regulated on the ſuppoſition of ſuch a compact; and all government reduced to the principles therein laid down; for that the happineſs of which civil ſociety is productive, can only be attained by it, when formed on thoſe principles. Now, ſomething like this, we ſay of our ALLIANCE BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE. But we ſay more; for,

CHAP. IV.

That the Chriſtian Religion is, of all other, beſt fitted for ſuch an Alliance with the State as may be moſt productive of their mutual Advantage: And that our own is the moſt perfect of all Chriſtian Eſtabliſhments.

WE have been the fuller in this account, in order to ſhew our adverſaries, how unreaſonable, and even impolitic they are, when, in their ill humour with *eſtabliſhments*, they chuſe to pick a quarrel with *their own*; where the national religion is on a footing exactly agreeable to the nature of a *free convention between church and ſtate*, on the principles of the laws of nature and nations. A felicity, (they ſhould have known,) which ſcarce any other people on the face of the earth can boaſt of: for let them look around, and tell us, if they can find another place where the

ſtate

ſtate doth not incroach on the church; or, what is indeed much the commoner, the church on the ſtate. In *England alone*, the original terms of this convention are kept up to ſo exactly, that this account of *the Alliance between Church and State* ſeems rather a copy of the church and ſtate of *England*, than a theory, as indeed it was, formed ſolely on the contemplation of nature, and the unvariable reaſon of things: and had no further regard to our particular eſtabliſhment, than as ſome part of it tended to illuſtrate theſe abſtract reaſonings. So that, fortunately for the motive I had in writing, our adverſaries are cut off from all ſubterfuge. For they can neither condemn this theory as a viſionary *Utopia*; nor approve it as reaſonable and fit for practice, and yet think themſelves at liberty to carry on their oppoſition againſt their own country eſtabliſhment: becauſe theſe *two* prove to be one and the ſame. If in a few minute things they diſagree, this diſagreement will perhaps, by ſome, be aſcribed to the unfiniſhed parts of an excellent model, which the misfortunes of Edward VI's reign prevented from being carried to perfection. For then it was that this alliance between the *proteſtant* church of *England* and the ſtate was made; on the natural diſſolution of the alliance, between the *popiſh* church and it. At which time, had not the hypocriſy of ſome complying churchmen; the domeſtic quarrels in the adminiſtration; the factions which fomented thoſe quarrels, and the immature death of that hopeful prince, intervened, we might have expected, they will ſay, the completeſt ſcheme of an ALLIANCE that human policy and pure religion could have produced. Nor have the ſucceeding ages been remiſs or negligent, as fit opportunities offered, to remedy thoſe irregularities. Of this honour, no ſmall ſhare is due to the *clergy*; ſo falſe are the calumnies of their enemies, that *they are always backward in reformations.* For it was the *clergy* which, in the reign of *Charles* the Second, freely gave up to the legiſlature their ancient practice of taxing themſelves. In which they acted with the greateſt juſtice as well as generoſity. For the cuſtom of taxing themſelves aroſe from the claim to their revenues

by

by divine right: whereas theſe being, indeed, the ſtate's donation, an *endowment* at the time of the ALLIANCE, the ſtate had a right to tax them as it did its *lay-fees* *. However this be, as there have been many and long, and, as it would ſeem hitherto, fruitleſs debates, concering *tythes*, *biſhops ſeats in parliament*, *ſpiritual courts*, *convocation*, and *ſupremacy*, in which men have run into the moſt contrary concluſions, I judged it not amiſs to draw out *corollaries* concerning each of them, that may poſſibly contribute ſomething towards the putting an end to theſe ill-founded controverſies.

Such then is the uncommon excellence of our happy conſtitution: And, ſtruck with the beauty of ſo juſt and generous a plan of power, a late noble writer, who regarded it no otherwiſe than as it concerned the ſtate, thus forcibly expreſſes himſelf.—" Some

* Quoad reditus qui vulgo ſpirituales dicuntur, magna eccleſiarum pars, cum decimis & oblationibus, laïcis in feudum datæ fuerant a Pippino, Carolo Magno, & Ludovico Pio, cum conſenſu eccleſiæ Gallicanæ; quæ deinde eccleſiaſticis viris conceſſæ ſunt ex permiſſu regum. Itaque principes non deſtituti ſunt ratione ut contendant ſervitia & debita feudorum in hujuſcemodi reditibus impoſita, extincta non eſſe vi conſenſus regii adhibiti liberalitati laicorum erga eccleſias, qui ea ad ipſas tranſtulerunt.—Legitimum et æquum eſt, quod feuda ad eccleſiam pertinentia iiſdem legibus ſubjecta ſunt, quibus cætera tenentur.—Permiſſus eſt deinde principibus uſufructus redituum eccleſiæ vacantis, contra quam priſcæ regulæ ſtatuerunt. Si quis vero inquiret in cauſas tam magnæ immutationis, is reperiet eam eſſe profectam ex immutatione quæ facta eſt in conditione & qualitate bonorum ab eccleſia poſſeſſorum. Quemadmodum enim in republica quoddam bonorum genus extat quod vulgo *feudum* vocant. Incognitum Romano juri, ideoque novis conſtitutionibus & antiquarum legum diſpoſitioni contrariis inductum, ſic, cum eccleſiæ regum beneficio donatæ fuiſſent bonis hujuſcemodi, neceſſarium prorſus fuit, ut illæ poſſiderent feuda iis conditionibus quas in prima feudorum origine invexit publica utilitas. Ergo perſonæ eccleſiaſticæ quæ feuda poſſidebant, per conſequentiam fiebant vaſalli regum, illiſque præſtare tenebantur homagium & juramentum fidelitatis, itemque certum militum numerum juxta valorem feudorum. Unde ſequitur neceſſario regem poſt obitum epiſcopi quod eo caſu feudum vacet, illud ad ſe recipere poſſe ac retinere, donec novus epiſcopus inveſtituram feudi receperit, homagiumque ac juramentum fidelitatis præſtiterit. Interim tamen regi competit jus quoddam fruendi reditibus, dum cuſtodia durat. Marca, l. viii. c. 19. 22. F. T.

" men

" men there are, the PESTS OF SOCIETY I think them, who pretend " a great regard to religion in general, but who take every oppor- " tunity of declaiming publickly againſt that *ſyſtem of religion*, or, " at leaſt, againſt that CHURCH ESTABLISHMENT which is received " in *Britain* *." In truth, this is bearing hard on our new guardians of liberty; who, when they have generouſly taken up an office they were not called to, and aſked nothing for it but the modeſt title of FREE-THINKERS, are to be called *peſts of ſociety* by the POLITICIAN; and branded with the odious name of *infidel* by the clergy. However the author above quoted cannot deny, but that *they pretend a great regard to religion in general*: and this juſtice is due to them, that they are no enemies to the *name*: for that, I ſuppoſe, he means by *religion in general*. *Ideal chriſtianity* they could well away with: *real chriſtianity* ſomewhat offends them. It does more ſo under the form of a *ſociety*: but moſt of all when that ſociety becomes *eſtabliſhed*. They could be well content to accept it under the faſhionable notion of a divine *philoſophy in the mind*; eſpecially if that philoſophy were to be received in England on the footing which, Cicero tells us, the Greek philoſophy was received in Rome; DISPUTANDI CAUSA, NON ITA VIVENDI †. But to take it for ſervice, and with the magiſtrate's ſtamp to make it current, revolts theſe great and free ſpirits. So that, even to thoſe ingaged in the cauſe of a court and miniſtry, or intruſted in the ſervice of a church, they muſt ſpeak their mind againſt ſo intolerable a grievance. However, a *Religion*, bleſſed be God, we yet have; and even an *eſtabliſhed* one. It enjoys this advantage for the ſervice it does the ſtate; and that it may no longer be envied the privileges, conſequent thereto, I ſhall now ſhew, that the CHRISTIAN, of all religious ſocieties, is beſt fitted to aſſiſt the civil magiſtrate, who is the *miniſter of God unto us for good*.

* Differt. on Parties, p. 148.

† Orat. pro Mar.

I. Its

I. Its ſuperior excellence in this ſervice, above the *ancient* PAGAN RELIGIONS of Greece and Rome, is ſeen in its being infinitely better fitted than thoſe to fall into a firm and laſting ſociety. It is to be obſerved, that unity in the object of faith, and agreement to a formulary of dogmatic theology, as the terms of communion, is the great foundation and bond of a religious ſociety. Now, in all the Pagan religions, there was only conformity in national ceremonies; there being no room for the object of faith, or a formulary of dogmatic theology; for as to matters of belief and opinion, it was not judged of moment to determine whether their Gods were real perſons, or only the ſymbols of natural powers. And the few ſpeculative points taught in their MYSTERIES, were altogether ſubſervient to the intereſts of morality. Hence it happened, that theſe ſocieties, being without their true foundation and ſupport, were, when they became *eſtabliſhed*, ſoon loſt and abſorbed in the ſtate *.

II. As *chriſtianity* was ſuperior to *Pagan religion*, in its CAPACITY for forming a ſociety: ſo it is ſuperior to pure NATURAL RELIGION, in being thus actually formed, by *divine* appointment; while natural religion needed to be formed only by *human*. Were there no other evidence that chriſtianity compoſed a ſociety of *divine* appointment than only this, that the body of the faithful is called the KINGDOM of Chriſt, *this* would be ſufficient to convince thoſe who know the general meaning of the word, and the peculiar uſe of it in the Jewiſh oeconomy. But when, in conſequence of his right of KINGSHIP, Jeſus, and, by his ſubſtitution, the apoſtles, go on to appoint officers, degrees of ſubordination, and exerciſe of power, one may well wonder at the ſtrength of that complexion which can hold out againſt ſuch force of evidence. But ſomething, you muſt think, there was, which made it worth their while not to be convinced. They imagined, if they could but perſuade us, that chriſtianity made no ſociety of *divine* appointment, it was no

* See The Divine Legation of Moſes, b. II. ſect. 1. and ſect. 5. ſub fin.

ſociety

ſociety *at all*; and conſequently a *creature of the ſtate*. This was ſo flattering a concluſion, that they may well be excuſed a little obſtinacy in encountering what obſtructed their advances to it. But we have ſhewn, that let the point of divine inſtitution be determined how it will, yet *Religion* naturally and neceſſarily compoſes a *ſociety*, ſovereign, and independent of the civil. Very idly therefore were their pains employed, had they proved what they attempted. But to perſiſt againſt evidence and reaſon, in ſupport of what can do them no ſervice, muſt render them doubly ridiculous.

III. Again, as the *Chriſtian* is ſuperior to *natural* religion in being a ſociety by divine appointment; ſo it is ſuperior to the JEWISH, in being perfectly free; and independent of the *civil**. The JEWISH religion was, like the *true natural*, which it ratified, eſſentially fitted to compoſe a ſociety: and, like the *Chriſtian* (of which it was the firſt rudiment) made a ſociety by divine appointment. But then unlike the *Chriſtian* in this, that it was not left independent of civil government, to unite with it, at its pleaſure, on terms agreed upon; but was, for great and wiſe reaſons †, at once united to it by God himſelf. Which alſo God was pleaſed to do, not by way of ALLIANCE, as between two bodies that were to continue diſtinct ‡; and might be ſeparated, from whence reſults an *eſtabliſhed* religion of the nature above explained, but by mutual converſion into one another, and perfect INCORPORATION. By which, both church and ſtate, under a ſeparate conſideration, were loſt, and a new ſpecies of government aroſe from it, that was both and neither. For the ſtate, whoſe object is a WHOLE, having here

* Sunt ab ipſo Deo tum religio tum imperium ita conſtituta, ut & vera religio ſine adjuncto ſibi imperio, & verum ac legitimum imperium ſine adjuncta ſibi vera religione eſſe poſſit. Boſſuet, l. v. c. 5. F. T.

† See The Divine Legation of Moſes, B. IV.

‡ Veluti in unum coierunt Chriſtiana fides & regum imperium, nullo partium detrimento, adeo ut regni ſummo jure nihil per Chriſtianam profeſſionem deceſſerit—Conjunctæ quidem fuerunt in hoc regno duæ illæ poteſtates, eccleſiaſticæ & civiles, ſed ſine confuſione perſonarum & munerum. Marca, l. ii. c. 1. F. T.

God himſelf for its magiſtrate, and conſequently being adminiſtered by an extraordinary providence, carried its care to *individuals*: And religion, whoſe object are INDIVIDUALS, having here the magiſtrate for God, and conſequently religious worſhip having a *public part*, its care was extended to the *whole*. Yet this being truly to be reckoned in the *genus* of thoſe unions which, we have ſhewn, neceſſity of ſtate made of ſo univerſal practice, we may be allowed to draw an argument from thence for the juſtice of ſuch unions, whereby a church becomes *eſtabliſhed*. For if the advocates of civil liberty may, without ſuſpicion of ſophiſtry or fanaticiſm *, bring the example of God, in the HOREB CONTRACT, to juſtify men's common right to erect free republics; I ſee no reaſon why the ſame example, in the union of the Jewiſh church and ſtate, ſhould not be thought of equal force to vindicate the equity of that *alliance* between the two ſocieties which is made by men; and is productive of *an eſtabliſhed church*.

But the CHRISTIAN RELIGION was not only left independent of the ſtate, by not being united to it like the *Jewiſh* (and being ſo left, it muſt needs, by the law of nature, be independent); but its independency was likewiſe ſecured by divine appointment, in that famous declaration of its great Founder, MY KINGDOM IS NOT OF THIS WORLD: which bears this plain and obvious ſenſe, "That "the *kingdom of Chriſt*, to be extended over *all mankind*, was not "like the *kingdom of God*, confined to the *Jewiſh people*, where "religion was incorporated with the ſtate; and therefore of *this* "*world*, as well in the exerciſe of it, as in the rewards and puniſh-"ments by which it was adminiſtered: but was *independent* of all "civil communities: and therefore neither of this world as to the "exerciſe of it, nor as to the rewards and puniſhments by which "it was adminiſtered." That ſuch is the true meaning of this miſtaken text, appears from the deluſion in which his followers then were, *viz.* that the *Goſpel* was to be adminiſtered according to

* See Algernon Sidney's Diſcourſes concerning Government, paſſim.

the

the œconomy of the *law*. But whoever imagines that from *this independency by inſtitution* the church cannot convene and unite with the ſtate, concludes much too faſt. We have obſerved, that this property, in the *kingdom of Chriſt*, was given as a mark to diſtinguiſh it from the *kingdom of God*. That is, it was given to ſhew, that this religion extended to all mankind; and was not confined, like the Moſaic, to one only people. Conſequently, that very reaſon which made it proper for the Moſaic religion to be united, by divine appointment, to the ſtate, made it fit the Chriſtian ſhould be left free and independent. But for what end, if not for this, To be at liberty to adapt itſelf to the many various kinds of civil policies, by a ſuitable union and alliance: whereby the famous prophecy of Iſaiah might receive its ultimate completion *: "Thus ſaith "the Lord God, Behold I will lift up my hand to the GENTILES, "and ſet up my ſtandard to the *people*—and KINGS SHALL BE THY "NURSING FATHERS, AND THEIR QUEENS THY NURSING MO-"THERS †:" An *alliance*, then, we muſt conclude, the Chriſtian church was at liberty to make with the ſtate, notwithſtanding this declared nature of *Chriſt's kingdom*. So far is indeed true, that it is debarred from entering into any alliance with the ſtate that may admit any LEGISLATOR into *Chriſt's kingdom* but himſelf: which would, indeed, *make* Chriſt's *kingdom of this world*. But, by our *alliance*, no ſuch power is granted by one of the parties, or uſurped by the other, as hath been proved in the Corollary concerning the SUPREMACY. And therefore an *eſtabliſhed* religion is no violation of this famous declaration.

Such then is the nature of CHRIST'S KINGDOM. It is eſſentially framed to compoſe a firm and laſting SOCIETY; it is formed into a SOCIETY by divine appointment; and, in order to fit it for public ſervice, it is, both by nature and inſtitution, declared ſovereign, and independent of civil government, that it may adapt itſelf by free alliance, to the various kinds of human policies. And though from

* See The Divine Legation, B. VI. Sect. 6.

† Iſaiah, chap. xlix. 23. See alſo note [O], at the end of this Book.

this its *nature* alone, it cannot be proved to be of divine original; yet ſo much may be eaſily ſhewn, that, had it not *this nature*, it could not have *that original*. For if Religion were deſigned (as no Religioniſt can doubt) to promote our happineſs here, as well as to procure for us greater hereafter, it will follow, that if that religion, which pretends to be the laſt and conſummate revelation of the will of God to man, be not a real *ſociety* and *independent*, its pretences are falſe and deceitful: becauſe the greateſt temporal good from Religion is procured by its becoming NATIONAL; but *national* it cannot be, but through alliance with the ſtate; and no reaſonable alliance can be made but between two ſovereign and independent ſocieties.

Hence may be ſeen the folly of thoſe *ſects*, which, under pretence that Chriſtianity is a ſpiritual Religion, fancy it cannot have rites, ceremonies, public worſhip, a miniſtry or eccleſiaſtical policy *: Not reflecting, that without theſe, it could never have become NATIONAL; nor conſequently have done that ſervice to the ſtate which, of all religions, the Chriſtian is moſt capable of performing.

But we are not to carry off this honour, ſo fairly won for our Religion, without a warm attack from the famous adventurer of Geneva, who croſſes our way, and cries out to us to prepare for the combat.—"I believe (ſays Mr. Rouſſeau †) that in developing "HISTORIC FACTS, under this point of view, one might eaſily re-"fute the oppoſite ſentiments of BAYLE and WARBURTON, the "firſt of whom pretends, that NO SORT of Religion is uſeful to

* See note [P], at the end of this Book.

† Je crois qu'en developant ſous ce point de vue *les faits hiſtoriques* on refuteroit aiſement les ſentimens oppoſes de Baile & de Warburton, dont l'un pretend que nulle religion n'eſt utile au corps politique, & dont l'autre ſoutient au contraire que le Chriſtianiſme en eſt le plus ferme appui. On prouveroit au premier que jamais etat ne fut fondé que la religion ne lui ſervit de baſe, et au ſecond que la Loi Chrétienne eſt au fond plus nuiſible qu'utile à la forte conſtitution de l'Etat.—Du Contract Social, Chap. viii. p. 192.

"the

" the body-politic; while the other, on the contrary, holds, that " CHRISTIANITY is its moſt firm ſupport. One might prove againſt " the firſt, that there never was a civil ſociety of which *Religion* " did not ſerve for the foundation; and againſt the ſecond, that the " CHRISTIAN RELIGION is, at bottom, MORE HURTFUL THAN " BENEFICIAL TO THE FIRM CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE."

Here I muſt do our *Citizen* the juſtice to own that he has not miſrepreſented me, as he does where he makes me hold the direct contrary to the main principle of my book, namely, that *Politics and Religion have one common object* *. He may, indeed, have miſrepreſented Bayle; but him, I am not concerned to defend. As to his cenſure of me and of Chriſtianity, it was natural for one who had pretended to ſhew that CIVIL SOCIETY itſelf was hurtful to humanity, to hold that CHRISTIANITY was ſo likewiſe. Or, was this intended for a ſecret recommendation of our *holy faith*, that it will afford no ſupport to an invention ſo fatal to mankind, as was *civil ſociety?*

But his intention concerns himſelf, not me: I have only to examine, how he ſupports his aſſertion againſt the Author of the *Alliance*.—" To make myſelf thoroughly underſtood (ſays he) I have nothing to do but to give a little more *preciſion* to the too vague ideas of RELIGION, as they relate to my ſubject †."

He had already given a notable ſpecimen of his *preciſion*, in the entrance on this atchievement; where promiſing to overturn my aſſertion, that CHRISTIANITY *is the moſt firm ſupport of civil ſociety*, he propoſes to do the feat, by HISTORIC FACTS; that is, as we ſhall ſee preſently, " by expoſing the miſchiefs done to ſociety by the " ABUSES and CORRUPTIONS of Chriſtianity." I but juſt mention it, to ſhew, how early his ſophiſtry begins to work. But now for his *more preciſe ideas of Religion*.

* Il ne faut pas de tout ceci conclurre avec Warburton que la politique & la religion aient parmi nous un objet commun. p. 59.

† Pour achever de me faire entendre, il ne faut que donner un peu plus de *preciſion* aux idées trop vagues de religion relatives à mon ſujet, p. 193.

" Religion,

" Religion, conſidered in its relation to Society, is either general or
" particular; and may alſo, like ſociety, be divided into two ſpecieſes;
" that is to ſay, the RELIGION OF A MAN, and the RELIGION OF A
" CITIZEN. The firſt, without temples, altars, or rites, and confined
" to a worſhip of the ſupreme God, merely interior, and to the eternal
" obligations of morality, is the pure and ſimple religion of the Goſ-
" pel; true Theiſm; and that which one may call *divine natural Right*.
" The other, confined to a particular country, gives, to that coun-
" try, its gods, who are the proper and tutelary patrons of it. It
" has its doctrines, its rites, its exterior worſhip preſcribed by the
" laws; all out of this pale, are to thoſe within, infidels, ſtran-
" gers, and Barbarians. It extends not the duties and devoirs of
" men beyond its altars. Such were all the religions of the firſt
" nations. To which one may give the name of *Divine-Civil, or*
" *poſitive, Right* *."

So ſtrange a heap of nonſenſe and miſrepreſentation, ſure never came till now, even from the pen of a *modern French philoſopher*. Here, we have the *Goſpel* confounded with *Natural Religion*, and *Revelation* with *Polytheiſm*. But it is not ſo much his ſpite to Chriſtianity (of which however he appears to have a *philoſophic* ſhare), as his abhorrence of CIVIL SOCIETY, that makes him thus reverſe and confound all ideas; and this, he calls, rendering them more PRECISE. What, in the firſt place, he would infer being plainly this, That beſides all thoſe advantages of the *ſtate of nature* over *civil ſociety* (ſo largely inſiſted on in his book called Diſcours

* La religion conſidérée par rapport à la ſociété, qui eſt où generale ou particuliere, peut auſſi ſe diviſer en deux eſpeces, ſavoir, la Religion de l'homme & celle du citoyen. La premiere, ſans temples, ſans autels, ſans rites, bornée au culte purement interieur du Dieu Supreme & aux devoirs eternels de la morale, eſt la pure & ſimple religion de l'evangile, le vrai théiſme, & ce qu'on peut appeller le droit divin naturel. L'autre, inſcrite dans un ſeul pays, lui donne ſes Dieux, ſes patrons propres & tutelaires: elle a ſes dogmes, ſes rites, ſon culte exterieur preſcrit par les loix: hors la ſeule nation qui la ſuit, tout eſt pour elle infidelle, etranger, barbare; elle n'étend les devoirs & le droits de l'homme qu'auſſi loin que ſes autels. Telles furent toutes les religions des premiers temps, auxquelles on peut donner le nom de droit divin civil ou poſitif. p. 193.

ſur

ſur l'origine de l'inegalité parmi les hommes); this bleſſed *ſtate* has yet a further advantage, *viz.* that pure Religion is to be found only there; while polytheiſm and idolatry overrun all the world beſides. For I would adviſe the Reader, that as often as he has to do with our CITIZEN OF GENEVA, he would obſerve the ſame caution which an old debauchee recommended to his phyſician, that whatever was the particular complaint, he would always have an eye to the p———. So whatever be the ſubject of our philoſopher's meditations, whether education, morality, laws, romance, or religion, we ſhould ſtill have an eye to that infection of the mind catched amongſt the *Caffrs*, at the *Cape of Good Hope*, which has poiſoned his conſtitution, and given him a horror of *civil government*; and is always breaking out in numberleſs odd vagaries, whenever he ſits down to ſpeculate. Without this, we ſhould be utterly at a loſs to account for the aſtoniſhing abſurdities of theſe few lines.

1. He ſays, that the RELIGION OF A MAN, as diſtinguiſhed from the *Religion of a citizen, is without temples, altars, or rites, and confined to a worſhip of the Supreme God merely interior.*—This idle fancy I have confuted at large, in the fifth chapter of the firſt book of this diſcourſe; wherein I have ſhewn, that what he calls the *religion of man*, or pure natural Religion, cannot ſupport itſelf without *external acts and offices* of devotion, as well as with *internal meditations*. I have ſhewn it, I ſay—from the *compound nature* of man—from his duty to make an *open* profeſſion of the relation in which he ſtands towards his Maker—from the fitneſs of returning thanks in *common*, for *common* bleſſings.

2. He ſays, that *this religion, without temples, altars, or rites*, IS THE SIMPLE RELIGION OF THE GOSPEL. So groſs an inſult on common ſenſe has, I think, never before been offered, even in theſe times of worſe than brutal licence.—Is not the *Religion of the Goſpel* the Religion of Jeſus Chriſt? and did not Jeſus Chriſt inſtitute the RITES of *baptiſm* and the *laſt ſupper?* Did he not ſay he would

build

build a CHURCH? Is not a CHURCH a *Society* of Chriſtians? And can any *ſociety* ſubſiſt without an external adminiſtration?

3. He holds, however, that this TRUE THEISM, as he calls it, is the ſame with the GOSPEL in *doctrine* at leaſt, if not in *diſcipline*. In which, perhaps, his ignorance, here, may be more excuſable than his ill faith, before. The great principle of TRUE THEISM is, that *God is, and that he is a rewarder of them who ſeek him*; The great principle of the GOSPEL is, that he will reward thoſe who ſeek him with *the free gift of immortality*.

So far, as to what he calls *the Religion of Man*. Come we next to his RELIGION OF THE CITIZEN. And what he ſays here is no leſs fruitful in his uſual flowers of ſpeech, with which he is accuſtomed to ſtrow the way, whenever he is diſpoſed to lead Religion in triumph; I mean, abſurdity and falſhood.

The Religion of the Citizen (ſays he) *is in force only in a particular country, it gives to that country its gods, who are the proper and tutelary patrons of it.*—This is the Polytheiſm of the GENTILES.—*It has* (ſays he) *its doctrines, its rites, its external worſhip preſcribed by the laws. All out of this pale are, to thoſe within, infidels, ſtrangers, and barbarians.*—This is his deſcription of the LAW OF MOSES: and agrees with no other in the ancient world; all of which gave allowance to an univerſal toleration or intercommunity of worſhip. Yet, of theſe two oppoſite religions, our candid Citizen has made one and the ſame. And, as before, *pure Theiſm was* (in his account) *the ſame with the* GOSPEL; ſo now, *Polytheiſm and Idolatry is the ſame with the* LAW. Indeed, where he ſays, that this *Religion of the Citizen doth not extend the duties and devoirs of men beyond its altars*, he fills up the meaſure, and vilely calumniates both PAGANISM and JUDAISM.

But he had left out, it ſeems, ſomething in his diviſion, where he diſtinguiſhed between the *religion of man* and the *religion of the citizen*; and therefore now patches up matters by the introduction of a third ſpecies, which he calls, *the religion of the prieſt*. "There "is (ſays he) a third ſpecies of religion ſtill more whimſical; "which

" which giving to men two legiſlatures, two heads, two countries, " puts them under ſubjection to contrary duties, and prevents " them from being, at the ſame time, good ſubjects to God and " to the magiſtrate. Such is the religion of the Lama, the Japo- " neſe, and the Roman Catholics. This we may call *the religion* " *of the prieſt* *."

And now let us ſee, for what end this HONEST ACCOUNT OF RELIGION was given us by our virtuous Citizen of Geneva. In general, it is enough for him if he can but diſcredit REVELATION, but he is here labouring at one particular topic of diſcredit; its uſeleſsneſs or miſchief to civil ſociety.—I had ſaid, that *Chriſtianity was its moſt firm ſupport*. He denies the propoſition; and confutes it by this way of reaſoning—" All Religion (ſays he) is compriſed within theſe three ſpecieſes.—1. *A worſhip merely interior*, which affords not one ſingle mark of religion.—2. *A* POLYTHEISTIC *worſhip*, which damns all out of its pale—And *Popery*, which brings in an *imperium in imperio*." Now, ſays he, theſe are all *more hurtful than beneficial to the firm conſtitution of the ſtate*. And ſo ſay I likewiſe. But he had promiſed to prove, againſt me, that the Chriſtian Religion as delivered in the Goſpel (the Religion which, I had ſaid, was the moſt firm ſupport of civil ſociety) *is at bottom more hurtful than beneficial to it*. Now I affirm, and appeal to his own ſober ſelf againſt his other ſelf, that NOT ONE of his *three ſpecieſes of Religion* is *Chriſtianity as delivered in the Goſpel*; nor can any one of them be called, but by the courteſy of England, even by the vague name of *Chriſtianity*. So that here, a blind argument is lamely conducted, at a vaſt expence of truth and common ſenſe. How much more compendiouſly and commodiouſly has the *New Hiſtorian of Great Britian* enforced the ſame charge againſt

* Il y a une troiſieme ſorte de religion plus bizarre, qui donnant aux hommes deux légiſlations, deux chefs, deux patries, les ſoumet à des devoirs contradictoires & les empêche de pouvoir être à la fois devots & citoyens. Telle eſt la religion des Lamas, telle eſt celle des Japonois, tel eſt le Chriſtianiſme Romain. On peut appeller celle-ci la religion du prêtre. P. 193, 194.

Chriſtianity. He divides ALL RELIGION, not into three, but two, ſpecies, SUPERSTITION and FANATICISM. And who will pretend to ſay, that either of theſe can be ſerviceable to Society? The CHURCH OF ENGLAND, in particular, that *Janus bifrons*, which had ſeen both the *old and new world*, he hath taught to play each part with great advantage; to turn its *fanatical* viſage, when it oppoſes Popery; and to become *ſuperſtition*, when it ſets its other face againſt the Puritans.

Thus our Citizen, by ſubſtituting three fantaſtic Mormos of his own raiſing for Goſpel Chriſtianity, he leaves my principle, of the *utility of this religion to civil ſociety*, untouched. So that whatever evil influence his three impoſtures may have on ſociety, my poſition is no way affected by it. However, let us hear him out. There are *curioſities* in his diſcourſe, which one rarely meets with in common writers.

1. Firſt then, he gives up his *third* ſpecies of religion, which brings in an *Imperium in Imperio*, as manifeſtly naught. And ſo do I.

2. The *ſecond*, which he calls the *Religion of the citizen*, has in it (he ſays) ſomething good, and ſomething bad. "It is ſo far "good, that it unites divine worſhip to a love of the laws – it "teaches men, that the ſervice of the ſtate is the ſervice of the "*tutelary God*—it is a ſpecies of THEOCRACY.—But then it is "bad in this, that it is founded in error and lies. It renders men "credulous and ſuperſtitious. It ſtifles the true worſhip of the "divinity, in a vain ceremonial. It is much worſe when, be-"coming excluſive and tyrannic, it renders a people ſanguinary "and intolerant—when it makes them think, they do a holy action "in the murder of thoſe who deny their Gods—when it puts them "in a ſtate of war with all others; a ſtate very pernicious to their "own proper ſafety *."

His

* La ſeconde eſt bonne en ce qu'elle réunit le culte divin & l'amour des loix [et que faiſant de la patrie l'objéct de l'adoration des citoyens] elle leur apprend que ſervir l'etat

His ſpite to the Moſaic law (we ſee) has made him pollute its ſanctity, by mixing and confounding it with Paganiſm; like him who, for a better purpoſe, *burnt dead men's bones on the altar of Bethel:* Out of this impure mixture he forms a fantom, compounded of *Polytheiſm*, a *Theocracy* and *Intolerance*; which never yet exiſted together but in his own bewildered imagination. He equally belies both PAGANISM and the LAW: the firſt being founded in, and exiſting by, univerſal tolerance; and the other abhorrent of every ſpecies of idolatry. One thing is remarkable; it is, his calling Paganiſm, under a *tutelar deity*, a ſpecies of THEOCRACY. I had ſhewn, in *The Divine Legation of Moſes*, that one of the moſt illuſtrious diſtinctions between the religion which he inſtituted and the ſeveral modes of Paganiſm, was this, that though Both go upon the common idea of a *tutelary God*, yet Moſes went further, and proclaimed the God of Iſrael to be their KING; and, by ſo doing, put God's peculiar people properly under a THEOCRACY. This no Pagan lawgiver ever dared to attempt. I have explained the reaſon; a reaſon ſo much to the credit of the Moſaic inſtitution. A *tutelary God* not implying an extraordinary or equal Providence, a Gentile lawgiver might, for the ſake of the civil uſes of it, venture to proclaim. Had he gone further, and made the *tutelary God* the NATIONAL KING, his impoſture had been detected; becauſe ſuch a ſyſtem unavoidably drew after it an *equal Providence*. Moſes advanced thus far, and by conſtituting a THEOCRACY, hath eſtabliſhed the truth of his pretenſions. To evade this reaſoning, the Citizen of Geneva inſinuates, that the admiſſion of a *tutelary God* conſtitutes a THEOCRACY.

l'etat c'eſt en ſervir le Dieu tutelaire. C'eſt une eſpece de theocratie.—Mais elle eſt mauvaiſe en ce qu'etant fondée ſur l'erreur & ſur le menſonge [elle trompe les hommes] les rend crédules, ſuperſtiteux, & noye le vrai culte de la divinité dans un vain ceremonial. Elle eſt mauvaiſe encore quand, devenant excluſive & tyrannique, elle rend un peuple ſanguinaire & intolerant [en ſorte qu'il ne reſpire que meurtre & maſſacre]; & croit faire une action ſainte en tuant quiconque n'admet pas ſes Dieux. Cela met un tel peuple dans un état naturel de guerre avec tous les autres, tres nuiſible à ſa propre ſûreté. P. 194, 195.

Here let me obſerve, how much the author of the *Alliance* has, in another work, diſtreſſed this whole tribe of unbelievers of the *bon ton*, ſprung from our Engliſh *Freethinkers*, and new-chriſtened, in France, under the name of PHILOSOPHERS, an' pleaſe you. The Author * had explained the nature of the Jewiſh *Theocracy*; and from thence, had not only vindicated the *reaſonableneſs* of the whole Jewiſh law from the objections of unbelievers; but had ſhewn how this very form of government itſelf diſtinguiſhed and aſcertained its divine original above all the pretences of Paganiſm: whoſe various modes of religion were built on the worſhip of *tutelary Deities*. This alarmed our PHILOSOPHERS. However, it furniſhed their ſtale declamations with a freſh topic, an abuſive miſrepreſentation of this ſingular ſpecies of divine government, by calling all worſhip of *tutelary deities*, THEOCRACIES. M. Rouſſeau leads the way; and he aſſures us that this worſhip is, UNE ESPECE DE THEOCRATIE. M. Voltaire has taken the hint, and even borrowed the words of our Citizen.—"Il ſemble (ſays he) que la plûpart des anciennes nations "aient été gouvernées par UNE ESPECE DE THEOCRATIE †." After theſe, comes an impious and miſerable Rhapſodiſt ‡, who undertakes to ſhew, on the ſame ridiculous abuſe of words, That *all the religions of the Eaſt were* THEOCRACIES. So that, from the joint labours of theſe Worthies (the PHILOSOPHERS) we are made to believe that this pretended THEOCRACY of Moſes was only productive of ſuperſtition in religion, and of tyranny in the ſtate. There is, indeed, a ſmall circumſtance, which may be thought a little to diſcredit this noble diſcovery. Our PHILOSOPHERS, with all their ſuperior erudition, appear to be ignorant, That the Greeks, ſo ſlender was their conception or idea of a THEOCRACY or a THEOCRATIC GOVERNMENT, had not, in all their comprehenſive language, ſo much as a *term* to denote the *thing*. And JOSEPHUS, where he attempts to explain the nature of this ſpecies of govern-

* See The Divine Legation, Book V. Sect. 2.

† La PHILOSOPHIE de l'Hiſtoire, p. 51.

‡ In a book called, Recherches ſur l'Origine du Deſpotiſme Oriental.

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ment (the *Jewiſh theocracy*), is forced to apologize for the liberty of inventing a *new name* to expreſs his meaning *.

But, to return, we come at length to our citizen's *firſt* ſpecies of religion, the *religion of man, or chriſtianity*; and here his purpoſe is to prove more directly againſt me, "That even *chriſtianity*, as delivered in the goſpel, is not the moſt firm ſupport of the ſtate." This were indeed to the point, had he not here again preſented us with another of his fantoms under that ſacred name. But the reader ſhall not be defrauded of his own words.——"There remains "the *religion of man, or of chriſtianity*, to be conſidered; not that "which is now called ſo, but that which we find in the GOSPEL, "a religion altogether different. By means of this religion, holy, "ſublime, and true, MEN, the children of the ſame God, ſee and "own themſelves to be BRETHREN; while the ſpiritual ſociety "which unites them is never to be diſſolved, not even in death. "But this religion having NO PARTICULAR RELATION to the body-"politic, leaves the laws without any other force than what they "draw from themſelves, without adding any thing of its own; "whereby one of the principal bonds of a particular ſociety (of "the civil kind) remains without effect. Further, it is ſo far "from attaching the hearts of citizens to the ſtate, that it with-"draws them, as it were, from all terreſtrial things; than "which, I know nothing more contrary to the ſpirit of ſociety †."

* —ἐι δ' ἄρ τις εἶπε βεβήλως τὸν λόγον ΘΕΟΚΡΑΤΙΑΝ ἀποδείξει τὸ πολίτευμα. Cont. Ap. lib. ii. ſect. 16.

† Reſte donc la religion de l'homme, ou le chriſtianiſme, non pas celui d'aujourd'hui, mais celui de l'EVANGILE, qui en eſt tout-à-fait différent. Par cette religion ſainte, ſublime, veritable, les hommes, enfans du même Dieu, ſe reconnoiſſent tous pour freres, & la ſociété qui les unit ne ſe diſſout pas même à la mort. Mais cette religion n'ayant nulle RELATION PARTICULIERE avec le corps-politique laiſſe aux loix la ſeule force qu'elles tirent d'elles-mêmes ſans leur en ajouter aucune autre, & par là un des grands liens de la ſociété particuliere reſte ſans effet. Bien plus: loin d'attacher les cœurs des citoyens à l'etat, elle les en detache comme de toutes les choſes de la terre: je ne connois rien de plus contraire a l'eſprit ſocial. P. 195.

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He owns, (we ſee) *it appears by the goſpel, that all men are brethren, the children of the ſame God, and united in a ſociety not to be diſſolved even in death.* Now, if the *ſame men* be members both of this more laſting ſociety, and of the *civil* likewiſe, muſt they not aim, in proportion to the dignity of each ſociety, equally to advance the intereſts of both? Muſt not that acknowledged *relationſhip* of brethren in the *religious* ſociety ſtrengthen their attachment to each other as fellow-members of the ſame *civil* community? And when they are once perſuaded (which every man of common ſenſe will ſoon be) that to advance the happineſs of civil ſociety is the beſt means of ſecuring the intereſts of that other, which is never to end, will not their very zeal for their religion diſpoſe them to as warm an adherence to the ſervice of the ſtate? All that can be ſaid in favour of our citizen's ridiculous paradox being only this, that a true chriſtian will prefer the *real* intereſts of the religious ſociety to the *apparent* intereſts of the civil, whenever they are made to claſh: for none but *real*, and *merely apparent*, can poſſibly come into competition. But this, on the very principles of our citizen of Geneva, will be ſo far from being hurtful to the ſtate, that it will be, in the higheſt degree, beneficial to it. He confeſſes that the religion of the goſpel is *holy, ſublime, and true:* in whatſoever matters, therefore, the adminiſtration of civil policy claſhes with the injunctions of this religion, we may be ſure that, ſo far forth, the civil adminiſtration is *prophane, baſe, or erroneous:* the removal of all which qualities from ſociety directly tends to promote its happineſs. For UTILITY AND TRUTH EVER COINCIDE. It is ſo far then from being true, that GOSPEL RELIGION is of no ſervice to the ſtate, that it is of the greateſt, by affording an unerring rule, ever at hand to apply, for the adminiſtration of civil policy.

But, as hath been obſerved before, we muſt ſeek for the key to all theſe ſtrange whimſies, in our citizen's *Diſcourſe ſur l'origine de l'inegalité parmi les Hommes.* The truth is, he regards CIVIL SOCIETY as a thing eſſentially evil; and ſo, never to be ſerved or benefited

benefited by a religion *holy, ſublime, and true*; for as he in the comedy ſays, "*The man doth fear God, however it ſeems not to be in him, by ſome large jeſts he will make* *;"—ſuch as the farce of the *Curé of Savoy*, and his own drollery upon *miracles*. In the work we are now upon, he is a little ſhy of his ſecret. But in his *Letters from the Mountain*, apologizing for this part of the *ſocial contract*, (where, in the ſtrongeſt terms, he taxes the goſpel with being pernicious "to ſociety †) he ſays,—"Far from taxing the pure goſpel with "being pernicious to SOCIETY, I find it, in ſome ſort, too ſociable, "too ſtrongly embracing the whole human kind, to be of uſe to a "LEGISLATION WHICH MUST BE EXCLUSIVE; a religion rather "inſpiring *humanity* than *patriotiſm*, and tending rather to form "MEN than CITIZENS ‡."—Here the ſecret is out. By *ſociety*, we ſee, he means NATURAL SOCIETY (the ſtate he ſo much extols in his *Diſcours ſur l'origine de l'inegalité*, &c.); and by a LEGISLATION WHICH MUST BE EXCLUSIVE, he means CIVIL SOCIETY. And were this all, we ſhould have nothing to blame but his bad philoſophy and his worſe logic. He ſuppoſes, that what men call *patriotiſm* conſiſts in doing all the good they can to their own country, though to the hurt and damage of all others. He miſtakes. It is the MOB who ſo thinks. MEN hold it to conſiſt in doing all the good they can to their own country, but without hurt or damage to any other. He therefore, from his definition, concludes, and rightly, that patriotiſm and humanity are inconſiſtent: we, from ours, that they are conſiſtent; juſt as our own preſervation is, with univerſal benevolence,

"When God and n ture link'd the general frame,
"And bad SELF-LOVE and SOCIAL be the ſame."

* Shakeſpeare.

† Je ne connois rien de plus contraire à l'eſprit ſocial. P. 195.

‡ —Bien loin de taxer le *ſur Evangile* d'etre pernicieux à la SOCIETE, je le trouve, en quelque ſorte, trop ſociable, embraſſant trop tout le genre humain pour UNE LEGISLATION QUI DOIT ETRE EXCLUSIVE; inſpirant l'humanité plutot que le patriotiſme, & tendant a former des hommes plutot que des citoyens.——*Lettres ecrites de la Montagne*, *Lett.* I. p. 35.

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We both abound in our own ſenſe; and, I ſuppoſe, with equal complaiſancy. So far then nothing is morally amiſs.

But when he begins to prevaricate—and ſurely he prevaricates very groſly, in this apology *from the Mountain*. Did his adverſary, in *the plain* *, accuſe him of taxing the *pure goſpel* with being pernicious to what HE calls, SOCIETY, and what others call, *the ſtate of nature?* Was it not for his holding that the *pure goſpel* was pernicious to an EXCLUSIVE LEGISLATION, which is the name he gives to *civil ſociety?* Certainly with this latter defect: for it is in a diſcourſe, written to confute the opinion of WARBURTON, where our citizen ſays, *the pure goſpel is pernicious to ſociety*.

But it is time to go on with his accuſation of chriſtianity, as it is urged in his *ſocial contract*.

This religion, he ſays, *has no* PARTICULAR RELATION *to the body-politic*. You may always with juſtice ſuſpect the man who deduces the force of his argument from vague and evaſive premiſſes. We know what is meant by one thing's being related to another. But nothing, I think, is meant by a *particular relation*, when thus employed, but *ſuch* a relation as may beſt ſerve the uſer, to ſupport a feeble ſyſtem.——That the chriſtian religion, as delivered in the *goſpel*, has *a cloſe and near relation* to the body-politic hath been ſhewn juſt above, from our citizen's own account of chriſtianity: but more eſpecially from this whole diſcourſe of the *alliance*, written for no other purpoſe than to ſhew how this *relationſhip* began, how it is carried on, and how it may be beſt improved to the advantage of BOTH SOCIETIES. How it began, has been explained at large in the third chapter of the firſt book: where it is ſhewn to have ariſen from the natural defect of civil ſociety; which requiring, for its remedy, the aſſiſtance of religion, and this not being to be afforded but on conditions; from thence, a *relationſhip* neceſſarily aroſe between them. After this, what muſt we think of the man who can tell us, that *Chriſtianity leaves the laws without other*

* Lettres ecrits de la Campagne.

force

force than that which they draw from themſelves, without adding any thing of its own? Bayle delighted in extravagant aſſertions almoſt as much as our citizen of Geneva; but he knew how to ſupport them, and that, with a vigour of invention, and a profoundneſs of reaſoning, which covered and ſecured them from an ordinary attack. Our citizen gives us his miſbegotten PARADOXES, as the oſtrich drops its young, expoſed, abandoned, and left to ſhift for themſelves: and then—as he ſays, to an argument of the Archbiſhop of Paris,—*Le lecteur en jugera. Pour moi, je n'ajoûterai pas un ſeul mot* *. But not only the internal virtue of religion in general, but the expreſs precepts of the goſpel confute this ſtrange man, when he ſays, *Chriſtianity, having no particular relation to the body-politic, leaves the laws without any other force than what they draw* FROM THEMSELVES, *without adding any thing of* ITS OWN.—Doth not the founder of our holy faith ſay, *Render unto Cæſar the things which are Cæſar's: and unto God the things that are God's* †? And this, in anſwer to a queſtion concerning obedience to the laws of the civil magiſtrate, in a caſe where the ſupport of ſociety is moſt vitally concerned, namely, *the paying of tribute.* Where, we ſee, the GOSPEL no more *leaves the laws* to that only force which they draw from their own ſanctions, than it *leaves the worſhip of God* to that only force which it draws from natural reaſon. Both *civil tribute* and *religious worſhip* are equally commanded by the ſanctions of chriſtianity. St. Paul hath nobly paraphraſed this text in his Epiſtle to the Romans ‡, where he explains the reaſon of *holy obedience* to the laws of the ſtate. It is, he ſays, becauſe

* Lettre à M. de Beaumont, p. 107.

† Matt. xxii. 21.

‡ "Let every ſoul be ſubject to the *higher powers.* For there is *no power but of God:* "the powers that be are *ordained* of God. Whoſoever therefore reſiſteth the *power,* "reſiſteth the ORDINANCE OF GOD: and they that reſiſt ſhall receive to themſelves "damnation.—For he is THE MINISTER OF GOD to thee, for good.—Wherefore, "ye muſt needs be *ſubject* not only for wrath, but alſo *for* CONSCIENCE SAKE." Chap. xiii. 1, & ſeq.

all legitimate power comes originally from God, and is actually ordained by him. Hence he makes the PRIEST and CIVIL MAGISTRATE to be equally the MINISTERS OF GOD; from which, he ſays, it follows that we muſt be ſubject to the ſtate, as well as to the church, for CONSCIENCE SAKE: and thus, diſobedience to the laws being diſobedience to religion, he makes the puniſhment of both to be the ſame; concluding in the words of his divine maſter, RENDER *therefore to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due, cuſtom to whom cuſtom, fear to whom fear, honour to whom honour.* Yet chriſtianity, as this man tells us, leaves the laws to their own inherent force, *without adding any thing of its own.*

But even this is not the worſt. Chriſtianity not only gives no *forenſic* ſtrength to ſociety, but takes away much of its *natural.* So ſays our illuſtrious citizen.—"Further, chriſtianity is ſo far from attaching the hearts of citizens to the ſtate, that it detaches them, as it were, from ALL TERRESTRIAL THINGS. I know nothing more contrary than this, to the ſocial ſpirit *." With what a commodious fallacy has our citizen here ſupplied his argument! It required him to ſhew, that chriſtianity detached us *from ſociety.* He could not do that; he therefore ſlips in, in the place of *ſociety—all terreſtrial things.* Had ſcripture condemned *ſociety*, it had been ſomething to his purpoſe; for then it might be ſuppoſed, that JESUS and the citizen of Geneva had juſt the ſame opinion of civil ſociety. But when a detachment from *earthly things* is commanded, it is to be underſtood COMPARATIVELY; and when the compariſon is between *earthly* and heavenly, the command is reaſonable and juſt. Let us ſee then how the ſage propagators of our holy faith have conducted themſelves on this delicate queſtion. The learned apoſtle of the Gentiles directs his followers, that they *uſe this world* AS NOT ABUSING IT.—χρώμενοι ὡς μὴ καταχρώμενοι.—He adds a reaſon—*For*

* Bien plus; loin d'attacher les cœurs des citoyens à l'Etat, elle les en détache comme de TOUS LES CHOSES DE LA TERRE: je ne connois rien de plus contraire à l'eſprit ſocial. P. 195.

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the FASHION *of this world paſſeth away* * ;—σχήμα τȣ̃ κόσμȣ τούτȣ—*the ſcene of things in this world.* – The ſober advice here given, is to enjoy the bleſſings which Providence hath beſtowed upon us in this ſtate, with TEMPERANCE and JUSTICE : but not to make the moſt of them, in the ſenſe and language of voluptuous and worldly men, who care not how they get them, or how they employ them when gotten. He ſhews them, the bad bargain they are likely to make, when they chuſe to run any riſque in this adventure; ſince the ſhortneſs of human life makes theſe ill-purchaſed advantages of little value.—And is this, *detaching men from ſociety?* Is it not rather *attaching* them, in the ſtrongeſt manner, to its true intereſts? by keeping them within the duties of good citizens. Look abroad amongſt men, and ſee, whether all the miſeries brought upon ſtates and nations, have not been owing to the neglect of this apoſtolic precept, when citizens *abuſe* their ſituations in ſociety, by letting looſe their irregular paſſions and appetites, in purſuit of its fleeting advantages. Yet the legiſlating citizen of Geneva *knows nothing more contrary to the ſocial ſpirit*, than THIS SPIRIT OF CHRISTIANITY. But, further, our citizen who, from theſe paſſages of St. Paul to the Corinthians, has apparently gathered what he collects concerning *the unſocial ſpirit of chriſtianity*, either did not, or would not ſee, that the advice here given to the church of Corinth, concerning their *detachment from the world*, in its extreme ſenſe, was a temporary direction, to enable them the better to bear an approaching perſecution ; which the apoſtle, by his prophetic ſpirit, foreſaw they were to ſuffer under Nero. This, in ſo many words, he declares to have been his intent.—*I ſpeak for your own profit* † ;—πρὸς τὸ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν συμφέρον λέγω.

But indeed, the GOSPEL is ſo far from looking coldly on ſociety; or from aiming to withdraw our affections from this, or any other of our natural or civil *relations*, that it makes the firſt and principal

* 1 Cor. vii. 31. † Ver. 35.

part of religion to conſiſt in imploring Heaven for the welfare of the ſtate. St. Paul directing Timothy, a ſelect miniſter of the word, in what manner he ſhould form and regulate the diſcipline of the church over which the Holy Ghoſt had made him overſeer, lays down this principal canon—*I exhort therefore, that* FIRST OF ALL, πρῶτον πάντων, *ſupplications, prayers, interceſſions, and giving of thanks be made for all men:* FOR KINGS, *and for all that are in* AUTHORITY; *that we may lead a quiet and a peaceable life in all godlineſs and honeſty* *. Now if this were to be done under a Pagan magiſtracy, which frequently perſecuted, at beſt barely ſuffered the profeſſion of Chriſt; how much greater were their effuſions of worſhip to be, in behalf of that community, in which kings and magiſtrates became NURSING FATHERS of the church? Could any thing more ſtrongly tend to endear civil government to good Chriſtians, than that a recommendation of the STATE and its intereſts to Heaven, was firſt and principally required of them, in their holy offices? All the writers on politics, I mean, writers of our author's ſize of belief, recommend it to the legiſlator, above all things, to cajole the people into a perſuaſion, that Heaven intereſts itſelf in the welfare of the community; as what would be the only laſting ſupport of civil felicity. Now, the followers of Chriſt have embraced a religion which aſſures them, that Heaven doth, indeed, thus intereſt itſelf: and that the impreſſion of this truth might be never obliterated, they are enjoined, as often as they aſſemble to their devotions, to make the firſt and principal part of them to conſiſt in praying for the peace and proſperity of *kings and all in authority.* Yet our citizen of Geneva tells us, that *he knows nothing more contrary to the* SOCIAL SPIRIT, *than the* SPIRIT OF CHRISTIANITY, *by detaching us from all earthly things.* What muſt we think? Was he in earneſt? Certainly not in good earneſt; ſince here, as in every other part of his diſcourſe, he impoſes on his reader that ſophiſm, of all the moſt hacknied by every

* 1 Tim. ii. 1, 2.

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paultry trader in infidelity, THE ABUSE OF THE THING, FOR THE THING ITSELF. The queſtion between us is, *What aſpect Goſpel-Chriſtianity hath on civil ſociety?* I have attempted to ſhew that it has the moſt benign and gracious. The citizen of Geneva ſays, *it has the moſt unfavourable, as it detaches men from all earthly things:* and to prove his bold aſſertion true, he gives us, inſtead of an honeſt account of that temper and moderation, which the GOSPEL preſcribes in the USE of theſe things, a frightful picture of the ſuperſtitious freaks of Monks and Aſceticks, of zealots and hypocrites, of fanatics and enthuſiaſts. This makes the common-place of two or three of his following pages, containing an abuſive paraphraſe of his truth, "that Chriſtianity is a religion altogether "ſpiritual; ſolely occupied in the affairs of Heaven: the Chriſtian's "country not being of this world *." To which, all, but that crew of idiots, are ready to reply—"*Nor is our maſter's kingdom of this world*, yet his providence governs and ſupports it. If, therefore, in imitation of this very providence, he bids us ſtrive *to be perfect, as he in Heaven is perfect* †, will not his followers, in their ſphere of citizens, contribute all they can to the happineſs of that ſociety in which providence hath placed them? inſtead of becoming, as he pretends, *by this very aim at* PERFECTION, *detached from all the bonds of ſociety* ‡." However, continues our citizen, if they ſhould be induced to lend a hand to the public, *it will be with the utmoſt indifference as to the iſſue* §. If by *indifference*, Mr. Rouſſeau means (and if he does not mean ſo, he calumniates) that the good Chriſtian will conſider himſelf a citizen of the world, as well as of that country to which he particularly belongs; it is

* Le chriſtianiſme eſt une religion toute ſpirituelle, occupée uniquement des choſes du ciel: la patrie du chrétien n'ſt pas de ce monde. P. 196.

† Matt. v. 48.

‡ A force d'être *parfaite*, elle manqueroit de liaiſon; ſon vice deſtructeur ſeroit dans ſa perfection même. P. 196.

§ Il fait ſon devoir, il eſt vrai, mais il le fait avec une profonde indifference ſur le bon ou mauvais ſuccés de ſes ſoins. P. 196.

true;

true; he will ſo conſider himſelf: the conſequence of which will be, that he will ſerve his own country, as far as may be done without injury or injuſtice to another. And what will be the conſequence of this? Certain felicity to his own: for that ſtate which obſerves the rules of juſtice and equity to all others, is moſt likely to have, in its turn, the ſame rules obſerved in favour of itſelf. But ſee the iniquity of theſe cavillers. Jeſus ſays, *his kingdom is not of this world.* Hence his diſciples ſay, *their country is not of this world:* and for this, chriſtianity is calumniated, as rendering no ſupport to the ſtate; and old idolatrous Rome, which treated all other ſtates with injuſtice, is preferred before it. Suppoſe now, Jeſus had ſaid, *his kingdom was of this world*; and his followers, in conſequence, had maintained that *dominion was founded in grace*, as Pagan Rome did, that its univerſal ſovereignty was founded in the horſe's head under the capitol; would Chriſtianity have got better quarter? We know it would not; ſince the *ſovereignty* of, what we call, Chriſtian Rome, has been ſo often objected to us, in diſcredit of the goſpel.—But the Chriſtian's indifference it ſeems lies in this,—*that ſo be, he have nothing with which to reproach himſelf, he cares little for the iſſue of things* *. What? Has his *faith* rooted out all the ſocial paſſions and affections which *nature* gave him? Hath he no regard for his parents, his children, or his poſterity? Not the leaſt, ſays our politician; for *if the ſtate ſink, he* BLESSETH GOD. He muſt needs be a bad citizen indeed, if, in this trying circumſtance, he do not, like a man of ſpirit, BLASPHEME his Maker.—*Curſe God, and die*, is, it ſeems, the heroic exhortation both of Job's paganiſed wife, and of our paganiſed citizen of Geneva. It had been in vain either for Job, or for me, to tell them, that if the true believer *bleſſes God* for the *ſeverity* of his diſpenſations, as believing that they tend to a good iſſue, he makes providence his friend; and, under this perſuaſion, he cannot but go on

* — Pourvu qu'il n'ait rien à ſe reprocher, peu lui importe que tout aille bien ou mal ici bas. P. 196.

with

with the greateſt alacrity to lend a helping hand to the ſhaken republic. – But *Chriſtianity makes men dupes to hypocriſy; and a Cromwell, or a Catiline, would find an eaſy prey of ſuch fellow-citizens* *. Our philoſopher muſt know very little of *Chriſtianity*, if he has not learnt, that it affords the beſt means of *detecting hypocriſy*. Be this as it may, ſays the citizen of Geneva, yet *Chriſtian charity doth not eaſily permit men to think evil of their neighbours* †: And this (he thinks) is enough to ſhew how *eaſily* good Chriſtians may be duped. But, before we can admit this conſequence, he muſt prove, that when Chriſtianity gives men charity, it takes away their underſtanding.——However, ſays he, admit that a Cromwell may ſometimes be detected by the atrocity of his actions.—Well, and what then?—Why then, *it is God's good pleaſure that we reverence his ordinance; this abuſed authority is the ſcourge of God to puniſh the offending children of men; and it will be deemed impiety to reſiſt the tyrant's uſurpation* ‡. Does not the good Chriſtian regard war, peſtilence, and famine, to be the ſcourges of offended Heaven? and yet what good Chriſtian, in his ſenſes, ever ſcrupled to guard againſt, and to repel theſe evils? But I am tired of this traſh; and ſhould not have tired my reader with it, but to ſhew him, how miſerably low this admired *philoſopher* and *politician* has deſcended; and all for the ſake of calumniating the Chriſtian faith. What follows, however, is too curious to be overlooked. After all theſe complaints of the *noxious ſpirit of Chriſtianity*, he confeſſes, however, that it makes good ſoldiers. This is ſomething, however; for the

* —Si malheureuſement il s'y trouve un ſeul ambitieux, un ſeul hypocrite, un Catilina, par example, un Cromwell, celui-là tres certainement aura bon marché de ſes pieux compatriotes. P. 196, 197.

† La charité chretienne ne permet pas aiſement de penſer mal de ſon prochain. P. 197.

‡ Voilà un homme conſtitué en dignité; Dieu veut qu'on le reſpecte; bientôt voilà, une puiſſance; Dieu veut qu'on lui obéiſſe; le depoſitaire de cette puiſſance en abuſe-t-il? C'eſt la verge dont Dieu punit ſes enfans. On ſe feroit conſcience de chaſſer l'uſurpateur. P. 197.

ſoldiery,

ſoldiery, in time of need, is the great ſupport of ſociety. The citizens of this caſt, ſays he, *march without reluctance to the combat: not one of them all ever dreams of flight; they do their duty, but without a paſſion for victory; they rather know how to die, than to conquer* *. What, now, can the reader conceive wanting, to reconcile our citizen to this part, at leaſt, of the *ſpirit of Chriſtianity*? A great deal. He wants ſuch a ſpirit in it, as would make them ſwear, like old Fabius, and his band of Pagans, that *they would conquer and not die.* "That (ſays our SOBER CITIZEN) was, ac-
"cording to my taſte, A MOST NOBLE AND ILLUSTRIOUS OATH.
"They ſwore to return victorious; and they kept their word. A
"Chriſtian army would never have done any thing like it. They
"would have thought it, to be a tempting of God †." It may be truly ſaid of this unaccountable citizen of ours, that he is at a vaſt expence of morals, metaphyſics, and politics; and all to enable him,

CUM RATIONE INSANIRE.

But now comes on his paroxyſm. He is even angry at himſelf for the little grace he hath hitherto ſhewn to *Chriſtianity*; and will, at laſt, demonſtrate that the profeſſion of it is even inconſiſtent with a FREE STATE.—"But I deceive myſelf (ſays he) when I talk of a
"CHRISTIAN REPUBLIC. Either of theſe terms excludes the other.
"Chriſtianity preaches up nothing but ſervitude and dependence.
"The SPIRIT OF IT is too favourable to *tyranny*, for her not always
"to take the advantage of it. TRUE CHRISTIANS ARE MADE TO
"BE SLAVES. They know it, and ſubmit. This ſhort life is, in
"their eyes, of too little value to give themſelves any trouble

* Les citoyens marchent ſans peine au combat: nul d'entre eux ne ſonge à fuir; ils font leur devoir, mais ſans paſſion pour la victoire; ils ſavent plutôt mourir que vaincre. P. 197.

† C'etoit un beau ferment, a mon gré, que celui des ſoldats de Fabius; ils ne jurerent pas de mourir ou de vaincre; ils jurerent de revenir Vainqueurs; et tinrent leur ferment. Jamais des chretiens n'en euſſent fait un pareil; ils auroient cru tenter Dieu. P. 198.

"about

"about it *." This is a fearful picture of *Goſpel Chriſtianity*. But what then, the virtuous Citizen of Geneva can never ſure be a *calumniator*. However, let us not DESPAIR of the Chriſtian Republic. This may be a monſter bred of his own brain perhaps; or rather of his heart; and not that *wiſdom* which ſprung from the head of Jove.

The *ſlavery* which Chriſtianity inculcates is derived, he ſays, from the *very ſpirit* of it. Now the *true ſpirit of Chriſtianity*, he himſelf will confeſs, is to be found, if any where, in the NEW TESTAMENT. The APOSTLES, he will own, underſtood, if any men did, in what *this ſpirit* conſiſted. Let us have recourſe then to their writings for our inſtruction on this important queſtion.

The Citizen of Geneva, you ſee, affirms, that WHERE THE SPIRIT OF THE LORD IS, THERE IS SLAVERY. St. Paul, on the contrary, aſſures us, that *where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is Liberty* †. Which of them do you chuſe to believe? Throughout the whole New Teſtament, the GOSPEL is characteriſed under the title of THE GLORIOUS LAW OF LIBERTY. It will be objected perhaps, that this word *liberty* always refers to the bondage and ſlavery of the *Moſaic Law*. It may be ſo. Nay, on this principle, I ſupport my argument, "That Chriſtianity naturally inſpires the love both of civil and of religious liberty, it raiſes the deſire of being governed by *laws* of our own making, and by the *conſcience* which is of God's own giving." For conſider, I pray you, *the ſpirit of the Moſaic law*. In religious matters, there was no *toleration*; and in civil, the government being Theocratical, there was no *popular will*; in which the idea of liberty is ſuppoſed to conſiſt. Now the

* Mais je me trompe en diſant une *Republique Chretienne*; chacun de ſes deux mots exclude l'autre. Le Chriſtianiſme ne prêche que ſervitude & dépendance. Son eſprit eſt trop favorable à la tyrannie pour qu'elle n'en profite pas toujours. LES VRAIS CHRETIENS SONT FAITS POUR ETRE ESCLAVES; ils le ſavent, & ne s'en emeuvent gueres; cette courte vie a trop peu de prix à leurs yeux. P. 198.

† 2 Cor. iii. 17.

being ſet free from *this law*, the apoſtolic writers call LIBERTY. They inſtruct us too in the nature of this *Chriſtian liberty*.

1. In the RELIGIOUS PART, it indulges us in a free inquiry concerning the truth of the Goſpel. The *Bereans* are diſtinguiſhed and extolled by the ſacred hiſtorian for this nobleneſs and generoſity of mind. *Theſe*, ſays he, *were more noble than thoſe of Theſſalonica, in that they received the word with all readineſs of mind*—μετὰ πάσης προθυμίας, which here ſignifies, the laying aſide of all Jewiſh prejudices—*and* SEARCHED *the Scriptures daily*, WHETHER THESE THINGS WERE SO *; —ἀναχρίνοντες τὰς γραφὰς — i. e. examined with a critical application. The virtue for which theſe Bereans are here extolled, St. PAUL recommends to the whole church, and in a more enlarged way. *Prove all things*, ſays he, [δοκιμάζετε, ſift well and examine] *hold faſt that which is good* †. And the arms, with which (by St. Paul's direction) the believer had provided himſelf, St. Peter adviſes him always to have in readineſs — *Be ready always to give an anſwer* [— ἀπολογία, i. e. a full and formal anſwer—] *to every man that aſketh you a* REASON *of the hope that is in you* ‡. So conſiſtently, with each other, did theſe holy men act, in their general direction to the churches. *We have no* DOMINION *over your faith*, — [Κυριεύομεν, we do not Lord it over] ſays the former of them, *but are* HELPERS *of your joy* §—[συνεργοὶ, fellow-labourers.] Hence it appears, the church is no deſpotic government, but a free republic. So ſcandalouſly (by the way) did the late author of, *Chriſtianity not founded on argument*, miſrepreſent the Religion of his country!

2. As to the CIVIL PART—A miſtake (occaſioned by thoſe apoſtolic triumphs, *where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty*) had crept in amongſt the early Chriſtians, that the Goſpel diſſolved the bonds of civil ſlavery, and manumiſed the convert, *foro civili*. To combat an error, which was likely to give much ſcandal to the ſtate, and to prejudice its citizens againſt the new religion, St. Paul

* Acts xvii. 11. † 1 Theſſ. v. 21. ‡ 1 Pet. iii. 15. § 2 Cor. i. 24.

delivers

delivers theſe directions to the church of Corinth—*Let every man abide in the calling wherein he was called. Art thou called being a ſervant* [δῦλος, a ſlave], *care not for it; but if thou mayeſt be made free, uſe it rather. Ye are bought with a price, be ye not the ſervants* [the ſlaves] *of men. Brethren, let every man wherein he is called, therein abide with God* *.

As *the kingdom of Chriſt is not of this world*, the coming under its dominion makes no change in the civil condition of men. The apoſtle therefore, to obviate any imputation that *Chriſtianity* diſturbed or was unfavourable to civil government, directs thoſe converts who were in a ſtate of civil ſlavery, to acquieſce, and remain contented under it. But leſt this direction ſhould be miſtaken to imply, what our Citizen of Geneva has dared to aſſert, "That *true Chriſtians are made to be ſlaves*; civil matters being below the notice of ſaints;" he, at the ſame time, adviſes them to change their condition of ſlavery, to that of free citizens, whenever a fair occaſion offers. And to ſhew them that this was no indifferent matter, he ſets before their eyes the height and nobility of the Chriſtian character.—*Ye are bought*, ſays he, *with a* PRICE; *be ye not the ſervants* [or ſlaves] *of men*. As much as to ſay, "The dignity of human nature is ſo highly advanced, by the immenſe price paid for it, the death and paſſion of the Son of God, that it would be baſe and incongruous for any of the REDEEMED, to reſt ſatisfied with a ſtate of ſlavery; when, without violating the eſtabliſhed rights of ſociety, it is in their power to become free." And this reaſoning in favour of CIVIL FREEDOM appeared *ſo powerful* to St. Paul himſelf, while he was urging it, that, timely alarmed for the *abuſe* it might occaſion, he returns to where he ſet out, and repeats the admonition he began with—*Brethren, let every man wherein he is called, therein abide with God*; i. e. "let him not be aſhamed to abide, and appear before God, in that ſtation in which God's providence hath placed him." We ſee then, that according to St. Paul's idea of Chriſtia-

* 1 Cor. vii. 20, & ſeq.

nity, the *ſpirit of liberty*, which it inſpires, is not confined to the pale of the CHURCH, but extends its vigour to the STATE; ſince, as he hath obſerved, the dignity of man's nature, acquired by the price paid for his *redemption*, obliges him to aſſert the freedom of the WHOLE MAN, as well *civil* as *religious*. But had St. Paul been leſs anxious for the plenitude of theſe rights, and contended only in general terms for *Chriſtian* freedom, the conſequence, in favour of *civil liberty*, wherever true Chriſtianity prevailed, would have been ſtill the ſame; as we ſhall now ſhew.

1. It is agreed, that if, *Where the ſpirit of the Lord is, there is liberty*, this *ſpirit* muſt recommend and encourage a FREEDOM OF ENQUIRY, like that exerted by the *noble Bereans*; and muſt ſupport and indulge the FREE EXERCISE OF CONSCIENCE. But men, practiſed in the exertion, and habituated to the enjoyment, of *religious rights*, can never long continue ignorant of, or bear with patience, the invaſion of their *civil*. The human faculties can never long remain in ſo violent and unnatural a ſtate as to have their operations perpetually checking and defeating one another, by the contrary actions of two ſuch oppoſite principles, as *love of freedom* and *acquieſcence in ſlavery*. The one or the other muſt, in a little time, prevail. Either the foul *ſpirit of tyranny* will defile the purity of religion, and introduce that blind ſubmiſſion of the underſtanding, and ſlaviſh compliance of the will, into the *church*: Or elſe the *ſpirit of the Lord* will overturn the uſurpation of an unjuſt deſpotic power, and bring into the STATE, as well as CHURCH, *a free and reaſonable ſervice*. The ſame ſpirit, be it which it will, muſt prevail in both. This, our author himſelf, in his own example, has ſhewn us will be the caſe, whether our paſſions carry us to love or hate. His paradoxical averſion to SOCIETY, we ſee, continues juſt the ſame, whether the object be the *civil* or the *religious*.

2. Secondly, *True* religion teaches, that its end is HUMAN HAPPINESS, in oppoſition to all the ſuperſtitious fancies of the *falſe*; which place it in the arbitrary, the ſelfiſh, or the capricious manifeſtations of God's power, or intereſt, or glory: and this naturally

rally leading us to the end of civil government, will direct us how to form a RIGHT conſtitution, where the *prince is made for the ſake of the people*; when we have, by the foregoing principle of free inquiry, already detected the abſurdity of a WRONG; which profeſſes to make *the people for the ſake of the prince.*

3. Thirdly, That equitable policy by which *true religion* governs in the church (and true religion as well as falſe muſt, as we have ſhewn, always have a church to govern), will further aid us, when we have now found the *end* of civil ſociety, to attain the *means* likewiſe, by copying in the ſtate, from that eccleſiaſtical ſubordination of power, and limitation of authority, where the SOVEREIGNTY reſides in the whole body of the faithful; not, as in the adminiſtration of *corrupt religion*, where a ſervile clergy and a deſpotic prelate conſtitute the CHURCH.

4. But, above all, That grandeur and elevation of mind, that ſublimity of ſentiment, that conſcious dignity of our nature, redeemed at ſo high a price, which *true religion* keeps alive; which holy ſcripture dictates; and which the Spirit of the Lord inſpires, will be ever puſhing us on to the attainment and preſervation of thoſe CIVIL RIGHTS, which we have been taught by reaſon to know are ours; and which we have been made to feel by experience, are, of all Ours, the moſt indiſpenſible to human happineſs.

By all theſe ſeveral ways is the SPIRIT OF THE LORD, or *true Religion*, naturally productive of the great bleſſing, *civil liberty.*

But the moſt generous and noble conſtitutions being moſt liable to abuſe, as fruits exalted to their higheſt degree of perfection are neareſt to their ſtate of decay, LIBERTY, the greateſt bleſſing here below, is principally ſubject to this common infirmity of our nature: On this account, St. Peter, while he recommends, and glories in, Chriſtian *liberty*, yet adds this neceſſary caution—*As free, and not uſing your liberty for a cloke of maliciouſneſs, but as the ſervants of God**; i. e. *Free as the ſervants of God*, alluding to what St. Paul had ſaid, *ye are bought with a price* [and therefore being the

* 1 Pet. ii. 16.

ſervants

ſervants of God] *be ye not the ſervants of men.* But leſt this indulgence of the ſpirit of *civil freedom* ſhould be abuſed, Peter reminds them on what principle it was indulged, namely, by their becoming (on the price paid) *the ſervants of God*; a principle equally operative to inſpire this ſpirit, and to keep it within juſt and proper bounds: for he makes their ſervice to their heavenly maſter the motive of obedience to their earthly—*Fear God, Honour the king* *.

What follows, in our Author's SOCIAL CONTRACT, *concerning the natural ſpirit of a Chriſtian Militia*, is ſuch a mixture of ſophiſtry and blunder, and in ſuch equal proportions, that I ſhould be aſhamed to give it a formal confutation. However, the laſt paragraph is too curious to be paſſed over in ſilence. "Under the "Pagan emperors the Chriſtian ſoldiery were brave. All the Chriſ-"tian writers aſſure us they were ſo. And I believe it. It was "plainly owing to an emulation of honour againſt the Pagan "troops. When the emperors became Chriſtian, this emulation "ceaſed; and when the *croſs* had driven away the *eagle*, all the "Roman valour diſappeared †." The *Roman valour* did indeed from henceforward, though not *diſappear*, yet, certainly, begin to decay. This all the hiſtorians of thoſe times, both Chriſtian and Pagan, unanimouſly confeſs. We have reaſon to believe them, for they aſſign a cauſe fully adequate to the effect; which was, the hireing of mercenary troops from amongſt the barbarous nations, to fight their battles. But EMULATION, the only thing they had occaſion for, to preſerve and keep alive their martial ſpirit, while the Romans and their mercenaries charged together under the ſame enſign, whether of the *croſs* or the *eagle*, they had ſtill, in all its vigour.

* 1 Pet. ii. 17.

† Sous les empereurs payens les ſoldats Chrétiens étoient braves; tous les auteurs Chrétiens l'aſſurent, & je le crois: c'etoit une émulation d'honneur contre les troupes paynnnes. Dès que les empereurs furent Chrétiens cette emulation ne ſubſiſta plus; et quand le croix eut chaſſé l'aigle, toute la valeur Romaine diſparut. P. 199.

It

It may be here juſt worth while to obſerve, that our citizen is very apt to forget his own principles. His charge againſt the unſocial ſpirit of *Chriſtianity* is founded in *this*, "that its profeſſors are actuated only by *heavenly*, not *earthly* affections." Yet here, to take off all he can from the merit of their acknowledged BRAVERY, he ſays, it aroſe from a ſpirit of military *emulation.*

In concluſion, let me here repeat my complaint, that Rouſſeau, in this accuſation of the *ſlaviſh ſpirit of Chriſtianity*, has once more ſlurred his uſual ſophiſm upon us; and, inſtead of the *ſpirit of Chriſtianity*, has given us the *ſpirit of Popery*; which does, indeed, by ſtifling all freedom of enquiry in religious matters, prepare us for a ſlaviſh ſubmiſſion to civil tyrants. An exploit, in which the church of Rome ſo much triumphs, that all the advocates of Popery, and all the enemies of the Reformed, from BELLARMINE down to VOLTAIRE, have made the FACTIOUS SPIRIT OF PROTESTANTISM the conſtant topic of their calumny and abuſe.

After all the inſtances of ILL FAITH here given, with what aſtoniſhment muſt the public hear the Citizen of Geneva boaſt to the archbiſhop of Paris, that he is A MAN MADE UP SOLELY OF TRUTH; THE ONLY AUTHOR OF THIS AGE, AND OF MANY OF THE FOREGOING, WHO HATH WRITTEN WITH GOOD FAITH *.

* Mes ennemis auront beau fare aver leurs injures; il's ne m'ôteront point l'honneur d'être UN HOMME VERIDIQUE EN TOUTE CHOSE, D'ETRE LE SEUL AUTEUR DE MON SIECLE, & DE BEAUCOUP D'AUTRES QUI AIT ECRIT DE BONNE FOI. Lettre à M. de Beaumont, p. 65.—Now, with all his *good faith*, he has ſurely a very unſound mind or memory. In writing againſt me, he ſays, as we have ſeen above, QUE LA LOI CHRETIENNE EST, AU FOND, PLUS NUISIBLE QU'UTILE A LA FORTE CONSTITUTION DE L'ETAT. But when he writes againſt the *French philoſophers*, he ſays juſt otherwiſe: NOS GOUVERNEMENS MODERNES DOIVENT INCONTESTABLEMENT AU CHRISTIANISME LEUR PLUS SOLIDE AUTORITE. Emile, v. III. p. 200.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

In which an Objection to the fundamental Principles of this Alliance is removed.

HERE I ſhould have concluded this Second Book, but that it appeared reaſonable to obviate an objection, which may ſeem to affect our fundamental principle, the REALITY of this *free convention*. The objection is this, "That as the two Societies are ſuppoſed to be formed out of one and the ſame number of individuals, thoſe very men who compoſe the ſtate compoſing the church alſo, it is a convention of the ſame individuals with themſelves, under different capacities. Which convention is as trifling and ineffectual as that which one individual would make with himſelf." The objection, we ſee, goes upon this ſuppoſition, that the circumſtances which prevent one individual's compacting with himſelf do unavoidably attend a compact attempted to be made by many individuals with themſelves, under the diſtinction of two Societies.

Now, to ſhew the ſuppoſition groundleſs, is to overthrow the objection. But we ſhall do more; we ſhall not only ſhew our *free convention* to have none of the circumſtances attending it, which prevent *one* individual's compacting with himſelf; but, that it hath all the circumſtances that make a compact binding between *two*.

Let us ſee what it is which prevents a man's contracting with himſelf. It is of the eſſence of all contracts that there be, 1. The concurrence of two wills; and, 2. A mutual obligation on two perſons for the performance of their mutual promiſes. But one man having but one *will*, there is no *foundation* for a compact, which requires the concurrence of two wills: and having but one *perſon*, there is no *efficacy* in the compact; becauſe no obligation: for what a man promiſes to himſelf, himſelf can acquit. Therefor

fore an obligation, which the obliged can deſtroy by the ſole act of his *will*, is not *real* but *fanciful*. Hence it appears, that a man's contracting with himſelf is, of all fancies, the moſt impertinent.

Thus, we ſee, the defect of that *compact of one individual with himſelf*, proceeds from the want of two *wills* and two *perſons*. If then, two Societies have really two diſtinct *wills*, and two diſtinct *perſonalities*; the ſubject matter's being one and the ſame (of which theſe two artificial bodies are compoſed) cannot poſſibly hinder thoſe two ſocieties from entering into compact; nor that compact from having all the effects of ſuch as are adjudged moſt real.

That two ſuch ſocieties have two diſtinct *wills* and *perſonalities* I ſhall ſhew. When any number of men form themſelves into a ſociety, whether civil or religious, this ſociety becomes a *body*, different from that aggregate which the number of individuals compoſed before the ſociety was formed. Elſe the ſociety would be nothing; or, in other words, no ſociety would be formed. Here then is a *body*, diſtinct from the aggregate compoſed by the number of individuals: and is called *factitious*, to diſtinguiſh it from the *natural body*; being, indeed, the *creature of human will*. But a *body* muſt have its *proper perſonality aad will*, which, without *theſe*, is no more than a ſhadow or a name. This perſonality and will are neither the perſonality and will of one individual, nor of all together. Not of one, is ſelf-evident. Not of *all*, becauſe the MAJORITY, in this *factitious body*, hath the denomination of the *perſon* and of the *will* of the ſociety. We conclude then, that the *will* and *perſonality* of a community are as different and diſtinct from the will and perſonality of the numbers of which it is compoſed, as the body itſelf is. And, that as in the erection of a community, a *factitious body* was created, ſo were a *factitious perſonality and will*. The reality of this *perſonality* is clearly ſeen in the adminiſtration of the *law of nations*, where two ſtates are conſidered as two men living in the ſtate of nature.

But the force of this reaſoning will be better ſeen and ſupported by an example. The writers of the law of nature and nations

allow that the *ſecond convention*, as it is called, in a pure *democratic* ſtate, is as real and binding as the ſame convention in a ſtate of any other form. The *ſecond convention* is that whereby protection and allegiance are mutually promiſed by ſovereign and people: "For "in the collective body (ſays Hooker) that have not derived the "principality of power into ſome one, or few, the whole of neceſ-"ſity muſt be head over each part *:" So that here the people contract with themſelves. And yet is the contract adjudged moſt real. This concluſion is founded on the very principle I lay down to prove the reality of the convention between church and ſtate; namely that, in entering into ſociety, a *factitious perſon* is created. In a democracy, this perſon, the ſovereign, is the WHOLE: and, with this perſon, the *natural perſons* of all the individuals convene.

If this be the caſe, then it follows that the ſelf-ſame number of individuals, which have formed and erected, of themſelves, one ſociety or *factitious body*, endowed with a diſtinct *perſonality and will*, may erect, of themſelves, as *many ſuch* ſocieties as they pleaſe. Becauſe the body, perſonality, and will, of ſuch ſocieties being all factitious, the ſtore-houſe, from whence they come, is as inexhauſtible as the wants of mankind. Whereas, were the will and perſonality of the individuals, the will and perſonality of the ſociety compoſed by them, then, on the contrary, the ſelf-ſame number of individuals could not erect above *one* ſociety: Becauſe their perſonality and will being already beſtowed upon one ſociety, they had them not to give again, in order to animate any other.

Here then we have two ſocieties, made up of one and the ſame number of individuals, with each its diſtinct perſonality and will; each different from the perſonality and will of the other, and from the perſonality and will of the individuals. But the different *natures* of the ſocieties not only make their wills and perſonalities diſtinct, but their different *ends* will keep them ſo. For each ſociety being created for one certain end, it hath its own proper views and in-

* Eccl. Pol. B. viii.

tereſts:

tereſts: and though each be ſo cloſely related to the other as to have one common *ſuppoſitum*, yet it purſues its proper intereſts only; without further regard to the intereſts of the other, than as *theſe* intereſts ſupport its own. In this, the *artificial* man, ſociety, is much unlike the *natural*; who being created for *ſeveral ends* hath ſeveral intereſts to purſue, and ſeveral relations to conſult; and may therefore be conſidered *under ſeveral capacities*, as a *religious*, a *civil*, a *rational* animal, *&c.* and yet they all make but one and the ſame man. But one and the ſame political ſociety cannot be conſidered, in one view, as a religious—in another, as a civil—and, in another, as a literary community. *One* ſociety can be preciſely *but one* of theſe communities *.

But, now it is to be obſerved, that, let this objection to a real convention, from the want of diſtinct perſonalities and wills in the two ſocieties, be as ſtrong as we have ſhewn it to be weak, yet it reaches only to thoſe two ſocieties under a pure unmixed *democratic* form; in which the ſovereignty of the ſociety reſides in the whole number of individuals. When both, or either, is under any other form, the objection is more clearly ſeen to have no weight. Becauſe then the ſovereignty of, at leaſt, one of the ſocieties reſides not in the whole, but in part only of the body politic. And all conventions between ſocieties being made between the ſovereignties thereof, theſe ſovereignties muſt needs have two perſonalities and wills, as being compoſed, not of the ſame, but of different individuals. But few or no religious or civil ſocieties being under this pure unmixed democratic form, the objection is not directed againſt any *actual* union between the two ſocieties. However having all

* Eccleſiaſtica poteſtas ſeu reſpublica Chriſtiana, quæ ſub nomine eccleſiæ ſæpe explicatur, eam ſignificat clericorum et laïcorum collectionem, qui in unum corpus adunati, eccleſiaſticis legibus ſe ſubjiciunt: non quidem quatenus homines civilem rempublicam componentes, ſed quatenus in ſpiritualem cœtum admiſſi. Eadem ratione civis reſpublica dici poteſt, quæ vel ex infidelibus principibus & rebuſpublicis conſtet, vel quæ ex Chriſtianis hominibus quidem, ſed nullo ad religionem reſpectu habito, componitur. Marca, l. ii. c. 1. F.T.

along, for the ſake of clearneſs and brevity, conſidered the two ſocieties under this ſimple and primitive *democratic* form, I thought it proper to remove an objection which lay againſt that form, though it lay againſt that only.

The concluſion from the whole is, that two ſocieties, compoſed of one and the ſame number of individuals, in which the perſonalities and wills not only *are*, but *muſt* neceſſarily continue to be and to be kept, diſtinct, are proper ſubjects for compact and convention with one another; there being no circumſtance, either neceſſary or commodious, for the making any kind of civil compacts binding, which is not to be found in theſe. I will only add, that as the adminiſtration of both ſocieties can never be in the ſame hands at once, thoſe *perſonalities and wills*, which *are*, and are *kept up*, diſtinct, will be eaſily underſtood to be ſo.

But, to crown the whole, let me obſerve, that nothing ſo clearly evinces the importance and neceſſity of this THEORY for juſtifying the right which the ſtate hath to interfere in church matters, as the miſtakes into which the excellent HOOKER was betrayed, on his miſſing of that capital idea of an ALLIANCE, when he came to defend *the right of civil princes to eccleſiaſtical dominion*, in the eighth book of his immortal work, intitled, OF THE LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY.

Now, although it hath been long doubted, Whether we have received the *three* laſt books of this work from the Author's moſt perfect copy, ſeeing they came not to the preſs till after his deceaſe; yet that they are indeed of the ſame hand with the other *five*, cannot I think be doubted by any who have ſtudied the unqueſtioned books with a due degree of attention.

The ſubject of this eighth book is, as we have ſaid, a defence of the civil magiſtrate, in the adminiſtration of eccleſiaſtical ſupremacy, againſt the PURITANS of that time, who denied the ſpiritual legality of ſuch a ſupremacy, and ſupported their oppoſition on this capital argument.—*The church and commonwealth being ſocieties or corporations totally diſtinct and independent on one another by nature, there*

there is a ſeparation perpetual and perſonal between the church and commonwealth *. This argument HOOKER attempts to overthrow. The poſition of his adverſary is looſely worded. But the conteſt, at that time, ſubſiſting between the *Puritans* and the *Church of England*, ſhews the meaning to be this, That "that INDEPENDENCY which a *religious* ſociety had by nature, it could never give up to the *civil*."

The argument itſelf might have been eaſily anſwered, as the Reader ſees it hath been in this diſcourſe of the *Alliance*, where the PREMISSES are not only granted, but by various reaſonings eſtabliſhed; and the INFERENCE not only denied, but by the ſame reaſonings refuted: It being ſhewn, that nothing can hinder two diſtinct and independent ſocieties from entering into compact: and that *only ſuch* ſocieties can contract a free *alliance*. This, which *may* be done lawfully, I have ſhewn *muſt* be done neceſſarily, before the church can claim the protection of the ſtate; or before the ſtate can engage the ſervice of the church; and both act in the manner in which theſe reciprocal benefits are given and returned, in the happy eſtabliſhment under which we live. In other words, I have ſhewn, how the church became enabled to exerciſe civil power without *tyranny*; and the ſtate, to exerciſe eccleſiaſtical power without *uſurpation*.

But, by ill hap, the excellent HOOKER took the contrary method: He denied the PREMISSES, inſtead of queſtioning the CONCLUSION; and ſo entangled himſelf and his cauſe in inextricable difficulties. He too haſtily conceded to his adverſaries, that thoſe things which were ſeparated by *nature*, and more eſpecially by divine *inſtitution*, and ſo, INDEPENDENT of one another, muſt always continue independent. An abſurd aſſertion! which the Reader will ſee confuted at large in the *Poſtſcript*, againſt the reaſoning of Lord Bolingbroke, who lately revived this Puritan principle. Inſtead therefore of expoſing the error of the *concluſion*, HOOKER addreſſes himſelf (as we ſaid) to confute the PEEMISSES; and to ſhew, that *church*

* Eccl. Pol. Book viii. p. 407.

and

and ſtate were not two ſocieties totally diſtinct and independent by nature, but rather *one and the ſame ſociety; which, regarded in different views, had different names* *. *For,* (ſaith he) *the truth is that the church and Commonwealth are names which import things really different.* But THESE THINGS ARE ACCIDENTS; *and ſuch accidents, as may, and always ſhould, dwell lovingly together in one* SUBJECT †. Which ſubject, he tells us, is the aggregate body of a people. Or, in other words, church and ſtate are one *ſociety under different names.* He attempts to ſupport this idea from *reaſon* and *fact.*

1. "We hold, (ſays he) that ſeeing there is not any man of "the Church of England but the ſame man is alſo a member "of the Commonwealth, nor any member of the Commonwealth "which is not alſo of the Church of England, therefore, as in a "figure triangle, the baſe doth differ from the ſides thereof, and "yet one and the ſelf-ſame line is both a baſe and alſo a ſide; a "ſide ſimply, a baſe if it chance to be the bottom, and underlye "the reſt: ſo albeit properties and actions of one, do cauſe the "*name of a Commonwealth*; qualities and functions of another ſort, "the *name of the church* to be given to a multitude; yet one and "the ſelf-ſame multitude may, in ſuch ſort, be both ‡." To this ingenious illuſtration, it is ſufficient to reply, in the great man's own words, in this very book:—*There is nothing for which ſome* COMPARABLE *reaſon or other may not be given*;—i. e. *by ſome ſimile or other, ſupported.*

But let us conſider the *argument,* on which he founds his illuſtration, "that the ſame individuals being members both of church and ſtate muſt make them but one community, under different names." An argument which he repeats in the next page.—"When all in the Commonwealth do believe the goſpel, and are "contained in the name of the church, how ſhould the church "remain BY PERSONAL SUBSISTENCE divided from the Common-"wealth? The church and the Commonwealth are in this caſe, "therefore,

* Page 407. Edit. 1723. † Page 409. ‡ Page 407.

" therefore, PERSONALLY, one ſociety: which ſociety being termed " *Commonwealth*, as it liveth under whatſoever form of ſecular " law and regiment; a *church*, as it liveth under the ſpiritual law " of Chriſt *."—Now all this ſtrange reaſoning ariſeth, as the reader ſees, from not diſtinguiſhing between a *natural* and an *artificial* PERSONAGE; which latter every ſociety, community, or corporation, neceſſarily creates; as hath been juſt now ſhewn at large in this very chapter; ſo that when this diſtinction is applied, the abſurdity becomes apparent.

2. The great writer's argument from *fact* is taken from the *Jewiſh Commonwealth*, where *church and ſtate* made but one ſociety.—" Unto the Jews (ſays he) God ſo revealed the truth of " religion, that he gave them, in ſpecial conſiderations, laws not " only for the adminiſtration of things ſpiritual, but alſo temporal. " The Lord himſelf appointing both the one and the other in that " Commonwealth, did not thereby diſtract it into ſeveral indepen- " dent communities, but inſtitute ſeveral functions of one and the " ſelf-ſame community. Some *reaſons* therefore muſt there be " alledged why it ſhould be otherwiſe in the church of Chriſt †." Theſe *reaſons*, the reader hath ſeen alledged juſt above. But with regard to his own reaſon, ſhewing whereby the Jewiſh church and ſtate became *one and the ſelf-ſame community*, nothing can be more defective; the true cauſe of *this incorporation* was peculiar and ſingular; it was the natural and neceſſary conſequence of a THEOCRACY; as hath been ſhewn at large elſewhere ‡; and therefore cannot be poſſibly urged in proof or ſupport of HOOKER's general principle, " that church and ſtate make but one ſociety or com- munity." However, this was an argument *ad homines*. The puritans of that time were accuſtomed to ſupport their diſſent from the eſtabliſhed diſcipline of the church, on peculiarities in the Moſaic œconomy, ill underſtood, and worſe applied. Yet had our great author, inſtead of oppoſing their premiſſes, bethought himſelf to

* Page 409. † Page 408.
‡ Divine Legation, Part II.

oppoſe

oppoſe their concluſion, *that the church and ſtate could never allie*, he had had a very eaſy victory; for all that the Puritans could find to ſupport this propoſition, was the principle, which in thoſe days they generally went upon, that *every thing was evil for which men had not the command or the permiſſion of ſcripture.* Now Hooker might eaſily have overthrown this principle, by only obſerving that there was ſuch *permiſſion given by ſcripture* to unite the two ſocieties, in the example of the Jewiſh republic.

But the abhorrence of one extreme, always runs indiſcreet diſputants into another. Sometimes the moſt diſcreet are liable to this abuſive conduct, when they have miſſed of the true medium. This was unhappily the caſe here. Hooker ſaw plainly, that the Puritan principle (which held, not only that *the church and Commonwealth were ſocieties totally diſtinct and independent on one another by nature, but that this ſeparation was to remain perpetual*) neceſſarily brought in that abſurd and fatal evil in politics, an *imperium in imperio:* for they held that the magiſtrate was notwithſtanding *ordained*, and therefore *obliged*, to ſupport the church, and to impart to it of his civil coercive power even while ſhe retained her independency and ſovereignty. To combat this principle, which makes the *ſtate a ſlave to the church*, Hooker ran into the oppoſite extreme, which makes the *church a ſlave to the ſtate.* His words are theſe: "Another occaſion of which *miſconceit*," (*viz.* that the church and ſtate are two diſtinct independent ſocieties) "is, that things "appertaining to religion are both diſtinguiſhed from other affairs, "and have always had, in the church ſpiritual, perſons choſen "to be exerciſed about them. By which diſtinction of ſpiritual "affairs, and perſons therein employed, from temporal, the error of "PERSONAL SEPARATION always neceſſary between the church "and Commonwealth hath ſtrengthened itſelf. For every politic "ſociety, that being true which *Ariſtotle* ſaith, namely, *that the "ſcope thereof is not ſimply to live*, NOR THE DUTY SO MUCH TO "PROVIDE FOR THE LIFE, as for the means of living well: and "that even as the ſoul is the worthier part of man, ſo human ſo-

"cieties

" cieties are much more to care for that which tendeth properly " to the ſoul's eſtate, than for ſuch temporal things which the life " hath need of. Other proof there needeth none, to ſhew that as " by all men the kingdom of God is to be ſought firſt, ſo in all " Commonwealths, things ſpiritual ought, above temporal, to be " ſought for; and of things ſpiritual the chiefeſt is religion *." This reaſoning is founded on the *miſconceit*, ſo thoroughly exploded above, " That civil ſociety was inſtituted for the attainment of every kind of good it is even accidentally capable of producing:" this he ſupports by the words of Ariſtotle ill interpreted; who by the *means of living well* meant no more, than that *ſociety* procured thoſe commodities of civil life, which in a *ſtate of nature* men muſt be content to live without. Ariſtotle's words are literally theſe, that ſociety was inſtituted firſt *for the ſake of living, ſimply; and then for the ſake of living happily*—γινομένη μὲν ὧν τῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, ὧσα δὲ τῦ εὖ ζῆν. He is extremely conciſe. But his meaning ſeems to be this, (as hath been obſerved above) that the *primary* end of civil ſociety, was to ſecure men from that mutual violence to which they were expoſed in a ſtate of nature: the *ſecondary*, to promote thoſe *accommodations* of life which civil ſociety only can beſtow. And here, I am ſorry to obſerve, that this excellent man, in paraphraſing the words of Ariſtotle, ſo as to give a ſenſe to his purpoſe, (a purpoſe, the Greek philoſopher never thought of) has added,—*nor the duty ſo much to provide for the life*—meaning THIS life.

But to proceed,—Again,—" Chriſtian Kings, within their own " precincts and territories, (ſays he) have an authority and power, " *even in matters of Chriſtian religion:* and there is no higher nor " greater that can in thoſe caſes ever command them, where they " are placed to reign as Kings †." The unavoidable conſequence of this doctrine is,

1. THAT *the church becomes a ſlave to the ſtate:* for if it be the firſt duty of the civil magiſtrate to ſee to the good condition of *things*

* Book viii. p. 408. † Page 411.

ſpiritual, the chiefeſt of which is religion, he muſt, on being inveſted with his office, (which Hooker very rightly derives from the people) be endowed with power to put and to keep *ſpiritual things in this condition*; which power can be no other than abſolute authority in church-matters, or, as Hooker himſelf more ſtrongly expreſſes it, *authority and power in* MATTERS OF CHRISTIAN RELIGION. So that the church as a religious ſociety hath nothing left to be performed, on their part, but a ready obedience to all the commands of the ſtate. And that this is no forced inference drawn from Hooker's principle will appear evident from hence,—One of the great purpoſes of Hobbes's LEVIATHAN is to prove, that the church is a creature of the ſtate: and he proceeds to induce his proof, on this very principle of Hooker, *that a* COMMONWEALTH *of Chriſtian men and a* CHURCH *are the ſame thing called by two names* *. But this is not the worſt; for,

2. Secondly, theſe principles ſupport and authorize *perſecution for opinions:* for if, when the magiſtrate decrees in religious matters, whether of doctrine or diſcipline, men will not ſubmit, the abſolute power here given him juſtifies him in uſing force, for *he beareth not the ſword in vain.* And to conteſs the truth, theſe principles, recommended by ſo great an authority, ſoon becoming the principles in faſhion; the practice ſoon followed: the magiſtrate became a *perſecutor*; and ſo continued; till *civil neceſſity*, ariſing from a ſtate revolution, not the *religious choice* of a better theory, put a final ſtop to this opprobrium of humanity.

To conclude, the PURITANS and their incomparable adverſary had, in this famous quarrel (as is the wont) divided truth and falſhood pretty equally between them. The Puritans were right in ſuppoſing church and ſtate to be two diſtinct independent ſocieties: they were wrong in ſuppoſing the two ſocieties muſt always continue ſo: but right again in holding, that while they did ſo continue, the civil magiſtrate had nothing to do with religion. On

* Leviathan.

the

the other hand, HOOKER was wrong in thinking, *church and ſtate* was only one ſociety under different names. He was right in aſſerting the civil magiſtrate's ſupremacy in religion; but wrong again in ſuppoſing that this ſupremacy was by *nature*, and not by *compact*. Thus, from right premiſes, the PURITANS drew a wrong concluſion; and from wrong premiſes, HOOKER drew a right one. But if, from the wrong concluſion of the *former*, the ſupremacy of the magiſtrate was for ever excluded; yet from the right concluſion of the *latter*, he was admitted before his time. And all this confuſion aroſe from a common error, admitted on both ſides, that if church and ſtate be diſtinct and independent ſocieties, they muſt EVER remain diſtinct and independent.

The reſult from all we have ſeen was this, that the PURITAN principle eſtabliſhed an IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO: and that HOOKER's introduced PERSECUTION FOR OPINIONS.

NOTES to BOOK II.

P. 79. [A]. WE have a remarkable inſtance of this in the ſtate of Venice, which is a thorough tyranny, if ever there was any. Mr. Bayle tells us [Crit. Dict. Art. *Abelard*, Rem. (P)], that one day aſking a friend, who had told him a thouſand ſtories of the diſorders of the Venetian eccleſiaſtics, how it happened that the ſtate would ſuffer things ſo diſhonourable to religion and ſociety? his informer replied, that the good of the public obliged the ſovereign to this indulgence; that the ſenate was not diſpleaſed to find the prieſts and monks fall under the public contempt for their debaucheries, for that in this condition they would have no credit to raiſe or foment ſedition amongſt the people; and that one of the reaſons why the Jeſuits were not acceptable to the ſovereign was, becauſe they knew how to preſerve the decorum of their character; and ſo, gaining reſpect and reverence by a more decent exteriour, had it in their power to excite the populace to ſedition.

P. 81. [B]. A juriſdiction ſomewhat reſembling this we find in the famous court of Areopagus at Athens: which city was once the model of *civil prudence* as well as of *religion*, to the improved part of mankind. Iſocrates, ſpeaking of this branch of juriſdiction in the Areopagus, ſays, *It was not occupied to puniſh crimes, but to prevent them*—ὃ τῦτο πρῶτον ἐσκό-πȣν, δι' ὧν κολάσȣσι τὺς ἀκοσμῦντας, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν ἂν κατασκευάσȣσι μηδὲν αὐτὺς ἄξιον ζημίας βȣλήσεσθαι ἁμαρτάνειν· ἡγῦντο γὰρ τῦτο μὲν αὐτῶν ἔργον εἶναι. ΑΡΕΙΟΠ. ΛΟΓ.

P. 84. [C]. In this conſiſts the MASTER-SOPHISM which runs through Tindal's whole book of the *Rights of the Chriſtian Church*. He brings all along the *confeſſed abuſe* of eccleſiaſtical government as an argument that the church

church is an *imperium in imperio*; whereas that evil conſiſts in the *legitimate* exerciſe of two contradictory ſovereign powers in one and the ſame republic; nothing of which there is, as we have ſhewn, in a church and ſtate; though both ſovereign and independent before *alliance*.

P. 85. [D]. The reaſon why, throughout this Diſcourſe, I have taken it for granted, "That a full and free toleration, or liberty of worſhipping God in the way every one ſhall chuſe, is of natural equity, and conſonant to the genius of our holy religion," is becauſe Mr. BAYLE in his *Philoſophic Commentary*, and Mr. LOCKE in his *Letters on Toleration*, have exhauſted the ſubject, and vindicated this liberty with the fulleſt and cleareſt evidence. And I am not of an humour *actum agere*. Mr. Voltaire indeed has lately undertaken to write in favour of it. How he has acquitted himſelf is now (ſince thoſe admirable diſcourſes have been in the hands of all mankind) of little conſequence to any but himſelf. Yet it muſt needs divert the Reader to obſerve the air with which he concludes—"Cet ecrit ſur la "tolerance eſt une requête que l'humanité preſente *tres humblement* au pou- "voir et à la prudence. JE SEME UN GRAIN QUI POURRA UN JOUR PRODUIRE "UN MOISSON."—*I ſow a grain of ſeed* (ſays he) *which may, one day, produce a harveſt*. He had been much nearer the truth, and that *humility*, which he here pretends to, if, with the man in the parable, he had confeſſed, that he *had reaped where another had ſown*. Or if in courteſy we will allow him his pretenſions, of being a labourer in the Lord's heritage, he will have the grace to confeſs, that he has ill obſerved the precept of the Law, *not to ſow his field with* MINGLED SEED: for his way throughout this diſcourſe is to recommend *toleration* by abuſing *religion*.

P. 94. [E]. When the QUAKERS firſt aroſe, the clergy generally claimed their tithes by DIVINE RIGHT; and there being nothing in the *light within* to direct thoſe people up to that original, they regarded the exaction of tithes as an *antichriſtian robbery*; and rather choſe to ſuffer, what they called, *perſecution*, than comply with the demand.

In no long time after, the Clergy in general gave up this claim. I think the prieſt's *divine right* to a tenth part, and the king's *divine right* to the other nine, went out of faſhion together. And thenceforward the church and the crown agreed to claim their temporal rights from the laws of the land only.

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One would think therefore, that when churchmen had changed their bad principles for better, the quakers might have done ſo too. To be candid, I will not ſuppoſe, they wanted this good diſpoſition. But the ſmalleſt change in their religious ſyſtem would have brought the whole into hazard. For here lay the difference between the *church* and the *conventicle*. The reform of the national religion from the corruptions of popery, was made on the principles of human reaſon guided by common ſenſe. In which, whatever miſtakes the REFORMERS had committed (errors incident to humanity), their ſucceſſors might redreſs without bluſhing; and, what is more, without any danger of diſhonouring religion. It was not ſo with the Quakers. For this ſect being founded in *modern inſpiration* (which is, by interpretation, *fanaticiſm*) to alter the leaſt article of their creed was giving the lye to the Holy Spirit, as it came from the mouth of their founder, George Fox.

Payment of tithes, therefore, was ſtill obſtinately to be refuſed. And, to ſupport their perſeverance, they had recourſe to another fetch of principle, "That whoever contributes to the ſupport of a thing ſinful is partaker of that ſin." And tithes being apparently ſinful, the deſired concluſion was within call. This afforded much conſolation to FRIENDS. It is true, the expedient was not without its inconvenience: for in the number of things ſinful, they held *war*, eſpecially an offenſive war, to be one. And then an act of parliament, granting an aid for the ſupport of ſuch a war, brought on a new diſtreſs. What was to be done? The king would be obeyed. This they well knew, and therefore in dutiful ſilence paid their quota, and left it to their ill-willers to detect the prevarication. Thus ſtands the caſe at preſent with theſe conſcientious people.

But to judge what indulgence is fairly due unto them, we ſhould conſider a little the true grounds of that complaiſance which free-ſtates are always diſpoſed to ſhew to tender conſciences. Now I apprehend they underſtand it to extend no further than to opinions which have no evil influence on the true and eſſential intereſts of ſociety. For to carry the indulgence further would be a ſpecies of fanaticiſm, though of a different kind indeed, yet as mad as that which produces the tender conſciences in queſtion.

Of opinions thus injurious, there are various kinds; from that which is leaſt ſo, the *unlawfulneſs of tithes*, up through the riſing degrees of—the UNLAWFULNESS *of oaths*—of *ſelf-defence*—of *capital puniſhments*; till we come

come to a reprobation of *civil magiſtracy* itſelf, and the renouncing of all kings *but king Jeſus*. It will be allowed, that moſt of them require ſuppreſſion, rather than indulgence: and I believe all will own that the laſt was not unjuſtly treated, when, in the memory of our fathers, it was exterminated between the king's guards and the gallows. To the firſt, the obſtinate refuſal to pay tithes, in defiance of the public laws, ſome indulgence has been reaſonably ſhewn: and that a wayward conſcience might lie as light as poſſible on their temporal intereſts, *a juſtice of peace* was authorized to wreſt from them, in an eaſy and expeditious way, what they could not keep, and were ſcrupulous to reſtore.

But now what return did they make for ſo much favour? Why, from thenceforward they never loſt an opportunity of teazing the legiſlature (of which they have given a recent inſtance) to exclude the clergy from every other entrance to juſtice. Their endeavours have been hitherto fruitleſs; and fruitleſs, I ſuppoſe, they are like to remain: for a more inſolent or iniquitous demand was never made on an equal legiſlature.

Theſe clergy-rights riſe upon the ſame footing with all the lay-rights in the kingdom; to whom every court of law and equity, as is fit, ſtands open. Yet theſe, as a ſealed fountain, are to be kept ſhut up for the ſolace of the ſaints; and the clergy to be admitted no higher than to the muddy ſtream of a country juſtice.

Had the Quakers confined their demand to an exemption from an *eccleſiaſtical juriſdiction*, ſome decency of appearances had been kept, for the ſpiritual courts might have been thought too much a party: not to ſay that the proper object of their power extends no further than *reformation of manners*. But to attempt a violation, not of this only, but of all civil communities, in which it is the eſſential right of citizens to have all the courts of juſtice thrown open to them, is a ſtrain of modeſty peculiar to this illuſtrious ſect.

P. 103. [F]. When a modern archbiſhop of the ſame ſee (and, to judge of him only by what follows, one might, though very erroneouſly, ſuſpect him of the ſame principles) had entertained us with this flattering ſtory of the archbiſhop Courtney, he proceeds thus: "Nor has the ſtatute of the "25th of Henry VIII. had any other influence on the ſtate of theſe aſſem-"blies [viz. Convocations] as to this matter [viz. the right of calling "themſelves] THAN ONLY THIS, that whereas, before, the archbiſhop "might, whenever he pleaſed, without any other direction, by his own "proper motion have ſummoned his clergy to a ſynod, now he may not "do

"do it, but by the king's writ to warrant him therein: but as for the "POWER of calling them, that is ſtill left to him as it was before." *Wake's State of the Church and Clergy of England*, p. 11. I believe, the Reader would ſuſpect me of a deſign to banter him, if in a ſimilar caſe I ſhould argue in a ſimilar manner, and ſay, "The FREE election of a biſhop by his "chapter, has received *no change* from what it was in ancient times *but only* "*this*; that whereas, anciently, the chapter, without any other direction, "might, on a vacancy, by their own proper motion, chuſe a new biſhop; "now they may not do it, but by the king's writ of *congé d'eſlire*; which they "muſt wait for, before they proceed to election. But as for the RIGHT of "chuſing their biſhop, that is ſtill left them as it was before." For without doubt the incurring a præmunire for ſummoning a ſynod, and chuſing a biſhop before the king's writ comes, or refuſing to ſummon or to chuſe after it is come, can never affect the *power* of the one or the *free choice* of the other.—But this will ever be the caſe even amongſt men of the moſt reaſonable principles, when they write, as party, and not as truth, directs their pen.

P. 118. [G]. CARTE the Nonjuror, AN ENGLISHMAN, as he calls himſelf, was (with a good deal of knowledge in old records, but without judgement) ſet on work and publickly paid to write a JACOBITE HISTORY OF *England*. This man, to ſupport his doctrine of *indefeaſible right*, obſerves, when he comes to the reign of Henry IV, *That the clergy of England have never* THRIVEN *under* (what he calls) *an uſurpation*. One of their *oppreſſions* under this reign, being, as he reckons, *to be enrolled in a commiſſion of array to oppoſe a French invaſion*. Now could any thing be more deſtructive of his avowed purpoſe than this ſilly obſervation, or more recommend an *interrupted* ſucceſſion to his maſters (who I ſuppoſe are *Engliſhmen* too), than that, at ſuch ſeaſons, the encroachments of the clergy on the civil power were wont to receive ſome check?

P. 128. [H]. But let it be obſerved, that the CANON LAW rarely cultivated a truth, but in order to graft a lye upon it: as here, under pretence of teaching humility in church governors, and of encouraging the inferior clergy to vindicate their Chriſtian liberty, the real purpoſe of the COURT of ROME was to mortify all Catholic biſhops, for inſolently pretending to be of the ſame rank and order with the biſhop of Rome; by a fair hint that they were BISHOPS but by courteſy, and that they differed from PRESBYTERS only in *name*, given them on no better authority than old doating *cuſtom*

P. 130.

P. 130. [I]. How neceſſary this SUPREMACY is, for the ſake of the ſtate, may be ſeen by the famous contention between the *Houſe of Commons* and the *Convocation* in 1532, before the Act of Submiſſion of the Clergy to *Henry* VIII.

The *Commons* in the year 1532 repreſent, in a petition to the King, "that the clergy in *Convocation* have made, and dayly make, divers ſanc-"tions or laws concerning *temporal things*; ſome of which be repugnant "to the laws and ſtatutes of the realm, not having ne requiring the royal "aſſent to the ſame; nother any aſſent or knowledge of the lay ſubject; "nother to them publiſhed and known in their mother tongue; albeit di-"vers of the ſaid laws extend to the King's perſon, his liberty, and pre-"rogative royal, and to the interdiction of his laws and poſſeſſions, and ſo "likewiſe to the goods and poſſeſſions of his lay ſubjects, declaring the "infringers of the ſaid laws, ſo by them made, not only to incur the "terrible cenſure of excommunication, but alſo the deteſtible crime and "ſin of hereſy; by which, the humble and obedient lay ſubjects be brought "into this ambiguity, whether they may execute the King's laws, accord-"ing to his juriſdiction royal, for dread of the ſame cenſures and pains com-"priſed in the ſame laws, ſo by them made in their Convocation, to the "great trouble and inquietation of the lay ſubject, &c. and the impeach-"ment of the King's juriſdiction and prerogative royal."

The anſwer of the *Convocation* to this repreſentation of the *Commons* was as follows——"We ſay, that foraſmuch as we repute and take our autho-"rity of making laws to be grounded upon the ſcripture of God, and "the determination of HOLY CHURCH, which muſt alſo be a rule and "ſquare to try the juſtice and righteouſneſs of all laws, as well ſpiritual "as temporal, we verily truſt, that, conſidering the laws of this realm be "ſuch as have been made by moſt Chriſtian, religious, and devout princes "and people, how both theſe laws proceeding from one fountain, the "ſame being ſincerely interpretated, and after the good meaning of the "makers, there ſhall be found no repugnancy nor contrariety, but that "the one ſhall be found, as aiding, maintaining and ſupporting the other. "And if it ſhall otherwiſe appear, as it is our duty to reform our ordinances "to God's commiſſion, and to conform our ſtatutes and laws and thoſe "of our predeceſſors, to the determination of ſcripture and HOLY CHURCH; "ſo we hope in God that your highneſs will, if there appear cauſe why, "with the aſſent of your people, temper your grace's laws accordingly.

" And as concerning the *requiring of your highneſs' royal aſſent* to the au-
" thority of ſuch laws as have been by our predeceſſors, or ſhall be made
" by us in ſuch points and articles as we have by God's authority to rule
" and order by ſuch proviſions and laws; we knowing your highneſs'
" wiſdom and virtue and learning, nothing doubt but the ſame perceiveth
" how the granting hereunto dependeth not upon our will and liberty.
" AND THAT WE, your moſt humble ſubjects, MAY NOT SUBMIT THE EXECU-
" TION OF OUR CHARGE AND DUTY certainly preſcribed by God, TO YOUR
" HIGHNESS' ASSENT, although in very deed the ſame is moſt worthy for
" your noble, princely, and excellent virtues, not only to give *your royal*
" *aſſent*, but alſo to deviſe and command what we ſhould for good order
" and manners by ſtatutes and laws provide in the church; nevertheleſs
" conſidering we may not refrain the doing of our office, we moſt humbly
" deſiring your grace, as the ſame hath heretofore, ſo from henceforth,
" to ſhew your grace's mind and opinion to us, which we ſhall moſt
" gladly hear and follow, IF IT SHALL PLEASE GOD TO INSPIRE US SO
" TO DO.

" Furthermore, whereas your ſaid lay-ſubjects ſay, that ſundry of the ſaid
" laws extend to your excellent perſon, your liberty, and prerogative
" royal, and to the interdiction of your lands and poſſeſſions: to this we
" ſay, that having ſubmitted the tryal and examining of the laws made
" in the church, by us and our predeceſſors, to the juſt and ſtrait rule of
" God's laws, which giveth meaſure of power, prerogative, and authority
" to all emperors, kings, princes and potentates, and all other; we have
" conceived ſuch opinion of your majeſty's goodneſs and virtue, that what-
" ſoever any perſons, not ſo well learned as your grace is, would pretend
" unto the ſame, whereby we may be brought into your grace's diſplea-
" ſure, ſurmiſing that we ſhould by uſurpation and preſumption extend
" our laws to your moſt noble perſon, prerogative and realm, yet the
" ſame your highneſs being ſo highly learned will facilly diſcharge and
" deliver us from that envy, when it ſhall appear that the ſaid laws are
" made by us or our predeceſſors conformable and maintainable by the
" ſcripture of God and *determination of the church*, AGAINST WHICH, NO
" LAWS CAN STAND OR TAKE EFFECT."

This was ſuch an apology as convinced HENRY that it was time to provide for their more perfect SUBMISSION; which he did, ſoon after, by act of parliament. For, how he reliſhed their anſwer appears from what he

he ſaid to the *Commons* when he ordered them to come and receive this anſwer of the *Convocation*. "We think (ſays he) their anſwer will finally "pleaſe you, for it ſeemeth to us very SLENDER. You be a GREAT "SORT OF WISE MEN; I doubt not but you will look CIRCUMSPECTLY "in the matter; and we will be INDIFFERENT between you."—Without doubt, he meant as an *umpire*, not as a ſimple *ſpectator*: For he was more concerned in the matter than either of them. The *Convocation* was intruſted with the welfare of the church: the *Commons* with that of the ſtate; but HENRY was intruſted with the welfare of both.

P. 131. [K]. Yet ſo perverſe or ignorant hath the citizen of Geneva ſhewn himſelf, that, after reading all this, he hath declared, that "though "the King of England hath eſtabliſhed himſelf *head of the church*, yet "in England as well as in other places there are two powers, two ſove-"reigns;" and conſequently an *imperium in imperio*. His reaſon is admirable: the *headſhip conſiſts rather in a power to preſerve religion than to change it*; that is, to deſtroy it. So that to prevent an *imperium in imperio*, nothing will ſerve him but the right of deſtroying at pleaſure. A right founded on no other principle than this, that religion is a *creature* of the ſtate, viz. a phantom invented by politicians to keep fools in awe. That this is all the notion which our virtuous citizen of Geneva has of the matter, he declares plainly enough throughout all his writings; and particularly by what immediately follows, "that of all the Chriſtian writers "the philoſopher, Hobbes, is the only man who has fully ſeen the miſ-"chief [of this *imperium in imperio*], and provided the remedy, by daring "to propoſe a reunion of the two heads of the eagle, and by bringing "back every thing to the political unity." But to manifeſt his good faith, or, at leaſt, his knowledge of the civil conſtitutions which he thus dogmatically condemns, he ſays, that *in all places where the clergy make and conſtitute a body, there they are maſters and legiſlators in their department*. In England the clergy make a body, and a diſtinct body; yet they are neither maſters nor legiſlators in their department. Their department is in CONVOCATION: yet there they cannot ſo much as enter into any buſineſs till they have particular and expreſs licence, from the civil magiſtrate, for ſo doing. He pretends to have read what is here ſaid of the *Alliance between Church and State*, as it exiſts at preſent in England: and there he might ſee, that the firſt and moſt neceſſary conſequence of the King's becoming

becoming *head of the church* is, that without the consent and allowance of the state, the church can exert no act of authority or legislation to decree or change any thing either in the discipline or doctrines of religion.

" Parmi nous, les rois d'Angleterre se sont établis chefs de l'Eglise, autant en ont fait les czars; mais par ce titre ils s'en sont moins rendus les maîtres que les ministres; ils ont moins acquis le droit de la changer que le pouvoir de la maintenir; ils n'y sont pas LEGISLATEURS, ils n'y sont que *princes*. Partout ou le clergé fait un corps il est maitre & legislateur dans sa partie. Il y a donc deux puissances, deux souverains, en Angleterre et en Russie, comme tout ailleurs. De tous les auteurs Chretiens le philosophe Hobbes est le seul qui ait bien vû le mal et le remede, qui ait osé proposer de réunir les deux têtes de l'Aigle, et de tout ramener à l'unité politique, sans laquelle jamais etat ni gouvernment ne sera bien constitué." *Du Contract Social*, L. iv. c. 8.

P. 133. [L]. The very learned, the president Henault, in his Chronological History of France, speaking in justification of the CONCORDAT, which gives the right of nomination of the greater benefices to the King, and of its just preference to the PRAGMATIC SANCTION, says—" Que le " roi *representant la nation*, c'est a lui d'exercer les droits qu'exercoient " les premiers fideles; et *qu'ils lui ont remis lorque l'Eglise a* ETE REÇUE " *dans l'etat*, POUR PRIX DE LA PROTECTION *que le roi accordoit a la reli-* " *gion*;" p. 603, ed. 8vo; agreeable to the principles, and in the very words, of the ALLIANCE.

P. 135. [M]. As in these *incorporate unions*, it commonly happens that the *fundamental* articles are declared by the contracting parties, to be unalterable; it hath become a question, whether the new sovereignty can alter such articles without dissolving the UNION. The difficulty seems to arise from the very nature of the convention. Two independent states unite in one, on certain conditions, declared, by the contracting parties, to be unalterable. When these two states are *equal*, a new one arises from their incorporation, composed of the other two; when *unequal*, the less is melted down into the more powerful; as in this latter case one only of the contracting parties now subsists; so, in the other, neither of them. But good faith requires, that all contracts shall remain in force, till dissolved by the mutual consent of the contracting parties themselves; but here the contracting

ing parties are no longer in being: So that theſe articles of *union* would ſeem to be perpetual, though that condition had not been expreſsly ſtipulated. On the other hand, the inceſſant flux of human things neceſſitates ſociety, in courſe of time, to make changes in the moſt fundamental parts of the conſtitution. This is the difficulty: which ſeems not to be well ſolved in only recurring to the common power of the ſovereignty of repealing and changing the laws; whoſe very *title* indeed ſhews the abſurdity of an irrevocable law; as ſuch law would tend to deſtroy the very power which puts it in force; for the reaſon of this act of power is founded on a ſuppoſition, that the laws, revoked by the ſovereign, were of the ſovereign's enacting; which is not the fact, in the caſe before us. For the articles of *Union*, made before the incorporation, had for their author, powers different from what are now left for their abrogation; one or both the contracting powers being no longer exiſtent.

To juſtify any alteration, therefore, we muſt have recourſe to a higher principle; which is not the rights of this or that ſovereignty, but of ſociety itſelf, as ſuch. Contracts between independent ſtates are of the ſame nature as thoſe between individuals. Now a number of individuals, let it be three hundred, or three hundred thouſand, agree, in the ſtate of nature, to form themſelves into civil ſociety. The *firſt convention* (as it is called by the writers on the laws of nature and nations) by which the *form* of government is agreed upon, is between individuals; where the conſent of every one is neceſſary to make him ſubject to it. And this *form* they declare to be unalterable, as the only one they are willing to exchange for their natural liberty. After this follows the *ſecond convention*; in which protection and allegiance are mutually promiſed by ſovereign and people; whereby the contracting parties in the *firſt convention* become annihilated, and a new factitious perſon is produced; as appears from hence, that in the *firſt convention* the conſent of every one is neceſſary to conclude him; in the *ſecond*, the majority is ſufficient. Now who ever doubted but that this new created body had a right of altering the form of government? For the neceſſity, which ariſes from the nature of things, requiring an alteration, and the contracting parties being no longer exiſtent, their ſurvivor muſt needs be deemed their ſubſtitute, on whom all their power is devolved.

P. 137.

P. 137. [N]. N. Bacon, in his diſcourſe on the Engliſh Government, compoſed by the aſſiſtance of Selden's papers, ſays, "The common law ever "held the ſupreme cognizance of excommunication within its own power, "as upon the writ *de quare excommunic to* may appear," p. 182. It was a law from the Conqueſt, and all along inſiſted on, that none of the king's barons could be excommunicated without his leave: For in the feudal times there was ſo cloſe a connexion between the ſovereign and his feudatories, that it was a maxim in this law, that the Lord owes no leſs to his vaſſal, than the vaſſal owes to the lord.

P. 147. [O]. The reader cannot but be much edified with the admirable reaſoning of Dr. Hoadly, Biſhop of Bangor, againſt Dr. Hare, Dean of Worceſter: who had quoted this text, and underſtood it in the ſenſe here given to it.—"Can ſuch a writer as this (ſays his lordſhip), ſo warm in a "cauſe touching the authority of the church, forget that the *church of* "*Chriſt* is not the CHILD of *Kings and Queens* becoming chriſtians, but the "MOTHER; that the buſineſs of a *mother* is to nurſe and feed her children, "and not to be fed by them: and that the church is thus repreſented even "by thoſe who are perpetually quoting this text? Nay the dean ought "to be put in mind that Chriſtian kings and queens are a part of this "very church, to which they are here repreſented as *nurſes*: and that if this "text relates to Chriſt's church, then Chriſtian kings and queens are to "*nurſe* themſelves."—*Dean of Worceſter ſtill the ſame*, &c. p. 71.—To all this, I will only ſuppoſe the dean to reply, "Can ſuch a writer as this, "ſo warm in a cauſe touching the *ſupremacy* of the civil magiſtrate, forget "that a *Chriſtian king*, is not the HEAD, but a MEMBER of the church: "that the buſineſs of every member in a body is to miniſter to the wants of "every other, *for we are members one of another* [Eph. iv. v. 25.]; not to "rule and domineer over all. Nay the biſhop ought to be put in mind, "that as kings and queens are parts and *members* of this very church of "which they are repreſented as *heads*, their *headſhip*, inſtead of being em-"ployed to govern others, muſt be exerciſed in governing themſelves."—But, the force of this ingenious reaſoning is more fully ſeen in the next chapter, where we ſpeak of *natural and fictitious perſonality*.

P. 148. [P]. Biſhop *Burnet*, in his Hiſtory of *Charles* II. p. 538. tells us, that *Algernon Sidney's* notion of Chriſtianity was, *that it was like a divine philoſophy in the mind, without public worſhip, or any thing that looked like a church.*

church. That an ignorant Monk who had ſeen no further than his cell, or a mad fanatic who had looked beſide his reaſon, ſhould talk in this manner, would be nothing ſtrange. But that a man ſo ſupremely ſkilled in the ſcience of human nature and civil policy, and who knew ſo well what religion was able to do for the ſtate, ſhould fall into this error, is indeed ſurpriſing. The view of thoſe monſtrous abuſes which Chriſtianity had done and ſuffered, in its application to the ſtate's ſervice, through a long age of ignorance, by a bloody and debauched clergy, and all for want of being guided by the principles here laid down, was, I ſuppoſe, the thing which ſtruck him with horror, and inclined him to eſpouſe this ſtrange novelty; inſtead of recurring to that natural remedy, which another great man, embarked in the ſame *cauſe*, points out, where he deſcribes the malady.——Primo homines ut tutò ac liberè ſine vi atque injuriis vitam agerent convenere in CIVITATEM; ut ſanctè et religiosè, in ECCLESIAM: illa *leges*, hæc *diſciplinam* habet ſuam, planè DIVERSAM. Hinc toto orbe Chriſtiano per tot annos bellum ex bello ſeritur, quod MAGISTRATUS et ECCLESIA inter ſe OFFICIA CONFUNDUNT. *Miltoni Defenſ. Pref.*

BOOK

BOOK III.

OF A TEST-LAW.

CHAP. I.

Of the Origin and Uſe of a Teſt-Law.

O MAGNA VIS VERITATIS, quæ contra hominum ingenia, calliditatem, ſollertiam, contraque fictas omnium inſidias, facile ſe, per ſe, ipſa defendat*!" Thus breaks out the illuſtrious Roman, tranſported by a fit of philoſophical enthuſiaſm. This *force of truth* never ſhone with greater luſtre than on the preſent occaſion: where, by the aſſiſtance of a few plain and ſimple principles, taken from the nature of man, and the ends of political ſociety, we have cleared up a chaos of controverſy; proved the juſtice and neceſſity of an ALLIANCE BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE; deduced the mutual conditions on which it was formed; and ſhewn them to have an amazing agreement with our own happy eſtabliſhment. What remains is to vindicate the equity of what our conſtitution calls a TEST-LAW; which we are now enabled to do *on the very principles of our adverſaries themſelves.*

* Cicer. Orat. pro Cœlio.

The neceſſity of a NATIONAL RELIGION was, till of late, one of the moſt unconteſted principles in politics. The practice of all nations and the opinion of all ſages concurred to give it credit. To collect what the beſt and wiſeſt authors of antiquity (where the conſent was univerſal) have ſaid in favour of a *national religion*, would be endleſs. We ſhall content ourſelves with the opinion of two modern writers in its favour: who, being profeſſed advocates for the common rights of mankind, will, we ſuppoſe, be favourably heard. "This (ſays one of them) was ancient policy [*viz.* the "union of the civil and religious intereſts] and hence it is neceſſary "that the people ſhould have a public leading in religion. For to "deny the magiſtrate a worſhip, or take away a NATIONAL CHURCH, "is as mere enthuſiaſm as the notion which ſets up perſecution *." "Toward keeping mankind in order (ſays the other) it is neceſſary "there ſhould be ſome religion profeſſed and even ESTABLISHED †." Indeed not many, even now, will directly deny this neceſſity; though, by employing ſuch arguments againſt a *Teſt* as would deſtroy an *eſtabliſhment*, they open a way, though a little more obliquely, to this concluſion. But it is that unavoidable conſequence ſpringing from an *eſtabliſhed church* in every place where there are diverſities of religions, a TEST-LAW, which makes the judgement of ſo many revolt; and chuſe rather to give up an *eſtabliſhment* than receive it with this tyrannical attendant. Although it appears, at firſt view, ſo evident that, when a church and ſtate are in UNION, he who cannot give ſecurity for his behaviour to *both*, may with as much reaſon be deprived of ſome civil advantages, as he, who, before the UNION, could not give ſecurity to the ſtate alone.

The matter, therefore, of greateſt concern remains to be enquired into; namely, how *the equity of a teſt-law* can be deduced from thoſe principles of the law of nature and nations, by which we have ſo clearly proved *the juſtice of an Eſtabliſhed Religion*. But here, as

* Shafteſbury's Characteriſticks, Vol. I. Tr. 1. § 2.

† Wollaſton's Religion of Nature Delineated, p. 124.

before,

before, in the caſe of an *eſtabliſhment*, it is not to my purpoſe to defend this or that national form or mode of *teſt*; for it may ſo happen (I wiſh I could ſay it has not happened) that the very worſt may be employed, where the dangers are preſſing, or the paſſions of men inflamed; but to defend a TEST-LAW in general. By which I underſtand *ſome ſufficient proof or evidence required from thoſe admitted into the adminiſtration of public affairs, that they are members of the religion eſtabliſhed by law.*

And, in ſhewing the juſtice, equity, and neceſſity of a *teſt-law*, I ſhall proceed in the manner in which I ſet out, and have hitherto obſerved, of deducing all my concluſions, in a continued chain of reaſoning, from the ſimple principles at firſt laid down.

Hitherto I have conſidered *that alliance*, between church and ſtate, which produces an *eſtabliſhment*, only under its more ſimple form, *i. e.* where there is but *one religion* in the ſtate. But it may ſo happen, that either at the time of convention, or afterwards, there may be *more than one.*

I. If there be more than one at the time of convention, the ſtate allies itſelf with the LARGEST of theſe religious ſocieties. It is *fit* the ſtate ſhould do ſo; becauſe the larger the religious ſociety is, where there is an equality in other points, the better enabled it will be to anſwer the ends of an *alliance*; as having the greateſt number under its influence. It is *ſcarce poſſible* it ſhould do otherwiſe; becauſe the two ſocieties being compoſed of the ſame individuals, the greatly prevailing religion muſt have a majority of its members in the aſſemblies of ſtate; who will naturally prefer their own religion to any other.

With this religion is the *alliance* made; and a full TOLERATION given to the reſt, *in eſſe*, or *in poſſe* *. Yet under the reſtriction of a TEST-LAW, to keep them from hurting that which is *eſtabliſhed.*

* See note [A], at the end of this Book.

From this account of the origin of a *teſt-law* may be deduced the following COROLLARIES concerning an *eſtabliſhment*. For,

1. From hence may be ſeen the reaſon why the *epiſcopal* is the *eſtabliſhed* church, in ENGLAND; and the *preſbyterian* the *eſtabliſhed* church in SCOTLAND; and the equity of that CONVERSION; which our adverſaries have repreſented as ſo egregious an abſurdity, in point of right, that it is ſufficient to diſcredit the reaſon of all *eſtabliſhments*.

2. Hence too may be ſeen the truth of what was before obſerved, concerning the DURATION of this *alliance*: that it is PERPETUAL, but NOT IRREVOCABLE; *i. e.* it ſubſiſts juſt ſo long as the church, thereby eſtabliſhed, maintains its ſuperiority of extent: which when it loſes to any conſiderable degree, the *alliance* becomes void. For the united church being then no longer able to perform its part of the convention, which is formed on reciprocal conditions, the ſtate becomes diſengaged. And a NEW ALLIANCE is, of courſe, contracted with the now prevailing church, for the reaſons which made the *old*. Thus, formerly, the *alliance* between the PAGAN CHURCH and the empire of Rome was diſſolved; and the CHRISTIAN eſtabliſhed, in its place: and, of late, the *alliance* between the POPISH CHURCH and the kingdom of England was broken; and another made with the PROTESTANT, in its ſtead.

II. If theſe different religions ſpring up *after* the alliance hath been formed; then, whenever they become conſiderable, a *teſt-law* is neceſſary, for the ſecurity of the *eſtabliſhed church*. For amongſt diverſities of religions, where every one thinks itſelf the *only true*, or, at leaſt, the *moſt pure*, every one aims at riſing on the ruins of the reſt *: which it calls, *bringing into conformity* with itſelf. The means of doing this when reaſon fails, which is rarely at hand,

* See an hiſtorical narration of the conduct of the early *Puritans* to make their diſcipline national in ſpight of the civil magiſtrate, in a curious account printed 1593, and intitled, "Dangerous Poſitions and Proceedings publiſhed and practiſed within this Iſland of Brytaine, under pretence of Reformation and for the Preſbiterial Diſcipline."

and

and more rarely heard when it is, will be by getting into the public adminiſtration, and applying the civil power to the work. But, when one of theſe religions is the *eſtabliſhed*, and the reſt under a *toleration*, then envy at the advantages of an *eſtabliſhment* will join the *tolerated* churches in confederacy againſt it, and unite them in one common quarrel to diſturb its peace. In this imminent danger, the *allied* church calls upon the ſtate, for the performance of its contract; who thereupon gives her a TEST-LAW for her ſecurity: whereby an entrance into the adminiſtration (the only way, the threatened miſchief may be effected) is ſhut to all but members of the *eſtabliſhed* church. So when the *ſectaries*, in the time of Charles the Firſt, had, for want of this law, overturned the *church* of *England*; as ſoon as the government was reſtored, and replaced on its old foundations, the legiſlature thought fit to make a *teſt-law* * (though with the lateſt; and, what was worſe, with the narroweſt views) to prevent a repetition of the like diſaſters. A law, on its firſt enacting, confeſſed, on all hands, ſo *equitable* as well as *expedient*, that the celebrated lord Digby, then earl of Briſtol, eminent for his parts of ſpeculation and buſineſs, though at that time a *papiſt*, largely acknowledged the high wiſdom of it, by arguments of great weight and validity. When the bill was firſt brought into the Houſe of Lords, the noble earl delivered his mind to this effect:—"He declared himſelf a catholic of the "*church*, not of the *court*, of Rome; and therefore ſpoke as a faith-"ful member of a Proteſtant parliament. The bill, he obſerved, "was brought up from the Houſe of Commons, the repreſentatives "of the people, and conſequently the beſt judges of the temper of "the nation. A bill as full of moderation towards Catholics, as of "prudence and ſecurity towards the religion of the ſtate: all the "particulars of it being reduced to this one intent, NATURAL TO "ALL SOCIETIES OF MEN, of hindering a leſſer oppoſite party from "growing too ſtrong for the greater and more conſiderable one.

* In 1671.

"And

" And in this juſt way of prevention (ſays he) is not the modera-
" tion of the Houſe of Commons to be admired, that they have
" reſtrained it to this ſole point of DEBARRING THEIR ADVERSARIES
" FROM OFFICES AND PLACES? However, the ſentiments of a Ca-
" tholic of the church of Rome may oblige me, upon ſcruple of
" conſcience in ſome particulars of this bill, to give my negative to
" it, when it comes to paſſing; yet as a member of a Proteſtant
" parliament my advice prudentially cannot but go along with the
" main ſcope of it."

Thus a TEST-LAW took its birth; whether *at*, or *after* the time of *alliance*. And from this moment the juſtice and equity of an ESTABLISHED CHURCH began to be called in queſtion. It will be therefore proper, in the next place, to ſhew that the ſtate is under the higheſt obligations to provide the church with this ſecurity.

CHAP. II.

Of the Neceſſity and Equity of a Teſt-Law.

WE have now proved the equity and neceſſity of the *Alliance between Church and State*; and have therefore a right to uſe it as a *principle*, in our further inquiry.

I. By this *alliance*, the ſtate promiſed to protect the church, and to ſecure it from the injuries and inſults of its enemies. An attempt, in the members of any other church, to get into the adminiſtration, in order to deprive the eſtabliſhed church of the covenanted rights which it enjoys, either by ſharing thoſe advantages with it, or by drawing them from it, is highly injurious. And we have ſhewn, that where there are diverſities of religions, this attempt will be always making: the ſtate then muſt defeat that attempt: But there is no other way of doing it, than by hindering its enemies from entering into the adminiſtration: but they can be hindered only by a TEST-LAW.

II. Again,

II. Again, This promiſe of protection is of ſuch a nature, as is, on no pretence, to be diſpenſed with. For, protection was not only a condition of alliance, but, on the church's part, the *ſole* condition of it. We have ſhewn, that all other benefits and advantages are *foreign* to a church, *as ſuch*, and *improper* for it. Now the not performing the *ſole condition* of a convention virtually deſtroys and diſſolves it: eſpecially if we conſider that this ſole condition is both *neceſſary* and *juſt*: *Neceſſary*, as a free convention muſt have mutual conditions; and, but for *this*, one ſide would be without any: *Juſt*, as the convention itſelf is founded on the laws of nature and nations; and *this* the only condition which ſuits the nature of a church to demand or expect.

III. But again, the church, in order to enable the ſtate to perform this *ſole condition*, the affording of protection, conſented to give up its ſupremacy, and independency, to the civil ſovereign. Whence it follows, that whenever the enemies of the eſtabliſhed church get into the magiſtrature, to which, as we ſaid, the ſupremacy of the church is transferred by the alliance, ſhe becomes a prey, and lies entirely at their mercy: being now, by the loſs of her ſupremacy, in no condition for defence, as ſhe was in her natural ſtate, unprotected and independent. So that not to ſecure her by a *teſt-law* is betraying, and delivering her up bound, to her enemies.

Thus it is ſeen what obligation the ſtate lies under, from compact, of providing a *teſt-law* for the ſecurity of the *eſtabliſhed church*: and, by inforcing this obligation, from the laſt motive, we have obviated the only plauſible objection that could be made to our account of this *condition of protection*: which is, "That if an union between church and ſtate be, as we have repreſented it, ſo neceſſary for the well-being of civil ſociety, how happened it, that that univerſal charity to mankind, which is the characteriſtic of true religion, could not engage the church to enter into union, without ſtanding upon terms of advantage to itſelf: eſpecially ſuch as neceſſarily introduce a *teſt-law*, ſo full of inconvenience to the ſubject?"

This

This objection, though already obviated, ſhall be now conſidered more particularly. 1. We ſay, that religion conſtituting a political ſociety, and it being of the nature of political ſociety to ſeek ſupport from alliances, the church was in a proper and reaſonable purſuit, when it aimed at its own advantage in this convention. 2. We ſay, that as man, when he entered into civil ſociety, neceſſarily parted from ſome of his natural rights, ſo the church, when it entered into *alliance* with the ſtate, did the ſame. The right ſhe departed from was her *independency*; which ſhe transferred to the civil ſovereign: for no alliance can be made between two ſuch independent ſocieties, till *one* hath given up its *independency* to the other; and this, the law of nations ſays, ſhall be the leſs powerful ſociety: which, in the preſent caſe, is the church. Now, as man received an equivalent for the natural rights he gave up; ſo, in all reaſon, ſhould the church. 3. But laſtly, we ſay, the church could not enter into alliance, and not ſtipulate for this condition, without concurring to its own deſtruction. It hath been ſhewn juſt before, that the *dependency* of the church on the ſtate neceſſarily follows an alliance: and, in the preceding paragraph, that, where a church, in this condition, hath enemies in the magiſtrature, and without means of defence in herſelf, ſhe muſt expect the moſt fatal iſſue. Now the great law of ſelf-preſervation obliges her to provide againſt them. But no other proviſion can be made than engaging the protection of the ſtate. Therefore we conclude, that the church's ſtipulating for that protection was not only what ſhe in juſtice *might*, but what in duty ſhe was *obliged* to do.

Here we might have concluded our inquiry; having, in a continued chain of reaſoning, drawn from the moſt ſimple principles, explained the original and nature of civil and religious ſociety; and, from thence, deduced our main concluſions, The NECESSITY OF AN ESTABLISHED CHURCH, and The JUSTICE AND EQUITY OF A TEST-LAW.

But, that nothing may be wanting to put ſo important a matter out of controverſy,

II. I pro-

II.

I proceed, in the next place, to ſhew, that had no promiſe of protection been made, yet the ſtate would have lain under the moſt indiſpenſable neceſſity of providing a *teſt-law* for *its own* ſecurity. A celebrated writer, who, as far as *religion* hath to do with *politics*, was no bad judge, either of its eſſential or accidental effects, ſpeaking of a TEST-LAW, ſcruples not to pronounce, "That no man ought to "be truſted with any ſhare of power under a government, who "muſt, to act conſiſtently with himſelf, endeavour the deſtruction "of that very government *."

It hath been obſerved, that wherever there are diverſities of religion, each ſect, believing its own the true, ſtrives to advance itſelf on the ruins of the reſt. If this doth not ſucceed by force of argument, theſe partiſans are very apt to have recourſe to the coactive power of the ſtate: which is done by introducing a party into the public adminiſtration. And they have always had art enough to make the ſtate believe, that its intereſts were much concerned in the ſucceſs of their religious quarrels. What perſecutions, rebellions, revolutions, loſs of civil and religious liberty, theſe inteſtine ſtruggles between ſects have occaſioned, is well known even to ſuch as are leaſt acquainted with the hiſtory of mankind.

To prevent theſe miſchiefs was (as we have ſhewn) one great motive for the ſtate's ſeeking *alliance* with the church. For the obvious remedy was to *eſtabliſh* one church, and give a *free toleration* to the reſt. But if, in adminiſtering this cure, the ſtate ſhould ſtop ſhort, and not proceed to exclude the *tolerated* religions from entering into the public adminiſtration, ſuch imperfect application of the remedy would infinitely heighten the diſtemper. For, before the *alliance*, it was only a miſtaken aim in propagating truth, which occaſioned theſe diſorders: but now, the zeal for opinions would be out of meaſure inflamed by envy and emulation; which

* Lord Bolingbroke's Letter to Sir W. Windham; where, if in any place, he delivers his real opinion.

the temporal advantages, enjoyed by the *eſtabliſhed* church, excluſive of the reſt, will always occaſion. And what miſchiefs this would produce, had every ſect a free entry into the adminiſtration, the reader may eaſily conceive.

Now this being the inevitable fate of every government where religion is *eſtabliſhed*, with diverſity of ſects, and without a teſt-law; and an *eſtabliſhed religion* being proved indiſpenſably neceſſary to ſociety; we muſt conclude, that the ſtate has the moſt preſſing reaſons to provide a teſt-law, as well for its own ſecurity, as for the diſcharge of its contract with the church *.

If it be ſaid, That would men content themſelves, as, in reaſon, they ought, with enjoying their own opinions, without obtruding them upon others, theſe evils, which require the remedy of a *teſt-law*, would never happen. This is very true: and ſo would men but obſerve the rule of right in general, there would be no need to have recourſe to civil ſociety to rectify the evils of a ſtate of nature.

CHAP. III.

In which the objections to the equity and expediency of a teſt-law are conſidered.

HAVING gone thus far, the argument leads us to give ſome good account of the principal *objections* againſt the EQUITY of a *teſt-law:* the way being now cleared to a ready and ſatisfactory anſwer.

I. The firſt *objection*, the ſheet-anchor of the cauſe, is this, "That every qualified ſubject having a right to a ſhare of the ho-"nours and profits in the diſpoſal of the magiſtrate, the debarring "him from theſe advantages, for matters of opinion, is a violation "of the common rights of ſubjects." This goes directly to the eſſentials; and attacks the very JUSTICE and EQUITY of a *teſt-law:* the other objections being only againſt the uſe and expediency of it.

* See note [B], at the end of this Book.

If

If then it can be ſhewn, that our adverſaries have here taken for granted a thing, which, though by reaſon of miſtaken notions of government, was never in diſpute, is yet utterly falſe; we ſhall quite overthrow all that oſtentatious declamation by which they have endeavoured to diſcredit a *teſt-law*. I ſay, therefore, that this pretended *right of every qualified ſubject to a ſhare of the honours and profits in the diſpoſal of the ſupreme magiſtrate* is altogether groundleſs and viſionary.

Let it be remembered, that, in the third chapter of the firſt book, it hath been proved at large, that REWARD IS NOT ONE OF THE SANCTIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY: the only claim which ſubjects have on the magiſtrate, for *obedience*, being *protection*.

Now the conſequence of this is, that all places of honour and profit, in the magiſtrate's diſpoſal, are not there in the nature of a TRUST; to be claimed, and equally ſhared by the ſubject: but of the nature of PREROGATIVE; which he may diſpoſe of at pleaſure, without being further accountable, than for having ſuch places *ably* ſupplied.

All right of claim then being abſolutely at an end; and conſequently, all *injuſtice*, in excluding at pleaſure; we might here finiſh our diſcourſe, having taken from our adverſaries the great *palladium* of their cauſe.

But, ſecondly, ſhould we for argument's ſake ſuppoſe, what is abſolutely falſe, that the ſubject had a *right*; yet ſtill it will be found to be amongſt thoſe rights, which are not *claimable*. For let it be again remembered, that in ſpeaking of moral *duties*, we obſerved, they were of two kinds, of *perfect* and *imperfect* obligation: and therefore anſwerable to theſe, muſt needs be the *rights* ariſing from them. Thoſe which ariſe from the duties of perfect obligation being *claimable*; and thoſe from imperfect obligation, not ſo. But an equal diſpenſation of public honours and profits can never be thought other than in the claſs of duties of imperfect obligation, ſuch as, in private men, *gratitude*, *hoſpitality*, *charity*; and conſe-

quently the right to them cannot be *claimable*, even when abuſively with-held.

But, to leave nothing unanſwered, let us, for a moment, wave theſe advantages; and, for argument-ſake, as before, ſuppoſe this COMMON RIGHT OF SUBJECTS; and then the propoſition will come to this,

That to exclude a citizen from his civil rights, for matters of opinion, is a violation of the common rights of ſubjects.

This propoſition, we ſee, is founded on theſe two others, 1. *That opinions cannot be puniſhed, becauſe puniſhment can be inflicted only for matters in which the will is concerned, and the will is not concerned in matters of opinion.* 2. *If opinions could be puniſhed, they are not within the civil magiſtrate's juriſdiction; his care extending only to bodies.* Now if it can be made appear that theſe two latter propoſitions give no ſupport to the former, we muſt conclude that the *objection* is, even in this ſenſe, vain and groundleſs.

To the firſt propoſition I reply, that it is indeed univerſally true; but not at all to the purpoſe: the diſqualification, by a teſt-law, being no PUNISHMENT in the true ſenſe of the word, which is that implied in the propoſition. To the ſecond, I ſay, that it is not univerſally true: for that when opinions do, directly and neceſſarily, affect the peace of ſociety, they then come within the magiſtrate's juriſdiction; and that this exception takes place in the caſe before us; the opinions, which a teſt-law makes matter of diſqualification, directly and neceſſarily affecting the peace of civil ſociety.

1. The firſt aſſertion is thus proved; evil of all kinds, and whence-ſoever proceeding, man hath, by nature, a right to repel. Evil which proceeds not from the will is called a *miſchief*; and may be ſimply repelled; and this repulſion is called RESTRAINT: evil which proceeds from the will is called a *crime*; and may, not only, be repelled, but have additional pain, more than ſufficient for the reſtraint, inflicted on the author; and this repulſion is properly called PUNISHMENT. That puniſhment ſhould not be inflicted for a miſchief, that is, for an evil in which the will is not concerned, is

is plain from hence; the *end* of that additional pain, more than is ſufficient for reſtraint, called puniſhment, being *a ſatisfaction to juſtice*, for *the reformation of the offender*, and for *example to deter others*; it would be abſolutely unjuſt to inflict *avenging* pain for what was involuntarily committed: and altogether impertinent to attempt to deter, by *example*, from involuntary actions. The utmoſt therefore that can be inflicted for a *miſchief* is *reſtraint*; that is, juſt ſo much pain, when the miſchief proceeds from a rational agent, as is neceſſary to repel that miſchief. Thus is *reſtraint* properly annexed to *miſchief*; and *puniſhment* to *crimes*.

Such diſtinct and preciſe *moral modes*, one would think, it was not very eaſy to confound. And yet they have been confounded; ſo as utterly to embarras all our reaſonings on this ſubject. It is true, while they are conſidered in their application to irrational and rational agents, the difference is ſeldom miſtaken; but when they are both applied to rational agents, then it is that men begin to confound the ideas, and loſe ſight of all theſe marks of diſtinction. For 1. *pain* being an inſeparable *idea* in puniſhment; and every *reſtraint* of a rational agent having ſome degree of pain attending it; this idea common to both led them to think the two terms, in each of which it was found, were ſynonymous. 2. *Reſtraint* of a rational agent being defined to be an infliction of *juſt ſo much* pain as is neceſſary to repel the evil, and *puniſhment* to be an infliction of *more* than is neceſſary for that purpoſe, men conſidered the difference as only from leſs to more: and applying *this* to *miſchiefs* and *crimes* ſet together in compariſon, inſtead of applying it to *miſchiefs* compared with *miſchiefs*, and *crimes* with *crimes*, even this ſmall difference was loſt and confounded. Becauſe, where the *miſchief* is vaſtly more obſtinate, and difficult to eradicate than the *crime*, there the pain attending the miſchief muſt be more and greater than that attending crime. The uſe and ſolidity of our diſtinction may be illuſtrated by this example. There are four ſects whoſe principles, our adverſaries will not deny, ought to be reſtrained.—The ATHEIST, the ENGLISH PAPIST, the GERMAN ANABAPTIST,

and

and the Quaker, all hold opinions pernicious to civil ſociety. But theſe having different degrees of malignity muſt have different degrees of reſtraint. The Atheist, who is incapable of giving ſecurity for his behaviour in community, and whoſe principles directly overthrow the very foundation on which it is built, ſhould certainly be baniſhed all civil government. The English Papist, who owns a foreign eccleſiaſtical power ſuperior to all temporal dominion, ſhould not be tolerated in any ſovereign ſtate. The German Anabaptist, who holds capital puniſhment to be ſinful, ſhould be debarred the magiſtracy; and the Quaker, who believes even defenſive war to be unchriſtian, ſhould be excluded, in ſtates upon the continent, the common liberty of reſiding in frontier places. Now theſe different degrees of pain do not make one a *puniſhment*, and the other, a *reſtraint*; but, being every one proportioned to the malignity of their reſpective evils, and no more than what is juſt neceſſary to repel them, they are all equally *mere reſtraints*. But now extend theſe pains and penalties, to the burning of the Atheiſt; to the baniſhing of the Papiſt; to the denying of civil protection to the Anabaptiſt; and of religious toleration to the Quaker; and then, notwithſtanding the ſame diverſity of degrees, they are all *puniſhments*, and none *mere reſtraints*. Becauſe more pain is, in every caſe, inflicted than is neceſſary to repel the reſpective evils.

I have only then to ſhew, that the pain inflicted by a teſt-law is no more than juſt neceſſary to repel *the evil of diverſity of ſects when got into the adminiſtration*: and, conſequently, that it is a *reſtraint only*. To make this evident, let us ſuppoſe a perſon able, in one certain place only, to do miſchief; and that he is diſpoſed to do it: it is plain, there are no other means of repelling this evil than by debarring his entrance into *that* place. Theſe means then are neceſſary: but what is neceſſary to repel an evil is *a reſtraint only*. But were this pain extended; and, becauſe the perſon can do miſchief in one place, he is debarred entrance into ten, then the *pain* becomes a *puniſhment*, becauſe more than neceſſary for repelling the evil. This is exactly the caſe in hand. Diverſity of ſects can do miſchief only by getting into the admi-

adminiſtration: therefore to keep them out, is, for the reaſons above, only a *reſtraint*. But, were their civil incapacity extended further, then it would become a *puniſhment*. By the teſt-law, it is not extended further; therefore it is no puniſhment, but a reſtraint only.

Had the force of this reaſoning been duly conſidered, it might, I apprehend, have ſoon decided a late famous queſtion, yet, it ſeems, undetermined.

By the cuſtom or conſtitution of one of our great incorporated bodies, ſome or other of its members are annually called upon to diſcharge a very important, though very onerous office. Now, if ſuch a one happens to be a *ſeparatiſt*, he takes the advantage of the *teſt-law*, which, under great penalties, forbids his entrance on this office, till he has given certain marks of his conformity to the eſtabliſhed worſhip; to give which, he makes matter of conſcience; and from which, he is at liberty to diſſent by the act of *toleration*. This renders him incapable of ſerving. But it having been long the cuſtom for members, thus appointed to this important ſervice, to purchaſe, of the body, an exemption, at a large price, by way of fine, it was thought reaſonable to demand it of the *non-conformiſt* who cannot ſerve, as well as of the *conformiſt*, who will not. And when it was urged, that this fine could only be equitably inflicted on thoſe who willingly declined a permitted office; not on thoſe, upon whom the law had laid an embargo, to ſtop their entrance into it; it was thought ſufficient to reply, "That the law, of which the *non-conformiſt* would thus avail himſelf, was never intended for his advantage or emolument: for which, it would be frequently brought to ſerve, if this plea were admitted." The queſtion therefore to be decided was this, "Whether he who *cannot* ſerve, is by law, equally obnoxious to the fine, with him who *will not*?"

Now, I humbly conceive that this queſtion can be then only reſolved with juſtice and preciſion, when the TRUE NATURE of a

teſt-

teſt-law has been previouſly ſettled. I have laid down the principles which lead to it; and on them I argue thus *.

Were this law ordained to *draw* or to *drive* diſſenters into the national *church*, the prohibition from entering on certain civil offices was without doubt intended for a PUNISHMENT. But if the LAW were ordained, only to keep diſſenters out of thoſe ſtations in the *ſtate*, in which, by injuring the eſtabliſhment, they would violate the peace of ſociety, then certainly the prohibition was intended for a RESTRAINT only; and becomes a *puniſhment* but by accident.

Now, were it intended for a PUNISHMENT, the cuſtomary *fine*, on thoſe who do not ſerve, would be moſt LEGAL: and, in ſuch caſe, the reaſoning of the body againſt the non-complying members, "that the legiſlature, by this law, never intended the diſſenter ſhould receive civil benefit or emolument," will not be without its force; for a *benefit* defeats the end of *ſuch a law*. But if the *teſt* impoſe a RESTRAINT only, and it become a *puniſhment* but by accident, it may, without the leaſt evil influence on that law, become a *benefit* likewiſe by accident. Nay, to hinder this fair chance, would be cruel and unjuſt: for if, by the inevitable condition of human things, particulars receive *damage* by a law which reſpects the general; and which never had ſuch damage in its intention; it is but fit, they ſhould have the like chance of a *benefit*, though equally without the intention of the legiſlature.

Indeed, where the unprovided for, or unthought of, conſequence tends naturally to defeat the purpoſe of the law, there the authoriſed interpreters of it will interpoſe, and declare the advantage taken to be againſt the law; or, which amounts to the ſame thing, unſupported by it. But an accidental *benefit* which ariſes from a ſimple reſtraint, ſeems better calculated to effect the end of the teſt-

* The following argument was firſt printed in the ſpring of the year 1762, in the book called *the Doctrine of Grace*.

law

law than a *damage*; ſince the firſt tends to keep the enemies of the church from office in the ſtate; the ſecond is a temptation to them to get in, by the violation of conſcience. The *benefit* is indeed liable to abuſe, (and what is there in civil matters which is not?) Yet this abuſe does not affect the purpoſe of the law, which is to keep ſectaries out of civil offices.

But let it not be ſuppoſed that any thing here ſaid in favour of the honeſt Sectarian member, is meant to include the OCCASIONAL CONFORMIST. For if ſuch a one can think, that he may, with his conſcience unhurt, *conform* for the ſake of *lucrative* employments, he ſhould never be permitted, on pretence of conſcience, to plead the reſtrictive law, in order to evade thoſe which are *onerous*. And here let me further obſerve, that the *diſſenters* will not ſeem to be in the propereſt diſpoſition to claim the advantage of the diſtinction here laid down in their favour, till they have a little reformed their ideas of a *teſt-law*. For they have generally, I think, in order to throw the greater odium on it, repreſented the embargo which it lays upon them, as a thing inflicted for a PUNISHMENT. Now it hath been ſhewn, that if our lawgivers intended a *puniſhment*, it would defeat their whole purpoſe to connive at its becoming an *accidental benefit*.

But now it appears, both from reaſon and fact, that the TEST is a *reſtrictive* and not a *penal law* in the proper meaning of theſe terms. For,

1. If a law may be underſtood in two ſenſes, one of which ſupports its equity, while the other betrays its injuſtice, reaſon directs us to adopt the firſt. To *puniſh* ſectaries, in order to bring them over to the national religion, is plainly iniquitous; but to *reſtrain* ſectaries from injuring the national religion, is evidently juſt. Therefore, had the intention of the legiſlature in this caſe been doubtful, yet a *general law of a free people* would admit of no other interpretation than this latter.

2. But the intention of the legiſlature is not doubtful. This reaſoning is ſupported by fact. When the law was made, the national church was thought to be in danger equally from *Proteſtant* and *Popiſh* ſectaries. In the early days, indeed, of the eſtabliſhed church, the government had endeavoured to bring both into ſubmiſſion to it, and many PENAL LAWS were enacted for this purpoſe. But by that time the *teſt* became a law, ſo viſionary and unjuſt a project had been long in diſcredit: and government was now content to confine its care to the *protection*, rather than to the *extenſion*, of the national church. Had this latter point been their aim, it was to be effected only by a vigorous execution of the old *penal laws* then, and ſtill in being, though long kept dormant. The teſt added no force to thoſe, but on the contrary greatly relaxed their activity, by diſpoſing government to place their chief confidence, and ſeek their only remedy for diſorders, in this new-made law.

And now the reader may ſee the ſtrength of that objection made to the *teſt-law*, as at preſent inforced to affect the intereſts of Proteſtant diſſenters, *viz.* "That its original and direct intention was to oppoſe to the machinations of Popery; and therefore, that the other, being included only by accident, may very reaſonably be overlooked." But if the idea here given of the *teſt-law* be right, it is apparent that the general, though perhaps not the immediate, purpoſe of the legiſlature in framing it, was to provide (and this, in behalf of the ſtate) for the ſafety of the national church, from what quarter ſoever the danger might ariſe. At one ſeaſon it might ariſe from *Popery*; at another, from *Puritaniſm*; but the various civil miſchiefs, conſequent on religious quarrels, were to be repelled as they ſprung up with equal vigilance and vigour. But let no one imagine, that a *compariſon of demerit* is here inſinuated between Popery and Puritaniſm. As religions, they are no more to be ſet together, in the opinion of an Engliſh epiſcoparian, than a body irrecoverably corrupted, and one but ſlightly tainted.

Yet

Yet with regard to the civil miſchiefs which religious rancour, when let looſe, may occaſion, we have conſtantly experienced, that the *ſlighteſt* matters often produce as great, as the moſt *weighty*. And the ſurplice and the croſs in baptiſm have ſet fellow-citizens againſt each other with as much inveterate hate, as the tyrannic claim of the Pope's ſupremacy, or the idolatrous worſhip of dead men deified. However, the nature and genius of the two ſects is ſufficiently diſcriminated by law, in *tolerating* the one, and only *conniving* at the other, under ſuſpended penal-ſtatutes; but ſtill on the ſame *civil principles*: theſe *ſanguinary laws*, as they are called, not being directed againſt the religious errors of the CHURCH, but againſt the political uſurpations of the COURT OF ROME; which, when theſe laws were made, excited men by Papal edicts to parricide and rebellion; and will not yet ſuffer its ſubjects to give any reaſonable ſecurity to the *civil ſovereign*. For, with *religious errors, as ſuch*, the ſtate hath no concern: they are the *civil miſchiefs* with which civil ſociety hath to do; miſchiefs ariſing from religious quarrels, where the two parties are nearly equal in power (as, I ſuppoſe, Proteſtant ſects, which differ only in ſmaller matters, would ſoon be, under a *toleration* without a *teſt-law*), and are ſet upon combating one another's ERRORS.

But let me not be miſunderſtood, as if from what hath been here ſaid, in behalf of *toleration*, I would inſinuate, that this law hath altered the nature of the crime going under the name of SCHISM; which is an unneceſſary ſeparation from the national church; or becauſe the law hath taken away all civil puniſhment from Proteſtant diſſenters, ſome of whom may poſſibly ſo offend, that therefore *ſchiſm* is become an innocent, and an empty name. And that the law in favour of SCHISMATICS, like that in favour of WITCHES, has diſſipated only a frightful fantom. It is true, that in both caſes, the legiſlature acted for the ſame general end, the *reſtraint of injuſtice*; but it was on very different principles: in the firſt caſe, they took off civil puniſhment from a *real crime*, not

cognizable by a human judicatory: And in the latter, they removed an opprobrium from the ſtatute-book, which expreſſed a ſanguinary reſentment againſt an *imaginary one*.

Schism, or a cauſeleſs ſeparation of a member from the national church, is a crime which, on all the principles of law and reaſon, deſerves condign puniſhment. But of *ſeparation*, whether with or without cauſe, there is no adequate judge, but that power who is able to diſtinguiſh between a well, and an ill informed conſcience. Very juſtly therefore did this free government remit the queſtion to an omniſcient tribunal. But, in ſo doing, it did not mitigate, but, by its indulgence, rather aggravate the guilt, wherever it ſhall be found, hereafter, to exiſt. And how wiſely ſo doubtful a point was remitted thither, we may, in part, ſee from the anſwer of the *foreign divines*, to whoſe judgment, at the beginning of our Reformation (when the quarrel between the Puritans and Churchmen, about habits and ceremonies, ran high) both parties agreed to ſubmit. Thoſe prudent and honeſt men, when thus appealed unto, gave it as their deliberate judgment, "THAT THE PURITANS OUGHT TO CONFORM, RATHER THAN MAKE A SCHISM: AND THAT THE CHURCH-MEN OUGHT TO INDULGE THE OTHERS' SCRUPLES, RATHER THAN HAZARD ONE." A wiſe deciſion, and reaching much further, in religious matters, than to the ſingle caſe to which it was applied. But to return.

2. We come now to our ſecond aſſertion, and ſay, that *it doth not hold univerſally true, that the civil magiſtrate hath nothing to do with opinions*: For, that when they directly and neceſſarily affect the peace of civil ſociety the coertion of them is in his juriſdiction: and this even our adverſaries themſelves confeſs. Which would they uniformly hold, we ſhould take on their words, and proceed. But though they allow this maxim in ſpeculation, yet they can rarely be brought to ſee its juſtice or fitneſs in practice. Which would tempt one to think, that the evident miſchiefs ariſing from ſome opinions had forced this general confeſſion from them, in

ſpite

ſpite of principle; the prejudice of which returning in particular inſtances drew them back into their old concluſion, that reaſon and truth were violated by the magiſtrate's interfering. I will in charity rather ſuppoſe this to be the caſe, than that a ſpirit of licentiouſneſs makes them retract in practice what they own in ſpeculation; and ſhall therefore endeavour to convince them that this coertion, which all parties agree to be neceſſary, is likewiſe reaſonable and ſafe.

Not at preſent then to inſiſt on the argument of its *juſtice*, drawn from its *neceſſity* alone, we ſay, that the final end of every rational creature is happineſs: and that the immediate end of ſuch as are deſtined to two ſeparate ſtates of exiſtence, is the happineſs of that ſtate in which they are exiſting. Otherwiſe the good of the creature in that ſtation would not have been conſulted by its creator. But as this cannot be ſaid, it follows that whatever oppoſes the attainment of *that* happineſs muſt be repelled; otherwiſe the purpoſe of the creator would be defeated. If this creature (*e. g.* man) be not only deſtined to two different ſtates, but compoſed of two different natures, one of which is ſolely adapted to his preſent ſtation, then the ſtates muſt not only be ſeparate, but different; and ſo, conſequently, muſt be the *happineſs* attendant upon each. But if the happineſs be different, ſo muſt the *means* of attaining it. Thus the means of attaining man's happineſs *here* is civil ſociety; the means of his happineſs *hereafter* is contemplation. If then opinions, the reſult of contemplation, obſtruct the efficacy of civil ſociety, it follows, that they muſt be reſtrained. Accordingly, the ancient maſters of wiſdom, who, from theſe conſiderations, taught, that man was *born* for *action*, not for *contemplation*, univerſally concurred to eſtabliſh it as a maxim founded in the nature of things, *that opinions ſhould always give way to civil peace.*

Again, if God deſtined man to two ſuch ſtates of exiſtence, in each of which the happineſs of the exiſting ſtate was to be his end; it is demonſtrable, and almoſt ſelf evident, that he, at the ſame time, ſo diſpoſed things, that the means of attaining the happineſs of

of one ſtate ſhould not croſs or obſtruct the means of attaining the happineſs of the other. From whence we muſt conclude, that where the ſuppoſed means of each, namely, *opinions* and *civil peace*, do claſh, there *one* of them is *not the true means* of happineſs. But the means of attaining the happineſs peculiar to that ſtate in which the man at preſent exiſts, being perfectly and infallibly known to man; and the means of the happineſs of his future exiſtence, as far as relates to the diſcovery of unrevealed truth, but very imperfectly known by him; it neceſſarily follows, that wherever opinions claſh with civil peace, thoſe opinions are no means of future happineſs: or, in other words, are either no truths, or truths of no importance.

Thus we have proved, that the magiſtrate's reſtraint of thoſe opinions which are miſchievous to civil ſociety, is both reaſonable and ſafe. Deſiring to be underſtood, when we ſpeak here of a *rational creature*, to mean the ſpecies; and when we ſpeak of a *civil ſociety*, to mean ſuch as is formed on the principles of public liberty and common rights of ſubjects. For to unjuſt and unnatural governments, the moſt momentous truths will be miſchievous and deſtructive: their end being private, not public utility. It is never then, but where the ſociety ſtands on legitimate foundations, that its peace is to be preferred to opinions: and there, that preference will be always reaſonable and juſt *.

I SHALL now ſhew, that what a *teſt-law* reſtrains doth directly and neceſſarily affect the peace of civil ſociety.

Where a determinate principle of ſome certain ſect is particularly oppoſed to this or that fundamental maxim or uſage of ſociety, the malignity is ſeen, and confeſſed on all hands. Thus, of thoſe opinions reſpectively held by the Atheiſt, the Papiſt, Anabaptiſt, and Quaker, mentioned above, there are few who ſee not their pernicious conſequences; or will not own the *reſtraint* of them to be

* See this further illuſtrated above, in the proof of the propoſition, *that truth and utility do neceſſarily coincide.*

neceſſary.

neceſſary. But where a religious principle oppoſes, not one certain maxim or uſage, but the general conſtitution of civil ſociety, the miſchief of it is not ſo eaſily ſeen; and if it oppoſes, not ſo much the nature of civil ſociety, conſidered alone, as when in union with the church, the miſchief will be leſs obſerved: and if this be a principle not peculiar to one ſect, but common to all, the miſchief will be ſtill leſs underſtood. This is the caſe with regard to the pernicious principle thus reſtrained. It being, as we have obſerved, that which ſets every ſect on attempting to eſtabliſh itſelf on the ruins of all the reſt.

Hence it is that men ſee the neceſſity, and ſeem to applaud the juſtice of reſtraint, in the firſt caſe; and yet, in the other, cry out againſt the tyranny of ſubjecting ſects to civil incapacities, which hold no *peculiar opinions* pernicious to the ſtate. But they ſeem not to apprehend, that the firſt is not the only legitimate reaſon which may be urged for the equity of reſtraint. For where is the difference, with regard to the ſtate, between the principle's being *peculiar* to one ſect, or *common* to all; between its injuriouſly affecting one certain maxim or uſage, or the whole frame and compoſure of a ſtate in union with a church; if ſo be the reſtraint be common to all, as well as the principle? Henceforth then we hope to hear no more of the injuſtice of civil incapacities on a ſect which holds nothing *peculiar*, that can injuriouſly affect the ſtate.

Having now overturned the two propoſitions, upon which this famous objection ſtands, it will give us no further trouble, but leave us at liberty to conclude, *That to abridge a citizen of his civil rights for matters of opinion which affect ſociety, is no violation of juſtice or natural equity.*

But if ſtill our adverſaries will perſiſt in affirming a *teſt* to be contrary to the LAW OF NATURE; one may ſafely undertake to vindicate it, even on that ſuppoſition; as having the univerſal practice of mankind on our ſide; who, for the ſake of civil ſociety, have ventured, in their municipal laws, to deviate from the law of nature; and this, with as univerſal approbation.

But,

But, to avoid obſcurity, it will be neceſſary to ſay, in what ſenſe the *law of nature* is to be underſtood. For an illiterate tribe of writers have, in this, as in moſt other matters, done their beſt to confound all ideas, and remove the marks and boundaries of ſcience: while they make the *law of nature*, as it reſpects man alone (for that we have only to do with), "to ſignify what right "reaſon, taking in all circumſtances, dictates, in every caſe, to be "done." Thus confounding the *law of nature* with *civil*, and all other laws. And in this ſenſe, our inquiry into the agreement of a TEST with the *law of nature*, after a *teſt* hath been proved juſt and reaſonable on the laws of ſociety, would be very impertinent. But, by the LAW OF NATURE, is here meant *that*, which all the beſt writers on *natural* and *civil laws* thus define—*What reaſon preſcribes, under the ſole conſideration of men's nature, and their mutual relations ariſing from thence, excluſive of all political or civil combinations.* And in this ſenſe, an inquiry concerning the conformity of a *teſt-law* to the law of nature, may be very proper.

We ſay then, that it is a practice as approved as it is univerſal, for ſtates, in compliance to the neceſſities of ſociety, to form many of their municipal laws in direct oppoſition to the law of nature. The writings of the civil lawyers are full of theſe caſes. I ſhall content myſelf with one or two. The caſe of that *civil* acquiſition called PRESCRIPTION is very famous. This is, when a man, by enjoying for a certain time, without another's claim or oppoſition, the other's property, but poſſeſſed by him *bona fide*, acquires a full right in it; in ſuch ſort, that the true proprietor has no longer any civil action for the recovery of it. Now this moſt writers agree hath its ſole foundation in the *civil law*. The incomparable Cujacius ſays expreſsly, *That the law of preſcription directly contradicts the law of nature and nations, becauſe the true proprietor is diſpoſſeſſed of his own, without his conſent* *. And indeed nothing is more evident.

* Rurſus dixerit aliquis, uſucapionem pugnare cum jure gentium, quod ea dominium invito auferat. Eſt ſane ita: pugnat enim hac in re jus civile cum naturali æquitate, ſed tamen

dent. For what I once had, I muſt ever have a right to; till I reſign, transfer, or forfeit it by a voluntary act. What then was it which occaſioned this general deviation from the law of nature but the public good? It is of the higheſt concernment to the ſtate that particulars be ſecure in their poſſeſſions without conteſt. But there can be no ſecurity, if the natural proprietor hath, for all time coming, the liberty to reclaim his right. This would obſtruct commerce and diſcourage intercourſe amongſt citizens. For who would lay out for property, if for ever after old claims might be revived? In a word, the LAW OF PRESCRIPTION is ſo evidently againſt the *law of nature*, that thoſe who deny this diſagreement are forced to have recourſe to that ridiculous ſignification of the *law of nature* taken notice of above. For they ſay, *preſcription is not againſt the law of nature, becauſe this law orders, in every thing, what reaſon ſays (all circumſtances taken in) is fit to be done.* Now which way ſoever the law of preſcription be defended, whether by owning it to be againſt the law of nature, and juſtifying the deviation from it, by public utility; or by denying it to be againſt that law, as here abſurdly interpreted; the defence will ſerve equally for a *teſt-law*, though we ſhould concede to the objection, that it is againſt the law of nature; which we do not, having largely proved that it is perfectly agreeable to that law in its true and proper ſignification.

Another inſtance may be given of this practice in ſtates, *pro bono publico*, which is more eaſily underſtood. When man entered into ſociety; and *property*, in conſequence thereof, was throughly regulated and eſtabliſhed, ſeveral things were left out in that general appropriation; and ſtill continued to become, as in the ſtate of

tamen hoc fit bono publico. Ait Caius, BONO PUBLICO USUCAPIO INTRODUCTA EST. *Comment. in Pandect. Tit. de Uſurpationibus & Uſucapionibus.*——*Caius* ſaid this on good authority: for the *laws of the twelve tables* give PRESCRIPTION no force in conteſts between the ſubjects of one ſtate and the ſubjects of another; but leave them to the deciſion of the *law of nature*. ADVERSUS HOSTEM ÆTERNA AUTHORITAS ESTO, ſay the *twelve tables*; which Cicero explains, "HOSTIS enim apud majores noſtros is dicebatur qui nunc PEREGRINUM dicimus."

nature, the acquiſition of the firſt occupant. Amongſt theſe were what the lawyers call FERÆ NATURÆ. Yet, for all this, moſt ſtates have concurred, againſt the law of nature, to enact GAME LAWS; whereby the right of capture is forbidden to all but thoſe, who, by deſcription, are deſigned not to be included in the prohibition. And the reaſon of ſuch LAWS is evident: it was not at all for the *public good* to ſuffer peaſants and mechanics to neglect their occupations, and to run up and down the woods and foreſts, armed: which in time, through their idle habits, and domeſtic diſtreſſes, draws them on to robbery and brigandage: nor to permit the populace, in towns and cities, to have, and carry *arms* at their pleaſure; which would give opportunity and encouragement to ſedition and commotions.

In this inſtance we all confeſs the juſtice, and ſee the reaſonableneſs of impinging on the law of nature. How happens it then, that thoſe who own it here will not own it in a *teſt-law?* Nothing ſure, but this: RELIGION mixes itſelf in this latter affair; and the jealouſies of its encroachment (which prepoſterouſly increaſe as its influence upon us abates) will not give us leave to judge impartially. And the truth is, *parties* muſt have a watch-word to carry on their buſineſs. There was a time, and that not long ſince paſt, when the word was, THE DANGER OF THE CHURCH. This ſerved tolerably, while *religion* was ſeen to have an influence; but ſince a general ſpirit of licence hath *poſſeſſed* us, it hath been thought proper to change the cry; and we now hear of nothing but the DANGER OF OUR CIVIL LIBERTIES.

Having now, as is preſumed, entirely overturned this bulwark of the cauſe,

1. By ſhewing that the rights pretended to are merely imaginary;

2. That if there be any ſuch, it is no violation of the law of nature, to exclude a citizen from them, on account of opinions;

3. That

3. That though it be a violation of that law, yet ſtill the excluſion may be well juſtified on the univerſal practice of ſociety, ariſing from neceſſity—

Having, I ſay, done this, the remaining objections, which conclude only againſt the EXPEDIENCY of a teſt-law, may be diſpatched in much fewer words.

II. The next objection then is, *That a teſt-law is injurious to* TRUE RELIGION, *by encouraging one ſet of opinions, and diſcouraging the reſt; which is clapping a falſe bias on the mind, that, in its ſearch after truth, ought to be left entirely free and diſengaged.* But it may be made appear, that a *teſt* is ſo far from being injurious to *true religion*, that it is, in the whole, highly ſerviceable to it.

Let us, 1ſt, then, examine how the *diſcouragement* affects it. Now admitting the *tolerated religion* to be the *true*; and that ſeveral of its members, under the diſcouragement of a teſt-law, will for the ſake of civil advantages leave it, and come over to the *eſtabliſhed religion*; we muſt yet conclude that, conſidering the ſmallneſs of the diſcouragement, they who leave it on that account, and knowingly embrace *a falſe*, muſt be very profligate and abandoned. Such as muſt diſgrace the true religion while they continue of it, and otherwiſe highly prejudice it. Unleſs it be ſuppoſed to be more for the intereſts of true religion to have large crouds though of falſe and unworthy members, than ſmaller numbers of ſincere profeſſors. It is therefore highly for the intereſts of true religion to have ſuch a touch-ſtone, or criterion, as the *teſt*, to diſcriminate its ſincere from its corrupt adherents. Which, on this account, can no more be ſaid to be injured by it, than gold is by fire, when, in trying the *ore*, it reduces its bulk, but increaſes its ſpecifick value. It is evident then, that this objection cannot, with any ſhew of reaſon, be made by a member of the *tolerated religion.*

2. Let us next ſee how the *encouragement* affects true religion. Our argument now leads us to ſuppoſe the *eſtabliſhed* the *true*. On this ſuppoſition, is it not for the benefit of mankind in all his

intereſts, that it ſhould be ſupported by civil power? and can it be ſupported without a teſt? But to wave that conſideration at preſent: It is owned, that as the uſe of religion ariſes from the real impreſſion it hath upon the mind, the bringing in members, who make only an outward profeſſion, is injurious to religion. However, none have reaſon to make this objection, but the eſtabliſhed church. But conſidering the *ſmallneſs* of the *encouragement*, and the probability of the conformity's being on conviction (for the caſe ſuppoſes the *eſtabliſhed* religion, the *true*), we have no reaſon to think this injury can prove of moment. But be it as it may, Is it fit ſo great a benefit to civil ſociety ſhould be loſt on account of a ſmall and partial injury, it may accidentally occaſion? It will be time enough to attend to an anſwer, when our adverſaries bring us an inſtance of any one ſignal *benefit* to mankind, in the improvement of civil life, which is not attended with ſome inconvenience. Till then we ſhall, perhaps, think ourſelves at liberty to ſupport *this*, though it be not exempt from the common lot to which all human things are ſubject.

But, 3. Admit ſome ſmall caſual *harm* to be thus derived to religion; it is not only abundantly compenſated by thoſe vaſt advantages accruing to the ſtate from thence, but likewiſe infinitely outweighed in the good done to religion by *an eſtabliſhment*, on which a *teſt* is built, and from which it neceſſarily flows. We have ſhewn, and it cannot be too oft repeated, that the ſtate entered into alliance with the church, for the ſake of public utility: we have proved, and it cannot be too much inculcated, *that public utility and truth do coincide*: Hence it follows, that falſehood, the reverſe of truth, muſt be deſtructive of public good; and the conſequence of this is, that the ſtate muſt, for the ſake of public utility, ſeek truth, and avoid falſhood: at the ſame time, as ſhe ſo well knows in *what* public utility (which is a ſure rule and meaſure of truth) conſiſts, ſhe will be much better enabled to find out truth than any ſpeculative inquirer, with the boaſted aids of philoſophy and the ſchools. From all this it appears, that while a ſtate, in union with

with the church, hath ſo great an intereſt and concern in true religion, and ſo great a capacity for diſcovering what is true; *religion* is likely to thrive much better than when left to itſelf; which hath been more fully ſhewn in treating of the firſt motive the ſtate had to ſeek an alliance with the church.

If it ſhould be ſtill urged, that though, indeed, true religion be not injured by a TEST, yet private men are, as having a *falſe bias* clapped upon their minds, which draws them, by hopes and fears, from the *true* to *falſe* religion: it may be replied, that were the rewards and diſcouragements of a teſt-law ſo great as to make thoſe who complied *not* with its threats and invitations uneaſy in civil life, and, conſequently, thoſe who *did*, to fall through mere human frailty, the objection would be plauſible. But when theſe rewards and diſcouragements are ſo ſmall as to tempt only the moſt profligate and abandoned, little injury is done: for what pretence can ſuch men have of a right to be put under cover for every the ſlighteſt temptation?

III. The third objection is, *That a teſt-law may endanger religious liberty. For if, for the good of the ſtate, all, but thoſe of the eſtabliſhed religion, may be kept out of the adminiſtration; then for the ſame good, if reaſons of ſtate ſo require, they may be reſtrained the exerciſe of all but the eſtabliſhed religion. And a pretence will not be wanting; for it is certain that diverſities of ſects oft produce the worſt conſequences to a ſtate.* To this it may be replied, 1. That though we have reaſoned, from the good of ſociety, to prove the neceſſity of a teſt, yet that was not till after we had ſhewn the juſtice of it from the cleareſt principles of the laws of nature and nations. But theſe laws oppoſe the taking away religious liberty, that is, freedom to worſhip God according to one's own conſcience, on any pretence whatſoever. 2. But we ſay further, that thoſe very principles of the laws of nature and nations, laid down in the firſt part, to prove the equity of an eſtabliſhed religion and a teſt-law, and on which the whole theory depends, do, in an invincible manner, eſtabliſh the

the DIVINE DOCTRINE OF TOLERATION, or the right of worſhipping God according to every man's own conſcience. So that this *theory* is ſo far from giving any entrance (as the objection ſuppoſes) to the infringement of *religious liberty*, that it lays the foundations of it on the only ſolid and impregnable grounds. For on theſe two cardinal principles on which, as on two hinges, the THEORY is raiſed and turns, namely, *That the ſtate hath only the care of bodies, and the church only the care of ſouls*; and *that each ſociety is ſovereign, and independent of the other*, is clearly deduced by the indefeaſible right of religious liberty. 3. But ſtill further. An eaſy anſwer may be now given to the old plea of *neceſſity of conformity, from the danger, to the ſtate, of diverſity of religions*, hinted at in the objection. For the miſchief of that *diverſity* ariſeth ſolely from the infringement of religious liberty. Do but once grant a toleration, with the eſtabliſhment of *one*, and an excluſion of all the *reſt* from the public adminiſtration, and the evil vaniſhes, and *many* religions become as harmleſs as *one*. It being only the tyrannic uſurpation of the magiſtrate, upon the rights of religion, that made diverſity of opinions miſchievous and malignant. 4. But laſtly, we ſay, that, even on our adverſaries' ſuppoſition, the objection has no force. For had a *teſt-law* been juſtified, by arguments drawn ſolely from the good of the ſtate, yet this very principle, if purſued, would be ſo far from endangering *toleration*, that it would perfectly ſecure it. For to make religion ſerviceable to the ſtate, which is the great end of an *eſtabliſhment*, it muſt make a *real* impreſſion on the mind; this is evident from what hath been obſerved in the firſt book. Now religion ſeldom or never makes a real impreſſion on the mind of thoſe who are forced into a church; all that forcing to outward conformity can do, is to make hypocrites and atheiſts. Therefore, for the ſake of the ſtate, the profeſſion of religion ſhould be free. Hence may be ſeen the ſtrange blindneſs of thoſe politicians, who expect to benefit the ſtate by forcing to outward conformity: which, making men irreligious, deſtroys the ſole means a church hath of ſerving the ſtate. But here, by a common fate of politicians,

cians, they fell from one blunder to another. For having firſt, in a tyrannical adherence to their own ſcheme of policy, or ſuperſtitious fondneſs to their own ſcheme of worſhip, infringed upon religious liberty; and then beginning to find, that diverſity of ſects was hurtful to the ſtate; as it always will be, while the rights of religion are violated; inſtead of repairing the miſtake, and reſtoring religious liberty; which would have ſtifled the pullulating evil in the ſeed, by affording it no further nouriſhment; they took the other courſe; and endeavoured, by a *thorough diſcipline of conformity*, violently to rend it away; and, with it, they rooted up and deſtroyed all that good to ſociety which ſo naturally ſprings from religion, when it has taken a real hold.

IV. The laſt objection is, *That a teſt-law is the novel invention of a bigotted and barbarous Gothic policy: unknown to the polite and happy ages of* Greece *and* Rome, *when civil and religious liberty flouriſhed beyond compare.* So near as I now am to the concluſion of this diſcourſe, it would ſtay me too long to detect our adverſaries' groſs ignorance concerning the condition of religious liberty in the antient world *: upon which errors the objection is built. It ſhall ſuffice, at preſent, to tell them, they are miſtaken in their fact. Theſe happy people had, like us, their ESTABLISHMENTS and TEST-LAWS. Though perhaps it may ſurpriſe them, we cannot forbear to tell them, that even *Athens*, their *Athens*, ſo flouriſhing and free, had, in its beſt times, a *teſt-law* to ſecure the *eſtabliſhed religion*. A teſt which was exacted of all their youth. For, *Athens* being a democracy, every citizen had a conſtant ſhare in the adminiſtration. And a teſt it was of the ſtrongeſt kind, even an oath. A copy of which is preſerved by Stobæus †, who tranſcribed this curious frag-

* See the Divine Legation of Moſes, Book II. § 1. 5. and 6.

† Οὐ καλλισχυιῶ ὅπλα τὰ ἱερὰ, δὲ ἐκκαλείψω τὸν παραστάτην, ὅπου ἂν συνχήσω. ΑΜΥΝΩ ΔΕ ΥΠΕΡ ΙΕΡΩΝ, καὶ ὑπερ ὁσίων, καὶ νόμων, καὶ μέλλουσῶν πολιῶν. τὴν πατρίδα δὲ οὐκ ἐλάσσω, παραδώσω πλείω δὲ καὶ ἀρείω, ὅσην ἂν παραδέξωμαι καὶ ἐγὼ ἐπὶ τῶν. ἀεὶ κριτῶν ἐμμελέως, καὶ τοῖς θεσμοῖς τοῖς ἰδρυμένοις πείσομαι, καὶ ἔς τινας ἂν ἄλλους τὸ πλῆθος ἰδρύσωσι μεμφόμενος, καὶ ὁ τις λύειν τὰ θεσμὰ ἢ μὴ πείθηται, ἀμυνῶ, ἐπιλέψω δὲ καὶ μοιῶ, καὶ μέλλοντι πάντων. καὶ ΙΕΡΑ ΤΑ ΠΑΤΡΙΑ ΤΙΜΗΣΩ· ἵστορες θεοὶ τάτων. Joan. Stobæi de Repub. Serm. xli. p. 243. Edit. Lugdun. 1608.

ment

ment from the writings of the *Pythagoreans*, the great ſchool of antient politics *. It is conceived in theſe words: "I will not diſhonour "the ſacred arms, nor deſert my comrade in battle: I will DEFEND "AND PROTECT MY COUNTRY AND MY RELIGION, whether alone, "or in conjunction with others: I will not leave the public in a "worſe condition than I found it, but in a better: I will be "always ready to obey the ſupreme magiſtrate, with prudence; "and to ſubmit to the eſtabliſhed laws, and to all ſuch as ſhall be "hereafter eſtabliſhed by full conſent of the people: and I will "never connive at any other who ſhall preſume to deſpiſe or diſ-"obey them; but will avenge all ſuch attempts on the ſanctity of "the republic, either alone, or in conjunction with the people: "and laſtly, I WILL CONFORM TO THE NATIONAL RELIGION. "So help me thoſe Gods who are the avengers of perjury."

Here we ſee, that after every man had ſworn, *I will defend and protect the religion of my country*, in conſequence of the obligation the ſtate lies under to protect the *eſtabliſhed worſhip*, he concludes, *I will conform to it:* the directeſt and ſtrongeſt of all *teſts*. But a teſt of conformity to the eſtabliſhed worſhip was not only required of thoſe who bore a ſhare in the civil adminiſtration, but of thoſe too who were choſen to preſide in their religious rites. *Demoſthenes* has recorded the oath which the prieſteſſes of *Bacchus*, called Γεραιραὶ, took on entering into their office: "I obſerve a religious "chaſtity, and am clean and pure from all other defilements, and "from converſation with man: AND I CELEBRATE THE THE-"OINIA AND IOBACCHIA TO BACCHUS ACCORDING TO THE ESTA-"BLISHED RITES, AND AT THE PROPER TIMES †."

So that thoſe, with whom the authority of the WISE ANCIENTS have ſo much weight, will, we hope, from this example in the wiſeſt of them, begin to entertain a better opinion of a *teſt-law*, and of a religion ſo *eſtabliſhed*.

* See the Divine Legation.

† Ἁλισεύω, καὶ εἰμὶ καθαρὸς, καὶ ἁγνὸς ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν καθαρεύουσιν, καὶ ἀπ' ἀνδρὸς Συνουσίας, καὶ τὰ Θεοίνια, καὶ Ἰοβακχεῖα γεραίρω τῷ Διονύσῳ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΑ ΠΑΤΡΙΑ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς καθήκουσι χρόνοις. Orat. cont. Neæram.

But

But a ſtronger evidence of the indiſpenſable neceſſity of theſe things, for the ſupport and ſecurity of government, can hardly be given, than in the example of the famous *William Penn*, one, who by his principles was moſt averſe to it, who ſtrove moſt to avoid it, and yet is forced to have recourſe to it. We have ſeen before, how the ſame man, as *head of a ſect*, had, by a ſide-wind, introduced SOCIETY into religion. We ſhall now ſee that, when become a *law-giver*, he found an equal neceſſity of having that ſociety ESTABLISHED, and ſecuring his eſtabliſhment by a *teſt-law*. In his *Frame of Government for the Province of Pennſilvania in America*, we have amongſt his *fundamental conſtitutions* theſe following; "That all Perſons living in this Province, who confeſs "and acknowledge the one Almighty and Eternal God to be the "Creator, Upholder, and Ruler of the World, ſhall in no wiſe be "moleſted or prejudiced for their Religious Perſuaſion or Practice in "matters of Faith and Worſhip." And, "That all Treaſurers, "Judges, Maſters of the Rolls, Sheriffs, Juſtices of the Peace, "and other Officers and Perſons whatſoever relating to Courts or "Trials of Cauſes, or any other Service in the Government; and "all Members elected to ſerve in Provincial Council, and General "Aſſembly, and all that have right to elect ſuch Members, ſhall be "ſuch as profeſs Faith in Jeſus Chriſt."

By theſe laws an *eſtabliſhed religion* is firſt of all conſtituted, which is the Chriſtian: and, ſecondly, a *teſt*, which excludes all, but ſuch, from a ſhare in the adminiſtration, even the remoteſt ſhare, as electing repreſentatives to ſerve in provincial council and general aſſembly. And, all this, in as good legal form as the PRIEST himſelf could wiſh: only (as ariſing from a neceſſity not to be gloried in) a little diſguiſed in the expreſſion, by the uſe of *affirmative* rather than *negative* terms. As to the large and extenſive conditions of this *eſtabliſhment* and *teſt*, that is another queſtion. What theſe CONSTITUTIONS are here cited for is to ſhew the neceſſity of the things themſelves.

I have but one further obſervation to make, before I end this chapter: it is, that the grand and palmary argument againſt a *teſt* concludes, with equal ſtrength, againſt an *eſtabliſhment*; unleſs, perhaps, our adverſaries have diſcovered, that the clergy are to have no ſhare with the laity, in the *common rights of ſubjects*. For it hath been ſhewn above, that one of the eſſential privileges of an *eſtabliſhed* church is a public maintenance for its clergy, given by the ſtate, in reward for their ſervices in teaching the people virtue and obedience. Now as the miniſters of all the tolerated churches do, or profeſs to do, the ſame; they ſeem to have ſomething a better pretence to a ſhare in theſe places of profit, poſſeſſed by the endowed clergy, than their lay-brethren have to what the laity of the eſtabliſhed church hold from them. At leaſt it muſt be ſaid, that the *injuſtice* of debarring either, for matters of opinion, is equal. I make no queſtion but thoſe with whom we have to do like their *principle* the better for this generous and impartial conſequence. But it is not their approbation I am ſo much concerned to procure. I now addreſs myſelf to the lovers of their country under the preſent conſtitution of church and ſtate. I would ſhew them, in what our adverſaries' principles neceſſarily terminate; *a total ſubverſion of all eſtabliſhed religion.* For this laſt claim puts an end to it at once. And ſhall we believe it will not be made whenever the other is obtained? Are not the miniſters of the tolerated ſects amongſt the firſt to puſh on this demand of the *common rights of ſubjects?* have they leſs regard to their own advantage than to that of their flock? or are they, good men, perſuaded, that theſe *common rights* extend not to churchmen?

However, the ſtate, we may be ſure, will be impartial in its juſtice. So that when once we ſee ſectaries of all kinds ſupply the civil adminiſtration; the next place to look for them is in the pulpit and the ſtall.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Of the miſtaken principles on which writers on this ſubject have hitherto proceeded; the miſchiefs and abſurdities that followed them; and the remedies which the principles here laid down are able to ſupply.

I HAVE now, at length, and I hope to the reader's ſatisfaction, performed what I undertook; which was, *to demonſtrate the equity and neceſſity of an eſtabliſhed religion and a teſt-law on the principles of the law of nature and nations.* It only remains to ſhew, (as I promiſed in the beginning of this diſcourſe) what FALSE PRINCIPLE it was which, embraced in common, hath miſled both parties; and brought one to conclude, that an *eſtabliſhed religion* was of divine right; and the other, that a *teſt-law* was a violation of all human ones. For, as the excellent *Hooker* ſays, "a common received error is never utterly overthrowne, till ſuch time "as we go from ſignes to cauſes, and ſhew ſome manifeſt root or "fountaine thereof common unto all, whereby it may clearely "appeare how it hath come to paſſe that ſo many have beene "overſeene." By this, likewiſe, we ſhall add new ſtrength to our concluſions (as it will afford us a view of the defects in the other ſcheme of defence), and remove any remaining doubts that may have ariſen from the authority of great names againſt us.

When a love for truth, my ſole motive to this inquiry, had engaged me in an examination of the nature and end of *an eſtabliſhed religion and a teſt-law*; and that I had laid down unqueſtioned principles, and drawn concluſions from them, as I thought, demonſtrative; I was yet not a little ſtaggered to find that ſome great names (to whom, as writers, we owe the higheſt regard) had, from the very ſame principles, deduced the very contrary conclu-

ſions. This then was to be accounted for, if I expected my argument ſhould have a fair hearing. And, on reflection, I ſuppoſed that the error, which ſeduced them, might be this; the defenders of an *eſtabliſhed religion* have all along gone on to ſupport it on the motives of TRUTH, and not of UTILITY. That is, that religion was to be *eſtabliſhed* and protected AS IT WAS THE TRUE RELIGION: not for the ſake of its CIVIL UTILITY; which is the great PRINCIPLE OF THIS THEORY. For that notion which, *Grotius* tells us, ſome churches on the Continent had of civil ſociety, ſeems to have been entertained by the defenders of our eſtabliſhment.—"Alii "diverſas [religiones] minus tolerant; quippe non in hoc *tantum* "ordinatas a Deo civitates ac magiſtratus dictantes, ut a *corporibus* "& *poſſeſſionibus* injuriæ abeſſent, *ſed ut, quo more ipſe juſſiſſet, eo in* "*commune coleretur*; cujus officii negligentes multos pœnam *alio-* "*rum impietati* debitam in ſe accerſiſſe."

Now, unluckily for truth, the beſt writers on the other ſide took this miſtaken principle for granted; imagining there could be no other poſſible cauſe aſſigned for *eſtabliſhed* religion: and, at the ſame time, finding *this* full, both of abſurdity and miſchief, too haſtily concluded an *eſtabliſhed religion* ſecured by a *teſt-law* to be a violation of the rights of nature and nations.

But let us take a ſhort view of the abſurdities and miſchiefs that ariſe from the hypotheſis which builds an eſtabliſhed religion and a teſt-law on a principle of *religious truth*, and not of *civil utility*.

If religion is to be eſtabliſhed and protected by a teſt-law, only becauſe it is the *true religion*, then opinions are encouraged as opinions; that is, as *truths*, not as *utilities*; and diſcouraged as opinions; that is, as *errors*, not as *miſchiefs*. See then what follows, both with regard to an *eſtabliſhment* and a *teſt*.

I. An *Eſtabliſhment* is unjuſt, 1. Becauſe the civil magiſtrate as ſuch hath no right to determine, which is the true religion; this power not being given him (as we have ſhewn) on man's entering into

into ſociety. Nor could it be given him; becauſe one man cannot impower another to determine for him in matters of religion. Therefore he not being judge, and there being no other to be found with authority to arbitrate between him and the ſeveral ſchemes of religion, he hath no right to eſtabliſh his own. Again, it is *unjuſt*, becauſe, were the magiſtrate a competent judge of what was *true religion*, he would have yet no right to reward its followers, or diſcourage its oppoſers; becauſe, as hath been ſhewn, matters of opinion belong not to his juriſdiction. He being, as St. *Peter* * tells us, "ſent by God for the *puniſhment* of EVIL-DOERS, and for "the *praiſe* of them that DO WELL." 2. An *eſtabliſhment* is abſurd: it being impoſſible that the end of it ſhould be attained. This end is the protection and ſupport of *true religion*. But the civil magiſtrate, who is to eſtabliſh it, aſſuming to himſelf the ſole authority of judging which is ſo, muſt neceſſarily conclude in favour of his own; ſo that the *eſtabliſhed religion*, all the world over, will be the magiſtrate's: that is, for one place where the *true* religion is eſtabliſhed, the *falſe* will be eſtabliſhed in a thouſand. And whether this be for the intereſt of *true religion*, let the maintainers of this hypotheſis conſider. I will only obſerve, that, as the civil magiſtrate had neither by nature, nor by the law of God, this juriſdiction; ſo it is impoſſible he ſhould have it; becauſe the very exerciſe of it would deſtroy the end for which it is ſuppoſed to be given.

II. I MIGHT ſhew, in the next place, that this hypotheſis takes away all the *reaſon* on which the mutual grants and privileges of church and ſtate, conſequent on an alliance, are founded: which muſt all, therefore, ceaſe: ſuch, for inſtance, as *the clergy's right to a public maintenance*: which, now, being for the ſupport of opinions, would be contrary to the fundamental laws of ſociety, by making men contribute to the maintenance of opinions which

* 1 Ep. ii. 14.

they

they reject and think falſe. And ſo of the reſt. But why do we talk of mutual grants and privileges, or ſtated conditions of alliance; When,

III. This ſcheme of an eſtabliſhment, not making the alliance between church and ſtate on a free convention, but appointing the ſtate a kind of executor of the church's decrees, the *alliance* can have no ſtated laws or conditions of union? On the contrary, the privileges of each ſociety muſt be perpetually fluctuating and various; having no other grounds than the unſettled notions men chance to embrace concerning the extent of that ſupport and protection which the ſtate is obliged to beſtow; and notions directed by no rule will never be adapted to the public good. Thus all fixed and preciſe ideas of an *eſtabliſhment* being confounded, ill-deſigning men have a handle to make it what they pleaſe. Which, in fact, we find they have done, to the infinite damage of ſociety, in moſt places, where this notion of its original hath prevailed. So that, inſtead of this peaceable union ſo beneficent to civil ſociety (the fruits of a *free convention*, under the ſtated and well-known conditions, mutually given and received), we ſee nothing but violent and continued ſtruggles between the TWO SOCIETIES, for power and independency.

IV. A *teſt-law*, on this ſcheme, will be abſolutely UNJUST. For now opinions being reſtrained as *errors*, not as *miſchiefs*—*reſtraint* converts into *puniſhment*. For the deſign of a teſt is now, not to keep men of other religions out of the *civil adminiſtration*, but to bring them in to the *eſtabliſhed church*. And its diſcouragements are thoſe WHOLESOME SEVERITIES ſo warmly recommended, to reduce men from the *falſe* to the *true* religion. Where if the firſt doſe do not ſucceed, it muſt be repeated and enlarged till it does. This is *puniſhment*, properly ſo called; and puniſhment, for what is no act of the will, we have ſhewn to be unjuſt. But were opinions, as ſuch, liable to puniſhment, the civil magiſtrate could not inflict it; becauſe his juriſdiction extends only to the care of bodies.

bodies. Further, this is depriving men of their civil rights for matters of opinion, as ſuch; but this we have ſhewn to be againſt the law of nature. On all theſe accounts, a teſt-law would be unjuſt.

V. Again, a *teſt-law* on this ſcheme would be moſt *miſchievous*, as directly tending to the deſtruction of religious liberty. For the end being to reduce men from the falſe to the true religion, the ſeverities, as we ſay, muſt be increaſed till they have ſtrength to operate effectually. And there is no ſtopping ſhort, without expoſing the ſcheme to the greateſt abſurdities. Therefore, the more ingenuous defenders of a *teſt*, on this ſcheme, are thoſe who regard a toleration, not as a right of nature due to mankind, but as a conceſſion which the neceſſities of the times extorted. For it is certain that *toleration* and *ſuch a teſt* can no more ſtand together on common principles, than liberty and perſecution.

This is but a very ſhort hint of the ſad conſequences which attend an eſtabliſhed religion and a teſt-law on the common hypotheſis; but enough to evince the following concluſions:

I. Firſt, that thoſe great defenders of *civil* and *religious* liberties, whoſe projects are here oppoſed, muſt needs think hardly of an eſtabliſhed religion raiſed on that hypotheſis; which ſo directly tends to the deſtruction of both.

II. Secondly, that the arguments employed in their various writings, againſt ſuch eſtabliſhments, do not at all effect or reach an eſtabliſhed religion and a teſt-law founded on this theory. For that,

III. Thirdly, on compariſon, it appears, that *this* removes and keeps clear of all thoſe monſtrous miſchiefs and abſurdities with which the other ſcheme abounds: as ſhewing the magiſtrate's act in the *alliance* to be reaſonable, juſt, and neceſſary: as ſtating and fixing the mutual *conditions* of the alliance with the utmoſt preciſion and exactneſs: as proving the equity and neceſſity of a *teſt-law*;

and.

and ſecuring religious liberty by a free *toleration*. And, to ſhew that nothing of advantage is wanting to make this ſcheme preferred to the common one, it may be obſerved, in the laſt place, that an eſtabliſhment, made only on the motives of CIVIL UTILITY, ſecures that very end, which the other pretends ſolely to aim at in eſtabliſhing a church; and which yet, by purſuing in a viſionary manner, it never attains: I mean, *the advancement of truth*. For if public utility and truth do coincide, then to provide for that utility is, at the ſame time, providing for truth, its inſeparable aſſociate. On the whole then we ſee that, in this caſe, to aim at *truth* is loſing as well *that*, as utility; but to aim at *utility* is gaining both together.

I will conclude, in requeſting my reader to have this always in mind, THAT THE TRUE END FOR WHICH RELIGION IS ESTABLISHED IS, NOT TO PROVIDE FOR THE TRUE FAITH, BUT FOR CIVIL UTILITY, as the key to open to him the whole myſtery of this controverſy; and the clew to lead him ſafe through all the intricacies, and perplexities, in which it has been involved.

The ſettling this matter on true foundations ſeems to be the only thing wanting to perfect the felicity of the *Britiſh* conſtitution. For while *literary*, *civil* and *religious* liberty, by occaſionally undergoing a free ſcrutiny, have at length become generally underſtood; *this laſt remaining queſtion*, of ſo much importance, concerning an *eſtabliſhed religion*, hath been ſo little examined to the bottom, or the true principles of it ſearched into, that the one party defended it on *ſuch* as directly tend to overthrow every thing already ſettled in favour of religious, and even civil and literary liberty: and the *other* oppoſed it on *ſuch* as muſt make all that liberty, they themſelves had been long contending for, and had at length obtained, degenerate into the worſt licentiouſneſs. Now whether we have contributed any thing to facilitate the removal of this laſt obſtruction to a ſtate of ſober and perfect liberty, is ſubmitted to the judgment of the public.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

The concluſion, in which the remaining objections of both parties are conſidered.

THE wild *Indians*, amidſt their uncultivated waſtes, ſee the beauty and uſe of every thing around them; and are not ſuch fools as to complain for want of better accommodations than what they find provided to their hands. Yet as important as this truth is to them, they are little ſolicitous to enquire from whence all this order and harmony ariſes: they have received it from their anceſtors, that the earth was ſupported on the back of a huge tortoiſe; and they do not take it well to have their tortoiſe diſturbed or laughed at. The friends of our happy eſtabliſhment have, many of them, a little of this Indian taſte.—In their fear of *ſhaking foundations*, they are unwilling that the weight of the conſtitution ſhould be removed from the tortoiſe of old opinion, to reſt upon a *theory which* they think *does not exactly tally with fact, as few theories do.*

This may be thought a notable objection. But on what miſtaken principle it ſtands, I ſhall now endeavour to ſhew. The word THEORY has been appropriated (as it were) to the explanation of a *natural ſyſtem.* Now as ſuch theories are good only in proportion to their agreement with *fact*; and as nature ſo much withdraws herſelf from our inquiry; it is no wonder that it ſhould have grown into an obſervation, *that few theories agree with fact*; and that this ſhould be eſteemed, what it really is, an objection to theories of this kind.

But our theory is an explanation of an *artificial*, not a *natural* ſyſtem: in which meaſures very different from the latter are to be followed. For truth being the end of all kinds of theories, a right

theory of *nature* is to be obtained only by purſuing fact; for God is the author of that ſyſtem: but in a theory of *politics*, which is an *artificial* ſyſtem, to follow fact is no certain way to truth, becauſe man is the author of that ſyſtem. Abſtract ideas, and their general relations, are the guides to lead us into truth; and *fact* hath, with good reaſon, but a ſubſidiary uſe. As therefore the method to be purſued is different, ſo ſhould the judgment be, which is paſſed upon it: the goodneſs of this theory being eſtimated, not according to its agreement with *fact*, but *right reaſon*. In the former caſe, the theory ſhould be regulated by the fact: in the latter, the fact by the theory.

But ſtill, *fact*, as we ſay, hath even here its ſubſidiary uſe. For as this theory muſt be founded on the principles of *right reaſon* to render it *juſt*; ſo, to ſatisfy us that it is *real*, that it is *practicable*, and no fanciful Utopia, it muſt be ſupported by *fact*: that is, it muſt be ſhewn that the policy, explained and juſtified in the theory, hath been practiſed to the common benefit of all. This is the uſe, and the only uſe, of conſulting fact in theſe kinds of theories. And this, I preſume, will be enough to recommend the theory of this ALLIANCE: which was written with no other view, than to furniſh every lover of his country with reaſonable principles, to oppoſe to the deſtructive fancies of the enemies of our happy eſtabliſhment. Not to reform the fundamental conſtitutions of the ſtate; but to ſhew they needed no reforming: an attempt, I ſhould think, neither irrational, nor unſeaſonable.

An example, uſed before, will illuſtrate what we have been now ſaying. The *theory* of civil ſociety, founded on the *original compact*, when it was firſt urged againſt the advocates for arbitrary government, had the fortune to fall into ill hands, the enemies of their country; who inforced it, not to defend the liberties we enjoyed, but to alter the nature of the conſtitution: the conſequence was, that the authors being juſtly obnoxious, the principles were ſuſpected, and then rejected. Afterwards they fell into more temperate hands; and being then employed to juſtify the ſubjects' rights under

our

our limited monarchy, they were in a little time generally received; and men were brought to found their liberties on thoſe principles; which liberties, till then, they choſe to claim on the precarious grants of ancient monarchs, or the illiberal tenure of more ancient cuſtom.

As to our adverſaries, if they thought that the few cant terms of *Natural Rights*, *Civil Liberty*, *Prieſtcraft*, and *Perſecution*, cuſtomarily varied by a jargon of ſophiſtical logic, would be ſufficient to undo what the wiſdom of all ages and people has concurred to *eſtabliſh*, many of them have lived to ſee themſelves miſtaken.

But if reaſon be what they require, and that they think they have a right to expect a reaſon for every thing, we have here endeavoured to ſatisfy them. If they like, as it is probable they will, their own reaſons better, it will then come to be a diſpute about taſte. I have given them corn. They chuſe to ſtick by their acorn-huſks. Much good may do them.

Nothing remains but to remove an argument *ad invidiam*, the only logic hitherto employed againſt this *theory*, and which would perſuade the reader that it MAKES RELIGION A TOOL OF POLITICS. If by this they mean, that I believe there is a *political uſe of religion*, whereby it may be made to advance the good of civil ſociety; and that therefore I have endeavoured to make this uſe of it; they do me no wrong. I not only believe ſo, but I have ſhewn * that we have not a more illuſtrious inſtance of the wiſdom and goodneſs of God, than in his thus cloſely uniting our preſent and our future happineſs. I believe what the BEST GOOD MAN of our order was not aſhamed to own before me. "A politique uſe of religion (ſays he †) "there is. Men fearing God are thereby a great deal more effec-"tually than by poſitive laws reſtrained from doing evil, inaſ-"much as thoſe laws have no further power than over our out-"ward actions only, whereas unto mens inward cogitations, unto "the privie intents and motions of their hearts, religion ſerveth for

* See The Divine Legation of Moſes, Vol. I.

† Eccl. Pol. B. V. Sect. 2.

"a bridle. What more ſavage, wilde, and cruell, than man, if "he ſee himſelfe able, either by fraude to over-reach, or by power "to overbeare, the laws whereunto he ſhould be ſubject? Where-"fore in ſo great boldneſs to offend, it behoveth that the world "ſhould be held in awe, not by a vaine ſurmiſe, but a true appre-"henſion of ſomewhat, which no man may thinke himſelfe able "to withſtand. THIS IS THE POLITIQUE USE OF RELIGION."

Thus the admirable Hooker, where he takes notice how certain atheiſts of his time, by obſerving this uſe of religion, were fortified in their folly, in thinking it was invented by ſtateſmen to keep men in awe. An idle viſion, which I have ſo thoroughly confuted in another place *, that, I perſuade myſelf, it ſhall, for the future, be only thought fit to go in rank with the tales of nurſes, and the dreams of Freethinkers.

But if they mean, that I have endeavoured *to make religion a convenient engine to ambitious and intriguing politicians to work the clergy, as the tools of power, in a ſeparate intereſt from the community*, this is a very groſs calumny. I have expreſsly declared, that where I ſpeak of religion's ſerving the ſtate, I always mean, by the ſtate, a *legitimate* government, or civil policy founded on the natural rights and liberties of mankind. And, ſo far is this plan of *alliance* from contributing to thoſe miſchiefs, that it effectually prevents them: and, what is more, is the only ſcheme of an ESTABLISHMENT which can prevent them.

To conclude all, We live in an age when the principles of public liberty are well underſtood: and, as corrupt as the age is, we muſt needs imagine, there are many real lovers of their country. But then a certain licentiouſneſs (which is the ſpirit of the times) is as fatally apt to delude honeſt men in their ideas of public good, as to infect corrupt men in their purſuit of private ſatisfactions. Now, as ſuch are always apt to embrace with warmth any project which hath the face of advancing public intereſts, I do not wonder

* Divine Legation of Moſes, B. III. Sect. 6.

they

they ſhould be drawn in, to think favourably of an attempt which profeſſes only to vindicate the COMMON RIGHTS OF SUBJECTS; or that they ſhould be inclined to judge hardly of a writer, who frankly oppoſes thoſe pretenſions. "Becauſe" (to uſe the words of the great author laſt quoted *) "ſuch as openly reprove ſuppoſed diſorders "of ſtate, are taken for principal friends to the common benefite of "all; and for men that carry ſingular freedome of mind. Under "this fair and plauſible colour, whatſoever they utter paſſeth for "good and currant. That which wanteth in the waight of their "ſpeach, is ſupplied by the aptneſs of mens minds to accept and "believe it. Whereas on the other ſide, if we maintaine things "that are eſtabliſhed, we have to ſtrive with a number of heavy "prejudices, deeply rooted in the hearts of men, who think that "herein we ſerve the time, and ſpeak in favour of the preſent "ſtate, becauſe thereby WE EITHER HOLD OR SEEK PREFER-"MENT."

* Hooker's Eccl. Pol. Lib. I. Sect. 1.

NOTES

NOTES ON BOOK III.

P. 203. [A]. NO man ever carried *human liberty* to the ridiculous exceſs, in which we find it in the writings of J. J. Rouſſeau, the Celebrated Citizen of Geneva. Yet, with the appearance of the like extravagant caprice in the other extreme, he deprives men of that moſt precious branch of their liberty, the worſhipping of God according to their conſcience. "As to Religions once *eſtabliſhed*, or *tolerated* in a "ſtate, I think it (ſays he, in a letter to the *archbiſhop* of Paris) unjuſt and "barbarous to deſtroy them by violence; and that the ſovereign hurts "himſelf in maltreating the followers of them. There is a great difference "between mens' embracing a new religion, and living and continuing in "that in which they were born. The *firſt only are puniſhable*. The civil "power ſhould neither ſuffer diverſities of opinion to be new planted, "neither ſhould it proſcribe thoſe which have already taken root. *For a* "*ſon is never in the wrong for following the religion of his father*: and "the *public peace requires* that there ſhould be no perſecution."—Lettre à M. De Beaumont, l'Archeveque de Paris, p. 86. I have given the original in another place.

This one might expect from a man of paradox: but, to find ſo ſage an advocate for liberty as M. de Monteſquieu ſpeaking in the ſame ſtrain, appears at firſt ſight, very unaccountable.—"See then (ſays he) the funda-"mental principle of civil laws with regard to religion. When the civil "power is the maſter, whether it will receive a *new religion* into the ſtate, "or whether it will not, It ſhould not receive it. When it hath already "gotten footing in the ſtate, it ſhould be *tolerated*."—Voici donc le principe fondamental des loix politiques en fait de religion. Quand on eſt Maître de recevoir dans un état une nouvelle religion, ou de ne pas recevoir, il ne faut pas l'y établir; quand elle y eſt établie, il faut la tolérer.—De l'Eſprit des Loix, l. 25. c. x.

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This deciſion of theſe two philoſophic legiſts appears to be as contradictory to their own general principle, as it is abſurd and unjuſt in itſelf. The only way I know, of accounting for it, is to ſuppoſe (and I believe I do ſmall injury to truth in ſuppoſing it) that both of them conſider RELIGION as a mere ENGINE OF STATE; an uſeful one indeed, when rightly applied; but very miſchievous when not conducted by as able politicians as themſelves. Suppoſe this; and then, as diſcordant as their deciſion is to their *civil principles* of liberty, it is very conſonant to their *religious principles* of an *engine of ſtate*. For if religion be only thus to be conſidered, any one mode of it will ſerve the turn: more than one may be too much, and occaſion civil diſorders: therefore more than one ought not to be admitted. But if ſeveral have already taken root, they are to be *tolerated* and left in peace, for the very ſame reaſon: becauſe the attempt to eradicate them might be attended with the ſame civil miſchief which a new introduction of them would produce.

But neither of theſe celebrated writers ſeemed to conſider, that though THEY regarded *religion as a mere engine of ſtate*, yet that RELIGIONISTS thought otherwiſe, and eſteemed it of divine original; and that conſequently, it was matter of CONSCIENCE to *Believers* to worſhip God according to that mode which they judged moſt acceptable to him. Now to reſtrain ſuch in the exerciſe of what they deem their chief duty, is one of the greateſt violations of the NATURAL RIGHTS of mankind: Yet theſe two ingenious men openly profeſs, nay boaſt, that the defence and preſervation of THESE RIGHTS was the great and principal end of their learned labours.

P. 210. [B]. The equal conduct of the beſt and greateſt of our monarchs, in his very different ſtations of Prince of Orange, and King of England, will do great credit to this reaſoning. When king James, a *papiſt*, demanded of his ſon-in-law, with whom he was then on good terms, his approbation of a TOLERATION and ABOLITION OF THE TEST: The Statholder readily concurred with the ſcheme of a *toleration*, but utterly condemned an *abolition of the teſt*. When afterwards, he became king of a free people, the *Proteſtant* Diſſenters, likewiſe, in their turn demanded both: His conduct was uniformly the ſame: He gave them a *toleration*, but was adviſed not to give his conſent to the abolition of the *teſt*.

APPEN-

APPENDIX

TO THE

FIRST EDITION

IN MDCCXXXVI.

THE ſubſtance of the preceding diſcourſe being no other than a ſingle chapter of a treatiſe which I have now by me, and which, therefore, I had oft occaſion to refer to as I went along, I thought it not amiſs, for theſe reaſons (not to mention others), to give the Reader ſome ſhort account of a work that may, I hope, on its appearance, engage his further attention. It is intitled, *The Divine Legation of Moſes Demonſtrated (on the Principles of a Religious Theiſt), from the Omiſſion of the Doctrine of a Future State in the Jewiſh Diſpenſation.* For having chalked out a plan for a defence of revealed religion againſt Deiſts, Jews, and Mahometans, which we are deſirous of raiſing as a laſting monument to the glory of the Chriſtian name, we were not reduced to that poverty of invention, or ignorance in deſign, to frame it of old or already-formed materials.—Such ſecond-hand labours are only worthy the adverſaries of our holy faith; whoſe cauſe relying on the ſtrength of half a dozen plauſible ſophiſms, their buſineſs is to cook them up in different diſguiſes, juſt as the palate of the times, or the fantaſtic appetite of their followers, give them opportunity or invitation. But truth, which is eternal, and whoſe relations are infinite, affords unexhauſted matter for defenſe and illuſtration. The views

in which ſhe may be placed are numberleſs; and attentive contemplation flaſhes conviction on every view.

This, if heaven give me life and health, I hope to execute. In the mean time, this *Defenſe of Moſes* was compoſed as a ſpecimen of what can be performed, in the new road I purpoſe to take, for a complete defenſe of revelation.

1. Why I choſe to make the *Defenſe of Moſes* the ſubject of my ſpecimen, was, Becauſe we have of late ſeen ſeveral writers, who profeſs to believe the Chriſtian Religion, treat Moſes and his diſpenſation ſo cavalierly that one would ſuſpect they thought the abandoning him could have no conſequences deſtructive of Chriſtianity. And thoſe who profeſs to think more ſoberly, are generally gone into an opinion that the truth of the Jewiſh religion is impoſſible to be proved but upon the foundation of the Chriſtian. An opinion, that had been long peculiar to the Socinians. Who go ſo far as to maintain *, *That the knowledge of the Old Teſtament is not abſolutely neceſſary for Chriſtians.*—As to the firſt ſort of people, if they really imagine Chriſtianity hath no dependence on Judaiſm, I have nothing further to ſay to them here. But if, as is moſt reaſonable to think, they only affect this air of indifference when preſſed with difficulties too weighty to remove, this Demonſtration may not come unſeaſonably to their relief. As for the other, I ſhall, I am perſuaded, merit their thanks, if I ſucceed in freeing their reaſonings from a vicious circle; that firſt, prove the Chriſtian by the Jewiſh; and then, the Jewiſh by the Chriſtian Religion.

2. Why I choſe this medium, namely, *the omiſſion of a future ſtate in the Jewiſh Diſpenſation* (before ſeveral others of equal ſtrength which I had in my choice), to prove its divine original, was, 1. Becauſe I ſhould be, thereby, enabled to ſhew, to the confuſion of infidelity, that this very circumſtance of omiſſion, which thoſe men eſteem ſuch an imperfection as makes the diſpenſation unworthy the author to whom we aſcribe it, is, in truth, a demonſtrative proof of the divinity of its original. Whereby it will be found, that

* Cuper adverſ. Trad. Theologico-polit. l. i.

ſeveral

ſeveral paſſages of ſcripture, which they charge with obſcurity, injuſtice, and contradiction, are, indeed, full of light, equity, and concord. 2. Becauſe this medium affords us an *internal argument for revelation.* Which a late able writer denies can be found for its ſupport. *Strictly ſpeaking*, ſays he, *there can be no internal evidence of a revelation* *. Now this being a ſort of evidence on which my propoſed *defenſe of revelation* will be chiefly built; and it having been hitherto little cultivated, and at length, as we ſee, its very exiſtence denied, I will beg leave to ſay a word or two concerning it.

The writers in defenſe of revealed religion diſtinguiſh their arguments under two ſorts. The firſt they call the *internal*, and the other the *external* evidence. Of theſe, the firſt is, in its nature, more ſimple and noble, and even capable of demonſtration. While the other, made up of very diſſimilar materials, and borrowing aid from without, muſt needs, on theſe accounts, have ſome parts of unequal ſtrength with the reſt; and conſequently lie open to the attacks of a willing adverſary. Beſides, the *internal* evidence is, by its nature, perpetuated, and ſo fitted for all times and periods: while the *external*, by length of time, weakens and decays. For the nature and genius of the religion defended affording the proofs of the firſt kind, theſe materials of defenſe are inſeparable from its exiſtence; and ſo always at hand, and the ſame. But time may, and doth efface memorials independent of that exiſtence, out of which the external evidence is compoſed. Which evidence muſt therefore become more and more imperfect; without being affected by that whimſical calculation to which a certain Scotſman † would ſubject it. Nay ſo neceſſary is the *internal* evidence, that even the very beſt of the external kind cannot ſupport itſelf without it. As may be ſeen from hence, that when the miracles, performed by the founders of our holy faith, are, from humane teſtimony, irre-

* Dr. Conybeare's Defenſe of revealed religion, ſecond edit. 8vo. p. 431.

† Craig, Theologiæ Chriſt. Principia Mathematica. Lond. 1699, 4to.

fiſtibly eſtabliſhed, the conſequence, that therefore they come from God, cannot be deduced till the nature of that doctrine is examined, for whoſe eſtabliſhment they were performed. But was there no other benefit in cultivating the internal evidence, yet the gaining, by it, a more perfect knowledge of revealed religion would fully recompence the pains. And this is beſt acquired in that purſuit.

Notwithſtanding theſe ſuperior advantages, it has ſo happened, that the *internal evidence* hath been hitherto uſed as an introduction only, to the *external:* and while, by this latter, men have proved our religion actually divine, they have gone no further with the former, than to ſhew it worthy, indeed, of ſuch original. But from this obſervation, a late writer, as I have ſaid, hath drawn a quite contrary concluſion. I, from the ſmall progreſs hitherto made in it, exhort to its better cultivation; he, from the ſame fact, concludes, that *ſtrictly ſpeaking there can be no internal evidence* at all *of a revelation.* He ſuppoſes this ſmall advance to be owing to a defect in the nature of the proof; I, to the negligence of its cultivators. Which of us is in the right, a few pages will, I hope, diſcover.

What may have occaſioned this neglect, in my view of it, is not ſo eaſy to find out. Whether it be that writers have imagined that, in general, the labours and difficulties attending the effectual proſecution of the *internal method* are not ſo eaſily ſurmounted as thoſe which the writer in the external is engaged in. While they ſuppoſe, that this latter, to be maſter of his ſubject, needs only the common requiſites of church hiſtory, diligence and judgement. But that the reaſoner, on the *internal proof*, muſt, beſides theſe, have a thorough knowledge of humane nature, civil policy, the univerſal hiſtory of mankind, an exact idea of the Moſaic and Chriſtian diſpenſations, cleared from the froth and grounds of ſchool ſubtilties, and church ſyſtems: and, above all, ſhould be bleſſed with a certain ſagacity to inveſtigate the relations of humane actions through all the combinations of natural, civil, and moral complex-

complexities. What may ſuggeſt this opinion may be the reflection, that in the *external evidence* each circumſtance of fact, that makes for the truth of revealed religion, is ſeen to do ſo as ſoon as known; ſo that the chief labour, here, is to ſearch and pick out ſuch facts; and to place them in their proper light and ſituation: but, that in proſecuting the *internal evidence*, the caſe is widely different. A circumſtance in the frame and compoſition of this religion that, perhaps, ſome time or other may be diſcovered to be a demonſtration of its divinity, ſhall be ſo far from being generally thought aſſiſting in its proof, that it ſhall be eſteemed, by many, a prejudice againſt it. As, I think, I have given a remarkable inſtance in the ſubject of the treatiſe I am now upon. And no wonder that a religion of divine original, conſtituted to ſerve many admirable ends of Providence, ſhould be full of ſuch complicated myſteries, the view of which filled the great apoſtle Paul with raptures. As, on the other hand, this religion being for the uſe of man, we need not deſpair, when we have attained a proper knowledge of man's nature, and the dependencies thereon, of making ſtill growing diſcoveries, on the *internal evidence*, of the divinity of its original.

Now though all this may perhaps be true; and that, conſequently, it would appear ridiculous arrogance in an ordinary writer, after having ſeen the difficulties attending this method, to hope to overcome them by the qualities above ſaid to be required: yet no modeſt examiner need be diſcouraged. For there are, in revealed religion, beſides thoſe interior marks of truth before deſcribed, which require the moſt delicate operation of a great genius and maſter workman to bring out and poliſh *, others, alſo, no leſs illuſtrious, but more univocal marks of truth, which God hath been pleaſed to impreſs upon his diſpenſations; which require no great qualities but humility and love of truth, in him who would from thence

* A noble inſtance of this, a great writer hath given us in the fourth *diſſertation* of *the Uſe and Intent of Prophecy*, &c. intitled, *Chriſt's Entry into Jeruſalem*.

inveſtigate

inveſtigate the ways of God to man. The ſubject of this diſcourſe is one of thoſe illuſtrious marks; from which the diſcoverer claims no merit from any long, learned, or laborious ſearch; it is honour enough for him that he is the firſt who brings it out to obſervation. If he be indeed the firſt. For the demonſtration is ſo beautiful, and, at the ſame time, appears to be ſo eaſy and ſimple, that one cannot tell whether the pleaſure of the diſcovery, or the wonder that it is now to make, be the greater.

In this treatiſe, I pretend to have carried the *internal evidence* much further than the proofs for revelation are uſually carried. Even to the height of which it is capable, a demonſtration, little ſhort of mathematical. In which, nothing, but a mere phyſical poſſibility of the contrary, can be oppoſed. Only allowing me this ſingle poſtulatum,

"That a ſkilful legiſlator eſtabliſhing a religion, and a civil "policy, acts with certain views and for certain ends; and not "capriciouſly, or without purpoſe or deſign."

From thence I proceed to erect my demonſtration, ſolely, on theſe three very clear and ſimple propoſitions.

1. "That the inculcating the doctrine of a future ſtate of re-"wards and puniſhments, is neceſſary for the well-being of civil "ſociety.

2. "That all mankind, eſpecially the moſt learned and wiſe na-"tions of antiquity, have concurred in believing that this doctrine "was of that uſe to civil ſociety. And,

3. "That the doctrine of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſh-"ments is not to be found in, nor did make part of, the Moſaic "diſpenſation."

Propoſitions ſo clear and evident, that one would think one might directly proceed to thoſe mediums whereby we deduce our concluſion.

"*That therefore the law of Moſes is of divine original.*"

But ſo great is the love to paradox and ſyſtem, that theſe, with all their clearneſs, have need of a very particular defence: The infidel having

having diſputed the firſt, and many Chriſtian writers thought fit to deny the laſt. The diſcourſe, therefore, is divided into ſix books. The firſt is in defence of the firſt propoſition: The ſecond and third, in defence of the ſecond propoſition: The fourth and fifth, in defence of the third propoſition: And the laſt is employed in deducing thoſe mediums whereby we erect this important demonſtration. I ſhall crave leave to give the Reader a ſhort account, in groſs, of what each book contains.

1. The firſt book opens with an account of the original of civil ſociety; the natural defect in its plan; and how that defect is ſupplied by religion only. But it being ſhewn, that religion cannot ſubſiſt or ſupport itſelf without the doctrine of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments, it follows, that that doctrine is of the higheſt uſe to ſociety. In the next place, the objections, which licentious wits have brought againſt the ſervice of religion to the ſtate, are fully anſwered. In particular, the arguments employed by Mr. Bayle, and interſperſed in his famous work, intitled, *Penſées diverſes à l'occaſion de la comete*, &c. are methodized, ſet in the ſtrongeſt light, and confuted. In which, amongſt divers other matters of importance, are ſettled and explained the true grounds of moral actions. The book concludes with a ſhort, but full, detection of the fundamental ſophiſms on which the execrable doctrine of the book called *The Fable of the Bees* is ſolely built. The writer of which adventured to go one ſtep further than any other atheiſt, or apologiſt for atheiſm. Thoſe who preceded him having only maintained, that a ſtate might ſubſiſt without religion, becauſe moral virtue might be had without it; this writer, that moral virtue, the fruit of religion alone, was deſtructive of a great and flouriſhing ſociety, whoſe grandeur could be ſupported only by vice.

2. The ſecond Book is employed in defence of the ſecond propoſition. It begins with ſhewing the ſenſe all mankind had of the utility of religion to the ſtate, by the doctrine of a future ſtate's being univerſally taught in all ages and nations of mankind, the

Jewiſh

Jewiſh only excepted. And it is proved, by the deduction of many particulars, that the reception and preſervation of that doctrine was owing to the general ſenſe of this its utility. It proceeds to an examination of the conduct of the ancient legiſlators: and delivers, and explains, at large, the various arts and contrivances they employed, to ſupport and propagate religion in general, and the doctrine of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments in particular. The hiſtory of theſe arts, *from the firſt*, which was a pretence to inſpiration, *to the laſt*, which was the *eſtabliſhment of religion* (that hath afforded matter for the treatiſe to which this ſhort account is an appendix), is here delivered. In which I pretend to have unfolded the whole myſtery of ancient legiſlation. A ſubject little known or attended to. And by deducing the hiſtory of its riſe, progreſs, and decay, from the old Egyptians to the lateſt Grecian ſophiſts, we preſume to have given light and congruity to an infinite number of paſſages in *Greek* and *Roman* authors.

3. The third book, continuing the defence of this propoſition, opens with a collection of teſtimonies from the antient hiſtorians and philoſophers. By which it appears there was an univerſal concurrence in opinion concerning the indiſpenſable uſe of religion in general, and the doctrine of a future ſtate in particular, to civil ſociety. And in order to ſhew the ſtrength of this perſuaſion, in the fulleſt light, the public teaching of the philoſophers, on this point, is examined into. Where it is proved that this utility was the ſole motive to all of them for propagating the doctrine of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments. This neceſſarily engages us in the hiſtory of the riſe, progreſs, and decay of the ancient Greek philoſophy. In which is ſhewn its original, like that of legiſlation, from Egypt: The ſeveral revolutions it underwent in its character; conſtantly attendant and conformable to the ſeveral revolutions of civil power: Its gradual decay, and total abſorpſion in the ſchools: Where it is ſhewn, that, as it ſprung from the fountains of the true Egyptian wiſdom, ſo it ended in the corrupt and ſpurious.

ſpurious. In which account will be found the true original and uſe of the twofold method of philoſophiſing; hitherto we preſume, much miſtaken: Which will help to unravel the moſt embarraſſed queſtions concerning the true nature and genius of the Greek philoſophy; and to reconcile an infinite number of ſuppoſed contradictions which the moſt eminent founders of it have fallen into. This univerſal conſent of legiſlators and philoſophers concerning the uſe of religion to the ſtate, and their arts and endeavours to propagate it, being largely proved and illuſtrated; leſt it ſhould be miſtaken and perverted. This book concludes with a confutation of the atheiſtical pretence *that religion was the offspring of ſtateſmen.* —The abſurdity of it is expoſed, and the impoſſibility of it demonſtrated. The original, and authors of this monſtrous paradox are animadverted on; particularly, the *third letter of* Toland *to* Serena *concerning the Origin of Idolatry and Reaſons of Heatheniſm*, which is a formal defence of it, is examined and refuted.—So far in ſupport of the ſecond propoſition.

4. The fourth book enters upon the third propoſition. And, as amongſt the ſeveral arguments brought to prove that the doctrine of a future ſtate was not in the Jewiſh diſpenſation, one, and the moſt conſiderable, is taken from the nature of the Jewiſh policy, this book is employed in explaining the true nature of that policy. In order to which, the character of Moſes, with the conceſſions of the Infidels concerning him, is premiſed. And that long debated queſtion, whether the Jews borrowed ſome of their cuſtoms, and the Greeks all their ancient learning and religion from the Egyptians; or whether, on the other hand, both Greeks and Egyptians received all they had of value in theſe matters from the Jews, is examined to the bottom, on ſuch principles as may, poſſibly, enable us to determine it with certainty. The way being thus cleared, the true Jewiſh policy is then attempted to be delivered and explained. The conſequence of which policy is ſhewn to be, the diſpenſation of an extraordinary Providence promiſed and believed. The book goes

on to examine how long this policy laſted; and whether it was ever changed while the Jews continued a people, under their own laws: and concludes with a very momentous attempt, namely, to demonſtrate, from the true nature of this policy, as here delivered, the agreeableneſs of every thing which Scripture tells us, God commanded; *did* to others; or repreſented of himſelf; the agreeableneſs, I ſay, of all this to truth, and the rights of nature and nations. In which will be obviated every thing of moment the Deiſts urge, particularly the late author of *Chriſtianity as old as the Creation*, to prove thoſe things contrary to reaſon, truth, and juſtice. Such as are the law for puniſhing opinions; which Mr. Bayle, after many endeavours to juſtify, gives up, as impoſſible to be defended on the principles of the tolerants; the extirpation of the ſeven nations; the deſtruction of the people for having been numbered by David; the repreſentation of the Godhead with human paſſions and the like.

5. The fifth book continues to proſecute the ſubject of the third propoſition. Many other arguments are now produced, to prove that the doctrine of a future ſtate neither was, nor could be, part of the Moſaic diſpenſation. Then the arguments of thoſe who are of another opinion are conſidered; where it is ſhewn, that they are all built on falſe principles, which in this, and in the foregoing book, have been detected and confuted. And, in the laſt place, the true hiſtory of the riſe and progreſs of the doctrine of a future ſtate amongſt the Jewiſh people is delivered. It is firſt told, from what quarter the ſlow dawnings of it firſt appeared. In doing which, there was occaſion to ſettle the chronology of ſeveral books of the Old Teſtament: particularly the book of *Job*, which we hope is exactly done from infallible internal characters. In this part of the hiſtory of the doctrine, we have been invited to give, what our main principle enables us to do, ſome good account of the contradictory methods which God in different places of holy Writ declares to uſe in dealing with ſinners: and to ſhew how reconcilable

thoſe

thoſe different methods are to truth, to equity, and to one another. A circumſtance that is now become the offence of every ſmatterer in infidelity. The book proceeds to an account of the progreſs and eſtabliſhment of the doctrine of a future ſtate amongſt the Jews. And, as, we find, it was throughly digeſted and eſtabliſhed, among them, at Chriſt's advent; the time, it firſt became a popular doctrine, is endeavoured to be diſcovered; which directs us to the occaſion of its propagation: as the mode of it doth to the authors from whence they received it. All which particulars, it is ſhewn, do in a remarkable manner contribute to the induction and illuſtration of our main concluſion. So far in ſupport of the third and laſt propoſition.

6. The ſixth and concluding book is taken up in ſearching out, and illuſtrating, by the foregoing books, all thoſe mediums whereby we eſtabliſh our great concluſion, *that therefore the law of Moſes is of divine original.* The ſum of the proof is in a word to this effect. The firſt book proved, that religion, which teaches an overruling Providence, the rewarder of good men, and the puniſher of ill, is neceſſary for ſociety, to help out the magiſtrate in the execution of his office, by reſtraining irregularities he could never reach, and by giving a ſanction to his decrees. But that the apparent irregularities in the diſpenſation of things, here below, would deſtroy the belief of a Providence, and conſequently all religion, were it not ſupported by the doctrine of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments, where all thoſe irregularities are ſet right. This was ſo evident a truth, that, as is ſhewn in the ſecond book, all nations concurred to cheriſh and ſupport this doctrine; all the legiſlators eſtabliſhed it; and all the philoſophers invented reaſons to give it credit. Which could be for no other end than its confeſſed ſervice to ſociety: Becauſe, it is ſhewn, that ſeveral of theſe latter who endeavoured moſt to propagate it, believed it not. Amidſt this univerſal conſent, ariſes a little ſtate, which, by the confeſſion of the deiſts themſelves, was the beſt policied of any that ever ancient

legiſlation formed; the author of which purſued his ſcheme by methods, and on principles, ſo reſembling the beſt pagan legiſlators, as Minos, Solon, Lycurgus, Numa, that thoſe Deiſts believe him to be of the ſame ſpecies and claſs with theſe; and to have juſt the ſame pretences to inſpiration. But, what muſt call up the attention of every one, there was this very ſingular difference between his inſtitution and all the other inſtitutions of mankind; that though he, like them, taught an overruling Providence, and a religion, yet it was *without the doctrine of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments*: as is largely proved in the fourth and fifth books. This omiſſion makes the whole deiſtical ſcheme with regard to Moſes, to the laſt degree, inconſiſtent, abſurd, and ridiculous. For firſt, according to their own repreſentation of Moſes, he was the wiſeſt of all legiſlators, and therefore muſt needs ſee the ſervice that doctrine was of to ſociety. He had been bred up in the Egyptian ſchools, and, as the Deiſts believe, had all his knowledge in legiſlation, and religion, from thence: But it is proved in the ſecond and third books, that this doctrine was invented (from the moſt early times) by the Egyptians, and invented for the ſake of the ſtate. Now the Deiſts ſay, he transferred all that was good and profitable, from their inſtitutions into his own. Why not, then, this moſt uſeful of all doctrines? Again, the Jewiſh people, it is confeſſed on all hands, had moſt largely imbibed the Egyptian cuſtoms; and the Deiſts obſerve, that Moſes, as a wiſe legiſlator who underſtood human nature, accommodated his inſtitutions to the inveteracy of ſuch prejudices and prepoſſeſſions: But, of all opinions, this of a future ſtate, as is ſhewn in the ſecond book, is the moſt pleaſing to the mind, gets the quickeſt poſſeſſion of it, and moſt difficultly ſuffers a divorce: and, being at the ſame time moſt uſeful, it is therefore impoſſible a wiſe legiſlator, acting with deſign, ſuch as the Deiſts repreſent Moſes, could omit to inculcate it. Nor doth it avail to ſay, Moſes did not himſelf believe this doctrine; for we have ſhewn, in the ſecond and third books, that many of the

wiſeſt ancients (legiſlators and philoſophers) believed it not, yet ſedulouſly inculcated it for its confeſſed utility to ſociety. So that Moſes had no reaſons for not teaching, but, the moſt momentous and forceable, to teach it. As, 1, its moſt apparent uſe. 2. His prepoſſeſſion in favour of it; being brought up in a ſchool of legiſlation in which this doctrine was the moſt indiſpenſible and eſſential part. 3. The prepoſſeſſion of his people in favour of it. And, 4. The particular neceſſity the Jewiſh ſtate had of this doctrine, above all other ſtates, if it was of mere human inſtitution, as the Deiſts imagine: which neceſſity is largely ſhewn in this book. Thus ſuppoſing Moſes to be a mere human legiſlator, his conduct, in this matter, muſt be owned to be to the laſt degree abſurd, capricious, and irrational. But now, take the account as Scripture gives it us, that he was a man choſe by God to give laws to his people, and all theſe difficulties vaniſh and diſappear: and the great legiſlator ſhines out again in one uniform courſe of ſplendour. For then, an extraordinary diſpenſation of Providence, exactly rewarding and puniſhing (which we ſhew, in the fourth book, to be a neceſſary conſequence of the Jewiſh policy) made the doctrine of a future ſtate needleſs, to all the ends of civil ſociety; and every thing, as we have ſhewn, tended, in the Moſaic diſpenſation, to thoſe ends. For the doctrine being propagated by ſtateſmen, only as a ſuccedaneum to an unequal providence, when that inequality was rectified, there was no further occaſion for it. The conſequence is, that that extraordinary providence over the Jewiſh people, as recorded in Scripture, was *real:* And if ſo, then MOSES, TRULY THE MESSENGER OF GOD. If it ſhould yet be objected that the *preaching up* this extraordinary Providence to popular belief, without the *reality of its exiſtence*, was enough to ſupply the want of the doctrine of a future ſtate; it is here ſhewn, that this pretence of an extraordinary Providence was made uſe of by all the ancient legiſlators: who, yet, found it totally inſufficient, for the ends of ſociety, without this doctrine: which, therefore, was every where

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ſedulouſly inculcated. If laſtly it ſhould be objected (which is the only remaining objection can be made) that Moſes might really believe an *extraordinary Providence* when there was none, and on the ſtrength of that belief might omit the doctrine of a future ſtate, as uſeleſs; this caſe is ſhewn to be impoſſible. For firſt this ſuppoſes him to be very enthuſiaſtical, which the Deiſts are far from taking him to be; and which we have clearly proved he was not. 2. It ſuppoſes that a ſpace of above forty years in which he conducted his people, and the long experience of that time, could not cure him of his enthuſiaſm, with regard to ſo clear a point that muſt be perpetually thruſting itſelf upon his obſervation. He muſt in that caſe have been ſtark-mad: which is ſo monſtrous a fancy that all mankind will be aſhamed of it. The book goes on to ſhew, that if Moſes had a divine miſſion, and conſequently what he had delivered of the extraordinary Providence of God was true, there was not only no need of the doctrine of a future ſtate; but that a great many wiſe ends, becoming infinite wiſdom, were ſerved by omitting it: nay, that it could not, for many important reaſons, have been taught. To ſupport this, a view is given of the univerſal diſpenſation of God to man as a religious agent: and the coincidency and dependence of his ſeveral revelations to him are explained and illuſtrated: In which, the true nature of his laſt and perfect revelation by the miniſtry of his Son is we preſume more rationally explained. From whence will appear the wonderful harmony of the whole; and *the depth and riches of the wiſdom and goodneſs of God* made manifeſt, in a ſeries of obſervations, that, we hope, have in them as much ſolidity as novelty. And with this concludes the laſt book.

This is a very ſlight and imperfect general view of a work, where a vaſt variety of circumſtances, not hinted at in this ſhort account, do, we preſume, ſo ſtrongly contribute to the eſtabliſhment of our concluſion, that nothing, as we ſaid, remains againſt it but a mere phyſical poſſibility of the contrary. And, *this*, on the principles

of

of the Deiſts themſelves. And from thoſe very marks of reſemblance they pretend to have diſcovered between Moſes and the ancient pagan legiſlators; and from many others, which, in the courſe of this work, we have brought out to obſervation. So well founded was the triumphal confidence of this great miſſionary of God, who, as if he had foreknown this objection that ſcoffers of the latter age were to make to the divinity of his character, dared reſt the truth of his pretenſions on an appeal to thoſe legiſlators themſelves, and their Pagan followers; where, in his laſt moments, he thus exultingly cries out, * THEIR ROCK IS NOT AS OUR ROCK, OUR ENEMIES THEMSELVES BEING JUDGES.

* Deut. xxxii. 31.

POST-

POSTSCRIPT

TO THE

FOURTH EDITION

In MDCCLXVI.

LORD Bolingbroke, in his large poſthumous work (on what motives, thoſe volumes ſufficiently declare) hath laboured at a full and formal confutation of the preceding diſcourſe; after having done the ſame honour to another of the author's works, *The Divine Legation of Moſes Demonſtrated.* But the pains he had taken, and the oppoſition he had found in the *argument* of that book, had, by the time he came upon this ſecond adventure, ſo ruffled his temper and diſcompoſed his polite manners, that he now breaks out into much opprobrious language, not only againſt the ſyſtem, but the perſon of the writer. To underſtand the cauſe of his lordſhip's reſentment, ſo far only as it aroſe from the nature of my diſcourſe, it may not be improper to ſay a word or two further concerning the occaſion of my writing, and the principles on which the diſcourſe is compoſed.

After the many violent convulſions our country had ſuffered ſince the REFORMATION by the rage of the religious parties (in which, at one time, liberty of conſcience was oppreſſed; and at another, the eſtabliſhed church over-turned and deſolated) it pleaſed Divine Providence to ſettle our religious rites on ſuch fundamental

principles of juſtice and equity, and to ſecure the civil peace on ſuch maxims of wiſdom and true policy, as moſt effectually guarded both againſt the return of their reſpective violations: and the means made uſe of were the giving, on proper terms of ſecurity to the national religion, a free toleration to thoſe who diſſented from the eſtabliſhed worſhip. This ſeemed to be going as far towards perfection in religious communion as the long diſtracted ſtate of the Chriſtian world would ſuffer us to indulge our hopes.

But men had not been long in poſſeſſion of this bleſſing before they grew weary of it, and ſet on foot many inventions, to throw us back into our old diſorders. For it is to be obſerved with ſorrow, that this reform of the Engliſh conſtitution happened not to be the good work of the CHURCH, begun in the conviction of TRUTH, and carried on upon the principles of charity: but was rather owing to the vigilance of the STATE; at one time, vainly perhaps, anxious for the eſtabliſhed religion *, at another, wiſely provident for the ſupport of civil liberty †. So that when ſucceeding diſſentions in church and ſtate had made this newly reformed conſtitution the ſubject of enquiry, the parties who managed the debate being thoſe who before had both perſecuted and ſuffered in their turns, the principles and tempers they brought with them to the diſcuſſion of the queſtion were not ſuch perhaps as were beſt fitted either to regulate their judgments, or to moderate their partialities. *One* ſide ſeemed to regard the TOLERATION as an evil in itſelf, and only a temporary expedient to prevent a worſe; while their conduct ſhewed, they lay at watch for the firſt occaſion to break in upon it. This was enough to miſlead the *other*, and diſpoſe it to conſider the TEST-LAW, which covered and ſecured the eſtabliſhed religion, as no better than a new ſpecies of perſecution: and having now no real injury to complain of, they began to take umbrage at this ſhadow of a grievance; "To have divine worſhip "really free, they ſaid, no religious profeſſion ſhould be attended

* Ch. II. † Will. III.

"with

"with civil incapacities; a TEST had made that diſtinction amongſt "God's worſhippers; it was therefore to be ſet aſide." But every man ſaw (and perhaps the enemies of the *teſt* were not amongſt the laſt who ſaw it) that to ſet aſide this law, which, under a general *toleration*, was the only ſecurity the *eſtabliſhed* church had to truſt to, was expoſing the national worſhip to all the inroads of a ſectarian rabble. This miſchievous project, ariſing out of abuſed liberty, was at firſt entertained, as we may well ſuppoſe, by the tolerated churches only. Some of the more ingenuous of them adopted it out of *fear*, on the diſcovery of that bigotted principle in their adverſaries, which conſidered *toleration* as only a temporary expedient. And where was the wonder if thoſe who believed they had no ſecurity for what they had got, while ſuch principles prevailed, ſhould endeavour to put it out of the power of their adverſaries to do them harm? Others of a more politic turn cheriſhed it from views of ambition, and in hopes of ſharing the emoluments of the eſtabliſhed church. It was ſome time before any member of the Church of England joined with Diſſenters in their clamours againſt a *teſt-law*, or, more properly ſpeaking, againſt *their own eſtabliſhment*. This monſtrous coalition did not happen till a warm diſpute on certain metaphyſical queſtions * (if conſidered in one light, too ſublime to become the ſubject of human wit; if in another, too trifling to gain the attention of reaſonable men) had ſtarted new ſcruples concerning church-ſubſcription. And to get rid of this neceſſary ENGAGEMENT TO PEACE, and acquieſcence in the eſtabliſhed religion, theſe *wiſe* and *faithful* miniſters of the national worſhip were amongſt the foremoſt to diſcredit it, and the buſieſt to trample down all its fences and ſecurities.

Bigotry, you ſee, was at the bottom of the firſt ſet of principles; and FANATICISM, at the top of the other. In their ſeparate appeals to the ſenſe of mankind, there was this remarkable difference: all

* The Trinitarian controverſy.

ages had felt the miſchiefs of religious reſtraint and perſecution; but there was no example, either in Pagan or in Chriſtian times, of the evils attending the WANT *of an eſtabliſhed religion*. The fanatics therefore were perpetually urging their experience againſt perſecution, ſecure in not having the argument retorted on them. But, in this imaginary advantage they deceived themſelves; and the very *want* of examples was the greateſt real advantage the bigots had over them: who if they had no inſtance of the evils attending the *want* of an eſtabliſhment, to retort upon their adverſaries, it was becauſe ſuch *want* was never known: the neceſſity of a national religion for the ſupport of ſociety being ſo indiſpenſable, that men even in the wildeſt times, the ſworn enemies of religious eſtabliſhments, and *leagued* together for their deſtruction, were no ſooner become able to effect their purpoſe, than they found, in beginning to new model the ſtate, which they had ſubdued by the ſuperiority of their arms, that there was even a neceſſity of ſupporting an eſtabliſhed church. Of this, we have a remarkable example in the INDEPENDENT *republic* *, and in the *protectorſhip* of OLIVER; both of which, under their ſeveral uſurpations, were forced to erect PRESBYTERY, the religion they moſt hated, into a NATIONAL CHURCH.

To proceed; the diſtempers of the ſtate ſtill further contributed to inflame thoſe of the church: and, on the acceſſion of the preſent royal line to the throne, a long, a famous, and a regular diſpute concerning the powers, bounds, and limits of the TWO SOCIETIES, was begun and carried on by two parties of churchmen. But as the ſeveral diſputants had reciprocally aſſigned too much, and allowed too little to the two ſocieties, and had erected their

* In April 1649, the Houſe (ſays Whitelock) came to theſe reſolutions—*That the government to be* ESTABLISHED *in England ſhall be the* PRESBYTERIAN *government.*

That a way ſhall be provided for ADMISSION *of all ſuch churches as tend to Godlineſs and to advance the kingdom of Jeſus Chriſt,* TO BE FREE WITHOUT DISTURBANCES. Memor. of Engliſh Affairs, p. 393.

arguments

arguments on one common fallacy: the maintainers of an eſtabliſhment ſupported a teſt-law on ſuch reaſoning as deſtroyed a toleration *; and the defenders of religious liberty argued againſt the juſtice of that ſecurity on ſuch principles as concluded equally againſt a national church †.

In this ferment, and in this embroiled condition, the author of *the Alliance between Church and State* found the ſentiments of men concerning religious liberty and eſtabliſhments, when he propoſed his *theory* to their conſideration: a theory calculated to vindicate our preſent happy conſtitution ON A PRINCIPLE OF RIGHT, by adjuſting the preciſe bounds of either ſociety; by ſhewing how they come to act in conjunction; and by explaining the nature of their union: and from thence, by natural and neceſſary conſequence, inducing, on the one hand, an ESTABLISHED RELIGION, with all its rights and privileges, ſecured by a TEST LAW; and on the other, a full and free TOLERATION to all who diſſented from the national worſhip.

He firſt ſhewed the uſe of religion to ſociety, from the experience and practice of all ages: he inquired from whence the uſe aroſe, and found it to be from certain original defects in the very eſſence and plan of civil ſociety. He went on to the nature of religion; and ſhewed how, and for what cauſes, it conſtituted a ſociety: and then, from the natures of the *two ſocieties*, he collected, that the object of the civil is only the *body* and its intereſts; and the object of the religious, only the *ſoul*. Hence he concluded, that both ſocieties are ſovereign, and independent; becauſe they ariſe not out of one another; and becauſe, as they are concerned in contrary provinces, they can never meet to claſh; the ſameneſs of *original*, or the ſameneſs of *adminiſtration*, being the only cauſes which can bring one, of two diſtinct ſocieties, into natural ſubjection to the other.

* Sherlock. † Hoadly.

To

To apply religion therefore to the ſervice of civil ſociety, in the beſt manner it is capable of being applied, he ſhewed it was neceſſary that the two ſocieties ſhould UNITE: For each being ſovereign and independent, there was no other way of applying the ſervice of religion in any ſolid or effectual manner. But no ſuch union could ariſe but from *free compact* and convention. And free convention is never likely to happen, unleſs each ſociety has its mutual motives, and mutual advantages. The author therefore, from what he had laid down of the natures of the two ſocieties, explained what thoſe motives and advantages were. Whence it appeared that all the rights, privileges, and prerogatives, of the two ſocieties, thus united, with the civil magiſtrate at their head, were indeed thoſe very rights, privileges, and prerogatives, which we find eſtabliſhed and enjoyed under our preſent happy conſtitution in church and ſtate: the reſult of this was, that an ESTABLISHED CHURCH and a free TOLERATION are made perfectly to agree by the medium of a TEST LAW. This law therefore the author, in the laſt place, proceeded to vindicate, on the ſame general principles of the law of nature and nations.

This is a true though ſhort analyſis of *the Alliance between Church and State*; with the principles on which the theory is conducted.

Let us now conſider what his lordſhip has to object to it. I ſhall take him paragraph by paragragh, in his native diſorder, as he lies: for when a writer is confuſed beyond redreſs, as our noble author is here where he reaſons againſt the book of the *alliance*, an attempt to reduce his diſcourſe to order becomes ſuſpicious; as the reader may chance to fancy that the *obſcurity* as well as the *order* were of the anſwerer's making. Therefore the ſafeſt, as well as faireſt way in this caſe is to take the writer as you find him. The obſcurities in thought and expreſſion will be then ſeen to be his own; and nothing can be objected to the anſwerer, but a few repetitions, which, in this method of anſwering, can never be avoided.

"THE

"THE notion (ſays his lordſhip) of a FORMAL ALLIANCE be-
"tween church and ſtate, as between two independent, diſtinct
"powers, is a very groundleſs and WHIMSICAL notion. But a
"fraudulent or ſilent compact between princes and prieſts became
"very real, as ſoon as an eccleſiaſtical order was eſtabliſhed *." The latter part of this period is but too true; and the theory of the *alliance* (miſrepreſented in the former part) was propoſed to remedy theſe miſchiefs. It is this theory only which I ſhall undertake to vindicate againſt his lordſhip's objections.

If, by *formal*, he means (and what ſhould he mean elſe?) one actually executed in form; and ſuppoſes that the author of *the Alliance between Church and State*, aſſerted the actual execution of ſuch a one, we may, with more juſtice perhaps, apply to his lordſhip what he ſays of the author, concerning DE MARCA and BOSSUET, *that he gives a character of the book called the Alliance, without knowing any thing of it.* Give me leave to quote my own words—"From all this it appears, that our plan of alliance is no
"precarious arbitrary hypotheſis, but a theory founded in reaſon,
"and the invariable nature of things. For having, from the ef-
"fence, collected the *neceſſity* of allying, and the *freedom* of the
"compact; we have from the ſame *neceſſity* fairly introduced it;
"and from its *freedom* conſequentially eſtabliſhed every mutual
"term and condition of it. So that now if the reader ſhould
"aſk where this charter or treaty of convention for the union of
"the two ſocieties, on the terms here delivered, is to be met with?
"we are able to anſwer him. We ſay, it may be found in the
"ſame archive with the famous ORIGINAL COMPACT between
"magiſtrate and people; ſo much inſiſted on, in vindication of
"the common rights of ſubjects. Now when a fight of this
"*compact* is required of the defenders of civil liberty, they hold
"it ſufficient to ſay, that it is enough for all the purpoſes of fact and
"right, that ſuch original compact is the only legitimate foun-

* Vol. IV. p. 515, 516.

"dation

" dation of civil ſociety: that if there was NO SUCH THING FOR-
" MALLY executed, there was, *virtually*: that all differences be-
" tween magiſtrate and people ought to be regulated on the ſup-
" poſition of ſuch a compact; and all government reduced to the
" principles therein laid down; for that the happineſs, of which
" civil ſociety is productive, can only be attained by it, when
" formed on thoſe principles. Now ſomething like this we ſay
" of our *Alliance between Church and State* *."

Let this ſerve too, for an anſwer to his lordſhip's inſulting queſtion in another place—" But where ſhall we look for the condi-
" tions of that *original contract which was made between the*
" *religious and civil ſociety*, I know not; unleſs we ſuppoſe them
" written on the back of Conſtantine's grant to Sylveſter †." Does his lordſhip know where to look for the ORIGINAL CONTRACT *made between the prince and people*, in any place of eaſier acceſs? Or will he, when at a loſs, ſend us to the *back of Conſtantine's grant to Sylveſter*, for this contract likewiſe?

But to proceed. If by *formally*, through a perverſe uſe of words, his lordſhip means only *virtually*, like the *original compact* between king and people; this indeed I do venture to ſay, and not only to ſay, but to prove likewiſe.

It is true, the foundation of the proof, his lordſhip ſays, ſtands upon a WHIMSICAL principle: So, in his opinion, did the argument of the Divine Legation of *Moſes*, from the omiſſion of a future ſtate. Indeed his lordſhip ſeems to have been as much diſtreſſed by WHIMSICAL DIVINES, when he turned philoſopher, as he was by WHIMSICAL POLITICIANS, while he continued a ſtateſman ‡. However, the *whimſical* principle in queſtion is this, That THE CHURCH OF CHRIST COMPOSES A SOCIETY SOVEREIGN, AND INDEPENDENT OF THE CIVIL.

* Alliance, third edition, p. 165, 166, 167.

† Vol. IV. p. 419.

‡ See his Letter to Sir William Windham.

This

This principle his lordſhip rejects: and it muſt be confeſſed, not, as is his wont, altogether abſurdly: for he who makes religion itſelf a fantom, can ſurely have little or no idea how it ſhould become imbodied.

"NEITHER NATURE nor REASON (ſays his lordſhip) could ever "lead men to imagine TWO DISTINCT AND INDEPENDENT SOCIE-"TIES IN THE SAME SOCIETY. This imagination was broached "by eccleſiaſtical ambition *."

A GRAVE ſentence! which to me ſeems equivalent to this, that *neither nature nor reaſon could ever lead men to imagine that* ONE *was* TWO. In this, I readily agree with him. But then the difficulty remains, how ſuch a thing could ever come to be *broached* (as his lordſhip ſays it was) by any *imagination* not more diſordered than it uſually is by *eccleſiaſtical ambition*. SCHOOL-LEARNING, indeed, might do much; for there his lordſhip has fixed his theological Bedlam: but *church ambition*, he aſſures us, is of another mould; which, as it never failed, he ſays, to *aim at*, ſo it ſeldom failed to *obtain*, *immoderate wealth and exorbitant power*. What then are we to think? That his lordſhip meant, that *neither nature nor reaſon could ever lead men to imagine two diſtinct and independent ſocieties in the ſame* COMMUNITY? for *community* being the genus, ſeveral *ſocieties*, as the ſpecies, may, indeed, be contained in it. This, I am ready to ſuppoſe, merely for my own eaſe; becauſe when his lordſhip is well underſtood he is always more than half confuted.

In this paragraph, then, are contained theſe two propoſitions:

1. That the church does not compoſe a *ſociety*.

2. That it does not compoſe a ſociety *independent and ſovereign*.

Let us examine his reaſoning on theſe points as it lies in his works; for as diſorderly as it lies, it is intended, I aſſure you, to overturn the whole theory of the *Alliance*.

* Vol. IV. p. 412.

" A RELIGIOUS SOCIETY (ſays his lordſhip) BY WHICH IS MEANT, " ON THIS OCCASION, A CLERGY, is, or is not, a creature of the " ſtate. *If the firſt*, it follows, that this order no more than " others, which the ſtate has inſtituted for the maintenance of " good government, can aſſume any rights, or exerciſe any powers, " except ſuch as the ſtate has thought fit to attribute to it, and " that the ſtate may and ought to keep a conſtant controul over " it, not only to prevent uſurpations and abuſes, but to direct the " public and private influence of the clergy, in a ſtrict conformity " to the letter and ſpirit of the conſtitution; the ſervants of which, " in a much truer ſenſe, they are, than what they affect ſome- " times to call themſelves, the ambaſſadors of God to other men. " *If the laſt* is ſaid, if it be aſſerted, that the church is in any " ſort independent on the ſtate, there ariſes from this pretenſion " the greateſt abſurdity imaginable, that, I mean, of *imperium in* " *imperio*; an empire of divine, in an empire of human inſti- " tution *."

Thus far his lordſhip, who is here reaſoning againſt the principles laid down in the book of the *Alliance*. He introduces his dilemma with telling the reader, that the author of that book has defined a *religious ſociety*, to be the *body of the clergy*. — *A religious ſociety, by which* (ſays he) IS MEANT ON THIS OCCASION A CLERGY, *is, or is not, a creature of the ſtate* †.

The reader cannot, I believe, ſee this aſſertion without ſome ſurprize, when he obſerves, that the author of the *Alliance* has defined a religious ſociety to be A NUMBER OF RELIGIOUS BEINGS ASSOCIATED ‡. — When he obſerves, that the author makes it one of the principal cares of a religious ſociety, to provide an order of men, to be ſet apart for miniſtring in holy things, or in other

* Vol. IV. p. 413.

† So again, *this order of men which we* CALL *the religious ſociety*.—v. iv. p. 440. And again, *the religious ſociety, as we have accuſtomed ourſelves to* CALL *the clergy*. v. iv. p. 561.

‡ Alliance, p. 48, 49.

words,

words, a CLERGY.—" The greateſt care is to be had, that the acts " of religious worſhip be preſerved ſimple, decent, and ſignificative. " But this can be done only by providing perſons ſet apart for " this office; whoſe peculiar employment it ſhall be to preſide in, " direct, and ſuperintend the acts and ſervices of religion, &c. *"— When he obſerves, that the author makes the *end* of religious ſociety to be, *Salvation of ſouls*, and one of the *means*, the order of the *clergy*.—Laſtly, when he obſerves, the author of the *Alliance* oppoſes the *church* and the *clergy* to each other. " It is unjuſt in " the CHURCH to aim at the propagation of religion by force, and " impertinent to aim at riches, honours, and powers. But what " motives the CLERGY OF A CHURCH might have, is nothing to " the purpoſe of our inquiry. We have only to conſider what the " CHURCH had, WHICH, as a religious ſociety, CONSISTS OF THE " WHOLE BODY OF THE COMMUNITY, BOTH LAITY AND CLERGY †." Nay, the very Popiſh clergy, even DE MARCA himſelf, that *time-ſerving prieſt and great flatterer*, was more honeſt than his lordſhip chuſes to repreſent the body of the *Engliſh* clergy, as he might have ſeen by the quotation at the bottom of this very page of the *Alliance*.——ECCLESIÆ CORPUS, EX FIDELIUM OMNIUM COMPAGE CONSTITUITUR.

In a word, the author of the *Alliance* was at much pains to prove that a religious ſociety, or *church*, does not mean the *clergy*, but the whole body of the faithful: and this for two reaſons, for the ſake of truth in general, and of his own ſyſtem in particular.

1. It ſhocks common ſenſe to call one order or rank in ſociety, *the ſociety*: it is little better than calling one of the qualities of a ſubſtance, *the ſubſtance*.

2. It ſubverts the theory of the *Alliance* to make the *clergy* conſtiture the *church*: for then the church could neither be a diſtinct ſociety, nor independent; both of which it muſt be, to make it

* Alliance, p. 52. † Ibid. p. 87.

capable of an alliance with the ſtate. It could not be a diſtinct ſociety; for an order of men, as I obſerved juſt before, is the ſame in politics, as a quality is in phyſics; the one muſt inhere in a *ſociety*, the other in a *ſubſtance*: and theſe being the ſubſtrata of the other, to talk of a diſtinct, much more, of the independent exiſtence of an *order*, or of a *quality*, is the profoundeſt nonſenſe in politics and phyſics. But admitting ſuch a church were capable of allying with the ſtate, the author has ſhewn, in the place quoted above, that it's *motives* for allying would be ſuch as the ſtate could never comply with, either in juſtice or policy.

EXTREME neceſſity (to do his lordſhip all the right we are able) forced him upon this bold and violent falſification of the doctrine of the *Alliance*. He ſaw no other way of diſcrediting the opinion of an *independent religious ſociety*, than by making it believed, that ſuch a ſociety would be an "*imperium in imperio, an empire of divine, in an empire of human inſtitution*;" a miſchief, againſt which the ſtate is always on its guard. And if a religious ſociety ſignified the church, and the church, only the CLERGY, the claim to independency would imply ſuch an *imperium*. But the author of the *alliance* goes upon other principles; he holds that the church ſignifies the whole body of the faithful; that though this ſociety be independent, yet, from its independency, no ſuch ſoleciſm in politics can ariſe as an *imperium in imperio*. This argument, which the author has drawn out at large, the noble perſon, in the following words, miſrepreſents, perverts, and attempts to overthrow.

"An *imperium in imperio* (ſays he) is in truth ſo expreſly con-
"tained in the very terms of the aſſertion, that none of THE
"TEDIOUS SOPHISTICAL REASONINGS, which have been employed
"for the purpoſe, can evade or diſguiſe it. One of theſe I will
"mention, becauſe it has a CERTAIN AIR OF PLAUSIBILITY, that
"impoſes on many; and becauſe, if it cannot ſtand a ſhort and
"fair examination, as I think it cannot, the whole edifice of eccle-
"ſiaſtical independency and grandeur falls to the ground. It
"has

" has been ſaid then, that *religious and civil ſocieties are widely diſ-*
" *tinguiſhed by the diſtinct ends of their inſtitutions, which imply ne-*
" *ceſſarily diſtinct powers and a mutual independency; that the end of*
" *the one is the ſalvation of ſouls, and that of the other the ſecurity of*
" *temporal intereſts; that the ſtate puniſhes overt acts, and can puniſh*
" *nothing elſe, becauſe it can have cognizance of nothing that paſſes*
" *in the mind, and does not break out into criminal actions; but that*
" *the church employing her influence to temper the paſſions, to regulate*
" *the inward diſpoſitions, and to prevent ſins, as well as crimes, is*
" *that tribunal at which even intentions are to be tried, and ſins,*
" *that do not ripen into crimes, nor immediately affect civil ſociety,*
" *are to be puniſhed* *."

This, I will ſuppoſe, his lordſhip intended as a fair repreſentation of the author's argument for the *independency* of the church. But the argument, as it ſtands in the *Alliance*, is drawn from the different *powers* belonging to the two ſocieties; as thoſe *powers* are deduced from their different *ends*. But different powers implying different adminiſtrations, they create a mutual independency; and different adminiſtrations implying an incapacity of their claſhing with one another, ſhew plainly that ſuch an independency can never produce an *imperium in imperio*. This is the natural order of the argument, as it ſtands in the *Alliance*. Let us ſee now, how his lordſhip repreſents it. He begins rightly, with the different ends, *viz. Salvation of ſouls*, and *ſecurity of temporal intereſts*: but, proceeding to ſpeak of the different *powers*, adapted to thoſe different *ends*, *viz. coercion* in the ſtate, and *perſuaſion* only in the church (from whence ariſes a mutual independency), he miſtakes the CONSEQUENCES of theſe powers, which are *puniſhment of overt acts*, and *ſubdual of the paſſions*; he miſtakes them, I ſay, for the *powers* THEMSELVES; from which *conſequences* indeed no independency enſues; becauſe *ſubdual of the paſſions* may, in his lordſhip's opinion at leaſt, be obtained by coercive power, as well as *puniſhment*

* Vol. iv. p. 413, 414.

of overt acts. And if both ſocieties have *coercive power*, one muſt needs be dependent on the other. I take notice of this miſtake only to ſhew, what a poor and imperfect conception his lordſhip himſelf had of the argument of the *Alliance*. Had he told us, though in fewer words, that the author's reaſoning againſt the pretence of an *imperium in imperio* ariſing out of a mutual independency, was this, that the ſtate having *coercive power*, and the church having *none*, the adminiſtration of the two ſocieties could never claſh; ſo as to induce the miſchief of an *imperium in imperio*; had he told this, I ſay, we ſhould have ſeen, that at leaſt he *underſtood* his adverſary.

But let us conſider how he goes about to anſwer what he ſo ill repreſents.

"Now in anſwer to all this (ſays his lordſhip) WE MAY DENY, "with truth and reaſon on our ſide, that the avowed ends of "religious, and the real ends of civil ſociety are ſo diſtinct as to "require diſtinct powers, *and a mutual independency*. The ſalvation "of ſouls is not the immediate end of civil ſociety, and I wiſh it "was not rather the pretence, than the end of eccleſiaſtical po- "licy; but if to abſtain from evil and to do good works be means "of ſalvation, the means of ſalvation are the objects of civil go- "vernment. It is the duty of princes and magiſtrates to promote "a ſtrict obſervation of the law of nature, of private and public "morality, and to make thoſe, who live in ſubjection to them, "good men, in order to make them good citizens. For this "purpoſe, the balance and the ſword are put into their hands, that "they may meaſure out puniſhment to every one, who injures the "community, or does wrong to his neighbour; and a rigorous "puniſhment of crimes, eſpecially if it be accompanied with re- "wards and encouragements to virtue, *for both are intruſted to the* "*ſame men*, is the ſureſt way not only to reform the outward "behaviour, but to create an habitual inward diſpoſition to the "practice of virtue *."

* Vol. iv. p. 474.

We

We may, says his lordship, *deny that the avowed ends of religions, and the real ends of civil society, are so distinct.*—Here he contradicts his master LOCKE. This indeed is a small matter. I shall shew he contradicts truth, and the whole system of human affairs, both in the constitution of laws and in the administration of justice.—But before we come to that, there is a great deal to be done.—*We may*, says his lordship, *deny that the* AVOWED *ends of religions, and the* REAL *ends of civil society, are so distinct, as to require distinct powers and a mutual independency.* The *avowed ends*, does he say? *Avowed* by whom? Common sense requires he should mean, *avowed* by those who go upon the principles of the book of *Alliance*. But then he *might* have said *real:* for the *avowed* and the *real* ends are the same: he *should* have said *real*; for the fair use of the proposition, and the force of the argument drawn from it, both require this adjective. But by what he predicates of these *avowed ends, viz.* their *not requiring distinct powers*, we see he means *avowed* by corrupt churchmen. (*The salvation of souls* (says he, immediately after) *is rather the pretence than the end of ecclesiastical policy:*) and these *ends* are church uniformity for the sake of spiritual dominion. Now these *avowed ends*, I readily confess, cannot be obtained without *coercive power* of the civil kind. Here then you have his lordship, after all his declamation against spiritual tyranny, coming at last, in the true spirit of a free-thinking politician, to profess that religious persecution and coercive power are, in the order of things, as justly and reasonably employed in matters of conscience, as in the overt acts of civil life: now though this be altogether upon principle (for what should restrain a statesman, who believes nothing of the truth of religion, and sees all the mischiefs of diversity of opinions, from attempting to bring about an outward uniformity, by force?); yet the reader would not have *expected* it in this place, where his lordship is defending religious liberty, against the priest craft of the *Alliance*; nor would you have *found* it, had not the distresses of controversy driven him into his native quarters, before his time. The *Alliance* went on this principle,

ciple, that the church was a ſociety, independent of the civil, as not having coercive power like the civil. To overturn this argument, his lordſhip was forced to deny the minor, and ſo unawares has brought in PERSECUTION as one of the natural powers of the church. But to compaſs this matter neatly, and without noiſe, he has recourſe to his old trade, the employing, under an ambiguous expreſſion, the *abuſe* of the thing for the thing itſelf.—*The avowed ends of religious—the real ends of civil ſociety.*—But it was ſo evident a truth, that the *ſalvation of ſouls* was the real end of religious ſociety, and *the ſecurity of temporal intereſts*, the real end of the civil, that he muſt have loſt his ſenſes who could be brought to believe that *coercive power* was as proper to promote the firſt as the ſecond; or that *inſtruction and exhortation* were as proper to promote the ſecond as the firſt: one of which two things, his aſſertion, *that the church and ſtate have not diſtinct powers*, neceſſarily implies: to diſguiſe this abſurdity therefore, for, *real*, which fair argument required him to uſe, he ſubſtitutes the ambiguous word, *avowed*, which his bad cauſe required him to abuſe. And under this cover, he denies, that the two ſocieties are *ſo diſtinct as to require diſtinct powers.*—Well, this however we underſtand; and have thoroughly conſidered. But what mean the words that follow?—AND A MUTUAL INDEPENDENCY. The author of the *Alliance* indeed had ſaid, that the ends of the two ſocieties were ſo diſtinct as to require *diſtinct powers.* But he was not ſo abſurd to add—*and a mutual independency*; becauſe, *independency* was not the MEAN of attaining an end, like *diſtinct powers*, but a CONSEQUENCE of thoſe powers: for if the powers, by which two ſocieties are adminiſtered, be different, thoſe ſocieties (ſeeing their adminiſtrations can never claſh) muſt needs be independent on one another. This is given only as a freſh inſtance of the cloudy apprehenſion this great ſtateſman had of a plain argument, the argument of the *Alliance*, built on the firſt principles of law and politics.

Let me now proceed to his reaſoning. He is to prove, what he had aſſerted, that the two ſocieties *are not ſo diſtinct as to require diſtinct*

distinct powers. He is writing against the book or rather against the author of the *Alliance*; who lays it down as an acknowledged truth, that the end of the religious is *salvation of souls*; the end of the civil, *security of temporal interests.* To this his lordship replies, that salvation of souls is only the *pretended* end of the religious; but it is the *real*, though not *immediate* end, of the civil. And thus he has with great dexterity wiped out all distinction between the two societies. I have already detected both the fraud and the fallacy of the first part of his assertion. I come now to the other, *that salvation of souls is the real, though not immediate, end of civil government.* Here the meanness of his sophistry is still more apparent, than in the former part. It stands thus,—"The *immediate* end of civil government is confessed, on all hands, to be *security of temporal interests.*—This is done by restraining men *from evil*, and exciting them *to good works—Good works are the means of salvation*—Therefore the *means of salvation are the objects of civil government*; or, in other words, the salvation of souls is at least the *real*, though *mediate* end of civil society."

The author of the *Alliance* had obviated all this paultry chicane in the following words: "Civil government, I suppose, will be "allowed to have been invented for the attainment of some cer- "tain end or ends exclusive of others: and this implies the ne- "cessity of distinguishing this end from others. Which distinction "arises from the different properties of the things pretending. "But amongst all those things which are apt to obtrude, or have in "fact obtruded, upon men as the ends of civil government, there "is but one difference in their properties, as ENDS: which is this, "*that one of these is attainable by civil society only, and all the rest* "*are easily attained without it.* The thing then with the first-men- "tioned property must needs be that *genuine end* of civil society. "And this is no other than *security to the temporal liberty and pro-* "*perty of men* *."

* Alliance, p. 37.

But his lordſhip's ſophiſm conſiſts in the ambiguity of the word END; which either ſignifies the conſequence or iſſue of a *mean*, ſimply; or, the conſequence and iſſue, with intention and forethought. In the firſt ſenſe it may be true, that ſalvation is the mediate end of civil ſociety; but then it is nothing to the purpoſe. In the ſecond ſenſe it is to the purpoſe, but not true. The civil magiſtrate, all men ſee, had not this conſequence or iſſue in his thoughts; as is evident from hence, that, in adapting his puniſhments to the various ſpecies of unlawful actions, he doth not proportion them to the heinouſneſs of the offence, as eſtimated on the principles of *natural* or of *revealed* religion, but to their malignant influence on civil ſociety. A plain indication, that when he meaſured out puniſhments to offences, he had only *political* and not *religious* conſiderations in his view. But you ſhall hear what the Author of the *Alliance* has ſaid on this ſubject, who had confuted his lordſhip's ſophiſm even before he had conceived it.

"We have ſhewn (ſays this writer) that it was the care of the "*bodies*, not of the *ſouls* of men, that the magiſtrate undertook to "give account of. Whatever therefore refers to the *body*, is in his "Juriſdiction; whatever to the ſoul, is not. But, and if there be "that which refers equally to both (as *morals* plainly do) ſuch "thing muſt needs be partly within, and partly without his pro-"vince; that is, it is to be *partially* conſidered by him; his care "thereto extending ſo far only as it affects civil ſociety. The "other conſideration of it, namely, as it makes part of religion, "being in the hands of thoſe, who preſide in another kind of "ſociety. Again, with regard to civil practice; if we caſt our "eye on any digeſt of laws, we find that evil actions have their "annexed puniſhment denounced, not as they are VICES, *i. e.* not "in proportion to their deviation from the eternal rule of right: "nor as they are SINS, *i. e.* not in proportion to their deviation "from the extraordinary revealed will of God; which two things "indeed coincide: but as they are CRIMES, *i. e.* in proportion to "their

" their malignant influence on civil ſociety. But the view in which " the *ſtate* regards the *practice of morality* is evidently ſeen, in its " recognition of that famous maxim, by which penal laws in all " communities are faſhioned and directed, THAT THE SEVERITY OF " THE PUNISHMENT MUST ALWAYS RISE IN PROPORTION TO THE " PROPENSITY TO THE CRIME. A maxim evidently *unjuſt*, were " actions regarded by the ſtate, as they are in themſelves only; " becauſe the *law of nature* enjoins only in proportion to the ability " of performance; and human abilities abate in proportion to the " contrary propenſities: evidently *impious*, were actions regarded by " the ſtate as they refer to the will of God, becauſe this ſtate-" meaſure directly contradicts his method and rule of puniſhing. " But ſuppoſe the magiſtrate's office to be what is here aſſigned, his " aim muſt be the SUPPRESSION of *crimes*, or of thoſe actions which " malignantly affect ſociety; and then nothing can be more rea-" ſonable than this proceeding; for then his end muſt be the good " of the *whole*, not of *particulars*, but as they come within that " view. But the good of the whole being to be procured only by " the *prevention* of crimes, and thoſe to which there is the greateſt " propenſity being of the moſt difficult prevention, the full ſeverity " of his laws muſt of neceſſity be turned againſt theſe *."

But, his lordſhip goes on to inform us, What thoſe *means* are which princes and magiſtrates employ to procure this *mediate end* of civil ſociety, the *ſalvation of ſouls*; and they are, he ſays, COERCIVE force.—*For this purpoſe, the balance and the ſword are put into their hands, that they may meaſure out puniſhment to every one who injures the community or does wrong to his neighbour. And a rigorous puniſhment of crimes, eſpecially if it be accompanied with rewards and encouragements to virtue, is the ſureſt way not only to reform the outward behaviour, but to create an inward diſpoſition to the practice of virtue.*

Who would have expected that it ſhould come to this at laſt, That a vigorous and exact diſtribution of rewards and puniſhments

* Alliance, p. 38, 39.

under the MAGISTRATE'S PROVIDENCE (which indeed is the only one his lordſhip thinks worth a ruſh) ſhould be ſo far from *taking away merit and making virtue ſervile*, that it is the *ſureſt way of creating an inward diſpoſition to the practice of virtue!* i. e. the ſureſt way of making virtue *free* and *meritorious.* When in the caſe of an *extraordinary Providence* he had affirmed, that "an immediate "and viſible interpoſition of Providence, in behalf of the righteous "and for the puniſhment of the wicked, would interfere with the "freedom of moral agents, and not leave room for their trial, "&c. *." There is ſomething marvelouſly perverſe in his lordſhip's reaſoning. The exact diſtribution of rewards and puniſhments by heaven, makes virtue worthleſs and ſervile, though the adminiſtration of Providence be able to operate on the mind and intention, the only way if any, of *creating an inward diſpoſition to the practice of virtue*; that is, of making it free and meritorious. While, on the other hand (if the reader will go on to give him credit), the exact diſtribution of rewards and puniſhments by the civil magiſtrate makes virtue free and meritorious, though the magiſtrate's adminiſtration be unable to operate on the mind and intention, and influences only the outward act; which is (if any thing can do it) to make virtue worthleſs and *ſervile.*

But to come to the point, which theſe obſervations naturally lead to. The very means his lordſhip aſſigns for the promotion of this imaginary end, namely *coercive force* for *ſalvation of ſouls*, entirely ſubverts his principle, and ſhews that ſalvation of ſouls could be no end of civil ſociety, ſince the *means* are in no wiſe calculated to promote the *end*; it not being action ſimply, which intitles to the favour of God, but action, upon proper motives. Now on theſe motives (which reſolve themſelves into what we call conſcience) force, or coercion, has no influence. Force may make hypocrites, but nothing but the rational convictions of religion can make men lovers of virtue.

* Vol. II. p. 258, 259. and vol. V. p. 428.

In

In a word, if it be by ſuch kind of reaſoning as this, that the *whole edifice of eccleſiaſtical inaependency and grandeur may be brought to the ground* (to uſe his lordſhip's big language) church power was never worth the rearing.

To proceed. His lordſhip, with much gravity, tells us next, that "A clergy might co-operate with the civil magiſtrate very uſe-"fully, no doubt, by exhortations, reproofs, and example.—This "they might do as aſſiſtants to the civil magiſtrate, in concert "with him, and in ſubordination to him. *To what purpoſe there-"fore do they claim and affect independency on him?* Greater power "never did, nor can enable them to do greater good. Would they "erect a tribunal to *puniſh intentions?* The very pretence is im-"pertinent. Would they erect it to *puniſh where no injury is of-"fered, nor wrong done?* The deſign is unjuſt and arbitrary. The "ideas of crimes are determinate and fixed. The magiſtrate cannot "alter them. The ideas of ſins are more confuſed and vague; "and we know by long and general experience, how they vary in "the minds, or at leaſt in the writings of caſuiſts. Would they "erect ſuch a tribunal *to try the orthodoxy of men's faith?* Such a "one is erected in ſome countries, under the name of the inquiſi-"tion, and is juſtly deteſted in all. To what end and purpoſe then "can SPIRITUAL COURTS and COERCIVE POWERS, ATTRIBUTED TO "THE CLERGY, ſerve, unleſs it be to make them judges and par-"ties in their own cauſe, when matters of intereſt are con-"cerned * ?"

His lordſhip, it muſt be remembered, is here reaſoning with the author of the *Alliance*, againſt his notions of the rights of a clergy in an eſtabliſhed church. And the noble perſon's firſt miſ-repreſentation, we ſee, is, that amongſt theſe rights, the claim of INDEPENDENCY on the ſtate, during their eſtabliſhment, is one; and that the coercive power exerciſed by them, under the alliance, is exerciſed as *inherent* in their order. *To what purpoſe* (ſays his lord-ſhip) *do they* [the Clergy] CLAIM AND AFFECT *independency on him,*

* Vol. IV. p. 415, 416.

the

the civil magiſtrate? And again, *To what end and purpoſe can ſpiritual courts, and coercive pawers,* ATTRIBUTED *to tha clergy, ſ'rve?* And, as if this were not plain enough, in the very next page, addreſſing himſelf to POPE, he ſays, "Amongſt all the fallacies "which have been employed by churchmen, one of the moſt ab- "ſurd has been advanced, though not INVENTED *, by a para- "doxical acquaintance of yours," (meaning the author of the *Alliance*) "and it is to maintain the INDEPENDENCY of the church, "and to ſuppoſe, AT THE SAME TIME, a ſort of original contract "between the church and ſtate, the terms of which, every whim- "ſical writer, EVEN THIS SCRIBLER, adjuſts as he pleaſes †."

The Reader ſhall now hear what the author of the *Alliance* holds on theſe two points, and from his own mouth. Firſt, as to the *independency*.—"Let us ſee next (ſays he) what the STATE gains "by it [the *Alliance.*] Theſe [advantages] in a word may be com- "prized in ITS SUPREMACY IN MATTERS ECCLESIASTICAL. "THE CHURCH RESIGNING UP HER INDEPENDENCY, and making "the magiſtrate her SUPREME HEAD, without whoſe approbation "and allowance, ſhe can adminiſter, tranſact, or decree nothing ‡."

Secondly, as to *coercive power*. "The third and laſt PRIVILEGE "THE CHURCH GAINS by this alliance, is the being INTRUSTED "WITH A JURISDICTION, INFORCED BY COACTIVE POWER §."

His lordſhip aſſures us, the author of the *Alliance* holds, that the *independency* of the church is *retained* under an eſtabliſhment: the

* It was invented, it ſeems, by one Dr. Senior; of whoſe preaching about Moſes and Aaron, he tells a curious tale, on the authority of his friend LEWIS; and from thence, he ſays, "Warburton POSSIBLY took his HINT, and turned it to ſerve his purpoſe, *to* "*banter mankind if he could, &c.*" Vol. IV. p. 515. Warburton muſt have been very quick at taking a *hint*, ſince he tells us the ſermon was preached before Charles II. at Newmarket, and conveyed to his lordſhip only by tradition. But he, who can falſify a book which is in every body's hands, deſerves little credit for what he ſays of a ſermon preached, as he tells us, *in the days of paſſive obedience*, and now exiſting only in the memory of old Mr. LEWIS.

† Vol. IV. p. 417. ‡ Alliance, p. 130. § Ib. p. 123.

author

author himſelf ſays, that it is *given up*. His lordſhip aſſures us, the author holds an *inherent coercive power* in the church; the author himſelf ſays, that *coercive power is a grant of the ſtate*, during the alliance. Who now is the SCRIBLER?

And here the Reader may obſerve, how greatly his lordſhip has improved upon his MASTERS, the authors of the *Rights of the Chriſtian church*, and of the *Independent Whig*. They had ventured indeed to charge both theſe doctrines on the body of the Engliſh clergy: But as one can never be ſure what an indiſcreet or corrupt member of ſo large a body may have ſaid, the confutation of their calumny was not ſo eaſy. His lordſhip is more bold; he charges theſe opinions on a particular member of the eſtabliſhed church, by name: but then he is more fair; he puts it in the power of the perſon injured to do himſelf juſtice; for it ſo happens, that this perſon not only denies the independency of the church under an eſtabliſhment, and all claim to *inherent* coercive power whatſoever, but has laid down principles to diſcredit, and rules to prevent the return of, thoſe uſurpations. The author of the *Alliance* had vindicated the *Engliſh Clergy* * from the calumnious prevarications of TINDAL and GORDON; and without doubt it was not for want of good-will, that none of them have lent a charitable hand to vindicate *him* from the ſame calumnies, when revived by this noble lord.

As, therefore, no independency in alliance is either claimed or affected, and no *inherent* coercive power is attributed to the clergy; we will ſuppoſe his lordſhip's ſimple queſtion to be, "For what "end is that tribunal, called a *ſpiritual court*, erected?" And had he been ſo candid to let the Author of the *Alliance*, to whom he directs his queſtion, ſpeak for himſelf, he had not waited for an anſwer. For the author tells us, in the moſt conſpicuous part of his book, and in great letters, that it is FOR REFORMATION OF MANNERS *only* †. But, as if the author of the *Alliance* had entirely left us to ourſelves to conjecture how he intended to employ this

* Alliance, p. 62, et ſeq. † Ib. p. 123.

ſpiritual

ſpiritual tribunal, his lordſhip falls a gueſſing: and there is no kind of abſurdity, he does not propoſe, as favoured by his adverſary, though they be ſuch as his adverſary had formally exploded.

To what purpoſe, ſays his lordſhip, *do the clergy claim and affect* INDEPENDENCY *on the magiſtrate? Greater power never did, nor can enable them to do greater good. Would they erect a tribunal to* PUNISH INTENTIONS? *The very pretence is impertinent.*

Before I come to his lordſhip's *conjecture*, give me leave to ſay one word of his ſkill in *induction*. This *tribunal*, or this coercive power, which his lordſhip makes to follow *independency*, is ſo far from being produced by it, that coercive power never comes into the church till it has given up its *independency*. The author of the *Alliance* aſſigns a plain reaſon. "The ſtate (ſays he) having, by "this alliance, beſtowed upon the clergy a juriſdiction with coac- "tive power, ſuch privilege would create an IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO "had not the *civil magiſtrate*, in return, the *ſupremacy of the church* "*conferred upon him* *."

And now, to his conjecture. Is it, ſays he, *to puniſh intentions?* The author of the *Alliance* ſays, no; it is for *reformation of manners only*. But we ſhall not underſtand half his lordſhip's drift, unleſs we conſider theſe queſtions as propoſed to inſinuate, that the author of the *Alliance* held the abſurdities contained in them. So here, for inſtance, we are to underſtand, that the author held that this tribunal was to *puniſh intentions*. However, I will acquit his lordſhip of malice; it ſeems to be a ſimple blunder. The author of the *Alliance* did indeed talk of a TRIBUNAL *regarding irregular intentions as criminal*; and by ill luck, the noble perſon miſtook this tribunal for a SPIRITUAL COURT. The author's words are theſe— "The effectual correction of ſuch evils [as ariſe from the *intempe-* "*rance of the ſenſual appetites*] muſt be begun by moderating and "ſubduing the paſſions themſelves. But this, civil laws are not "underſtood to preſcribe, as puniſhing thoſe paſſions only when

* Alliance, p. 131.

"they

" they proceed to act; and not rewarding the attempts to ſubdue " them. *It muſt be a* TRIBUNAL *regarding irregular Intentions as* " *criminal which can do this; and that is no other than the* TRIBUNAL " OF RELIGION. When this is done, a coactive power of the civil " kind may have a good effect, but not till then. And who ſo " proper to apply this coactive power, in ſuch caſes, as that ſociety, " which fitted and prepared the ſubject, for its due reception and " application * ?" This *tribunal regarding irregular intentions as criminal*, the author calls the TRIBUNAL OF RELIGION *(forum conſcientiæ)*, and diſtinguiſhes it from that other tribunal, which is inveſted with *coactive power of the civil kind*, called SPIRITUAL COURTS: he makes the firſt a preparative to the other. Yet, ſtrange to believe! his lordſhip miſtook this *tribunal of religion*, ſo deſcribed and diſtinguiſhed, for a *ſpiritual court*; and upbraids the author of the *Alliance* for ſupporting a *tribunal with coercive powers, to* PUNISH INTENTIONS. But we ſhall ſee more of his lordſhip's wonderful Acumen as we go along.

His ſecond charge againſt the principles of the *alliance* is in theſe words—*Would they erect this tribunal to puniſh, where* NO INJURY IS OFFERED, NOR WRONG DONE? *The deſign is unjuſt and arbitrary. The ideas of* CRIMES *are determinate and fixed. The magiſtrate cannot alter them. The ideas of* SINS *are more confuſed and vague; and we know by long and general experience, how they vary in the minds, or at leaſt in the writings of caſuiſts.*

To puniſh where no injury is offered, nor wrong done, is his lordſhip's periphraſis for the *puniſhment of vague luſt*, which the author of the *Alliance* makes one branch of the reformation of manners, and conſequently an object of ſpiritual courts. But his lordſhip's own opinion of the *quality* of vague luſt, intimated in this periphraſis, is but a ſecond conſideration. His principal purpoſe in giving it, was to expoſe the tyranny of ſpiritual courts, in puniſhing where *no injury is offered*. For a lord to forget his BIBLE is a

* Alliance, p. 81.

ſmall diſcredit; but to forget his HORACE is a diſgrace indeed. Now this honeſt Pagan reckoned the prohibition of *vague luſt*, as one of the chief objects of *civil laws*.

" Fuit hæc ſapientia quondam
" Publica privatis ſecernere, *ſacra prophanis*;
" CONCUBITU PROHIBERE VAGO; dare jura maritis."

All this is ſo very extraordinary, that the Reader will not readily believe his lordſhip could deſign the *puniſhment of vague luſt*, by the words—*puniſhing where no injury is offered nor wrong done*; nor would I neither, did he not ſo clearly explain himſelf, in his curious diſtinction between CRIMES and SINS: which, becauſe it was occaſioned by, and alludes to, a paſſage in the *Alliance*, it may not be amiſs previouſly to tranſcribe that paſſage: " If we caſt our eye " on any digeſt of laws, we find that evil actions have their an- " nexed puniſhment denounced, not as they are VICES, *i. e.* in pro- " portion to their deviation from the eternal rule of right: nor as " they are SINS, *i. e.* not in proportion to their deviation from the " extraordinary revealed will of God; which two things indeed " coincide; but as they are CRIMES, *i. e.* in proportion to their " malignant influence on civil ſociety *." I ſaid this, to ſhew that the civil magiſtrate does not concern himſelf with religion, AS SUCH. His lordſhip borrows the ſame diſtinction between *Crimes* and *Sins*, to ſhew, that it is arbitrary and unjuſt to puniſh *ſins*, as *ſpiritual courts* undertake to do: for, ſays he, *the ideas of* CRIMES *are determinate and fixed: The ideas of* SINS *are more confuſed and vague.* From this, it appears, that his lordſhip miſtook *vices*, *ſins*, and *crimes*, for different actions; whereas they are the ſame actions under different conſiderations: either as they reſpect *natural light*, *revealed religion*, or *civil laws*; and ſo have different names given to them. The *ideas* therefore of theſe three modifications of forbidden actions are all equally *determinate and fixed*, or all equally *confuſed and vague*. But it comes with a peculiar ill grace from his

* Alliance, p. 38, 39.

lordſhip

lordſhip to object to the *confuſed and vague ideas of* SINS, ſince this idea is formed upon the revealed will of God in the Goſpel, which, in a hundred places of his ESSAYS, his lordſhip tells us, coincides with the eternal *rule of right*; a rule acknowledged by him to be the moſt determinate and fixed of all things.

But he ſays, *the* MAGISTRATE *cannot alter the ideas of crimes, as the* CASUIST *may, the idea of ſins.* That is, the magiſtrate cannot give the name of crimes to innocent actions. What ſhould hinder him? He had two advantages above the caſuiſt: Firſt, *coercive power*: Secondly, the *vague and confuſed* meaſure to which *crimes* refer; namely, to the influence of actions on ſociety. Matter of fact confirms this obſervation. Look round the world; enquire through ancient and modern times, and you ſhall find that the *magiſtrate* has been guilty of infinitely more abuſe in ranging actions under the idea of *crimes*, than the *caſuiſt*, in ranging actions under the idea of *ſins*. This was not improper to be obſerved in anſwer to his lordſhip's EXPERIENCE, which uſhers in his old ſophiſm, ready at every turn to help him out, the *abuſe* of the thing, for the thing itſelf—*We know*, ſays he, *by long and general experience, how the ideas of ſins vary in the minds, or at leaſt in the* WRITINGS *of caſuiſts.* By which it would ſeem, the noble author has as little acquaintance with *caſuiſts*, as with any other ſort of learned men, whoſe characters he has treated ſo LORDLY. For corrupt caſuiſtry does not ſo much conſiſt *in varying the ideas of ſins* (concerning which they are generally agreed) as in contriving to evade the puniſhment denounced againſt them.

His laſt conjecture about the uſe of an eccleſiaſtical tribunal, on the principles of the *alliance*, is, that it is erected for the puniſhment of opinions. *Would they erect*, ſays he, *ſuch a tribunal to try the orthodoxy of men's faith?* Why no, ſays the author of the ALLIANCE, in as plain terms as he can ſpeak;—NO MATTERS OF OPINION COME WITHIN THIS SPIRITUAL JURISDICTION *: And he not only ſays it, but proves it too †.—*To what end and purpoſe then,*

* Alliance, p. 124. † Ib. p. 124, 125.

ſays his lordſhip, can *ſpiritual courts and coercive powers ſerve, unleſs it be to make the clergy judges and parties in their own cauſe, where matters of intereſt are concerned?—To what end?* The author of the *Alliance* has told him plainly and directly; FOR THE REFORMATION OF MANNERS ONLY. But ſuch an anſwer did not ſerve his lordſhip's turn. He will make the author ſay as he would have him; or injoin him ſilence, and anſwer for him, himſelf. He inſinuates therefore, in the laſt place, that the end aimed at is to determine in civil matters where the temporal intereſt of the clergy is concerned, and where they become judges in their own cauſe. Hear then what the author of the *Alliance* ſays upon this head likewiſe: "CIVIL MATTERS (in which, ſure, matters of property are "eminently contained) which temporal courts may conveniently "inſpect, can never belong to an eccleſiaſtical juriſdiction. It hath "been ſhewn, that this court was erected as a ſuccedaneum to the "civil, to take cognizance of ſuch actions as the civil could not "reach, or could not remedy: which ſhew, the ſtate could never "intend to put thoſe things under the eccleſiaſtical juriſdiction that "fall moſt conveniently under its own. Beſides, for eccleſiaſtical "courts to engroſs matters that belong to the civil juriſdiction, as "it can poſſibly have no good uſe, may very poſſibly be attended "with this evil, of inviting and encouraging the church to aim at "more power than is conſiſtent, either with her own good, or the "good of the ſtate. The great Founder of our religion ſaid, *Who "made me a judge or divider between you?* And what he would not "aſſume to himſelf, he would hardly beſtow upon his church: and "that the ſtate ſhould ever intend to give her what was the peculiar right of temporal courts, is as difficult to ſuppoſe. We muſt "conclude then, that ſuch practice, wherever it is found, was derived not from the reaſonable laws of this *alliance*, but from the "authority of old papal uſurpations *." Thus far the author of the *Alliance*; where the reader may find a great deal more to the ſame purpoſe.

* Alliance, p. 126.

But

But his lordſhip goes on with his confutation:—" By admitting " the independency of the church on the ſtate, the ſtate acknow- " ledges an original independency in the church, derived from a " greater authority than her own: and the ſuppoſed terms of *union* " may be conſtrued to be rather conceſſions of the religious ſociety " to the civil. for the ſake of order and peace, than grants of the " civil to the religious ſociety. Thus religion and the church are " ſet on the ſame foot: no human authority can alter one, but " muſt receive it in *the terms* in which it has been revealed; and ſo " may a good caſuiſt prove on this hypotheſis, that no human " authority can meaſure out any conditions of eſtabliſhment to the " other. Thus the ſtate becomes no better than a coordinate, but " inferior power *." I once met with a philoſopher of deep thought, who profeſſed the ſame reverence for artificial nonſenſe, that the Turks pay to natural folly. His ſyſtem on this point was very ſingular. He ſuppoſed that, as in the *material* world there was an univerſal, though very ſubtile fire, diffuſed in ſecret through all bodies; which, by a late contrivance, might be allured or drawn out from the moſt inactive and lumpiſh matter; ſo in the *intellectual*, that there was a certain witty ſpirit, which lay dormant in the moſt inexplicable nonſenſe, and only wanted the application of ſome engine of analogous invention to rouſe it, and ſet it free. Till ſuch a one be diſcovered, we muſt ſearch in the dark for his lordſhip's meaning.

By admitting the independency of the church on the ſtate (ſays he) *the ſtate acknowledges an original independency in the church derived from a greater authority than her own.* If, by *church*, he means the Chriſtian church in general, it is confeſſed, that its independency is derived from a higher authority than what the ſtate claims for any of its rights. The church holding of God immediately, and in an extraordinary manner; the ſtate, only mediately, and in a common way. But what are the conſequences his lordſhip would de-

* Vol. IV. p. 417.

duce

duce from thence? The firſt is, that *then the ſuppoſed terms of union may be conſtrued to be rather conceſſions of the religious ſociety to the civil, for the ſake of order and peace, than grants of the civil to the religious ſociety.* The *ſuppoſed terms* are terms of alliance between two independent ſocieties. Theſe terms cannot, in the nature of things, be any other than MUTUAL *conceſſions* and MUTUAL *grants.* What then does he mean, by their being *conſtrued to be rather conceſſions of the religious ſociety than grants of the civil?* By the *ſuppoſition* on which his lordſhip condeſcends to reaſon, When the church in alliance gives up its *original independency*, it is without doubt a CONCESSION; becauſe it is giving up a right: And when the ſtate in alliance, confers a *coercive power* on the church, this is certainly a GRANT; becauſe an original independent religious ſociety can have no inherent coercive power. However ſome meaning, it is likely, his lordſhip had: and perhaps it may be this, "That if the church have an original independency, no ſuch *alliance* as is ſuppoſed could be made: for that the terms, on the ſide of the church, would not be conditional, but voluntary conceſſions, the ſtate having nothing to give in return." This would be talking ſenſe at leaſt, though not truth. But, firſt to *ſuppoſe* the fact, that the terms of this union are mutual grants and mutual conceſſions; and then to deny mutual grants and mutual conceſſions, is giving ſuch a form to his argument as will need a *firſt logic* to turn into ſenſe, as much as the doctrine conveyed under it needs a *firſt philoſophy* (as he calls theſe lucubrations) to turn into truth. Thus much however you may ſee; ſome cloudy conception his lordſhip plainly had, that a ſociety of *divine* original could never enter into alliance with another, only of *human.* When the ſons of God came down amongſt the daughters of men, we are told they begot GIANTS. His lordſhip betrays his apprehenſions, that this coalition between the civil and religious ſocieties would produce an iſſue altogether as monſtrous, a kind of STATE LEVIATHAN. Indeed, he charges the author of the *Alliance* with being no better than a pander or procurer in this intrigue. But whatever his

his apprehenſions were, his conception was altogether unworthy both of a philoſopher and a ſtateſman. The AUTHOR OF THE ALLIANCE hath ſhewn from the nature of things, that religion compoſes an independent ſociety: the GOSPEL, by divine inſtitution, hath declared the Chriſtian religion to be an independent ſociety. His LORDSHIP hath ſhewn, from the nature of things, that civil wants create an independent ſociety of the civil kind: and the LAW, by divine inſtitution, hath declared the Jewiſh republic to be an independent civil ſociety. Now I would aſk his lordſhip this queſtion; If nothing hindered this *civil ſociety of divine original* from entering into leagues and conventions with all the neighbouring nations, which were not, for political reaſons, excepted by name; what ſhould hinder this *religious ſociety of divine original* from entering into alliance with the ſtate?

Another conſequence his lordſhip draws from an original independency in the church is, that RELIGION *and the* CHURCH *are ſet on the ſame foot.* That is, if I underſtand him right, for he might have expreſſed himſelf better, the DISCIPLINE of the church is as unalterable as the DOCTRINE: the inference from which is, that the *ſtate muſt receive the* CHURCH *on the terms in which its faith was revealed:* from whence his lordſhip draws another conſequence, that *no human authority can meaſure out any conditions of eſtabliſhment to the church:* and, from thence another, (for his lordſhip's falſe conceptions are always attended with ſuperfetations) that the *ſtate becomes an inferior power, or creature to the church.* All theſe brave conſequences, we ſee, ariſe out of this principle, "that, in a "church of divine original, the *diſcipline* is as unalterable as the "*doctrine.*" And of the truth of this principle his lordſhip is ſo confident, that he calls his adverſary a *ſtupid fellow* for not owning it. "The STUPID FELLOW, who advanced this paradox in Engliſh, "did not ſee how ill the parts of it hang together, nor that if eccle-"ſiſtical government was, by divine appointment, independent of "civil, no ſuch contract as he ſuppoſes could be made. The reli-"gious ſociety, notwithſtanding their known moderation, could

"not

" not have parted from that independency AND SUPERIORITY over " the civil power, which God had given them *."

It is true, this STUPID FELLOW did not ſee it. And I don't well know how he ſhould; ſince, on the other hand, he ſaw it to be impoſſible that any *ſuch contract as he ſuppoſes* could be made, unleſs the church or religious ſociety were *independent* of the civil. For what *contract* is it, which I ſuppoſe to have been made between church and ſtate? I tell the reader in expreſs words, it is a *mutual compact by* FREE CONVENTION †. Now the entering into a *free convention* is at the pleaſure of the contracting parties. But parties, who have this liberty, muſt needs be *independent* on one another.

Well, but he has his reaſon, ſuch as it is, to confound this STUPID FELLOW. *The religious ſociety* (ſays he) *could not have parted from that independency*, AND SUPERIORITY, *over the civil power, which God had given them.* And now indeed, after much cloudy flouriſhing, we are come to the point; which is, WHETHER A RELIGIOUS SOCIETY CAN PART WITH THAT INDEPENDENCY WHICH GOD, *as well as the nature of things*, HATH BESTOWED UPON IT? This is in truth a queſtion worth debating: and the negative, as we have ſeen above, was the old Puritan plea againſt the King's ſupremacy. But as his lordſhip rarely ſuffers an important propoſition, which he is ſet either upon denying or depraving, to paſs through his hands without firſt perplexing it *in the expreſſion*, with an abſurdity or an equivocation, I ſhall be obliged, before we can paſs forward, to free this from the BOLINGBROKIAN embarraſs. *The religious ſociety* (ſays he) *could not have parted from that independency* AND SUPERIORITY *over the civil power which God hath given them.* Now, as the author of the *Alliance* contends only for the INDEPENDENCY of the church *before alliance*, and as his lordſhip's reaſoning confeſſes that the queſtion is only con- " cerning *independency before alliance*, he muſt needs ſuppoſe by

* Vol. IV. p. 418.

† Alliance, p. 74.

adding

adding, AND SUPERIORITY *over the civil*, that this *ſuperiority* is a conſequence of *independency*. And ſo, indeed, he ſpeaks of it more plainly juſt before,—*Thus*, [i. e. from the *independency* of the church] *the ſtate becomes no better than a co-ordinate*, BUT INFERIOR, *power*. Now if we judge of this matter on the principles of the law of nature and nations, *ſuperiority* is ſo far from following *independency*, that it cannot ſubſiſt with it. For why is religious ſociety by nature *independent* (as I ſhew it is) but for the reaſon I give, that it is *eſſentially different* from the civil, *by having different ends and means* *? But there is no ground for ſuperiority of one perſon or ſociety over another, but where ſome *natural* relation or connexion exiſts between them: none ſuch exiſts in this caſe; therefore a pretence of ſuperiority on the one ſide, and of dependency on the other, is abſurd. However, as I am well perſuaded his lordſhip did not know enough of theſe matters even to PREVARICATE NEATLY in the point in queſtion, I conſider it as an innocent blunder, ariſing from the following words of the *Alliance*, ſhamefully, indeed, miſunderſtood. — "Such then is the nature of "Chriſt's kingdom [*i. e.* the Chriſtian church]: it is eſſentially "framed to compoſe a firm and laſting ſociety; it is made ſuch by "divine appointment; and, in order to fit it for public ſervice, it "is both by nature and inſtitution declared SOVEREIGN, and inde-"pendent of civil government, that it may adapt itſelf by *free* "*alliance* to the various kinds of human policies †." Now *ſovereign in itſelf and independent of civil government*, this great writer hath paraphraſed to ſignify, *independency and ſuperiority over the civil*.

"Bleſt, for his ſake, be human reaſon,
"Which came at laſt, though late in ſeaſon ‡.

But, to proceed to the queſtion; which is, WHETHER A RELIGIOUS SOCIETY CAN PART WITH THAT INDEPENDENCY WHICH GOD, *as well as the nature of things*, HATH BESTOWED UPON IT.

* Alliance, p. 54. † Ibid. p. 147. ‡ Prior.

His lordſhip determines in the negative. *For if*, ſays he, *eccleſiaſtical government was by divine appointment independent of the civil, the religious ſociety could not have parted with that independency which God had given them.*

Man was, by *divine appointment*, made free and independent; therefore, according to this reaſoning, he could not part with his *independency*, and become ſubject to civil laws. Hold, ſays his lordſhip, man was made free, that he might be ſubject to no laws but thoſe to which he had given his conſent; and as he needed protection from laws, he had a right to part with his independency if he could get protection upon no other terms. And is not this the very caſe of the religious ſociety in queſtion, which is only an artificial man, by nature and inſtitution free, and ſtanding in need of protection?

But his lordſhip's aſſertion, you will find, bottoms at laſt upon this principle, that DIVINE AUTHORITY REDUCES ALL ITS LAWS TO ONE AND THE SAME SPECIES: an error which *bigots* and *fanatics* indeed are equally fond of indulging; and hath been indulged by them to the infinite diſſervice both of civil and of religious ſociety: but that a *philoſopher* and a *ſtateſman* ſhould know ſo little of the NATURE OF LAWS is perfectly aſtoniſhing. The firſt elements of his profeſſion might have taught him, "That the *authority* by "which a thing is commanded makes no alteration in the *eſſence* "of the thing." Natural and poſitive duties retain their reſpective natures in the code of religion. Natural duties are eternal; poſitive duties are revocable. Of theſe latter, ſome are laſting as the diſpenſation to which they belong; others only temporary. Of the temporary, ſome ceaſe not till they are expreſly revoked; others ceaſe with the occaſion that enjoined them. Theſe laſt are again to be diſtinguiſhed into *privileges* and *duties*; privileges may be receded from at pleaſure; but duties muſt either be revoked, or the occaſion muſt be plainly ſeen to ceaſe. Now the INDEPENDENCY in queſtion is one of thoſe qualities in the divine law which ceaſes with the occaſion; and is, beſides, a *privilege*, which

may

may be receded from, at pleaſure. Again, in the divine laws, ſome things are enjoined to be believed as truths; others to be practiſed as utilities. Of utilities ſome are general; others particular: the firſt of theſe are permanent and conſtant; the ſecond variable. Of the firſt, is the church's compoſing a *ſociety*: of the ſecond, is its *peculiar mode*. Thus Jeſus ſeemed to inſtitute, for the then occaſion, an equal miniſtry; the apoſtles, epiſcopal government; and modern churches have choſen one or the other, as beſt ſuited the various forms of civil regimen, with which they had *allied* themſelves.

As chriſtianity was, by divine inſtitution, a *ſociety at large*, to authorize and to enable the ſeveral churches to give particular forms to eccleſiaſtical government; ſo the *independency* was beſtowed upon it, to enable it to enter into free alliance with the ſtate. When God himſelf allied the Jewiſh church with the ſtate, he did not leave that religion a *ſociety at large*; neither did he ordain it *independent*: he preſcribed, in the minuteſt manner, the form of church government; and made it dependent on the ſtate. But the book of the *Alliance* tells this ſtory better. "The Chriſtian religion "was not only left *independent* of the ſtate by not being united "to it like the Jewiſh (and being ſo left it muſt needs by the "law of nature be independent); but its independency was likewiſe "ſecured by divine appointment, in that famous declaration of its "founder, *my kingdom is not of this world*; which bears this plain "and obvious ſenſe, *that the kingdom of Chriſt, to be extended over "all mankind, was not like the kingdom of God, confined to the Jewiſh "people, where religion was incorporated with the ſtate; and there-"fore*, of this world, *as well in the exerciſe of it, as in the rewards "and puniſhments by which it was adminiſtered: but was indepen-"dent of all civil communities; and therefore, neither* of this world, "*as to the exerciſe of it, nor as to the rewards and puniſhments by "which it was adminiſtered.*——But whoever imagines that, from "this *independency by inſtitution*, the church cannot convene and "unite with the ſtate, concludes much too faſt. We have ob-

" ſerved, that this property in the *Kingdom of Chriſt* was given as " a mark to diſtinguiſh it from the *Kingdom of God*, that is, it " was given to ſhew that this religion extended to all mankind; " and was not, like the Moſaic, confined to one only people. Con- " ſequently, that very reaſon which made it proper for the Moſaic " religion to be united by divine appointment to the ſtate, made " it fit, the Chriſtian ſhould be left free and independent. But " for what end, if not for this, to be at liberty to adapt itſelf to " the many various kinds of civil policies, by a ſuitable union and " alliance?—An alliance then we muſt conclude the Chriſtian " church was at liberty to make, notwithſtanding this declared " nature of *Chriſt's Kingdom*. So far is indeed true, that it is " debarred from entering into any ſuch *alliance* with the ſtate as " may admit any LEGISLATOR in Chriſt's kingdom but himſelf " [that is, a power in the magiſtrate to alter DOCTRINES.] But " no ſuch power is granted or uſurped by the *ſupremacy* of the " ſtate *:" [which extends only to DISCIPLINE.]

From all this it appears, that the *unalterable* part of the law of Chriſt is the DOCTRINE: and the only *alterable* part, the DISCIPLINE: but it is the latter, with which ſociety, as ſuch, is chiefly concerned, when it enters into *alliance* with the church. Therefore, when his lordſhip ſays, *Religion and the church being ſet on the ſame foot, no human authority can alter one, but muſt receive it on the terms in which it has been revealed*; if he means, there can be no alteration in *diſcipline*, I have ſhewn he is miſtaken: if he means, there can be no alteration in *doctrine*, he is certainly right; and I muſt then conſider his lordſhip's obſervation as a complaint that, by the conſtitution of the Chriſtian church, the magiſtrate cannot tyrannize over conſcience.

In the mean time, we ſee to what little purpoſe this great philoſopher and ſtateſman had read his HOOKER; of whom he confeſſes ſomething is to be learnt. Now, HOOKER would have ſhewn

* Alliance, p. 146, 147, &c.

him,

him, that divine authority does not reduce all its laws to one and the ſame ſpecies—— "Poſitive laws (ſays this truly great man) are ei- "ther permanent or elſe changeable, according as the matter itſelf "is, concerning which they were firſt made. Whether GOD or "MAN be the maker of them, ALTERATION they ſo far forth "admit, as the MATTER doth exact. Wherefore, to end with a "general rule concerning all the laws which God hath tied men "unto: thoſe laws divine, that belong, whether naturally or ſu- "pernaturally, either to men as men, or to men as they live in "politique ſociety, or to men as they are of that politique ſociety "which is the church, without any further reſpect had unto any "ſuch variable accident as the ſtate of men, and of ſocieties of "men, and of the church itſelf in this world, is ſubject unto; all "laws that ſo belong unto men, they belong for ever, yea although "they be poſitive laws, unleſs, being poſitive, God himſelf, which "made them, alter them. The reaſon is, becauſe the ſubject or "matter of laws in general is thus far forth conſtant: which "matter is, that for the ordering whereof laws were inſtituted, "and being inſtituted are not changeable without cauſe, neither "can they have cauſe of change, when that which gave them their "firſt inſtitution remaineth for ever one and the ſame. *On the "other ſide, laws that were made for men, or ſocieties, or churches, "in regard of their being ſuch as do not always continue, but may "perhaps be clean otherwiſe a-while after, and ſo may be required "to be otherwiſe ordered than before; the laws of God himſelf which "are of this nature,* NO MAN ENDOWED WITH COMMON SENSE *will "ever deny to be of a different conſtitution from the former, in reſpect "of the one's conſtancy, and the mutability of the other* *."

So much for this country parſon. And how poorly does his lordſhip figure before him with his aſſertion, that *divine law makes every thing, which relates to the church, equally unalterable?* Yet this noble haranguer, thus ignorant of the very firſt elements of

* Eccl. Pol. l. i. ſect. 15.

law,

law, can dictate with the authority of an oracle, and be received with the reverence due to one, concerning *civil liberty*, *church uſurpations*, *a patriot king*, and the *balance of power*. But maſter Hooker will tell you how eaſily all this may be done by any one, without knowing more than their neighbours.

——" Thus far therefore (ſays he) we have endeavoured in " part to open, of what nature and force laws are, according unto " their ſeveral kinds: the law which God himſelf had eternally " ſet down to follow in his own works; the law which he hath " made for his creatures to keep; the law of natural and neceſſary " agents; the law which angels in Heaven obey; the law where- " unto, by the light of reaſon, men find themſelves bound, in that " they are men; the law which they made by compoſition for " multitudes and politique ſocieties of men to be guided by; the " law which belongeth unto each nation; the law that concerneth " the fellowſhip of all; and laſtly the law which God himſelf hath " ſupernaturally revealed. *It might peradventure have been more* PO- " PULAR AND MORE PLAUSIBLE TO VULGAR EARS *if this diſcourſe* " *had been ſpent in* EXTOLLING THE FORCE OF LAWS, *in ſhewing* " *the* GREAT NECESSITY OF THEM, *when they are* GOOD, and in " AGGRAVATING THEIR OFFENCE BY WHOM PUBLIC LAWS ARE " INJURIOUSLY TRADUCED. *But foraſmuch as with ſuch kind of* " *matter* THE PASSIONS OF MEN *are rather ſtirred one way or other,* " *than* THEIR KNOWLEDGE *any way ſet forward* unto the trial of " that whereof there is doubt made, I have therefore turned aſide " from that BEATEN PATH, and choſen, though a LESS EASY, yet " a more profitable way, in regard of the end we propoſe *."

Great names, however, are ſtill of good uſe to his lordſhip: for though he cannot profit by their lights, he can ſhine at their expence: and, having well chicaned their expreſſions, can afterwards convert the truths contained in them to his own uſe. Let me give you, out of many, one example of this kind. HOOKER and

* Eccl. Pol. l. i. ſect. 16.

LOCKE

LOCKE have been ſuppoſed to write tolerably well on the origin of civil government. Alas; *nil ſine theſeo.* There is nothing ſo well done, which his lordſhip cannot mend. He reproves both of them, with much ſolemnity, for *repreſenting mankind to themſelves, like a number of ſavage individuals out of ſociety, in their natural ſtate, inſtead of conſidering them as members of families from their birth.* "This "(he ſays) has made them reaſon INCONSISTENTLY, and on a "FALSE FOUNDATION. *Inconſiſtently*, becauſe they ſometimes ac- "knowledge paternal government to have preceded civil, and yet "reaſon about the inſtitution of civil, as if men had then firſt aſſem- "bled in any kind of ſociety, or had been ſubject to any kind of "rule; for to ſay that the law of nature was of itſelf ſuch a rule, "and that every one of theſe independent inhabitants of the earth "did or might exerciſe juſtice for himſelf, and others on thoſe "who violated the law, was language unworthy of Mr. LOCKE, "and unneceſſary to his ſyſtem.——*Falſely*, becauſe it is eaſy to "demonſtrate that mankind never was in ſuch a ſtate *."

To ſay the truth, *eaſy* enough, and like *demonſtrating* day-light. A man need only open his eyes to ſee that a mother does not abandon her infant as ſoon as ſhe has dropt it, nor the father immediately renounce the care of it and her. Is it poſſible then that HOOKER, LOCKE, and their followers, ſhould want to be told by his lordſhip ſo obvious a truth, that, before civil ſociety, mankind did not ſtart up like muſhrooms, a number of ſavage individuals at once, but came as they could be got, and entered as they were born, into tribes and families. Why then, you aſk, did not HOOKER and LOCKE ſo conſider them, when they were deducing the origin of CIVIL SOCIETY? For very important reaſons; and, one would think, very obvious ones.

Firſt, becauſe the real origin of civil ſociety being equally ſhewn on either ſuppoſition, the truths which followed from it were

* Vol. V. p. 125, 126.

clearer

clearer ſeen, as they were leſs embarraſſed, by conſidering mankind before civil ſociety, as individuals.

But this was not all. Had they conſidered men before civil ſociety as ranked under tribes, the *rights* belonging to the heads of families, thus brought into view, though neither relative to, nor connected with, thoſe of a civil kind, might have too much countenanced that abſurd ſyſtem, which derives *political* rule from *patriarchal*; a ſyſtem which, both for its abſurdities and miſchiefs, it was the purpoſe of LOCKE and HOOKER to expoſe and diſcredit. The former therefore did judiciouſly, to aſſert, as he might do it truly, (for the *exerciſe of juſtice* no more belonging to fathers of families, as ſuch, than the *exerciſe of regal prerogative*) that, before the inſtitution of civil ſociety, *every one of theſe independent inhabitants of the earth did, or might, exerciſe juſtice for himſelf and others, on thoſe who violated the law.* Yet this, his lordſhip calls language unworthy of his maſter. Nay, ſo great a ſtranger is he to this whole matter, that he declares the repreſentation to be UNNECESSARY: whereas we ſee it was done to keep the unwary from the ſight of circumſtances of no uſe to aſſiſt their judgment, and eaſily abuſed by deſigning men, to miſlead them *.

—But to proceed with our ſubjects. His lordſhip goes on againſt the book of the *Alliance* in this manner. "This imaginary con-
"tract, in ſhort, whether well or ill made, never exiſted at any
"time, nor in any country; though, to have been real, and really
"authorized, it ſhould have been the ſame at all times and in all
"countries where Chriſtianity was propagated. Political ſocieties
"make and alter and break their *alliances*, as the varying reaſon of
"ſtate ſuggeſts. Different orders of civil government in the ſame
"ſociety change, and with them the whole conſtitution of ſuch
"governments, as reaſon or paſſion, the intereſts or the diſpoſi-
"tions of men determine them. *But a religion given by God is in*
"*its nature invariable.* And therefore if a religious ſociety with

* See Alliance, p. 47; and Note (E) p. 67.

"certain

" certain privileges, immunities, and prerogatives, be neceſſary to " preſerve it ſo, the *order and conſtitution* of ſuch a ſociety muſt be " *invariable* too. The CHURCH muſt be eſtabliſhed by the ſame " divine authority as the RELIGION, and be by conſequence inde- " pendent of the ſtate. But nothing of this kind has been. Chriſt's " *kingdom was not of this world.* He ſent out his apoſtles to teach, " and to baptize; and the utmoſt power he gave them, beſides that " of working miracles to convince and to convert, was to ſhake off " the duſt of their feet, and to proteſt againſt the infidelity of thoſe " who refuſed to receive them, and the Goſpel they publiſhed. The " apoſtles ordained others to accompany and to ſucceed them in " the ſame office, the office of teaching and baptizing. The " apoſtles could give no more power than they received; and no " argument *of right* can be drawn from any thing that paſſed, or " from any thing that theſe men did for the maintenance of their " ſect, while Chriſtianity was a ſect *."

This imaginary contract (he ſays) *never exiſted at any time or in any country.* If he means, a *contract* actually and formally executed, I have anſwered that already, and ſhewn, that the objection holds equally againſt *the original contract between king and people*; which I ſuppoſe his lordſhip will allow not to be ſo *imaginary* but that the prerogative of the one, and the rights of the other, ought every where to be regulated on the conditions aſcribed to it. But you ſhall hear the book of the *Alliance* on this matter.

" † When I ſay that *all* regular policied ſtates had *an eſtabliſhed* " *religion*, I mean no more than he would do, who, deducing civil " ſociety from its true original, ſhould, in order to perſuade men " of the benefits it produces, affirm that all nations had a *civil policy.* " For as this writer could not be ſuppoſed to mean that every one " conſtituted a free ſtate, on the principles of public liberty, which " yet was the only ſociety he purpoſed to prove was founded on " truth, and productive of public good; becauſe it is notorious, that

* Vol. IV. p. 419, 420.

† Alliance, p. 88—90.

" the far greater part of civil policies are founded on different
" principles, or abuſed to different ends: ſo neither would I be un-
" derſtood to mean, when I ſay all nations concurred in making
" this *union*, that they all exactly diſcriminated the natures, and
" fairly adjuſted the rights of both ſocieties, on the principles here
" laid down; though an *eſtabliſhment* reſulting from this diſcrimi-
" nation and adjuſtment be the only one I would be ſuppoſed to
" recommend. On the contrary, I know this union has been gene-
" rally made on miſtaken principles; or, if not ſo, hath degene-
" rated in length of time; by which means the national religion in
" the Pagan world hath been moſt commonly a ſlave to the ſtate;
" and in the Chriſtian ſyſtem, the ſtate ſometimes a ſlave to the
" eſtabliſhed church. And as it was ſufficient for that writer's pur-
" poſe, that thoſe ſocieties, whether good or bad, proved the ſenſe
" all men had of the benefits reſulting from civil policy in general,
" though they were oft miſtaken in the application; ſo it is for
" ours, that this univerſal concurrence in the two ſocieties to *unite*,
" ſhews the ſenſe mankind had of the uſefulneſs of ſuch an *union*.
" And laſtly, as that writer's principles are not the leſs true on ac-
" count of the general deviation from them in forming civil ſocie-
" ties; ſo may not the plain ones of *alliance* here delivered; though
" ſo few ſtates have ſuffered themſelves to be directed by them in
" practice; nor any man before delivered them in ſpeculation;
" eſpecially if, as in that caſe, ſo in this, we can derive ſuch *miſ-*
" *take* and *degeneracy* from their cauſes. It would draw me too far
" out of my way to explain diſtinctly the cauſes of the *miſtake*; and
" the intelligent reader, who carefully attends to the whole of this
" diſcourſe, will not be at a loſs to diſcover the moſt conſiderable of
" them; ſome of which I have already hinted at; and others, I
" may poſſibly, in the ſequel of this diſcourſe, take occaſion to men-
" tion. As for the *degeneracy*, we have obſerved, that the *Alliance*
" is of the nature of the FOEDERA INÆQUALIA: now, the common
" iſſue of ſuch, *Grotius* acquaints us with, in theſe words: *Interim*
" *verum*

" *verum eſt accidere plerumque, ut qui ſuperior eſt in fœdere,* SI IS " POTENTIA MULTUM ANTECELLAT, PAULATIM IMPERIUM PRO- " PRIE DICTUM USURPET : PRÆSERTIM SI FOEDUS PERPETUUM " SIT *."

But if, by, *never exiſted*, his lordſhip means, that the mutual rights and privileges of either ſociety, which naturally follow ſuch an *alliance*, were never actually exerciſed and enjoyed by the two ſocieties, his aſſertion is falſe. They are at this preſent actually exerciſed and enjoyed by the two ſocieties, in ENGLAND, under our happy conſtitution of church and ſtate. And it was a principal purpoſe of the book of the *Alliance* to ſhew they are ſo, in order to realize the theory. Here again it may not be improper to give the Reader the words of the *Alliance :* " We ſee how unreaſonable " and even how impolitic our adverſaries are, when, in their ill " humour with *eſtabliſhments*, they chuſe to pick a quarrel with " their own ; where the national religion is on a footing exactly " agreeable to the nature of a *free convention between church and ſtate*, " on the principles of the laws of nature and nations. A felicity, " they ſhould have known, that ſcarce any other people on the " face of the earth can boaſt of. In *England* alone the original " terms of this *convention* are kept up to, ſo exactly, that this ac- " count of the *alliance between church and ſtate* ſeems rather a copy " of the church and ſtate of *England*, than a theory, as indeed it " was, formed ſolely on the contemplation of nature, and the un- " variable reaſon of things †."

To make this contract (ſays his lordſhip) *real, and to be really authorized, it ſhould have been the ſame at all times and in all countries where Chriſtianity was profeſſed.* In plain terms, RIGHT waits to receive its nature from man's acceptance of it : or, in ſtill plainer, *Right* becomes WRONG when rejected by him. How would this political aphoriſm of his lordſhip's ſound when applied to the ORI-

* De jure Belli & Pacis, Lib. I. cap. iii. § 21.

† Alliance, p. 140, 141.

GINAL CONTRACT between prince and people?—*to make it real and to be really authorized, it ſhould have been the ſame at all times and in all countries, where civil rule had been introduced.*

But *political ſocieties* (he ſays) *make and alter and break their alliances as the varying reaſon of ſtate ſuggeſts.* If he would be here meant to ſpeak of ſuch which make theſe alterations *juſtly*, the ſame may be ſaid of the *alliance between church and ſtate.* I have ſhewn that, in this reſpect, the alliances of political ſocieties with one another, and the alliance of the political with the religious, ſtand juſt upon the ſame footing. "If there be more religious "ſocieties than one at the time of convention, the ſtate allies itſelf "with the largeſt of thoſe religious ſocieties. It is *fit* the ſtate "ſhould do ſo, becauſe the larger the religious ſociety is, where "there is an equality in other points, the better enabled it will be "to anſwer the ends of the alliance. It is *ſcarce poſſible* it ſhould "be otherwiſe, becauſe the two ſocieties being compoſed of the "ſame individuals, the greatly prevailing religion muſt have a ma-"jority of its members in the aſſemblies of ſtate, who will natu-"rally prefer their own religion to any other. Hence we ſee the "reaſon why the *epiſcopal* is the eſtabliſhed church in *England*; "and the *preſbyterian* the eſtabliſhed church in *Scotland.* Hence "too we ſee the reaſon of what was before obſerved, concerning "the duration of this alliance; that it is *perpetual*, but not *irrevo-*"*cable*: i. e. It ſubſiſts juſt ſo long as the church thereby eſtab-"liſhed maintains its ſuperiority of extent; which when it loſes to "any conſiderable degree, the alliance becomes void. For the "united church being then no longer able to perform its part of "the convention which is formed on reciprocal conditions, the "ſtate becomes diſengaged; and a *new alliance* is of courſe con-"tracted with the now prevailing church, for the reaſons which "made the *old.* Thus formerly, the alliance between the *pagan* "*church* and the empire of Rome was diſſolved; and the *Chriſtian* "eſtabliſhed in its place: and of late the alliance between the *popiſh*

"*church*

" *church* and the kingdom of England was broken; and another " made with the *Proteſtant*, in its ſtead *."

Different orders of civil government, in the ſame ſociety, change (ſays his lordſhip); *and with them the whole conſtitution of ſuch governments, as reaſon or paſſion, the intereſts or diſpoſitions of men determine them.*— And is it not the ſame in Church-government? It is here Epiſcopacy; there Preſbytery; and in another place Independency.

But, *a religion given by God is in its nature invariable.* In its DOCTRINE it is. Yes, and in its DISCIPLINE likewiſe (ſays his lordſhip), and thus I prove it. *If a religious ſociety with certain privileges, immunities, and prerogatives, be neceſſary to preſerve it ſo, the order and conſtitution of ſuch a ſociety muſt be invariable too.* The inference is juſt. But what principle of the *alliance* (againſt which his lordſhip is here arguing) ſuppoſes, that *one certain ſet of privileges, immunities, and prerogatives*, is neceſſary to preſerve a religious ſociety in that ſtate and condition? This theory ſays, that religion compoſed a ſociety before it had any of thoſe *privileges, immunities, and prerogatives*; and will remain a ſociety after it has loſt them. For it had none of them till it came into alliance with the ſtate, and will hold none of them longer than that alliance continues. But, if by a ſtrange liberty of expreſſion his lordſhip means, by *privileges, immunities, and prerogatives*, only CHURCH-GOVERNMENT in general, ſo far forth as it is a ſociety; I own that this is *neceſſary to preſerve a religious ſociety* in the ſtate and condition of a ſociety: But then, give me leave to ſay, it does not follow from thence, that *the* ORDER *and* CONSTITUTION *of ſuch a ſociety muſt be invariable too:* Becauſe Church-government may be adminiſtered by an Epiſcopacy, a Preſbytery, or an Independency. The ſpecific form of Church-government amongſt the Jews was preſcribed, and therefore intended to be invariable, becauſe *Moſes* united the religion to the ſtate, under the collective name of LAW: The ſpecific form of Church-government amongſt Chriſtians was

* Alliance, p. 204.

not

not prescribed, and therefore none seems intended to be invariably followed, because *Jesus* did not unite his religion to the state, but left it to particular churches to follow such as were most agreeable to the forms of those civil societies, in which they were to be established. For this purpose it was sufficient that *Jesus* instituted his religion, a *society*, by directing the members of it to *hear the church*, and by appointing officers, as its organs, to convey its decisions.

On this matter it may not be improper again to hear the book of the *Alliance*, which, speaking of the *Jewish* and *Christian* churches, says, "This, Both had in common, to be political societies by "divine appointment; but different in this, that GOD, for *wise* "*ends*, minutely prescribed the whole mode of *Jewish* policy: and "CHRIST, on the contrary, with the same divine wisdom, only "constituted his church a policied society at large, and left the "mode of it to human discretion *."

Those *ends*, the book explains, in another place. "The *Jewish* "religion was, like the true *natural* (which it ratified), essentially "fitted to compose a society; and, like the *Christian* (of which it "was the first rudiment), made a society by divine appointment. "But then unlike the Christian, in this, that it was not left inde-"pendent of civil government, to unite with it at its pleasure, on "terms agreed upon; but was for great and wise reasons at once "united to it, by God himself. Which also he was pleased to do, "not by way of *alliance* as between two bodies that were to con-"tinue distinct, and might be separated, but by mutual conversion "into one another, and perfect incorporation †."

His lordship then owns, that if *the church be established by the same divine authority as the religion* (that is, if religion be formed into a society) *it is by consequence independent of the state*. I am apt to suspect, he here grants more than he is aware of: for it follows from this concession, that if the Christian religion even composes a society by natural right, though not by divine appointment, it must

* Alliance, p. 138, 139.

† Ibid. p. 145.

be

be *independent* of the ſtate: becauſe the *independency* does not ariſe from the authority which formed it, but from the *nature* it poſſeſſes: and the author of the *Alliance* hath ſhewn * that religion compoſeth a ſociety by natural right. His lordſhip's endeavour therefore to avoid the *conſequence*, its *independency*, by affirming that *the church was not eſtabliſhed by the ſame divine authority as the religion*, would be to no purpoſe even though he could have proved it. However let us hear how he ſupports his aſſertion.

His firſt argument is the declaration of *Jeſus* himſelf, that *his kingdom was not of this world*. The queſtion is, Whether *Chriſt's* religion compoſes a ſociety, and a ſociety independent? And his lordſhip quotes a declaration of *Jeſus* to prove it does *neither*, which, in the very terms, implies that it does *both*. For what is a *kingdom*, but a *ſociety*? And what is the *not being of this world*, but a declaration of *independency*? Indeed, the author of the *Alliance* employed the *ſubject* of the propoſition, *Chriſt's kingdom*, to prove it was a SOCIETY; and the *attribute*, its not being of *this world*, to prove, that church and ſtrate are INDEPENDENT of one another. For were *Chriſt's* religion a *kingdom of this world*, the conſequence would be, that either the ſtate is *dependent* on the church, or the church on the ſtate; becauſe, in that caſe, both having COERCIVE POWER (as all *kingdoms of this world* have) a mutual *independency* would make that ſoleciſm in politics called, IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO: Whereas, *Chriſt's kingdom not being of this world*; and *his apoſtles*, as his lordſhip rightly obſerves, having *no power (beſides miracles) but that of teaching, exhorting, and proteſting againſt infidelity*, i. e. having no COERCIVE power, there remained no pretence for its *dependency* on the ſtate.

His lordſhip's ſecond argument againſt the *independency* of the church is, that *Jeſus ſent out his apoſtles to teach, and to baptize; and the utmoſt power he gave them, beſides that of working miracles, to convince and to convert, was to ſhake off the duſt of their feet, and to pro-*

* Book I. c. 5.

teſt

teſt againſt the infidelity of thoſe who refuſed to receive them, and the goſpel they publiſhed. The apoſtles ordained others to accompany and to ſucceed them in the ſame office of teaching and baptizing. The apoſtles could give no more power than they had received.

1. He is to prove that the Chriſtian religion did not compoſe a ſociety by inſtitution. And how does he ſet to work? With an argument which ſhews it to be a ſociety by *inſtitution*, and without *coercive* power, the very ſociety which the author of the *Alliance* contends for. *Jeſus ſent out his apoſtles—they ordained others to accompany and to ſucceed them.* Here a ſociety is plainly inſtituted; for you find officers appointed; and theſe provide for a ſucceſſion.—*The utmoſt power they had was to teach and baptize thoſe who willingly received the goſpel.* Here all *coercive* power is excluded; and that excluſion makes the ſociety *independent.* What more may be inferred from this account (and which his lordſhip ſhould have inferred) is, that though a ſociety was inſtituted, yet the particular form of church-government was left to human diſcretion: But his lordſhip could find no ſociety of Chriſt's appointment, where he ſaw no particular form of church-government minutely marked out, as in the Moſaic diſpenſation. Though, had he found any ſuch, it would, when he leaſt ſuſpected it, have been moſt to his purpoſe: for of ſuch, and only of ſuch, he might have ſaid truly, that being *given by God* [for that purpoſe] *it is in its nature invariable.*

2. His obſervation, that the *apoſtles could give no more power than they had received*, inſinuates that the author of the *Alliance* contended for *inherent coercive power* in the church; which is a groſs miſrepreſentation of this author; who expreſsly affirms that the church hath no ſuch power, while *unallied*; and when *allied*, receives it in a very limited manner from the ſtate; and enjoys it no longer than the *alliance* continues. But theſe miſrepreſentations are things eſſential to his lordſhip's polemics. So again, "To pretend" (ſays he) "that the church has a right to the former [*i. e.* wealth

"and

" and grandeur] by *compact* or by virtue of an *alliance* with the ſtate, " would be to ſay whatever comes uppermoſt in a WHIMSICAL " HEAD *." This is to inſinuate that the author of the *Alliance* *pretends* that the *wealth and grandeur* of the church neceſſarily ariſes from its *alliance* with the ſtate: But let him ſpeak for himſelf, and you ſhall hear him ſaying the direct contrary—*the acquiſition of honours, riches, and power, could not be a motive for alliance.* His reaſon is, that *it would be impertinent in a church to aim at them, becauſe they are things a church could neither uſe nor profit by* †.

His lordſhip coucludes this long paragraph in theſe words—*No argument of right can be drawn from any thing that paſſed, nor from any thing that theſe men* [the apoſtles] *did for the maintenance of their ſect, while Chriſtianity was a ſect.* His lordſhip here forgets, as uſual, the perſonage he at preſent aſſumes, which is that of a believer, who ſuppoſes, the apoſtles acted, in all things, by the direction of their Maſter: conſequently, *an argument of* RIGHT MAY *be drawn from every thing that paſſed, and from all they did, in ſupport or maintenance of their ſect, while Chriſtianity was a ſect.* It is true, if we ſuppoſe the apoſtles to be politicians like his lordſhip, or a ſort of men who put in practice all kind of means to ſupport and maintain their cauſe or party, no argument *of right* can be drawn from any thing they did or ſaid. But when God directs the actions and organs of his miniſters in the propagation of religion, we are aſſured, from the knowledge we have of his attributes, that no rights of humanity or ſociety will be violated; and conſequently that from every ſuch action, *an argument of right may be drawn.*

If, indeed, his lordſhip meant no more in this profound obſervation, than that, from what the apoſtles did to aſſert and maintain the *independency* of Chriſt's religion while it remained a SECT, *no argument of right can be drawn* to prove it muſt continue *independent* when it becomes ESTABLISHED, I perfectly agree with him: and I have but one objection to the underſtanding him in ſo rea-

* Vol. IV. p. 604. † Alliance, p. 87.

ſonable a ſenſe, which is, that it ſupports the theory of the *Alliance*; a purpoſe, I preſume, not in his lordſhip's view. Beſides, it contradicts what he ſo much labours to prove, That, if the *independency* of the church was of divine inſtitution, the church could not give it up, when it entered into alliance.

In a word, the whole of his lordſhip's reaſoning againſt an *alliance between church and ſtate* from the *nature of a church*, may be reduced to theſe four propoſitions:

1. If Chriſtianity be not a ſociety by divine inſtitution, it is no ſociety at all.

2. If Chriſtianity be an independent ſociety by divine inſtitution, it could not give up its independency to the ſtate.

3. If Chriſtianity be a ſociety by divine inſtitution, a certain form of church-government muſt be explicitly preſcribed.

4. If ſuch a form be explicitly preſcribed, then that form, and the diſcipline which attends it, muſt be as unalterable as the doctrine; which is contrary to the genius of the ſuppoſed alliance.

Now I have ſhewn, that every one of theſe four propoſitions is utterly devoid of all truth, reaſon, and common ſenſe.

After theſe exploits, nothing was wanting to make his lordſhip's victory complete againſt ALLIANCES and ESTABLISHMENTS, but to diſcredit that firſt and moſt famous one of all, made by CONSTANTINE. "This great revolution (ſays his lordſhip) was "effected in part by circumſtances I have mentioned, and by others "that favoured the growth of Chriſtianity. The imperial autho-"rity did the reſt, but did it ill; ſo ill, that the chief of thoſe "political views which Conſtantine had in making this ESTAB-"LISHMENT were defeated by it, and the admiſſion of a religious "ſociety into the ſtate, in the manner in which he admitted it, was "the cauſe of all the eccleſiaſtical and theological evils that have "followed from his time to ours, and *that are ſo falſely imputed to*

"*religion*

"*religion itſelf**. We may be aſſured, that the SOCIETY co-
"operated with the COURT, to bring about a revolution ſo much
"to their advantage; and thought themſelves happy enough to be
"*dependent*, not *independent* on the emperor; his *inſtruments*, not
"his *allies*, whatever appearances he might give, or ſuffer them
"to aſſume, in thoſe ſolemn eccleſiaſtical farces, wherein he con-
"deſcended to act, in ſome reſpects, a ſecond part.—But while he
"recalled to his mind, as he did moſt probably, the great ſervice
"religion was of to ancient Rome, he ſeemed to forget, that when
"that religion flouriſhed, and was of ſo much ſervice to the ſtate,
"it was under the immediate inſpection of the ſtate. There was
"no council but the ſenate to define doctrines, nor to regulate diſ-
"cipline. And men were at the head of the religious, becauſe
"they were at the head of the civil, adminiſtration; inſtead of
"being at the head of the latter, becauſe they were at the head
"of the former.—He [*Conſtantine*] meaned that this [ſpiritual power]
"ſhould be diſtinct from the civil; THAT THEY SHOULD BE IN-
"DEPENDENT OF ONE ANOTHER, and both dependent on him †."

That nobleſt part of legiſlation, to adjuſt the rights and privi-leges, to ſettle the bounds and limits of the TWO SOCIETIES, *to know*, as the poet expreſſes it,

"Both ſpiritual power and civil, what each means,
"What ſevers each ‡"———

his lordſhip, we have ſeen, is much a ſtranger to. Indeed every new paragraph makes his ignorance but the more conſpicuous, by his endeavouring to diſguiſe it; for his attempts are generally made at the expence of a contradiction.

* And, ſtrange to tell, by no one ſo much as by his lordſhip himſelf, throughout all his bulky poſthumous works.

† Vol. IV. p. 432—445. ‡ Milton.

In the eſtabliſhment of religion under CONSTANTINE, the church, he ſays, became dependent on the ſupreme civil magiſtrate. *They thought themſelves happy enough to be dependent, not independent on the emperor; his inſtruments, not his allies.* Yet, in the ſame breath, he tells us, that this very emperor was contented to *act a ſecond part* to theſe his *inſtruments*, or, in other words, to become *their's*: Nay, he expreſsly affirms, that Chriſtianity was on another footing in new Rome, than Paganiſm had been in the old: Now Paganiſm, he tells us, was the *inſtrument* of the ſupreme magiſtrate. Chriſtianity then muſt be an *ally*, not an *inſtrument*, to the ſupreme magiſtrate. His lordſhip ſays, this eſtabliſhment was *very ill made*: however that be, every body ſees it is *very ill* repreſented. It was and it was not an *ally*; it was and it was not an *inſtrument.—It defeated all Conſtantine's political views, all the good he intended.* Were his premiſſes true, the conſequence was likely enough to follow. We have an example before us, in his lordſhip's *eſſays* throughout, that his *contradictions* can *defeat* all the evil he *intended*; and this (let me add to the honour of his lordſhip's abilities) is doing ſomething more; for malice is not ſo eaſily defeated as benevolence.

But if you aſk, Why, in this account of CONSTANTINE's eſtabliſhment, the church is one while made the *inſtrument*, and another, the *ally* of the civil magiſtrate? I will tell you. His lordſhip had decried the ALLIANCE both in *fact* and *right*. There never was, he ſays, in FACT, ſuch an alliance. To countenance this aſſertion, CONSTANTINE's eſtabliſhment muſt be repreſented as being made on different terms; terms whereby the church became the tool and inſtrument of the civil magiſtrate. But then again, he was to ſhew that ſuch an alliance was not of RIGHT, as being very miſchievous to the ſtate: This turns the tables; and then CONSTANTINE muſt *mean that the ſpiritual power ſhould be diſtinct from the civil, and that they ſhould be* INDEPENDENT OF ONE

ANOTHER

ANOTHER (for he all along misrepresents the theory of the *Alliance*, as making the church keep its *independency* even after the union) indeed he says—and *both dependent on himself* * ; but this was added only to soften the absurdity.—To such wretched shifts do his principles ever and anon reduce him : the religious and the civil society are independent of one another; yet the religious is dependent on the supreme magistrate; *i. e.* on him who represents the civil society, and is at its head.

But now let us examine the ground-work, the canvas, of this curious paragraph, without any particular regard to the embroidery of his contradictions.

He says, *the church was happy enough to be dependent*, NOT INDEPENDENT, *on the emperor*; *his instruments*, NOT HIS ALLIES. This sentence is made up of a false insinuation, and a mistaken consequence. The false insinuation is, that the Author of the *Alliance* holds, the *independency* of the church on the magistrate, during an establishment. The mistaken consequence is, that if the church be *dependent*, it is the Instrument, not the Ally, of the state. But GROTIUS, as he is quoted in the book of the *Alliance*, might have set his lordship right in this matter. "This (say I) is "what GROTIUS calls *fœdus inæquale*. Inæquale FOEDUS, hic in- "telligo quod ex ipsa vi pactionis MANENTEM PRÆDATIONEM quan- "dam alteri donat : Hoc est ubi quis tenetur alterius imperium "ac majestatem conservare, ut POTENTIORI PLUS HONORIS, in- "feriori plus auxilii deferatur. *De jur. B. & P.* l. I. c. iii. "sect. 21 †." Hence we see, in the opinion of this great man; great by nature, great by discipline, and not *made great*, after the modern mode, in the workhouse of vanity and faction; we see, I say, that *alliance* and *dependence*, are very consistent things.

* Vol. IV. p. 445.

† Alliance, p. 75.

In

In the eſtabliſhment of religion under CONSTANTINE, the church, he ſays, became dependent on the ſupreme civil magiſtrate. *They thought themſelves happy enough to be dependent, not independent on the emperor; his inſtruments, not his allies.* Yet, in the ſame breath, he tells us, that this very emperor was contented to *act a ſecond part* to theſe his *inſtruments*, or, in other words, to become *theirs*: Nay, he expreſsly affirms, that Chriſtianity was on another footing in new Rome, than Paganiſm had been in the old: Now Paganiſm, he tells us, was the *inſtrument* of the ſupreme magiſtrate. Chriſtianity then muſt be an *ally*, not an *inſtrument*, to the ſupreme magiſtrate. His lordſhip ſays, this eſtabliſhment was *very ill made*: however that be, every body ſees it is *very ill* repreſented. It was and it was not an *ally*; it was and it was not an *inſtrument.—It defeated all Conſtantine's political views, all the good he intended.* Were his premiſſes true, the conſequence was likely enough to follow. We have an example before us, in his lordſhip's *eſſays* throughout, that his *contradictions* can *defeat* all the evil he *intended*; and this (let me add to the honour of his lordſhip's abilities) is doing ſomething more; for malice is not ſo eaſily defeated as benevolence.

But if you aſk, Why, in this account of CONSTANTINE's eſtabliſhment, the church is one while made the *inſtrument*, and another, the *ally* of the civil magiſtrate? I will tell you. His lordſhip had decried the ALLIANCE both in *fact* and *right*. There never was, he ſays, in FACT, ſuch an alliance. To countenance this aſſertion, CONSTANTINE's eſtabliſhment muſt be repreſented as being made on different terms; terms whereby the church became the tool and inſtrument of the civil magiſtrate. But then again, he was to ſhew that ſuch an alliance was not of RIGHT, as being very miſchievous to the ſtate: This turns the tables; and then CONSTANTINE muſt *mean that the ſpiritual power ſhould be diſtinct from the civil, and that they ſhould be* INDEPENDENT OF ONE ANOTHER

ANOTHER (for he all along misrepresents the theory of the *Alliance*, as making the church keep its *independency* even after the union) indeed he says—and *both dependent on himself* * ; but this was added only to soften the absurdity.—To such wretched shifts do his principles ever and anon reduce him: the religious and the civil society are independent of one another; yet the religious is dependent on the supreme magistrate; *i. e.* on him who represents the civil society, and is at its head.

But now let us examine the ground-work, the canvas, of this curious paragraph, without any particular regard to the embroidery of his contradictions.

He says, *the church was happy enough to be dependent*, NOT INDEPENDENT, *on the emperor*; *his instruments*, NOT HIS ALLIES. This sentence is made up of a false insinuation, and a mistaken consequence. The false insinuation is, that the Author of the *Alliance* holds, the *independency* of the church on the magistrate, during an establishment. The mistaken consequence is, that if the church be *dependent*, it is the Instrument, not the Ally, of the state. But GROTIUS, as he is quoted in the book of the *Alliance*, might have set his lordship right in this matter. "This (say I) is "what GROTIUS calls *fœdus inæquale*. Inæquale FOEDUS, hic in- "telligo quod ex ipsa vi pactionis MANENTEM PRÆDATIONEM quan- "dam alteri donat: Hoc est ubi quis tenetur alterius imperium "ac majestatem conservare, ut POTENTIORI PLUS HONORIS, in- "feriori plus auxilii deferatur. *De jur. B. & P.* l. I. c. iii. "sect. 21 †." Hence we see, in the opinion of this great man; great by nature, great by discipline, and not *made great*, after the modern mode, in the workhouse of vanity and faction; we see, I say, that *alliance* and *dependence*, are very consistent things.

* Vol. IV. p. 445.

† Alliance, p. 75.

In

In ancient Rome, ſays his lordſhip, *there was no council, but the ſenate, to* DEFINE DOCTRINES, *nor to* REGULATE DISCIPLINE. Now in ancient Rome it ſo happened, there were no DOCTRINES to define *. And as to DISCIPLINE, this was regulated not by the ſenate, but by the colleges of the prieſts. When the ſenate imagined the neceſſities of ſtate required the obſervance of religious rites, they ſent to the prieſts for their directions concerning the choice and regulation of them. The ſenate were the maſters whether they would have any celebrated; but if they had decreed for a celebration, they were tied down to the rules and directions of the ſacred books, as the ſenſe of them was repreſented and interpreted by the prieſts.

This conferred ſo much power on the prieſthood in civil matters in the opinion of Cicero, that he does not ſcruple, in the perſon of his brother, to ſay,—"in quâ et reges, augures, et poſtea privati eodem ſacerdotio prædiți, rempublicam religionum auctoritate rexerunt †."

When the Romans had entered on a war with Philip of Macedon, "Senatus decrevit (they are the words of Livy) uti conſules majoribus hoſtiis rem divinam facerent *quibus diis ipſis videretur*, cum precatione ea: quam rem, &c." He then tells us that the conſuls made their report to the ſenate; and there we find the part their prieſts had in this matter.—"Quum pronunciâſſent conſules; rem divinam RITE perfectam eſſe, et precationem admiſiſſe Deos ARUSPICES RESPONDERE, *lætaque exta eſſe* et prolationem finium, victoriamque et triumphum portendi."—L. xxxi. c. 5. But the ſtate further ordered that the conſul, to make the Gods propitious, ſhould according to old cuſtom make a vow; and on this occaſion we have a more explicit account of the ſhare the old Pagan church had in this matter, by which we find it was not the ſe-

* See Div. Leg. b. ii. ſect. 6.

† De Divin. l. i. c. 40.

nate,

nate, but the college of prieſts which regulated diſcipline, or, if his lordſhip will have it ſo, DEFINED DOCTRINE. "Civitas religioſa (ſays the hiſtorian) ne quid prætermitteretur, quod aliquando factum eſſet; ludos Jovi, donumque *vovere conſulem* juſſit *moram voto publico Licinius pontifex maximus attulit*, qui negavit ex incerta pecunia vovere debere. Si ea pecunia non poſſet in bellum uſui eſſe; reponi ſtatim debere, nec cum alia pecunia miſceri. *Quod niſi factum eſſet, votum* RITE *ſolvi non poſſe.* Quanquam et res, et *auctor movebat*; tamen ad COLLEGIUM PONTIFICUM *referre* conſul juſſus, ſi poſſet *recte* votum incertæ pecuniæ ſuſcipi. Poſſe rectiuſque etiam eſſe, PONTIFICES DECREVERUNT. Vovit in eadem verba conſul, *præeunte maximo pontifice* *." Again, by the Papirian law all conſecrations of houſes, lands, or altars, to RELIGION, were forbidden, without the expreſs command of the people. But then, when the people had commanded it, the ceremony could not be performed by a tribune, or any other civil magiſtrate, but by one of the college of prieſts only. Which was juſt ſuch a ſupremacy of the ſtate in religious matters, as that which is exerciſed in England, and juſtified on the principles of the ALLIANCE.

On the whole, his lordſhip aſſures us, that CONSTANTINE *eſtabliſhed the church very ill.* It would indeed appear ſo from his account of it; which when ſet againſt the principles of the ALLIANCE, it either much ſhames *Conſtantine's eſtabliſhment*, or at leaſt the noble reporter of it.

1. CONSTANTINE *made the church* (his lordſhip ſays) *his inſtruments, not his allies.* The ALLIANCE makes the church the ally, and not the inſtrument, of the civil magiſtrate.

2. CONSTANTINE *placed men at the head of the civil adminiſtration, becauſe they were at the head of the religious.* The ALLIANCE places men at the head of the religious, becauſe they were at the head of the civil adminiſtration.

* L. xxxi. c. 9.

3. CON-

3. CONSTANTINE *did not take to himſelf the title of ſupreme head of the church under God and Chriſt.* The ALLIANCE makes the ſupreme magiſtrate head of the church under God and Chriſt.

4. CONSTANTINE *gave riches and coercive power to the church without aſſuming this ſupremacy or headſhip.* The ALLIANCE, when it gave riches and coercive power to the church, conferred the ſupremacy on the civil magiſtrate.

His lordſhip's concluſion from this long and ſuſpicious ſtory of CONSTANTINE, is this, that he and his ſucceſſors raiſed that ſpi- "ritual tyranny, which was eſtabliſhed and grown into full ſtrength "before CHARLES THE GREAT *." And what could we expect leſs, when, if his lordſhip reports truly, every term in the *Alliance* was violated or neglected? This was juſt as natural as that civil tyranny ſhould grow to a head, when the terms of the *original compact* between prince and people, had not been adverted to, or obſerved? In a word, the miſchiefs which his lordſhip pretends did follow from *Conſtantine's eſtabliſhment*, would, if true, be the beſt recommendation of the *theory of the Alliance*; a theory formed, as it were, and fitted to avoid and guard againſt them: it has in fact done ſo, and rendered our preſent conſtitution of church and ſtate the moſt happy and proſperous of any on the face of the earth.

At laſt, as if on ſet purpoſe to recommend the *theory of the Alliance*, his lordſhip concludes his ſection concerning CONSTANTINE in theſe words: "Thus it ſeems to me that the great and funda- "mental error, from whence ſo many others proceeded, and which "CONSTANTINE COMMITTED IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF "CHRISTIANITY, was this, *he admitted a clergy into an eſtabliſh- "ment, on the ſame foot, on which this order had ſtood, while Chriſ- "tianity was the religion, and theſe men were the heads, the direc- "tors, the governors, and magiſtrates of a ſect, by no authority, but*

* Vol. IV. p. 446.

"*that*

" *that of the ſect itſelf.* He admitted them veſted with this au-
" thority, which might be neceſſary as long as Chriſtians made a
" ſect apart, out of the protection of the laws; and which became
" unneceſſary and dangerous, when Chriſtianity had a legal eſta-
" bliſhment.—The conduct of Conſtantine on this occaſion muſt
" needs appear extremely abſurd to every one who conſiders the
" conſequences it had *." Can there be a greater encomium on the principles of the ALLIANCE? The *fundamental error* of CONSTANTINE'S eſtabliſhment was, it ſeems, ſuffering the Church to RETAIN ITS INDEPENDENCY. The fundamental condition of eſtabliſhment on the theory of *Alliance* is, that the Church ſhall GIVE UP its INDEPENDENCY. But all this is only taking advantage of his lordſhip's miſtakes concerning CONSTANTINE'S ESTABLISHMENT.—A man who underſtood this part of eccleſiaſtical hiſtory infinitely better than his lordſhip, gives a very different account of it.—" Etſi enim eccleſiam (ſays Moſheim, ſpeaking of *Conſtantine*) civitatem quandam a republica diſtinctam in civitate, qualis ante ipſum fuerat, manere patiebatur: SUPREMUM ſibi tamen in hanc civitatem IMPERIUM, atque jus eam ſic conſtituendi et temperandi, uti ſalus reipublicæ poſceret, ſumebat †." And again,—" Multa quæ totius eccleſiæ fuerant, ad imperatores eorumque præſides et magiſtratus tranſierant." We ſee here an abridged but exact deſcription of the *Alliance between Church and State:* And one is much better pleaſed to have our theory recommended on the authority, than at the expence, of that great inſtrument of Divine Providence.

After this, would you expect to hear him return again to his abuſe of the ALLIANCE? " The ſole intention and ſole effect of
" [the theologic ſyſtem of the ſchools] was to eſtabliſh an eccle-
" ſiaſtical empire, under that ſpiritual monarch the Pope, and his
" ſpiritual miniſters the clergy. THIS WAS THE EFFECT OF THAT
" SUPPOSED ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND STATE ‡."

* Vol. IV. p. 438, 439.
‡ Vol. IV. p. 621, 622.

† Inſtit. Hiſt. Eccl. p. 155.

Before, it was CONSTANTINE *and his ſucceſſors, who raiſed that ſpiritual tyranny* * : and it was done, he ſays, by means of *his eſtabliſhment*; which ſuffered the church to retain its INDEPENDENCY, *and admitted it on the ſame foot on which it has ſtood while it was a ſect* †. But now, it is the *ſuppoſed* ALLIANCE *between church and ſtate* which raiſed this ſpiritual tyranny; an alliance which will not ſuffer the church to retain its INDEPENDENCY; nor *admit it on the ſame foot on which it ſtood while it was a ſect.*

We have ſeen ſuch amazing inſtances of his lordſhip's CONTRADICTIONS, as not to be ſurprized at the boldeſt of them. Sometimes, when rapt in a fit of rhetoric, he does, by his *contradictions*, what the man in the play did by his *ingratitude*, he ſtrives *to cover the monſtrous bulk of them*, by a proportionable *ſize of words* ‡; ſometimes again, to ſhew his utter contempt of the public, he chuſes to follow the advice there given; *to let them go naked, whereby men would ſee them the better.* But, when he maſks his double face, the FALSIFICATION of the *theory of the Alliance* always affords him the beſt play. He conſtantly takes it for granted, or avouches it for a fact, throughout his whole argument againſt the book, that the author contends for and maintains the *independency of the church on the ſtate, under an eſtabliſhment.* This brings CONSTANTINE's eſtabliſhment, as he has repreſented it, and the eſtabliſhment on the principles of the ALLIANCE, pretty much to the ſame thing; ſo that the miſchiefs aſcribed to one may be ſafely transferred to the other.

And here, reader, in concluſion, the odd fortune of this book of the ALLIANCE is worth thy notice. It had been written againſt by many nameleſs ſcribblers, before his lordſhip: and had their force been equal to their fury, its innocence had been no protection to it. *Their daggers hacked one another* §, *not in the ſides of my ſyſtem*, but in the unfeeling fronts of the aſſaſſins themſelves.

* Vol. IV. p. 446.
† Vol. IV. p. 438.
‡ Timon of Athens.
§ Shakeſpeare.

themſelves. Three capital crimes had been imputed to it. One, that it eſtabliſhed an *imperium in imperio*; another, that it made the church a creature of the civil magiſtrate; and a third, that it made the civil magiſtrate a creature of the church: while one ſhameleſs fellow, as I remember, in a thing he called a *Comment on the Alliance*, charged it with all theſe three crimes at once: ſo that his *lordſhip*, whoſe care is for the STATE, and my *diſſenting adverſaries*, who are as anxious for the CHURCH, will come in but for ſhares in the full merit of that illuſtrious Commentator.

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JULIAN:

JULIAN:

OR,

A DISCOURSE

CONCERNING THE

EARTHQUAKE AND FIREY ERUPTION,

Which defeated that EMPEROR's ATTEMPT to rebuild the

TEMPLE AT JERUSALEM.

IN WHICH

The Reality of a Divine Interpoſition is ſhewn;

The Objections to it are anſwered;

AND

The nature of that Evidence which demands the aſſent of every reaſonable man to a *miraculous* fact, is conſidered and explained.

Neſciunt Neceſſaria, quia ſupervacanea dedicerunt. SENECA.

INTRODUCTION.

A SOVEREIGN contempt for the authority of the FATHERS, and no great reverence for any other, is what now-a-days conſtitutes a Proteſtant in faſhion. But, as I imagine Religion loſeth ſomewhat, and Learning a great deal more, by the neglect in which the FATHERS lye at preſent, I ſhould have been tempted to ſay a word or two in their behalf, even though the ſubject of the following ſheets did not require that they, whoſe teſtimony I make ſome uſe of, ſhould have their pretenſions fairly ſtated, and their character examined. But what is here inſinuated to the diſcredit of the *preſent* mode in theology with regard to the FATHERS is by no means ſaid in favour of the *paſt*, but of *that* which good ſenſe ſeems diſpoſed to place between them.

Their authority had now, for many ages, been held *ſacred*. Although by taking the Greek philoſophy, in which they had been nurtured, for their guide in explaining the nature and genius of the GOSPEL, they had unhappily turned religion into an *art*; which their ſucceſſors, the SCHOOLMEN, ſoon after turned into a *trade*. But, as in all matters where reaſon doth not hold the balance, that authority, which had been extravagantly advanced, was, on the turn of the times, as extravagantly undervalued: It may not therefore be amiſs to acquaint the Engliſh reader, in few words, how all this came to paſs.

When the avarice and ambition of the church of Rome had, by working with the ſuperſtition and ignorance of the people, erected what it calls the HIERARCHY, which was the digeſting an eccleſiaſtical policy on the ruins of goſpel liberty, they found nothing of ſuch uſe for the adminiſtration and ſupport of this ſpiritual ſyſtem * as the making the authority of the FATHERS ſacred, and conſequently deciſive. For this church having introduced numerous errors and ſuperſtitions, both in rites and doctrines, which the *ſilence* and the *declarations* of ſcripture equally condemned, they were obliged to ſeal up thoſe living oracles, and open this new warehouſe of the dead. And it was no wonder if, in that ſhoal of writers which *the great drag-net of time* (as a poet of our own calls it) had incloſed and brought down to us, under the name of FATHERS, there ſhould be ſome amongſt them of a character ſuited to countenance any kind of folly or extravagance. Their deciſion, therefore, it was thought fit ſhould be treated as laws; and collected into a kind of code, under the title of the *Sentences*.

From this time every thing was tried at the bar of the *fathers*; and ſo unqueſtioned was their juriſdiction, that when the great Defection was made from the *Church of Rome*, the Reformed, though they ſhook off the tyranny of the POPE, could not diſengage themſelves from the unbounded authority of the FATHERS; but carried that prejudice with them (as they did ſome others, of a worſe complexion) into the REFORMATION. For, in religious matters, novelty being ſuſpicious, and antiquity venerable, the Reformed thought it for their credit to have the FATHERS on their ſide. They ſeemed neither to conſider antiquity in general as a thing *relative*, nor Chriſtian-antiquity as a thing *poſitive*: either of which conſi-

* Comme l'autorité fait le fondement de cette étude [la theologie] il eſt juſte de deferer ABSOLUMENT non ſeulement à *l'Ecriture ſainte*, mais encore aux ſentimens des *Peres*, qui nous ont expliqué la tradition, ſur tout à ceux que l'Egliſe a canoniſez, pour ainſi dire, par ſon approbation, ou en tout ou en partie. *Traité des etudes monaſtiques, par Mabillon*, p. 360.

derations

derations would have ſhewn them, that the FATHERS themſelves were modern, compared to that authority on which the Reformed founded their churches; and that the GOSPEL was that true antiquity on which they ſhould repoſe their confidence *. The effect of this error was, that in the long appeal to truth between Proteſtants and Papiſts (both of them going on a common principle, that the authority of the FATHERS was deciſive), the latter were enabled to prop up their credit againſt all the evidence of common ſenſe and ſacred ſcripture.

At length an excellent writer of the *Reformed* religion, obſerving that the controverſy was likely to be endleſs (for though the groſs corruptions of Popery were certainly later than the third, fourth, and fifth centuries, to which the appeal was uſually made, yet the ſeeds of them being then ſown, and beginning to pullulate, it was but too plain there was hold enough for a ſkilful debater to draw the FATHERS to his own ſide, and make them water the ſprouts they had been planting); M. Daillé, I ſay, obſerving this, wiſely projected to ſhift the ground, and force the diſputants on both ſides to vary their method of attack as well as of defence. In order to this he compoſed a diſcourſe of the *true uſe of the Fathers* †. In which,

* The Roman Catholics have long objected to us the *antiquity* of their church, as one of its greateſt ſupports. But none of them have been ſo ingenuous as the excellent author of *L'Eſprit des Loix*, to point out wherein the force of this argument conſiſts. "L'antiquité (ſays he) convient à la Religion, parce que ſouvent nous croyons plus les choſes à meſure qu'elles ſont plus reculées: car nous n'avons pas dans la tête des idées acceſſoires tirées de ces tems-là qui puiſſent les contredire." Vol. II. p. 203, 8vo ed. Force we ſee it has. But then unluckily it lyes in the ſuppoſition of Popery's being a *falſe*, not a *true* church. For though *falſe* religion acquires an advantage from the oblivion of thoſe diſcrediting circumſtances which attended its original, and of which by *time* we are now deprived; yet *true* religion receives much damage from the ſame effects of time; becauſe ſeveral circumſtances, long ſince loſt, which accompanied its birth, muſt needs have greatly confirmed its character. For it is as much in the nature of things that the circumſtances attending truth ſhould confirm it, as that the circumſtances attending error ſhould detect it.

† *De l'Emploi des Peres.*

with

with admirable learning, and force of argument, he ſhewed, that the FATHERS were incompetent Deciders of the controverſies now on foot; ſince the points in queſtion were not formed into articles till long after the ages in which thoſe FATHERS lived. This was bringing them from the bench to the table; degrading them from the rank of judges, into the claſs of ſimple evidence; in which, Daillé too was not for ſuffering them to ſpeak, like *Iriſh* Evidence, in every cauſe where they were wanted, but only to ſuch matters as were agreed to be within their competence. Had this learned critic ſtopped here, his book had been free from blame; but then in all likelihood his honeſt purpoſe had been rendered ineffectual: for old prejudices are not to be ſet ſtrait by barely reducing the obliquity to that ſtrait line which juſt reſtores it to its rectitude. He went much further: and by ſhewing, occaſionally, that they were abſurd interpreters of ſcripture; that they were bad reaſoners in morals; and very looſe evidence in facts; he ſeemed willing to have his reader infer, that, even though they had been maſters of their ſubject, yet theſe other defects would have rendered them very unqualified deciders.

However, the work of this famous foreigner had great conſequences: and eſpecially with us here at home. The more learned amongſt the nobility (an order, which, at that time, was of the republic of letters) were the firſt who emancipated themſelves from the general prejudice. It brought the incomparable Lord *Falkland* to think moderately of the FATHERS, and to turn his theological inquiries into a more uſeful channel. And his great rival in arts, though not in virtue, the famous Lord *Digby*, found it of ſuch uſe to him, in his defence of the Reformed religion againſt his couſin Sir *Kenhelm*, that he has even epitomiſed *l'emploi des Peres*, in his fine Letter on that ſubject. But, what it hath chiefly to boaſt is, that it gave birth to the two beſt defences ever written, on the two beſt of ſubjects, *Religion* and *Liberty*; I mean Mr. *Chillingworth's Religion of Proteſtants*, and Dr. *Jer. Taylor's Liberty*

of

of Propheſying. In a word, it may be truly ſaid to be the ſtorehouſe, from whence all who have ſince written popularly on the character of the FATHERS have derived their materials.

Dr. Whitby, in whoſe way they fell as *Interpreters of Scripture*, hath, in imitation of the pattern Daillé ſet him, made a large collection from their writings, to expoſe their talents for *criticiſm* *. In the ſame manner, and in a larger volume, Mr. Barbeyrac afterwards treated their pretenſions to the ſcience of *Ethics* †: And now of late the very learned and ingenious Dr. Middleton, finding them in the ſupport of Monkiſh miracles, hath written as largely to prove their *teſtimony* in matters of fact to be none of the ſtrongeſt.

So that theſe ſeveral conſtituent parts of their character being thus taken up in their turns; and the whole order expoſed, as incompetent judges of doctrine, as trifling interpreters of ſcripture, as bad moraliſts, and as ſlippery evidence; it is no wonder the Engliſh reader, who only meaſures them by ſuch repreſentations, ſhould be diſpoſed to think very irreverently of theſe early lights of the Chriſtian Church.

But, let us diveſt ourſelves of prejudice, whether we think with the few or the many; and we ſhall ſoon underſtand that in the heat of a contention evidence will be apt to be over-rated. Nay, when fairly eſtimated, no reflecting man will think himſelf able to form a true judgment of a character, when no more of it is laid before him than a collection of its blots and blemiſhes.

Till of late, there were always ſome who could preſerve their candour and moderation, which in religion and politics, where our higheſt intereſts are concerned, is no eaſy matter; and theſe men were wont to ſay, "That though we ſhould indeed ſuppoſe the fathers to be as fanciful divines, as bad critics, and as unſafe moraliſts, as Daillé, Whitby, and Barbeyrac, are pleaſed to repreſent them, yet

* *Diſſert. de S. S. interpretatione ſecund. Patres.*

† *La Morale des Peres, &c.*

this

this would take little from the integrity of their evidence: and what we want of them is only their teſtimony to facts." But now, even this ſmall remain of credit is thought too much to be allowed them; and, of this, the learned author of the *Free Inquiry*, by expoſing their exceſſive credulity in point of falſe miracles *, hath laboured to deprive them. But, controverſy apart, their teſtimony to *common facts* may yet ſtand good. I ſee no reaſon why their veracity ſhould be brought in queſtion when they bear witneſs to the ſtate of religion in their own times, becauſe they diſgraced their judgment, in giving ear to every ſtrange tale of Monkiſh extraction. The moſt learned and virtuous divine of the barbarous ages is the venerable Bede; and the honeſteſt as well as moſt diſcerning hiſtorian of thoſe, or perhaps of any age, is Matthew Paris: yet their propenſity to recount the wonderful exceeds all imagination. Neither learning, judgment, nor integrity, could ſecure them againſt the general contagion. Now if this diſpoſition was in them (as is confeſſed) only the vice of the *times*, is it not unjuſt to aſcribe the ſame diſpoſition in the *fathers*, to the vice of the *men*?

But our folly has ever been, and is likely to continue, to judge of antiquity by a modern ſtandard: when, if we would form reaſonable ideas of it, we ſhould weigh it with its own. We examine the *conceits* of a BASIL or an AUSTIN, on the teſt of the improved reaſoning of our own times. And we do well. It is the way to read them with profit. But when, from a contempt of their logic, which follows this compariſon, we come to deſpiſe their other accompliſhments of parts and learning, we betray groſs ignorance or injuſtice. To know the true value of the *fathers*, we ſhould place them by their contemporaries, the Pagan writers of greateſt eſtimation: and if they ſuffer in their neighbourhood;

* "Videmus, quanto dignitatis detrimento hic error credendi recipiendique omnia "facilitas affecerit ex eccleſiaſticis hiſtoriis nonnullas; quæ nimis faciles ſe præbuerunt, "in prodendis tranſcribendiſque miraculis, à martyribus, eremitis, anachoretis, et aliis "ſanctis viris, atque ab eorum reliquiis, ſepulcris, ſacellis, imaginibus editis." *Bacon de Augm. Scien.*

e'en

c'en let them ſtay, where moſt of them already are, with the grocers. But it is a fact none acquainted with antiquity will deny, how great a ſecret ſoever modern divines may make of it, that as *polite ſcholars* (which is the thing their deſpiſers now moſt affect to value) the Chriſtian writers have indiſputably the advantage, both in eloquence and ethics. And we may venture to ſay that there are ſome of them who have ſucceſſively rivaled the beſt writers of the higher and purer antiquity. St. Chryſoſtome has more good ſenſe than Plato; and the critic may find in Lactantius almoſt as many good words as in Tully. So that if, on the principles of a claſſical taſte, we diſcard the *fathers*, we ſhould ſend along with them the *Pagan writers* of the ſame ages; unleſs the wonderful theology of the latter can atone for (what they both have in common) their falſe rhetoric and bad reaſoning.

Theſe imperfections, therefore, in both, being equal, it is plain they were the faults of the times. For whatever advantages the ancients had over us in the arts of poetry, oratory, and hiſtory, it is certain, we have over them in the *ſcience of reaſoning*, as far as it concerns the inveſtigation of moral truth.

Thoſe who are not able to form a compariſon between them, on their own knowledge, may be reconciled to this concluſion, when the *peculiar hindrances*, in the ancient world, to the advancement of moral truth, on the principles of a juſt logic, have been laid before them.

The cultivation of the art of reaſoning was, in the moſt early times of learning, in the hands of their ORATORS and SOPHISTS. Whatever was the profeſſion, the real buſineſs of the *orator* was not to convince, but to perſuade; and not in favour of truth, but of convenience or utility: which, again, was not general utility (for that coincides with truth), but particular; which is often at variance with it. So that their art of reaſoning

was as much an art to *hinder* the diſcovery of truth *, as to *promote* it. Nor was that part which was employed in the ſupport of error merely loſt to the ſervice of truth. The miſchief went further. It brought in many fallacious rules and modes of reaſoning, which greatly embarraſſed and miſled the advocate when employed in a better cauſe. Particularly thoſe by *ſimilitude* and *analogy:* which had their riſe from hence; and ſoon ſpread, like a leproſy, over all the argumentation of antiquity.

We need not wonder then, if under this management truth was rarely found. What ſeems to be more wonderful is, that, when it was found, its value was ſo little underſtood that it was as frequently ſacrificed to the empty *vanity*, as to the more ſolid *intereſts* of the diſputer. For the *ſophiſts*, the ſpeculative inquirers after truth, made their wiſdom (from whence they took their name) to conſiſt in bringing truth to the ſide of their reaſoning; not their reaſoning to the ſide of truth. Hence it became the glory of their profeſſion to demonſtrate for, or againſt any opinion, indifferently: and they were never better pleaſed than when that propoſition (let it be what it would) was preſcribed to them for their ſubject, which their auditors had a mind ſhould be the truth. The difficulties they frequently had to encounter, in ſupport of ſo extravagant a character, introduced into the ancient reaſoning new modes of fallacies, a ſet of *metaphyſical quibbles*; which being the invention of theſe SOPHISTS, or *wiſe men*, are fitted only to impoſe on others as *wiſe*.

But though ſo much had been done to betray, to diſcredit, and to eſtrange us from truth; yet common ſenſe revolts againſt every thing when it becomes, to a certain degree, unnatural. This inſolent abuſe of reaſon, now proceeding to an open mockery of truth, brought the *ſophiſts* into public contempt: and gave room to another ſet of men, of a modeſter denomination, to raiſe themſelves upon their ruins.

* Ubi verò animis judicum vis afferenda eſt, et ab ipſa veri contemplatione abducenda mens, IBI PROPRIUM ORATORIS OPUS EST. Quint. l. vi. c. ii.

Theſe

Theſe were the PHILOSOPHERS: and to theſe, it muſt be owned, the Gentile word owed all its real improvements in the art of reaſoning, and advancement in truth. But the defects of their conſtitution, the errors of their principles, and the folly of their conduct, were ſo great, that truth was kept in that ſtate of inferiority, in which, we ſay, it came to and was unhappily eſpouſed by the *fathers*. It would ill ſuit the confined nature of this diſcourſe to explain theſe things at large: we can only hint at ſome of the moſt conſiderable of their errors.

They ſoon ran into the two extremes, of *ſcepticiſm* and *dogmatizing*; of all other, the two diſorders of the mind, moſt hurtful to ſound reaſon. Theſe maladies they contracted of the ſtock from which they ſprung, the *ſophiſts*: who, by their cuſtom of diſputing for and againſt every thing, brought every thing, in its turn, according to the temper of the recipients, to be firmly embraced, or wantonly ſuſpected. For extremes *often* beget, and, when they have begot, *always* ſupport one another.

A ſecond violation of right reaſon was that principle, which they all held in common, *that truth was ever to give place to utility*. A principle which had the appearance of modeſty, as ſeeming only to imply, what is too true, that we are leſs able to judge of *cauſes* than *effects*; but, indeed, the natural iſſue of the inveteracy and abſurdity of popular Paganiſm, and of its incorporation with the ſtate.

Another principle as univerſal, and no leſs injurious to the rights of reaſon, was that the fundamental doctrines of each ſect were to be held unqueſtioned by its followers. For, in moſt ſocieties, truth is but the ſecond care; the *firſt* is to provide for themſelves: and as this can be done only by uniformity of opinions, and opinions will continue no longer uniform than while they remain unqueſtioned, an *ipſe dixit* was the *rule* of all, though the *badge* only of a ſingle ſect. Theſe ſeveral defects in the conſtitution of ancient *philoſophy* had, in courſe of time, brought on others. The dog-

matiſts, as was natural, grew *enthuſiaſtic*; and the ſceptics *immoral*. The two worſt diſorders that can befall a ſearcher after truth; for her abode is neither in the clouds, nor on the dung-hill.

Take then all theſe things together, and we ſhall ſee, they muſt be inſuperable bars to any great improvement, in the ſcience of moral reaſoning.

But to this it will be ſaid, that thoſe two famous inſtruments of truth, LOGIC and MATHEMATICS, were, the one invented, and the other highly advanced, in theſe very ages. It is certain they were. But if the plain truth may be told, the uſe of theſe boaſted inſtruments goes no further than to aſſiſt us, the one in the FORM of *reaſoning*, the other in the METHOD of *diſcourſe*.

Ariſtotle's invention of the *Categories* was a ſurprizing effort of human wit. But, in practice, *logic* is more a *trick* than a *ſcience*, formed rather to amuſe than to inſtruct. And, in ſome ſort, we may apply to the *art of ſyllogiſm* what a man of wit * has obſerved of *rhetoric*, that it only tells us how to *name* thoſe tools, which nature had before put into our hands, and habit taught the uſe of. However, all its real virtue conſiſts in the *compendious* detection of a fallacy. This is all the ſervice it can do for truth. In the ſervice of Chicane, indeed, it is a mere juggler's knot, now faſt, now looſe; and the *ſchools*, where this legerdemain was exerciſed in great perfection, are full of the ſtories of its wonders. But its true value is now well known: and there is but little need to put it lower in the general eſtimation.

However, what *logic* hath loſt of its credit, *mathematics* have gained. And *geometry* is now ſuppoſed to do wonders as well in the ſyſtem of man as of matter. It muſt be owned, the real virtue it hath, it had acquired long ſince: for, by what is left us of antiquity, we ſee how elegantly it was then handled, and how

* Butler.

ſublimely

ſublimely it was purſued. But the truth is, all its uſe, for the purpoſe in queſtion, beſides what hath been already mentioned, ſeems to be only habituating the mind to think long and cloſely: and it would be well if this advantage made amends for ſome inconveniencies, as inſeparable from its ſtudy. It may ſeem perhaps too much a paradox to ſay, that long habit in this ſcience incapacitates the mind for reaſoning at large, and eſpecially in the ſearch of moral truth. And yet, I believe, nothing is more certain. The object of geometry is demonſtration; its ſubject admits of it, and is almoſt the only ſubject that doth. In this ſcience, whatever is not demonſtration, goes for nothing; or is at leaſt below the ſublime inquirer's regard. *Probability*, through its almoſt infinite degrees, from ſimple doubt up to abſolute certainty, is the *terra incognita* of the geometer. And yet here it is that the great buſineſs of the human mind, the ſearch and diſcovery of all the important truths which concern us as reaſonable beings, is carried on. And here too it is that all its vigour is exerted: for to proportion the aſſent to the probability accompanying every varying degree of moral evidence requires the moſt enlarged and ſovereign exerciſe of reaſon. But, as to excel in the uſe of any thing, the habit muſt always be in proportion to the difficulty, it ſeems very unlikely that the *geometer* (long confined to the routine of demonſtration, the eaſieſt exerciſe of reaſon, where much leſs of the vigour than of the attention of mind is required to excel), ſhould form a right judgement on ſubjects, whoſe truth or falſhood is to be rated on the degrees of moral evidence. I venture to call mathematics the eaſieſt exerciſe of reaſon, on the authority of Cicero, who obſerves, *that ſcarce any man ever ſet himſelf upon this ſtudy, who did not make what progreſs in it he pleaſed**. But beſides acquired inability, prejudice renders the veteran mathematician ſtill leſs capable of judging

* Quis ignorat, ii, qui mathematici vocantur, quanta in obſcuritate rerum, et quam recondita in arte et multiplici, ſubtilique verſentur? quo tamen in genere ita multi perfecti homines exſtiterunt, ut nemo fere ſtuduiſſe ei ſcientiæ vehementius videatur, quin quod voluerit, conſecutus ſit. De Orat. l. i.

of

of moral evidence. He who hath been ſo long accuſtomed to lay together and compare ideas, and hath reaped demonſtration, the richeſt fruit of ſpeculative truth, for his labour, regards all the lower degrees of evidence as in the train only of his mathematical principality: and he commonly ranks them in ſo arbitrary a manner, that the *ratio ultima mathematicorum* is become almoſt as great a libel upon common ſenſe, as other ſovereign deciſions. I might appeal, for the truth of this, to thoſe wonderful concluſions which *geometers*, when condeſcending to write on hiſtory, ethics, or theology, have made from their premiſſes. But the thing is notorious: and it is now no ſecret that the oldeſt mathematician in England is the worſt reaſoner in it. But I would not be miſtaken, as undervaluing the many uſeful diſcoveries made from time to time in moral matters by profeſſed mathematicians. Nor will any one ſo miſtake me, who does not firſt confound the genius and the geometer; and then conclude that what was the atchievement of his wit, was the product of his theorems.

Yet ſtill it muſt be owned, that this diſcipline habituates the mind to think cloſely; and may help us to a good method of compoſition. In thoſe moſt unpromiſing ages, when the *forms* of the ſchools were as tedious and intricate, as the *matter* they treated was abſurd or trifling, it hath had force enough to break through the bondage of cuſtom, and to clear away the thorns that then perplexed and overgrew the paths of learning. Thomas Bradwardin, a mathematician, and archbiſhop of Canterbury, in the fourteenth century, in his famous book *De cauſa Dei*, hath treated his ſubject, not as it was wont to be handled in the ſchools, but in the better method of the geometers. And in another inſtance, of more importance, he hath given the age he lived in an example to emancipate itſelf from the ſlavery of faſhion; I mean, in his attempt (as by his freedom with the *fathers* it ſeems to be) of reducing their extravagant authority to more reaſonable bounds. But yet, ſo true is the foregoing obſervation, that though mathematics, in good hands,

hands, could do this, it could do no more: all the opening it gave to truth could not ſecure Bradwardin from the diſhonour of becoming advocate for the moſt abſurd opinion that ever was, the *Anti-Pelagian* doctrine of St. Auſtin; in which the good archbiſhop was ſo much in earneſt, that he calls the defence of it, *the cauſe of God.*

To return. Such was the ſtate and condition of the human underſtanding in the ancient world, rather a *mechanical* than a moral or intellectual cultivation of reaſon, when CHRISTIANITY aroſe; and on ſuch principles as were beſt fitted to correct thoſe errors and prejudices, which had ſo long and ſo fatally retarded the progreſs of truth. It would require a juſt volume to treat this matter as it deſerves. The nature of my work will not permit me to do it. I ſhall only give a ſingle inſtance, but an inſtance of importance, namely, the uſe of thoſe principles in diſcovering the true *end* of man; and in directing him to the right *mean* of attaining it.

The knowledge of the ONE GOD, as the moral and immediate Governor of the Univerſe, directly leads us to the *Supreme Good*; and the doctrine of FAITH in Him, directly inſpiring the *love of truth*, enables us to procure it.

In Paganiſm, the *end* was totally obſcured, by its having alway kept the true God, the ſupreme good, out of ſight, which therefore muſt be needs ſought in vain; and the true *mean* entirely loſt, by the introduction of a number of falſe ones.

Theſe were amongſt the great principles revealed by heaven for the advancement of *moral knowledge*: and in time they had their effect: though indeed ſomewhat with the lateſt. For it is not to be diſſembled, that here, as in moſt other caſes in the moral world, the perverſity of man ſoon ran counter to God's good Providence; which had ſo admirably fitted and diſpoſed things for a general reform.

I have ſaid the *fathers* were, at leaſt, equal, if not ſuperior, to thoſe Gentile writers, their contemporaries, whom we moſt affect to

to admire: I ſhall now explain the unhappy cauſes (in which *Religio* and *Reaſon* ſuffered equally, as they always will ſuffer together) why the fathers did not, in the exactneſs of their *logic*, and in the purity of their *ethics*, infinitely ſurpaſs them.

The firſt preachers of the Goſpel were the inſpired meſſengers of the WORD. They committed its dictates to writing; and with that purity and ſplendor in which they drew them from the fountain of truth.

Their immediate followers, whom we are wont to call the *apoſtolic fathers*, received at their hands the doctrine of life, in all the ſimplicity of *underſtanding* as well as *heart*. It cannot be ſaid that their writings do much honour to the rational ſublimity of our holy religion: but then they have not hurt or violated the integrity of ſacred truth. For *falſe philoſophy* had not yet made havock of the *faith*. If, in their writings, we ſee but little of that manly elegance of reaſon, which makes the writings of their inſpired predeceſſors ſo truly admirable; and is ſo ſtriking a proof of the reality of that inſpiration: yet ſtill there is as little of thoſe adulterate and polluted ornaments, which their ſucceſſors brought from the brothels of Pagan philoſophy, to ſtain the ſanctity of religion. And let me add, that though the early proſpect of things may not be, in all reſpects, what we could wiſh it; yet there is one circumſtance, which does great credit to our holy faith: It is this, that as the integrity and dignity of its ſimple and perfect nature refuſed all fellowſhip with the adulterate arts of Grecian learning; ſo the admirable diſplay of divine wiſdom in diſpoſing the parts, and conducting the courſe of the grand ſyſtem of redemption, was not to be tolerably apprehended but by an improved and well-diſciplined underſtanding. Both theſe qualities ſuited the nobility of its original. It could bear no communion with *error*; and was as little fitted to conſort with *ignorance*.

The men of *ſcience* were not the firſt who attended to the call of the Goſpel. It was not to be expected they ſhould be the firſt. Their ſtation preſented many prejudices againſt it. It was taught by

by ſimple unlettered men, whoſe condition they held in contempt; and it required that they, who had been till now the teachers of mankind, ſhould become learners. The doctrines of the Goſpel had indeed this to recommend them, that they were *rational*; but the philoſophers were already no ſtrangers to thoſe principles of natural religion which Chriſtianity adopted, ſuch as the unity of the Godhead, his moral government, and the eſſential difference between good and evil. The *atteſtations* to its truth were wonderful; but theſe, their principles of falſe philoſophy enabled them to evade: ſo that their paſſions and prejudices, for ſome time, ſupported them in holding out againſt all the conviction of goſpel-evidence.

But it was not thus with plainer men. They ſubmitted to its force with leſs reluctance. Philoſophy had ſecreted from the prophane vulgar the high truths of natural law, which is taught to the initiated concerning the one true God and his worſhip. When the Goſpel openly proclaimed theſe truths, with others of the like repoſe and comfort to the human mind, theſe *prophane vulgar* eagerly embraced it. And as Grecian wiſdom could not keep them from believing what was thus revealed; ſo neither did that wiſdom, falſely ſo called, tempt them to viciate it, after they had embraced it. They were apt, indeed, to run into the oppoſite extreme, and, reflecting of how little uſe philoſophy had ever been to the body of mankind, and how violently it now oppoſed the new religion, which had the body of mankind for its object, they became much diſpoſed to avoid or neglect all prophane literature, without diſtinction. They ſaw, in the power of miracles, a more efficacious way of propagating the faith: and they thought they ſaw, in St. Paul's cenſure of the Grecian wiſdom, the condemnation of all human literature, in general. St. Paul had himſelf abſtained from their meretricious eloquence, and had cautioned poſterity againſt their magical philoſophy. The *firſt*, leſt it ſhould occaſion a ſuſpicion that the faith had made its way rather by the arts of human ſpeech, than by the power of the ſpirit: The *latter*, becauſe he

ſaw it was fatally framed to infect religion; and had ſome experience, and more divine foreknowledge, that it would ſpeedily do ſo.

Indeed the time was at hand. For the convictive evidence and rapid progreſs of the Goſpel had ſo ſhaken and diſconcerted learned pride, that the next age ſaw a torrent of believers pour into the church, from the ſchools of their rhetors, the colleges of their philoſophers, and the cloiſters of their prieſts. The ſincerity of theſe illuſtrious converts in embracing a religion which did not hold out, ſo much as in diſtant proſpect, any advantages of the temporal kind, cannot be fairly brought in queſtion. Their diſcretion, their prudence, were the things moſt wanted. For that paſſion of new converts, *zeal*, which is then leaſt under the direction of *knowledge* when zeal moſt needs it, hindered them from making their *advantages* of the principles of revelation; ſo admirably fitted, as we have ſhewn, to improve human nature on that ſide where its perfection lies, I mean, in the high attainments of moral ſcience. For, inſtead of reaſoning from truths clearly revealed, and ſo, from things known, to advance, by due degrees, in the method of the mathematicians, to the diſcovery of truths unknown, They traveſted obſcure uncertainties, nay, manifeſt errors, into truth; and ſought in philoſophy and logic analogies and quibbles to ſupport them.

Their two great objects, as became them, were to increaſe the number of believers; and to defend the faith againſt infidels and hereticks.

Amongſt the means they employed for the ſpeedy converſion of the world, one was to bring Chriſtianity as near to the genius of the *Gentile religion*, and of the *Greek philoſophy*, as could be done without giving offence to themſelves or their brethren. They thought it but prudent to avail themſelves of the prejudices of Paganiſm; and perhaps they themſelves were not free from all remains of thoſe prejudices. The Jewiſh law, ill underſtood, ſatisfied them in the propriety of theſe means. They ſaw there,

com-

compliances made by God himſelf to the prejudices and ſuperſtitions of the times. But this was all they ſaw: They did not reflect that a local worſhip, inſtituted for peculiar and temporary ends, was to be conducted on maxims different from what was required in an univerſal religion, erected on the general principles of ſpirit and truth. They did not reflect that *one* mean was to be purſued when the end was to keep a choſen family from the contagion of idol worſhip; and *another* when an idolatrous world was to be invited to the profeſſion of SAVING FAITH.

It is very obſervable, that, while the *fathers* were thus diſhonouring Chriſtianity by giving it the faſhionable air of Paganiſm, the *philoſophers*, on their ſide, were as buſy in reforming and purifying their ſyſtems on the model of the great truths of Revelation *. And, what is yet more ſtrange, this mutual approach ſtill kept them at an irreconciled diſtance. For the advances on both ſides were made for no other end than that each might the better keep their own ground; the *philoſophers*, by conciliating the reaſon; the *fathers*, by indulging the paſſions; into which various conduct they were alike betrayed by the condition of our common nature, unable either to bear pure and ſimple truth, or groſs and undiſguiſed error.

There were two things in Paganiſm, which, as they excited and kept up that amuſing exerciſe of the mind, *admiration*, did, more ſtrongly than any elſe, hold the people attached to idolatry; and theſe were MYSTERIOUS RITES and HIDDEN DOCTRINES.

One would have thought it hard to find an equivalent for theſe in ſo ſimple and perfect a religion as the Chriſtian; yet the figurative expreſſions uſed in the inſtitution of the *Lord's ſupper*, and the frequent mention of myſteries throughout the New Teſtament (though it be of myſteries which the genius of the goſpel had *revealed* and *explained*, not of myſteries which it invented and kept hidden), gave occaſion to accommodators to ancient prejudices to

* See The Divine Legation.

ſpeak of the *laſt ſupper* as a myſterious rite, to which they ventured to apply all the terms in uſe at the celebration of the Pagan myſteries; and to ſpeak of REDEMPTION as of one of thoſe hidden doctrines, which the fanatic *Platoniſts* of that time boaſted they had in truſt, for the purification and advancement of human nature.

This will account for a circumſtance that never fails of giving ſcandal to the readers of Church-hiſtory: which is, that the principles and doctrines of the ancient *Heretics* were infinitely more ſhocking and abſurd than thoſe of any modern *ſectaries*. The reaſon (we ſee) is, that the ancient Heretics formed their tenets on the principles of *Pagan philoſophy*; while the modern ſectaries form theirs on the books of *ſacred Scripture*. And though the one was on philoſophy reformed and purified, and the other is on the Bible perverted and miſunderſtood, yet the difference in favour of the latter becomes immenſe.

This myſterious genius of Paganiſm, together with its popular abſurdities, naturally produced a method of teaching, which always pleaſes the imagination in proportion as it diſguſts the judgement, that is to ſay, the uſe of *allegory*. A practice, excellently fitted to cover the early follies of *vulgar* Gentiliſm, and to ornament the late knaveries of the *philoſophic*; but very abhorrent of the genius of Chriſtianity, where every doctrine was rational, and therefore every rite ſhould have been plain and open. Yet as allegory was become the general vehicle of inſtruction, and that which particularly diſtinguiſhed the ſchool of *Plato*; the FATHERS, who leaned moſt towards that ſect, thought fit to go into that faſhionable mode. They allegorized every thing; and their ſucceſs was ſuch as might be expected from ſo abſurd an accommodation. Here again they were miſled in their ignorance of the nature of the Jewiſh law: a law full of allegories, and figurative repreſentations. And with great propriety ſo, as that religion was dependent on, and preparatory to the *Goſpel*: which, being its *end* and completion, required to have ſome ſhadow of itſelf delineated in the ſteps which led to it.

But

But this, which ſhews the uſe of allegories to be reaſonable in the *Old Teſtament*, ſhews the folly of expecting them in the *New*. For when the ſubſtance was advanced, and placed in full light, the ſhadow was of courſe to be caſt behind. Yet, by the moſt unaccountable perverſity, the very reaſon which the apoſtle gives for the neceſſity of interpreting the *law* figuratively, that *the letter killeth, but the ſpirit giveth life*, was made the authority for uſing the *Goſpel* in the ſame manner.

We have ſaid, that the ſchool to which the FATHERS chiefly inclined, was the *Academy*. There is a paſſage in St. Auſtin, which ſhews to what exceſs the authority of Plato was carried. In his *Confeſſions*, he returns thanks to God for having made the books of Plato an inſtrument of redeeming him from the errors of *Manicheiſm*. His partialities for that philoſopher muſt have ſtrangely blinded him; for, humanly ſpeaking, nothing could have more contributed to keep him a Manichean than the doctrines of Plato, who held two coeternal principles, *God* and *matter*, and that the latter was the cauſe of evil. This fondneſs for the academy aroſe partly from its being the philoſophy in vogue, and partly becauſe (in conſequence of that) ſeveral of the fathers came from that ſchool into the church; but chiefly becauſe they had entertained greater hopes of bringing over the Platoniſts to the faith, which, as Plato was in the higheſt credit, would be deemed a victory over philoſophy in general. What they ſeemed to ground their hopes upon was the ſceptical diſpoſition of the academy as in its firſt inſtitution. The earlier Platoniſts profeſſed to ſeek truth; and were not aſhamed to own they could not find it. It was therefore imagined they would gladly receive it, in doctrines ſo rationally deduced, and ſo clearly revealed. But in this they were deceived: for uncertainty is not the *ſtate and condition* of the ſceptic's knowledge, but the *principle and the genius* of it, and it was departing from the fundamental laws of their profeſſion to acknowledge any thing certain. As for the enthuſiaſtic part of this ſect, which was now daily getting ground, the *magic*, to which they were ſo madly given,

given, kept them confined within its circle. This, and ſome manifeſt miſchiefs, which even the warmeſt of the *fathers* could not but perceive, made them ever and anon, when in ill humour with a heretic, to execrate the ſchools of *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, *Pythagoras*, &c. and denounce each of them, in their turns, to be the great nurſeries of error: as Tertullian did of the chief of them, who calls *Plato the common cook and ſeaſoner of hereſy* *. But, falſely ſuppoſing that the evil aroſe from this or that particular ſect, when it had its root in the conſtitution of them all, they went on exclaiming againſt their *particular doctrines*, and theologizing and reaſoning on their *general principles*. We ſay the fathers would ſometimes call the Greek philoſophy the nurſery of hereſy. Nothing is more true. And yet all the difference between the *orthodox* and the *heretics*, as far as concerned their application of philoſophy to religion, was only from leſs to more. The orthodox employed it to *explain* articles of faith; and the heretics to *invent* them.

Thus much for a taſte of the *didactic* theology of the fathers. Their *polemic* ſavoured as ſtrongly of the ſame impure mixture. For, the form of argument, and force of confutation, came from the ſame ſhops: from the teaching *rhetors*, they learnt the art of reaſoning by *ſimilitudes* and *analogies*; from the talking *orators*, that capital argument, called, *ad hominem*; and from the wrangling *philoſophers* of the academy, the addreſs of *uſing any ſort of principles*, to ſupport their own opinions, or confute their adverſaries. The three laſting bars to the diſcovery and advancement of truth.

But matters ſtill grew from bad to worſe; till one black cloud of blind credulity had over-ſpread the Weſtern world: this ſoon brought on a ſpiritual dominion, which took advantage of the confuſions occaſioned by the continued inroads of fierce barbarians, to ſtrike its roots deep and wide into the fat and lumpiſh ſoil of

* Omnium Hæreticorum condimentarium.

Gothic

Gothic ignorance. For as a *temporal* tyranny ſupports itſelf by corrupt *manners*, ſo a *ſpiritual* eſtabliſheth it's uſurpation by corrupt *doctrines*. And, as in large empires ſubject to the temporal, the luxury of vice runs into *delicacies*; ſo, in thoſe ſubject to the ſpiritual, the abſurdity of doctrines hides itſelf in *ſubtilties*. Hence the original of the SCHOOLMEN's art; as we find it completed in the PERIPATETIC code of *ſums* and *ſentences*. And this was in the order of things: that what the *fanatic viſions* of the *platonic* philoſophy had brought into the faith, the *frigid ſubtilties* of the *Ariſtotelian* ſhould ſupport *. And it is obſervable, that the uſe the *ſchoolmen* made of their diſputatious genius, was juſt the ſame the *ſophiſts* had made before them. For triumphant dulneſs commonly grows wanton in the exerciſe of imputed wit †. And the *Sic* and *Non* of *Peter Abelard* was now as famous as heretofore the προβάλλε of *Gorgias*.

At length truth ſhot its ray into this chaos of diſordered reaſon: but it came not directly from its ſource; but from the ferment of ſuch paſſions as error and corruption are apt to raiſe amongſt thoſe who govern in, and benefit by, that ſtate of confuſion. For when a reform happens to ariſe from within, it cannot be ſuppoſed to have its birth in a *love* of truth; hardly, in the *knowledge* of it. Generally, ſome corrupt paſſion gratifies itſelf by decrying the groſſer errors, ſupported by, and ſupporting, thoſe it hates. The

* It is remarkable, that the *Mahometan Arabs*, by the aſſiſtance of the *ſame* philoſophy, invented the ſame kind of *ſcholaſtic theology*: and, as with ſuperior refinement, in proportion to the ſubtiler wits of that people; ſo, with better judgment: for that which obſcures reaſon, will always be a cover for abſurdity.

† It was held diſgraceful when the *ſubtile* Doctor was ſo preſſed by his opponent as to have no other way of extricating himſelf than by quoting Scripture (an expedient, in his ideas, like that of introducing *the God in the Machine*, which bungling poets were wont to have recourſe to). M. Menage tells us he found the following entry in the regiſter of the faculty at Paris—"*Solida die* ſexta Julii ab Aurora ad veſperam fuit diſputatum, et quidem tam SUBTILITER, *ut ne verbum quidem de tota ſcriptura fuerit allegatum.*"

machine

machine thus ſet a-going, truth hath fair play: ſhe is now in turn to procure friends, and to attach them to her ſervice. This was the caſe in the revolution we are about to ſpeak of; and is the caſe of religious reformations in general. For if, in the ſtate of ſuch eſtabliſhed error, Providence was to wait till a love of truth had ſet men upon ſhaking off their bondage, its diſpenſations could never provide that timely aid, which we now find they always do to diſtreſſed humanity. For when the corruption hath ſpread ſo wide, as to make truth, if by chance ſhe could be found, an indifferent object; what is there left, to enable men to break their fetters, but the claſhing intereſts of the corruption itſelf? And it is knowing as little of the *religious*, as of the *moral* courſe of God's providence, to upbraid thoſe, who have profited of this bleſſing, with the *baſeneſs* of the inſtruments that procured it *.

However, the love of truth came afterwards in aid of thoſe, whom St. Paul himſelf did not think fit to diſcourage, ſuch as *preach Chriſt even of envy and ſtrife*, to carry on the work of reformation. For though the *groſſneſs* of the corruptions did not ſtraitway make them *ſuſpected*; yet, being tyrannically impoſed, they ſoon became *hated*; and that hatred brought on the enquiry; which never ceaſed but with their detection. And then, thoſe, whoſe honeſty and courage emboldened them to make a ſeceſſion from an Anti-Chriſtian Church, found no way of ſtanding in their new-recovered liberty, but by ſupplying their want of power with a ſuperior ſhare of knowledge.

To this every thing contributed. They were led, even by the ſpirit of oppoſition, to the fountain of truth, the Scriptures; from which they had been ſo long and violently excluded. And the Scriptures, as we obſerved, had, amongſt their other advantages,

* "Si on veut réduire les cauſes des progres de la réforme à des principes ſim-
"ples, on verra, qu'en Allemagne ce fut l'Ouvrage de l'Interêt, en Angleterre
"celui de l'Amour; et en France celui de la Nouveauté, ou peut-être d'une
"Chanſon." Voiez, *Memoirs pour ſervir à l'Hiſtoire de Brandebourg de main de Maitre*, p. 27.

this

this peculiar virtue, to direct and enlarge the mind; by providing it with ſuch objects as were beſt ſuited for its contemplation; and preſenting them in ſuch lights as moſt readily promoted its improvement by them. Such too was the gracious diſpoſition of Heaven, that, at the very time theſe ſervants of truth were breaking open the recovered treaſury of holy writ, the largeſt ſource of human learning was ready to pour in upon them. For a powerful nation of fierce enthuſiaſts, the enemies of the Chriſtian name, had juſt driven Grecian literature from its native ſeats, and forced it to take refuge in the North Weſt of Europe.

How admirable are the ways of Providence! and how illuſtrious was this diſpenſation! It directed the independent, the various, and the contrary revolutions of *theſe times*, to rectify the miſchiefs occaſioned by the *paſt*: whereby that very learning, which, in the firſt ages, had been perverted to corrupt Chriſtianity, was now employed to purify and reſtore it: that very philoſophy, which had been adopted to invent and explain articles of faith, was now ſtudied only to inſtruct us in the hiſtory of the human mind, and to aſſiſt us in developing its faculties, and regulating its operations: and thoſe very ſyſtems which had ſupported the whole body of *ſchool divinity*, now afforded the principles proper to overturn it.

But in the courſe of this reform, it was not enough that the bad logic, on which the ſchool-determinations reſted, ſhould be reduced to its juſt value. The ſervice of truth required the invention of a better. A better was invented: and the ſuperiority that followed from its uſe was immediately felt: So that our adverſaries were ſoon reduced to avail themſelves of the ſame advantages. Thus the true ſcience of humanity opened and enlarged itſelf: It ſpread and penetrated through every quarter; till it arrived at that diſtinguiſhed height in which we place the true glory of theſe later ages.

The advantage of the *modern* over *ancient* times, in the ſucceſsful purſuit of moral ſcience, is now generally acknowledged.

And the impartial reader, who hath attended to theſe brief reflections, will, we preſume, find no other cauſe, to which it can be ſo reaſonably aſcribed, as to the *genius* and the *conſtitution* of the Chriſtian religion; whoſe *doctrines* reveal the great principles of moral truth; and whoſe *diſcipline* eſtabliſhes a miniſtry conſecrated to its ſupport and ſervice.

It is true, indeed, the concurrence of ſeveral croſs accidents had for many ages deprived the world of theſe advantages: They had defeated the natural virtue and efficacy of the *doctrines*; and rendered the *diſcipline* vain and uſeleſs. For theſe two parts of the Chriſtian ſyſtem cannot act but in conjunction: ſeparate them, and its doctrines will abound in *enthuſiaſms*, and its diſcipline, in *ſuperſtitions*. But now, ſince the cold and heavy incumbrance of *human inventions* hath been removed out of the *Lord's vineyard*, the miniſters of religion have been enabled to produce that fruit which, from the beginning, they were enabled to cultivate and mature. So that greater improvements were made, during the laſt two hundred years, in the ſcience of humanity, than in all the preceding ages put together.

Nor let any one, from what he may have ſeen not very conformable to theſe ideas, ſuſpect the truth of this repreſentation. It was never pretended that theſe advantages prevailed equally or conſtantly in all places, to which the influence of their cauſes had reached. As time would improve them in ſome, ſo it would impair them in others. All nature is in a conſtant flux, and every modification of it, however circumſtanced, when conſidered locally, muſt have its period; and ſuch as are moſt valuable, have, very often, the quickeſt. Of the advantages ſpoken of above, THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND had made the beſt uſe: and the *ſyſtem of man*, that is, of ethics and theology, had received there almoſt as many improvements, as the *ſyſtem of nature*, 'amongſt the ſame people, hath done ſince. It would have received more but for the evil influence which the corrupt and miſtaken politics of thoſe times have had upon it. For

politics

politics have ever had great effects on science. And this is natural. What is strange in the story is, that these studies gradually decay under an improved Constitution. Insomuch that there is now neither force enough in the public genius to emulate their forefathers; nor sense enough to understand the use of their discoveries. It would be an invidious task to enquire into the causes of this degeneracy. It is sufficient, for our humiliation, that we feel the effects. Not that we must suppose, there was nothing to dishonour the happier times which went before: there were too many: but then the mischiefs were well repaired by the abundance of the surrounding blessings. This church, like a fair and vigorous tree, once teemed with the richest and noblest burthen. And though, together with its best fruits, it pushed out some hurtful suckers, receding every way from the mother plant; crooked and mishapen, if you will, and obscuring and eclipsing the beauty of its stem; yet still there was something in their height and verdure which bespoke the generosity of the stock they rose from. She is now seen under all the marks of a total decay: her top scorched and blasted, her chief branches bare and barren, and nothing remaining of that comeliness which once invited the whole continent to her shade. The chief sign of life she now gives is the exsuding from her sickly trunk a number of deformed fungus's; which call themselves of her, because they stick upon her surface, and suck out the little remains of her sap and spirits.

To conclude: my more immediate concern in these observations was to justify the FATHERS from the injurious contempt under which they now lye. But, in the course of this apology, I have endeavoured to serve a greater purpose; which was, to vindicate our holy Religion from its supposed impotency and incapacity to direct and enlarge the reasoning faculties, in the discovery and advancement of moral truth.

So far then as to the *genius and literary talents* of the *Fathers*: their *moral* character is a distinct question; and would well bear, and does deserve a full examination. But I have already gone beyond

my limits. However, this I may venture to ſay, that the men moſt prejudiced againſt them, though they talk, will never be able to prove, that the *Fathers* had an immoral intention to deceive. If there be any learned man who thinks otherwiſe, I would adviſe him, before he attempts to proſecute this charge againſt them, to weigh well the force of the following remark, though made on ſomewhat a different occaſion. "Whenever" (ſays the fine author of the *Spirit of Laws*) "one obſerves, in any age or government, "the ſeveral bodies in a community intent on augmenting their own "authority, and vigilant to procure certain advantages to themſelves "excluſive of each other's pretenſions, we ſhould run a very great "chance of being deceived if we regarded theſe attempts as a cer-"tain mark of their corruptions. By an unhappineſs inſeparable "from the condition of humanity, moderation is a rare virtue in "men of ſuperior talents. And as it is always more eaſy to puſh "on force in the direction in which it moves, than to ſtop or divert "its moment; perhaps, in the claſs of ſuperior geniuſes, you will "ſooner find men extremely virtuous, than extremely prudent *."

* Lorſque dans un ſiécle, ou dans un gouvernement, on voit les divers corps de l'etat chercher à augmenter leur autorité, & à prendre les uns ſur les autres de certains avantages, on ſe tromperoit ſouvent, ſi l'on regardoit leurs entrepriſes, comme une marque certaine de leur corruption. Par un malheur attaché à la condition humaine, les Grands-hommes modérés ſont rares; & comme il eſt toûjours plus aiſé de ſuivre ſa force que de l'arrêter, peut-être dans la claſſe des gens ſuperieurs, eſt-il plus facile de trouver des gens extremement vertueux, que les hommes extrememeat ſages. L'Eſprit des Loix, V. II. p. 334. 8vo edit.

A DIS-

A

DISCOURSE

ON THE ATTEMPT OF THE

EMPEROR JULIAN

TO REBUILD THE

TEMPLE OF JERUSALEM.

BOOK I.

IN reflecting on the ſtate of this new controverſy, concerning MIRACLES, *two* things ſeemed to be wanting, though very uſeful to oppoſe to the inſinuations of licentious readers, who are commonly more forward to come to a concluſion than the diſputants themſelves; the *one* was, to ſhew that *all* the miracles recorded in *church-hiſtory* are *not* forgeries or deluſions: The *other*, that the evidence of moſt of them doth *not* ſtand on the ſame foot of credit with the miracles recorded in *Goſpel-hiſtory*. For moſt theological debates amongſt churchmen, notwithſtanding the ſervice they do to truth, occaſion this ſenſible miſchief to the people, that the enemies of religion ſpread abroad *their own* conſequences from them, as the conſequences of the *doctrines advanced*, how contrary ſoever to the expreſs reaſonings and declarations of the parties concerned.

To

To obviate therefore the ABUSES ariſing from the management of the preſent queſtion, I have taken upon me to *defend* A MIRACLE OF THE FOURTH CENTURY; and to *enquire into the nature of that evidence, which will demand the aſſent of every reaſonable man to a miraculous fact.*

The firſt part of this plan is proſecuted in the following ſheets: The ſecond will afford a ſubject for another diſcourſe.

My chief purpoſe here is to prove the miraculous interpoſition of Providence, in defeating the attempt of JULIAN to rebuild the TEMPLE OF JERUSALEM.

As my deſign in writing is in behalf of our common Chriſtianity, and not to ſupport or to diſcredit the particular doctrines of this or that church or age; I have taken for my ſubject a miracle worked by the immediate hand of God, and not through the agency of his ſervants.

So that, whether the power of miracles as exerciſed by the apoſtles, and their firſt followers, ceaſed with them, or was conveyed to their ſucceſſors of the next age, is a queſtion that doth not at all affect the preſent ſubject: for, God's ſhortening the hands of his ſervants doth not imply that he ſhortened his own.

CHAP. I.

WHEN God, in his mercy, had decreed to reſtore mankind to the ſtate of immortality forfeited by Adam, he ſaw fit, in order to preſerve the memory of himſelf amidſt a world running headlong into idolatry, to ſelect a ſingle family, which, advanced into a nation, might, in the interim, become the repoſitory of his holy name. To this purpoſe he took the ſeed of Abraham, in reward of the virtues of their forefathers, and, in due time, brought them, by leaders choſen from amongſt themſelves, to the land he had appointed for them.

In

In compliance with the religious notions of thoſe times, he condeſcended, when he communicated himſelf as the Maker and Governor of the Univerſe, to adopt them for his peculiar people, under the idea of their *tutelar Deity*, or the God of Abraham, Iſaac, and Jacob. And, the better to ſecure the great end of their ſeparation, aſſumed likewiſe the title and office of their *King*, or Civil Governor.

Hence their Religion came under the idea of a *Law*; and was ſo conſidered and denominated. And their Law was, in the ſtricteſt ſenſe, *Religion*, as having all the ſanctions of a divine command.

In a word, theſe two great rules of human conduct, which are, elſewhere, kept ſo diſtinct by their different originals, and different adminiſtrations, were, here, by the ſameneſs in both, ſpecifically loſt in a perfect incorporation. And the whole œconomy (as every thing in this diſpenſation was relative to the Jews as a body) went under the common name of LAW.

From this account of the Jewiſh conſtitution, it follows, That Religion, which, elſewhere, hath only *particulars* for its ſubjects, had, Here, the nation or *community*: And what, elſewhere, as far as concerns the divine origin of religion, is only a *private* matter, was, Here, a *public*: For the Deity being both their tutelary God and civil Governor, the proper object of his care, in each capacity, was the collective body: and, whether we conſider the obſervance due to him under the idea of Law or Religion, it was ſtill the body which was the proper ſubject of it. Not but that religion had there a *private* part, or particulars for its ſubject: But then it was that religion we call *natural*; founded in what reaſon diſcovers of the relation between the Creator and the creature; an aid, which revelation is ſo far from rejecting, that we find it conſtitutes the ground of every extraordinary diſpenſation vouchſafed by God to mankind. For, *he that cometh to God* [*i. e.* by revelation] *muſt believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently ſeek him* *.

* Heb. xi. 6.

From

From this account of the Hebrew Government, one natural conſequence ariſeth, That the principal rites of their *religion* and *law* were to be performed and celebrated in ſome determined place. This, the object and ſubject of their *ceremonial* ſeemed equally to require. For, the ideas of tutelary God and King implied a local reſidence: and a national act, created by the relations ariſing from theſe things, required a fixed and certain place for its celebration: and both together ſeemed to mark out the capital of the country for that purpoſe.

This conſequent practice, which the nature and reaſon of things ſo evidently point out, the inſtitutes of the Hebrew conſtitution expreſsly order and enjoin. During the early and unſettled times of the Jewiſh ſtate, the ſacrifices, preſcribed by their ritual, were directed to be offered up before the door of an ambulatory tabernacle: but when they had gained the eſtabliſhment decreed for them, and a magnificent temple was erected for religious worſhip, then all their ſacrifices were to be offered at Jeruſalem only.

Now, ſacrifices conſtituting the ſubſtance of their national worſhip, their religion could not be ſaid to ſubſiſt longer than the continuance of that celebration. But ſacrifices could be performed only in one appointed temple: ſo that when this was finally deſtroyed, according to the predictions of the prophets, the inſtitution itſelf became aboliſhed.

Nor was any thing more conſonant to the *nature* of this religion, than the aſſigning ſuch a celebration of its rites. The temple would exiſt while they remained a people, and continued ſovereign: and when they ceaſed to be ſuch, they would indeed loſe their temple, but then they had no further uſe for it; becauſe the rites there celebrated were relative to them, only as a civil policied nation.

Theſe conſequences are all ſo neceſſarily connected, and were ſo clearly underſtood, that when Jeſus informs the woman of Samaria of the approaching abolition of the law of Moſes, he expreſſes himſelf

ſelf by this circumſtance, that men ſhould *no longer worſhip at the temple of Jeruſalem* *.

As on the other hand, when the falſe witneſſes againſt Stephen depoſed that they heard him ſay, that *Jeſus of Nazareth would deſtroy the holy place*, the Temple, they drew their own inference from it, that he *would change the law and cuſtoms which Moſes had delivered them* †.

If, from the *nature* of this religion, we go on to conſider its *end*, we ſhall find, in it, all the marks of a religion, preparatory and introductory to another more complete and perfect; of which it contains the rudiments, and preſents the ſhadow. Such as the confining its fundamental doctrine, the worſhip of the true God, within the limits of one ſmall country. Such again, as its multifarious and enigmatic ritual; of which no reaſonable account can be had, but that part was inſtituted to oppoſe the reigning ſuperſtitions, in order to preſerve the ſeparation; and part to prefigure, by types or ſymbols, the eſſential circumſtances of ſome future diſpenſation. And part again by the admirable contrivance of divine Wiſdom. Both oppoſed the reigning ſuperſtitions, and prefigured the future diſpenſation.

But Chriſtianity, which eſtabliſhed its pretenſions by the power of miracles and the purity of doctrine, doth in fact ſupport theſe concluſions, by repreſenting Judaiſm as only the rudiments and ſhadow of its own more complete œconomy.

This being premiſed, we ſay, that the more perfect diſpenſation could not take place till the leſs perfect, which prefigured it, and prepared its way, was ſet aſide and aboliſhed.

But now, if the mere voluntary adherence to a religion, or men's calling themſelves of it, were enough to prevent its abolition, the perverſeneſs and obſtinacy of our nature are ſuch, that

* John iv. 21.

† Acts vi. 13, 14. And in this the falſhood of their teſtimony ſeemed to conſiſt. For Stephen could never have ſpoken ſo crudely of the deſtruction of the *Law*, when his Maſter had ſaid, he was *not come to deſtroy the Law, but to fulfil it*, Matt. v. 17.

they might, and, in fact, would lie in the way, and obſtruct the purpoſes of Providence.

Therefore has the great Diſpoſer of all things ſo divinely conſtituted this preparatory religion, as to put it out of the power of human perverſity even to delay or retard its deſtined abolition; by ſo conſtituting the natures, and diſpoſing the order of his diſpenſations, that thoſe eſſential rites, which made the Jewiſh religion to be what it was, ſhould of neceſſity require a fixed local celebration, which it was not poſſible to perform longer than while the Jewiſh people continued a nation, and in poſſeſſion of the ſovereignty of Paleſtine. St. Chryſoſtom has an elegant obſervation to this purpoſe: "From the neceſſity (ſays he) of a local worſhip, God co-" vertly withdrew the Jews from the rage of ritual obſervances. " For as a Phyſician, by breaking the cup, prevents his patient " from indulging his appetite in a hurtful draught; ſo God with-" held them from their ſacrifices, by deſtroying the city itſelf, and " making the place inacceſſible to all of them *."

It may not be improper, in this place, to take notice of an objection, though indeed it be already obviated. It is, "that the ſacrificing at Jeruſalem being a mere ceremony, we can hardly conceive how the want of it ſhould annihilate the whole ſyſtem of a religious inſtitution. The objection goes upon ideas foreign to the ſubject. The *eſſence* of the Jewiſh religion was *ceremonial*. Hence it is, that there is no word in the Hebrew language that ſignifies what we mean by *ceremonies*: nor, if what we have delivered, concerning the nature and genius of the Jewiſh religion, be true, could there be any ſuch. The ſame is obſervable in the Greek language. And the reaſon is the ſame. It hath been ſhewn elſewhere †, that this nature was common both to the Jewiſh and Greek religions; rational indeed, in the former; but altogether abſurd in the other.

* Διὰ τῆς κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἀναγκης λανθανόντως αὐτὸς ἀπήγαγε, τῆς περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα μανίας—ὥσπερ ἂν ὁ Ἰατρὸς ἴσησι τῆς ἀκαίρου ψυχροποσίας τὸν ἄῤῥωστον, τὸ σκεῦος ἀφανίσας, οὕτω καὶ ὁ Θεὸς τῶν θυσιῶν ἀπήγαγε, τὴν πόλιν αὐτὴν καθελών, καὶ ποιήσας αὐτὴν ἄβατον πᾶσιν. Homil. VI. adverſ. Jud.

† Divine Legation.

Yet

Yet it will be ſaid, the Romans had a word to expreſs *ceremonies*. It is true, they had. And the reaſon of their having it will ſhew why the Jews and Greeks had it not. Their lawgiver, Numa, inſtituted a kind of ſyſtem of *natural* religion for their *national* uſe; which, time and craft ſoon corrupted with groſs idolatries. So that as ſuperſtitions accumulated, they would be under a neceſſity of inventing a word to ſignify that ſpecific mode of worſhip, through which ſuch ſuperſtitions were conveyed.

Thus Judaiſm being of neceſſity to ceaſe on the eſtabliſhment of Chriſtianity, we ſee for what reaſon it was predicted, that when *Shiloh came, the ſceptre ſhould depart from Judah.* Admirable are the ways of Providence! and ſo will they be always found, whenever we happen upon the clue, that leads us to the right opening.

If then, from the nature of things, it doth appear, that the TEMPLE WORSHIP muſt fall with the riſe of that which is *in ſpirit and in truth*; and that the abolition of the Moſaic law is eſſential to the eſtabliſhment of the Goſpel; we cannot but conclude, that a matter of this importance (ſo illuſtrious a proof of the relation and dependance between theſe two religions!) muſt be predicted, both by the prophets of the *old*, and the Founder of the *new* diſpenſation.

They both, indeed, have done it. And fully to comprehend the force and juſt value of their expreſſions was the end for which we have here deduced things from their original, and given this general view of the courſe and order of God's moral œconomy; on which, the ſenſe of the prophecies relating to it muſt needs be determined: and without which, the ſeveral predictions of the deſtruction of the temple, expreſſed in general terms, would be ſubject to cavil, as in themſelves implying only a *total*, and not a *final* ſubverſion. Whereas now, from the nature of the diſpenſations, we underſtand that a deſtruction, thus foretold, neceſſarily implied a *final* one.

The prophet Iſaiah, predicting, as uſual, the triumphs of the Goſpel under the terms of a temporal deliverance of the Jews from their hoſtile neighbours, delivers himſelf in the following words: "And in this mountain [*viz.* of Zion] ſhall the Lord of Hoſts "make *unto all people* a feaſt of fat things, a feaſt of wines on the "lees, of fat things full of marrow, of wines on the lees well re-"fined. And he will deſtroy in this mountain *the face of the cover-*"*ing caſt over all people, and the veil that is ſpread over all nations.* "He will *ſwallow up death in victory* *." And to ſhew, that ſome great event in a remote and future age was the principal object of his prophecy, he introduces it with this ſong of triumph: "O Lord, "thou art my God, I will exalt thee, I will praiſe thy name; for "thou haſt done wonderful things; *thy counſels of old are faithful-*"*neſs and truth* †;" *i. e.* What thou haſt originally decreed, thou wilt, in the latter ages, bring to paſs. Therefore having, in the *ſixth* verſe, enigmatically deſcribed that ſalvation which ſhould ariſe from mount Zion; in the *ſeventh*, he more openly intimates the abolition of the Temple-worſhip, by the figure of deſtroying that *veil*, which, at the crucifixion of the Lord of life, the evangeliſt informs us, *was rent in twain from the top to the bottom*; called by the prophet, from the confined nature of the Jewiſh religion, the veil that hid truth from the nations. In this ſenſe St. Paul appears to have underſtood the prophecy; for he applies the concluding words to the laſt triumph of Chriſt over *death* ‡.

Conformably to theſe ideas, Jeſus ſays to the woman of *Samaria*, "Believe me, the hour cometh, when ye ſhall neither in this "mountain, nor yet at Jeruſalem, worſhip the Father.—But the "hour cometh, and now is, when the true worſhippers ſhall wor-"ſhip the Father in ſpirit and in truth §." And to ſecure the honour of this great event, Providence had decreed that the city and temple of Jeruſalem ſhould be deſtroyed; of which the angel

* Chap. xxv. ver. 6, 7, 8.

† Iſai. xxv. 1.

‡ 1 Cor. xv. 54.

§ John iv. 21, 22, 23.

informs

informs Daniel in the following words: "And after threeſcore and "two weeks ſhall Meſſiah be cut off, but not for himſelf; and the "people of the prince that ſhall come ſhall deſtroy the *city* and the "*ſanctuary*; and the end thereof ſhall be with a flood, and unto "the end of the war *deſolations* are determined. And he ſhall con-"firm the covenant with many for one week: and in the midſt of "the week he ſhall cauſe the ſacrifice and oblation to ceaſe, and "for the overſpreading of *abominations*, he ſhall make it *deſolate*, "even until the conſummation, and that determined ſhall be poured "upon the deſolate *." In which we ſee a plain and circumſtantial deſcription of the overthrow of the city and temple by the Romans under Titus. Jeſus foretels the then approaching event in the following manner: "And when Jeſus was come near, he "beheld the *city*, and wept over it, ſaying—The days ſhall come "upon thee, that thine enemies ſhall caſt a trench about thee, and "compaſs thee round, and keep thee in on every ſide, and ſhall "lay thee even with the ground, and thy children within thee; "and they ſhall not leave in thee one ſtone upon another †." Two other evangeliſts ‡ inform us, "that Jeſus went out, and departed "from the *temple*; and his diſciples came to him for to ſhew him "the buildings of the temple. And Jeſus ſaid unto them, See ye "not all theſe things? Verily, I ſay unto you, there ſhall not be "left here one ſtone upon another, that ſhall not be thrown down." And when the diſciples *privately* asked him *when theſe things ſhould be*, he anſwered, *When ye ſhall ſee the abomination of deſolation ſpoken of by Daniel the prophet, ſtanding in the holy place*; referring to the prophecy quoted above. Hitherto we ſee a total deſtruction indefinitely predicted. The following paſſage of St. Luke's Goſpel marks the fixed duration of it. "And Jeruſalem (ſays Jeſus) ſhall "be trodden down of the Gentiles, until the times of the Gentiles "be fulfilled §." But, of the period here meant, commentators

* Dan. ix. 26, 27. † Luke xix. 41. 43, 44.

‡ Matt. xxiv. 1, 2. 15. Mark xiii. 1, 2. 14. § Luke xxi. 24.

differ;

differ: Some, as Hammond, ſuppoſe it reaches no lower than till the empire became Chriſtian: others, as Dr. S. Clarke, that it extends to the future converſion of the Jews.

Amidſt this uncertainty, ariſing from the general expreſſions of theſe prophecies conſidered alone, the only way of coming to the truth, *i. e.* to know whether they mean a *final* deſtruction, or, if not, what ſort of reſtoration; and when it is to ſucceed; the only way, I ſay, is to recur to what hath been diſcourſed above, concerning the *nature* of the TWO DISPENSATIONS: In which we have ſhewn, that *Chriſtianity* and the *Temple-worſhip* cannot ſubſiſt together: and ſo muſt conclude, that theſe prophecies foretel not only the *total*, but the *final* deſtruction of the Jewiſh temple.

And now, What are we to conclude from all this, to the caſe in hand?—It is evident, a *repugnancy* in the co-exiſtence of Judaiſm and Chriſtianity, would require God's interpoſition to prevent the reſtoration of the temple: it is as evident, that a *prophecy* of its *final* deſtruction would do the ſame. *Either* of theſe facts therefore being ſufficient to eſtabliſh our point, ſo much diſcourſe had not been employed on *both*, had they ſtood independent of one another. But the *prophecies* being *ſo* delivered, as to be of themſelves ambiguous, there was a neceſſity of calling-in the *nature* of God's diſpenſations, to explain their preciſe meaning; which propheſies would, then, reciprocally ſupport what we infer from the different *genius* of the two religions.

If it be asked (as there is now no ſecret in the counſels of God but what audacious man will ask the reaſon of) "Why the *final* deſtruction of the temple was ſo doubtfully delivered, that there was need of our having recourſe to the nature and genius of the two diſpenſations, to comprehend the full meaning of the prophecy;" I anſwer, in general, that it ſeems very irreverent, when God hath clearly made known his will to us, to cavil with his wiſdom, for not doing it in that way which to us may ſeem the moſt direct and ſimple. But, in this caſe it happens, that we ſee great *ends* obtained,

ed, by the very *way* he hath been pleaſed to uſe. For by obliging us to have recourſe to the nature of his *diſpenſations*, in order to aſcertain the full meaning of his *prophecies*, he hath put us under the neceſſity of having always in view a circumſtance of great moment, which we might otherwiſe be apt to forget; a circumſtance which impreſſeth on us the ſtrongeſt ideas of the divine wiſdom. Had the abolition of Judaiſm, on the eſtabliſhment of Chriſtianity, been only *expedient*, and not *neceſſary*, as even in that caſe we may be aſſured it had been in God's counſel never to ſuffer the temple to be rebuilt, ſo we may well believe that the revelation of this counſel by prophecy had been in the expreſs terms of a *final* deſtruction; becauſe, from the *expediency* only of an abolition, general terms could never lead us to conclude the predicted deſtruction to be *final*. But now as the abolition was *neceſſary*, that alone would ſuffice to fix the preciſe meaning of general terms. And as the uſe of general terms would oblige us to have recourſe to thoſe circumſtances on which the neceſſity was founded, and the conſtant view of thoſe circumſtances is highly uſeful for religious purpoſes, therefore were general terms very wiſely employed.

It may perhaps be further objected, "That the reaſons here given for the neceſſity of aboliſhing Judaiſm, on the coming of Chriſtianity, reach no farther than to a *virtual* abolition: whereas it is an *actual* abolition only that can ſerve our purpoſe."

To this I reply, That the abolition of a preparatory religion, on the appearance of that which was to follow, is not a matter of every day's experience. There is but this one inſtance in the world, and never will be another. Let us diveſt ourſelves, therefore, of all thoſe common notions we form from analogies, and we ſhall ſee that reaſon leads us to expect an *actual* abolition. Indeed, according to our ideas of the general nature of religion, an *actual* abolition could not be certainly had, without a force upon free-will; hence, in ſuch caſes, a *virtual* abolition is all we are to expect; and, from a conſideration of the general nature of religion, we are miſled into this objection. But the religion in queſtion was of a

peculiar

peculiar kind. The *eſſential part* of it was a *local worſhip*. This might be *actually* aboliſhed without any force upon the will. When therefore an abolition was *foretold*, and the *neceſſity* of it ſeen, muſt we not conclude ſuch a one to be meant? On the whole, a *virtual* abolition of *circumciſion*, *purification*, *diſtinction of meats*, &c. which regarded particulars directly, and the body, only obliquely, was all that could be expected: but the nature of things ſeems to require an *actual* abolition of what concerned only the body as ſuch; which was the *temple-worſhip*. To theſe many other reaſons might be added, ſuch as the apparent neceſſity of ſhewing, that this nation was no longer God's *peculiar*; which could hardly be done while they were in poſſeſſion of a worſhip, that was the characteriſtic mark of God's *peculiarity*: and ſuch as the transferring the kingſhip of the Jews from God to *Chriſt*; which would not appear to be done while the temple-worſhip, the ſpecific act of allegiance, was in being. There are various conſiderations beſides of equal weight. But we may ſeem perhaps to have already exceeded the proportion that the parts of this diſcourſe ſhould bear to one another.

And yet I am tempted to make one obſervation more, which, I hope, the importance of the ſubject will excuſe.

The prophecy of Jeſus, concerning the approaching deſtruction of Jeruſalem by Titus, is conceived in ſuch high and ſwelling terms, that not only the modern interpreters, but the ancient likewiſe, have ſuppoſed that our Lord interweaves into it a DIRECT prediction of his ſecond coming to judgement *. Hence aroſe a current opinion of *thoſe* times, that the conſummation of all things was at hand; which hath afforded a handle to an infidel objection in *theſe*, inſinuating that Jeſus, in order ro keep his followers attached to his ſervice, and patient under ſufferings, flattered them with the near approach of thoſe rewards which compleated all their views and expectations. To which, the defenders of religion have oppoſed this anſwer, That the diſtinction of ſhort and long, in the

* See Divine Legation.

duration

duration of time, is loſt in eternity; and, with the Almighty, *a thouſand years are but as yeſterday*, &c.

But the principle both go upon is falſe; and if what hath been ſaid be duly weighed, it will appear, that the parts of this propheſy which mark a ſpeedy advent do not reſpect God's *ſecond* coming to judgement, but his *firſt*; in the abolition of the Jewiſh policy, and the ESTABLISHMENT of the Chriſtian: that *kingdom of Chriſt*, which commenced on the total ceaſing of the *theocracy*. For as God's reign over the Jews entirely ended with the abolition of the *temple-ſervice*, ſo the reign of *Chriſt*, *in ſpirit and in truth*, had then its firſt beginning.

This was the true ESTABLISHMENT of Chriſtianity, not that effected by the *donations* or *converſions* of *Conſtantine*. Till the Jewiſh Law was aboliſhed, over which the *Father* preſided as King, the reign of the *Son* could not take place; becauſe the ſovereignty of *Chriſt* over mankind, was that very ſovereignty of God over the Jews, *transferred*, and more largely extended.

This therefore being one of the moſt important æras in the œconomy of grace; and the moſt awful revolution in all God's religious diſpenſations; we ſee the elegance and propriety of the terms in queſtion, to denote ſo *great an event*, together with the *deſtruction of Jeruſalem*, by which it was effected: for in the old prophetic language * the change and fall of principalities and powers, whether *ſpiritual* or *civil*, are ſignified by the ſhaking heaven and earth; the darkening the ſun and moon, and the falling of the ſtars; as the riſe and eſtabliſhment of *new ones* are by proceſſions in the clouds of heaven, by the ſound of trumpets, and the aſſembling together of hoſts and congregations †.

Thus much, therefore, being premiſed, we enter directly on our ſubject; it being now ſeen, that the truth of Chriſtianity muſt ſtand or fall with the ruin or the reſtoration of the temple at Je-

* See The Divine Legation, vol II.

† Matt. chap. xxiv.

ruſalem; for if that temple ſhould be rebuilt for the purpoſe of Jewiſh worſhip, Chriſtianity could not ſupport its pretenſions; nor the Prophets, nor Jeſus, the truth of their predictions.

CHAP. II.

THERE was a time when the *powers of this world* were all oppoſed to the progreſs of the *goſpel*; and as they continued thus oppoſed for ſome ages, it would have been a miracle, as rare as moſt of thoſe by which it was ſupported, if, amongſt the various attempts to ſuppreſs and diſcredit it, there had not been a project formed to give the lie to thoſe prophecies which denounced laſting ruin and deſolation to the *Jewiſh Temple*.

The firſt attempt upon Chriſtianity was ſuch as was moſt natural to this *power*, the ſuppreſſing it by brutal force: and the ſubjection of the whole civilized world to the deſpotic will of one blind perſecutor, gave that force its utmoſt moment. The violence of its effort was TEN times repeated; and as often, by the blood of the martyrs, victoriouſly repelled.

Though this may be juſtly reckoned amongſt the marks of its divinity, yet it muſt be owned, that brutal force was not the moſt artful or dangerous way of procuring the ruin even of what they thought it, a mere human contrivance. The utmoſt which force can do (and that it often fails in) is to ſtop the progreſs of a profeſſion: while the ſame advantages of power, employed towards a rational conviction of its falſehood, proceed more fatally to its ſubverſion. But this method of attack required a comprehenſive knowledge of human nature, and of the doctrines to be ſuppreſſed.

Few of the perſecuting emperors had either. M. Antoninus had the one; Julian only, who cloſed the ſcene, had both. Till his time, the ſole engine was ſimple force. Antonine himſelf uſed no other. And yet his knowledge of men might have ſhewn him the folly of ſo unmanly a proceeding. But then he knew no more of Chriſ-

Chriſtianity than the moſt ignorant of his courtiers. Philoſophy, which ſhould have led him to enquire into a religion that all were running eagerly to embrace, was the very thing that reſtrained his curioſity. For Stoical pride (of which ſect he was) would confeſs no need of the knowledge of falſehood to perfect its followers in truth: It deſpiſed the oblique genius of the Academy, which made all truth to depend on the knowledge and detection of falſehood.

Julian was the firſt who got enough acquainted with the Goſpel to apply ſuch arms againſt it as muſt have ended in its ruin, had it been nothing more than what he affected to think it, a human invention. And here we ſhall be forced to confeſs, that Providence ſeems to have raiſed up this extraordinary man on ſet purpoſe to do the laſt honours to the Religion of Jeſus; to ſhew the world what *human power*, with all its advantages united, was able to oppoſe to its eſtabliſhment. For we find in this emperor all the great qualities that a projector could conceive, or an adverſary would require, to ſecure ſucceſs to ſo daring an oppoſition. He was eloquent and liberal; artful, inſinuating, and indefatigable; which, joined to a ſevere temperance, an affected love of juſtice, and a courage ſuperior to all trials, firſt gained him the affections, and, ſoon after, the peaceable poſſeſſion of the whole empire.

He was bred up in the Chriſtian religion from his infancy: and was obliged to profeſs it (or at leaſt to diſguiſe his paſſion * for Paganiſm) to the time he aſſumed the purple. His averſion to his uncle Conſtantine, and his couſin Conſtantius, for the cruelties exerciſed on his family, had prejudiced him againſt the Chriſtian religion: and his attachment to ſome Platonic ſophiſts, who had been employed in his education, gave him as violent a bias towards Paganiſm. He was ambitious; and Paganiſm, in ſome of its Thëurgic rites, had flattered and encouraged his views of the diadem: He was vain, which made him aſpire to the glory of re-eſtab-

* A rudimentis pueritiæ primis inclinatior erat erga numinum cultum, paullatimque adulescens desiderio rei flagrabat. Am. Marc. l. xxii. c. 5.

liſhing the ancient rites: he was extremely knowing, and fond of Grecian literature; the very ſoul of which, in his opinion *, was the old Theology: But above all, notwithſtanding a conſiderable mixture of enthuſiaſm †, his ſuperſtition was exceſſive, and what nothing but the blood of *hecatombs* could appeaſe.

With theſe diſpoſitions he came to the empire; and, conſequently, with a determined purpoſe of ſubverting the Chriſtian, and reſtoring the Pagan worſhip. His predeceſſors had left him the repeated experience of the inefficacy of downright force. The *virtue* of the firſt Chriſtians then rendered this effort fruitleſs; the *numbers* of the *preſent* would have now made it dangerous. He found it neceſſary therefore to change his ground: his knowledge of human nature furniſhed him with arms; and his knowledge of the faith he had abandoned, enabled him to direct thoſe arms to moſt advantage.

He began with re-eſtabliſhing Paganiſm by law ‡, and granting a full liberty of conſcince to the Chriſtians. On this principle, he reſtored thoſe to their civil rights, of what party ſoever, who had been baniſhed on account of religion; and even affected to reconcile, to a mutual forbearance, the various ſects of Chriſtianity. Yet notwithſtanding, his own hiſtorian aſſures us, he put on this maſk of moderation and equity, for no other purpoſe than to inflame the diſſentions in the church §. And his ſubſequent conduct fully juſtifies the hiſtorian's obſervation.

He then fined and baniſhed || ſuch of the more popular clergy as had abuſed their power, either in exciting the people to burn and

* Vid. Ep. Jul. xlii.

† Οὗτος [Ἰουλιανὸς] ὁ ἐν τελεταῖς μυρίαις ὁμιλήσας Δαίμοσιν.—Libanii Or. de ulc. Juliani nece.

‡ Planis abſolutiſque decretis aperiri templa, ariſque hoſtias admoveri ad deorum ſtatuit cultum. Am. Mar. l. xxii. c. 5.

§ Utque diſpoſitorum roboraret effectum, diſſidentes Chriſtianorum antiſtites cum plebe diſciſſa in palatium intromiſſos monebat, ut, civilibus diſcordiis conſopitis, quiſque, nullo vetante, religioni ſuæ ſerviret intrepidus. Quod agebat ideo obſtinate, ut diſſenſiones, augente licentia, non timeret unanimantem poſtea plebem. Idem ib.

‖ Nazian. Orat. i. cont. Jul.

deſtroy

deſtroy pagan temples, or to commit violence on an oppoſite ſect. And it cannot be denied but that their turbulent and inſolent manners deſerved all the ſeverity of his juſtice.

He proceeded to revoke and take away thoſe immunities, honours, and revenues *, which his uncle and couſin had granted to the clergy. Neither was his pretence for this altogether unreaſonable. He judged the grants to be exorbitant; and beſides, as they were attendant on a *national religion*, when the *eſtabliſhment* came to be transferred from Chriſtianity to Paganiſm, he concluded they muſt follow the religion of the ſtate. But there was one immunity he took away, which no good policy, even under an eſtabliſhment, ſhould have granted them; which was an exemption † from the civil *tribunals*.

The Apoſtate went ſtill further; he diſqualified the Chriſtian laity for bearing office in the ſtate: and even this, the ſecurity of the eſtabliſhed religion may often require.

But his moſt illiberal treatment of the Chriſtians, was his forbidding the profeſſors, who were of that religion, to teach *humanity* and the ſciences, in the public ſchools. His more immediate deſign, in this, was to hinder the youth from taking impreſſions to the diſadvantage of Paganiſm: His remoter view, to deprive Chriſtianity of the ſupport of human literature ‡.

Not

* Κληρικὰς μέλλοι, πᾶσαν ἀτέλειαν καὶ τιμὴν καὶ τὰ σιτηρέσια ἀφαιρεῖσθαι Κωνσταντίου [Κωνσταντίνου Val.] Soz. l. v. c. 5.

† Τοῖς βουλευτηρίοις ἀπεδώκει. Soz. l. v. c. 5.

‡ This edict is to be found amongſt the works of Julian; and goes under the name of his xliid epiſtle. It forbids the Chriſtian Profeſſors to *teach* human literature. But becauſe the ancients, ſuch as Gregory Naz. Socrates, Sozomene, Theodoret, and Rufinus, expreſsly ſay, that he forbad Chriſtians to *learn* it; ſome modern critics have embarraſſed themſelves in according this imaginary difference. Baronius and Valeſius, who could not find it was forbidden, by this edict, to *learn*, concluded there was no ſuch prohibition. Tillemont and Fleuri will not allow the fathers to be miſtaken; and therefore imagine there was another edict, which extended the prohibition to the caſe in queſtion. Tillemont ſuppoſes this the more readily, becauſe he thinks the xliid letter is indefinite and obſcure. It appears to me very clear and preciſe; and it ſeems

ſtrange

Not content with this, he endeavoured even to deſtroy what was already written in defence of Chriſtianity. With this view he wrote to Ecdicius the governor of Egypt, and to Porphyry the treaſurer-general, to collect up, and ſend to him the library * of George biſhop of Alexandria, who for his cruelty and tyranny had been torn in pieces by the people.

ſtrange none of theſe critics ſaw, that, as this prohibition is circumſtanced in the edict, the not being allowed to *learn* was the neceſſary conſequence of being forbid to *teach*. For the Profeſſors are not only diſallowed to explain Pagan authors to Pagan auditories, but to Chriſtian likewiſe; as appears from the following words, *But if they* [the Chriſtian profeſſors] *think theſe authors give a falſe and unworthy account of the tremendous majeſty of the immortals, let them go and explain Matthew and Luke in the churches of the Galileans.* εἰ δὲ εἰς τὰς τιμιωλάτας ὑπολαμβάνουσι πεπλανῆσθαι, βαδιζόντων εἰς τὰς τῶν Γαλιλαίων ἐκκλησίας, ἐξηγησόμενοι Ματθαῖον καὶ Λουκᾶν. But why was this ſaid, if they were at liberty to teach the Chriſtian youth the ſciences? If they were not, Where could they go for inſtruction but to the ſchools of the Pagan Profeſſors? Hither, indeed, they are invited by the edict itſelf. *Thoſe of the* [Chriſtian] *youth* (ſays Julian) *who are deſirous of frequenting* [the ſchools of the Pagan profeſſors] *are by no means to be excluded.* Ὁ βουλόμενος τῶν νέων φοιτᾶν, οὐκ ἀποκέκλεισται. This was kind: but would by no means be accepted. Here the bait was half off the hook; and diſcovered, that to draw them thither was one end of the edict: which he imagined would neceſſarily reduce things to this ſtate, either to diſpoſe the Galileans, during their youth, in favour of Paganiſm; or to diſable them, in their adult age, to defend Chriſtianity. So that it appears, from hence, his forbidding Chriſtian profeſſors to *explain* Pagan writers to any audience whatſoever, fully amounted to a prohibition of *learning* them. The Fathers, we ſee, did not ſcruple directly to affirm it. And that they believed it, appears from their finding no other way of avoiding the dilemma of *corruption*, or *ignorance*, than by compoſing Epic poems, tragedies, and other claſſic compoſitions upon a Chriſtian plan, and on ſubjects taken from ſacred ſtory. This circumſtance (had Baronius and Valeſius attended to it) was alone ſufficient to ſhew them, that the Fathers have told us no more than what they ſaw and felt, when they ſaid, that Julian forbad them to *learn* human literature, as well as to *teach* it. Let me add, that nothing but this interpretation of his edict can account for the ſevere cenſure which his own hiſtorian, Ammianus Marcellinus, paſſes upon it, in the following words; "illud autem erat inclemens, *obruendum perenni ſilentio*, quod arcebat docere magiſtros "rhetoricos et grammaticos, ritus Chriſtani cultores." Lib. xxii. c. 10.

* Ep. ix. and xxxvi.—πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν φιλόσοφα παρ' αὐτῷ, πολλὰ δὲ ῥητορικὰ, πολλὰ δὲ ἦν καὶ τῆς τῶν δυσσεβῶν Γαλιλαίων διδασκαλίας, ἃ βουλόμην μὲν ἠφανίσθαι πάλη. Ep. ix.

Nay,

Nay, to ſuch a length did his averſion to the name of CHRIST carry him, as to decree, by a public edict, that his followers ſhould be no longer called Chriſtians, but *Galileans* *. Not but there might be a mixture of policy in it too, as knowing the efficacy of a *nick-name* to render a profeſſion ridiculous. However, it is more than probable, ſuperſtition had its ſhare in this unprincely edict. The fanatic Platoniſts, to whom *Julian* had entirely given himſelf up, were much beſotted with the myſterious *power of names*. Theſe having been ſtruck with the wonders performed by the name of *Chriſt*, and finding ſo many difficulties oppoſe themſelves to their maſter's exterminating ſcheme, might well fancy there was a certain *charm* in the word *Chriſtian*, which rendered the religion, ſo denominated, invincible. And this ſeems to be the ground *Gregory Naz.* went upon (if he had any) for ſaying, that the reaſon of this extraordinary law might be, that *Julian* trembled at the name of *Chriſt*, juſt as the *Demons* did, who ſuffered torments as often as they heard it pronounced †.

A man ſo tranſported by a train of the moſt ungoverned paſſions, we may well ſuppoſe, would ſtop at no means, how low and vile ſoever, to carry on his project. His letters afford us an inſtance of one ſo diſhonourable, that no teſtimony but his own could make it credible. Titus, biſhop of Boſtra, and his clergy, in an addreſs preſented to Julian, acquaint him with their care in keeping the flock committed to them (then equal in number to the Pagans) in due obedience to the laws. The return Julian makes for this act of duty, is to acquaint the people of Boſtra, that their biſhop was become their delator; that he had repreſented them as prone to ſedition, and even capable of the laſt exceſſes,

* Γαλιλαίους ἀπὸ Χριστιανῶν ὀνομάσας τε καὶ καλεῖσθαι νομοθετήσας. Greg. Naz. Orat. ii. cont. Jul.

† ἢ φοβούμενός γε τὴν δύναμιν τῆς προσηγορίας, ὥσπερ οἱ δαίμονες. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μεταβαίνων ἐφ' ἕτερον, ὄνομα τῶν ἐκ εἰωθότων, οὐδὲ γνωρίμων. Orat. iii.

Καὶ οἱ μὲν δαίμονες φρίττουσιν εἰς ἔτι καὶ νῦν Χριστὸν καλούμενον, καὶ οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τῆς κακίας ἡμῶν ἐξίτηλος γέγονεν ἡ τοῦ ὀνόματος τούτου δύναμις. Orat. i.

but

but that he and his clergy kept them in order. For this crime therefore, which he calls the taking to himſelf the merit of the people's good behaviour, he adviſes them to expel the biſhop from their city *.

After this, no inſtance of baſeneſs or injuſtice will be thought ſtrange. On pretence that the Arian church of Edeſſa was too rich, and had not uſed the Valentinians with temper, he ſeized on every thing belonging to it, and divided the plunder amongſt his ſoldiers. And, to add the bitterneſs of contumely to his injuſtice, he told them he did it to eaſe them of their burthens, that they might proceed more lightly, and with leſs impediment in their journey to Heaven †.

But Socrates, the hiſtorian, tells us, that he impoſed a tax or tribute, proportioned to every man's circumſtances, on all who would not ſacrifice ‡. This was perſecution in form: and yet he did not ſtop here, but proceeded to ſtill greater extremities.

Though he did not perſecute to death by laws, that being directly contrary to his edicts of toleration, which he had with ſo much oſtentation and frequency repeated; yet he connived at the *fury* of the people, and the *brutality* of the governors of provinces; who, during his ſhort reign, brought many martyrs to the ſtake. For he put ſuch into governments, whoſe inhumanity and blind zeal for their country-ſuperſtitions were moſt diſtinguiſhed. And when the ſuffering churches preſented their complaints to him, he diſmiſſed them with cruel ſcoffs; telling them §, their religion di-

* Ep. lii. Βοστρυοῦς. It is remarkable, that the author of the Characteriſtics, in his third volume of Miſc. Ref. hath given us a tranſlation of this letter, for *a pattern*, as he tells us, *of the humour and genius, of the principle and ſentiments, of this virtuous, gallant, generous, and mild Emperor*, p. 87, & ſeq. 4th ed. It is true, his tranſlation drops the affair of Titus, their biſhop. So that nothing hinders his reader from concluding but that the Emperor might indeed be as *gallant* and *generous* as he is pleaſed to repreſent him.

† Ep. xliii. Ἐκπόλῳ. ‡ Hiſt. Eccl. l. iii. c. 13.

§ Greg. Naz. i. Orat. cont. Jul. Socrat. Eccl. Hiſt. l. iii. c. 14.

rected

rected them to ſuffer without murmuring. So that we have little reaſon to doubt what the ancients * ſay of his declared intention (had he returned victorious from the Perſian war) to ſubject the whole Chriſtian world to the honeſter perſecution of fire and ſword †.

Theſe were the efforts of the Emperor Julian to overturn Chriſtianity. However he took care to avoid the abſurdity of our modern apoſtates, who are for aboliſhing the faith in which, like him, they have been bred, without ſubſtituting any other religion in its ſtead. Julian's attempts to deſtroy Chriſtianity did not precede, but went hand in hand with his projects to ſupport and reform Paganiſm.

He wrote and he *preached* in perſon, in defence of Gentile ſuperſtition: and has himſelf acquainted us with the ill ſucceſs of his miniſtry ‡. Of his controverſial writings, his anſwerer Cyril hath given us a large ſpecimen; by which we ſee he was equally intent to recommend Paganiſm and to diſcredit Revelation.

His reformation of Gentile ſuperſtition turned upon theſe points, 1. To hide the abſurdity of its traditions by moral and philoſophic

* Greg. Naz. ii. Orat. contr. Jul. Ruff. Eccl. Hiſt. l. i. c. 36. How well all this agrees with what the author of the Characteriſtics ſays of Julian, in the following words, I leave the admirers of that noble writer to determine: [Julian] *was a great reſtrainer of perſecution, and would allow of nothing farther than a reſumption of church-lands and publick ſchools; without any attempt on the goods or perſons, even of thoſe who branded the ſtate religion, and made a merit of affronting the public worſhip.* Vol. I. p. 25, 4th edit.

† What his creature and confident Libanius tells us, as part of his panegyric, makes this account of the Chriſtian writers very credible. He ſays that Julian took up arms againſt Conſtantius, to reſtore the Pagan religion: Οὗτος ὁ ὑπὲρ τῶν ὑβρισμένων ἱερῶν στασάξας μὲν ἕως τοῦτ' ἐξῆν μόνον, ὅπλων δὲ ἁψάμενος, ἐπειδὴ καιρὸς παρῆν. De Ulcif. Juliani nec.

‡ — εἰς τὴν Βέῤῥοιαν ἐπορευόμην—Διελέχθην δὲ ὀλίγα τῇ βουλῇ περὶ θεοσεβείας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς λόγους ἐπῄνων μὲν ἅπαντες. ἐπείθησαν δὲ αὐτοῖς ὀλίγοι πάνυ, καὶ ἔστι οἳ καὶ πρὸ τῶν ἐμῶν λόγων ἐδόκουν ἴσχειν ὑγιῶς ἱλάσκοντο δὲ ὥσπερ παῤῥησίας ἀπολῄψασθαι τὴν αἰδῶ καὶ ἀποθέσθαι. Ep. xxvii. Libanio sophistæ.

allegories *. Theſe he found provided to his hands, principally, by philoſophers of his own ſect, the Platoniſts. Who, not without the aſſiſtance of the other ſects of Theiſts, had, ever ſince the appearance of Chriſtianity, been refining the theology of Paganiſm, to oppoſe it to that of Revelation; under pretence, that their new-invented allegories were the ancient *ſpirit* of the *letter*, which the firſt poetical divines had conveyed down, in this involope, to poſterity. A noble deſign! of which ſome *letters*, lately publiſhed, *concerning mythology*, will give the reader a very tolerable idea.

2. He then attempted to correct the morals of the Pagan prieſthood, and regulate their manners on the practice of the firſt Chriſtians. In his epiſtle to Arſacius, he not only requires of them a perſonal behaviour void of offence; but that they reform their houſhold on the ſame principle: He directs that they who attend at the altar ſhould abſtain from the theatre, the tavern, and the exerciſe of all ignoble profeſſions: that in their private character they be meek and humble; but that, in the acts and offices of religion, they aſſume a character conformable to the majeſty of the immortal Gods, whoſe miniſters they are. But above all he recommends to them the virtues of charity and benevolence †.

With regard to diſcipline and religious policy, Nazianzene and Sozomene tell us, he had planned an eſtabliſhment for readers in divinity; for the order and parts of the divine offices; for a regular and formal ſervice, with days and hours of worſhip; that he had decreed to found hoſpitals for the poor, monaſteries for the devout, and to preſcribe and enjoin initiatory and expiatory rites, with a courſe of inſtruction for converts, and of penance for offenders; and in all things to imitate the church diſcipline of that time ‡.

* See his diſcourſe compoſed in honour of the *Mother of the Gods*.

† Ep. xlix. Ἀρσακίῳ ἀρχιερεῖ Γαλατίας. Fragmentum Orationis Epiſtolæ.

‡ Greg. Naz. i. Orat. cont. Jul. Sozom. l. v. c. 16.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

BUT the indifference and corruptions of Paganiſm, joined to the inflexibility and perſeverance of the Chriſtians, kept his project from advancing with that ſpeed which his malice as well as zeal demanded. So that, impatient of delay, he ſtruck out a new and daring project to alter the whole face of things at once. With this view he planned the famous ſcheme of rebuilding the TEMPLE OF JERUSALEM. Its final deſtruction had been foretold both by Jeſus and the Prophets: and it was, as he imagined, reſerved for this favorite of the Gods *, to give the lye to their predictions.

He had before (in purſuance of his general ſcheme of oppoſing Revelation to itſelf, by ſetting one ſect againſt another) written to the body or community of the Jews †, in which he aſſured them of his protection; his concern for their former ill uſage; and his fixed purpoſe to ſcreen them from future oppreſſion, that they might be at liberty, and in a diſpoſition to redouble their

* His confident, Libanius, compliments him on his cloſe communion with the Gods, and on the familiar intercourſe with which they honoured him. This he ſpeaks of as a peculiar favour, as indeed it was, both to *hear* and *ſee* them.—Καὶ μόνος σὺ τὰς ἐκείνων ἐώρακας μορφὰς εὐδαίμων εὐδαιμόνων θεωρὸς, καὶ μόνῳ σοὶ φωνῆς θεῶν ὑπῆρξεν ἀκῦσαι. Legat. ad Julian. This was doubtleſs at an *initiation*; for Libanius informs us, in another place quoted above, that Julian had been joined in communion with Demons in all the *myſteries*. Of one of theſe initiations, Gregory, in his firſt oration againſt Julian, tells a remarkable ſtory; that as he deſcended into the initiating cave, he was terrified with the viſions that paſſed before him [ſee the account of the *myſteries* in the Div. Leg.], which, on his making the ſign of the croſs, fled and diſappeared. I think this not incredible; for the ſign of the croſs was then the common ſecurity againſt all ſudden and unuſual terrors; and whatever the Demons did, the prieſts certainly did not like it. How they turned this farce to their advantage, in the preſent caſe, may be ſeen in Gregory.

† Ἰουδαίων τῷ κοινῷ.

vows for the proſperity of his reign. And concluded with a promiſe, that, if he came back victorious from the Perſian war, he would rebuild Jeruſalem, reſtore them to their poſſeſſions, live with them in the holy city, and join with them in their worſhip of the great God of the univerſe *.

So that, after this, a propoſal of beginning with the Temple, we may well think, would be eagerly embraced by them. Till this was rebuilt, their religion, as we have ſeen, was in a ſtate of inanition; ſacrifices, which were eſſential to it, being forbidden to be offered in any other place. Hence the Jews had attempted, more than once, to reſtore it, in defiance of the power to which they were ſubject; firſt, in the reign of Adrian, and afterwards, under that of Conſtantine †: but reaſons of ſtate defeated the former attempt; and reaſons of religion, the latter. Adrian regarded and puniſhed it as a rebellion; Conſtantine, as an impiety. They were now invited, as *good ſubjects* and faithful *worſhippers of the true God*, to ſecond the Emperor's deſign in reſtoring them to their city and religion.

But here if any one ſhould aſk, how it appears that Julian had the purpoſe we accuſe him of? we ſhall refer him to the whole plan of Julian's conduct for an anſwer. For men's purpoſes are beſt declared by their actions. He had formed a deſign to ruin Chriſtianity. He had played off the round of his machines to no purpoſe; and was got, by due degrees, to this; the only battery that was left untried. He had ſtrove in vain to weaken its *influence*; he would now, as his laſt effort, attack its *pretenſions*: and his knowledge of the *two* religions enabled him to chuſe his ground to advantage. This is the utmoſt evidence the caſe will afford. For ſure no man can be ſo abſurd to imagine, that Julian (ſuppoſing this to be his

* Καλιυθῦναι τὴν βασιλεῖαν ἐπὶ τὰ κάλλιςα, καθάπερ προαιρέμεθα, ὅπερ χρὴ ποιεῖν ἡμᾶς, ἵνα κἀγὼ τὸν τῶν Περσῶν πόλεμον διορθωσάμενος, τὴν ἐκ πολλῶν ἐτῶν ἐπιθυμουμένην παρ' ὑμῖν ἰδεῖν οἰκουμένην πόλιν ἁγίαν Ἱερουσαλὴμ, ἐμοῖς καμάτοις ἀνοικοδομήσας οἰκήσω, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ δόξαν δώσα μετ' ὑμῶν τῷ κρείττονι. Ep. xxv.

† Chryſoſt. adverſ. Judæos, paſſim.

intention)

intention) would proclaim his purpoſe by edict, or, what was the ſame thing, would tell it at court, till he had ſeen the iſſue of the event: though had that proved fortunate, we cannot doubt but the Imperial Sophiſt would have deſcanted on his triumph over the Galilæan, in all the forms of the chancery, and in all the modes of the ſchools. But as his project was ſo effectually diſgraced, it would be ſtill more abſurd to expect, that either he, or any of his band of ſophiſts, ſhould be forward to divulge the ſecret to the world. Indeed, their ſhyneſs in mentioning the *diſaſter at Jeruſalem*, when their ſubject requires it, and the affected diſguiſe they throw over it, when they cannot avoid it, are, to me, the ſtrongeſt proofs of ſome conſcious guilt, or ſevere mortification.

But the Chriſtians of that time ſaw no cauſe to defer accuſing Julian of this *purpoſe*, till he himſelf ſhould think fit to confeſs it; and, therefore, with one voice, they proclaim it, and charge it on him without ſcruple or heſitation. And the church was too attentive to his motions to be the dupe of his profeſſions, in any thing that concerned religion. The RUINED TEMPLE was the trophy of Chriſt's victory over his enemies; ſo that a project to reſtore it, could not but give them the alarm. They collected, as we do now (but with far better opportunities of ſo doing), what was Julian's *real purpoſe*, from his general character, and his particular behaviour towards them. Nor is it unlikely but they might get further intelligence from ſomething dropt by his confidents, the Sophiſts, a people vain and talkative, and at no time renowned for ſecrecy.

Thus much is certain, that the Chriſtian writers are unanimous in what they ſay of Julian's motive: and ſeem to be ſo well aſſured of its not being brought in queſtion, that they generally content themſelves with calling it indefinitely, *a pernicious project, deſtructive of Chriſtianity* *. But Sozomene goes further, and aſſures us,

* Τίλος ἐπαφῆκε κὴ τὸ Ἰουδαίων φῦλον ἡμῖν—Καὶ ἀποκρυπτόμενος εὐνοίας πλάσμασι τὴν ἐπιβουλὴν — Greg. Naz.—Καὶ κατ' ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ὁ βασιλεὺς τὸς Χριστιανὸς βλάπτειν σπουδάζων—Socr. Διπλῆν

us, that not only Julian, but all the Gentiles, who aſſiſted in it, puſhed it forward upon that very motive; and for the ſake of *that*, ſuſpended their averſion to the Jewiſh nation *. For an averſion they always had, and that, no ſmall one, if we may credit the beſt Pagan writers themſelves.

However this is not to be forgotten, that let Julian's motive be what it would, as the ſucceſsful execution of his deſign muſt have impeached the veracity of the prophecies, there was a *neceſſity* for ſome interpoſition to defeat it.

But, beſides the principal purpoſe of utterly diſcrediting the Chriſtian name, there were other auxiliary motives to puſh Julian on to a ſpeedy execution. He liked the Jews for their bloody ſacrifices, to which he himſelf was extravagantly given; he liked them better for their implacable hatred to the Chriſtians, in which he far outwent them; and he ſoothed his family revenge, in favouring thoſe whom Conſtantine had perſecuted, and perſecuted for this very attempt. To which we may add that which Marcellinus aſſigns as his principal motive, the glory of atchieving ſo bold an enterprize †.

But Julian, who aimed at higher matters than obtaining the good-will of the Jews, would not intruſt ſo important a deſign to their inclinations or abilities. He aſſumed the care of it himſelf; and carried on the project (as far as it was carried) under the Imperial authority. He aſſigned for this purpoſe immenſe ſums out of the public treaſury. The ſuperintendancy of it he committed

καὶ κατὰ τὴς εὐσεβείας—Καὶ τὲς Ἰουδαίους καθώπλισι κατὰ τῶν εἰς Χριςὸν πεπιςευκότων—Theodor.—Ὅτι προσάξας φησὶ Ἰουλιανὸς τὰ Ἱεροσόλυμα ἀνοικοδομεῖσθαι, ὡς ἂν τὰς περὶ αὐτῶν δισπολικὰς προῤῥήσεις ἀκύρως ἐλέγξῃ. Philoſt. apud Photium.

* Πάνλα δὲ τὰ ἄλλα δεύτερα ἦν τῷ πονεμένῳ, βασιλεῖ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι, καὶ πᾶσιν Ἰουδαίοις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὅτε Ἰουδαίοις εὐνοῦλες, ἐκοινώνεν αὐτοῖς τῆς σπουδῆς, ὑπολαβόνλες δύνασθαι καλορθῶν τὸ ἐγχείρημα, καὶ ψευδεῖς ἀπελέγξαι τῷ Χριςῷ τὰς προῤῥήσεις. Sozom.

† Imperii ſui memoriam magnitudine operum geſtiens propagare. Am. Marc. l. iii. c. 1.

to

to his boſom friend, Alypius * ; to whom he joined, for his aſſiſtant, the governor of the province. Alypius was one who had been much obliged by Julian †, and for this reaſon, as is the nature of princes, was as much beloved by him: but their ſtrongeſt tye was an equal malice, and congenial averſion to the Chriſtian name; qualities, doubtleſs, for which Alypius was preferred to that employment. This man, in conjunction with the Jews, and under the ſanction of the Imperial authority, entered upon the buſineſs. They laid in immenſe quantities of materials; they aſſembled vaſt numbers of workmen; the Jews, of both ſexes, and of all degrees, bore a ſhare in the labour: they entered upon the ruins, cleared away the rubbiſh, and opened the old foundations.

An account of this attempt (to wave the teſtimony of Chriſtian authors) is tranſmitted to us by a contemporary writer, of noble extraction, a friend and admirer of Julian, and his companion in arms; a man of affairs, a lover of truth, learned, candid, and impartial; qualities which rendered him the beſt hiſtorian of his time; who, although neither ignorant of the doctrines, nor bigotted againſt the followers of our faith, yet was ſtrongly attached to the ſuperſtition of his anceſtors, and, in one word, a Pagan profeſſed and declared ‡.

So

* The xxixth and xxxth epiſtles of Julian are written to him, in the latter of which he calls him, Ἀδελφὲ σεβεσιώτατε καὶ φιλικώτατε.

† See the xxixth Epiſtle.

‡ As there have been critics abſurd enough to ſuſpect that Ammianus Marcellinus might be a Chriſtian; it may be juſt worth while to quote a paſſage of the celebrated Hadrian Valeſius, who, in few words, has well expoſed this groundleſs conceit. "Petrus "Pithœus ad latus Ammiani ſui manu ſua notavit, eum Chriſtianum fuiſſe, propterea "quod in libro xxvii. ſcripſit, *Antiſtites quoſdam provinciales*, id eſt, epiſcopos Chriſtia- "norum, parco victu, vili veſte, & demiſſis oculis, *perpetuo numini veriſque ejus cultoribus* "*ut parcos commendari & verecundos.* An ideo Ammianus Chriſtianus habendus eſt, quòd "Deum Chriſtianorum *perpetuum numen*, id eſt, Deum æternum, & Chriſtianos *Antiſtites* "*veros perpetui numinis cultores appellat?* Quaſi non *veros perpetui numinis cultores* Ammianus "vocaverat Gentiles ipſos ac ſui ſimiles, quibus quidam etiam Chriſtianorum epiſcopi

"in.

So much then the moſt ſceptical reader muſt be forced to grant. To doubt of this, would be ſubverting the very foundations of human credit; and it might as well be queſtioned whether Cæſar was aſſaulted in the ſenate, as whether Julian *attempted* to rebuild the Temple of Jeruſalem.

What

" in provinciis ſanctitate vitæ & verecundia commendarentur ac placerent. Ita tamen " de Ammiano ſenſit & Claudius Chiffletius, cum verbis ejus ſupra laudatis, tum aliis " leviſſimis conjecturis adductus. Sed qui attente legerit, quæ præter cætera in fine " libri xiv de Adraſti vel Nemeſi, quæ in libro xvi de Mercurio, quæ in libro xxi de " numine Themidis, de Haruſpicina, de Auguriis, variiſque artibus futura prænoſcendi, " veteres theologos ſuos, & phyſicos, ac myſticos ſecutus ſcripſit: profectò fateri coge- " tur, eum cultui Deum addictum ac devotum fuiſſe. Certè de diis gentium tanquam " de ſuis ſemper loquitur; de Chriſtianis ſacris myſteriiſque non item. Nunquam Chriſ- " tianis ſe adjungit; nunquam & nuſquam eorum ſe numero adſcribit; & Julianum A. " quem ſuum heroa fecit, hanc præcipuè ob cauſam mihi videtur toties & tantopere " laudare, quod à religione Chriſtiana ad numinum cultum deſciverit. Quâ tamen erat " prudentiâ, adeo modeſtè atque ſincerè, ac nonnumquam etiam benevolè de Chriſtianis " rebus commemorat, ut aliqui unum ex noſtris putaverint. Nimirum, ſicuti exiſtimo, " vir bonus, integer & ſapiens religionem Chriſtianam non ſequi, tuto ſe poſſe intellige- " bat: eandem principibus ſuis acceptam & toto ferè orbe Romano diffuſam palam dam- " nare non audebat, ſed & forſitan religionum diverſitates non improbavit, perſuaſumque " habuit (ſicut ait De notitia Dei Symmachus) unâ viâ non poſſe pervenire ad tam grande " ſecretum." Præf. in poſter. Am. Marc. editionem. To theſe a thouſand other proofs might be added. I ſhall content myſelf, at preſent, with one, taken from thoſe very words which Chifflet has given as the ſtrongeſt evidence of his Chriſtianity, where, ſpeaking of Conſtantius, he ſays, " Chriſtianam religionem abſolutam & ſimplicem anili " ſuperſtitione confundens; in qua ſcrutanda perplexius quam componenda gravius, ex- " citavit diſcidia plurima; quæ progreſſa fuſiùs aluit concertatione verborum." Lib. xxi. cap. 16. By theſe *words* (as the critics obſerve) are doubtleſs meant thoſe two famous party badges, the ὁμοούσιον and ὁμοιούσιον. Now it ſeems odd, the hiſtorian ſhould characterize a temper of mind, ariſing from a diſpute of this kind (which has rather the appearance of a *philoſophic* than a *popular* bigotry) by the name of *anilis ſuperſtitio*. On a ſuppoſition, that the cenſurer was a Chriſtian, it appears very odd: but conſider him as a Pagan, and nothing is more natural: He muſt then ſee this queſtion, concerning the *Son* of God, in the ſame light he did what their *mythology* taught concerning the paternity and filiation of their gods; which the learned amongſt them ranked in the firſt claſs of their *aniles ſuperſtitiones*. It is true, Ammianus thought more reverently

of

What now was the condition of the church at this juncture! and how were the fears of the good people alarmed! It had long combated, and at length triumphed over, the prejudices of the people, the arts of the philoſophers, and the violence of civil power. It had bent the obſtinacy of ſuperſtition by the ſuperior force of miracles: it had confounded the meretricious confidence of Grecian Sophiſtry, by the ſimple majeſty of Truth; and had wearied out the rage of tyranny, by conſtancy and contempt of ſuffering. But it was now ſummoned to a ſeverer trial, and puſhed upon the very criſis of its fate. Its enemies, ſupported by the whole power of the empire, had brought a deciſive ſcheme to its projection; a ſcheme that was

of the *Chriſtian martyrs* than the famous philoſophic emperor had formerly done (who called their virtue a *mere brutiſh obſtinacy*, ψιλὴ παράταξις, Lib. xi. § 3.) for he ſays of them,—"Qui deviare a religione compulſi, pertulere cruciabiles pœnas, aduſque glorio-"ſam mortem intemerata fide ptogreſſi nunc Martyres appellantur." Lib. xxii. cap. 11. But Antoninus was entirely ignorant of the Chriſtian religion: We have ſhewn above what kept him from the knowledge of it. The hiſtorian knew it well, as appears from the character he gives it, of *abſoluta & ſimplex*; and the dying in defence of ſuch a religion could not but be, in his opinion, *mors glorioſa:* he being, as appears throughout his hiſtory, a *religious Theiſt*, and untainted with the *Naturaliſm* of *Tacitus*; for Chriſtianity had produced this good effect in the quarter of its enemies, that it had entirely diſcredited the ſchools of Strato and Epicurus, as Julian himſelf informs us. Ammianus, then, was Pagan, if his religion may be gathered from the reflections he makes upon his facts. It is true, this way of reaſoning cannot be ſafely applied to any but to an original Writer of Hiſtory. Compilers and Abbreviators of other men's works are not ſuppoſed to have any ſenſe of their own; they take their colours, like the Camelion, from the various matter on which they feed; and, with the facts, often epitomize the ſentiments of their originals. George Elmacine, an Eaſtern Chriſtian, whoſe chronicle of the Saracens is tranſlated from the Arabic by Erpenius into Latin, and by Vattier into French, is ſo regularly changeable in this reſpect, that Vattier very juſtly ſays of him, "Quand il parle de quelque choſe concernant la religion de Mahomet, on diroit "qu'il eſt Mahometan: Quand il parle des Catholiques, qu'il eſt Catholique: Quand il "parle des Jacobites, de meſme." The tranſlator's reflection upon it is extraordinary, "Grand perfection, à mon advis, pour un hiſtorien: pour un hiſtorien Chreſtien, je "n'en parle point." Every one ſees the ridicule. However the maxim he had in view is a good one, *That the hiſtorian ſhould not appear to be of any ſect or party*. But this is very different from being of *all* in their turns.

to reflect eternal dishonour upon the *Oracles of Truth*. The credit of God's servants, the authority of his word, and the very pretensions of revelation, were all vitally interested in the event. The long struggle between Superstition and Religion was now to be finally decided. The God of the Christians was publicly challenged: his power was defied to protect his Dispensation against this impending stroke. Destitute of all human aid, their only reliance was on heaven. And no *believer*, but must conclude, that God would indeed interpose to vindicate the character of his son: no *man*, but must confess, that to support a Religion like this, was an occasion worthy the interposition of the Lord of all things.

Well, the impious attack was made; and the expected protection afforded *. The same great and impartial historian, who acquaints us with the attempt, informs us likewise of the defeat of it. His account is in these words: "Julian (having been already thrice "consul) taking Sallust, prefect of the several Gauls, for his col-"league, entered a fourth time on this high magistracy. It appeared "strange to see a private man associated with Augustus: a thing, "which, since the consulate of Diocletian and Aristobulus, history "afforded no example of. And although his sensibility of the many "and great events, which this year was likely to produce, made "him very anxious for the future, yet he both pushed on the "various and complicated preparatives for this expedition with the "utmost application, and, having an eye in every quarter, and "being desirous to eternize his reign by the greatness of his at-"chievements, he projected to rebuild, at an immense expense, the "proud and magnificent temple of Jerusalem; which (after many "combats, attended with much bloodshed on both sides, during "the siege by Vespasian) was, with great difficulty, taken and de-"stroyed by Titus. He committed the conduct of this affair to

* τότε δὴ Κύριλλος ὁ τῶν Ἱεροσολύμων Ἐπίσκοπος, τὸ τοῦ Προφήτου Δανιὴλ καλὰ νῦν ἐλάμβανεν, ὅπερ καὶ ὁ Χριστὸς ἐν τοῖς ἁγίοις Εὐαγγελίοις ἐπισφραγίσαιτο, πολλοῖς τε προείλεγεν, ὡς ἄρα νῦν ἥκει ὁ καιρὸς, ὅτε λίθος ἐπὶ λίθον οὐκ ἂν μείνοι εἰς τὸν ναὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ Σωτῆρος λόγιον πληρωθήσεται. Socrat. Hist. Eccl. lib. iii. cap. 20.

"Alypius

" ALYPIUS of Antioch, who formerly had been lieutenant in Bri-
" tain. When, therefore, this Alypius had ſet himſelf to the
" vigorous execution of his charge, in which he had all the aſſiſ-
" tance that the governor of the province could afford him, hor-
" rible balls of fire, breaking out near the foundations, with fre-
" quent and reiterated attacks, rendered the place, from time to
" time, inacceſſible to the ſcorched and blaſted workmen; and the
" victorious element continuing, in this manner, obſtinately and
" reſolutely bent, as it were, to drive them to a diſtance, Alypius
" thought beſt to give over the enterprize *."

Thus did the vigilance of Providence not only vindicate the honour of our holy faith in the open view of all men, but, in its goodneſs, ſecured the *memory* of this impious attempt by the teſtimony of the moſt unexceptionable witneſs. For were infidelity itſelf, when it would evade the force of evidence, to preſcribe what qualities it expected in a faultleſs teſtimony, it could invent none but what might be found in the hiſtorian here produced. He was a Pagan, and ſo not prejudiced in favour of Chriſtianity: He was a dependent, a follower, and a profound admirer of Julian, and ſo not inclined to report any thing to his diſhonour: He was a lover of truth, and ſo would not relate what he knew, or but ſuſpected, to be falſe: He had great ſenſe, improved by the ſtudy of philoſo-

* Julianus jam ter conſul adſcito in collegium trabeæ Salluſtio, præfecto per Gallias, quater ipſe ampliſſimum inierat magiſtratum: & videbatur novum, adjunctum eſſe Auguſto privatum, quod poſt Diocleſianum & Ariſtobulum nullus meminerat geſtum. Et licet accidentium varietatem ſollicita mente præcipiens, multiplicatos expeditionis apparatus flagranti ſtudio perurgeret: diligentiam tamen ubique dividens, imperiique ſui memoriam magnitudine operum geſtiens propagare, ambitioſum quondam apud Hieroſolymam templum, quod poſt multa & interneciva certamina, obſidente Veſpaſiano poſteaque Tito, ægre eſt expugnatum, inſtaurare ſumptibus cogitabat immodicis: negotiumque maturandum Alypio dederat Antiochenſi, qui olim Britannias curaverat pro præfectis. Cum itaque rei idem fortiter inſtaret Alypius, juvaretque provinciæ Rector, metuendi globi flammarum prope fundamenta crebris aſſultibus erumpentes, fecere locum exuſtis aliquoties operantibus inacceſſum: hocque modo elemento deſtinatius repellente, ceſſavit inceptum. Amm. Marc. lib. xxiii. cap. 1.

phy and knowledge of the world, and ſo would not eaſily ſuffer himſelf to be deceived: he was not only contemporary to the fact; but, at the time it happened, reſident near the place: He recorded the event not on its firſt report, when, in the relation of journalary occurrences, much falſhood blends itſelf with truth; but after time and enquiry, which ſeparates this impure mixture, had confirmed what really happened: He related it not as an uncertain report or hearſay, with diffidence; but as a notorious fact, at that time, no more queſtioned in Aſia, than the project and ſucceſs of the Perſian expedition: He inſerted it not for any partial purpoſe in ſupport or confutation of any ſyſtem; in defence or diſcredit of any character: he delivered it in no curſory or tranſient manner, nor in a looſe or private memoir; but gravely and deliberately, as the natural and neceſſary part of a compoſition the moſt uſeful and important, a general hiſtory of the empire; on the complete performance of which the author was ſo intent, that he exchanged a court life, for one of ſtudy and contemplation; and choſe Rome, the great repoſitory of the proper materials, for the place of his retirement.

CHAP. IV.

BUT the evidence given by the adverſaries of our faith to the truth of this illuſtrious miracle does not reſt upon a ſingle witneſs: I propoſe to ſhew, that Libanius, the friend and favourite of Julian and even JULIAN himſelf, whoſe impiety brought this diſgrace upon Paganiſm, have both confeſſed the hand by which he was *overcome*; though with that obſcurity, and confuſion of tongue, which always attends the graceleſs ſhame of impenitent offenders.

And I ſhall be the fuller in weighing the value of their teſtimony, as it hath hitherto, I think, been entirely overlooked, and, by reaſon of an affected diſguiſe, paſſed the critics unobſerved.

Libanius,

Libanius, in the *Hiſtory of his own Life*, ſpeaking of the fate of Julian, ſays, "The Perſians, indeed, were informed by a deſerter, "of the ſtate to which fortune had now reduced our affairs: but "not a ſingle man * amongſt us at Antioch, knew any thing of "the matter. It is true, the calamity ſeemed to have been foretold "by certain *earthquakes in Paleſtine*, which overthrew ſome cities, "and damaged others. For it appeared to us, as if God had pre-"ſignified ſome great event by theſe diſaſters: and, while we were "making our vows for averting the evil we apprehended, came a "meſſenger, &c †." Again, in his *funeral oration on Julian's death*, he ſays, "The temple of Apollo conſumed by fire, preſaged this "misfortune—as did thoſe *earthquakes* which ſhook all the land, "the meſſengers, as it were, of the following diſorders and con-"fuſion ‡." It can admit no doubt but that the *earthquakes* ſpoken of in both paſſages, and ſaid to have happened *before* the death of Julian, are the ſame. The *firſt* ſays they were in Paleſtine; the *ſecond* fixes them to the time of burning the *temple at Daphne*: all which laid together brings us directly to the *earthquake at Jeruſalem*. And though, either out of malice, imperfect information, or wrong conception of what he heard, he leſſens the event by the omiſſion of one circumſtance, and aggravates it by the invention of others, yet the characteriſtic marks of *time* and *place*, which he has left to it, prevent his putting the change upon us, if that was

* Ἀνθρώπων μὲν ἀδεὶς—The words are remarkable, and, I ſuſpect, *emphatical*. It looks as if he uſed them to diſcredit a common report then in the mouths of the people, and which hath ſince figured in eccleſiaſtical hiſtory, to this effect, "That Libanius, about this time, meeting a certain ſchoolmaſter in Antioch, aſked him, in deriſion, What the carpenter's ſon was doing? To which the other replied, Making a coffin for your hero."

† Τῷ μὲν δὴ Πέρσῃ, παρ' αὐτομόλου τινὸς μαθεῖν ὑπῆρξεν, ἐν ὅτῳ εἴη τύχης· ἡμῖν δὲ τοῖς Ἀντιοχεῦσιν, ἀνθρώπων μὲν ἀδείς. Σεισμοὶ δὲ ἐγίγνοντο τῷ κακῷ μήνυμα, πόλεων τῶν ἐν τῇ Παλαιστίνῃ [Παλαιστίνῃ] Συρίᾳ, τῶν μὲν μέρη· τὰς δὲ ὅλας καταπεσόντες. ἐδόκει γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ Θεὸς, μεγάλοις πάθεσι, μέγα σημαίνειν. εὐχομένων δὲ μὴ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν, σμικρὸν, &c.

‡ Τοῦτο ἦν νεὼς Ἀπόλλωνος πυρὶ δαπανώμενος—τοῦτο σεισμοὶ γῆν πᾶσαν δονοῦντες μελλούσης ἄγγελοι ταραχῆς τε καὶ ἀκοσμίας.

his

his intention, as it ſeems to have been, if we reflect, that the circumſtance of *deſtroying cities*, and *ſhaking the whole empire*, belong to an earthquake which happened about a year and half after Julian's death *, and of which he was well appriſed, as appears by his *oration to avenge the death of Julian*, addreſſed to Theodoſius: in which he tells the emperor, the Gods were angry that Julian's death had not been hitherto avenged: and had given evident marks of their diſpleaſure by the frequent ſlaughters of the Roman people; and a dreadful earthquake, which ſhook both *land* and *ſea* †. Hitherto Libanius, notwithſtanding the diſguiſements taken notice of above, hath reaſonably well diſtinguiſhed theſe two different earthquakes, the one in Paleſtine, and the other over all the Roman empire; by expreſſly affirming, that the firſt happened *before* the death of Julian; and the ſecond, ſome time *after*. Yet, in another place, in his *oration on the death of Julian*, he ſeems totally to have confounded them with one another ‡.

But the careleſſneſs or the perverſity of the writers of theſe times, whether Chriſtians or Pagans, is equally to be lamented. We have obſerved the arts Libanius employs to hide the *earthquake at Jeruſalem*, and ſeen with what pomp he aſcribes the diſaſter occaſioned by *that*, which happened under the firſt conſulate of Valentinian and his brother, to the anger of the gods for the unavenged murder of Julian. On which account, I ſuppoſe, it is, that Sozomene affirms, that this earthquake happened in the time of Julian §,

* Kal. Aug. conſule Valentiniano primum cum fratre horrendi terrores per omnem orbis ambitum graſſati ſunt ſubiti.—concutitur omnis terreni STABILITAS ponderis, MAREque diſpulſum retro fluctibus evolutis abſceſſit.—innumera quædam in civitatibus & ubi reperta ſunt ædificia complanarunt.—Am. Marc. l. xxvi. c. 10.

† Ὁ πολὺς δὲ φόνος ὅτε τῇδε, ὅτε ἐν Ῥώμῃ, Δαιμόνων ὀργὴν μηνύει, δι' ἣν οἱ μὲν ἀπέθνησκον, οἱ δὲ ἔμελλον. ὁ φόβος ΓΗΝ τε ἴσεισε καὶ ΘΑΛΑΤΤΑΝ. c. 10.

‡ Ἡ μέν γε γῆ, καλῶς τε ἠσθεῖτο τῶν πάθους—ἀπωσεισαμένη, καθάπερ ἵππος ἀναβάτην, πόλεις τόσας καὶ τόσας· ἐν Παλαιστίνῃ πολλὰς τὰς Λιβύων ἁπάσας, &c.

§ Ἀμέλειαι παρὰ πάντα τὸν χρόνον ταυτησὶ τῆς βασιλείας ἀγανακτῶν ὁ θεὸς ἐφαίνετο—τῆς τε γὰρ γῆς συνεχῶς ὑποχαλεπωτάτων σεισμῶν τινασσομένης—συμβάλλω δὲ ἐξ ὧν ἐπυθόμην, ἢ βασιλεύοντι αὐτῷ ἢ κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον σχῆμα τῆς βασιλείας ὄντι καὶ τὸ συμβὰν τοῖς πρὸς Αἴγυπτον Ἀλεξανδρεῦσι γέγονε πάθος, &c. Lib. vi. c. 2.

and

and makes it one of the marks of God's diſpleaſure at his apoſtaſy. So again becauſe Libanius had with exceſſive impudence accuſed the Chriſtians of the death of Julian, Gregory Naz. to be even with him, charges Julian with the murder of Conſtantius. Each, I dare ſay, with equal juſtice; both, I am well ſatisfied, with the ſame ſpirit.

I come now to the teſtimony of Julian. His letter to the *community of the Jews* has been already mentioned. From that part of it, wherein he informs them how he had puniſhed ſuch as had given their people unjuſt vexation, it appears to have been written early in his reign; on his firſt coming to Conſtantinople, when he purged the city and palace of ſpies, informers, and the like peſts of a corrupted court *. The principal deſign of it is to acquaint them with his

* Sozomene takes notice of this letter, καὶ πατριάρχαις καὶ ἀρχηγοῖς αὐτῶν καὶ αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ πλήθει ἔγραψεν, εὔχεσθαι ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ βασιλείας. Notwithſtanding which, thoſe who have conveyed it down to us have ſtampt this mark of doubt and ſuſpicion on the face of it, εἰ γνήσιον. Without queſtion, they believed it to be forged by the Jews. The writer of it ſtyles the injuries offered to the Jews, *impious*; as if they were a holy nation—Καὶ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης δυσφημίας ἀσέβημα ἐκλαῦθα ἐξιασάμην ἅπασι: tells them that he had precipitated the delators into horrible dungeons with his *own hands*, ὃς μὲν ἐγὼ ἐν χερσὶν ἐμαῖς λαβόμενος, εἰς βάθρον ὥσας ὤλεσα: calls the patriarch, *brother*, τὸν ἀδελφὸν Ἴουλον τὸν αἰδεσιμώταλον πατριάρχην: and promiſes, that when he had reſtored their city, he would come thither, and live and worſhip with them. All theſe particulars, the critics conceived to ſmell ſtrongly of impoſture.

But what probably moſt confirmed their ſuſpicions, was the *uſe* the Jews made of it, to evade a miracle that ſo much humbled them: We ſee it only promiſes their reſtoration *after* his Perſian expedition. And one R. David Gans, of the ſixteenth century, in the ſecond part of his book, called Zamach, quoted by Wagenſeilius, in his Tela ignea Satanæ, p. 231, appears to have made this very uſe of it. "Julianus Cæſar præcepit "ut reſtitueretur templum ſanctiſſimum, magno cum decore & pulchritudine, huicque "rei ipſe ſumtus ſuppeditavit. Verum cœlitus impedimentum injectum eſt ne perficere-"tur fabrica, NAM Cæſar in bello Perſico periit."

But what Greg. Nazianzen, in his ſecond *Invective*, tells us of the conference that followed this letter, plainly ſhews it to be genuine. Julian, he ſays, aſſured the leaders of the Jews, he had diſcovered, from their ſacred books, that the time of their reſtoration was

his purpoſe to rebuild their city, on his return from the Perſian war. And without doubt he then intended to defer the re-eſtabliſhment of the Jewiſh religion till that war was at an end. But his various attacks upon Chriſtianity not ſucceeding to his hopes, he grew enraged by his defeat, and reſolved to put this laſt effort of his malice in immediate execution.

We may be aſſured, this letter had brought the principal Jews, from all quarters of the world, to court. The manner in which was at hand. ἐπιθειάζων τε δῆθεν ἐκ τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς βίβλων καὶ ἀπορρήτων, ὡς νῦν αὐτοῖς ἀποκείμενον εἴη καλεῖσθαι εἰς τὴν ἐκείνων καὶ νεὼν ἀναδείμασθαι, καὶ τῶν παλαίων τὸ κράτος ἀνανεώσασθαι καὶ ἀποκρυπτόμενος εὐνοίας πλάσματι τὴν ἐπίνοιαν.—It is not a mere curioſity to enquire, what prophecy it was, that Julian perverted; becauſe it tends to confirm the truth of Nazianzen's relation. I have ſometimes thought it might poſſibly be the words of the Septuagint, in Dan. ix. 27. Συντέλεια δοθήσεται ἐπὶ τὴν ἐρήνωσιν. The ambiguity of which Julian took the advantage of (againſt Helleniſtic Jews, who, it is probable, knew no more of the original than himſelf) as ſignifying, *the tribute ſhall be given to the deſolate*, inſtead of, *the conſummation ſhall be poured upon the deſolate*. For the letter in queſtion tells us, he had remitted their *tribute*; and by ſo doing, we ſee, was for paſſing himſelf upon them for a kind of ſecond Cyrus.

All this (that is to ſay, the authenticity of the letter, the truth of Nazianzen's relation, and this conjecture concerning the prophecy Julian pretended to go upon) ſeems greatly to be ſupported by what the Chriſtian writers ſay of the behaviour of the Jews while the project was in agitation. Socrates aſſures us, that they menaced the Chriſtians, and threatened to treat them as they themſelves had been treated by the Romans. L. iii. c. 20.—φοβερὰς δὲ τοῖς Χριστιανοῖς ἐπιδείκνυσαν ἑαυτὰς, ἠλαζονεύοντό τε κατ' αὐτῶν, ἐπαπειλοῦντες τοσαῦτα ποιήσειν, ὅσα αὐτοὶ παρὰ Ῥωμαίων πάλαι πεπόνθασι. And Rufinus ſays, *they were as vain as if they had had a prophet of their own at their head.* And this they might well be, when they had an emperor who promiſed to live and worſhip with them, and ſet himſelf up for the reſtorer foretold by their prophets.

There is only one thing in the letter, which remains to be accounted for; and that is, the ſtrange boaſt of his perſonal atchievement, in *thruſting down the delators into dungeons with his own hands:* in which the Imperial character is ſo little preſerved, that the learned M. de la Bleterie is almoſt tempted, on this ſingle circumſtance, to give up the letter for a forgery. But he here forgets what he himſelf had before mentioned of the ſtrange eſcapes of this fantaſtic monarch. "Saint Gregoire Nazianze dit, que Julien "chaſſoit à coups de *pié* & de *poing* de pauvres gens qui venoient lui demander des "graces. Ces *pauvres gens* (ſays M. de la Bleterie) pouvoient bien être des Dela-"teurs." Vie de Julien, p. 314. 2d edit.

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he appeared to intereſt himſelf in their quarrel, could not but perſuade them, that the apoſtate from Chriſtianity was become more than half a proſelyte to Judaiſm. While he, on his part, flattered himſelf, that thoſe who adhered ſo obſtinately to bloody ſacrifices might be eaſily cajoled into idolatry.

Theſe, apparently, were the men, then reſiding at court, and waiting for his favours, whom, Chryſoſtome and Gregory Nazianzen tell us, he called together, to enquire, Why they did not offer ſacrifices as the *law* directed; at a time when the empire ſtood ſo much in need of the divine protection, and the emperor was ſo well diſpoſed to implore it from all quarters. They replied, that it was not lawful to ſacrifice but in the *temple of Jeruſalem* only. This was what He would be at: ſo he took the advantage of their anſwer, to facilitate his ſecret purpoſe; which was to give the lie at once to all the prophets and meſſengers of God.

For we are by no means to ſuppoſe him ſo ignorant as not to know what the *law* in this caſe required. That very letter to the *community* plainly inſinuates he did know it. His acquaintance with Scripture muſt have informed him of it: for if there was any part to which he would give greater attention than the reſt, it was the ritual of ſacrifices, a ſpecies of worſhip, to which he was inordinately addicted. Beſides, in his *diſcourſe* againſt the Chriſtian Religion, he occaſionally, but in expreſs words, declares, that it was of the nature of the Moſaic Law, to offer ſacrifices at Jeruſalem only *. But as this *diſcourſe* was written ſome time after the conſultation in queſtion, I would lay the leſs weight upon it.

However, no one, I think, can doubt, but that the whole conference was a farce; that Julian only wanted a ſcreen for his impiety; and that the pretence of procuring the means of their interceſſion with the God of the univerſe, for the proſperity of the empire, was no other than a decent cover for putting this laſt effort

* Ὑμεῖς δὲ οἱ τὴν καινὴν θυσίαν εὐρόντες, ἐδὴν δὲ δόμενοι τῆς Ἱερουσαλὴμ, ἀλλὶ τίνῳ ἃ θύετε;—apud Cyril, p. 306. Spanh. ed.

of his malice in preſent execution. The Jews eagerly fell in with his project; and the iſſue was as we have related it.

This great event happened in the beginning of the year CCCLXIII, as appears from the words of Ammianus Marcellinus, quoted above. Julian, who then wintered at Antioch, was preparing for his Perſian expedition; for which he did not ſet out till the month of March. So unexpected a traverſe, we muſt ſuppoſe, would be immediately carried to him *, with all the circumſtances that attended it: Alypius could not but aſſure him, that the repeated eruptions made it impracticable to perſiſt in the attempt; and that the conſumption of the materials utterly diſabled his agents from ſpeedily renewing it. What his firſt ſentiments were, on this occaſion, we have no certain or particular account: how he reſented the diſgrace in his cooler hours, I am now going to ſhew.

There is, amongſt the writings of Julian, a notable fragment of an *oration*, or *epiſtle*, call it which you will, firſt given us by Petavius, wherein the emperor, with great abilities and learning, preſcribes and marks out a method to reform Paganiſm, and ſet it up for a rival to the Goſpel, in all the plauſible pretences to piety and virtue. This, and his books againſt the Chriſtian Religion, were the two maſter wheels of the ſame machine: the one was to degrade Chriſtianity, the other to advance ſuperſtition: and therefore it is no wonder we find them written at the ſame time. St. Jerom expreſſly ſays †, that the books againſt our holy faith were

* ταῦτα ἤκουσε μὲν Ἰουλιανός. Theod. l. iii. c. 20.

† Ep. lxxxiii. ad magnum oratorem. And his hiſtorian tells us, that, even to the laſt, while harraſſed with famine and the Perſian cavalry, he continued to employ the ſilent hours of the night, in his uſual ſophiſtic exerciſes of reading and compoſing: which Ammianus, to do his maſter honour, ſays, was in imitation of Julius Cæſar.—Ipſe autem ad ſollicitam ſuſpenſamque quietem pauliſper protractus, cum ſomno (ut ſolebat) depulſo, ad æmulationem Cæſaris Julii quædam ſub pellibus ſcribens, obſcuro noctis, altitudine ſenſus cujuſdam philoſophi teneretur, vidit ſqualidius, ut confeſſus eſt proximis, ſpeciem illam genii publici, &c. lib. xxv. c. 2. And it is not improbable but his favourite Libanius had thoſe very writings in his eye, when he ſaid that the life of his maſter, Julian, was then equally divided between his cares for *religion* and the *ſtate*. Οὗτος γάρ ἐστι ὁ μερίσας αὐτῷ τὸν βίον εἴς τε τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων βουλὰς, εἴς τε τὰς περὶ βωμὺς διαλήξεις. De ulciſc. Julian. nece.

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compoſed during the Perſian expedition. Libanius, indeed, intimates, they were written in his winter quarters at Antioch. Their accounts may be eaſily reconciled, in ſuppoſing that this part was planned and begun before his remove. However, the other part, the directions for the reformation of Paganiſm, was as late as the Perſian expedition; for this, we have the author's own word, where, ſpeaking of the cuſtomary honours paid to the Gods, he ſays—"which not THREE years, nor three thouſand have eſta-"bliſhed: but all paſt ages, amongſt all the nations upon earth *." By the *three years* he evidently alludes to his reſtoration of idolatry; which, at any time ſooner than the Perſian expedition, was not intitled to ſo high a date. For he was firſt ſaluted Auguſtus in the ſpring of the year CCCLX, and the Perſian expedition was in the ſpring CCCLXIII.

At this time, therefore, he had well digeſted his defeat at Jeruſalem. What effects it left upon his temper, the following paſſage of this fragment will inform us; where, after having juſtified the Gods for ſuffering their temples, images, and moſt devout worſhippers to be injuriouſly treated, he goes on thus:—"Let no "man, therefore, becauſe he hath ſeen or heard of thoſe who have "inſulted their images and *Temples*, entertain any doubts concern-"ing their ſuperintendency. For this reaſon too, let them not "think to delude us with their ſophiſtry, nor terrify us with the "cry of *Providence*. For, the prophets amongſt the Jews, who "ſo much upbraid us with theſe diſaſters, what will they ſay to "their own temple? that temple of theirs, which has been now a "third time deſtroyed †, and is not raiſed again to this day. I "ſay

* —ἢ ἐνομοθέτησαν ἐκ ἐνιαυτοὶ τρεῖς, ἀλλὰ τρισχίλιοι· πᾶς δὲ ὁ προλαβὼν αἰὼν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς τῆς γῆς ἔθνεσιν. p. 294. Spanh. Ed.

† The learned J. A. Fabricius thinks this τρίτον ἀναλῳσπάστῳ includes the defeat of Julian's attempt to rebuild the temple; and ſo, in his *Lux Evangelii*, he brings it to prove Julian's own acknowledgement of the miracle: in which he has been followed by M. de la Bleterie and others. But 1. Defeating an attempt to rebuild cannot,

" ſay not this to upbraid them; for I myſelf, after ſo long a deſo-
" lation, would have rebuilt it *, in honour of the God which
" was there worſhipped. But I now mention it only as I was
" willing to ſhew, that nothing human is exempt from the inju-
" ries of time. As to the prophets, who write in this manner,
" they merely rave, and cant to the capacities of dreaming old
" women. Not that I would inſinuate, the God they worſhip is
" not great and mighty: but this I ſay, he hath no good pro-
" phets, nor interpreters of his will, amongſt them. The reaſon
" is, they never applied themſelves to purge and purify the mind
" in the circle of human ſcience, nor tried to open their eyes which
" ignorance had ſhut up, nor ſtrove to drive away the darkneſs in
" which they lay involved: but are as men, who through miſts
" or clouds ſee the great light of heaven † neither clearly nor diſ-
" tinctly,

in any known figure of ſpeech, he called the overthrow of a building. 2. Ἐγειρομένῃ δὲ ἀδὶ νῦν can never be ſaid of a building deſtroyed but two months before. In a word, Fabricius is miſtaken; the three ſubverſions here meant, were—that by the Aſſyrians,—that by Herod, the ſon of Antipater,—and that by Veſpaſian. And though Herod's demolition of it was only in order to rebuild it more magnificently, yet it was ſuch a deſtruction as Julian might properly enough urge for the ſupport of his argument, againſt an objection, that ſuppoſed *ſtability and duration* amongſt the qualities to be looked for in the domicile of the *true* God; which the Pagan temples not having, were concluded to belong to the *falſe*.—Or it may poſſibly be, that, inſtead of Herod's *demolition*, he might allude to the prophanation of it by Antiochus, as a learned friend ſuggeſts. But what is deciſive againſt Fabricius's interpretation is this: Julian in one and the ſame paragraph could never call his project a deſtruction of the temple, and an attempt to rebuild it.

* ὅσῳ τοσούτοις ὕστερον χρόνοις ἀνασήσασθαι διενοήθην αὐτὸν—I do not urge this independent declaration (which implies ſome hindrance of his purpoſe) againſt the unbelievers, " becauſe they will ſay, " the hindrance appears to have been the Perſian expedition; " Julian having told the Jews, in his Letter ſtill extant, that he would rebuild their " temple when he had ended that war, which implies his inability of doing it " before."

† Julian, by φῶς μέγα, means the *Sun*, as before, Θεὸν μέγαν, *the God of the univerſe*. For, φῶς καθαρὸν, which follows, was, I believe, never uſed by theſe fanatic platoniſts, for a *terreſtrial* fire, it being the term they gave to their *holy light*, or αὔτοπλον ἄγαλμα.

Julian

" tinctly, and miſtake that ethereal ſplendor for an impure ter-
" reſtrial fire; and, ſtark blind to all nature working round them,
" roar out with frantic vehemence, *Fear and tremble, ye inhabi-*
" *tants of earth! Fire, lightning, the ſword, darts, death,* and all
" the frightful words that expreſs that one deſtructive property of
" FIRE. But of theſe things it is more expedient to ſpeak in
" private, where we may ſhew, how much theſe maſters of wiſ-
" dom, who pretend to be ſent from God, are inferior to our
" Poets *."

The reader, who conſults the fragment from whence this long paſſage is tranſcribed, will perceive, that it is a mere digreſſion. But if it were foreign to his ſubject, we ſhall ſee it concerned a matter very intimate to his thoughts. The perſecuted church of Chriſt was, at this time, triumphant, and loudly exulting in the divine protection ſo miraculouſly afforded it. The apoſtate, when the power of the empire failed him, had recourſe to this laſt expedient, the arms of calumny, to vent his rage, and cover the ſhame of his diſappointment. And then it was that, exchanging the *Imperial* for the *Sophiſt's throne* †, he compoſed the two diſ-

Julian thought nothing more holy than the Sun.—He did not add the article, becauſe he is here expreſſing the idea of the miſtaken beholder,—*a great light*, though, by *that*, he himſelf meant, *the great light*.

* Μηδεὶς ἓν ἀπιστείτω θεοῖς ὁρῶν καὶ ἀκούων ὡς ἐνίβρισάν τινες εἰς τὰ ἀγάλματα καὶ τὸν ΝΑΟΥΣ. Μηδεὶς ἓν ἀπαλάτω λόγοις· μηδὲ παρατίθετω περὶ τῆς προνοίας ἡμᾶς· οἱ γὰρ ἡμῖν ὀνειδίζοντες τοιαῦτα, τῶν Ἰουδαίων οἱ Προφῆται, τί περὶ τοῦ νεὼ φήσουσι; τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς τρίτον ἀναλραπέντος, ἐγειρομένου δὲ οὐδὲ νῦν· Ἐγὼ δὲ εἶπον ἂν ὀνειδίζων ἐκείνοις, ὅσῳ τοσούτοις ὕστερον χρόνοις ἀνασήσασθαι διεσόθην αὐτὸν εἰς τιμὴν τοῦ κληθέντος ἐπ' αὐτῷ, θεῷ νυνὶ δὲ ἐχρησάμην αὐτῷ, δεῖξαι βελόμενος, ὅτι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων οὐδὲν ἄφθαρτον εἶναι δύναται· καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα γράφοντες ἐλήρουν προφῆται, γραϊδίοις ψυχροῖς ὁμιλοῦντες. Οὐθέν, δὴ, οἶμαι, κωλύει τὸν μὲν θεὸν εἶναι μέγαν ὁ μὴν σπουδαίων προφητῶν οὐδὲ ἐξηγητὴν τυχεῖν, αἴτιον δ' ὅτι τὴν ἐαυτῶν ψυχὴν, ὁ παρέσχον ἀποκαθᾶραι τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις μαθήμασιν· ὅτε ἀνοῖξαι μεμυκότα λίαν τὰ ὄμματα· οὐδὲ ἀναχαθᾶραι τὴν ἐπικειμένην αὐτοῖς ἀχλύν. Ἀλλ' οἷον φῶς μέγα δι' ὀμίχλης οἱ ἄνθρωποι βλέπουσιν ὁ καθαρῶς, οὐδὲ εἰλικρινῶς, αὐτὸ δὲ ἐκεῖνο νενομικότες οὐχὶ φῶς κάθαρον, ἀλλὰ ΠΥΡ, καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸ πάντων ὅσα ἀθέατοι, βοῶσι μεγάλα· φρίττετε· φοβεῖσθε· πῦρ, φλὸξ, θάνατος, μαχαιρα, ῥομφαία· πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι μίαν ἐξηγούμενοι τὴν βλαπτικὴν τοῦ πυρὸς δύναμιν· ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ μὲ τούτων ἰδία βέλτιον παρασῆσαι, πόσῳ φαυλότεροι τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ἔτω γεγόνασι ποιητῶν, οἱ τῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγων διδάσκαλοι. p. 295. Spanh. Ed.

† ἐπὶ θρόνου τινὸς ὑψηλοῦ μάλα Σοφιστικῆς καὶ Σοβαρᾶς. Themiſt. Orat i.

courſes

courſes mentioned above. Now, to be altogether ſilent on a ſubject, that was plainly the occaſion of his writing, would have been an affectation that had rather betrayed, than covered, his ſelf-conviction. On the other hand, the ſoldier's pride of heart, the pedant's contempt for his unclaſſical adverſaries, and the monarch's delicacy for the imperial dignity, would not ſuffer him to enter on a formal altercation. Beſides, in this caſe, he muſt either have confeſſed or denied the fact. The one would have completed the triumph of his adverſaries; and the other offended the ingenuity of his friends. He therefore choſe a middle way: and, under ſhew of expoſing the denunciations of the Jewiſh prophets againſt paſt idolatries, as the ravings of enthuſiaſm, he covertly condemns the preſent triumphs of the church as the workings of the ſame ſpirit, upon the ground of a natural event.

For, taking occaſion (though the ſubject of the work before us was the *reformation* of Paganiſm) to vindicate that ancient worſhip from the diſhonours it had from time to time ſuffered, in the overthrow of its temples and idols, he obſerves, that thoſe who exulted moſt in its diſgraces, the Jewiſh *prophets* (whoſe writings, indeed, abound with exclamations and denunciations on the folly of idolatry, the impuiſſance of idols, and the deſtruction to which both were devoted) had of all men the leaſt reaſon to triumph; ſince their own TEMPLE had been thrice deſtroyed, and at that very time lay in ruins. This leads him to the ſubject he wanted to touch upon: he therefore adds, that he ſpoke this out of no ill-will to the *community of the Jews*, for that he was himſelf *deſirous of rebuilding their temple*. No, but only to convince them that neither the overthrow of their temple, nor the temples of Paganiſm, was to be aſcribed to *divine wrath*, but to the natural condition of earthly things. And, enraged at the contrary principle, which occaſioned theſe exultations in the Chriſtian church, he attempts to ſhew, in the character he gives of the Jewiſh prophets, which he truſted the intelligent reader would apply to the Chriſtian

Chriſtian miniſters, that it was the iſſue of ignorance and ſuperſtition. Theſe prophets he repreſents as deſpiſing human ſcience, and acting upon the principles, and preaching to the capacities of ignorant and ſuperſtitious women, a character which was, and might be, objected to the Chriſtian *miniſtry*, whoſe writings are full of exclamations againſt Grecian literature, but what by no means ſuited the Jewiſh *prophets*, who appear to have had as much of the barbaric learning of thoſe early times as any of their Pagan neighbours. But, leſt this ſhould not ſufficiently mark his purpoſe, by an elegant ſimilitude, in which he employs his favourite idol, the Sun, to ſhew the root of theſe ſuperſtitions to be the ignorance of nature; he makes thoſe, whom he ſuppoſes under its illuſions, to cry out in the very exclamations that then reſounded from one end of the Chriſtian world to the other, *Fear and tremble, ye inhabitants of earth!—Fire, lightning, the ſword, darts, death, and all the frightful words* (ſays he) *which expreſs that one deſtructive property of fire.*—By which he plainly enough inſinuates that this boaſted miracle, by which his purpoſe was defeated was only a natural eruption: but that the Chriſtians were as ignorant of natural cauſes as men who ſeeing the Sun through miſts miſtake it for a globe of terreſtrial fire. But as if now he had run riot, he ſuddenly checks himſelf, and obſerves, that this was a ſubject properer for a *private* audience. And here the genius of Paganiſm came to his aid very opportunely; which, when pinched and diſtreſſed, was always as ready to cry out MYSTERY, as he ſays the church was to call out FIRE. To ſay the truth, it was full time to draw back. He had confeſſed his inclination and purpoſe of rebuilding the Jewiſh temple; and had evidently enough hinted at the exultations of the Chriſtians on his defeat; ſo that he had indeed nothing to do, but to put off the cauſe to a *private* audience.

On this expoſition of the paſſage, let me juſt make the fo'lowing remarks.

1. If we underſtand Julian's reflections as *indefinite*, nothing can be more disjointed or abſurd. The Chriſtians of that time were wont to draw an argument of the impuiſſance of polytheiſm from the repeated diſgraces the heathen temples and their idols had ſuffered in every period of the world. Julian undertakes to ſolve this objection; but, inſtead of directing his anſwer to the Chriſtians, who now make it againſt *him*, he retorts it upon the Jews, who, many ages ago, had made it againſt *others*. Theſe he wantonly provokes at a time his views made them neceſſary to him. Again, he characteriſes theſe *prophets* in ſo ambiguous and looſe a manner, that you may either take them for the writers of the Old Teſtament, or the heads of the Jewiſh community of that time: which no rule of compoſition can account for, but that which allows cautious writers to explain one ſyſtem of things by the names that belong to another. Laſtly, he ſpeaks of *terrifying exclamations* as made by the prophets, which they never did make; and which, though made by Chriſt and his Apoſtles, are applied by them to the puniſhments of a *future ſtate*; whereas he is ſpeaking of what the worſhippers of one God ſay of the diſpenſation of his providence in the *preſent*. We muſt conclude therefore, that the exclamations ridiculed in this paſſage muſt needs be thoſe which the recent event at Jeruſalem had juſt occaſioned.

2. Take the paſſage in this *determined* ſenſe, and nothing can be more artful than the conduct of the imperial ſophiſt. Our religion was at this juncture properly victorious. It was exulting over Paganiſm in the deſtruction of the temple at Daphné *; it was

* The Oracle of Apollo in the temple at Daphné near Antioch had been dumb for ſome time. When Julian came thither, he urged the God himſelf to declare the cauſe of his ſilence. The Oracle replied, that he was hindered by the bones of St. Babylas, which were then inſhrined in his neighbourhood. Theſe Julian ordered to be removed: And ſoon after the temple at Daphné was burnt to the ground. The Chriſtians (ſays Sozomene) affirmed it was by lightning from Heaven: but the Pagans laughed at this, and ſaid it was fired by the Galileans.

exulting

exulting over Judaiſm in the divine oppoſition to the reſtoration of that at Jeruſalem; and over the Apoſtate Emperor in the diſgraces of both. This ſpirit Julian wanted to repreſs and mortify. In the caſe of Apollo's temple he had no reaſon to be delicate. As to *that* of the God of Iſrael, we have ſhewn, it would not bear a profeſſed mention. How has he conducted his diſcourſe? By retorting upon the Jews, in the caſe of their old ruined temple, the Chriſtian objection ariſing from that at Daphné: which recrimination ſerved a double purpoſe; to introduce what he had to ſay on his own baffled attempt; and to ſay it (which was the point) obſcurely and darkly. Thus the Chriſtian triumphs, which he introduces to ridicule, are ſo repreſented as to have a more obvious reference to the temple at Daphné, and a covert one to the temple at Jeruſalem, by the choice of ſeveral words and circumſtances which neceſſarily extend it to that further meaning. Thus, for inſtance, the circumſtance of their *ignorance of nature*, τῶν περὶ αὐτὸ πάντων ὄντες ἀθέατοι, by which he would inſinuate, that the readineſs in believing miracles ariſes from that ignorance. But he could never intend this obſervation ſhould be applied to the temple at Daphné, which he did not believe was ſet on fire by lightning. And thus again the words θάνατος, μάχαιρα, ῥομφαία, *the ſword*, *darts*, *death*, which he adds to πῦρ, φλὸξ, *fire*, *lightning*, neceſſarily carry us to Jeruſalem, where the eruption occaſioned much human ſlaughter, whereas nothing ſuffered at Antioch but the temple of Apollo. And with theſe views the retortion on the Jewiſh writers will not appear ſo forced and unnatural. It was a Chriſtian practice to apply the language of the Old Teſtament to the events of the goſpel diſpenſation; and the diſgrace of idols and idolaters being the conſtant ſubject of thoſe writings, we may be ſure, the Chriſtians would not fail to apply every thing of this nature to the preſent occaſion *. So that thoſe *ſcriptures* being employed

* Theodoret tells the following ſtory, very appoſite to this ſubject: He ſays, that when Julian was at Antioch, one Publia, a venerable matron, and at the head of a community

ployed as divine deciſions to confirm their cauſe, naturally became the object of Julian's reſentment.

3. This likewiſe well accounts for the title of Prophets, which he gives theſe Jewiſh writers or rulers; and for his abuſe of them under that character. It was to prevent the reader's ſtopping at Apollo's temple, when it was the writer's purpoſe to lead him ſilently to that of Jeruſalem: to which only the Jewiſh prophets and their *prophecies* had any relation. Theſe things then we may conſider as certain marks of his further meaning. And, indeed, if he had it not, what reaſon was there for being ſo ſhy in the mention of that idol temple? its deſtruction did not at all diſtreſs him; as he believed it to be ſet on fire by the Chriſtians. But, in the other caſe, he had to do with the God of the Chriſtians; and he was not yet in an humour, whatever he might be afterwards, to cry, *Viciſti, Galilæe.*

4. It being now ſeen, that Julian in this paſſage evidently refers to his defeat, the covert manner in which he owns himſelf overcome adds greatly to the weight of it. For no ſuſpicion can lie againſt ſo oblique a reference to the fact, even in the opinion of thoſe who could ſmell forgery in an open and direct confeſſion. An impoſtor, *piouſly* diſpoſed to procure Julian's teſtimony againſt

munity of virgins devoted to religion, took occaſion, whenever the Emperor went that way, to chant louder than was the cuſtom, in defiance of his impiety: they choſe too to ſing thoſe pſalms of David which ridicule the vanity and impuiſſance of idols, ἃ τῶν εἰδώλων κωμῳδεῖ τὴν ἀσθένειαν, and particularly the following verſes. *The Idols of the Heathens are but ſilver and gold, the work of men's hands: they that make them are like unto them, and ſo are all they that put their truſt in them.* Julian (as he had reaſon) was offended with this inſult, and, as often as he paſſed by, ordered them to be ſilent. Inſtead of obeying, Publia exhorted her virgins to ſtrain their throats ſtill higher, and eſpecially when they came to this verſe: *Let God ariſe, and let his enemies be ſcattered.* This provoked the Emperor to order one of his guards to bring out the old woman and box her ears, which (ſays the hiſtorian) Publia eſteemed a great honour, and went on to torment the apoſtate with her pſalm-ſinging, in the ſame manner as the author of the Pſalms tormented the evil ſpirit in Saul. L. iii. c. xix.

himſelf,

himſelf, would never think of doing it ſo obſcurely, as that it ſhould eſcape the notice of thoſe whom he principally intended to impoſe upon.

Thus far concerning the APOSTATE's own teſtimony. But as there were three parties intereſted in this affair, the Pagans, the Jews, and the Chriſtians; our evidence might be thought defective, if any one of them were wanting on ſo important an occaſion.

We ſhall therefore, in the next place, produce the teſtimony of a famous RABBI; who, though late in time, yet compoſed the work, from whence the following paſſage is taken, on the traditions and records of the ſeveral ages he writes of. This is the celebrated R. Gedaliah ben Joſeph Jechaja; he lived in the fifteenth century, and, in his hiſtory called Schalſcheleth Hakkabbala, expreſſes himſelf to this effect: "In the days of R. Channan and his brethren, "about the year of the world 4349, our annals tell us, there was "a great earthquake *over all the earth*; by which the temple "which the Jews had raiſed at Jeruſalem with vaſt expence, at "the command of Julian the apoſtate, was thrown down. The "day after the earthquake, a dreadful fire fell from heaven, which "melted all the iron tools and inſtruments employed about the "work; and deſtroyed many, nay incredible numbers of the "Jews *." I will make two remarks on this teſtimony. 1. The hiſtorian's calling it an *earthquake over all the earth*, is in the language of the Jews; and the ſame with that of the Evangeliſt, who tells us, that at the crucifixion, *there was darkneſs over all the earth* †. 2. This ſtory of a rebuilt temple, ſhews he had his ma-

* In diebus R. Channan & ſociorum ejus, anno circiter orbis conditi 4349, memorant libri annalium, magnum in orbe univerſo fuiſſe terræ motum, collapſumque eſſe templum quod ſtruxerunt Judæi Hieroſolymis, præcepto Cæſaris Juliani Apoſtatæ, impenſis maximis. Poſtridie ejus diei [quo mota fuerat terra] de Cœlo ignis multus cecidit, ita ut omnia ferramenta illius ædificii liqueſcerent & amburerentur Judæi multi atque adeo innumerabiles. Apud Wagenſeil, Tela ignea Satanæ.

† Luke xxiii. 44.

terials neither from Pagan nor Chriſtian writers; who are unanimous that no more than the foundations were prepared. And, as there is no viſible purpoſe why he ſhould invent it, we muſt conclude, he found it thus related in the annals of the rabbins; the compoſers of which might poſſibly draw this concluſion from what they found recorded of the immenſe contributions of their people. 3. The hiſtorian ſays, it was at the *command of Julian*; which, without bringing Chriſtianity into the queſtion, ſupplies his reader with a plauſible account of this viſible mark of the divine diſpleaſure at the attempt *; and conſequently affords his brethren a principle on which they might believe the fact, conſiſtently with their profeſſion of Judaiſm.

CHAP. V.

HERE then, for the preſent, we ſhall reſt our evidence; ON THE CONFESSION OF OUR ADVERSARIES THEMSELVES: And, from the *nature of the* TESTIMONY, proceed to ſome conſiderations on the *nature of the* FACT, in order to the fuller eſtabliſhment of this important truth.

One of the requiſite qualities in a forged miracle, that pretends to live and do well, is, that the fact on which it riſes be private, obſcure, unconcerning, and remote from general obſervation. And though theſe circumſtances may ſometimes attend a *true* one; yet that is but accidental, and hurts not its credit, ſo long as it is accompanied (which it ever is) with others, that ſupply their defects. But for a forged miracle to affect the diſtinction of *public notoriety*, would be too impudent a reliance even on religious credulity. To feign a miracle on a civil fact, which muſt have paſſed in ſight of a whole nation, would be rather an attempt to put out men's eyes, than to impoſe on their underſtandings. Hence it is

* Book II. c. iv. p. 225.

we

we find, the *lying wonders* of him, *whoſe coming was after the working of Satan* *, ſo well anſwer the deſcription which He, who came with all the power of the Father, hath given us of every ſubtile Impoſtor in general, that *they love darkneſs rather than light, becauſe their deeds are evil.*

Now the PROJECT to rebuild the temple of Jeruſalem was a public tranſaction, the moſt notorious and intereſting of that age.

The PROJECTOR was no other than the Emperor of the world himſelf: a circumſtance alone ſufficient to draw the attention of the world upon it.

His ATTEMPT produced other circumſtances that would obtrude themſelves even on the moſt incurious. The principal Jews were called together from all quarters †: Alypius, a man of the firſt figure, was put at the head of the undertaking: immenſe quantities of materials were laid in; vaſt numbers of workmen were aſſembled; and the impotent triumphs of the Jews gave an eclat to every movement which the reſtleſs though determined ſpirit of Julian was hourly puſhing forward.

The PLACE contributed no leſs to its notoriety. It was in the centre of the empire; and in the head quarters of the two religious parties that then divided it.

The TIME likewiſe was critical. The religious world had juſt ſuffered a ſurpriſing revolution. It had been ſuddenly brought back from the *new* opinions to a profeſſion of the *old*. Yet the diſgraced religion, by courage and conſtancy in ſuffering, ſtill kept its enemies anxious amidſt all their ſucceſs, and fearful, amidſt all their power, for what might be the final iſſue.

The ACTION too was capitally intereſting: The deſign of the project was to give the laſt blow to the credit of Chriſtianity. And the honour of the new and old profeſſion was ſtaked on the event.

* 2 Theſſ. ii. 9.

† —τούτων γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι [οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι] τῶν λόγων ἀσπασίως ἀκέστριλες, ἅπασι τὰ προσταττόμενα τοῖς κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην ὁμοφύλοις ἐδήλωσαν. Οἱ δὲ πάνθεν συνιόντες καὶ χρήματα καὶ παρασκευὴν εἰς τὴν οἰκοδομίαν εἰσφέροντες. Theodoret, Hiſt. Eccl. l. iii. c. 20.

We

We have ſhewn that every body underſtood Julian's purpoſe to be no other than to put a public affront upon Revelation. Paganiſm was big with expectation. The Church in general was alarmed; but the more knowing and pious amongſt them, to the very laſt, mocked and defied the impiety of the attempt *.

Such were the various *paſſions and intereſts* which concurred with the *time* and *place*, to engage the attention, and excite the impatience of all men for the event.

But now, when full expectation on the one ſide, and continued alarms on the other, had ſet the world at gaze, the project ſuddenly diſappeared. It was as it had never been; and the temple once more preſented itſelf in its old ruins; but with a worſe face, of horror and deſolation. A ſurpriſing iſſue of ſo much determined power, and immenſe preparation!

A world, thus attentive and concerned, could not but be deſirous of knowing the *cauſe* of ſo ſudden a change of meaſures, if it were a change of meaſures, that influenced the event. Did the emperor relent? Did his agents fail in their obedience? or were the Jews, on better thoughts, become reſigned to their viſitation? Was the purpoſe diverted by a foreign invaſion, or by domeſtic troubles? Did ſome hoſtile Barbarian, at that juncture, break in upon the empire; or ſome rebellious province ſuſpend and weaken its authority? Or, laſtly, did the Chriſtians themſelves defeat the inſult, by oppoſing force to force? One or other of theſe *cauſes* muſt be given, to account for the defeat in a common way: and yet the aſtoniſhed inquirer perceived that none of theſe had any thing to do in it. The emperor's hatred to our holy faith kept increaſing to his death: Alypius's fidelity to his

* Cyrillus, poſt Maximum confeſſorem, Jeroſolymis habebatur epiſcopus. Apertis igitur fundamentis, calces cæmentaque adhibita: nihil omnino deerat, quin die poſtera, veteribus deturbatis, nova jacerent fundamenta; cum tamen epiſcopus, diligenti conſideratione habita, vel ex his quæ in Danielis prophetia de temporibus legerat, vel quod in evangeliis dominus prædixerat, perſiſteret nullo genere fieri poſſe ut ibi a Judæis lapis ſuper lapidem poneretur. *Res erat in expectatione.*—Rufini Hiſt. Eccl. l. x. c. 37, &c.

maſter,

maſter, and zeal for the old ſuperſtition, were without bounds; and the mad inſolence of the Jews proved them ready to ſtorm heaven itſelf to get into their old quarters. The empire, in all *other* parts, was at peace; and the only enemies it had, in *theſe*, were the Perſians; who were too much alarmed by Julian's preparations, and too much taken up in putting their own frontiers in a condition of defence, to think of farther provoking him by new inroads into the empire.

What then would be the ſtate of men's minds on this poſture of affairs? Thoſe who were at a diſtance would, in their loſs for a natural cauſe, be attentive to what was told them of a miracle*. And thoſe who were on the place would want no means of convincing them. For nothing was equivocal. The directors, the overſeers, and the chief agents in this attempt, were all ſcattered and diſperſed; and, ſurely, by no panic terror. An earthquake, that let looſe a ſubterraneous fire, joined to a heaven all in flames, tore in ſunder the foundations, deſtroyed the workmen, and burnt up and conſumed the materials. Effects, which were all the objects of ſenſe, and, what is more, remained ſo for a long time after. For many of thoſe who ſurvived their fellows, bore about them the laſting marks of their puniſhment: and, another religious revolution coming on, the ſite of the temple was ſuffered to retain that face of ravage and combuſtion, which the eſcape of pent-up fires always leave behind them †.

In this account then all parties muſt agree. And, by what remains of antiquity, it appears they did ſo: A conſent, not procured in the way whereby *falſe* reports of the like kind have ſometimes procured it. For this was no trifling event, laid in a remote corner, ſeen but by a few prejudiced relators, and accompanied only with ambiguous circumſtances: In which caſe, partly from

* Φήμη ἐπὶ τὸν τόπον ἦγε τὸς πόῤῥω διάγοντας. Socrat Hiſt. Eccl. l. iii. c. 20.

† Καὶ νῦν ἐὰν ἔλθῃς εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα, γυμνὰ ὄψει τὰ θεμέλια· κἂν τὴν αἰτίαν ζητήσῃς, ἀδεμίαν ἀλλ' ἢ ταύτην ἀκούσεις. κ᾽ τότε μαρτύρες ἡμῖν πάντες· ἐφ' ἡμῶν γὰρ, ὰ πρὸ πολλῶ ταῦτα γέγονε χρόνω— Chryſ. adver. Judæos, Orat. v.

contempt

contempt of a thing incredible, partly from neglect of a thing uninteresting, but principally from an indolence that shuns the trouble of examining, many a monkish tale hath made its fortune. But here, had the fact been *groundless*, or the event *different*, their falsehood must have been known to thousands: and what was so easy to be disproved, the interests of thousands would have exposed. Had the circumstances been *ambiguous*, they could not have passed uncontroverted: for This was not of the nature of the miracle said to be procured by the prayers of the *thundering legion*, which only gave testimony to the *power* of Christ, a matter about which Paganism was very indifferent: This went to the quick, and exposed the impotence and *falsehood* of their idols, a charge which always put the Gentiles out of temper. But if they were so cold in the cause of superstition as to need a spur to vindicate its honour, This they had likewise in the triumphs and exultations of the Christian ministers; who, in their sermons, their apologies, their histories, addressed both to friends and enemies, relate the event in all its circumstances; call upon the numerous eye-witnesses to attest the truth; appeal to the standing marks of the fact, the traces of a dreadful exterminating fire over *all* the place, and on *many* of the persons concerned; and, lastly, defy the advocates of idolatry to gainsay the exactness of their relation.

Such is the illustrious miracle we have here attempted to defend. We have examined it on the severest rules of rational assent. And we find it established on that full concurrence of happy circumstances which, we might expect, should attend a miracle so *singular* in its nature, and so important and *decisive* in its use.

But there is one circumstance almost peculiar to it, and, as it crowns all the rest, will deserve our most serious regard. It is this, that the *attempt* and the *issue* are so interwoven with one another, that they must stand or fall together. For whoever allows that Julian began to rebuild the temple, which he could not finish, must confess the obstruction came from above, because no human impediment

impediment interfered. And whoever denies the obſtruction muſt deny the attempt, becauſe if there were no obſtruction of *that kind*, there was none at all: and if there were none at all, then there was nothing to be obſtructed. That is, Julian never attempted to rebuild the Temple; an inference ſo furiouſly ſceptical, as would overturn the whole body of civil hiſtory.

A DISCOURSE

ON THE ATTEMPT OF THE

EMPEROR JULIAN

TO REBUILD THE

TEMPLE OF JERUSALEM.

BOOK II.

HAVING now ſo well eſtabliſhed the MIRACLE, we have little need to inquire into the objections that may be made to it, any further than as we may be led by our own curioſity, or inclined to gratify the curioſity of others, in ſeeing how far the capriciouſneſs of wanton wit can go in its frolics towards perplexing the plaineſt and moſt evident of uſeful truths.

CHAP. I.

FIRST then it may be objected, "That the credit of the miracle reſts entirely on the truth of this ſuppoſition, *That the holy oracles of God have declared, that the Jewiſh Temple ſhould never be rebuilt*: For if this were not predicted, the reſtoration of it did not

not impeach the divine veracity; nor, conſequently, was its honour concerned in fruſtrating the attempt. Now the word of God no where ſays that the Jewiſh Temple *ſhould never* be rebuilt; on the contrary, it inſinuates that it *ſhould*. It predicts, in general terms, the *total*, but not *final* deſtruction of the Temple; and, in expreſs words, ſays, That *Jeruſalem ſhall be trodden down of the Gentiles* UNTIL *the times of the Gentiles be fulfilled*. Which imply there was to be a period to the deſolation, though the *time* be ſo obſcurely marked as to make the fixing it uncertain."

The objection is plauſible, and well deſerves a ſolution. On which account (the method of the Diſcourſe concurring) it was thought proper to obviate it in the very entrance on this argument: where it is ſhewn, from the nature of the Jewiſh and Chriſtian religions, that the *total* deſtruction, mentioned in the Prophecies, neceſſarily implied a *final* one: For that, in the order of God's diſpenſations, the Jewiſh and the Chriſtian Religions could never ſtand together: when *This* became eſtabliſhed, *That* was to be done away. But while the temple remained, Judaiſm ſtill exiſted: when That was overthrown, the religion fell with it; and conſequently muſt riſe again with the temple. But as this religion was *not* to riſe while Chriſtianity continued, the Temple was never to be reſtored. The conſequence of all is, that, If it were reſtored, Chriſtianity could no longer ſupport its pretenſions, nor the prophets nor Jeſus the truth of their predictions.

CHAP. II.

SECONDLY, The teſtimony of Amm. Marcellinus, deciſive as it is, hath been cavilled. It is ſuſpected, "That He is no *original* Evidence; but hath taken the account, he gives us of what then paſſed at Jeruſalem, from the Chriſtian writers: the work in which we find it being compoſed near twenty years after the event, when the *fathers* had turned what there was of the natural fact

into a miracle; and, by their declamatory eloquence, had made it famous throughout the now *believing* empire."

This objection abounds with abſurdities: but it is not of my invention.

It ſuppoſes Marcellinus to have taken his account from the Chriſtian writers, becauſe there were no other to be had: for if there were other, then the Hiſtorian's authority does not reſt on their teſtimony; or, if it does, it reſts on a good foundation, the evidence of Chriſtian writers, ſupported by the Pagan. But is it likely that an unbeliever, a man of ſenſe, and a lover of truth, ſhould ſo confide in thoſe of the new perſuaſion, ſpeaking in their own cauſe, and unſupported by other evidence, as to deliver a fact, in terms of abſolute certainty, which diſcredited a religion he reverenced, and a maſter he idolized? Could we, under theſe circumſtances, ſuppoſe him capable of preſerving the memory of ſo unſupported a ſtory, we ſhould at leaſt look to find it delivered in ſuch terms of doubt and ſuſpicion as he muſt needs think were juſtly due unto it.

But the Objector * ſeems to have attended as little to the *ſituation and circumſtances*, as to the *character* of the Hiſtorian. When this event happened at Jeruſalem, Ammianus was not in winter-quarters afar off in Gaul or Germany; but near at hand, in the emperor's court at Antioch, and in an office of diſtinction. The objector, I ſuppoſe, will allow that Julian made the attempt. The attempt, I have ſhewn, was in its nature, ſuch as muſt draw the attention of the whole empire upon it. Ammianus repreſents it as one of the moſt conſiderable enterpriſes of his maſter's reign; and that it was projected to perpetuate his memory. It miſcarried. And is it poſſible the cauſe of the miſcarriage could, at that time, be more a ſecret to him than the undertaking? Yet, if we believe the objector, the firſt news he heard of it was from the Chriſtian Prieſts. Be it ſo. I ask no more, to ſhew the objection devoid of all com-

* Dr. S.

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mon ſenſe. A courtier of credit, a curious obſerver of what paſſed about him, hears nothing of what happened in his neighbourhood, at the time it did happen, though in an affair that engaged all men's attention. Many years after, in hunting for materials to compoſe his hiſtory, he ſtarts this ſtory. And where, I pray, does he find it! Why truly ſkulking in the cover of a thorny and perplext invective, or flaunting amongſt the meretricious ornaments, and on the authority, of looſe and prejudiced declaimers, records it, in his *Annals*, as a fact unqueſtionable. Not, as was ſaid, to derive credit to his maſter or his religion, but to entail eternal diſhonour upon both: and all this without giving either of them the leaſt relief; as was eaſy to be done by only telling from whom he had his ſtory.

In a word, we ſee, the objection ariſes out of this circumſtance, *The diſtance of time between the fact and the hiſtorian's account of it.* But ſuch a circumſtance can never ſupport a concluſion of this nature, but in the caſe where a writer, who had an occaſion to record a memorable fact at the time it happened, omits to do ſo; and afterwards, at the diſtance of many years, ſticks it into his hiſtory, without any reaſon given for his preceding ſilence. But this was not the caſe here: Amm. Marcellinus tells the ſtory as ſoon as ever he had an opportunity of ſo doing; which was when he retired from buſineſs to write hiſtory. And the diſtance between *that* and the event is ſo far from taking from the credit of his relation, that, as was obſerved, it adds greatly to it.

For we cannot but conclude, that as a ſoldier and man of buſineſs, he kept a journal of every thing that paſſed; though we ſhould not ſuppoſe, what is equally probable, that as a lover of letters he had very early formed his deſign of writing hiſtory. In what, therefore, concerned the tranſactions of thoſe times, he had a ſure and eaſy way of coming to the truth; which was by comparing his own diary with the later, and better digeſted, accounts of others. But indeed the *nature* of the fact, and the *quality* of

the writer, ſhew us, there was little danger of miſtake. An authentic account of this whole matter was doubtleſs amongſt the papers of ſtate; to all which our hiſtorian had free acceſs. And if we ſhould ſuppoſe his relation to be no other than a faithful abſtract of Alypius's letter to Julian, we ſhould not, I believe, be a great way from the truth. It is certain, that a prudent hiſtorian, circumſtanced as Marcellinus then was, could not have acted a wiſer part than to relate ſo nice an adventure in the very words of the perſon, to whoſe conduct it was committed: for in ſo doing, he found himſelf in that rare ſituation of adherence ſtrictly to truth, without offending either of the parties who then ſtrove for the poſſeſſion of it. We may further obſerve, that this ſuppoſition clears up another objection which has been made to his narrative. For,

Thirdly, we are told, "that the teſtimony of Marcellinus does but half our buſineſs: for though he gives a circumſtantial relation of the fact, he ſpeaks of it as a *natural*, not a *miraculous*, event."

The *former* objection, we ſee, ſuppoſes he had gone too far; *This*, that he hath not gone far enough. And yet I cannot underſtand how a profeſſed Pagan could have ſaid more, in conſcience. This objector, ſure, is not ſo unreaſonable to expect, he ſhould have recorded the triumphs of the Goſpel over his own religion, in the words of the Chriſtian writers, Becauſe the other Objector had taken it into his head that he was beholden to them for his account of the ſtory.

Thus far we may be certain: Had Ammianus thought it an artifice or impoſture, he would have contrived to tell us ſo. For what ſhould hinder him? Not any regard to the leaders of the Chriſtian ſect, upon whom the ſcandal would have fallen; for he is not backward, on every occaſion, to expoſe their follies and perverſities. On the other hand, the general character of Paganiſm made him very eaſy not to form any diſtinct judgement about the matter. Had he had any ſuch inclination, he was fairly invited to it by what he found (and therefore honeſtly related) of the obſtinacy

obſtinacy of the eruption, *reſolutely* bent to drive them to a diſtance *.

After all, a faithful hiſtorian, thus circumſtanced, muſt be ſufficiently diſtreſſed.

But Ammianus's ſkill was great, like his honeſty; and he found a way to diſengage himſelf with honour. Other conſiderations apart, the fact was too notorious to be ſmothered, and too important to be paſſed over: at the ſame time, the mention of it was nice and delicate; it was like walking over thoſe burning ruins while yet *hot with the breath* of the avenger. Two things, in it, equally required management, the *motive to the attempt*; and the *nature of the defeat*: the one affected the glory of his maſter; the other, the intereſts of his religion. See, now, his addreſs, and how artfully he has come off! Julian gave different reaſons for his project, as beſt ſuited the views he had on thoſe to whom he told it. To the Jews he affected compaſſion for their ſufferings, and reverence for their holy rites: To his *Prieſts* and *Sophiſts*, we may be confident, he revealed his ſecret purpoſe to be the diſgrace and ruin of revelation †: And to his *courtiers* and *military* men he pretended, what was moſt to their humour, the fame and glory of the enterprize. Though Ammianus was certainly no dupe to his profeſſions, yet he found it convenient, and he thought it fair, to convey that motive to poſterity, which Julian had given to his corps. The *defeat* was next to be conſidered. To own the miracle, would be condemning his *Religion*; explicitely to deny it, would be violating his *Honour*. He avoided this dilemma, by employing the words of the original Relator: and when we ſee, in his account, the very language of a narrative of State, we can no more doubt that he did employ them, than that Alypius himſelf ſent his maſter a relation of the whole affair.

But if the neceſſity of ſaying ſo much diſtreſſed his *Principles*, the neceſſity of ſaying no more crampt his *Genius*; which was

* Horque modo elemento *deſtinatius* repellente, ceſſavit inceptum.

† See the note in p. 410.

bold and ſwelling; and prompt, on theſe occaſions, to pour along the torrent of his eloquence. Hear how pompouſly he deſcribes an earthquake at Nicomedia.—"Eminuere Nicomediæ clades—"But the reader will find the reſt below *.

He profeſſes, we ſee, to tell his ſtory *briefly* and *truly*: And I believe he did ſo. Yet his *brevity* does not hinder him from ſpecifying the very day, nay even the hour when † this or that circumſtance was remarked: nor his *truth* from giving us as minute a deſcription of the various kinds of deaths as at a battle in Homer. How different is this from his relation of the event at Jeruſalem! There he does not ſo much as inform us of the *month* in which it happened; we ſhould even have been at a loſs for the *year*, but that the Perſian expedition directs us, to which the form of his annals hath connected it. And ſo far is he from dwelling upon the

* "—cujus ruinarum eventum *vere breviterque* abſolvam. Primo lucis exortu *die nono* "*kal. Septembrium*, concreti nubium globi nigrantium, lætam paulo antè cœli ſpeciem "confuderunt: et amandato ſolis ſplendore, nec contigua vel appoſita cernebantur: ita "oculorum obtutu præſtricto, humo involutus craſſæ caliginis ſqualor inſedit. *Dein*, "*velut numine ſummo fatales contorquente manubias*, ventoſque ab ipſis excitante cardinibus, "magnitudo furentium incubuit procellarum, et eliſi literis fragor; hæc quæ ſecuti "*typhones atque preſteres*, cum horrifico tremore terrarum, civitatem et ſuburbana fun- "ditus everterunt.—Interim clamoribus variis excelſa culmina reſultabant, *quæritantium* "*conjugium liberoſque*, et ſi quid neceſſitudinis arte conſtringit. *Poſt horam denique ſecun-* "*dam*, *multo ante tertiam*, aër jam ſudus et liquidus latentes retexit funereas ſtrages. "*Nonnulli* enim ſuperruentium ruderum vi nimia conſtipata ſub ipſis interiere ponderibus. "*Quidam* collo tenus aggeribus obruti, cum ſupereſſe poſſent ſi qui juviſſent, auxiliorum "inopiâ necabantur. *Alii* lignorum extantium acuminibus fixi pendebant. Uno ictu "cæſi *complures* paullo ante homines, tunc promiſcuæ ſtrages cadaverum cernebantur. "*Quoſdam* domorum inclinata faſtigia intrinſecus ferebant intactos, augore et inediâ "conſumendos.—*Alii* ſubita ruinæ magnitudine oppreſſi iiſdem adhuc molibus conte- "guntur. Colliſis *quidam* capitibus, vel humeris præfractis aut cruribus, inter vitæ mor- "tiſque confinia, aliorum adjumenta paria perferentium implorantes cum obteſtatione "magna deferebantur—"

† He is alike circumſtantial in dating that other dreadful commotion which happened in the firſt conſulate of Valentinian and his brother—"diem duodecimum Kal. Auguſ- "tas, Contule Valentiniano primum cum fratre, horrendi terrores," &c. l. xxvi. c. 10.

ſlaughter

ſlaughter that followed, the too certain conſequence of eruptions of this nature, that, had it not been for the Chriſtian writers, we might have ſuſpected his *horrible balls of fire* * had contained little more than a lambent flame, for any miſchief that followed.

Again, he is not content to relate the Nicomedian earthquake, and expatiate only on its *effects*: he is as particular in deſcribing both the *prognoſtics* that preceded it (ſuch as the firmament overcaſt, and the day darkened with ſtorms and tempeſts), and the *ſymptoms* that attended it (ſuch as the lightning and whirlwind). While, on the other hand, his account of the diſaſter in Jeruſalem is ſtript of all theſe circumſtances of terror; though they be the conſtant forerunners and attendants of fiery eruptions; and, if we may believe the Chriſtian writers, did actually precede and accompany this: nor have we any reaſon to diſbelieve them, becauſe they ſpeak (as we ſhall ſee) of certain phænomena, the natural effects of the diſordered elements, which they erroneouſly aſcribe to a different cauſe.

But this is not all: Ammianus, to give us the moſt fearful idea of this deſolation at Nicomedia, ſays, the conflict of nature was ſuch, as if the God of Nature himſelf, armed with all the ſtores of heaven, was hurling his lightning over a periſhing world. But we find not a line of this imagery in the affair at Jeruſalem. The Deity is there kept out of ſight; though the repeated eruptions, which, he ſays, ſeemed *obſtinately and reſolutely bent* to drive the workmen to a diſtance, drove him to the confines of ſuperior agency. But he was unwilling, and for a good reaſon, to call his readers after him.

What could occaſion a conduct ſo different in a caſe ſo ſimilar? Had he related the one as a noted fact, and the other but as an uncertain rumour, ſomething might be pretended. But this makes the difficulty, he tells them both as facts, and facts of equal notoriety and truth. A difficulty nothing can ſolve but what we

* Metuendi globi flammarum.

have already ſhewn to be the caſe, the baſhfulneſs of a backward evidence.

In this light we ſee, that his relating the eruption of Jeruſalem as a natural event, takes nothing from the reality of the divine interpoſition. When a Pagan bears teſtimony to a fact of this importance, we may be as ſure it is a *miracle* as, when a Papiſt bears teſtimony to a miracle of no importance at all, we are ſure it is a *trick*.

But his *reſerve* is ſo far from depriving us of the benefit of his teſtimony, that it is that which ſupports it. Had we found a Pagan ſpeaking like a Chriſtian Father on this occaſion, his evidence had ſoon become as ſuſpected as that of the Jewiſh hiſtorian, where he ſpeaks of *Chriſt*; which one of the ableſt and moſt candid of his critics has fairly condemned for an impoſture; and another equally reſpectable, who would fain bolſter up its credit, frankly owns, could never come from him in the condition it is brought down to us. This miracle, without queſtion, embarraſſed Marcellinus no leſs than the Worker of miracles diſtreſſed the other Hiſtorian: whoſe caſe the excellent Writer, juſt now mentioned, has well deſcribed. But had poſterity made equally free with both, I ſhould have deſpaired of diſengaging my Author with the addreſs and abilities he has ſerved Joſephus *.

In a word, all we want of our adverſaries is to have the fact acknowledged as Ammianus relates it. Its nature depends neither on his, nor on their, nor on our opinion of the matter, but on the nature of things. We think, indeed, that it ſpeaks itſelf. But, for the ſake of thoſe who think otherwiſe, I propoſe, in the courſe of this examination, to ſhew, that it was an effect, which no power but that of the moral Governor of the univerſe was able to produce.

I proceed, then, in my ſubject; to which theſe cavils are only the prelude.

* See Mr. Forſter's Diſcourſe, intituled, "A Diſſertation upon the account ſuppoſed to have been given of Jeſus Chriſt by Joſephus, &c. Oxon. MDCCXLIX."

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

THE next objection to the fact arises from what, one would have hoped, should have been the chief support of it, THE TESTIMONY OF THE FATHERS. But their credit amongst fashionable letters is now so low, that if they do not dishonour the cause they appear in, it is all we are to expect from them. For, as a late writer * graciously allows us to believe every strange thing except a MIRACLE, so, to say the truth, we are apt enough to credit every strange relator of antiquity, so he be not a FATHER. And yet, it is very certain, the *fathers* were, at worst, no more prejudiced in favour of Religion, than their Pagan neighbours were prejudiced against it. And whether these were philosophers, sophists, or statesmen, if we read their works, we shall find that very credulity, prejudice, false reasoning, and ill faith, which these objectors pretend has been discovered in some of the most celebrated of the *fathers*.

But what is it They have done, in the point in question, which proves so injurious to their own cause? "Why, it seems, they differ greatly from Ammianus, in their relation of this extraordinary fact; by adding many circumstances to his; some of which are utterly incredible."

Whether it were the *Fathers*, or their *Cause*, which render their accounts incredible, will be seen in due time. At present let me observe, it greatly eases their defence, that it cannot be fairly pretended, that the Christian writers contradict the relation of Ammianus, in any the least particular.

In the Second place, What I said before, of Marcellinus's substractions, I here repeat of the *Fathers' additions*; that they are so far from invalidating the fact, that they add greatly to its support. We have shewn Marcellinus to be an unwilling Evidence, who

* In a book, intituled, "Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding," printed 1748, p. 199.

hath cautiouſly avoided ſaying more than was juſt neceſſary to ſave harmleſs his character of a faithful hiſtorian. It was natural then to expect he had ſtudiouſly omitted ſuch circumſtances as made moſt for the honour of that cauſe to which he was neither a friend nor favourer.

Thirdly, Admitting it was as is pretended, that incredible things are to be found in their relations: this circumſtance will ſcarce be deemed ſufficient to overthrow a well-atteſted fact, by any who conſider that ſuch as are beſt eſtabliſhed have never been exempt from theſe injurious pollutions. The miracles of *Chriſt* and his apoſtles have not eſcaped the adulterations of heretics. And if this were ſufficient to diſcredit truth, there is not a fact in civil hiſtory that would ſtand its ground. As to thoſe who expect a certain innate virtue in Truth, of force to extrude all heterogeneous mixture, they expect a quality which was never yet found in it, nor, I fear, ever will. Nay, the more notorious a fact of this kind is, that is to ſay, the more eye-witneſſes there are of it, the more ſubject it is to undeſigned depravation; as there muſt be, amongſt a large cloud of evidence, ſome men of heated fancies: and the greater the communication, and the frequenter the colliſion, of theſe warm heads, the more active and inflamed will be the creative faculty of the mind; which, in that ſtate, we find, has always been the ſeminary of falſe circumſtances of the prodigious kind.

But we ſhould grant a great deal too much in allowing this to be the caſe here. Providence did not do its work by halves; nor was penurious in the grace ſo ſeaſonably beſtowed upon the ſuffering church. For, what, we have ſhewn, was performed in the ſight of all men, we ſhall ſee, was faithfully commemorated by the moſt celebrated preachers and apologiſts of *that* age; and as ſoberly and carefully recorded by the beſt hiſtorians of the *following*. And if, travelling downwards in a blind and heavy road, it contracted ſome ſtains of the ſoil through which it paſſed, it was never ſo diſfigured as to have thoſe dirty features miſtaken for its natural countenance, by any the leaſt attentive obſerver.

The

The Chriſtian Evidence for the fact are GREGORY NAZIANZEN, AMBROSE, and CHRYSOSTOM. Theſe lived at the time it happened. The next age produced RUFINUS, SOCRATES, SOZOMEN, and THEODORET, whoſe teſtimony is perfectly conſiſtent one with the other. In the laſt place are PHILOSTORGIUS, THEOPHANES, OROSIUS, NICEPHORUS, ZONARAS, and CEDRENUS, who, although diſtant and different in age, are ſo near allied in judgement, that they are here put together; not to add credit to the cauſe they ſerve; but, by ſeparating them from their ſeveral contemporaries of a better paſte and compound, to bear alone the ſhame of their proper folly or prevarication.

The original evidence, as we ſaid, are Ambroſe, Chryſoſtom, and Geegory Nazianzen. Of theſe, Ambroſe lived far in the Weſt; and having, as may be ſuppoſed, received only a general relation of the fact, he delivers it as generally. *Have you not heard* (ſays he, writing to the emperor Theodoſius) *how when Julian gave command to rebuild the temple of Jeruſalem, the workmen were deſtroyed by a* FIRE *ſent from God* * *?*

In

* This is an epiſtle to the Emperor, written on a very ſingular occaſion—A certain biſhop had excited his flock to burn a Jewiſh ſynagogue: which being complained of to Theodoſius, he ordered the offenders to be puniſhed; and that the biſhop ſhould rebuild it at his own expence. The impiety of this ſentence was ſo offenſive to Ambroſe, that, having reminded the Emperor of the fate of the Jewiſh Temple, he aſks him, whether he does not expect the ſame diſhonours ſhould attend his command, which followed the attempt of Julian. "Non audiſti, Imperator, quia cum juſſiſſet Julianus "reparari Templum Hieroſolymis, quod divino qui faciebant repagulum igne flagrarunt? "Non caves ne etiam nunc faciat? Adeo a te non fuit jubendum ut Julianus hoc juſ- "ſerit." Ep. xl. It was well this miracle was performed by God, to do honour to himſelf: Had it been to do honour to the biſhops of his church, we ſee how little they deſerved it! Here is one who violates the civil peace, and invades the religious rights of his neighbour; and another who ſupports him in ſo doing, on the authority of the miracle at Jeruſalem. In which they either foully prevaricate; or groſly miſtake the purpoſe of God's interpoſition. They repreſent it as intended for an example to the magiſtrate to reſtrain the Jews from all exerciſe of their ſuperſtition; when it was evidently for no other purpoſe than to ſupport the truth of the divine predictions concerning the

In which may be diſcerned the different fortune that naturally attends *truth* and *falſhood*. A fable, the further it goes, the more it gathers: for, like all untimely productions, coming out, at firſt, rude and unformed, it leaves room for charitable invention to give it ſhape; which, by general contribution, ſoon raiſes it to a bulk that looks conſiderable. Whereas the circumſtances of a true ſtory drop off, one after another, as it advances in its progreſs, till it becomes ſtript, and contracted to its eſſence: for there being preciſion in the teſtimony of the evidence, and conviction in the nature of the fact, men, on its firſt appearance, are leſs ſolicitous, as they have leſs need, to ſupport it by its circumſtances, than to convey it by its eſſentials.

Chryſoſtom, indeed, was in the neighbourhood of the place. But, ſpeaking to an audience as well inſtructed in the affair as himſelf, though he had frequent occaſion to put them in mind of ſo diſtinguiſhing a mercy, yet always dwells in generals; juſt as he would have done in referring to the crucifixion, or to any other the moſt known incident in the Goſpel. Thus, in his *Diſcourſe againſt the Jews and Gentiles*, ſpeaking of the deſolate condition of the *temple*, he ſays—"For in our times that monarch, who ex-
" ceeded all men in his malice to our holy faith, both lent the aid
" of the Imperial authority, and became an aſſociate in the deſign.
" They began the work, but could make no progreſs; for a FIRE,
" burſting from the foundations, drove away, and diſperſed all con-
" cerned in the undertaking *."

the ruin of a certain temple. Theodoſius was to expect the fate of Julian. And why? Becauſe he was *ſupporting* thoſe very rights of nature which Julian then *violated*: For the attempt to rebuild the temple was but one of the many arts he employed to extirpate the Chriſtian Faith by violence. But it has always been the trick, and has often proved the defeat, of Intolerance, to place their miſerable Principle on ſuch foundations as are found moſt of all to diſcredit it.

* —κ) γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς γεν-ᾶς τῆς ἡμεΐέρας ὁ πάνλας εἰς ἀσέβειαν νικήσας βασιλεὺς, κ) ἔδωκεν ἐξυσίαν τότε συνέ-εαξε, κ) τῷ ἔργῳ ἤψανλο, κ) ὐδὲ μικρὸν προσελθεῖν ἠδυνήθησαν, ἀλλὰ πῦρ ἀπὸ τῶν θεμελιῶν ἐκπηδῆσαν πάνλας αὐτοῖς ἀπήλασεν. Adverſus Judæos et Gentiles, tom. i.

The

The only contemporary *father*, therefore, from whom we can expect a detailed hiſtory of the event, is Gregory Nazianzen. For he, not living at a diſtance, like Ambroſe; nor preaching, like Chryſoſtome, to thoſe who knew every circumſtance, but reſiding in theſe quarters, and writing in defence of our holy faith, againſt Julian, in an appeal to the Roman Empire, was both qualified by his knowledge, and called upon by the nature of his performance, to be particular in his relation of the fact.

Now, as his account muſt undergo a ſevere ſcrutiny, it will be but fair to give it in his own words. Speaking then of Julian, he ſays,

"After having run through a courſe of every other tyrannical "experiment againſt the Faith, and, upon trial, deſpiſing all of "them as trifling and contemptible, he, at laſt, brought down the "whole body of the Jews upon us; whom, for their ancient turn "to ſeditious novelties, and an inveterate hatred of the Chriſtian "name, he choſe as the fitteſt inſtruments of his machinations. "Theſe, under a ſhew of great good will, which hid his ſecret pur-"poſe, he endeavoured to convince, from their ſacred books and "traditions, which he took upon him to interpret *, that now was "come the time foretold, when they ſhould return to their own "*Land*, rebuild their *temple*, and reſtore the *law* to its ancient "force and ſplendor. When theſe things had been thoroughly "inſinuated, and heartily entertained (for deceit finds eaſy admit-"tance when it flatters our paſſions), the Jews ſet upon the work "of rebuilding with great attention, and puſhed on the project "with the utmoſt labour and application. But when now driven "from their work by a violent whirlwind and a ſudden earthquake, "they fled together for refuge to a certain neighbouring church "(ſome to deprecate the impending miſchief; others, as is natural "in ſuch caſes, to catch at any help that preſents itſelf; and others,

* I think Gregory uſes the word ἐπῳδὴν ironically, in the ſenſe of pretending to interpret with a prophetic ſpirit.

"again,

" again, inveloped in the crowd, were carried along with the body " of flyers): there are who ſay, the church refuſed them entrance; " and that when they came to the doors, which were wide open " but a moment before, they found them, on a ſudden, cloſed by " a ſecret and inviſible hand; a hand accuſtomed to work theſe " wonders for the terror and confuſion of the impious, and for the " ſecurity and comfort of godly men. This however is now invariably " affirmed and believed by all, That as they ſtrove to force their way " in by violence, the FIRE, which burſt from the foundations of the " *temple*, met and ſtopt them, and one part it burnt and deſtroyed; " and another it deſperately maimed, leaving them a living monu- " ment of God's commination and wrath againſt ſinners. Thus " the affair paſſed; and let no man continue incredulous concern- " ing this, or the other miraculous works of God. But ſtill the " thing moſt wonderful and illuſtrious was a light, which appeared " in the heavens, of a Croſs within a Circle. That name and " figure, which impious men before eſteemed ſo diſhonourable upon " earth, was now raiſed on high, and equally objected to the com- " mon view of all men; advanced, by God himſelf, as the trophy " of his victory over unbelievers; of all trophies the moſt exalted " and ſublime. Nay further, they who were preſent, and partak- " ers of the miracle we are now about to ſpeak of, ſhew, to this " very day, the ſign or figure of the croſs which was then marked " or impreſſed upon their garments. For, at that time, as theſe " men (whether ſuch as were of us, or ſtrangers) were ſhewing " theſe marks, or attending to others who ſhewed them, each " preſently obſerved the wonder, either on himſelf or his neigh- " bour: having a radiant mark on his body or on his garment: " in which there was ſomething that, in art and elegance, exceed- " ed all painting or embroidery *."

This

* — ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντα διεξελθὼν τἄλλαν, καὶ πᾶν εἶδος τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶν τυραννίδος, ὡς μικρόν τι καὶ ἀγεννὲς ἀτιμάσας;—τέλος ἐπαφῆκε καὶ τὸ Ἰουδαίων φῦλον ἡμῖν, τὴν παλαιάν τε αὐτῶν κυφότητα, καὶ τὸ καθ' ἡμᾶν ἄνωθεν

This is the only contemporary writer amongſt the Chriſtians who delivers the account of the miracle *differently* from Ammianus Marcellinus, that is, with *additional* circumſtances. Let us ſee then what handle *he* hath given to the objector.

But before we come to examine what he *really* affirms, and takes upon his credit to ſupport; it will be proper to ſet in a true light what he is only *ſuppoſed* to affirm, and what he does not undertake to warrant.

He tells us, it was reported, that *thoſe who fled for refuge to an adjoining church, whoſe doors were wide open but a moment before, found them ſuddenly cloſed by an inviſible power.*—And, without queſtion, They who could not then get in, did believe the impediment to be miraculous. They did not conſider, that a frighted croud, all preſſing to be foremoſt, would ſoon choak up a wider paſſage than the door of a little oratory, like this where they ſought for refuge, had the doors been ſtill *open.* But he tells us they were ſuddenly *cloſed:* and, if they opened outward, the *power* that ſhut them could be only *inviſible* to a blind croud, half frighted

ἄνωθεν ὑποσμυκόμενον ἐν αὐτοῖς μῖσ⊙ ζυνεργὸν λαβὼν τῷ τεχνάσματι⊙, ἐπιθειάζων τε δῆθεν ἐκ τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς βίβλων καὶ ἀπορρήτων, ὡς νῦν αὐτοῖς ἀποκείμενον εἴη καὶ ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶν, καὶ τὸν νεὼν ἀναδείμασθαι, καὶ τῶν παλαίων τὸ κράτ⊙ ἀνανεώσασθαι, καὶ ἀποκρυπτόμεν⊙ εὐνοίας πλάσματι τὴν ἐπίνοιαν, ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ διεπήθη, καὶ ἔπεισεν. εὔκολον γὰρ εἰς ἀπάτην τὸ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἅπαν, οἱ μὲν ὡς ἀναγήσοντες διενοῦντο τὸ ἱερὸν, καὶ χερὶ πολλῇ, καὶ προθυμίᾳ περὶ τὸ ἔργον ἐταλαιπώρουν— ὡς δὲ ὑπὸ ἀθρίας λαίλαπ⊙, καὶ βρασμῷ γῆς ἄφνω ζυνελαθέντες ἐπί τι τῶν πλησίων ἱερῶν, οἱ μὲν ὡς ἐκπεπυσόντες ὥρμησαν. οἱ δὲ, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις φίλει ζυμβαίνειν, τῷ παρόντι χρώμενοι πρὸς βοήθειαν, οἱ δὲ ἄλλως ταραχῇ ζυμφερόμενοι, καὶ τοῖς θέσι ζυνεκπίπτοντες· εἰσὶ μὲν οἳ λέγουσιν, ὡς ὑδὲ τὸ ἱερὸν αὐτὰς προσοδέξαιτο, ἀλλ' ἀναπεπταμέναις προσελθόντες ταῖς πύλαις, ἐπιπεσοῦσαι ἐνέτυχον ἔκ τιν⊙ ἀοράτου καὶ ἀφανοῦς δυνάμεως, ἣ τὰ τοιαῦτα περαίνεσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀσεβῶν καθάπληξιν, καὶ τῶν εὐσεβῶν ἀσφάλειαν. ὃ δὲ ἅπαντες ἤδη καὶ λέγουσι πιστεύουσιν, ὅτι βιαζομένας αὐτὰς καὶ φιλονεικούσας περὶ τὴν εἴσοδον, πῦρ ἔρρηξεν ἀπαυθῆσαν ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ καὶ τὰς μὲν καθέφλεξε καὶ ἀνάλωσεν —τὰς δὲ τῶν καιρίων ἀπολοιπιάσας, σήλην ἀφῆκεν ἔμψυχον τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ κατὰ τῶν ἁμαρτωλῶν ἀπειλῆς καὶ κινήσεως. τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τοιοῦτο, καὶ ἀπιστεῖτο μηδείς, ἔτι μηδὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεσιν. Ὃ δὲ ἔτι παραδοξότερον καὶ περιφανέστερον, ἔστι φῶς ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ τὸν Σταυρὸν περίγαρφον. καὶ τὸ πρότερον ἐπὶ γῆς ἀτιμαζόμενον τοῖς ἀθέοις, καὶ σχῆμα καὶ ὄνομα νῦν ἐν οὐρανῷ δείκνυσθαι πασὶν ἐπίσης. καὶ γίνεσθαι τρόπαιον τῷ θεῷ τῆς κατὰ τῶν ἀσεβῶν νίκης, τροπαίου παντὸς ὑψηλότερον—ἐπιδεικνύμενον ἔτι καὶ νῦν τὰς ἐσθῆτας, αἷ τοῦ θαύματ⊙ ἐκείνου θεσπαὶ καὶ μύσται, τὰς τότε καθαγιασθείσας τοῖς τοῦ σταυροῦ τίτλοις. ὁμοῦ τι γὰρ ταῦτα διηγεῖτό τις [εἴτ' οὖν τῶν ἡμετέρων, εἴτ' οὖν τῶν ξένων] ἢ διηγουμένων ἤκουε καὶ τὸ θαῦμα ἑώρα παρ' ἑαυτῷ, ἢ τῷ πλησίον γινόμενον καθάπερ⊙ ὄν, ἢ ἐκείνον ὁρῶν τοιοῦτον ἐν ταῖς ἐσθήμασι, πάσης ἱστορικῆς ψηφῖδ⊙, ἢ περιέργου ζωγραφίας ποικιλώτερον ἐκ τούτου τί γίνεσθαι. Orat. iv. adv. Jul.

out of their wits. And, indeed, Gregory himſelf intimates, in the following words (where he ſpeaks of the fiery eruption) that this was not the general opinion; and particularly not his own; for he inſinuates what he deemed to be the true cauſe of the impediment, in telling us *they ſtrove to force their way in by violence.* But (adds he) that which followed, namely, the eruption, *is now invariably affirmed and believed by all.* As much as to ſay, time and cool examination, which corrected the firſt reports, have left the miraculous circumſtance of the *impediment* doubtful; but have put that of the *eruption* out of all queſtion.

This being premiſed, we come to the circumſtances additional to the account of Marcellinus. Gregory mentions three: 1. *a whirlwind and earthquake.* 2. *The light which appeared in the heavens of a croſs within a circle*; and, 3. *The figure of a croſs on the bodies and garments of the workmen and aſſiſtants.* Theſe, indeed, Gregory delivers as unqueſtioned facts, doubted or contradicted by none: and of ſo trite and frequent mention in the divines and hiſtorians of this time, that it is obſervable he tells the main fact, the *fiery eruption*, not directly or abſolutely, but only obliquely and occaſionally, for the ſake of a circumſtance not ſo generally known. Of all theſe, therefore, it will be incumbent on us to give ſome good account. I ſhall try them on the teſt of Ammianus's relation, as that is made (though only for this purpoſe) the ſtandard of the truth; and doubt not but they will be *all* found very credible, notwithſtanding their different degrees of evidence; the firſt, the whirlwind and earthquake, being *neceſſarily* connected with the eruption recorded by Ammianus; the ſecond, the croſs in the heavens, a *likely* attendant on the then unquiet ſtate of the elements: and the third, the croſs on the garments, very *conſonant* to what we know of meteorology.

1. Firſt then, as to the *earthquake.* Natural hiſtory informs us, that fiery eruptions, of which it makes frequent mention, are always preceded by an *earthquake.* And, indeed, the obvious nature of

of the thing inſtructs us, it can hardly be otherwiſe; the force of fire making its way through a heavy load, oppoſed to its exploſion, cannot but throw the incumbent earth into convulſive ſtruggles, during the agitation. And this tumult in the *inferior* elements muſt needs communicate itſelf to the adjoining parts of the *ſuperior*. Hence it hath ſo generally happened, that the diſorder below has been accompanied with the like above; ſuch as fierce *whirlwinds* and a troubled ſky: this was the firſt ſignal of the like dreadful conflict in the deſolation at Nicomedia, as Ammianus himſelf relates it.—"Concreti nubium globi nigrantium, lætam paullo ante "cœli ſpeciem confuderunt, ventoſque ab ipſis excitante cardini- "bus," &c. Thus far, therefore, Gregory's account is not only agreeable to the uſual courſe of things, in their unquiet ſtate, but the appearances are told in their order; the *whirlwind*, the *earthquake*, and the *fire*.

2. *The light which was ſeen in the heavens of a croſs within a circle*, is the ſecond thing we are to ſpeak to. Of this kind of phænomenon, the *eccleſiaſtical*, the *civil*, and the *natural* hiſtory, both of ancient and modern ages, affords us ſo many inſtances, that it will give us very little trouble. Not to keep the Reader in ſuſpenſe, it was neither more nor leſs than one of thoſe meteoric lights, in a ſtill and clouded ſky, which are not unfrequently ſeen in ſolar or lunar halos: And when the parhelia, and paraſelenes, which ſometimes attend them, are added to that appearance, we can eaſily conceive how greatly the pomp of them muſt be increaſed. To ſupport this account, we may obſerve, that this celeſtial croſs was not ſeen till the conflict in the ſky was over: it being the night after the ſtorm, and the night after that, as Theodoret * informs us; where, by the way, we may obſerve, this was a lunar halo.

* —κατὰ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν νύκτα καὶ αὖ πάλιν τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ, ὠφθη ἐν τῷ ἠέρι τὸ σωτηρίου σταυροῦ τὸ σχῆμα φωτοειδές. Eccl. Hiſt. l. iii. c. 20.

It was the ſame appearance, from whence (as Euſebius and others tell us) Conſtantine the Great drew the happy preſage of an approaching victory: it was the ſame which Cyril of Jeruſalem ſaw over that city, in the time of his ſon Conſtantius; to whom the good biſhop ſent the news, and, indeed, endeavoured to make the moſt of it. The hiſtorians of the middle ages have, at different times, occaſionally mentioned the like appearances; and, generally, mentioned them as miraculous. Since the revival of learning, the Naturaliſts and aſtronomers have taken notice of ſuch as happened in their times; and have attempted to explain their phyſical cauſes.

But here I find what I had farther to ſay, on this ſubject, already done to my hands, in a very ingenious and learned diſcourſe * of the excellent J. A. Fabricius: to which, with much ſatisfaction, I refer the Reader: For it is not my way to repeat what others have proved before me; or to defraud them of the praiſes due to their diſcoveries.

I will only make one obſervation. All theſe meteoric croſſes are repreſented as being encompaſſed by a luminous circle. A circumſtance, which, if but commonly attended to, would have betrayed their original. But ſo far from that, the *circle* was brought as a convincing argument of their being miraculous. With this, Gregory triumphs † over the mathematicians or aſtrologers; and defies them to account for it by their rules of art. Would the reader know the ground of ſo groſs a deluſion? It was no more than this, the *circle* was ſo eſtabliſhed an emblem of victory, that, like one of Epicurus's *Simulacra* (the exuviæ of *bodies*, as theſe of *minds*), they regarded it as the *moral phantom* that proclaimed Julian's defeat.

* Intit. "Exercitatio critica, qua diſputatur, Crucem, quam in cœlis vidiſſe ſe "juravit Conſtantinus imp. fuiſſe phænomenon naturale in halone ſolari." Vid. Bib. Græc. vol. vi.

† Πῆ σὺ τοῦτον ἔχεις τὸν ΚΥΚΛΟΝ ἐν τοῖς σοῖς μαθήμασι; Οὗτος τῆς Χριστοῦ ΝΙΚΗΣ ὁ ΣΤΕΦΑΝΟΣ. Orat. iv.

For

For figure and rhetoric had, in moſt times, but eſpecially in thoſe, been an overmatch for reaſon and ſcience.

3. But the laſt circumſtance (ſay the objectors) ſo far exceeds all the common length of credulity, that its invention muſt have put fancy to the ſtretch, and even fraud itſelf to the bluſh: and this is, the *mark of the croſs impreſſed upon the bodies, or garments*, of the people preſent.

As extraordinary as this may ſeem, I do not deſpair of regaining thoſe whom it hath moſt revolted.

But firſt it will be neceſſary to call in a writer of the next claſs, and conſider his words—"When therefore (ſays Socrates) a vaſt "number were aſſembled on the place, another prodigy happened; "for a FIRE FELL FROM HEAVEN, which conſumed all the work-"mens tools*." As this hiſtorian is the only writer who explicitely † mentions *lightning*, and its effects; it will be proper to conſider its credibility. Under the laſt head we have ſhewn, how a fiery eruption muſt occaſion a previous earthquake; and this earthquake, a ſtormy ſky. But air, put into a violent motion, always produces *lightning*, when it abounds with matter ſuſceptible of inflammation. And thoſe columns of air, which lie over places that labour with convulſive throws to caſt out an inkindled matter from its entrails, muſt needs be impregnated with vaſt quantities of ſulphureous particles, which the earth, in that condition, exſudes from its pores, and which the ſolar heat draws upwards. But the natural hiſtory of theſe eruptions ſupports this reaſoning. And Ammianus, whoſe evidence we have ſo often appealed to, gives us an example of it in the before-cited caſe of the *earthquake* at Nicomedia, attended, as appears by his account, with a firey eruption, like *that* at Jeruſalem. Now this hiſtorian tells us, that

* Παρόντων ἐν σφόδρα πολλῶν, ἕτερον τεράστιον ἐπιγίνεσθαι. πῦρ γὰρ ἐξ ἀέρος καταῖσκῆψαν, πάντα τὰ τῶν οἰκοδόμων ἐργαλεῖα διέφθειρεν. Soc. L. iii. c. 20.

† Philoſtorgius, by the mode of his expreſſion and by the order in which he puts things, ſeems as if he meant this fire, in the following words; τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ, πῦρ ἐπιπέμπει τοὺς ἐργάζεσθαι τολμῶντας. τοῦτο δὲ, σεισμὸς ἐχώνευεν. Ex. Lib. vii. c. 9.

there,

there, the earthquake was preceded by *lightning*, as well as ſtorms.—"Concreti nubium globi nigrantium, lætam paullo ante cœli ſpe-"ciem confuderunt—Dein velut numine ſummo *fatales contorquente* "*manubias* ventoſque ab ipſis excitante cardinibus, &c. —hæcque "ſecuti typhones atque preſteres, cum horrifico *tremore terrarum.*" The ſame, he affirms of that more dreadful earthquake which happened in the firſt conſulate of Valentinian and his brother. "Paulo poſt lucis exortum, denſitate prævia fulgurum acrius "vibratorum tremefacta concutitur omnis terreni ſtabilitas pon-"deris *."—

Lightning therefore, we ſee, is one of the conſtant concomitants in this deſolation.

Now lightning is formed by the ferment and exploſion of ſulphureous and bituminous exhalations from the earth, mixing with nitrous acids in the air. And as this mixture, or combination, is variouſly proportioned, according to the then caſual concourſe of elementary particles, ſo its deſtructive effects are various. Sometimes it hath been known to ſcorch up the cloaths without penetrating the body; and, ſometimes again, to break all the bones without diſcolouring the fleſh or cloaths; nay, even to melt the ſword without injuring the ſcabbard. In the *firſt* caſe we muſt conclude, the ſulphur predominated; in the *latter*, the ſalts. And according to *this* proportion, the lightning in queſtion ſeems to have been formed. For, they tell us, it melted the iron inſtruments, but hurt neither the cloaths nor fleſh; on which it affixed a croſs, without any ſenſible notice at the time of the impreſſion. For I make no ſcruple to affirm, that this mark was the natural effect of lightning, ſo conſtituted.

That lightning falls in regular figures, hath been frequentiy obſerved. The moſt unlikely, one ſhould think, is the circular; and yet, in that, it hath been commonly known to fall: the moſt likely is the angular, (and a *croſs* is but two ſtraight lines

* L. xxvi. c. 10.

meeting

meeting at right angles); yet this, though not very rare, has been leſs common.

But, it will be ſaid, "the fathers make it a matter of much more importance: and the fantaſtic things they tell of theſe *croſſes* exclude both nature and ſober miracle; and admit of no other cauſe but fraud or fanaticiſm; even though we ſhould ſubſtract from the account the contradictions that ariſe from their joint teſtimony. Gregory * and Socrates † ſay theſe croſſes were *ſhining* and *radiated:* but Theodoret ‡ tells us, they were not bright and ſhining, but ſhaded with a dark colour: again, Rufinus and Socrates affirm, they were by no means to be waſhed out §."

All this, it muſt be owned, hath the rank air of inventive prodigy. Yet view it well, and you ſee nature breaking in upon you. In a word, the fathers could have ſaid nothing more corroborative of our account; which reduces them to a natural phænomenon: for the qualities they give to theſe croſſes, not only ſhew them to be *meteoric*, but inform us of their very *ſpecific* nature; which was preciſely that of the PHOSPHORUS.

They ſhone by night, and were dark, and ſmokey-coloured by day (for thus, the different accounts of their appearance, given us by Gregory and Theodoret, are plainly to be reconciled, by the teſtimony of Rufinus ‖) the very property both of natural and artificial Phoſphori. Of the *firſt* kind, are inſects, rotten-wood, ſhell-fiſh, tainted fleſh **, ſcales, feathers, of certain animals, &c.

Of

* Κατάστερος.

† Τῇ ἐρχομένῃ νυκτὶ, σφραγῖδες ταυρῷ ἀλλιναιδεῖς.

‡ Οὐκ ἔτι μέλοι φωσφόρων, ἀλλ' ἐκ μελαίνης καλαστευασμένων χροιᾶς. L. iii. c. 20.

§ Ut etiam qui diluere pro ſui infidelitate voluiſſet, nullo genere valeret abolere. Ruf.——ἀποπλύνειν καὶ ἀποσμήχειν θέλοιεν, οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ ἐκ ἐνῆν. Socr.

‖ In ſequenti nocte in veſtimentis omnium ſignaculum crucis ita evidens apparuit. Hiſt. Eccl. l. x. c. 37.

** Hoſſein the ſon of Ali, and grandſon of Mahomet, was killed in aſpiring to the throne in the Califate of Yeſid. His head was cut off and carried by a ſoldier to the governor

Of the *latter*, that ſolid body, in particular, made from urine (for almoſt all bodies will afford it) with which, if one writes, as with a pencil on paper, the letters, in the night, will appear like flame, and, in the day time, preſent only a dim, ſmokey ſuffuſion.

The reader will be further confirmed in this opinion, if he conſiders of what the *artificial phoſphorus* is compoſed; which is chiefly a fixed ſalt, obtained by a long proceſs by fire; in the courſe of which much of this element ſeems to be imbibed: ſo as to give the minute parts of the phoſphorus the proper motion and agitation to produce light. Now the ſalts were predominant in the lightning in queſtion, as appears by its violent effects on metals, and its innocuous contact with ſofter bodies. And we can eaſily conceive how that high ferment, by which lightning is formed, may produce a *natural* phoſphorus, in the ſame manner as a long proceſs by fire makes the *artificial*.

This will account too for the difficulty in waſhing out the marks. Thoſe on the bodies would ſooner diſappear; thoſe on the habits more ſlowly. And it is obſervable, that, though Gregory tells us, the curious yet produced (when he wrote) the marks on the garments; he ſays nothing of thoſe on the bodies.

And now, I preſume, the candid reader may be diſpoſed to abate his wonder, and inclined to give the *fathers* credit for the facts, how much ſoever they might be miſtaken in the immediate cauſe of them: and the unbeliever, from the fate of ſo *promiſing an objection*, may be taught the uſe of modeſty and diffidence, when he oppoſes his own reaſon to the truths that eſtabliſh Revelation.

But to put the matter farther out of doubt, I ſhall produce a paſſage from the Adverſaria of the famous Isaac Casaubon, written while in England, and, as his ſon Meric conjectures (to whom we are indebted for it) about the year 1610-11. It follows in

governor of Couſſah; as it lay on a table in the night the wife of the ſoldier pretended that a lambent flame played about the head, which might very well be. But this by the Partiſans of Ali was eſteemed a great miracle.

theſe words: "This day the Lord Biſhop of Ely *, a prelate of "great piety and holineſs, related to me a wonderful thing. He "ſaid he had received the account from many hands, but chiefly "from the Lord Biſhop of Wells, lately dead †, who was ſuc- "ceeded by Biſhop Montague; that in the *city of Wells*, about fif- "teen years ago ‡, one ſummer's day, while the people were at "divine ſervice in the cathedral church, they heard, as it thun- "dered, two or three claps above meaſure dreadful, ſo that the "whole congregation, affected alike, threw themſelves on their "knees at this terrifying ſound. It appeared, the lightning fell "at the ſame time, but without harm to any one. So far, then, "there was nothing but what is common in the like caſes. The "wonderful part was this, which afterwards was taken notice of "by many, that the marks of a CROSS were found to have been "imprinted on the bodies of thoſe who were then at divine ſer- "vice in the cathedral. The Biſhop of Wells told my Lord of Ely, "that his wife (a woman of uncommon probity) came to him, "and informed him, as of a great *miracle*, that ſhe had then the mark "of a *croſs* impreſſed upon her body. Which tale when the Biſhop "treated as abſurd, his wife expoſed the part, and gave him ocular "proof. He afterwards obſerved, that he had upon himſelf, on "his arm (as I take it) the plaineſt mark of a ✝. Others had it "on the ſhoulder, the breaſt, the back, or other parts. This ac- "count that great man, my Lord of Ely, gave me in ſuch a "manner, as forbade me even to doubt of its truth §."

Here,

* Doctor Lanc. Andrews, afterwards Biſhop of Wincheſter.

† Dr. John Still.

‡ The following note was communicated by a learned friend. R. W.

"Hoc etiam anno [1596], in agro Somerſettenſi, urbeculæ epiſcopalis, cui a fontibus "Velles [Wells] nomen, templum—die dominico, magnâ plebis frequentiâ, fulmine "concuſſum, & ardere viſum; ingenti populi conſternatione, planctu & lamentatione: "flamma undique circumvolitans omnem multitudinem circumplexa eſt, majore formi- "dine quàm damno, quippe veſtes & capilli ambuſti, intactis corporibus." Rob. Johnſon, Rerum Britannicarum Hiſtoria, L. vii. p. 223.

§ Rem miram mihi narrabat hodie Dom. Epiſcopus Elienſis, ſanctæ pietatis Antiſtes.

Here, then, we have the very ſame event, happening from the ſame cauſe, the *burſt of lightning*. The only difference is, that *here* the *croſs* appeared upon the bodies only: *there* both on the cloaths and bodies. A difference which the more or leſs ſubtilty of the meteoric matter would occaſion.

The fact, we find, is as well atteſted as a fact can poſſibly be. A biſhop, of the greateſt name in his time for virtue and knowledge, receives it from an eye-witneſs, and a party concerned, a biſhop likewiſe of an irreproachable character, and tells it to a man whoſe candid honeſty and well-digeſted learning had rendered him one of the greateſt ornaments of the age in which he lived. This account his ſon, a man of learning likewiſe, and of approved integrity, finds under his father's own hand, in his Adverſaria, and gives it to the world; with this additional information, that he, the ſon, who had been beneficed in Somerſetſhire, had never heard the fact diſputed, but had frequently met with ſeveral who pretended to a perfect knowledge of it.

To this let me add, that religion was out of the queſtion. Here was no church, or churchman, no ſect or doctrine, to be confuted or eſtabliſhed, by the atteſtation of a prodigy. The great critic

Dicebat ſe accepiſſe à multis, ſed præcipue à Dom. Epiſcopo Vellenſi nuper mortuo, cui ſucceſſit Dom. Montacutus: eveniſſe ante annos circiter xv, in urbe Wella, ſive ea dicenda, Valla, die quadam æſtiva, ut, dum in Eccleſiâ Cathedrali populus ſacris vacabat, duo vel tria tonitrua inter plura audirentur, ſupra modum horrenda, ita ut populus univerſus in genua μιᾷ ὁρμῇ procumberet ad illum ſonum terribilem. Conſtitit fulmen ſimul cecidiſſe, ſine cujuſquam damno tamen. Atque hæc vulgaria. Illud admirandum, quod poſtea eſt obſervatum à multis, repertas eſſe crucis imagines impreſſas corporibus eorum, qui in æde ſacra tum fuerant. Dicebat Epiſcopus Vallenſis D. Elienſi, uxorem ſuam (honeſtiſſima ea fœmina fuit) veniſſe ad ſe, et ei narraſſe pro grandi miraculo ſibi in corpore impreſſa ✠ ſigna extare; quod cum riſu exciperet Epiſcopus, uxor, nudato corpore, ei probavit verum eſſe quod dixerat. Deinde ipſe obſervavit ſibi quoque ejuſdem ✠ manifeſtiſſimam imaginem impreſſam eſſe, in brachio, opinor: aliis in humero, in pectore, in dorſo, aut alia corporis parte. Hoc vir maximus, Dom. Elienſis, ita mihi narrabat, ut vetaret de veritate hiſtoriæ ambigere. Ex Adverſ. Iſ. Caſaubon. apud Mer. Caſaubon. in tract. intit. *Of credulity and incredulity*, p. 118.

ſpeaks

ſpeaks of it as a phyſical, though a wonderful event. The very biſhops deliver it to one another, and to him, as only an eſcape of nature. The biſhop's wife indeed, at firſt, ſeemed a little planet-ſtruck with ſuperſtition; and while ſhe thought herſelf only diſtinguiſhed with this badge of ſanctity, was very willing it ſhould paſs for a *miracle*. But the honeſt biſhop laughed her out of this conceit: and when ſhe found how ſmall a part of the honour was likely to fall to her ſhare, ſhe ſeemed content to ſubmit it to her huſband's better judgment.

Now, as religion and religious purpoſes had nothing to do in this wonder, that extraordinary philoſopher *, once before quoted, will permit us to give it credit.

It is indeed ſo well proved, as to bear much weightier obſervations than any I have to lay upon it: what I have to ſay being only this, 1. That the two or three dreadful exploſions perfectly agree with what hath been obſerved of the componency of that lightning which produces ſuch an effect; namely, that it abounded with nitrous and fixed ſalts. 2. The relation ſays, it was ſome time after that the croſſes were found upon the bodies of the patients; and that the biſhop obſerved one upon himſelf on talking with his wife about it. This may give light to a paſſage in Gregory, which has the air of myſtery, and yet amounts to no more than what the ſimpler and leſs ſublime pen of this modern critic explains. The words of Gregory are theſe: *As they were ſhewing theſe marks, or attending to others who ſhewed them, each preſently obſerved the wonder, either on himſelf or his neighbour; a radiant mark on his body or his garment.*

But ſuppoſe it ſhould be ſaid, "That the circumſtance of *lightning*, on which we pretend to explain this phænomenon, is not ſufficiently eſtabliſhed; as it is mentioned but by one hiſtorian; and only in two words; and by the general name of a *fire* from

* The author of Philoſophical Eſſays, &c.

Heaven." Whoever ſays it, will gain little, if his deſign be to invalidate the circumſtance; and yet leſs, if he thinks that the diſcredit of that circumſtance will deprive us of the means of accounting for the *croſſes*. For it appears, from the nature of things already explained, that a *fire* from *beneath* might produce this effect as naturally as a *fire* from *above*. And by a relation, as well atteſted and notorious as the fact preſerved in Caſaubon, we have a famous inſtance of its having actually produced it. The excellent Mr. Boyle, in his *diſcourſe of ſome unheeded cauſes of the inſalubrity and ſalubrity of the air*, gives us the following hiſtory from Kircher and others.——" And that the ſubterraneal effluvia may produce
" effects, and therefore probably be of natures very uncommon,
" irregular, and, if I may ſo ſpeak, extravagant, may appear in thoſe
" *prodigious* crosses that were ſeen in our time, *viz.* in the year
" 1660, in the kingdom of Naples, after the *eruption of the fiery*
" *mountain Veſuvius*; of which prodigies the learned Kircherus has
" given an account in a particular Diatribe: for theſe *croſſes* were
" ſeen on linen-garments, as ſhirt-ſleeves, womens' aprons, that
" had lain open to the air, and upon the expoſed parts of ſheets;
" which is the leſs to be admired, becauſe, as Kircher fairly gueſſes,
" the mineral vapours were, by the texture that belongs to linen
" (which conſiſts of threads croſſing one another, for the moſt
" part, at or near right angles) eaſily determined to run along in
" almoſt ſtraight lines, croſſing each other, and conſequently to
" frame ſpots reſembling ſome one, and ſome another kind of *croſſes*.
" Theſe were *extremely numerous* in the ſeveral parts of the king-
" dom of Naples; inſomuch that the Jeſuit, that ſent the relation
" to Kircher, ſays, that he himſelf found thirty in one altar-cloth,
" that fifteen were found upon the ſmock-ſleeve of a woman, and
" that he reckoned eight in a boy's band: alſo, their colour and
" magnitude were very unequal, and their figures diſcrepant, as
" may appear by many pictures of them drawn by the relator; *they*
" *would not waſh out with ſimple water, but required ſoap*; their
" *duration*

" *duration* was alſo unequal, ſome laſting ten or fifteen days, and " others *longer*, before they diſappeared *."

1. The firſt obſervation I ſhall make on this curious narrative, is, that theſe Veſuvian *croſſes* appear to have been impreſſed only on the garments, and not on the bodies: juſt contrary to thoſe occaſioned by the lightning at Wells; which were on the bodies, and not on the garments: while the Julian croſſes appeared on *both*. The reader, therefore, if he likes it, may ſuppoſe, without any abſurdity, that in the caſe at Jeruſalem, the croſſes on the bodies were cauſed by the *lightning*; and the croſſes on the garments, by the *eruption from the foundations*.

2. The Veſuvian croſſes were *extremely numerous*; which agrees well with the relations of Sozomene and Theodoret, the laſt of whom ſays, their garments were *filled* with them.

3. Theſe Veſuvian croſſes were hardly to be waſhed out: which exactly agrees with what Socrates and Rufinus tell of the ſame remarkable quality in the croſſes at Jeruſalem.

4. Laſtly, we underſtand, that the marks of ſome of theſe were of conſiderable duration; as were thoſe mentioned by Gregory Nazianzene; which, he ſays, continued to the time he wrote.

So much then for the contemporary evidence; which, though *fathers of the church*, are come off, we ſee, with honours and moſt ſo in a circumſtance of a very delicate nature.

In the next claſs are Rufinus, Socrates, Sozomene and Theodoret. And all they add to the miraculous of Gregory's relation, are theſe two particulars, 1. The *lightning*, or a fire from Heaven, mentioned by Socrates. And, 2. this other circumſtance, told us by Theodoret, that *when they began to dig the foundations, and carry out the earth, an incredible number of people was employed all day long upon the work. But in the night, the earth, thus taken out,*

* Works of Mr. Boyle, in folio, vol. IV. p. 293.

returned,

returned, of its own accord, from the valley into which it had been thrown *.

The caſe of the *lightning* hath been conſidered already, where it was brought in to explain the nature of the *croſſes*. And, on that occaſion, its cloſe connexion with the reſt of the phænomena was examined and explained.

What reſts to be accounted for is only the *filling again of the foundations* with the earth that had been thrown out. And this appears to be one of thoſe natural events, which, when mens minds are poſſeſſed with miracles (whether real or imaginary) they are wont to explain into prodigies: of the ſame nature and origin, doubtleſs, with that imagination in Gregory, that when the croud, which were tumultuouſly breaking into the church, had ſtopped up the paſſage, they were kept back by an inviſible hand. For admit the fact as Theodoret relates it, that the *foundations* were filled again, and the *valley*, into which the earth had been thrown, was emptied; nothing was more natural than for an *earthquake* to do both, if it did any thing at all. The uſual effect it is obſerved to produce, being an entire alteration in the face of things; ſuch as the filling what is empty, and the emptying what is full. Caſſiodorus, called *the Senator* (who abridged the *Tripartite Hiſtory* which Epiphanius Scholaſticus compoſed out of thoſe of Socrates, Sozomene, and Theodoret), ſmooths what looked too rugged in this miracle, by the lightneſs and currency of his expreſſion, *nocte vero ſpontanea terra de valle creſcebat* †; ſuffering the reader to go at his pleaſure into the ſolution here given: In ſupport of which it will be proper to obſerve, that the ſhocks of the *earthquake* were repeated at different times. Gregory, we ſee, tells us of one which happened by *day*, when the labourers were driven for refuge to a neighbouring church. On the other hand, Socrates as expreſsly

* Ἐπεὶ δὲ ὀρύττειν ἤρξαντο καὶ τὸν χῶν ἐκφορεῖν, πανημέριον μὲν τοῦτο ἔδρων μυριάδες πολλαί. νύκτωρ δὲ ὁ χῶς αὐτομάτως ἀπὸ τῆς φάραγγος μετεῖθεο. Eccl. Hiſt. L. iii. c. 20.

† L. vi. c. 43.

mentions

mentions one by night * : the very ſame (as appears from the ſimilarity of the effects) which Socrates ſpeaks of, in theſe words: *On the coming day, when they were to begin with the foundation, a great earthquake happened* †: Sozomene's caſt out *ſtones from the foundation*; ſo did that of Socrates ‡. It *overturned a portico*, and cruſhed to death ſeveral who were then abiding in it §: And this Theodoret expreſsly ſays happened by *night*, and to men aſleep ‖.

The *order*, or, to ſpeak more properly, *caſual* diſpoſition of Theodoret's relation, is this:—The miraculous filling again of the foundations—The diſperſion of the lime and ſand by tempeſts—The earthquake—After that the eruption, and then, for a cloſe, the fall of the portico.

From hence I would obſerve, 1. That, though Theodoret, by the turn of his expreſſion, would ſeem to inſinuate, that the eruption followed the earthquake very ſpeedily **; yet we ſee, by Sozomene, there was a conſiderable ſpace between; ſufficient to clear again the foundations from the ruin they had ſuffered ††. But leſt it ſhould be ſaid (as it hath been obſerved there were ſhocks of an earthquake at *different* times) this might be what immediately preceded that eruption, it will be proper to take notice, that the reflection Theodoret makes upon it is the very ſame with, and, indeed, appears to be borrowed from, what Socrates makes on the

* Διὰ τῆς νυκτὸς σεισμὸς μέγας ἐπιγενόμενος. L. iii. cap. 20.

† Λέγεται τῆς ἐπιούσης, καθ' ἣν πρῶτον θεμέλιον ἤμελλον ὑποτίθεσθαι, σεισμὸν γενέσθαι μέγαν. L. v. c. 22.

‡ Λιθρασε τὰς λίθας τῶν παλαι θεμέλιον τοῦ ναοῦ Socrat.
Ὑπὸ δὲ κλόνου τῆς γῆς ἐκ βάθρων ἀναδοθῆναι τὰς λίθους. Sozom.

§ Καὶ δημόσιαι Στοαὶ ἐν αἷς κατέλυσαν ἀθρόον καὶ ῥύηναν καὶ οἱ πλείους ἐν καλαληφθέντες, οἱ μὲν αὐτίκα ἀπώλοντο, &c. Sozom.

‖ Καὶ Νύκτωρ δὲ παμπόλλων ἔν τινι φυλαζόντων καθευδόντων Στοᾷ, καὶ κατέχθη μὲν ἀθρόως σὺν τῷ ὀρόφῳ τὸ οἰκοδόμημα· τοὺς δὲ καθευδοντας συνέχασιν ἄπαλλαι. Theodor.

** Πρῶτον μὲν σεισμὸς ἐγένετο μέγιστος—ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν ἔδεισαν, πῦρ τε τῶν ὀρυσσομένων θεμελίων ἀνάδραμὸν, &c. Theodor.

†† Ὡς δὲ σείων ἔληξεν ὁ Θεὸς, αὖθις ἐπεφώλο τοῦ ἔργου οἱ περιλειφθέντες—πάλιν ἀνήνυτα ἐσπέδαζον, λύγῳ δ' ἅμα τε τὸ διύτερον ἐνεχείρουν τῷ ἔργῳ, καὶ πῦρ, &c. Sozom.

earthquake,

earthquake, which he expreſsly ſays happened by *night* *. Now, between this, and the eruption, he tells us, there was time ſufficient for many to come out of the country to Jeruſalem, whither the fame of the earthquake had brought them †. But Theodoret's own expreſſion helps us to aſcertain the thing. He ſays the fire broke out, ἐκ τῶν ὀρυσσομένων θεμελίων, *from the foundations which were ready dug*, in order to be built upon, which ſuppoſes what Sozomene ſays, to be true, that there was time to repair the diſorders which *that* ſhock of the earthquade had occaſioned.

And thus Caſſiodorus underſtood him: For, ſpeaking, as we obſerved above, of this miraculous return of the earth, he ſays, *every thing was prepared anew* ‡.

By this time the Reader begins to ſee day, through the thick confuſion of Theodoret's cloud of circumſtances: in which, his addition of the wonderful, in filling again the works, amounts only to this, that an earthquake, in the night, tumbled ſome rubbiſh into the *foundations*; and forced ſome out from a *valley* into which it had been thrown.

The disjointed parts in Gregory, Socrates, and Sozomene, and which are ſtill further diſtorted by Theodoret, the Latin Hiſtorian Rufinus fairly reduces to their place. "Behold (ſays he) in the * "*night*, the laſt that preceded the day for laying the foundation, a "prodigious earthquake ariſes, by which, not only the ſtones of "the foundations are caſt abroad and diſperſed, but almoſt all the "edifices, that were about the place, are thrown down and levelled. "Public porticos alſo, in which a great multitude of Jews, who "were obſerved to puſh on the work with moſt vigour, had their "abode, being thrown down, bury all that are found under them

* Δέος δὲ ἐν τῇ γενομένῃ Ἰουδαίοις κατέλαβε. Socrat.
Καὶ τοὺς παμπληθῶς ἀμυήτους τῶν θείων ἐκπληξαι καὶ ἐκπλῆξαι. Theodor.

† Καὶ φήμη ἐπὶ τὸν τόπον ἦγε τὴν τοῦ πύρρου διάνοιαν, παρόντων δὲ σφόδρα πολλῶν ἕτερον τερατίον ἐπιγίνεσθαι. πῦρ γὰρ, &c. Socrat.

‡ Nocte vero ſpontanea terra de valle creſcebat. Solutis itaque prioris etiam fundamenti reliquiis, nova omnia præparabant. L. vi. c. 43.

"in

" in their ruins *." Thus Rufinus, by *fairly putting together* the ſeveral parts of one event, hath ſhewn, that levelling the ground, and overthrowing the porticos, were the ſimple conſequences of the earthquake: while Theodoret, by *disjointing* them, and delivering the effects ſeparately, and without their common cauſe, hath made two miracles out of one natural event.

The Reader now ſees what the FATHERS have to ſay on the occaſion. He has had their teſtimony laid at large before him. Let us ſtop a moment then, and caſt a general eye upon the whole. I perſuade myſelf we ſhall ſee ſuch a concurrence and conſiſtency in the accounts of the TWO PARTIES; ſo perfect an agreemenr between the Pagan teſtimony, and the *firſt* claſs of Chriſtian writers; ſo cloſe a dependency between *theſe* and the *ſecond* claſs; and ſuch a connection and enchainment of one fact to another, throughout the whole, as will force the moſt backward to confeſs, that the hand of God was of a truth in this wonderful defeat.

Ammianus Marcellinus, Julian, and Ambroſe, ſpeak ſimply of the firey eruption; Chryſoſtome goes one ſtep further, and tells us of its fatal effects. Gregory enters more minutely into the affair: he uſhers it in with what is always found to be the precurſors of this dreadful judgement, *ſtorms* and *earthquakes*: and cloſes the ſcene with two meteoric phænomena, likely enough to ſucceed it, though, indeed, not ſo much in the way of common obſervation.

The following writers, Rufinus, Socrates, Sozomene, and Theodoret, add little to theſe relations. But the manner in which they tell their ſtory (at the ſame time that it confirms, and explains the accounts of thoſe who went before) proves they are not mere tranſcribers from their predeceſſors; at leaſt not from ſuch of them as

* Ecce, Nocte, quæ ad incipiendum opus jam ſola reſtabat, Terræ motus ingens oboritur, et non ſolum fundamentorum ſaxa longeque lateque jactantur, verum etiam totius pene loci ædificia complanantur. Porticus quoque publicæ, in quibus Judæorum multitudo, quæ operi videbatur inſiſtere, commanebat, ad ſolum deductæ, omnes Judæos, qui reperti ſunt, oppreſſere. L. x. c. 37, &c.

now remain; which amounts to the ſame as if they themſelves were original.

Thus, for inſtance, Gregory, indeed, mentions the *croſs* upon the garments; but it is to Socrates only, who ſpeaks of the *lightning*, that we owe the knowledge of the *cauſe*.

So again, Gregory calls them *lucid* croſſes; but we are indebted to Rufinus, Socrates, and Theodoret, for the diſcovery of their ſpecific nature; who tell us, that they ſhone by night, were dark-coloured by day, and could not eaſily be waſhed out.

This will lead us to obſerve another mark of truth in theſe relations; That the moſt wonderful circumſtances, ſuch as the *qualities* of theſe croſſes, and the lucid circle round the *aerial* croſs (circumſtances which might ſeem to be made at pleaſure for the ſake of the marvellous) prove to be the *very qualities* which belong phyſically to their reſpective natures.

Nay, where their prepoſſeſſions had led them to find prodigies in accidents the moſt common; as where Gregory aſcribes the impediment to enter the church-doors to an inviſible hand; and Theodoret, the filling up the foundations, to be the return of the ſame earth back to its poſt; they have themſelves honeſtly recorded theſe very *facts* which enable us to rectify their miſtakes: Thus the *confuſion* of the crowd, which Gregory mentions, when they were endeavouring tumultuouſly to force their way, very naturally accounts for the impediment: and the *earthquake*, Theodoret ſpeaks of, could not but produce that new face in the foundations, which he took to be miraculous.

Once more. The *fathers* indeed record many dreadful circumſtances: but then none of them prove falſe terrors. If there were *ſtorms* and *tempeſts*, they do their work; the ſand and lime are diſperſed: When the *lightning* falls, the tools and inſtruments of building are conſumed and melted: the *earthquake* overthrows porticos: The *firey eruption* tears in pieces the foundations: and not one of theſe attacks upon impiety, but what diſperſes, maims, or deſtroys the aſſembled workmen, and their abettors.

After

After this too we are told, the various effects it had upon the minds of all, how differently ſoever intereſted. This is of more importance than appears at firſt ſight. Invention and fable is not wont to go thus far. It may tell us of *appearances*; but it will never venture to ſpeak of *effects*, which the hearer could immediately diſprove. That which has a fairy entrance, has a fairy exit. Here the effects are mentioned that the truth may be examined. Chryſoſtome actually appeals, for the reality of the *eruption*, to the ſight of the burnt and ſhattered foundations, and to the maimed and ſcorched ſurvivors amongſt the workmen. And All of them might have appealed, for the reality of the *ſtorms* and *lightning* (which diſperſed the lighter materials, and conſumed the heavier, together with the tools and inſtruments of work) to the conduct of Julian and Alypius: For what other reaſon can be aſſigned, I do not ſay, for their *deferring*, but for their *giving up*, the whole enterprize * ?

Having now diſcourſed ſo largely on the ſeveral circumſtances of this event, and yet (by reaſon of the *occaſional* mention of them) not having been able to preſerve the order in which they happened; it may tend to ſupport, or at leaſt to illuſtrate, what hath been already ſaid, if we give a general view of them in one continued and connected relation.

And here our principal Guide will be the *nature of the phænomena*: for though the Chriſtian Writers will not be uſeleſs, yet their perpetual violation of the order of time makes it neceſſary to regulate their accounts on the reaſon of things.

In excuſe of their conduct, ſomething is to be aſcribed to the literary genius of thoſe times, which was inaccurate and immethodical; ſomething to the nature of their evidence, collected from diſcourſes, where the mention of this illuſtrious event is only brought in to ſupport ſome particular point of doctrine or morality

* Πεισθῆναι δὲ καὶ Ἰουδαίους καὶ Ἕλληνας, ἐμπλεῖς τὸ ἔργον καταλιπόντας. Soz. L. v. c. 22. Καὶ αὐτὸν [Ἰουλιανὸν] καὶ τοὺς Ἰουδαίους εἰς ἐσχάτην ἐμπεσεῖν καὶ αἰσχύνην καταπεσόντας. Philoſt. Hiſt. Eccl. l. vii. c. 9.

then in queſtion; but the principal ſource of their neglect of order, was a falſe perſuaſion that every circumſtance was miraculous and out of nature. This hindered them from inquiring into the order of time, and would have prevented them from finding it, had they been diſpoſed to inquire. Beſides, the *confuſion* of time ſupported their *ſyſtem* of the miraculous, by ſeparating the *cauſes* from the *effects*: and the *regulation* of it would have looked like an impiety, as ſeeking for that in nature whoſe ſource was only in God. This too will account why the fault was not reformed by the Hiſtorians who followed the original evidence; and whoſe buſineſs it was to reduce to order the confuſion in the occaſional works of their predeceſſors. However, whether the miracles became *caſually* multiplied by a neglect of chronology, or that they *purpoſely* neglected it, in order to multiply them; yet multiplied they were; as we have ſhewn, in our inquiry into the *nature* of the circumſtances. And nothing can better ſupport the *truth of the deduction* ariſing from this enquiry, than the placing each circumſtance in the order in which it happened. This we ſhall now endeavour to do.

1. The firſt ſigns the Almighty gave of his approaching judgement, were the *ſtorms*, *tempeſts*, and *whirlwinds*. For the incumbent air could not but be affected with the ferment, at that time working in the earth, and exſuding through its pores. Theſe inſtruments of vengeance performed their office, in the diſperſion of the looſe materials *.

2. After theſe followed the *lightning*, the uſual conſequence of the claſh and colliſion of clouds, driven forcibly together by ſtorms and tempeſts. The effects this produced were, *firſt*, deſtroying the more ſolid materials, and melting down the iron inſtruments †: and *ſecondly*, impreſſing that prodigious mark on the bodies and

* Ἐπειδὴ δὲ χὴ γύψῳ χὴ τιλάισι πολλὰς μεδίμνων συνήθροισαν μυριάδας, ἐξαπίνης ἄνεμοι βίαιοι πνεύσαντες, πάσας ἀθρόως ἐσκέδασαν. Theod. Hiſt. Eccl. l. iii. c. 20.

† Πῦρ γὰρ ἐξ ΟΥΡΑΝΟΥ καλασκῆψαν, πάντα τὰ τῶν οἰκοδόμων ἐργαλεῖα διέφθειρεν. ἦν γᾶν ἰδεῖν ὑπὸ τῆς φλογὸς ἀπολλυμένας τὰς σφύρας, τὰς γλαρίδας, τὺς πρίονας, τὺς πελέκεις, τὰ σκέπαρνα, πάντα ἁπλῶς ὅσα πρὸς τὸ ἔργον ἐπιτήδεια εἶχον οἱ ἐργαζόμενοι. Socrat. l. iii. c. 20.

garments

garments of the aſſiſtants. For what *Socrates* ſays is remarkable, that the *night after* (for this *lightning*, by his account, was in the *day*) the ſhining croſſes appeared upon their garments *: which was as ſoon as they could appear, with that eclat. But it may not be improper to obſerve, that Rufinus ſeems to have mixed together the fire from heaven and the fire from the earth; for he gives all the effects of *both* fires, mentioned by others, to the ſingle *one* he himſelf ſpeaks of †.

3. The *earthquake* came next: which, Socrates ſays, happened in the *night* ‡; that night, in which the marks upon the garments were firſt obſerved. Its effects were theſe. It caſt out the ſtones of the old foundations (which gave occaſion to a remark, that the prophecy of Jeſus was now *literally* fulfilled); it ſhook the earth into the new-dug foundation (of which Theodoret, we ſee, made a miracle), and it overthrew the adjoining buildings and porticos.

4. Then followed the *fiery eruption* §, which deſtroyed and maimed ſo many of the workmen and aſſiſtants; and at length forced the undertakers to give over the attempt as deſperate ||. But it is to be obſerved, that this eruption was attended both with *ſtorms*

* Καὶ γὰρ τῇ ἐρχομένῃ νυκτὶ, ζφαγῖδες ταυρῆ ἀκλινοειδεῖς, τοῖς ἱματίοις αὐτῶν ἐμπεπυτωμέναι ἐφάνησαν. L. iii. c. 20.

† Ædes erat quædam—in qua ferramenta aliaque operi neceſſaria ſervabantur; e qua ſubito globus quidam ignis emicuit, et per medium plateæ percurrens, aduſtis et exterminatis qui aderant Judæis, ultra citraque ferebatur. Hoc iterum ſæpiuſque et frequentiſſime per totum illum diem repetens, pertinacis populi temeritatem flammis ultricibus coercebat—inſequenti nocte in veſtimentis omnium ſignaculum crucis, &c. L. x. c. 37.

‡ Καὶ διὰ τῆς Νυκτὸς ζεισμὸς μέγας ἐπιγενόμενος, ἀνέβρασε τὰς λίθους τῶν πάλαι θεμελίων, &c. L. iii. c. 20.

§ Λόγῳ δὲ ἅμα τε τὸ δεύτερον ἐπιχέαι τῷ ἔργῳ, καὶ πῦρ ἐξαίφνης ἐκ τῶν θεμελίων τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἀνέθορε, καὶ πολλοὺς ἀνήλωσε. καὶ τοῦτο πῶς πολλῶν ἀδεῶς λέγεταί τε καὶ πιστεύεται, καὶ παρ' ἑδενὸς ἀμφιβάλλεται. Sozom. L. v. c. 22.

|| Ταῦτα οἱ ἀνίθιοι θεασάμενοι, καὶ τὰς θεηλάτους μάστιγας ὑπεδέησαν, ἀπίδρασάν τε καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα καθέλαβον. Theodor. l. iii. c. 20.

and

and tempeſts above, and with an *earthquake* below *. This, Gregory, an original evidence, directly affirms; and it is altogether conſonant to the nature of things. An earthquake could not but immediately precede ſo violent an eruption; and it is highly probable, that this tumult communicated itſelf to the neighbouring air. I mention this, becauſe it contributed to the embarras we find in the accounts of the evidence; ſome of whom have confounded this *latter* ſtorm and earthquake with the *former*. Another obſervation I would make is, that, according to Ammianus Marcellinus, the fits of the firey eruption continued longer than the Chriſtian writers repreſent the matter. Thoſe of them who ſay the moſt, ſeeming to confine the eruptions to one day †, if we except the abridged account of Philoſtorgius, which intimates, they continued as long as any one attempted to go on with the enterprize ‡: and they would hardly deſiſt for the impediment of a ſingle day. It is abſurd to ſuppoſe they did: and Ammianus's words clearly imply they did not §: conſequently the eruption laſted much longer; and continued to be repeated as often as the projectors began to renew the attempt, till it had fairly tired them out. This, the reader will find, is of importance to eſtabliſh the divine interpoſition. Yet the *Fathers* are ſo impatient to be at their favourite miracles, the *croſſes* in the *ſky*, and on the *garments*, that they ſlip negligently over what ought principally to have been inſiſted on, the FIREY ERUPTION; and leave what was truly miraculous, to run after an imaginary prodigy. The great St. Chryſoſtome, indeed, muſt be excepted

* Ὡς δὲ ὑπὸ ἀγρίας λαίλαπος, καὶ βρασμῷ γῆς ἄφνω συνελαθέντες ἐπί τι τῶν πλησίον ἱερῶν—ὅτι βιαζομένους αὐτοὺς καὶ φιλονεικοῦντας περὶ τὴν εἴσοδον, πῦρ ἔπνευσεν, &c. Greg. Naz. Orat. ix.

† Ἐπενέμειλο μὲν οὖν ταῦτα τὸ πῦρ, δὲ ὅλης τῆς ἡμέρας. Socrat. L. iii. c. 20. Hoc iterum ſæpiuſque et frequentiſſime per totam illam diem repetens, *pertinacis* populi temeritatem flammis ultricibus coercebat.

‡ Τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ, πῦρ ἐπενέμειλο τοὺς ἐπιβάζεσθαι τολμῶντας· τοῦτο δὲ, Σεισμὸς ἐκώννυεν. Philoſt. Hiſt. Eccl. L. vii. c. 9.

§ Metuendi globi flammarum prope fundamenta crebris aſſultibus erumpentes, fecere locum exuſtis *aliquoties* operantibus inacceſſum: hocque modo elemento *deſtinatius* repellente, *ceſſavit* inceptum. L. xxiii. c. 1.

excepted out of this cenſure. He would not ſuffer the change to be put upon him; but judiciouſly lays the ſtreſs upon that which would bear it.

5. The laſt appearance was *a lucid croſs in the heavens, circumſcribed within a luminous circle.* Nature, put ſo ſuddenly into commotion by its Creator, was, on the deſpair and diſperſion of his enemies, as ſuddenly calmed and compoſed. And then appeared, in the yet clouded firmament, this noble phænomenon, in a lunar halo. And what could be conceived ſo proper to cloſe this tremendous ſcene, or to celebrate this deciſive victory, as the CROSS triumphant, incircled with the HEROIC ſymbol of conqueſt?

The *order* here given to the ſeveral *parts* of this event, is further ſupported by Marcellinus's narrative of that parallel diſaſter at Nicomedia; which we have already employed, and more than once, though for different purpoſes, to illuſtrate the fact in queſtion. And it is remarkable, the Roman hiſtorian not only records the ſame circumſtances, but aſſigns, to each of them the ſame order of time. 1. It began with *ſtorms and tempeſts.* "Concreti "nubium globi nigrantium," &c. 2. Then followed the *lightning*, "Dein velut numine ſummo fatales torquente manubias," &c. 3. Then the *earthquake.* "Horrifico tremore terrarum, civi- "tatem et ſuburbana funditus everterunt." 4. And laſtly the *fiery eruption.* "Palantes abrupte flammarum ardores," &c.

The order, ſo carefully preſerved by Marcellinus, at Nicomedia, is, we ſee, totally neglected by the Chriſtian hiſtorians, at Jeruſalem. And what but this could ſuggeſt ſo different a conduct? *He* related what he rightly underſtood to be, *in the whole*, a natural event; *They*, what they falſely conceived to be, *in every part*, miraculous.

To conclude this head, let me obſerve, That, in an aggregate concurrent evidence, a minute *uniformity* on the one hand, or a real *inconſiſtency* on the other, equally tend to the diſcredit of the fact in queſtion. In the firſt caſe, we juſtly ſuſpect the *evidence* to be

be concerted; in the latter, the *fact* to be ill founded. Becauſe, where men relate what they receive from one common object, their accounts muſt be as various as the variety of the ſeveral recipients; which is juſt ſo much as to give a *different colouring* to the ſame things, not to *alter* the things themſelves. When we ſee, therefore, the minuteſt uniformity in the colouring, we conclude them not to be originals, who fairly repreſent from nature, but copyiſts, in concert from one another. And where, again, that common object, from which men receive their intelligence, is *real*, there, their accounts can admit of no inconſiſtency, becauſe the nature of things is invariable. But if this object be the *creature of the imagination*, begot by the diſordered paſſions, which are always changing, the teſtimony of the deluded obſervers will never be ſecure from contradiction.

Now the *Chriſtian teſtimony* which we have examined, on this occaſion, appears to be entirely free from both theſe ſuſpicious circumſtances. They tell it, indeed, in the whole, variouſly; but with a perfect conſiſtence of all its parts. They ſhew, by this, they wrote neither in concert, nor at random; but drew from one common object, and an object that was real.

Having explained the *general cauſe* of that variety, in concurrent evidence, which moſt eſtabliſhes its credit; it may be proper to conſider, the *peculiar cauſe*, in the evidence in queſtion.

Where a notorious fact conſiſts of many circumſtances, the obſervers, according to their different tempers and diſpoſitions, will be differently affected. Some will be ſtruck with *this* circumſtance, ſome with *that*. Hence one man will ſpeak of a cauſe without its effect: Another, of the effect without the cauſe. *This* relator will run two circumſtances into one; *That* will ſplit one into two. And if, of theſe circumſtances, there are ſome not rightly underſtood, the order of time will be neglected: and, from that neglect, another embarras, in the evidence, will ariſe, a different order aſſigned by different writers to the ſame circumſtance.

Laſtly,

Laſtly, let me obſerve, it is not *every appearance*, neither, of a *concerted agreement*, or *irreconciled contradiction*, that ſhould make us lightly reject a teſtimony of (otherwiſe) eſtabliſhed credit. A ſingle circumſtance, in the event before us, will ſhew how eaſily, in either caſe, we may be betrayed into a wrong judgement. Nazianzen, Rufinus, Socrates, Sozomene, Theodoret, are ſo exact, and in ſo perfect agreement, about the *croſs upon the garments* (while each, in his turn, overlooks more material circumſtances) that if we take it in the light they place it, of a great and amazing prodigy, we ſhould be apt to ſuſpect it only a ſtudied ornament to their relation. Yet the finding, on examination, that the properties, they aſſign to theſe croſſes, lead to the diſcovery of their real nature, this entirely acquits them of invention. Again, what on the other hand has a ſtronger appearance of *contradiction* than one of them affirming that theſe croſſes were *ſhining* and *radiated*; and another, that they were *ſombrous* and *dark-coloured?* Yet this apparent contradiction aſſiſts us in the diſcovery of one of their phyſical properties; and that diſcovery helps us to reconcile the contradiction; as we find they were black by day, and lucid by night.

I choſe to let this ſingle circumſtance of the *croſſes* ſupply me with theſe inſtances of the contrary qualities (of too great conformity, and too little conſiſtency, in a concurrent evidence) which equally tend to render it ſuſpicious; becauſe, indeed, theſe contrary qualities frequently exiſt together, in the teſtimony of *falſe witneſſes to the ſame fact.*

We come now, in the laſt place, to that refuſe of evidence, which we threw together as of no account; Philoſtorgius, Theophanes, Oroſius, Nicephorus, Zonaras, Cedrenus, and their fellows. Theſe men, like impertinent players, have only the language of others, without any ſenſe of their own; ſave, that they, ſometimes, preſume to add their own inventions to their author's conceits. Thus Philoſtorgius and Theophanes clap on a couple of ſenſeleſs lies, to the well-compoſed relation of their predeceſſors;

which, like wens in a fair-proportioned body, ſtick out ſo unſightly as never to be miſtaken for its natural members.

The firſt of them tells a ſtory (which Nicephorus has repeated) of a certain cave laid open by the workmen, in which was found the Goſpel of St. John, miraculouſly preſerved *. As this was apparently invented in favour of the *religion of reliques*, I ſhall deliver it up to the inquiſition of Dr. Middleton.

Theophanes tells his tale on better grounds. He affirms, that the marks of the croſs were not only found at Jeruſalem; but at Antioch, and other cities; and that they appeared on the coverings of the altars, on the church-books, and on the ſacred veſtments †. Well fare Theophanes, for a punctual relator. I fancy Philoſtorgius would have been at a loſs to produce his miraculous *goſpel*: But without doubt, Theophanes knew where to find enough of his own manufacture, to ſave him from bluſhing, had he been of ſo weak a complexion.

CHAP. IV.

THE Reader hath now the whole of the church-evidence laid before him. It hath been largely and minutely examined; and, I preſume, ſo fully explained and vindicated, as to make it needleſs to take notice of any *particular* Writer, who hath objected to its credit.

Yet the remarks of M. James Basnage, on this collective evidence, are ſo very extraordinary, and his authority in the learned world ſo high, that I might be reaſonably accuſed of neglect, ſhould I paſs him over in ſilence, though a great part of his cenſure hath been already obviated.

* Καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν θεμελίων ἐντρεπιζομένων, εἷς τῶν λίθων εἷς τὴν ἐσχάτην κεφαλὴν τελαμένων κινηθεὶς, τόμιον ἄντρου τινὸς παρέδειξεν, ἐνειργασμένα τῇ πέτρᾳ, &c.—Ἐνυσχάνει σήλη τινὶ—ἢ τὴν χεῖρα ἐπιλαβὼν εὑρίσκει βιβλίον αὐτῇ ἐμπεπτωκὸς. Hiſt. Eccl. vii. c. 14.

† —αὐτομάτως τε τοῖς ἁπλώμασι τῶν θυσιαστηρίων καὶ βίβλοις καὶ ἄλλοις ἐσθήμασι τῶν Ἐκκλησιῶν, καὶ ἐν ἱματίοις δὲ μόνον Χριστιανῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἰουδαίων ἐπιπόλαζε τὸ σημεῖον τοῦ σταυροῦ, δὲ μόνον ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν Ἀντιοχείᾳ καὶ ἄλλαις πόλεσι. Chronog. p. 44.

This

This very learned man, whoſe candour, exactneſs, and ſtrength of reaſoning, have advanced him to the firſt rank in letters, hath, amongſt his other excellent labours, enriched the public with a *hiſtory of the Jews*, from the beginning of the Chriſtian Æra, down to the preſent times; compoſed in a judicious method, interſperſed with many curious inquiries, and abounding in a vaſt variety of good learning.

In the ſixth book of this work, he gives us, what he calls, an *Examination of thoſe miracles which defeated Julian's attempt to rebuild the Temple:* where, to ſpeak freely, I find not one of thoſe qualities, which have rendered him ſo deſervedly famous amongſt the Proteſtants abroad.

After having told us what ſhare Julian had in the attempt, and how eaſily he brought the Jews into his meaſures, he goes on in this manner.

* "It is ſaid, that God hindered the building of the temple, by "three ſucceeding miracles. Three ancient hiſtorians, SOCRATES, "SOZOMENE,

* On dit que Dieu l'empêcha par trois miracles conſecutifs. Trois hiſtoriens anciens, Socrate, Sozomene, & Theodoret, raportent unanimement ces faits. Sozomene même, qui, à peur que quelques incredules ne les regardent comme fabuleux, renvoie ces incredules à la depoſition des temoins oculaires, qui vivoient encore lors qu'il écrivoit. Le prémier de ces miracles fut un tremblement de terre, qui arriva lors qu'on nettoioit les fondemens de l'ancien temple pour en jetter des nouveaux: et ce tremblemente de terre renverſa les materiaux. Il y a deux variations ſur ce prémier miracle; car Theodoret le fait preceder de je ne ſai quelle vertu divine, qui raportoit la nuit les anciens materiaux & les ordures qu'on avoit ôtées, et enſuite d'un vent miraculeux, qui diſſipa les pierres, quoi qu'on eût jetté deſſus une prodigieuſe quantité de chaux et de ciment pour les affermir. Secondement, Sozomene fait mourir par ce tremblement de terre un *grand nombre de perſonnes*, qui étoient venues là en qualité d'ouvriers, ou de ſpectateurs, et qui furent ecraſées ſous les ruines des maiſons voiſines et des porches, ſous leſquels ils s'étoient retirez. Le ſecond miracle fut un feu, qui, ſortant des fondemens qu'on venoit de poſer, conſuma une partie des ouvriers, et mit le reſte en fuite: l'un fait deſcendre ce feu du ciel, et les deux autres le font ſortir de terre. Socrate le fait durer un jour entier pour conſumer les hoiaux, les peles, et tous les inſtrumens deſtinez à l'ouvrage. Sozomene raporte avec quelque

" Sozomene, and Theodoret, unanimouſly relate theſe facts.
" And as to Sozomene, in particular, who is apprehenſive, there
" might

incertitude *la mort des ouvriers*. Il marque même qu'on varioit un peu ; les uns aſſûrent que le feu les avoit conſumez, lors qu'ils avoient voulu *entrer dans le temple* ; ce qui étoit impertinent ; puis que les fondemens étoient à peine achevez ; & les autres ſoutenoient que cela étoit arrivé, lors qu'on commença à remuer la terre, et à la tranſporter. Il y a une quatrieme variation ſur ce miracle ; car on ajoûte que les Juifs reconnurent malgré eux que J. Christ étoit Dieu, et qu'ils ne laiſſerent pas de perſeverer dans leur entrepriſe ; ce qui eſt contradictoire. Mais il n'importe : leur fermeté donna lieu à un troiſieme prodigie. Car ils s'aperçurent le matin qu'il y avoit un grand nombre d'étoiles raïonnantes ſemées ſur leurs habits, qu'ils voulurent effacer ſans pouvoir y reüſſir. Sozomene y ajoute des étoiles qui étoient faites avec autant d'art, que ſi elles y avoient été miſes par la main de l'ouvrier. Theodoret s'écarte un peu ; car au lieu d'étoiles raïonnantes il en met de noires, ce qui repreſentoit mieux le crime et le ſuplice des Juifs, et à même tems il en fait écraſer pluſieurs qui étoient endormis ſous un porche. Mais la grande variation roulle ſur l'effet de ce tròiſieme miracle ; car les uns aſſurent que les Juifs ſe retirerent chez eux auſſi endurcis que s'ils n'avoient rien vû. Mais les deux autres pretendent que la plupart ſe firent Chrêtiens, et que le bruit de leur converſion alla juſqu'aux oreilles de l'Empereur Julien. Nous avons crû devoir remarquer ces differentes circonſtances, à fin qu'on puiſſe mieux peſer la verité de ce récit. Les uns trouveront quelque plaiſir à multiplier le nombre de ces miracles, comme Theodoret, et y ajoûter même ce que les Ecrivains modernes en ont dit. Mais il eſt juſte que les autres y trouvent auſſi les raiſons qu'on peut avoir de ſuſpendre ſa foi. J'ajouterai ſeulement deux choſes. L'une, que la preuve que Sozomene allegue pour montrer la verité de ce qu'il avance, eſt très foible. Il en appelle *à l'evenement*, & ſoutient qu'on ne peut plus douter de cette longue ſuite de miracles, parce que le temple ne fut point achevè. Mais cet hiſtorien avoit-il oublié que la permiſſion ne fut donnée aux Juifs, que lors que Julien partoit pour ſon expedition contre les Perſes, dans laquelle il fut tué, & qu'ainſi on n'avoit pas beſoin de tant de miracles pour empêcher la ſtructure d'un edifice ? L'opoſition des Chrêtiens, qui profiterent de l'éloignement du prince, ſa mort, et l'elevation de Jovien, enemi des Juifs, ſuffiſoient pour arrêter tout court ce deſſein. D'ailleurs il renvoye ſes lectures en termes vagues à des temoins oculaires, ſans nommer, ni indiquer perſonne. Enfin Cyrille de Jeruſalem, qui étoit alors Evêque de cette ville, devoit être ſur les lieux, puis que ce fut lui qui raſſura le peuple par le moïn d'un oracle de Daniel, qui avoit prédit, à ce qu'il croyoit, que l'ouvrage ne reüſſiroit pas. Cependant Cyrille n'a jamais parlé de tous ces miracles. Ce n'eſt pas qu'il ne les aimât. Il écrivit, dit-on, à Conſtantin le Jeune, pour lui apprendre qu'il étoit plus heureux que ſon pere, ſous l'empire duquel on avoit trouvé en terre la croix

du

" might be certain unbelievers, who would give no credit to them,
" he ſends ſuch to the depoſitions of thoſe who had been eye-wit-
" neſſes, and were yet living when he wrote his hiſtory.

" The *firſt* of theſe miracles was an EARTHQUAKE, which hap-
" pened at the time they were clearing the old foundations, in
" order to lay *new*: and this earthquake overthrew their magazines
" of materials.

" There are two variations on the ſubject of this firſt miracle.
" For Theodoret makes it preceded, 1. by I can't tell what divine
" power; which, in the night, brought back the old materials and
" rubbiſh into the place from whence they had been taken: and
" 2dly, by a miraculous wind, which diſperſed the ſtones, though
" they had been covered by a prodigious quantity of lime and
" mortar, to bind them into one ſolid maſs. The ſecond varia-
" tion is in Sozomene's making this earthquake deſtroy *a great*
" *number of people*, who were there in quality of workmen or
" lookers on, and were buried under the ruins of the neigh-
" bouring houſes and portico's, whither they had retired for ſhelter.

" The *ſecond* miracle was a FIRE, which burſt from the foun-
" dations they were then preparing; and deſtroyed one part of
" the workmen, and put the reſt to flight. 1. One of theſe hiſ-

du fils de Dieu, puis que le ciel lui faiſoit voir un prodige plus éclatant: c'étoit une croix plus lumineuſe que le ſoleil, que toute la ville de Jeruſalem avoit vue au firmament un long eſpece de tems. Pourquoi parler de cette croix, et ſe taire ſur ces miracles? Il aprend aux Juifs qu'ils verront le ſigne de la croix, lequel precedera la venuë du fils de Dieu, & ne dit pas un ſeul mot de celles qui avoient été attachées miraculeuſement à leurs habits. Ce ſilence d'un Evêque qui étoit ſur les lieux, qui aimoit les miracles et la converſion des Juifs, eſt ſuſpect, lors qu'il n'y a que des temoins eloignez qui parlent. Cependant il ne faut pas diſſimuler, que ſi un des Chronologiſtes Juifs ſoutient, que le temple ne fut point bâti à cauſe de la mort imprevuë de Julien, un autre aſſure que ce temple, rebati à grands frais, tomba, et que le *lendemain un grand feu, qui vint du ciel, fondit les ferremens qui reſtoient, & fit périr une multitude innombrable de Juifs.* Cet aveu des Rabbins eſt d'autant plus conſiderable qu'il eſt ingarieux à la nation, et que ces meſſieurs ne ſont pas accoûtumez à copier les Ouvrages des Chrêtiens. Baſnage, Hiſt. des Juifs, Lib. vi. c. 18, 19.

" torians.

" torians makes this fire to deſcend from Heaven; the *other two*
" bring it from beneath. 2. Socrates ſays, it continued the whole
" day, and conſumed the pick-axes, ſhovels, and all the tools and
" inſtruments deſtined to this ſervice. 3. Sozomene relates the
" *death of the workmen* with ſome uncertainty. Nay, he obſerves,
" that here the evidence varied a little; ſome affirming that the
" fire deſtroyed them as they were ſtriving *to enter the temple*
" (which was certainly an idle ſtory, ſince even the foundations
" were hardly finiſhed); while others ſay, it happened when they
" firſt began to break ground, and carry off the rubbiſh. 4. There
" is a fourth variation on the ſubject of this miracle; for it is
" added, the Jews confeſſed, though in ſpite of themſelves, that
" JESUS CHRIST was God; and yet they did not ceaſe to perſevere
" in their attempt: which is a manifeſt contradiction.

" But no matter for that: their obſtinacy gave occaſion to a
" *third* miracle. For, in the morning, they perceived a great num-
" ber of SHINING STARS ſcattered over their habits; which they
" tried to efface, but in vain. Sozomene adds, there were of theſe
" ſtars ſo artfully formed, that the hand of a workman could not
" have done them better: Theodoret deviates a little here; For,
" inſtead of the *ſhining ſtars*, he ſpeaks of *black* ones. Such as in-
" deed more properly marked the crime and puniſhment of the
" Jews. And at the ſame time, he cruſhes to death a great number,
" who were faſt aſleep under a portico.

" But the great variation of all turns upon the *effect* of the third
" miracle. For one aſſures us, that the Jews returned home as
" hardened as if they had ſeen nothing: whereas the other two
" pretend, that the greater part embraced the Chriſtian faith; and
" that the news of their converſion reached even to the ears of
" Julian himſelf.

" We have conceived it to be the duty of a faithful hiſtorian to
" take notice of theſe differences, in order to aſſiſt the reader, in
" forming a right judgment of the truth of the whole relation.

" Some,

" Some, doubtleſs, will find their pleaſure in multiplying the " number of theſe miracles, like Theodoret; and even in adding " every thing which modern writers have ſaid to ſet them off. " But it is no more than fitting that men of a different turn " ſhould be made acquainted with the reaſons there are to *ſuſpend* " their belief.

" I will only add theſe two obſervations to what has been already " ſaid. The *one* is, that the argument Sozomene brings to prove " the truth of what he advances, is a very weak one. He appeals " to the iſſue; and maintains, we can no longer doubt of this long " train of miracles, ſince the temple was never finiſhed But " could this hiſtorian forget that the Jews did not obtain their " permiſſion to rebuild it till the time of Julian's ſetting out for " his Perſian expedition, in which he periſhed? As this was the " caſe, there was little need of all theſe miracles to hinder the " *erection of a ſingle building*; ſurely, a ſufficient cauſe for cutting " ſhort an enterprize of this nature may be found in the oppoſition " of the Chriſtians, who might take advantage of the prince's ab- " ſence in a remote region, of his death there, and the advance- " ment of Jovian, who was an enemy to the Jews. Beſides the " hiſtorian refers his readers, in a vague, indefinite manner, to the " eye-witneſſes of the fact, without pointing out one ſingle perſon " by name.

" But laſtly, Cyrill of Jeruſalem, who was, at that time, Bi- " ſhop of the place, and muſt have been upon the ſpot, ſince it " was he, who confiding in a prophecy of Daniel (which had " foretold, as he thought, that the attempt would prove unſuc- " ceſsful) encouraged and animated the people to repoſe their con- " fidence in God. Notwithſtanding, this ſame Cyrill has never " taken the leaſt notice of theſe many miracles: and yet it cer- " tainly was not becauſe he was no friend to miracles: We are " told he wrote to Conſtantine the Younger, to inform him, that " he was more happy than his father, under whoſe empire the " croſs of Chriſt had been found here on earth, ſince Heaven,

" to

" to grace his reign, had diſplayed a more illuſtrious prodigy:
" which was, a croſs much brighter than the ſun, ſeen in the
" firmament for a long time together, by the whole city of Jeru-
" ſalem. Why, now, was that croſs remembered, and all theſe
" miracles forgotten? He aſſures the Jews, they ſhall ſee the ſign
" of the croſs; and that it will precede the coming of the Son of
" God; and yet he ſays not one ſingle word of thoſe which had
" been miraculouſly affixed to their habits. The ſilence of a
" Biſhop, who was upon the place, who loved miracles, and la-
" boured for the converſion of the Jews, looks very ſuſpicious;
" while, at the ſame time, they, who do ſpeak to it, lived at a
" diſtance.

" However, it ought not to be diſſembled, that, if *one* of the
" Jewiſh Chronologiſts maintains, that the ſudden and unexpected
" death of Julian prevented the rebuilding the temple; *another* of
" them aſſures us it was rebuilt, and that, when this was done at
" a vaſt expence, it tumbled down again, and *the next day, a*
" *dreadful fire, which fell from Heaven, melted all the iron inſtruments*
" *that remained, and deſtroyed an innumerable multitude of Jews.*
" This confeſſion of the Rabbins is the more conſiderable, as it re-
" flects diſhonour on the nation; and theſe gentry are not wont to
" copy from the writings of the Chriſtians."

Before I proceed to a particular examination of this long paſſage I ſhall make theſe two general remarks upon it.

Firſt, that the learned critic goes all the way upon a *falſe ſuppoſition*; namely, that it was the purpoſe of theſe three hiſtorians, in their accounts of this event, to place the ſeveral circumſtances, attending it, in the order of time in which each of them was ſuppoſed to happen. I have ſhewn they had no ſuch purpoſe, and have explained the cauſe of their neglecting the order of time *. This was fit to be taken notice of, becauſe the main force in his objections ariſes from the contrary ſuppoſition.

* See p. 447, 448.

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My *ſecond* remark is, that the learned critic embarraſſes both himſelf and his reader, by uſing, without explaining, the ambiguous term of VARIATION: which may either ſignify a *contradiction*; or, only a ſimple *diverſity*. His *reaſoning* requires you ſhould apply it in the former ſenſe; but his *facts* commonly go no higher than the latter. This was proper to obſerve, becauſe a *contradiction* diſcredits a concurrent evidence: while a ſimple *diverſity* never hurts, and often ſupports it *.

When a writer's purpoſe is not to confirm the fact in queſtion; but to render it doubtful and ſuſpected; it will lye upon him to give a good account of every part of the evidence by which it may be ſupported: becauſe no concluſion can be drawn *againſt* a fact till the whole teſtimony *for* it hath been fairly invalidated. It is otherwiſe when a fact is to be eſtabliſhed. In that caſe, it may be ſufficient to ſelect and urge only the moſt material. Now the learned critic begins his diſcourſe in this manner, *It is ſaid, that God hindered the building of the temple by three ſucceeding miracles. Three ancient hiſtorians,* SOCRATES, SOZOMENE, *and* THEODORET, *unanimouſly relate theſe facts.*

His proceſs againſt the miracle is regular and in form. He firſt names his witneſſes: but does he name them all? So one would be apt to conclude, both from the nature of the caſe, and the critic's turn of expreſſion: at leaſt one would never ſuſpect that he had omitted any of the firſt and original evidence. Yet he has omitted all of them. Not only Ambroſe, Gregory, Nazianzene, and St. Chryſoſtome: but even the teſtimony of Marcellinus himſelf. This is a proceeding, which bears as hard againſt the ingenuity of the writer, as againſt the ſtrength of his concluſion: and, with regard to his argument, the utmoſt this method can effect is only to diſcredit the witneſſes he does think fit to produce and examine; while the fact itſelf, ſupported by others, of greater and

* See p. 451, & ſeq.

unqueſtioned authority, remains entire. But let us view his confutation in the light he would have it ſeen.

His objection to the *earthquake*, which he calls the FIRST miracle, is, that there are two *variations* concerning it.

The *firſt* is, that Theodoret *makes it preceded, firſt, by I can't tell what divine power, which, in the night, brought back the old materials and rubbiſh into the place from whence they had been taken; and, 2dly, by a miraculous wind, which diſperſed the ſtones, though they had been covered by a prodigious quantity of lime and mortar, to bind them into one ſolid maſs.*

1. As M. Baſnage himſelf here ſtates the caſe, we ſee this is of the nature of thoſe *variations*, mentioned juſt before, that imply no *contradiction*, but only a *diverſity*. A caſe almoſt eſſential to the truth of an accumulative evidence, not given in concert. One witneſs delivers a circumſtance omitted by another; and omits a circumſtance which the other hath delivered. Thus Theodoret is here ſaid to relate two circumſtances preceding the earthquake, of which Socrates and Sozomene are ſilent: and Sozomene to relate an *effect* of this earthquake, of which Socrates and Theodoret are ſilent. Now, not to repeat whath hath been juſt obſerved of the real credit *theſe diverſities* carry with them; what can more ſtrongly ſupport the truth of this earthquake, atteſted by three hiſtorians, than that, when *one* had only recorded the fact itſelf, the *other two* preſerved the memory of thoſe circumſtances, which, we have ſhewn *, this fact was moſt likely to produce?

2. But on the learned critic's falſe ſuppoſition of an *order of time* obſerved in theſe accounts, he might have improved this *variation* into a *contradiction*. And, conſidering he had this imaginary advantage, one would wonder he did not uſe it. For, in the order of Theodoret's relation, the filling up the foundations *goes before* the earthquake; whereas from the accounts of Rufinus and Caſſiodorus, explained on the reaſon of things, it appears to have been *after*,

* See p. 442, 443. and 430, 431.

and

and the effect of the earthquake. But, as it hath been ſhewn *, that the hiſtorians had it not in their purpoſe to obſerve the order of time, the objection, even when thus ſtated, is ſeen to have no weight. However, admit, the hiſtorians had it in their purpoſe to obſerve the order of time, and that they differed in placing ſome of the circumſtances: what follows? Not that the facts were falſe: but that the witneſſes were men of credit, who did not write in concert. Is not the whole body of civil hiſtory full of facts believed by all mankind; about the *order* of which, as they ſtand connected in time to one another, hiſtorians do, and will eternally differ? I have now accidentally lying before me Dr. Hody's learned account of thoſe *illuſtrious Greeks* who brought the uſe of their language into the weſt of Europe; where, ſpeaking of Emmanuel Chryſologus, it appears that a number of writers, contemporary with him, affirm, that he firſt taught at Venice, then at Florence: while as great a number, and of equal credit, affirm juſt the contrary, that it was *firſt* at Florence, and *afterwards* at Venice. In the mean while no body ever doubted that he taught in both places.—And here the diſtinction between a *natural* and *ſupernatural* fact (frequently, and indeed, properly urged in theſe diſputes) hath no place. For M. Baſnage's objection ſtands on a *civil*, not a *phyſical*, reaſon.

3. Laſtly, He tells us, Theodoret ſays, *a miraculous wind diſperſed the ſtones, though they had been covered by a prodigious quantity of lime and mortar to bind them into one ſolid maſs.* But the beſt is, Theodoret ſays no ſuch thing. The candid Critic ſhould not have made his miracles ſtill more wonderful by a falſe expoſition of them. The whole affair, indeed, we think, was one continued declaration of the divine diſpleaſure: but where God employs natural inſtruments to execute his judgements, they uſually work according to their capacities: and Theodoret's *wind* does no more. His words are theſe—"When they had laid in, and diſpoſed on heaps,

* See p. 447, 448.

" many thouſand meaſures of lime and plaſter; violent ſtorms, " whirlwinds, and tempeſts, unexpectedly aroſe, and diſperſed them " all about *." Here we find nothing told, but what this elementary agency might well perform. So that one cannot conceive what it was that induced this learned man, firſt to lay ſo ſtrong an embargo on his heavy weight of ſtones, and then to diſperſe them again ſo lightly; unleſs, becauſe, as he ſays, the *Fathers* loved to *talk* of miracles, ſo he loved to *laugh* at them. But he ſhould have choſen a fitter ſubject for his mirth.

His *ſecond variation* about the *earthquake* is, in Sozomene's *making it diſtroy a great number of people who were buried under the ruins of the neighbouring houſes and porticos*. Here the *variation* is ſtill more imaginary. Sozomene is not alone in the fact. Theodoret likewiſe mentions it; though, by placing the firey eruption between the earthquake and the fall of the porticos, he hath ſeparated the *cauſe* from the *effect* †. We ſhould therefore place this inſtance amongſt the *ſupports*, not the *objections*, to this illuſtrious event.

The SECOND miracle, according to M. Baſnage's repreſentation of things, is *the fire from the foundations*: and concerning this, he aſſures us, there are no leſs than *four variations*.

The *firſt* is, that *one of the hiſtorians makes the fire to deſcend from heaven; the other two bring it from beneath.*

The aſſertion is grounded on a mere miſtake of the text. Socrates ſpeaks of *one* fact, when he ſays, " A fire came from Heaven, and " conſumed all the workmen's tools ‡;" Sozomene and Theodoret, of *another*, when they ſay, " A fire broke out of the foundations, " and deſtroyed many of the workmen themſelves §." And no-

* Ἐπειδὴ δὲ κ᾽ γύψε κ᾽ τιλάνε πολλὰς μεδίμνων ζυνήθροισαν μυριάδας ἐξαπίνης ἄνεμοι βίαιοι πνεύσαντες κ᾽ τρόβιλοι κ᾽ καλαιγίδες κ᾽ λαίλαπες, πάσας ἀθρόως ἐσκέδασαν. Hiſt. Eccl. l. iii. c. 20.

† See p. 443.

‡ Πῦρ γὰρ ἐξ ἀέρανῦ καλασκήψαν, πάνλα τὰ τῶν οἰκοδόμων ἐργαλεῖα διέφθειρεν. L. iii. c. 20.

§ Πῦρ ἐξαίφνης ἐκ τῶν θεμελίων τῦ ἱερῦ ἀνέθορε κ᾽ πολλὲς ἀνήλωσε—Sozom. L. v. c. 22.—πῦρ ἐκ τῶν ὀρυσσομένων θεμελίων ἀνάδραμον, πολείσες τῶν ὀρυτόνων ἐνέπρησε. Theod. l. iii. c. 20.

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thing but much prejudice, or little attention, could have blended *two conſiſtent*, into *one inconſiſtent* fact. The fire from *heaven*, and the fire from the *foundations*, were different events: and diſtant from each other in time as well as place. All the myſtery is, that Socrates mentions the former, and omits the latter; and Sozomene and Theodoret mention the latter, and omit the former. The *nature of things* *, as well as the rules of interpretation, ſupports this diſtinction: and, phyſically ſpeaking, it had been more to be wondered at, if the ſtorms and tempeſts had not produced *lightning*, than if a *firey eruption* had not followed an earthquake.

The *ſecond variation is*, that Socrates ſays, *the fire continued the whole day; and conſumed the pick-axes, ſhovels, and all the tools and inſtruments deſtined to the ſervice.*

This *variation* is as fanciful, as the ſuppoſition, on which it riſes, is falſe; namely, that Socrates here ſpeaks of the *ſame* fire mentioned by Sozomene and Theodoret. For if he meant a *different* (as he certainly did), then its continuance for a *whole day* is no *variation*, even in the loweſt ſenſe our critic uſes it, of one writer's recording a circumſtance of the ſame fact, which another hath omitted.

A *third variation* (ſays M. Baſnage) *is, that Sozomene relates the death of the workmen with ſome uncertainty. Nay, the hiſtorian obſerves, that here the evidence varied a little. Some affirming that the fire deſtroyed them as they were ſtriving to enter the temple (which was certainly an idle ſtory, ſince the foundations were hardly finiſhed); while others ſay, it happened when they firſt began to break ground and carry off the rubbiſh.*

That *Sozomene relates the death of the workmen with ſome uncertainty* is a ſtrange miſrepreſentation: his words are theſe, *It is ſaid, that a fire burſt ſuddenly from the ruins, and deſtroyed many. And this thing is confidently reported and believed by all, no one man ever*

* See p. 443.

calling

calling it in queſtion *. Could a writer poſſibly expreſs more confidence in a Fact related? Let the Reader judge.

Indeed, Sozomene does obſerve, that, though, in the fact itſelf, all were agreed; yet, in one circumſtance attending it, the evidence varied a little. A paſſage of Gregory Nazianzene ill underſtood apparently betrayed him into this groundleſs remark. But if Sozomene miſtook Gregory, M. Baſnage has much more groſsly miſtaken Sozomene.

Gregory delivered his account of the eruption in theſe words—*They fled together for refuge to an adjoining church—As they ſtrove violently to force their way in, the fire, which burſt from the foundations of the temple, met and ſtopped them; and one part of them it burnt and deſtroyed* †, *&c.* Sozomene, alluding to this paſſage (after he had told us, that the fact of the fire's breaking from the foundations was *believed by all, and contradicted by none*) ſays, *Indeed there is this ſmall difference in the circumſtances; ſome ſay the flame met them as they were forcing their way into the church, and produced the effect ſpoken of above; while others ſay, it happened when firſt they began to clear the foundations* ‡. Sozomene, we ſee, underſtood Gregory, as if he had meant, that the flame which met thoſe who were ſtriving to enter the church, happened at ſome time *different* from that which was ſaid to deſtroy the men working at the foundations. But he certainly miſtook Gregory; who ſuppoſes plainly enough, that this deſtruction happened at the very time they were digging the foundations. Gregory not only aſſures us that the fact, as he tells it, ſtood *unqueſtioned* by all (which he could not have ſaid had it related to *another time*); but he expreſsly ſays, they fled to this church as to a refuge from the *whirlwind* and *earthquake*.

* Λόγ⊖. Ἅμα τε τὸ δεύτερον ἐνεχείρουν τῷ ἔργῳ, καὶ πῦρ ἐξαίφνης ἐκ τῶν θεμελίων τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἀνέθορε, καὶ πολλοὺς ἀνήλωσε· καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς πάντων ἀδεῶς λέγεταί τε καὶ πιστεύεται, καὶ παρ' ἑτέρους ἀμφισβάλλεται. L. v. c. 22.

† See p. 427,

‡ —Πλὴν ὅτι μέν φασιν ὅτι βιαζομένους αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν προϊέναι, φλὸξ ἀπαντήσασα, τὸ εἰρημένον εἰργάσατο· οἱ δὲ, ἅμα ἤρξαντο τὸν χῶν ἐκφορεῖν. L. v. c. 22.

Now

Now the evidence is unanimous, that the whirlwind and earthquake happened as they were preparing the foundations. In a word, what Sozomene miſtook for a *variation*, properly ſo called, was two different relations of the different parts of the ſame event. Great numbers *fled* from the whirlwind and earthquake; and theſe the fire, which burſt from the foundations, deſtroyed as they were ſtriving to enter the church: others *ſtood* their ground; and theſe were deſtroyed on the ſpot. Unwarily, Sozomene miſtook Gregory's narrative of the ſtate, in which the ſame eruption ſeized ſome of the ſufferers, for the narrative of a different eruption. But though the ancient relators of this fact had indeed ſpoken of *different* eruptions, and, in aſcribing the ſame general effect to all, had yet repreſented the workmen as deſtroyed, while buſied in different places, and in different occupations: What then? Would this have taken off from the credit of their relation? By no means. On the contrary, it muſt have added to it. For we have ſeen in part, and ſhall ſee more fully hereafter, that the *fits* of this firey eruption were ſo obſtinate as not to give over till it had brought the directors to deſpair of the undertaking.

But to return to Sozomene; an attentive writer might have fallen into *his* miſtake: What drew M. Baſnage aſide is not ſo eaſily underſtood. To interpret Sozomene as ſaying, that it was the *new-built temple*, into which theſe unhappy ſufferers ſtrove to enter, when his whole hiſtory ſhews, the foundations were never finiſhed, implies ſtrange inattention to his ſubject; or confidence in the implicit faith of his readers. But let Sozomene ſpeak for himſelf. He ſays, *the fire met them as they ſtrove to enter* εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν, *into the church*, or *temple*. And to know what place he meant by theſe words, we muſt have recourſe to his author, Greg. Nazianzene: Who, in the relation already given at large *, ſays, that when the Jews had procured the countenance and aſſiſtance of Julian to rebuild the temple, they addreſſed themſelves to the undertaking,

* Page 427.

with

with great alacrity and vigour; but, being driven from their work by a whirlwind and earthquake, they fled for refuge to a certain neighbouring church, ἐπί τι τῶν πλησίον ἱερῶν, ăpparently a Chriſtian Oratory, built amongſt, or adjoining to, the ruins of thoſe ſacred places, formerly included within the walls of the temple. This particular, Sozomene takes from Gregory: And what the latter expreſſes by ἐπί τι τῶν πλησίον ἱερῶν, the other calls εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν, *into the church.* Yet M. Baſnage ſuppoſes, he meant the *Jewiſh temple rebuilt.* But perhaps he might be betrayed into this abſurd interpretation, from what followed in Gregory; who ſays, that while they were ſtriving to force their way into this church, a fire, ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ, met and ſtopped them. The queſtion is what he here meant by ἱεροῦ; doubtleſs the ſame with ἱερῶν, going before, *the Jewiſh Temple,* near which the Chriſtian Church or Oratory ſtood. But what *temple?* Not a new one rebuilt, but the old one in ruins: ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ſignifying the ſame as ἐκ τῶν θεμελίων τοῦ ναοῦ, and with elegance; for ἱερὸν is the generic word, and ſignifies as well the ſite of a holy building as the building itſelf. It appears, at leaſt, that Sozomene underſtood the word ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ in this ſenſe, from his making *all* the variation in Gregory's account from the reſt, to conſiſt in his aſſigning a *different time* for the deſtruction of the workmen; and from his expreſs affirmation, that the witneſſes all agreed in atteſting, that the fire came from the *foundations of the ruined temple.* And it appears, he underſtood Gregory rightly; who, in his turn, affirms, that the evidence were *unanimous* in atteſting the fire came ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ, by which he could mean nothing but the *foundations* of the ruined temple; becauſe it was in that only they were unanimous. Nor, for the ſame reaſon, could Gregory mean, nor could Sozomene ſo underſtand him, that the fire came from the *church*, into which they were forcing an entrance. And Gregory ſeems to have well weighed what he ſays; for, in this very place, he carefully diſtinguiſhes between uncertain rumour and eſtabliſhed evidence.

But

But, indeed, in every view, the learned critic's interpretation is inſupportable. The whole tenor of Gregory's relation (which is in perfect harmony with the reſt) ſhews that the obſtruction began *before* they had laid the foundations.

On the whole, then, we ſee, *this variation*, concerning the eruption, is as imaginary as the reſt.

Mr. Baſnage proceeds; and tells us, there is a *fourth variation*, concerning this miracle of the Fire; which is, that *the Jews confeſſed, though in ſpite of themſelves, that* JESUS CHRIST *was* GOD; *and yet they did not ceaſe to perſevere in their attempt*; *which* (ſays the Critic) *is a manifeſt contradiction.*

Though I would not call this a *contradiction*, yet I readily confeſs it to be a high improbability. However, be it what it will, the Critic alone is to anſwer for it. In a word, the charge is entirely groundleſs, not one of them affirming, or intimating, the leaſt word of any ſuch matter; but, on the contrary, plainly declaring that this *confeſſion* of the Jews was not till they had *given up* the enterprize, as deſperate.

The words of SOCRATES are theſe: "The Jews, ſeized with ex-
"treme affright, were forced, in ſpight of themſelves, to confeſs
"that JESUS CHRIST was GOD; yet, for all that, they would not
"*obey his will*; but, as men faſt bound in religious prejudices, ſtill
"continued in their old ſuperſtition. Nor did a third miracle,
"which happened afterwards (the ſhining croſſes) bring them to
"the true faith *." This hiſtorian ſpeaks only of the Jews.

SOZOMENE ſpeaks both of Jews and Gentiles; and in the order here named. — "*Some* (ſays he) on the inſtant, judged that CHRIST
"was GOD, and that the reſtoration of the temple was diſpleaſing
"to him: while *others*, not long after, went over to the church,
"and were baptiſed †."

* Ἰουδαῖοι δὲ ἐν μεγίστῳ φόβῳ γενόμενοι, καὶ ἄκοντες ὁμολόγων τὸν Χριστὸν Θεὸν λέγοντες εἶναι ἐποίουν δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸ θέλημα, ἀλλ' ἔμενον τῇ τῶν Ἰουδαϊσμῶν προλήψει κρατούμενοι, διὸ γὰρ τὸ τρίτον θαῦμα τὸ ὕστερον ἐπιγενόμενον, εἰς πίστιν τῆς ἀληθείας ἦγεν αὐτούς· σφραγῖδες γὰρ ἐκλογῆς ἀπέλιπον. L. iii. c. 20.

† —τοῖς μὲν αὐτίκα ἐκρίθη Θεὸν εἶναι τὸν Χριστὸν, καὶ μὴ ἀρέσθαι τῇ ἀνατυπώσει τοῦ ναοῦ, οἱ δὲ, οὐκ εἰς ἀκρὰν προσέθεντο τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ καὶ ἐμυήθησαν. L. v. c. 22.

Theodoret, again, ſpeaks only of the Jews; for, after having related the whole ſeries of miracles, the laſt of which (in the rank he places them) was the croſſes on their garments, he goes on in this manner: "The enemies of God ſeeing theſe things, and fearing "his hand, now advanced, might fall upon themſelves, fled away, "and returned every man to his place; confeſſing him to be God, "whom their forefathers had affixed to the tree *."

Now let the impartial Reader but reflect, that this circumſtance of the confeſſion is related, by each of the hiſtorians, as happening *after* all the deſtructive interpoſitions, which hindered the work; and he muſt needs conclude, that M. Baſnage has given a falſe repreſentation of their accounts.

Socrates lets us know, in what their obſtinacy lay: not in perſiſting in their project; but perſevering in their ſuperſtition.

Sozomene mentions only their ſudden *confeſſion*; and had he not oppoſed it to the laſting *converſion* of the Gentiles, it muſt be owned that, from him, we could conclude nothing of their obſtinacy: but, as he hath ſo oppoſed it, we find his account to be perfectly conformable to the relation of Socrates; and diſcover even a hint in the words, ἐκ μὴ ἀρεσθῆναι τῇ ἀνανεώσει τοῦ ναοῦ, that they did *deſiſt* on their *confeſſion*.

Theoderet is fuller than either of them, and explains what might be, otherwiſe, thought doubtful in Both. He marks the *obſtinacy* of thoſe, who (Sozomene ſays) *on the inſtant, concluded that Chriſt was God*: and the *deſpair* of thoſe who (Socrates ſays) *continued in their* obſtinacy.

Nothing can be clearer, or more conſiſtent than this whole account of their behaviour. Yet M. Baſnage aſſures us, "They are repreſented as confeſſing Christ, and at the ſame time perſiſting in their attempt." It would be hard to think it a deſigned miſrepreſentation: and ſtill harder to conceive how he could fall into an involuntary error, in a caſe ſo evident, unleſs we ſuppoſe he miſtook

* ταῦτα οἱ ἀντίθεοι θεασάμενοι, καὶ τὰς θεηλάτους μάστιγας ὀῤῥωδήσαντες, ἀπέδρασάν τε καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα καθίλαβον, Θεὸν ὁμολογοῦντες τὰν ὑπὸ τῶν προγόνων τῷ ξύλῳ προσηλωθέντα. L. iii. c. 20.

miſtook the ſenſe of Socrates' expreſſion, οὐκ ἐποίουν δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸ θέλημα —*they did not obey his will*: as if it meant, they were not *obſequious to this declaration of his will in the prodigies*; whereas θέλημα is here uſed in the common theologic ſenſe, of the *whole will of Chriſt*: as appears from what follows, which, by neceſſary conſtruction, is explanative of what went before—ἀλλ' ἔμενον τῇ τοῦ ΙΟΥΔΑΙΣΜΟΥ προλήψει κρατούμενοι, οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ τρισὸν θαῦμα τὸ ὕστερον ἐπιγενόμενον εἰς ΠΙΣΤΙΝ ——

But here, perhaps, it may be objected, That even what we ourſelves allow theſe ancient writers to have ſaid, creates a difficulty, which will deſerve ſome ſolution, "The Jews are repreſented as confeſſing the divinity of *Jeſus Chriſt*, and yet perſiſting in their old ſuperſtition: ſurely a ſtate of mind made up of very diſcordant principles." It is true, the objection will deſerve to be conſidered: and the rather as it is not impoſſible but this might be all M. Baſnage aimed at; though he miſſed the mark by a careleſs expreſſion. However, the objection is ſo obvious; and the account has, at firſt ſight, ſo much ſeeming incongruity, that, I conclude, theſe Hiſtorians were well aſſured of their fact, before they would venture to truſt it to the public judgement. And, when it comes to be examined, I perſuade myſelf, *the reaſon of things* will give *us* the ſame ſatisfaction in its truth, which *concurrent evidence* gave *them*.

If we admit theſe prodigies to have happened, in the manner they are related, we cannot but conclude, that thoſe, againſt whom they were directed, how hardened and determined ſoever, muſt be ſeized with ſudden aſtoniſhment and affright. Now, in this ſtate, the mind, hurried from its baſis, catches at any thing which promiſes protection. Nothing therefore was ſo natural as their applying to the object *offended*; which, at that moment, could be thought no other than *Jeſus of Nazareth*. His power, then, would, in ſpite of all old impreſſions, be inſtantaneouſly acknowledged. This is what Socrates means, and well expreſſes, by ſaying, that, *in their extreme fright, they were forced, in ſpite of themſelves, to confeſs that Jeſus Chriſt was God*.

So far every thing was juſt as the working of human nature would be, when not hindered by any foreign impreſſion.

But they muſt know nothing of its workings, who can imagine, that new and contrary directions, produced by ſuch accidents, in minds warped by the ſtrong attraction of inveterate prejudices, and hardened by a national obſtinacy, could be regular or laſting. When the fright was over, the mind would return mechanically to its old ſtation; and there it would reſt, eſpecially if it could find, or even invent for its ſupport, any ſolution of the phænomena conſiſtent with their former ſentiments concerning Jeſus: and theſe, we ſhall ſee hereafter, they might, and did invent. So that now we are ready for the concluding part of the account, which Socrates hath given us of this matter.—*Yet for all that, they would not obey his will, but, as men faſt bound in religious prejudices, ſtill continued iu their old ſuperſtition.* He talks, we ſee, like one who underſtood what he ſaid;—That their haſty *confeſſion* was owing to their ſudden *fright*; and their fixed *impiety*, to their inveterate *habits*. All here is ſo much in order, that the contrary had been the unnatural thing. Had they told us, either that the Jews were *not* frightened into a *confeſſion*; or that they *were* frightened into a *converſion*; the fact had been equally incredible; becauſe, the firſt caſe implied the abſence of *paſſions*; and the latter, a freedom from *prejudices*; neither of which agreed with them, as *men* or as *Jews*. But they relate, what was perfectly conſiſtent with *both*, that their ſtubborn metal was ſoftened in the flames, and grew hard again as theſe abated. And have we not many examples of the like behaviour in more modern reprobates, who are in the other extreme of believing nothing? What ſentiments of religion did we not hear on a late occaſion of terror, where they were never heard before? But what ſymptoms of ſobriety remained, when the danger was ſuppoſed to be over! The offended Deity, which they then ſaw dreſſed in terrors, was afterwards laughed at, as the phantom of a frightened imagination: and that good prelate, who was then ſo much reverenced for his paſtoral care in warning them of the danger of

of falling under the juſtice of an offended God, was ſoon after purſued with a torrent of abuſe, as an evil citizen, who maliciouſly projected to fright them out of their wits. Now, if *Free-thinking* can thus keep its hold, when it hath nothing to rely on but the mere vanity of its profeſſion; what muſt we think of *ſuperſtition*, which hath a thouſand fanciful reſources to ſupport men in an old habit?

We come now to what M. Baſnage calls the *third miracle*. And, concerning this, he reckons up as many *variations* as in that which went before. But it will be proper firſt to ſee how he repreſents the miracle itſelf. His words are theſe,—*their obſtinacy gave occaſion to a third miracle. For, in the morning, they perceived a great number of ſhining* STARS *ſcattered over their habits.* His authority for calling theſe marks, *ſtars*, is Sozomene: who, indeed, gives them that name: but, as I conceive, very erroneouſly; by miſtaking the ſenſe of Gregory Nazianzene, whom he here follows *. Gregory's words are, καλάσερος ὤν; which Billius tranſlates, *ſtellatus nimirum ipſe notiſque diſtinctus*; following the interpretation of Sozomene, who calls them downright *ſtars*, ᾗ τρόπον τινὰ ΑΣΤΡΑΣΙ ποικιλμένα τὰ ἐσθήματα εἶχον. But I apprehend, that Gregory meant no more by καλάσερος, than that the mark had a ſtar-like *radiance*; not a ſtar-like *figure*. And my reaſons are, 1. Becauſe he had juſt before affirmed, that theſe marks were *croſſes*; and, proceeding in his relation, he acquaints us with their *quality*, that they were καλάσεροι, or *ſhining*. A circumſtance that would firſt catch the obſervation; though, as we have ſhewn †, it may be naturally accounted for. He uſes the ſame term to expreſs the ſhining feathers in a peacock's train — τὸ πτερὸν κυκλοτερῶς περιςήσας τὸ χρυσαιγὲς ᾗ ΚΑΤΑΣΤΕΡΟΝ ‡.—2. Socrates, if he borrowed from Gregory, gives this ſenſe to his words; or, if he did not borrow

* It appears he followed Nazianzene from what he further obſerves of their elegant form:—ὡς ἀπὸ ἰσουργικῆς περιποίας καλιστρίνα. Soz.—πάσης ἰσουργικῆς ψηφῖδος, ἢ περιεργῆ ζωγραφίας ποικιλώτερον ἐκ τούτου τὶ γίνεται. Naz.

† See p. 435, & ſeq. ‡ Orat. xxxiv.

from

from him, at leaſt he teaches us how to underſtand him. His expreſſion is σφραγῖδες ϛαυρῷ ΑΚΤΙΝΟΕΙΔΕΙΣ, *ſhining impreſſions of the croſs.* They were like *ſtars* in *radiance*, but in *figure* they were *croſſes.* Nor do Rufinus, Theodoret, or Caſſiodorus, who all remember the *croſſes*, ſpeak one word of *ſtars*; no not even Theophanes, who ſtudied them well; and ſeems to have had the manufacturing of a ſpurious ſort, in imitation of them.

Thus much was proper to be ſaid: For, though this difference of figure does not in the leaſt affect our reaſoning on its *phyſical* cauſe, yet it much impairs its *moral* meaning as a ſymbolic mark. Which, as Sozomene could not but ſee, it ſhews his honeſty at leaſt, in not concealing a miſtaken circumſtance, though it took off from the awful ſignificancy of the impreſſion.

With our Critic's leave, therefore, we will call them CROSSES. And now let us ſee what he hath to object to them.

He preludes his reflections with this oblique remark,—*theſe ſhining ſtars they tried to efface, but in vain.* This is ſaid to inſinuate diſcredit on the fact, by an acceſſion of the wonderful. But we have ſhewn, that the difficulty of waſhing them out was a natural effect of their ſhining quality *; at leaſt, a property they had in common with other the like appearances in later times †. So that this will ſtand no longer in our way.

He comes to his *variations*, by which, as we obſerved before, he ſometimes means *additions*; ſometimes *differences*; and ſometimes, again, *contradictions.*

The *firſt* is the loweſt ſpecies of a *variation*, that is to ſay, an *addition.*—Sozomene adds, *there were of theſe ſtars ſo artfully formed, that the hand of a workman could not have done them better.* Sozomene, as we obſerved, borrowed this particular from Gregory. And if Socrates and Theodoret omit it, it was not becauſe they were ignorant of it; much leſs becauſe they did not believe it. However, ſuch who know that nature frequently caſts the mixed ſub-

* P. 436. † P. 441.

ſtances,

ſtances, produced by fermentation, into regular figures, and often, with that elegance of deſign which art can but lamely imitate, will have no reaſon to doubt of the truth of this circumſtance, after it hath been ſhewn *, that the marks were entirely *meteoric*.

The *ſecond* variation is, that Theodoret *deviates a little here; for, inſtead of the ſhining ſtars, he ſpeaks of black ones. Such as indeed more properly marked the crime and puniſhment of the Jews.* Theſe laſt words are ſlyly added to recommend the ingenious turn of Theodoret's *addition:* and to ſhew his Reader, that the *Father* knew how to invent with judgement. But to leave his juſtification to the nature of the fact, which we are juſt coming to, when we have obſerved; that M. Baſnage ſhould here have changed his language, and uſed *croſſes* inſtead of *ſtars*; for Theodoret does not intimate a ſyllable about *ſtars*. It is true, then, he does indeed ſay, that the croſſes on the garments of the Jews were of a dark colour—ἐκ μελαίνης χροιᾶς—We have ſeen, that the matter of theſe croſſes was of the nature of the Phoſphorus, whoſe property it is to ſhine by night, and to be dark-coloured by day †. Now if one Writer were to deſcribe their appearance by night, and another their appearance by day, Muſt not This ſay, they were *radiant and ſhining*; and That, that they were *dark coloured?* And ſo much for his *ſecond variation*.

The *third* is, that Theodoret, AT THE SAME TIME, *cruſhes to death a great number who were faſt aſleep under a portico.* The force of this objection, ſuch as it hath, lies in the *time*. For as to the *fall* of the portico, Rufinus and Sozomene concur with Theodoret. But it is by no means true, that Theodoret ſays, it was at *the ſame time*. If we ſuppoſe that he obſerves order in this incident, we muſt conclude the *fall* happened *before*. For the ſeries of his relation ſtands thus—a portico fell by night—on the ſame night, and on the following, a croſs in the ſky—then the croſſes on the garments

* P. 435.

† See p. 435, & ſeq.

ments *. The truth is, the fall of this portico had a very ſufficient cauſe. Sozomene plainly intimates, and Rufinus expreſsly ſays, it was thrown down by the *firſt* earthquake which *preceded* the firey eruption †.

We come now to what the learned Critic calls the *great variation of all.*

Which, he ſays, *turns upon the effect of the third miracle. For one aſſures us, that the Jews returned home as hardened as if they had ſeen nothing: whereas the other two pretend, that the greater part embraced the Chriſtian faith. And that the news of their converſion reached even to the ears of the Emperor Julian himſelf.*

This, I confeſs, is to the purpoſe; and, were it true, would be a conſiderable objection to the credit of their evidence. But the contradiction charged upon them is groundleſs and imaginary. He who (our Critic ſays) *aſſures us, that the Jews returned home, as hardened as if they had ſeen nothing*, is Socrates; whoſe words are theſe: "The Jews, ſeized with a horrible conſternation, were "forced, in ſpite of themſelves, to confeſs that Jesus Christ was "God. Yet for all that, they would not obey his will. But, as "men faſt bound in religious prejudices, ſtill continued in their "old ſuperſtition: nor did a third miracle, which happened afterwards, bring them to the true faith—They were hardened, "therefore, according to the ſaying of the apoſtle, and caſt away "the good which was then laid before them ‡."

This, without doubt, is a plain aſſertion that the groſs body of the Jews concerned in this attempt returned home religionleſs as they came; without either their *temple*, or any holier worſhip. So far, therefore, is allowed; and he hath it to make his beſt of;

* καὶ νύκλωρ ἔν τινι Στοᾷ—καλὰ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ αὖ πάλιν τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ὤφθη ἐν τῷ ἀφανῷ—καὶ αὐτὰ δὲ τῶν Ἰουδαίων ἐδήλωσα. L. iii. c. 20.

† See p 444, 445.

‡ Ἰουδαῖοι δὲ ἐν μεγίστῳ φόβῳ γενόμενοι, καὶ ἄκοντες ὡμολόγουν τὸν Χριστὸν Θεὸν λέγοντες. ὐκ ἐποίουν δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ θέλημα, ἀλλ' ἔμενον τῇ τῶ Ἰουδαϊσμῷ προλήψει κρατούμενοι· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ τρίτον θαῦμα τὸ ὕστερον ἐπιγενόμενον, εἰς πίστιν τῆς ἀληθείας ἦγεν αὐτούς.—πεπώρωντο ὧν καλὰ τὸν Ἀπόστολον, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν χερσὶν ἔχοντες ἔῤῥιπτον. Socr. L. iii. c. 20.

which,

which, we ſee, he is willing enough to do; for he takes notice, that the other two hiſtorians, Sozomene and Theodoret, contradict Socrates, and *pretend, that the greater part embraced the Chriſtian faith.*

This then is the point to be examined. But let me previouſly obſerve, 1. That both Jews and Gentiles joined in the attempt to rebuild the temple; and had both of them the ſtigma of the croſs upon their garments, as Gregory Nazianzene and Rufinus inform us *. Nay, from Gregory we learn, it was impreſſed on the habits of ſuch of the *believers*, likewiſe, as were preſent. And, indeed, but for this circumſtance, the falſe miracle of Theophanes had never been invented, or at leaſt had been differently faſhioned: for he covers the very church-books and ſacred veſtments with croſſes. And, what is chiefly worth obſerving is, that this falling of the croſſes *indifferently* on all parties preſent, confirms the phyſical account we have given of their nature. 2. My ſecond obſervation is, That as Socrates records the effect of this miracle on the Jews, ſo Gregory Nazianzene records the effect of it on the Gentiles: For this Father having inſulted and triumphed over their Mathematicians and Aſtronomers on the ſubject of the aerial Croſs; goes on to ſpeak of *that* upon the habits of the perſons preſent; and concludes his account in this manner: *So great was the aſtoniſhment of the ſpectators, that almoſt all of them, as at a common ſign, with one voice invoked for mercy the God of the Chriſtians, and ſtrove to render him propitious with hymns and ſupplications. And many of them, without procraſtinating, but, at the very time theſe things happened, addreſſing themſelves to our prieſts with earneſt prayers, were admitted into the boſom of the church* †, *&c.* Where we may obſerve

* ἐπιδειξάτωσαν ἔτι καὶ νῦν τὰ ἐσθῆτας, οἱ τῷ θαύματι ἐκείνῳ θιασῶται καὶ μύσται—ὁμῶ τε γὰρ ταῦτα διηγεῖτό τις, εἴτ' ἂν τῶν ἡμιέρων, εἴτ' ἄντων ξένων—Naz. Orat. ix.—In ſequenti nocte in veſtimentis *omnium* ſignaculum crucis. Ruf. L. x. c. 37.

† Τοσαύτη τῶν ὁρωμένων καλάπληξις, ὡς μικρῷ μὲν ἅπαντας ὥσπερ ἐξ ἑνὸς ζυνθήματος καὶ μιᾶς φωνῆς, τὸν τῶν Χριστιανῶν ἀνακαλεῖσθαι θεὸν, ἱκεσίαις τε πολλαῖς καὶ ἱκετείαις αὐτὸν ἐξιλάσκεσθαι· πολλοὺς δὲ ἐκ εἰς ἀναβολὰς, ἀλλὰ παρ' αὐτὰ τῶν ζυμβαίνων προσδραμόντας τοῖς ἱερεῦσιν ἡμῶν, καὶ πολλὰ καλαδεηθέντας τῆς τε ἐκκλησίας γενέσθαι μέρος, &c. Orat. ix.

the different language of Nazianzene on this occaſion ſpeaking of the Gentiles, from that of Socrates, who ſpoke of the Jews. The firſt ſays, τὸν τῶν Χριϛιανῶν ἀναϰαλεῖσθαι Θεὸν; the other, ἄϰονϑες ὠμολόϒουν τὸν Χριϛὸν Θεὸν λέϒονϑες. The Gentiles implored the protection of the great *God of Heaven*, whom they had before *neglected*: the Jews were forced to own *that Chriſt* to be God, whom they had before *rejected*.

This being premiſed, we come now to Sozomene and Theodoret; who, our learned Critic affirms, have contradicted Socrates, in *pretending that the greater part embraced the Chriſtian faith.*

I will give the paſſage of Sozomene entire. *After theſe things* [namely the earthquake and firey eruption], *another miracle happened, more illuſtrious and wonderful than the foregoing: for, on a ſudden, and without human agency, every man's habit was impreſſed with the ſign of the Croſs.—The conſequence of this was, that ſome, on the inſtant, concluded Chriſt to be God, and that the reſtoration of the temple was diſpleaſing to him. While others, not long after, went over to the Church and were baptized; and by hymns and ſupplications, in behalf of the guilty, endeavoured to appeaſe the wrath of the Son of God* *.

As evident as it certainly is that Socrates ſpoke only of the Jews; and Gregory Nazianzene only of the Gentiles; ſo certain is it, that Sozomene, who took from both of them, ſpeaks *both of Jews and Gentiles.*

He ſays, *every man's habit was marked with a Croſs.* That is, as Greg. Naz. had ſaid before, every man indifferently, whether Jew or Gentile. He then mentions the *conſequence* of this prodigy, not on the Jews only, but on the Gentiles; ἐν τούτῳ δὲ—And as it was reaſonable to expect it would have a different effect on theſe different bigots; he *firſt* ſpeaks of what it had upon the Jews, that,

* Ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὲ ϰ᾽ ἄλλο ξυνηνέχθη, τῷ παρόντι ϛαφέϛερόν τε ϰ᾽ παραδοξότερον· αὐτομάτως γὰρ πάντων ἡ σθὴς τῷ ϛημείῳ τοῦ ϛαυροῦ ϰαθεϛημάνθη—ἐϰ τούτου δὲ, τοῖς μὲν αὐτίϰα ἐϰρίθη θεὸν εἶναι τὸν Χριϛὸν, ϰ᾽ μὴ ἀρεϛὸν εἶναι τῇ ἀναϰαινίσει τοῦ ναοῦ· οἱ δὲ, ὅϰ εἰς μαϰρὰν παρελθόντος τῇ ἐϰϰλησίᾳ ϰ᾽ ἐμυήθησαν, ϰ᾽ ὕμνοις ϰ᾽ ἱϰεσίαις ὑπὲρ τῶν πεπολιτευμένων αὐτοῖς, τὸν Χριϛὸν ἱλάσϰοντο. Eccl. Hiſt. l. v. c. 22.

on the inſtant, they confeſſed Chriſt to be God. This is no more than Socrates had ſaid. They only differ in the manner of telling: For while Socrates goes on to inform us, in expreſs words, that the confeſſion was not *laſting*, and that they preſently fell back into their old ſuperſtition; Sozomene contents himſelf to *lead* his reader to the ſame concluſion, by oppoſing this ſudden flaſh of *conviction*, to the real and laſting *converſion* of the Pagans, as he found it recorded by Gregory. *Others* (ſays he) *not long after went over to the church, &c.* From hence it appears, that Sozomene is ſo far from contradicting Socrates, on this article, that he lends him all the ſupport a concurrent teſtimony can afford.

THEODORET comes next. And him too the learned Critic hath involved in the ſame charge of contradiction; but with much leſs pretence. For he, like Socrates, ſpeaks only of the Jews; and, in ſuch a manner too, as if he had Socrates all the way in his eye. The whole of what he ſays is to this effect: *The very garments alſo of the Jews were filled with croſſes—which theſe enemies of God ſeeing, and fearing that his hand, now exerted, might fall upon themſelves, fled away, and returned every man to his place, confeſſing him to be God, whom their forefathers affixed to the tree* *.

And now, what is there that can countenance M. Baſnage in ſaying, that *Theodoret pretends the greater part embraced the Chriſtian faith?* Is not the *confeſſion* he records the very ſame with that which, Socrates tells us, ſo ſoon paſſed away in their returning infidelity, inſinuated in the very words, τὰ οἰκεῖα κατέλαβον? We conclude, therefore, againſt the learned Critic's objection, that, in this article, there is a perfect harmony amongſt the three hiſtorians.

But it will be ſaid perhaps that, in clearing away this objection, I make room for another, that may prove more ſtubborn, and difficult to remove. "For it ſeems incredible that ſo illuſtrious a

* Καὶ αὐτὰ δὲ τῶν Ἰουδαίων ἱσθήματα σαυρῶν ἐμπλήσαντο, ταῦτα οἱ ἀνίλιθεοι θεασάμενοι, καὶ τὰς θεηλάτους μάστιγας ὑῤῥωδήσαντες, ἀπέδρασάν τε καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα κατέλαβον, θεὸν ὁμολογοῦντες τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν προγόνων τῷ ξύλῳ προσηλωθέντα. Eccl. Hiſt. L. iii. cap. 20.

miracle ſhould have made no impreſſion on the Jews; and yet have had ſo conſiderable an effect upon the Gentiles. An objection, which ſeems to be redoubled upon one who hath affirmed *, that a Jew's conviction of the truth of Chriſtianity muſt, on his own notions of the *unity*, be neceſſarily attended with a converſion: while that Polytheiſtic principle of *intercommunity* did not imply the neceſſity of a Gentile's converſion under the ſame conviction."

To this I anſwer, It is very true, that a miracle performed before a Pagan, and not directly addreſſed to him, made, for the moſt part, but a ſmall impreſſion on his religious notions; becauſe that general principle of Paganiſm hindered him from ſeeing, that the evident truth of *another* religion neceſſarily implied the falſhood of his *own*. It was different with the Jew; who, being a worſhipper of the true God, muſt neceſſarily regard his atteſtation, by miracle, not ſimply as an evidence of the truth propoſed, but as an obligation upon all men to embrace it. Hence the apoſtle Paul, who beſt knew the different geniuſes of the two oppoſed Religions, ſays, *The Jews require a ſign, and the Greeks ſeek after wiſdom:* Σοφίαν, the religious principles of their philoſophy: in the chief of which was the doctrine of *intercommunity*.

Had the Jews therefore conſidered this miracle at Jeruſalem, as *an atteſtation to the truth of Chriſtianity*, they muſt have embraced it. And to affirm they did ſo conſider it, and yet not embrace it, would, it muſt be owned, be ſaying ſomething ſtrangely incredible. But this was not the caſe. In their fright they might call out upon *Chriſt as God*; but when that was over, their prejudice regained its hold, and drew them back to their ancient ſuperſtition; however it could not have kept them there, but that it enabled them to find a purpoſe, in this miracle, very well conſiſtent with Judaiſm: and this was *God's anger* at their prophaning a work ſo holy, by conſenting to put it under the direction of a Pagan emperor. This would be eaſily credited by thoſe who had learnt from

* See Divine Legation, Book II. Sect. 6. See alſo Book V. Sect. 6.

their

their ſacred Books that an Iſraelite was ſtruck dead but for ſtretching out his hand to uphold the falling ARK. When, therefore, they ſaw and felt theſe ſevere marks of His diſpleaſure, To what would they aſcribe it, but to their accepting the impure aſſiſtance of an impious Gentile to rebuild the houſe of the Divine preſence? For could it be expected (would their leaders now ſay) when God had denied this honour to the *Man after his own heart*, becauſe his hands were defiled with blood, that he would confer it upon a Pagan, a Warrior, and a declared Enemy to that Diſpenſation; a zeal for which was David's great merit with the God of Iſrael? We ſee, by the paſſage quoted above * from R. Gedaliah ben Joſeph Jechaiah, that ſome ſuch reaſoning as this, which a *Father* † of the church ſeemed to think did not want its weight, enabled them to own the miracle without bluſhing. But had they even wanted ſo plauſible an evaſion, yet their prejudices would not have ſuffered them to be nice in a caſe where the whole of their Religion lay at ſtake: In ſuch caſes, they were not uſed to be delicate; as appears by a parallel inſtance, in the bungling ſolutions they invented to evade the conſequences ariſing from the miracles of Jeſus himſelf. Sometimes they aſcribed his power (as the Goſpel tells us) to the aſſiſtance of the evil dæmon; and ſometimes again (as the books of their traditions inform us) to certain ſpells or charms ſtolen from the temple of Solomon.

However, though the miracle at Jeruſalem was too notorious to be queſtioned in that age; and ſo was to be accounted for in the manner we have ſeen; yet in aftertimes it was thought ſafer to *deny* it; though ſtill by the *modeſt* way of an implication. Thus (as we have ſeen above ‡) R. David Gans pretends, that the miſcarriage in the Perſian war prevented the rebuilding their temple—

* P. 407.

† St. Chryſoſtome, ſpeaking of the readineſs of the Jews to accept Julian's aſſiſtance, ſays,—Καὶ ὐκ ἠσχύνοντο οἱ μιαροὶ καὶ ἀναισχυντοι παρὰ ἀνδρὸς ἀσεβοῦς καὶ Ἕλληνος ταῦτα αἰτοῦντες, καὶ τὰς μιαρὰς ἐκείνας χεῖρας καλοῦντες ἐπὶ τὴν των ἁγίων οἰκοδομήν. Hom. v. adv. Jud.

‡ P. 305, note.

Nam.

Nam Cæſar in bello Perſico periit. Another of them invents a very different tale (for falſhood is rarely conſtant), and pretends that a ſly trick of the Samaritans made both the Jews and the Emperor, in their turns, weary of the project. But ſo fooliſh a ſtory will hardly bear the telling. However the reader may find it below *. And in this manner too they treated the miracles of Jeſus: for though, at firſt, they only tried to evade their force; they ventured at length to deny their reality.

On the whole, then, we ſee, That the inveterate *prejudices* of the Jews; their *obſtinacy* in the wrong; and their *averſion* to the Chriſtian name, would hinder a miracle from having its proper effect upon them, could they but contrive either to put it to the ſupport of their own ſuperſtitions, or, at leaſt, to turn it from the condemnation of them. We ſee, the miracle in queſtion might be thus evaded. Who then can doubt but they would evade it? The conſequence was, their continuance in error. The Chriſtian writers tell us they did ſo continue. And we now find, They ſay nothing but what is very probable.

* In diebus R. Jehoſuah Hananiæ filii, mandavit Imperator ut *Templum reædificaretur*. Papus autem, & Julianus opiparas menſas præponunt Judæis à captivitate advenientibus (ad opus adjuvandum) ab Hako ad Antiochiam. Cutei vero ſeu Samaritani Imperatori aſſerunt, quod ſi Hieruſalem reſtauretur, Judæos a contribuendis vectigalibus ceſſaturos, indeque ab illo defecturos; quibus Imperator: Quomodo inquit, licet mihi ab incepto recedere poſt mandati promulgationem? Ad quod Samaritani, Domine, inquiunt, præcipe ergo, ut locum prioris Templi mutent, vel ut augeatur aut diminuatur in longitudine vel latitudine circa quinque cubitos, itaque, nullo cogente, opus deſtituent. Huic ſententiæ acquievit Imperator; atque juxta eam, novum miſit Judæis mandatum in valle *Bet Kimon* aggregatis, quo audito, in magnum prorumpunt fletum, indeque furore perciti de defectione loquuntur; ſed Magnates defectionis conſequentiis valde perterriti, implorant a prædicto R. Jehoſuah, ut populum alloquatur, eumque ad pacem adducere conetur, quod fecit ſequenti fabula. Leo a fruſtulo oſſis in ejus gutture infixo admodum afflictus, magnam ſpondet mercedem cuicunque moleſtum os ab ejus gutture averruncaret. Accedit Grus, os averruncat, & mercedem petit. Cui Leo, Jacta te ipſum, inquit, quod ingreſſus es in Leonis os in pace, & egreſſus es in pace. Sic, fratres, ſufficit ut ingreſſi ſimus ſub hujus gentis poteſtate in pace, & egrediamur in pace. Hæc ſunt Bereſit-Raba verba fideliter tranſlata, ex fine cap. 64. Hoc accidit anno ab orbe condito circa 4833, ſecundum R. David Ganz in ejus Zemah David.

The

The contrary effect of this miracle on *Paganiſm* is as eaſily underſtood. For though the principle of *intercommunity* ſupported a Gentile againſt the power of miracles at large; yet when he found one of them levelled at himſelf, as its direct object, the caſe would be altered. He would then feel the point in queſtion brought home to him; and the circumſtances of affright and deſolation (if, as here, the miracle was attended with any ſuch) would keep off prejudice till reaſon had paſſed a fair judgement. The Jews and Gentiles joined cordially in this project. The prime motive of the Jews was a *fond* deſire to be reſtored to their country and religion; but that of the Gentiles, a *malicious* purpoſe to give the lie to Revelation. And, without doubt, the moral *impreſſion* on the defeat would be relative to the *motive* of the attempt. They thought to diſhonour the holy faith; and they added new credit to it. So that a *conſciouſneſs* of their intentions would add proportionable *facility* to their converſion. The Jewiſh evaſion would not ſerve *their* purpoſe. At moſt, it could only make them waver between the *Church* and the *Synagogue*; a ſtate of no long continuance. Sozomene aſſures us it was ſoon over; *In a little time* (ſays he) ἀπ εἰς μακρὰν, *they went over to the Church, and were baptiſed.*

But, before we leave this ſubject, it may be proper to obſerve, That *general* expreſſions, relative to parties, and bodies of men, are not to be underſtood *univerſally*. Thus when the Hiſtorians tell us, *all* were marked with the croſs, They do not mean *every individual* preſent; but all indifferently, of every denomination. So again, when they ſay, the *Pagans* were converted, and the Jews remained hardened, They do not mean every particular man; but the far greater number in either party. And thus St. Chryſoſtome directs us to underſtand it, where he ſays, *that the Jews, for the moſt part, remained hardened* *.

It is ſcarce worth while to take notice, that what M. Baſnage affirms (of Sozomene and Theodoret's ſaying, *That the news of the*

* Tom. V. Orat. xlv.

Jews'

Jews' converſion reached even the ears of the emperor Julian himſelf), is as miſtaken as the reſt. For Sozomene ſays nothing of the matter: and as to Theodoret, his words are as follows: *Theſe things came to the ears of Julian, for they were cried up, and in the mouths of all men; but his heart was hardened like Pharaoh's* *: where we ſee, by ταῦτα he means the miracles. For it was not the *converſion*, which was in the mouths of all men, but the *miracles*. And Julian's reſiſting theſe, was what made his caſe like Pharaoh's.

Our critic, having now well canvaſſed the *evidence*, tells us for what purpoſe he hath given himſelf this trouble; *It was to ſupply thoſe ſober perſons, who do not believe the miracle, with arguments to fortify their doubts.* But as if ſomething was ſtill wanting to ſo good an end, he reſumes his taſk, and ſays, he *will add two obſervations* more.

The *firſt* is, That *the argument Sozomene brings, to prove the truth of what he advances, is a very weak one. He appeals to the iſſue; and maintains, we can no longer doubt of this long train of miracles ſince the temple was never finiſhed. But* (ſays the critic) *has the hiſtorian forgot that the Jews did not obtain their permiſſion till the time of Julian's ſetting out for his Perſian expedition, in which he periſhed? There was then little need for all theſe miracles, to hinder the erection of a building. Surely a ſufficient cauſe of cutting ſhort an enterpriſe of this nature might be found in the oppoſition of the Chriſtians, who might take advantage of the Prince's abſence in a remote region, his death there, and the advancement of Jovian to the Empire, who had an averſion for the Jews. Beſides, the hiſtorian refers his readers in a vague indefinite manner to the eye-witneſſes of the fact, without pointing out one ſingle perſon by name.*

Here are many things aſſerted, that will deſerve to be examined.

1. He miſrepreſents the matter, in ſaying that Sozomene gives the unbuilt temple as a proof of its being obſtructed by a miracle.

* Ταῦτα ἤκουσε μὲν Ἰουλιανὸς, παρὰ πάντων γὰρ ἤδετο. τῷ δὲ Φαραὼ παραπλησίως τὴν καρδίαν ἐσκλήρυνεν. L. iii. c. 20.

To

To ſuch reaſoning, I own, M. Baſnage's obſervation of *Julian's abſence and death, &c.* had been a good reply. But Sozomene's argument ſtands thus: "The yielding up the place, and leaving the work imperfect, ἡμιτελὲς τὸ ἔργον καταλιπόντες, is a proof of the miraculous interpoſition." Now, it is one thing to *ſee a work* unfiniſhed; and another, to *know who* left it in that condition. From the firſt (which is as M. Baſnage repreſents it) Sozomene's concluſion would not hold; from the latter (which is as Sozomene himſelf puts it) his concluſion may be very fairly drawn. But to this it may be objected, "That, at the time Sozomene made this obſervation, the two different repreſentations amounted to one and the ſame thing; becauſe all that the reader could ſee, was a *work unfiniſhed*; and, for the reſt, he had only the hiſtorian's word." This, our adverſaries will allow to be fairly put. But they are not aware, that when Sozomene wrote, the face of things, upon the place, was ſuch as was ſufficient to convince his readers that the Jews and Gentiles were forcibly driven from their work; namely the marks of a deſolating earthquake, and a conſuming fire. Chryſoſtome tells us, theſe exiſted when he wrote; and it would be abſurd to think that ſuch kind of marks could be obliterated ſo ſoon after.

Thus far in defence of the hiſtorian's argument, falſely repreſented by the critic. I proceed to conſider the falſe fact, which the critic has advanced, in ſupport of his falſe repreſentation. He ſays, *that the Jews did not obtain their permiſſion to rebuild the temple, till the time Julian ſet out for his Perſian expedition.* This he grounds on the words of Socrates, Κελεύει τοίνυν καὶ τὸν Σολομῶνος ναὸν· καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ Πέρσας ἤλαυνε. which the Latin tranſlator renders, *Solomonis templum protinus inſtaurari jubet. Ipſe interim ad bellum contra Perſas proficiſcitur.* But ἐπὶ Πέρσας ἤλαυνε does not ſignify he forthwith began his march, as if it had been ἐπὶ Πέρσας πορεύεσθαι; but that he began the war againſt them, by putting every thing in a hoſtile motion; which he might do while he ſtayed at Antioch. And Amm. Marcellinus, who was, at that

time, with Julian, and of his court, tells us, that the eruption which put an end to the project, happened before his master left Antioch.

But the critic's *inference* from this will deserve a more particular consideration—*so that there was little need of all these miracles to hinder the erection of a single building. Surely a sufficient cause for cutting short an enterprise of this nature may be found in the opposition of the Christians, who might take advantage of the prince's absence in a remote region, of his death there, and the advancement of Jovian, who was an enemy to the Jews.*

Here are two things reprehensible in this inference, 1. A *false state of the case*; 2. and a *groundless insinuation.*

1. He speaks as if these miracles were worked only to hinder the simple erection of a building for superstitious worship; the error of Ambrose, taken notice of above. Whereas there was much more in the affair. It's erection would have contradicted the prophecies, and opposed the declared nature of the gospel dispensation. In the first case, there seemed no sufficient reason to interfere; in the latter, an interposition was necessary.

2. He *insinuates*, that the real obstruction came from the Christians in Julian's absence;—from his unexpected death;—and from the succession of a Christian to the empire. This, we see, is only his opinion; I think differently: and had I nothing but my conjectures to oppose to *his*, here I would leave it: but, without betraying the cause I have undertaken, I cannot omit to remind the reader, that the critic's *insinuation* is utterly discredited by the concurrent testimony of two unexceptionable witnesses, Ammianus Marcellinus, and Julian himself: from both of whom * we learn, that the affair of the temple-project was all over before the Emperor removed from Antioch.

But there is still something behind the curtain: which, either prudence or modesty, made the critic backward to subject to the

* See p. 390, 391. 399, & seq.

abuse

abuſe of every licentious reader. But I am always for letting truth be truſted with itſelf: therefore, to diſguiſe nothing, I would obſerve, that one of the ſtrongeſt objections to the miracle ſeems here to be obſcurely inſinuated. Whether he ſaw it in it's full force may be doubted. However, here it is: and the reader ſhall have no reaſon to complain that it does not come with it's beſt foot forward. I will ſuppoſe then M. Baſnage to make the following objection:

"That, admitting the re-edification of the temple was both contrary to the words of the old prophecies, and to the nature of the new diſpenſation; yet, as the projector of this affront upon religion was ſuddenly cut off, and ſucceeded by a Chriſtian Emperor, before any conſiderable progreſs could be made, there was no need of a miracle to defeat the attempt; and God is not wont to make a needleſs waſte of miracles."

The objection, we ſee, is ſpecious, and, at firſt view, will be apt to impoſe upon us. But let us weigh it's real value.

The caſe is agreed to be this: the two inveterate enemies of the Chriſtian name conſpire together, though with different views, to blaſt its credit, and diſhonour its pretenſions; and this, in a point ſo eſſential, that the religion itſelf muſt ſtand or fall with the iſſue of the event.

They put their deſign in execution. The materials are collected, the workmen aſſembled, the foundations laid, and the ſuperſtructure now advances without ſtop or impediment. In a word, every thing ſucceeds to their wiſhes. When, on a ſudden, one of the moſt common accidents in the world blaſts the whole project; a giddy headſtrong prince * periſhes in a raſh adventure againſt a fierce and ſubtle enemy.

* The temper and character of this prince was ſo well known, that, when he conſulted the Gods about his fate, the prieſts were in no danger of diſcrediting their oracles by a miſtaken conjecture. They told him he ſhould die a violent death. This he himſelf informs us of in his laſt harangue to his friends.—Nec fateri pudebit, interiturum me ferro dudum didici fide fatidica præcinente. Amm. Mar. l. xxv. c. 3.

In this caſe, what would the world have thought; the world, which never thinks favourably of religious novelties; and which this bold defiance of the power of Chriſt had ſet at gaze, and made impatient for the event * ? Would it not have ſaid, that Chriſtianity was beholden to a mere accident; while the power, that ſhould have ſupported it, was not at hand to vindicate its credit and reputation ? And it was well if they had ſaid no more. For the popular ſtory, which the malice of the Pagans, and the indiſcretion of ſome Chriſtians, had ſet a going, *that Julian was aſſaſſinated by a Chriſtian ſoldier*, would, in that caſe, have been enough to raiſe ſuſpicions that the *faith* had been propagated, at firſt, by as indirect means as it was now ſupported.

The Jews had twice before projected the reſtoration of their *temple-worſhip:* once under Hadrian; and once again, under Conſtantine. At thoſe junctures the attempt had none of this malice and formed impiety againſt the divinity of our holy faith. The Gentiles then gave the Jews no aſſiſtance or ſupport: and it was in them a ſimple, natural deſire of returning to their own land, and of re-eſtabliſhing their country-rites. But ſtill, it being contrary to God's religious œconomy, the deſign was defeated by the *policy* of Hadrian, and the *zeal* of Conſtantine; and theſe *civil* impediments were ſufficient to cover the honour of religion. For, in theſe two inſtances, God's tranſaction was only with his church. He promiſed to ſupport it to the end of time, and he equally performs his promiſe whether that protection be conveyed by the mortal inſtruments with which he works in the courſe of his general providence, and whoſe blindneſs is guided by his all-ſeeing eye: or whether it be immediately afforded by the ſudden arreſt and new direction of nature, irreſiſtibly impelled by his all-powerful hand.

But the caſe was different in the affair before us. Here God had a controverſy with his enemies. His power was defied, his

* See p. 409.

protection

protection ſcorned, and his Godhead dared and challenged to interpoſe between them and his ſervants. At this important juncture, to let a natural event decide the quarrel; and to urge *that* as a proof of his victory, would be taking for granted the thing in queſtion. For the affair was not with his friends, who believed his ſuperintendency; but with his enemies, who laughed at and deſpiſed it. Not to ſhew himſelf, on this occaſion, in all the terror of offended majeſty, muſt have expoſed his religion to the ſame contempt as if the very pinnacles of the new-projected temple had been completed.

But this is not all. A PROPHECY, ſuch as this, concerning the *final* deſtruction of the temple, is of the nature of a PROHIBITORY LAW. For God's *foretelling* a thing *ſhould never be*, contains in it a *prohibition* to do it: becauſe that information is founded in *his own* will, or command; not in the will or command of *another*: therefore that *will* binds all, to whoſe knowledge it arrives. This law came to the knowledge of our projectors, as appears from their very impiety in defying it *. But it is of the nature and eſſence of *Law*, to have penal ſanctions. Without them, all laws are vain; eſpecially *prohibitory laws*. Now theſe tranſgreſſors were as culpable in beginning the foundations, as they could have been had they lived to finiſh their work. Therefore to ſee them eſcape puniſhment, and ſafely and quietly go off when the change of times forbad them to proceed (a change, which had nothing in it more wonderful than the death of a raſh adventurer in battle) muſt have argued, that God was no more concerned in the iſſue of this, than of all other natural events; and conſequently, that theſe *boaſted prophecies*, and this *pretended goſpel*, were the inventions of men. I believe modern infidels would ſcarce have ſpared us, had they taken church-hiſtory at this advantage.

* Πάντα δὲ τὰ ἄλλα διύτερα ἦν τῶ ποιυμένω. βασιλεῖ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι, καὶ πᾶσιν Ἰυδαίοις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὅτε Ἰυδαίοις συνῆλθες, ἐκοινώνυν, αὐτοῖ τῆς σπυδῆς, ὑπολαβόλ-, λύισθαι καλοςθὲν τὸ ἐγχείρημα, καὶ ψευδεῖς ἀπελέγξαι τῶ Χριςῶ τὰς πρεῤῥήσεις. εἰ δὲ, ἅμα τῶτο διεσοβήλο, καὶ καιρὸν ἔχειν φοιλο ἀναςῆσαι τὸ ἱερόν.—τὴν διαπόλιχην ὑπολαμβάνων ὁ Μάταιος πρόῤῥησιν διελέγχειν. Theod. l. iii. c. 20, Sozom. l. v. c. 22.

But

But now, by a timely interpoſition, the honour of religion was ſecured: And, an exemplary puniſhment being inflicted, the reverence of his laws, the credit of his meſſengers, and the regal dignity of his Son, were all amply vindicated.

While I am upon this ſubject, let me obſerve, what, perhaps, I might have found a better place for, that the forbearance of Jovian and Valentinian to revenge, on thoſe forward creatures in power, the inſults and injuries offered on this occaſion to many peaceable and honeſt men, is no ſlight proof of the reality of a miraculous interpoſition. For it ſhewed the church fully ſatisfied that God had avenged his own cauſe. Gregory Nazianzene ends his *Diſcourſe againſt Julian* with an excellent perſuaſive to forgiveneſs; wherein he exhorts the Chriſtians to ſacrifice their reſentments, as a *Thank-offering*, to God: ἐνοσ]ιδῶμεν (ſays he) τῷ Θεῷ χαριςήριον.

Thus having ſet this objection in the beſt light we were able, both for the honour of religion, and the credit of M. Baſnage's criticiſm; and ſeen to what it amounts: we leave it to the reader to make his concluſions on the general queſtion.

M. Baſnage goes on in theſe words,—*Beſides, the hiſtorian* [Sozomene] *refers his readers in a vague indefinite manner to the eye-witneſſes of the fact, without pointing out one ſingle perſon by name.*

Objectors are often too careleſs where their random reflections will light. This will fall upon the Apoſtle's narrative as well as our hiſtorian's. St Paul, arguing againſt ſome who denied the Reſurrection from the dead, confutes them by the Reſurrection of Jeſus; who was *ſeen*, after he was riſen, *of above five hundred brethren at once, of whom* (ſays he, without ſpecifying any one by name) *the greater part remain unto this preſent, but ſome are fallen aſleep* *.

Sozomene writes a general hiſtory of the church, for the uſe of the whole Chriſtian world: and ſpeaking, in its place, of the

* 1 Cor. xv. 6.

event

event at Jeruſalem, he concludes his account in this manner: *Should theſe things ſeem incredible to any one, thoſe who have had their information from eye-witneſſes, and are yet alive, will confirm it to him* *. Of which number, if he himſelf was not one; yet, at leaſt, he had his account from one. In either caſe, this was proper ſatisfaction to a doubter. And it had been impertinent to add, that "amongſt theſe were John, Thomas or Andrew of Jeruſalem;" obſcure names, which would have given his reader no more ſatisfaction, than what his general information had conveyed before. But it may be ſaid, that St. Paul, beſides his *vague* account of *five hundred*, adds the names of Cephas, James, and himſelf. And ſo, doubtleſs, would Sozomene have done, had he either ſeen it himſelf, or known any that had, with whoſe names his reader was as well acquainted, as the Corinthians were with Cephas, James, and the *reſt of the Twelve*. What he hath done was what common ſenſe dictated he ſhould do. But M. Baſnage ſeems to expect in a general hiſtory all the circumſtance and preciſion of a *procés-verbal*.

However, thus much we learn from theſe *vague* words of Sozomene, that he was not a mere copier; but, to verify his ſtory, went as nigh the fountain-head as he could get. And this being the practice of theſe three honeſt and judicious hiſtorians, we need not wonder that *one* ſhould mention *this* incident, and *another*, *that*, juſt as they received their information from the moſt credible of the *firſt ear-witneſſes* they could find then alive: which too, by the way, is ſufficient to take off all M. Baſnage urges on the head of *variations*. But had we taken his VARIATIONS from him, what were he then? An artiſt without the proper tool of his trade; for a *profeſſed objector* never borrowed more than this from the magazine of Quintilian—ARTIFICIS *eſt invenire in actione adverſarii quæ inter ſemetipſa pugnent, aut* PUGNARE VIDEANTUR.

* Ταῦτα ὅτῳ πιστὰ ὐ καλαφαίνεται, πιστόσθωσαν οἱ παρὰ τῶν θεασαμενῶν ἀκηκούτες ἴτι τῷ βίῳ πιρι-όντες. l. v. c. 22.

We

We are now come to the end of this long piece of criticiſm, which concludes in theſe words: *But laſtly, Cyril of Jeruſalem, who was, at that time, Biſhop of the place, and muſt have been upon the ſpot, ſince it was he, who, confiding in a prophecy of Daniel (which had foretold, as he thought, that the attempt would prove unſucceſsful) encouraged and animated the people to repoſe their confidence in God. Notwithſtanding, this ſame Cyril hath never taken the leaſt notice of theſe many miracles: and yet it certainly was not, becauſe he was no friend to miracles: we are told he wrote to Conſtantine the Younger, to inform him, that he was more happy than his father, under whoſe empire the Croſs of Chriſt had been found here on earth; ſince Heaven, to grace his reign, had diſplayed a more illuſtrious prodigy: which was a croſs much brighter than the Sun, ſeen in the firmament, for a long time together, by the whole city of Jeruſalem. Why now was that croſs remembered, and all theſe miracles forgotten? He aſſures the Jews they ſhall ſee the ſign of the croſs; and that it will precede the coming of the Son of God; and yet he ſays not one word of thoſe which had been miraculouſly affixed on their habits. The ſilence of a Biſhop, who was upon the place, who loved miracles, and laboured for the converſion of the Jews, looks very ſuſpicious; while, at the ſame time, thoſe who do ſpeak to it lived at a diſtance.*

The ſuppoſed fact, as here ſtated, concerning *Cyril's teſtimony*, is indeed a material objection to the miracle. What ſhall we ſay then? Would not any one conclude that this learned man, a real friend to Revelation, and faithful hiſtorian, had weighed it well before he ventured to pronounce upon its conſequences, in ſo public a manner? Who would ſuſpect that he has taken for granted *one* thing, which every body knows to be falſe; and *another*, which nobody can know to be true?

He takes it for granted, that the works which now remain of *Cyril* were written *after* the event; whereas they were all written *before*. Theſe are the *Catecheſes ad competentes*, the *Catecheſes myſtagogicæ*, and the *Epiſtle to Conſtantius*: the two firſt bear date about

about 347, and the latter in 351; thoſe, ſixteen; this, twelve years *before* the miracle in queſtion. And the worſt is, the learned critic could not but know it.

If he had no intention to deceive by this captious inſinuation, we muſt lay the blame on his careleſs expreſſion; and that his argument from Cyril's ſilence, when ſet in the beſt light, ſtands thus:

"The pretended miracle at the temple of Jeruſalem happened in the year 363. Cyril lived to the year 386, ſo that we cannot but conclude, he wrote and preached much within that period. He appears to be fond of recording miracles: but he had peculiar reaſons to celebrate, and expatiate upon, *this*. It favoured his charitable zeal for the converſion of the Jews; but, above all, the glory of it reflected much luſtre upon himſelf, as he had predicted the defeat. Had he therefore known it to be true, he muſt have recorded it. But the ſilence of antiquity concerning his teſtimony ſhews he did not record it. For to whom but to Cyril, the Biſhop of the place, and then upon the ſpot, ſhould the ancient relators of the fact have appealed? Yet he was not forgotten in the crowd: for they tell us of his faith in the *prophecy of Daniel*. We muſt, therefore, conclude, that the event, whatever it was, had ſtruck the good biſhop dumb; and that his ſilence proceeded from that ſort of confuſion, which we now-a-days ſee in the *modeſter part* of our *Revelation-Prophets*, when ſome unexpected event between the Turk and the Emperor has diſconcerted the ſcheme they had chalked out for the direction of Divine Providence.

It will hardly be thought, I have not done the argument juſtice. Let us ſee then what can be ſaid to it.

1. Whether Cyril left any thing behind him (except what he wrote before the event) is not any where ſaid. Some perhaps may conclude from Jerom, that he wrote nothing after this time: For, in Jerom's catalogue of eccleſiaſtical writers, the works mentioned above are given as a complete liſt of what Cyril wrote: and it

is ſcarce to be ſuppoſed that any of his writings ſhould have periſhed between his time and that of Jerom.

2. Cyril might write many things, and yet none relative to this affair; or in which he could properly introduce it.

3. He might have given the hiſtory of it in all its circumſtances, and yet theſe three hiſtorians (to whom M. Baſnage's obſervation is confined) not been guilty of any neglect in not mentioning his teſtimony *by name*. Or if it were a neglect, it was the ſame they committed in paſſing over two other contemporary writers, Gregory Nazianzene and John Chryſoſtome; one of whom has ſpoken fully, and the other frequently to the miracle in queſtion. But to this, perhaps, it may be replied, "That though they have not quoted them, yet they have referred to, and borrowed from them." How does the objector know that?—From the *homilies* of the one, and the *invectives* of the other, now remaining.—Very well: and for aught he knows to the contrary, had any of Cyril's ſuppoſed works been remaining, we ſhould have found them quoting from, and referring to him; eſpecially, as they relate ſeveral circumſtances, mentioned neither by Gregory nor Chryſoſtome. Had Gregory's works been loſt, we had been as unable to know that they borrowed from *him*, as we now are that they borrowed from Cyril.

4. As to their recording the good biſhop's prophetic *confidence* in the divine interpoſition, and at the ſame time overlooking his teſtimony to the miracle that followed, a very good reaſon may be given; and ſuch a one as does honour to their judgment. Cyril was *ſingular* in the firſt caſe; and but *one of many* in the other. They took, therefore, from him what no other could ſupply: and what was to be found every where (the teſtimony to the miracle) they left in common to the church.

5. As to the objection, from the circumſtance of Cyril's *loving miracles*, let me obſerve, that if it could be proved, from a work of his written after 363, that he had neglected any fair occaſion to re-

cord the defeat of Julian, the objection would have ſome weight. But in the total uncertainty whether he did record the ſtory or no, it turns againſt the objector, as the circumſtance of Cyril's *loving miracles* adds probability to the affirmative, that, if he did write at all, he would find room for a ſubject he loved to write upon.

6. But ſince the learned critic hath been pleaſed to ſpeak ſlightly of this excellent prelate, as if he were both fanatical in interpreting prophecies, and bigotted in believing miracles; ſo much will be due to the virtues of a worthy man (how far ſoever removed in time and place), as to vindicate him from unfair aſperſions; due eſpecially from us, as this juſtice to his character will be ſeen to reflect credit on the ſhare he took in oppoſing Julian's attempt. There is a ſtory recorded of him, for which every good man will reverence his memory. He had an eccleſiaſtical ſquabble with Acacius Biſhop of Cæſarea, about Metropolitical juriſdiction. Cyril deſpiſed ſo frivolous a conteſt; and refuſed to appear before the Paleſtine Synod, to which his factious adverſary had delated him. Whereon, the Synod agreed to depoſe Cyril, for contempt. But to give their ſentence a ſhew of credit againſt ſo diſtinguiſhed a perſonage, they added this crime to the other, that once, in a deſolating famine, he diſpoſed of the treaſures of his church to feed the poor. This action, ſo becoming a faithful miniſter of Jeſus Chriſt, fully ſhews, that, whether he had a right to metropolitical juriſdiction or no, he well deſerved it. But the crying part of this ſacrilege is yet behind: it ſeems, that in the ſale of his ſacred wardrobe, a reverend Stole, interwoven with gold, and made yet more illuſtrious by the *ſanctity* of its giver, Conſtantine the Great, came at length, in the ceaſeleſs round of property, into the poſſeſſion of a notorious proſtitute, who flouriſhed with it on the public ſtage.

M. Baſnage concludes his remark on Cyril in this manner: *The ſilence of a biſhop, who was upon the place, looks very ſuſpicious; while, at the ſame time, thoſe who do ſpeak to it lived at a diſtance.*

Admitting the biſhop was indeed ſilent, How could this learned man, who forms his charge on the information of the three Hiſtorians, ſay, that *thoſe who ſpeak to the miracle lived at a diſtance*; when Sozomene plainly tells us, that, at the time he wrote, there were ſeveral ſtill living, who had it from the eye-witneſſes of the fact? Here then, for the ſilence of *one* man, we have the teſtimony of *many*.—But Sozomene ſpeaks of none by *name*—Who knows, then, but the biſhop might be amongſt the *nameleſs*? It hath been many a biſhop's fate. However, *the teſtimony of the people on the place* is directly *aſſerted* by the hiſtorian; and the *ſilence* of Cyril only *inferred* by the Critic, from his not finding him amongſt the witneſſes.

And, with theſe reflections on the good prelate, ſo unworthy the learning, the ſenſe, and the ingenuity of M. Baſnage, he concludes his OBJECTIONS *againſt the miracle.*

What follows is to ſhew his impartiality. "However (ſays he) "it ought not to be diſſembled, that if one of the Jewiſh Chrono- "logiſts maintains, that the ſudden and unexpected death of Julian "prevented the rebuilding the temple; another of them aſſures "us, it was rebuilt; and that when this was done at a vaſt ex- "pence, it tumbled down again; and, the next day, a dreadful "fire from heaven melted all the iron inſtruments which remain- "ed, and deſtroyed an innumerable multitude of the Jews. This "confeſſion of the Rabbins is the more conſiderable, as it reflects "diſhonour on the nation; and theſe gentry are not wont to copy "from the writings of the Chriſtians."

Here, it muſt be owned, he hath approved himſelf *indifferent*: and if his arguments *againſt* the miracle be more in *number*, than thoſe *for* it; the *weight*, at leaſt, on both ſides is equal.

Not that I would inſinuate, as if this Rabbinical teſtimony was altogether impertinent. I have myſelf produced it in ſupport of the evidence *: and, principally for the ſake of that circumſtance,

* P. 407.

which

which M. Baſnage ſo ingenuouſly acknowledges—*That the Rabbins are not wont to copy from Chriſtian writers.*

Nor will I deny, that this teſtimony hath *its proper place* in a religious *Hiſtory of the Jews.* What I cannot reconcile to this great man's general character, nor even to that air of impartiality which he here profeſſes to preſerve, is, that when he hath brought out all he could invent to the diſcredit of the miracle, he ſhould content himſelf with producing only one ſingle circumſtance, and that, the leaſt conſiderable, in its favour. Inſomuch that if ever the concluſive teſtimonies of Ammianus Marcellinus, Gregory Nazianzene, and John Chryſoſtome, ſhould be loſt, and this piece of criticiſm remain, the ſilence of ſo candid and knowing a writer as M. Baſnage will be infinitely a better proof that no ſuch evidence had ever been, than what he himſelf urges, from the ſilence of antiquity, againſt the teſtimony of Cyril.

But, to end with this learned Critic. There is, I muſt confeſs, ſomething ſo very odd in his conduct on this occaſion, as cannot but give offence to every ſober Reader. Yet I would by no means be thought to approve of Mr. Lowth's uncharitable reflections: which ſtand (as they often do amongſt worſe writers) in the place of a confutation. One may allow M. Baſnage to have thought perverſely; becauſe this is an infirmity common to believers and unbelievers: But one would never ſuſpect a *Miniſter of the Goſpel* of a formed deſign to undermine a Religion into whoſe ſervice he had ſolemnly entered; nor, a *man, truly learned,* of a bias to infidelity: ſuch diſpoſitions imply groſs *knavery* and *ignorance*; and M. Baſnage approved himſelf, on all other occaſions, a man of uncommon talents and integrity.

A ſtrong prejudice againſt the character of the *Fathers* was what, apparently, betrayed him into this unwarrantable concluſion: for, injuriouſly ſuſpecting them of impoſture whenever they ſpeak of miracles, he began with them where he ſhould have ended; and read their accounts, not to examine facts yet in queſtion, but to condemn

condemn frauds as already detected. Hence every *variation*, nay, every *variety* in their relations, appeared to him a *contradiction*. And that which indeed ſupports their joint teſtimony, was by this learned man imagined to be the very thing that overthrew it. But their beſt vindication is a ſtrict ſcrutiny into their evidence *. This we have attempted; not as an advocate for the *Fathers*, but an Inquirer after *Truth*. What hath been the iſſue muſt be left to the judgement of the Public.

CHAP. V.

WE go on with the remaining objections to this miracle, in which we ſhall be more brief.

V. In the next place it is pretended, "That this firey eruption was an ARTIFICIAL contrivance of the Chriſtians to keep their enemies at a diſtance. It is ſaid, the Egyptians, from the earlieſt times, had the ſecret of mixing combuſtible materials in ſuch a manner as to produce the effects of exploded Gunpowder: That Sir William Temple, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, and, an abler man than either of them, Sir Thomas Browne of Norwich, have dropt hints as if ſome of the greateſt wonders, both in ſacred and prophane antiquity, were the effects of this deſtructive compoſition; ſuch as the thunders and lightning at the giving the *law* from mount Sinai; the deaths of Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, in their conteſt with Aaron; and the defeat of Brennus and his army of Gauls when they aſſaulted the temple of Apollo at Delphi. This too, they ſay, will account for a ſtrong mark of reſemblance, between the latter, and the defeat of Julian; in both which the

* Whoever will take the pains of examining what the Fathers, and particularly Gregory Nazianzene, ſay of this miracle, and will compare it with their ſentiments of the extraordinary reports that went about, concerning Julian's death, will ſee cauſe to confeſs, that they were not ſo *credulous* or ſo *deſigning* as they have been repreſented.

impending

impending deſtruction was predicted; in the one by Cyril; in the other, by the prieſts of Apollo *."

The objection, we ſee, ſuppoſes full *power* and *opportunity*, as well as profound addreſs in theſe Chriſtian engineers: for let them be as knowing as you will, in all the hidden arts of Egypt, yet, if they had not elbow-room for their work, all their ſkill would come to nothing.

We will examine how they were beſtead in each of theſe particulars. At this important juncture the Chriſtians were unarmed, and defenceleſs. They were forbidden by law to bear office; and they every where ſubmitted to the imperial decrees. But This, to rebuild the temple, was inforced by all the power and authority of the empire. And the project was no ſooner on foot, than the place was poſſeſſed and crowded with vaſt numbers of Jews and Gentiles. Nor was this all. The Chriſtians were driven from the neighbourhood of the holy place, by their juſt fears and apprehenſions. They had every thing to expect from this impious combination. For their enemies of both parties came in crowds to ſhare and enjoy the approaching triumph; while each ſtrove which ſhould exceed the other in violence and outrage. Inſomuch that *ſome*, as Chryſoſtome aſſures us, *abſconded, and ſhut themſelves up in their houſes*; *others fled into deſerts and ſolitudes, and avoided all places of public reſort* †. So that whatever the prieſts of Apollo at Delphi (who had their town and temple in poſſeſſion, and a good garriſon to keep off the enemy, till they were ready for their reception) might find themſelves capable of performing; it is plain the poor Chriſtian Paſtors (their Flocks diſperſed, and themſelves abſconding), were utterly deprived of all arms but thoſe of Faith and Prayer. This, I think, may ſtand for an anſwer to that reſemblance between the *predictions* of Cyril, and the prieſts of Apollo, from which the objection would deduce ſuch conſequences of ſuſpicion.

* —In hoc partium certamine repente antiſtites adveniſſe Deum clamant, &c. Juſt. l. xxiv. c. 8.

† οἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς οἴκοις ἐκρύπτοντο, οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὰς ἐρημίας μετῳκίζοντο, καὶ τὰς ἀγορὰς ἐφευγον. Adv. Jud. Orat. v.

But,

But, let us allow them both will and opportunity to do the feat: yet ſtill, I apprehend, every likely *means* would be wanting. Chemical writers, indeed, in their romantic claims to antiquity, have boaſted much of the profound knowledge of the old Egyptians in the Spagiric Art: but this without the leaſt proof, or warrant from hiſtory. The firſt authentic account we have of *artificial fire* was an invention or diſcovery of the ſeventh century. One Callinicus, an Egyptian of Heliopolis, fled from the Saracens (who then poſſeſſed that country) to Conſtantinople*; and taught the Greeks a military miſchief, called by them ὑγρὸν πῦρ [a liquid fire], but by the Franks *feu Gregiois*. It was compoſed, they tell us, of naphtha and bitumen; and was blown out of iron and braſs tubes; or ſhot from a kind of croſsbow. Wherever it fell, it ſtuck, and burnt obſtinately; and was with great difficulty extinguiſhed. Some, indeed, ſay it was accompanied with a ſound like thunder. But this is certain, the execution was not by the force of the exploſion, but by a ſtrong and continued burning. After this we hear of no other artificial fires till the thirteenth century; when our famous countryman, Roger Bacon, invented that very compoſition we call *Gunpowder*. He ſpecifies all the ingredients; and ſpeaks of it as a diſcovery of his own. It was not long ere it was put in practice: For, in the next century, Froiſſart, and other French hiſtorians, mention the uſe of *cannon*; and, as an invention of their own times.

It is true, that when the miſſionaries had opened themſelves a way into China, and were enabled to give us a more perfect account of that great empire than we had received from the ſtraggling adventurers, who at ſeveral times had penetrated thither before them; we are told, amongſt the other wonders of theſe remote regions, of fire-arms, both great and ſmall; which had been in uſe for ſixteen hundred years; nay, theſe miſſionaries go ſo far as to ſay, that they themſelves had ſeen cannon which had been caſt ſix or eight centuries before. But there are other, and more early accounts, which

* See Nicetas, Theophanes, Cedrenus, Conſtantius Porphyrogenetus.

ſhew

ſhew we are not to depend entirely upon theſe. M. Renaudot hath given the public a tranſlation of two Mahometan Voyagers, who viſited the ſouth part of China, in the ninth century. Theſe Arabians are curious in deſcribing every thing rare and uncommon, or in the leaſt differing from their own cuſtoms and manners: And yet they give us no hint of their meeting with this prodigious machine; and ſuch muſt cannon needs be deemed by men unacquainted with the uſe of gunpowder. Four centuries afterwards, Marco Polo the Venetian, a curious and intelligent traveller, penetrated into China by the north: and he too is ſilent on this head. In the next century our famous countryman Mandeville rambled thither. His genius was towards natural knowledge, having ſtudied and profeſſed medicine; he was ſkilled likewiſe in moſt of the languages of the Eaſt and Weſt. This man ſojourned a conſiderable time in China: he ſerved in their armies, and commanded in their ſtrong places: yet he takes not the leaſt notice of cannon, which he muſt have uſed, had there been any; and the uſe of ſo intereſting a novelty he would hardly have omitted to deſcribe. For he ſet out on his travels in the year 1332; and Larry ſays that the firſt piece of cannon, that had been ſeen in France, was in 1346. Though Du Cange * obſerves, that the Regiſters of the chamber of accounts † at Paris make mention of gunpowder ſo early as the year 1338. And Froiſſart under the year 1340 records, that the town of Queſnoy diſcharged their cannon againſt the French who made their courſes to the gates of that city.

All this, when laid together, ſeems to furniſh out a very ſtrong proof that the Chineſe had never ſeen cannon till after this viſit of Sir John Mandeville: which agrees well with a known fact, That, about two centuries ago, the Chineſe, in their wars with the Tartars, were forced to take in the aſſiſtance of the Europeans to manage their artillery.

* In Gloſſ. v. BOMBARDA.

† One article of which ſtands thus — à Henri de Faumechon pour avoir poudres, & autres choſes neceſſaires aux canons qui etoient devant Puy-Guillaume.

But this fable of the antient uſe of cannon in China is not to be charged on the miſſionaries, but on the Chineſe themſelves, the proudeſt and vaineſt people upon earth; arrogating to themſelves the invention and improvement of every kind of art and ſcience. They boaſted, in the ſame manner, of the antiquity and perfection of their aſtronomy and mathematics. But here their performances ſoon betrayed the folly and impudence of their pretences. It was not ſo eaſy to detect them in the ſubject in queſtion. The miſſionaries, on their arrival, ſaw cannon, which doubtleſs had lain there for two or three ages. And of theſe, the Chineſe were at liberty to fable what they pleaſed. But it appears plain enough, they were indebted for them to their commerce with the Mahometans (the only people on the Weſtern ſide of India, with whom they had then any commerce), ſome time between the voyage of Mandeville and the arrival of the miſſionaries: very likely, ſoon after their invention in Europe; for Peter Mexia ſpeaks of the Moors as having the uſe of cannon about the year 1343. A probability very much ſupported by the confeſſion of the Chineſe themſelves, in a modeſter humour, That though they had cannon from the moſt early times of their empire, yet, till the Tartar war, ſpoken of above, they were totally unacquainted with the management of artillery.

Let this ſuffice, in anſwer to this wild objection, or ſuſpicion rather; the wildeſt ſure that ever infidelity advanced to elude the force of ſober evidence. An objection not only unſupported by antiquity, but diſcredited by itſelf. Inventions, which promote the health and happineſs of our ſpecies, have been often, indeed, kept concealed; and when at laſt communicated have ſoon paſſed again into oblivion. But the natural malignity of our nature would never ſuffer ſo deſtructive and pernicious an invention to remain long a ſecret; or, when it was once known, ever to be diſuſed or forgotten. So that if this kind of artificial fire was an early diſcovery of the Egyptian ſages, it had a fortune which can never be accounted for on the common principles of human conduct.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

THE laſt objection, which is a little more plauſible, is to be received with a great deal more ceremony and diſtinction; as coming from the great Intimados of NATURE, the ſecretaries and confidents of her intrigues. Theſe men tell us, "That the fire, which burſt from the foundations of the *temple*, was a mere *natural eruption*. The regions in and about the Leſſer Aſia were (they ſay) in all ages ſubject to earthquakes, proceeding from ſubterraneous fires: and the preſent face of the country about Sodom and Gomorrah ſhews, that the land of Judæa, in particular, had its entrails full of theſe deſtructive principles. The fire from the mountain of the *temple* had, they ſay, all the marks of a *natural eruption*; the ſame circumſtances attending it which attend all natural eruptions, and eſpecially that at Nicomedia. Nor is the *time*, in which it happened, ſufficient to oppoſe to this concluſion. For theſe *commotions of nature* being frequent in every age, it is no wonder they ſhould ſometimes fall in with thoſe *moral diſorders*, occaſioned by religious conteſts, which are as frequent; or that, at ſuch a juncture, frighted ſuperſtition ſhould catch at theſe accidents of terror to ſupport a labouring cauſe. Hence it was (ſay they) that Jupiter Ammon was made to deſtroy the army of Cambyſes, when ſent to burn his temple, and lay waſte the country of his worſhippers; and Apollo, to fall upon the army of Brennus, when he led it to plunder the treaſury at Delphi."

This is the objection: and I have not ſcrupled my help to ſet it off. For, beſides the diſtinction due to the character of the objectors, I had other reaſons why I would willingly have it ſeen in the beſt light.

Several of the circumſtances attending the event in queſtion, and *ſome*, which have been generally held the moſt *miraculous*, I have myſelf delivered as the effects of *natural cauſes*; induced thereto

by the love of truth, and a fond desire of reconciling the fact itself, and the Christian *Fathers*, who relate it, to the more favourable opinion of modern *Freethinkers*. It will be fit, therefore, I should explain and justify my own conduct before I object to that of my adversaries.

The agency of a superior Being on any portion of the visible creation lying within the reach of our senses, whereby it acquires properties and directions different from what we hold it capable of receiving from the established laws of matter and motion, we call a MIRACLE.

To ask, whether God's *immediate* agency makes a necessary part of the definition; or whether, to give a miracle its name, it be sufficient that another Being, superior to man, performed the operation, appears to me a very impertinent enquiry. Because there are but two sorts of men who concern themselves about the matter; Those who hold God's *moral government*; and Those who allow only his *natural*.

The first sort, the *Religionists*, must on their proper principles allow, that a work performed by superior agency, in confirmation of a doctrine worthy of God, and remaining uncontrouled by a greater, can be no other than the attestation of Heaven, to which God hath set his hand and seal. Because the permitting an *evil Being* to perform these wonders, would be deceiving his creatures, who know little or nothing of the world of spirits. It would be drawing them unavoidably into an error, where they would be fixed; which is contrary to what the Religionist conceives of God's moral attributes, and, consequently, of his government. As to the Sectators of *Naturalism*, the specific qualities of a miracle never come within the range of their enquiries; for, holding only the *natural* government of God, they deny, of course, the very existence of every thing that implies a *moral* regimen.

Miracles, then, we may be allowed to say, are of two sorts. Those where the laws of nature are *suspended* or *reversed* (such as the *budding of Aaron's rod*, and the *raising of Lazarus from the dead*).

And

And thoſe which only *give a new direction* to its Laws (ſuch as bringing *water from the rock*, and *ſtopping the iſſue of blood*). For miracles being an uſeful, not an oſtentatious diſplay of God's power, we cannot but conclude, He would employ the one or other ſort indifferently, as beſt ſerved the purpoſe of his interpoſition.

Now, as it would be *impious* to bring in NATURAL CAUSES to explain the *firſt* ſort; ſo, totally to exclude thoſe cauſes in the latter, would be *ſuperſtitious*: and both, infinitely *abſurd*. Who, for inſtance, would venture to affirm that the prolific virtue in the ſtock of *Aaron's rod* contributed to the bloſſoming of its branch? Or, on the other hand, that the water which came from the *rock* at the command of Moſes, was juſt then created to do honour to his miniſtry? In this laſt caſe, what more would a rational Believer conclude, than that GOD, by making, at the inſtant, a fiſſure in the rock, gave room for the water to burſt out, which had been before lodged there by *nature*, as in its proper reſervoir? And the ſober Critic, who proceeds in this manner, does no more than follow that method of *interpreting*, which God himſelf uſeth in *working* the miracle; which is, to give to Nature all that Nature could eaſily perform.

We are further encouraged in thus explaining the mode of God's interpoſition, by one of the moſt awful exertions of Divine Power, recorded in holy Writ. But, previous to the ſtory, the Reader ſhould be reminded of what hath been obſerved of the *order* of the appearances both in the *natural* eruption at *Nicomedia*, and in that, we call, *miraculous*, at Jeruſalem; where, in each caſe, the deſolation began with *winds* and tempeſt; was continued by an *earthquake*; and concluded in a *firey* eruption. The ſtory is this, The Prophet Elijah, oppreſſed with the corruptions of the houſe of Iſrael, is commanded to wait God's preſence, and attend his word.

" And he ſaid, Go forth, and ſtand upon the mount before the
" Lord. And behold the Lord paſſed by, and a great and ſtrong
" WIND rent the mountains, and brake in pieces the rocks before
" the Lord; but the Lord was not in the wind: and after the
" wind

" wind an EARTHQUAKE; but the Lord was not in the earth-
" quake: and after the earthquake a FIRE; but the Lord was not
" in the fire: and after the fire a SMALL STILL VOICE *." His coming *to ſhake terribly the earth* is here, we ſee, deſcribed, in all the pomp of incenſed Majeſty. Yet it is remarkable, that the precurſors of his preſence follow each other in the ſame order of phyſical progreſſion, in which nature ranged the ſeveral phænomena at Nicomedia and Jeruſalem; the *tempeſts*, the *earthquake*, and the *fire:* an order, the ſacred Hiſtorian plainly points out to us, where he ſays, that *God was not in any of theſe*; intimating, that they were pure phyſical appearances, the parade of nature, thus far ſuffered to do its office without ſtop or impediment: but that *He was in the ſmall ſtill voice*, which cloſed this dreadful proceſſion; intimating, that theſe natural appearances were *miniſterial* to the *interpoſition* of the Author and Lord of Nature.

Let us apply all this to our argument; and conſider, how a ſober believer, convinced by the force of evidence, would interpret the *miracle in queſtion*. He would, without doubt, conclude, that the mineral and metallic ſubſtances (which, by their accidental fermentation, are wont to take fire and burſt out in flames) were the native contents of the place from which they iſſued; but that, in all likelihood, they would there have ſlept, and ſtill continued in the quiet innoxious ſtate in which they had ſo long remained, had not the *breath of the Lord awoke and kindled them*.

But when the Divine Power had thus *miraculouſly* interpoſed to *ſtir up* the rage of theſe firey elements, and yet to *reſtrain* their fury to the objects of his vengeance, he then again ſuffered them to do their ordinary office: becauſe *Nature* thus directed would, by the exertion of its own laws, anſwer all the ends of the *moral deſignation*.

The conſequence of which would be, that its effects, whether *deſtructive* or only *terrific*, would be the ſame with thoſe attending mere natural eruptions.

* 1 Kings xix. 11, 12.

So

So far, indeed, one cannot but ſuſpect, That the *ſpecific* qualities in the fermented elements, which occaſioned the *frightful appearances*, though they were natural to enflamed matter under certain circumſtances, were yet, by the peculiar pleaſure of Providence, *given* on this occaſion; and not left merely to the conjunction of mechanic cauſes, or the fortuitous concourſe of matter and motion, to *produce*. And my reaſon is, becauſe theſe *frightful* appearances, namely the *croſs in the heavens, and on the garments*, were admirably fitted, as MORAL EMBLEMS, to proclaim the triumph of CHRIST over Julian. For the apoſtate having, in a public and contemptuous manner, taken the *monogramme* and *croſs* out of the military enſigns *, which Conſtantine had put there, in memory of the aerial viſion that preſaged his victories; the ſame kind of triumphant croſs was again erected in the heavens, to confound the vanity of that impotent bravade: and having forbidden the followers of Jeſus, by public edict, to uſe the very *name* of Chriſtians; a *ſtigmatic croſs* was now imprinted upon the garments of thoſe who were ſeconding his impieties, or were witneſſes to the defeat of his attempt.

And, in theſe ſhining marks of vengeance, there was nothing low, fantaſtical, or ſuperſtitious. The impreſs was great and ſolemn, and correſponded to the dignity of the occaſion.

Another *uſe* of theſe *terrific appearances* (now firſt beginning to manifeſt itſelf, as in many other circumſtances of religious diſpenſation, produced in one age for the ſervice of another, moſt remote) will further confirm our opinion of their *final cauſe*. The *uſe*, I mean, is their ſupporting the teſtimony of the *fathers*. The *croſſes on the garments*, to the men of that time, not apprized of their being meteoric marks, muſt appear a very incredulous circumſtance: on which too (whatever the nature of the croſſes was), the evidence of the divine interpoſition was ſeen not to depend. Yet the *fathers*, with the utmoſt confidence, and moſt perfect agreement, relate this circumſtance at large; dwell more upon it, and glory

* Greg. Naz. Or. iii. Sozom. l. v. c. 17.

more

more in it, than on all the reſt. Hence I infer, that nothing but the notoriety of the fact induced them to load the miracle with a circumſtance, which, they could not but ſee, was ſo far from adding credit to the evidence, that it would render the whole tranſaction ſuſpicious.

Thus much concerning theſe *two ſorts of miracles*, and the different manner of treating them. But it is to be obſerved, There is yet a *third*, compounded of the other *two*, where the laws of nature are in part *arreſted* and *ſuſpended*; and, in part only, *differently directed*. Of this kind was the puniſhment of the old world by a *deluge* of waters. Now, if, to ſuch as theſe, we ſhould apply the way of interpretation proper to the *ſecond* ſort, where only a new direction is given to the laws of nature; the abſurdities, ariſing from this abuſive application, would go near to diſgrace the method itſelf: as That Divine hath helped to ſhew us, who ingeniouſly contrived to bring on the deluge of waters by the aid of an approaching *comet*, but was never after, by any phyſical addreſs, able to draw it off again. And ſuch diſgraces are hardly to be avoided: for, in the *ſecond* and ſimpler kind, the phyſical interpretation hath *experience* to ſupport it: whereas, in the *third* and more complicated, the artiſt muſt be content with an *hypotheſis*.

This was proper to be ſaid before we came to try the force of the objection.

1. It begins with obſerving, "That the regions in and about the Leſſer Aſia were, in all ages, ſubject to earthquakes, cauſed by ſubterraneous fires; and that Judæa in particular had its entrails full of theſe deſtructive principles; as appears even from the preſent face of the country about Sodom and Gomorrah."

If this account be true, as I believe it is, then Judæa was a proper theatre (as occaſion required) for this *ſpecific* diſplay of the divine vengeance. And we ſee why *fire* was the ſcourge employed: as *water* doubtleſs would have been, were the region of Judæa naturally ſubject to inundations. For miracles not being an oſtentatious but a neceſſary inſtrument of God's moral government, we cannot

cannot conceive it probable that he would *create* the elements for this purpoſe; but *uſe* thoſe which lay ready ſtored up againſt the *day of viſitation*. By this means, his *wiſdom* would appear as conſpicuous as his *power*, when it ſhould be ſeen, that the proviſions layed in, at the formation of the world, for the uſe and ſolace of his creatures while they continued in obedience, could, at his word, be turned into ſcourges when they became faithleſs and rebellious. The force of this reaſoning is ſo obvious, that, had Providence been pleaſed to uſe the contrary method, unbelievers, I am perſuaded, would have made that very method an objection to the credibility of the fact. However, though it ſeemeth moſt agreeable to what we conceive of divine wiſdom, that it ſhould often uſe the inſtrumentality of nature in its miraculous interpoſitions, yet, let it be obſerved, the ſame wiſdom always provides, that the *Author of Nature* be not loſt or obſcured under the glare and noiſe of his *inſtruments*.

It is ſaid, the region of Judæa was, from the quality of its contents, much ſubject to earthquakes and firey eruptions. If ſo, how happened it, that, from the moſt early times to the period in queſtion, there never was any unuſual diſorder in its entrails (if you except an earthquake which Joſephus mentions as happening in the time of Herod) but at the overthrow of Sodom and Gomorrah; at the deſtruction of Korah and his company; in the days of Uzziah *; at the Crucifixion; and on this attempt of Julian? How happened it, that this deſtructive element lay quiet in the midſt of ſo much fuel, and for ſo many ages; and only then, and at thoſe critical junctures, ſhewed itſelf, when God had a conteſt with his enemies? Can any reaſonable account be given of ſuch a diſpoſition but this, that, whenever God decrees to puniſh, it is his purpoſe the divine agency ſhould be fully manifeſted? To pretend, they were all natural events, and the ſeveral coincidences merely caſual, is ſuppoſing ſomething vaſtly more incredible

* See Amos i. 1. and Zech. xiv. 5.

than what unbelievers would perſuade us is implied in the notion of a *miracle*.

2. But it is ſaid, "This eruption from the foundations of the temple had all the *marks* of a natural event, being attended with the ſame circumſtances which, Amm. Marcellinus tells us, accompanied the earthquake at Nicomedia."

It is very certain, the eruption from the foundations of the temple had all theſe *marks*; and if our explanation of the miracle, as it ſeems the moſt *rational*, be indeed the *true*, it could not but have them. When God had kindled the firey matter in this ſtorehouſe of his wrath, all the effects that ſucceeded, muſt needs be the ſame with thoſe which attend the exploſion of any other ſubterraneous fire. What would follow, had they not been the ſame, but rejection of the whole ſtory? which, in times ſo ſqueamiſh as ours, and ſo difficult of credit, would have paſſed for a fairy-tale. This conſideration induced me to ſhew, at large, the exact conformity, throughout the proceſs of the event, between the viſitation at Jeruſalem and the diſaſter at Nicomedia. Not but I foreſaw the conſequence. It is the leaſt of an unbeliever's care to reconcile his objections to one another. I knew his firſt cavil to the credit of the fact would be the *wonderful* attending the eruption. I therefore provided againſt it, by ſhewing this fact to be ſimilar in its main circumſtances to the beſt atteſted relations of natural events. But I knew too, that, in caſe of a defeat here, he would not be aſhamed to point his cavil the other way, and turn this very *reſemblance* to an argument againſt a ſupernatural interpoſition.—What pity is it that Ammianus, who beſt knew the full extent of this *reſemblance*, was not more quick-ſighted? He too was an enemy of the Chriſtian name (indeed, to do him juſtice, more fair and candid than any I know of the ſame denomination amongſt ourſelves), but ſo little ſenſible of its force, and ſo much confounded with the event, That, inſtead of telling the affair at large, which fell in ſo exactly with his detailed account of the diſaſter at Nicomedia,

he

he hurries it over with the rapidity of one of the frightened workmen, who had juſt eſcaped the common deſolation.

After all, a general *reſemblance* in the *effects* is allowed. What we inſiſt on is, the *difference* in their *cauſe* or original. And this difference is ſupported even by the very nature of things from whence that general reſemblance aroſe.

Nicomedia, a city of Bithynia, was placed on an eminence, at the bottom of a Gulph of that name, in the *Propontis*. Now mountains thus ſituated, into whoſe cavernous entrails the ſea may find its way, muſt, if other natural cauſes favour, be, ſometimes, ſubject to firey eruptions; of which we need no other example than the mountain Veſuvius. But the temple-hill at Jeruſalem was neither large nor cavernous; nor was it in the neighbourhood of the ſea: circumſtances, which, all the world over, are wont to produce this effect. Neither were any *new openings* made, at this time, into the bowels of the mountain; which, by letting in *air* or *water*, might be ſuppoſed to ferment and inflame their combuſtible contents. The hiſtorians who relate this *attempt* inform us, that even ſome parts of the old foundations were left ſtanding to erect the new edifice upon; and in others, where the old works were little better than a heap of rubbiſh, or at leaſt judged too infirm, that incumbrance only was removed. This appears from the relations of Socrates and Sozomene compared with one another. Socrates aſſures us *, that the earthquake threw out ſtones from the old foundations: which he mentions to ſhew the *literal* accompliſhment of the prophecy of *Jeſus*, that there *ſhould not be left one ſtone upon another*. Sozomene indeed affirms †, that the foundations were cleared; but then he goes on and ſays, the earthquake threw out ſtones. Now, as no new foundations were ever laid, he muſt mean with Socrates, the ſtones of the old. And thus the ſeeming difference in their accounts will be reconciled. Let me

* L. iii. c. 20. † L. v. c. 22.

add, that more than once before, and at diſtant times, they had dug deep into this hill, to lay the foundations of Solomon's and Herod's temples: and then every thing continued quiet. Yet, now, when no new openings were made, the effort to build a *third* was followed by a firey eruption.

Again, in natural ferments of this kind, the commotion is generally very *extenſive*, and runs through large tracts of country. Thus the earthquake mentioned by Joſephus ſhook the whole land of Judæa; and the diſaſter at Nicomedia, as Marcellinus informs us, was occaſioned by a tremor which went over Macedonia, Aſia, and Pontus; and did infinite miſchief throughout its courſe *. The ſame hiſtorian tells us of another which ſhook the whole globe of the earth †; and deſcribed by Jerom ‡ in theſe words, "Ea "tempeſtate terræ motu totius orbis qui poſt Juliani mortem ac- "cidit maria egreſſa ſunt terminos ſuos, &c." On the contrary, the eruption at Jeruſalem was confined to the very ſpot on which the temple had ſtood; and continued only to deny acceſs to ſuch who, not taking warning by thoſe whom it had deſtroyed, would ſtill perſevere in their impiety §. A circumſtance very different from common earthquakes and firey eruptions; and of which we have no examples, ſave in the eruption that deſtroyed Korah and his company; and in the earthquake at the Crucifixion of our Lord; and perhaps in that in the days of Uzziah; all of them ſupernatural events.

Thirdly, in natural eruptions the fire continues burning till the fuel which ſupplies it be conſumed. But the witneſſes to *this* aſſign a very different period to its fury. It continued juſt as long as the builders perſiſted in their attempt, and no longer. At every new effort to proceed, the riſing fire drove them back; but at the

* Iiſdem diebus terræmotus horrendi per Macedoniam, Aſiamque, & Pontum adſiduis pulſibus oppida multa concuſſerunt & montes. Inter monumenta tamen multiformium ærumnarum eminuere Nicomediæ clades, &c. Marcell. l. xvii. c. 7.

† L. xxvi. c. 10. ‡ Vit. Hilar.

§ — fecere locum exuſtis aliquoties operantibus inacceſſum. L. xxiij. c. 1.

inſtant

inſtant they gave out, it totally ſubſided. This ſo terrified Julian, that Chryſoſtome tells us *, he relinquiſhed the enterprize for fear the fire ſhould turn upon his own head. And this made Marcellinus ſay, — "elemento DESTINATIUS repellente"—an expreſſion of great elegance to imply the direction of an intelligent agent.

3. In the laſt place we are told, "That even ſo critical a juncture is not to be accounted of: for that *religious ſquabbles* and *natural prodigies* are equally common; and church-artiſts never wanting to fit them to one another. Hence, they ſay, are derived thoſe two notable judgments of Jupiter Ammon and Apollo, upon the armies of Cambyſes and Brennus."

The obſervation is plauſible. It pleaſes the imagination: and wants nothing but truth to reconcile it to the judgment.

In miracles performed by the *miniſtry* of God's meſſengers, where the laws of nature are *ſuſpended* or *reverſed*, it is ſufficient if he who works them ſhall, at any time, declare their purpoſe and intention. But, in a miracle performed by the *immediate power* of God, without the intervention of his ſervants, in which only a *new direction* is given to the laws of nature, one of theſe two conditions is required to give it credit: either that an inſpired ſervant of God predicted it, and declared its purpoſe beforehand, as Samuel did the *ſtorm of thunder and rain*, the declaration of God's diſpleaſure, for the people's demand of a king: or that it be ſeen to interpoſe ſo ſeaſonably and critically as to cover and ſecure God's moral government from inevitable diſhonour, as in the caſe before us. Without one or other of theſe conditions, ſuperſtition would break looſe at once, and ſoon over-run the world: for bigotry (always in cloſe conjunction with our natural malignity) would convert every unuſual appearance of nature, ill into a prodigy, and a puniſhment: but why do I ſay it *would*? It hath in fact done ſo: and

* ταῦτα ἀκούσας ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἰουλιανὸς καίτοι τοσαύτην μανίαν ἔχων περὶ τὴν σπουδὴν ἐκείνην, δείσας μὴ περαιτέρω προελθὼν, ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν κεφαλὴν καλέσῃ τὸ πῦρ, ἀπέστη ἡττηθεὶς μὲν τῷ ἔθνει παντὸς. Adver. Judæos, Orat. ii.

every

every age and religion hath abounded with theſe ſpurious judgments, by which human charity and God's moral government hath been inceſſantly violated and diſhonoured. And yet an ordinary attention to the obvious and rational conditions, here pointed out, would have prevented this miſchief: for I know but of one inſtance in all antiquity which could embarraſs the deciſion: and that is,—not the expedition of Cambyſes; for it would have been a greater wonder that an army ſhould get ſafe through the ſands of thoſe deſerts, than that it periſhed in them. The caſe I mean is the deſtruction of Brennus's army before Delphi. Here, neither of the conditions ſeemed wanting. The prieſts of Apollo, we are told, *predicted* the approaching deſolation: and the *cauſe* (which was the puniſhment of impiety and irreligion) appeared not altogether unworthy the divine interpoſition. Theſe, together with the faith due to the beſt human teſtimony, which ſtrangely concurred to ſupport the fact, were, I preſume, the reaſons that inclined the excellent Dean Prideaux to eſteem the accident *miraculous*; not ſo weakly as hath been repreſented by ſome; nor yet with that maturity of judgment, which one would expect from ſo great a maſter of ancient hiſtory. His words are theſe—"Brennus marched on "with the groſs of his army towards Delphos, to plunder the tem- "ple—But he there met a wonderful defeat. For on his approach- "ing the place, there happened a terrible ſtorm of thunder, "lightning, and hail, which deſtroyed great numbers of his men, "and, at the ſame time, there was as terrible an earthquake, which "rending the mountains in pieces, threw down whole rocks upon "them, which overwhelmed them by hundreds at a time.—Thus "was God pleaſed, in a very extraordinary manner, to execute his "vengeance upon thoſe ſacrilegious wretches for the ſake of re- "ligion in general, how falſe and idolatrous ſoever that religion "was, for which that temple at Delphos was erected *." The learned hiſtorian, we ſee, takes it for granted, and he is not mif-

* Connect. Vol. II. p. 20, 21. Fol. Ed.

taken,

taken, that Brennus and his Gauls acknowledged the divinity of Apollo. Julius Cæſar informs us, that the Gauls had very near the ſame ſentiments of the greater deities (as they were called) with the Greeks and Romans *, and the reſt of the politer Pagan nations. And, diſtinct from his authority, we know, that their principle of *intercommunity* made their national Gods free of all countries. Brennus, therefore, was a ſacrilege in form. But notwithſtanding this, there are many ſtrong objections to the Dean's notion concerning the *quality* of the diſaſter.

This ſacred place, the repoſitory of immenſe riches, had, at other times, been attempted with impunity; nay with ſucceſs; for it had been ſo often plundered, that, when Strabo wrote, the temple was become exceeding poor †. And if, amongſt theſe ſeveral inſults, there were any more worthy the divine interpoſition, *for the ſake of religion in general*, than the reſt, it was when the Phocenſes, the natural and civil protectors of the temple, plundered it of all its wealth, to raiſe an army of mercenary ſoldiers. And yet, at that time, the offended deity gave no marks of his diſpleaſure. Now to ſuppoſe, when ſeveral attempts of this kind had ſucceeded, that the failure of one, though attended with ſome uncommon circumſtances, was a divine interpoſition, is going very far in favour of an hypotheſis. If it ſhould be ſaid, that the God of Iſrael ſuffered his own temple to be ſeveral times prophaned (which Julian himſelf takes care to remember ‡) and yet at laſt vindicated the glory of his name; I reply, there was this eſſential difference in the caſe, that whenever the temple of the Jews was violated, the evil was foretold as due to their crimes, and the people made acquainted with the impending puniſhment: and that now, when its ſanctity was inſulted by a Gentile's attempt to reſtore its ho-

* —Poſt hunc [Mercurium] Apollinem, Martem & Jovem & Minervam. De his eandem fere, quam reliquæ gentes, habent opinionem. De Bell. Gall. L. vi.

† νυνί γέ τοι πενέσταλόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἱερόν. Lib. xi.

‡ See p. 399, 400.

nours,

nours, it was in defiance of a prophecy which had doomed it to a final desolation.

There is yet a stronger objection to the learned Dean's solution; which is, that, had the defeat been miraculous, the interposition would have lost its end. For it could never have been deemed as effectuated *to vindicate religion in general*; but *as* done *for the sake of their false Gods only*; the story informing us, that the *priests* of the temple denounced the coming vengeance; and ascribed it to the wrath and power of Apollo * and his two sisters. So that this intervention would have been the means of fixing idolatry, and rivetting down polytheism upon the Gentile world.

But what is still more, the circumstances of the times did not at all favour a miracle for the purpose assigned, namely *for the sake of religion in general, against impiety*. The popular folly, in the Pagan world, ran all the other way. It was not *irreligion*, but *superstition*, that then infected mankind. They had no need of a real miracle to remind them of the superintendency of Providence; they were but too apt to ascribe every unusual appearance of nature to moral agency. So that, had Heaven *now* thought fit to interfere; we cannot but conclude, it had been rather in *discredit of idolatry in particular*, than in *behalf of religion in general*.— There is hardly any need to observe, that the reasons, which make against God's own intervention, hold equally against his permitting evil spirits to co-operate with the delusions of their priests.

Having, therefore, excluded all superior agency from this affair; it will be incumbent on us to shew, by what human contrivance it might have been effected. For it must be owned, its arrival at

* In hoc partium certamine repentè universorum templorum antistites, simul & ipsæ vates, sparsis crinibus, cum insignibus atque infulis, pavidi vecordesque in primam pugnantium aciem procurrunt: adveniſſe Deum clamant; eumque se vidisse dililientem in templum—Juvenem supra humanum modum insignis pulchritudinis, comitesque ei duas armatas virgines ex propinquis duabus *Dianæ Minervæque* ædibus occurrisse: nec oculis tantum hæc se perspexisse; audisse etiam stridorem arcûs ac strepitum armorum.—Just. lib. xxiv. c. 8.

so

ſo critical a juncture will not eaſily ſuffer us to ſuppoſe it a mere *natural* event.

The inclination of a Pagan Prieſt to aſſiſt his God in extremity will hardly be called in queſtion. We ſee, by the round ſtory of *thoſe* at *Delphi*, that they were not embarraſſed by vulgar ſcruples. They told their townſmen, they ſaw the God, at his firſt alighting, in the perſon of a young man of exquiſite beauty, and his two virgin aſſociates, Diana and Minerva, with each her proper arms of bow and ſpear: But they did not expect the people ſhould truſt to their *eye-ſight* only; they aſſured them, they *heard*, beſides, the clang of their arms.

So much for a good diſpoſition: which was not ill ſeconded by their public management and addreſs. On the firſt rumour of Brennus's march againſt them, they iſſued out orders as from the oracle, to all the region round, forbidding the country people to ſecrete or bear away their wine and proviſions. The effects of this order ſucceeded to their expectation. The half-ſtarved Barbarians finding, on their arrival in Phocis, ſo great a plenty of all things, made ſhort marches, diſperſed themſelves over the country, and revelled in the abundance that was provided for them. This reſpite gave time to the friends and allies of the God to come to his aſſiſtance: ſo that by ſuch time as Brennus was ſat down at the foot of the rocks, there was a numerous garriſon within to diſpute his aſcent *.

Their advantages of ſituation likewiſe ſupported the meaſures they had taken for a vigorous defence. The town and temple of Delphi were ſeated on a bare and cavernous rock; defended, on all ſides, with precipices, inſtead of walls. The large receſs within

* Gallorum vulgus, ex longâ inopiâ, ubi primùm vino cæteriſque commeatibus refertа rura invenit, non minus abundantiâ quàm victoriâ lætum, per agros ſe ſparſerat; deſertiſque ſignis, ad occupanda omnia pro victoribus vagabantur. Quæ res dilationem Delphis dedit. Prima namque opinione adventûs Gallorum prohibiti agreſtes oraculis, feruntur meſſes, vinaque villis efferre.—Salutare præceptum—velut morâ Gallis objectâ auxilia finitimorum convenere. Juſtin. lib. xxiv. c. 7.

aſſumed the form of a theatre: ſo that the ſhouts of ſoldiers, and the ſounds of military inſtruments, re-echoing from rock to rock, and from cavern to cavern, increaſed the clamour to an immenſe degree. Which, as the hiſtorian obſerves, could not but have great effects on ignorant and barbarous minds *.

The playing off theſe panic terrors was not indeed ſufficient of itſelf to repell and diſſipate a hoſt of fierce and hungry invaders; but it enabled the defenders of the place to keep them at bay, till a more ſolid entertainment was provided for them. I mean the *exploſion*, and fall of that portion of the rock, at the foot of which the greater part of the army lay encamped.

For, the town and temple, as we obſerved, were ſeated on a bare and hollow rock; which would here and there afford vent-holes for ſuch fumes as generated within to tranſpire. One of theſe, from an intoxicating quality, diſcovered in the ſteam which iſſued at it, was rendered very famous, by being fitted to the recipient of the prieſteſs of Apollo †. Now if we only ſuppoſe this, or any other of the vapours, emitted from the fiſſures, in ſo large and cavernous a rock, to be endowed with that unctuous or otherwiſe inflammable quality which modern experience ſhews us to be common in mines and ſubterraneous places, we can eaſily conceive how the prieſts of the temple might, without a miracle, be able to work

* Templum & Civitatem non muri, ſed præcipitia; non manu facta, ſed naturalia præſidia defendunt; prorſus ut incertum ſit, utrum munimentum loci, an majeſtas Dei plus hic admirationis habeat. Media ſaxi rupes in formam theatri receſſit. Quamobrem & hominum clamor, & ſi quando accedit tubarum ſonus, perſonantibus & reſpondentibus inter ſe rupibus, multiplex audiri, ampliorque quàm editur, reſonare ſolet. Quæ res majorem majeſtatis terrorem ignaris rei, & admirationem ſtupentibus plerumque affert. Juſt. l. xxiv. c. 6.

† Ἦισα δὲ καὶ ὡς ἄνδρες ποιμαίνοντες, ἐπεύχοιεν τῷ μαντείῳ, καὶ ἔνθεοί τε ἐγένοντο ὑπὸ τῷ ἀτμῷ, καὶ ἐμαντεύσαντο ἐξ Ἀπόλλωνος. Pauſan. Phoc. c. v.—Φασὶ δ' εἶναι τὸ μαντεῖον, ἄντρον κοῖλον κατὰ βάθους, οὐ μάλα εὐρύστομον· ἀναφέρεσθαι δ' ἐξ αὐτῷ πνεῦμα ἐνθουσιαστικόν. Strabo, Geogr. l. ix. In hoc rupis anfractu, media ferme montis altitudine, planities exigua eſt, atque in ea profundum terræ foramen, quod in oracula patet: ex quo frigidus ſpiritus, vi quadam velut vento in ſublime expulſus, mentes Vatum in vecordiam vertit, impletaſque Deo, reſponſa conſulentibus dare cogit. Juſt. lib. xxiv. c. 6.

the

the wonders which hiſtory ſpeaks of as effected in this tranſaction. For the throwing down a lighted torch or two into a chaſm, from whence ſuch a vapour iſſued, would ſet the whole into a flame; which, by rarifying and dilating the incloſed air, would, like fired gunpowder, blow up all before it. Theſe effects are ſo known and dreaded in coal-mines, ſubject to inflammable vapours, that, in ſome of them, in the north of this kingdom, inſtead of lamps or candles, which would be fatal, the workmen are obliged to have recourſe to a very extraordinary contrivance to give them light, which is the application of a flint to a ſteel cylinder in motion. And we cannot ſuppoſe the prieſts, the guardians of the rock, could be long ignorant of ſuch a quality; which either chance or deſigned experiments might bring to their acquaintance: or that they would divulge it when they had diſcovered it. I am even inclined to think, they had the art of managing this quality at pleaſure; ſo as to produce a greater or leſs effect, as their occaſions required. It is certain, Strabo relates *, that one Onomarchus with his companions, as they were attempting by night to dig their way through to rob the holy treaſury, were frightened from their work by the violent ſhaking of the rock: and he adds, that the ſame phænomenon had defeated many other attempts of the like nature. Now whether the tapers which Onomarchus and his companions were obliged to uſe while they were at work, inflamed the vapour, or whether the prieſts of Apollo heard them at it, and ſet fire to a countermine, it is certain, a *quality* of this kind would always ſtand them in ſtead.

Such, then, I preſume, was the expedient they employed to diſlodge this neſt of hornets, which had ſettled at the foot of their ſacred rock.

It is further remarkable that this exploſion was followed (as it was likely it ſhould) by an event of as much terror and affright,

* τὰς περὶ τὸν Ὀνόμαρχον ἐπιχειρήσαντας ἀνασκάπτειν νύκτωρ ζεισμῶν γενομένων μεγάλων, ἐξω τῶ ιαῶ πέπτεσθαι καὶ παύσασθαι τῆς ἀνασκαφῆς· ἐμβαλεῖν δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις φόβον τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπιχειρήσεως. Strab. Geogr. lib. ix.

a *ſtorm of thunder, lightning, and hail*; which theſe violent concuſſions of the air phyſically generate. For Juſtin aſſures us *, the tempeſt did not happen till *after* the fall of the rock; though the *Dean*, we ſee, makes them operate *together*.

But what, after all, if theſe Barbarians were ſomething leſs unfortunate than the Prieſts of Apollo would have us think them; and had got a conſiderable booty before they fell into this diſgrace? Strabo tells an odd ſtory † of the Roman general Cæpio's finding a vaſt treaſure at Toloſe, ſuppoſed to be part of the riches which its inhabitants, the Tectoſages, had brought home from this very expedition againſt the Delphic God. It would almoſt make one ſuſpect, that the prieſts, before they came to extremities with the ſacred rock, had entered into treaty with theſe Barbarians, and paid them a large tribute to decamp and quit the country; which poſſibly they might receive with the ſame good faith that their countrymen, in a like expedition, weighed out the *Roman gold*, before the capitol; and ſo neceſſitate the Delphians to ſend down the rock upon them to clear accounts; juſt as, in the other inſtance, Camillus revenged their extortion in Italy. What ſeems to ſtrengthen our conjecture is, that the Tectoſages, in order to appeaſe the offended Deity, had conſecrated this treaſure to holy uſes, with an addition of their own. Nor does it take from the credit of the ſtory, that all which the penetrating Strabo hath to oppoſe is the ill ſucceſs of Brennus and his followers, as we find it related in the common hiſtories of the expedition. If this were the caſe, the pretended miracle ſhrinks into a very ſlender kind of prodigy.

However, the account given above ſeems, on the whole, to be the true ſolution of this extraordinary event. It is eaſy and natural;

* *Inſecuta deinde* tempeſtas eſt, quæ grandine & frigore ſaucios ex vulneribus abſumpſit. l. xxiv. c. 8.

† —καὶ τὰς Τεκτοσάγας δὲ φασὶ μεῖσχεῖν τῆς ἐπὶ Δελφὰς στρατείας, καὶ τάς τε θησαυρὰς τὰς εὑρεθείσας παρ' αὐτοῖς, ὑπὸ Καιπίωνος τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐν πόλει Τολώσσῃ, τῶν ἐκεῖθεν χρημάτων μέρος εἶναι φασί· προσθεῖναι δὲ τὰς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ἐν τῶν ἰδίων οἴκων ἀνιερῶντας καὶ ἐξιλασκομένους τὸν Θεόν. L. iv.

and

and the cauſe fully equal to the effect. But my chief reaſon for being ſo explicit, was, to add ſtill further ſupport to our general concluſion; as the detail would ſhew, that all the main circumſtances in the deſtruction at Delphi, and in that at Jeruſalem, were eſſentially different.

The *rock* on which Delphi ſtood, was exactly fitted for ſuch a contrivance: The *mountain* at Jeruſalem, by its compactneſs and continuity, altogether improper. The eaſy *object* of Apollo's reſentment was a rabble of half-ſtarved and half-intoxicated Barbarians: The *object* of the reſentment of the God of Iſrael was a ſelect number of the politeſt, joined to the craftieſt, people upon earth, detached to ſupport a project, which the ableſt artiſts of all kinds were aſſembled to put in execution. The *prieſts* of Apollo were maſters of the town and temple, and ſupported by a powerful garriſon: Both the *prieſts* and *people* of the God of Iſrael were diſperſed, and had left the place free and open to their enemies.

But the principal difference lay in the grounds and reaſons of the thing. By which I do not mean, that one event was ſuppoſed to be the agency of *a God of the Greeks*, and the other of *the God of the Jews*: For, who was the *true*, and who the *falſe* God, the Gentlemen, with whom we are concerned, ſeem willing ſhould remain undetermined. The difference lay in this, That the interpoſition of the *Delphic God* was to ſave the treaſures of his prieſts; which he had, at other times, and on more flagitious terms, ſuffered to be violated. But the interpoſition of the *Lord of Hoſts* was to ſave the honour of his name, which he hath never ſince ſuffered to be impeached by malice or impiety, throughout a courſe of fourteen hundred years. Or, in other words, to defend the general ſyſtem of revelation from being forcibly borne down by the whole power of the *Roman* empire. For the attempt to re-eſtabliſh the Jewiſh worſhip was profeſſedly and publicly to give the lie to the *prophecies* on which Chriſtianity was founded, that is, to the *God of Heaven* himſelf: the *moſt important occaſion* we can conceive of exerting his power, as including in it a NECESSITY to exert it. But more of this,

this, when I come, hereafter, to ſpeak *of the nature of that evidence which demands the aſſent of every reaſonable man to a miraculous fact.*

However, it may not be amiſs at preſent, ſo far to foreſtall that inquiry, as, by way of ſpecimen, to ſay one word of a particular hitherto untouched, the *ſpecific nature* of this ſupernatural event. A circumſtance which ſeems greatly to confirm and illuſtrate all that hath been ſaid. I have obſerved, that the *end* or *purpoſe* of it was twofold: 1. To *ſupport* the œconomy of God's diſpenſation *. And, 2. To *puniſh* the impiety of thoſe who attempted to diſturb it †. As in order to evince the *firſt* end or purpoſe, I have ſhewn ‡, that the attempt aimed to falſify the propheſy, which had foretold the final deſtruction of the temple; ſo, in order to evince the *ſecond*, I ſhall now ſhew, that this diſaſter was the very ſpecific puniſhment, which, the prophet Iſaiah informs the Jews, was reſerved and kept in ſtore, to be the ſcourge for impiety and rebellion. This ſeems to be conſiderable, and of moment. For where, as in the *extraordinary* diſpenſations to this people, the ſpecific puniſhments, which, from time to time, were reſerved, by God's decree, for their chaſtiſement, had been marked out, and ſet before them; it is reaſonable to expect, that, when a ſupernatural puniſhment was ſo inflicted, it would be by the agency of ſuch a ſpecific diſaſter as was foretold would be attendant on the crime. Now this, we ſay, was exactly the caſe in the affair before us. The prophet deſcribes the puniſhment, reſerved for the obſtinacy and impiety of the Jewiſh people, in theſe words, *Thou ſhalt be viſited of the Lord of Hoſts with* THUNDER, *and with* EARTHQUAKE, *and great noiſe, with* STORM AND TEMPEST, *and the* FLAME OF DEVOURING FIRE §.

Here we ſee the denunciation and execution are ſo wonderfully coincident, that one might be well excuſed in going a little further,

* See l. i. c. 1. † See p. 489. ‡ See l. i. c. 3.

§ Iſa. chap. xxix. ver. 6.

and

and even ſuppoſing the words here quoted to be a particular propheſy of the diſaſter in queſtion. And our conjecture would receive further countenance from this important circumſtance, that the immediate preceding verſes are an undoubted propheſy of the total deſtruction of Jeruſalem by Titus. *Woe to Ariel, to Ariel the city where David dwelt—I will camp againſt thee round about, and will lay ſiege againſt thee with a mount, and will raiſe forts againſt thee. And thou ſhalt be brought down, and ſhalt ſpeak out of the ground, and thy ſpeech ſhall be low out of the duſt—yea, it ſhall be at an inſtant, ſuddenly* *. However this be; ſo much, at leaſt, is certain, That had a writer deſcribed this diſaſter after the event, and copied from it, he could not have given a more exact and faithful picture of it than the prophet Iſaiah hath here done.

But it is now time to turn to our *mathematician*; and requeſt him to prepare his tables of calculation; if for no other purpoſe than to gratify our curioſity in the *doctrine of chances*. When he is ready, let us know, how many millions to one are the odds againſt a *natural eruption's* ſecuring the honour of the Chriſtian Religion, at that very important juncture when God's omnipotence was thus openly defied; and not by this or that crack-brained atheiſt, but by all the powers of the world combined againſt it. Let him add theſe other circumſtances, that the mountain of the temple was, both from its frame and ſituation, moſt unlikely to be the ſcene of a *phyſical eruption:* and that this eruption was confined, contrary to its uſual nature, to that very ſpot of ground: and then ſee how theſe will increaſe the odds. But his taſk is but begun; he muſt reckon another circumſtance, the fire's obſtinately breaking out by fits, as often as they attempted to proceed; and its total extinction on their giving up the enterprize: let him, I ſay, add this to the account, and ſee how it will then ſtand. To theſe, too, he muſt join the phænomena of the croſs in the air, and on the garments; which will open a new career to his calculations. And further, to

* Ver. 3, 4, 5. confer this with Matt. xxiv. 17, 18.

inflame

inflame the reckoning, he may take notice, that hiſtory ſpeaks but of *one* other commotion confined to the intrails of this hill, which likewiſe happened at a very critical juncture, the *crucifixion* of our Lord, when the *vail of the temple was rent in twain from the top to the bottom, and the earth did quake, and the rocks rent* *. Laſtly, he may reflect, if he pleaſes, that all theſe odds lie on the ſide of a divine interpoſition to hinder an *attempt*, which a ſpace of fourteen hundred years hath never ſeen revived; though the project itſelf (the reſtoration of one of the moſt celebrated temples in the world) is in its nature moſt alluring to ſuperſtition: and though the long imbecillities of religion and government, in the various revolutions there undergone, have afforded ample opportunity to a rich and crafty people to effect what was the only means of wiping out their opprobrium, and redeeming them from univerſal contempt. He muſt, I ſay, take in all this before he ſums up the account. And then, if he be ingenuous, without doubt he will confeſs, that to compute the immenſity of theſe odds will exceed all the powers of number.

To ſpeak freely, The attempt to account for it by a *natural cauſe* is a wretched evaſion. Let us conſider in how different a manner unbelievers are wont to treat thoſe parallel miracles, *The burſting of water from the rock at the command of Moſes*; and, *of fire from the earth to puniſh the rebellion of Korah.* No man was ever ſo wild to charge theſe facts to the account of *natural cauſes.* And yet, the ſudden guſhing out of water from a rock is certainly a commoner thing than a burning mountain. But the reaſon of their reſerve, in theſe inſtances, is plain; they had other cauſes at hand, beſides natural events, to exclude a miracle; ſuch as human artifice and contrivance; the uncertainty of very early hiſtory, &c. But, in the eruption from the foundations of the temple, the fact was ſo well circumſtanced, that an objector found nothing elſe left to trade with but this laſt miſerable ſhift: which, when all other means

* Matt. chap. xxvii. ver. 51.

fail,

fail, is ſtill at hand to keep back that bugbear to impiety, GOD'S MORAL GOVERNMENT, which government, together with REVEALED RELIGION founded on it, are (to obſerve it by the way) as compleatly exhibited by *one* miraculous interpoſition, fully proved, as by *one hundred*.

In ſupport of all that hath been ſaid, give me leave to obſerve, That the contemporary evidence, who, from their more intimate knowledge of the fact, muſt needs be allowed the beſt judges of its nature in general, give no intimation that they themſelves thought, or that others ſuſpected it to be a *natural event*. Julian, indeed, to hide his confuſion, inſinuates * ſomething like it, but under cover of the deſtruction of the temple at Daphne †; and otherwiſe, in ſo oblique and obſcure a manner as ſhews him to be aſhamed of ſo fooliſh a pretence. But then his honeſt and well-inſtructed advocate, Amm. Marcellinus, is far from giving into this ſuſpicion; the different manner in which he relates the two events at Nicomedia and Jeruſalem evidently imply the contrary. In his account of the *former*, out of a pure parade of ſcience, he digreſſes, on the phyſical cauſes of *earthquakes*. In the *latter* (would the fact have borne him out) he had better reaſons than an affectation to ſhew his learning, to tell us what the philoſophers had ſaid moſt plauſible, in favour of a natural event; for had that been the fact, the true *cauſe*, he knew, was univerſally miſtaken; and Paganiſm was eſſentially concerned to have that miſtake rectified. On the contrary, Ammianus hath contributed to ſupport the general opinion, by expreſſions which evidently imply *ſuperior agency*. Yet was this candid Hiſtorian nothing ſhy in ſpeaking his mind, when he conceived either fraud or ſuperſtition had too large a ſhare in common reports. For, mentioning the conflagration of Apollo's temple at Daphne, which the Chriſtians boaſted to be miraculouſly conſumed

* See p. 400, 401. and 403.

† Which, it is not unlikely, was burnt by common lightning, though Julian, in his Miſopogon, directly charges it on the Chriſtians.

by lightning, he frankly declares it was ſuſpected to have been ſet on fire by themſelves *. But why ſhould I inſiſt on the conduct of ſo fair an adverſary as Marcellinus, when Libanius, and the reſt of Julian's ſophiſts, thoſe bigots to Paganiſm, and inflamers of their maſter's follies, dared not ſo much as mutter the leaſt ſuſpicion of this nature, though the firſt of them, as we have ſeen, hath mentioned this diſaſter in ſuch a manner as ſhews he well underſtood the neceſſity of throwing into ſhade, what he could give no good account of, if placed in a fair light. Nor was their ſilence the effect of fear, or want of good-will. In more dangerous and offenſive matters they ſpoke freely; and with inſolence enough; For when the Chriſtians every where gave out that the death of Julian was miraculous, theſe friends of his publicly maintained that he was baſely aſſaſſinated by a Chriſtian ſoldier; and undertook to make good the charge, at their own peril †, if the emperor would appoint commiſſaries to examine

* Suſpicabatur id Chriſtianos egiſſe ſtimulatos invidia, quod idem templum inviti videbant ambitioſo circumdari periſtylio. L. xxii. c. 13.

† See Libanius ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἰουλιανοῦ τιμωρίας. Fabr. Bibl. Græc. vol. vii. and the oblique reflections of the noble author of the *Characteriſtics* upon it, vol. iii. Miſ. ii. c. 3—But, by what I can gather from antiquity, it ſeems to have been a frank calumny. Eutropius, who was in the action, and Marcellinus, who ſerved there in the body-guards, ſeem, neither of them, to have entertained the leaſt ſuſpicion of this kind. Beſides, Julian was wounded at that very inſtant when the darts of the Perſians were known to do moſt execution; that is to ſay, in one of their *diſſembled flights*; and when his own guards forewarned him of the danger, in preſſing upon their rear—"Clamabant hinc inde cancdidati (ſays Ammianus) ut fugientium molem tamquam ruinam malè compoſiti culminis declinaret: et incertum ſubita *equeſtris* haſta cute brachii ejus præſtricta, coſtis perfoſſis hæſit in ima jecoris fibra." Lib. xxv. c. iii. But what ſhall we ſay to the emperor's own teſtimony; who, in his dying harangue, returns thanks to God for not ſuffering him to fall by *ſecret conſpiracy*?—"Ideoque ſempiternum veneror numen quod *non clandeſtinis inſidiis*, nec longa morborum aſperitate, vel damnatorum fine decedo: ſed in medio curſu florentium gloriarum hunc merui *clarum* e mundo *digreſſum*." Id. ib. And this teſtimony will be ſeen to have the more weight, if we conſider, that Julian having (as in this place he tells us) conſulted the oracle about his fate, was anſwered, that he ſhould *fall by the ſword*—"interiturum me ferro dudum didici fide fatidica præcinente." Id, ib. The ambiguity of which anſwer would naturally make him as vigilant

amine into the fact. Laſtly, the *Fathers* and *Church Hiſtorians*, who are ſo large in eſtabliſhing the credit of God's interpoſition at Jeruſalem,

vigilant againſt his perſonal enemies, as againſt the enemies of the ſtate. So that when he calls his death *clarum digreſſum*, we may take his word for it, that he knew it to be by the darts of the Perſians.

Yet Libanius, we ſee, brings a formal charge againſt the Chriſtians, of a pretended aſſaſſinate; and offered himſelf as the proſecutor, to make it good. What evidence he had in reſerve is hard to ſay: But, in his *Oration to revenge the death* of his maſter, having related that Sapor, willing to recompenſe the hand which had worked his deliverance, had publiſhed a reward which nobody came in to receive, and from thence had concluded, that Julian muſt have fallen by one of his own ſoldiers; Libanius, I ſay, calls this the ſtrongeſt proof of all, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον ἁπάντων. And it was no wonder he rated it ſo high: for when he compoſed his *funeral oration on the death of Julian*, he was ſo unfurniſhed on this head, that he takes it for granted his maſter was ſlain by a *Perſian horſeman*, ὑπ' Ἀχαιμενίδε τινὸς κατενήνεχλαι.—At that time, he ſeemed to think with Eutropius, Marcellinus, and every other reaſonable man, that the circumſtance of the reward's being unclaimed was ſo far from being extraordinary, that it was not to be expected a particular ſtroke ſhould be diſtinguiſhed amidſt a general flight of darts and arrows. A great poet, long before, in the deſcription of a battle, had feigned the ſame accident: but he had too much good ſenſe to ſuppoſe ſo unlikely a circumſtance attending it, as that the author of the ſtroke was either diſtinguiſhed by others, or conſcious of it himſelf:

" Ecce, viro ſtridens alis allepſa ſagitta eſt,
" Incertum qua pulſa manu, quo turbine adacta;
" Quis tantam Rutilis laudem, caſuſne deuſne,
" Attulerit preſſa eſt inſignis gloria facti;
" NEC SESE ÆNEÆ JACTAVIT VOLNERE QUISQUAM."

But, you will ſay, Libanius was better informed when he wrote the *Oration to revenge his death*. Be it ſo. It is certain, however, he does no honour to his information; neither in the matter, nor in the compoſition of that piece; it being indeed one of the meaneſt and moſt diſingenuous diſcourſes of all antiquity: and, in every reſpect, ſo pitiful, that, had the reaſoning and rhetoric belonged to a *Father*, our anti-eccleſiaſtics could not have deſired a better fund for their mirth and raillery.

On the whole, this calumny ſeems to have had its birth from a ſtratagem of Sapor to throw the Roman army into diſcord and confuſion, when, on the death of Julian, he found it was not like to become ſo eaſy a prey to him, as he expected. It is probable he publiſhed the reward, ſpoken of above, without affectation or deſign: but no one

Jeruſalem, afford us not the leaſt hint that their adverſaries ever thought of evading it by the pretence of a *natural event*.

coming to lay in his claim, he found a good uſe might be made of it; and ſo gave out, That Julian muſt needs be ſlain by a Roman ſoldier, ſince, after the moſt diligent ſearch amongſt his own troops, there was no one that pretended to the merit of his death. That this report might make its due impreſſion, he ordered the Perſians (who were then harraſſing the Romans) whenever they came up within hearing of the enemy, to reproach them with the murder of their maſter: It was in proſecution of the ſame ſcheme, that when the ambaſſadors, whom Jovian ſent to treat of peace, came to their audience, The firſt queſtion he aſked them was, Whether Julian's death had been yet revenged. But why ſo much ſolicitude in a matter he had no concern in: and ſo much reſentment of an action he had reaped ſuch advantages from, if he did not expect, by this affected generoſity, to reap greater? Every man of ſenſe in the army treated this artifice as it deſerved: and hence, without doubt, the neglect ſhewn to it by Eutropius and Marcellinus. Nor is this a ſtratagem unuſual in war. Our Henry V. employed it with ſucceſs after the battle of Azincourt, to appeaſe the duke of Burgundy, when he ſent the king his gantlet by an herald (the declaration of war in thoſe times) to revenge the death of his two brothers, who fell in that action fighting on the ſide of Charles VI. For, unwilling to bring down upon himſelf ſo powerful an enemy, but principally deſirous of inflaming the diſtracted councils of France, he took advantage of the quarrels between the houſes of Burgundy and Orleans, to aſſure the herald that the duke's brothers were not killed by the Engliſh troops, but by thoſe of their own party, in the faction of Orleans: of which, he ſaid, he would produce evidence, and make good his allegation to the full. But he performed his word juſt as Sapor did his, of the aſſaſſinate of Julian: where (to return to our ſubject) the pretence was ſo groſs and ridiculous, that it is probable we had heard no more of it, had it not been for the deluſion of ſome Chriſtians, who, being on the hunt after miracles, catched at the circumſtance of the dart's coming from an unknown hand, to make a miracle of the apoſtate's death. Henceforward the fable received new vigour; and ſoon after, a kind of eſtabliſhment, from the ſtrange indiſcretion of Sozomene, who would needs venture to defend the *morality* of this pretended aſſaſſinate: a raſhneſs which did the faithful more diſhonour than all the contrivances of Julian againſt them. And yet, to do juſtice to every one, the folly, to ſpeak no worſe of it, is not to be charged on the Chriſtian principles, but on the Pagan; which Sozomene would not ſuffer his Chriſtianity to correct; for the cutting off a tyrant was one of the moſt illuſtrious of the Pagan virtues; and unhappily our church-hiſtorian ſeems to have been ſtruck with the glory attending that atchievement.

CON-

CONCLUSION.

WE ſhall conclude with a ſhort recapitulation of the whole argument.

Firſt, It hath been ſhewn, That the *occaſion* was moſt important; and that the credit and honour of Revelation required God's interpoſition at this juncture.

That Julian aggravated the impiety of his attempt, by all the inſulting circumſtances moſt likely to bring upon him the vengeance of heaven.

That the *event* is eſtabliſhed by all the power of human teſtimony: That the church hath borne witneſs to it by a full, conſiſtent, and contemporary evidence.

That the adverſaries of our holy Faith, who were in the neighbourhood of the ſcene, the followers of Julian, and moſt partial to his views, have confirmed their report. Nay, that the emperor himſelf hath confeſſed the hand which overcame him, though with that diſingenuity which characteriſes the *ſophiſt* and the *bigot*, in what party ſoever they are found.

And laſtly, That the *fact* was, in its nature, ſuch as leaſt admitted of unfaithful accounts concerning it.

Then the OBJECTIONS to the miracle have been conſidered.

It hath been ſhewn, that, from the word of PROPHECY, and the courſe of God's diſpenſations, his interpoſition was even *neceſſary* to ſupport the honour of Religion.

That the evidence of the hiſtorian, AMM. MARCELLINUS, is ſo full and perfect in all its parts, that there is not one circumſtance in his character or teſtimony, which an unbeliever could abuſe, to keep back his aſſent; nor any wanting, which a Believer would deſire, to prevent a cavil.

That the ſeveral accounts of the FATHERS *of the Church* and the *Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtorians* are not only conſiſtent with, but highly corroborative of, one another; and, that ſuch parts of their relations

tions as appear at firſt ſight moſt prodigious, are indeed, when maturely examined, the parts which moſt deſerve credit,

That it is very unlikely, nay almoſt impoſſible, that the eruption ſhould be the effect of *human* ART *and contrivance.*

And laſtly, that it is no leſs abſurd to ſuppoſe it a NATURAL *event.*

Thus new light continually ſpringing up from each circumſtance as it paſſed in review; by ſuch time as the whole was conſidered, this illuſtrious MIRACLE hath come out in one full blaze of evidence. Inſomuch, that I will venture to affirm, there is nothing to be oppoſed to its force, but what muſt at the ſame time deſtroy the credit of all human teſtimony whatſoever.

When, therefore, the Reader reflects, how little this invincible demonſtration for our holy Faith hath been hitherto inſiſted on; how ſlightly it hath been handled; and how haſtily and ſlovenly hurried over; he will poſſibly find cauſe to wonder as much, on the one hand, at this ſtrange inattention, as on the other, at the unreaſonable credulity of the blind adorers of antiquity. For though it hath ever affected the learned and impartial obſerver with the ſuperiority of its evidence, yet no one before, that I know of, hath attempted to ſet that ſuperiority in a juſt light, though provoked to it by the inſolence of our enemies, and, what is ſtill more provoking, the indiſcretion of our FRIENDS: ſome of whom have hinted their ſuſpicions in private; and others given more open intimations of its falſhood.

This, in part, may be owing to thoſe tickliſh circumſtances in the evidence of the *Fathers*, which, on examination, we have ſhewn to be its principal ſupport. But what hath chiefly occaſioned this neglect, I am perſuaded, is the ſtate and condition of the *Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory* of that time; when the light of miracles was ſurrounded with ſuch a ſwarm of monkiſh fables, as was enough to darken the brighteſt of its rays; and, indeed, nothing, but the force of its divine extraction, could ever have broke through them: for,

for, as if theſe unhappy artificers *deſigned* what they brought to paſs, they were not content to counterfeit the hand of God on other common occaſions: they would try their ſkill on *this*, where it had been ſo eminently diſplayed; and actually contrived to mimic its moſt eſſential and triumphant circumſtances. Accordingly, *Church Hiſtory* informs us, that when Julian and his brother Gallus projected to build a *temple* over the ſepulchre of one St. Mamas; that part which Julian undertook *fell down again* as ſoon as built; the ſaint, it ſeems, diſdaining the ſervice of the future apoſtate. The cloudy monk, who invented this fable, had, we ſee, two conceits in his head: he would make Julian's offering as unacceptable as Cain's; and reſolving likewiſe, he ſhould be an unlucky builder through life, would not give him the ſkill or privilege of that primitive out-law. The ſame *Hiſtory* again informs us *, That once, when Julian ſacrificed, there was found impreſſed upon the entrails of the victim, *a croſs within a crown or circle*: for when the monks had once got the apoſtate into their hands, they treated him as a true Demoniac; and ſo plied him with CROSSES, that ſovereign Panacea of the Exorciſts.

Thus they dreſſed up their impoſtures as like as they could, in garb and faſhion, to the miracles of heavenly extraction; with the ſpirit, or, muſt we ſay, in *imitation* of thoſe Pagan prieſts, who forged their *Ancilia* to ſecure the SACRED SHIELD which fell from heaven: as if they had taken it into their heads, that true miracles, unattended with theſe deluſions, were in the ſame danger from the enemies of the Faith, that the *Palladium* of *Rome* was from robbers, without a numerous guard of brazen counterfeits.

* Greg. Naz. Orat. iii. Soz. l. v. c. 2.

THE

THE

DOCTRINE OF GRACE:

OR, THE

OFFICE AND OPERATIONS

OF THE

HOLY SPIRIT

VINDICATED FROM

THE INSULTS OF INFIDELITY,

AND

THE ABUSES OF FANATICISM:

WITH SOME THOUGHTS

(Humbly offered to the Conſideration of the ESTABLISHED CLERGY)

REGARDING

The right Method of defending Religion againſt the Attacks of either Party.

IN THREE BOOKS.

ADVERTISEMENT
TO THE FIRST EDITION.

WHILE I was compoſing theſe ſheets to vindicate the honour of Religion, it was given out that I was writing in defence of a late Miniſter of State.

I have a Maſter above, and I have one below; I mean GOD and the KING. To them my ſervices are bound.

The moſt ſacred of all private ties are *Friendſhip* and *Gratitude*. The duties ariſing from theſe, though not altogether ſo extenſive as the other, are ſubſervient only to them.

With reſpect to the great Miniſter here underſtood, His vindication, had he wanted any, could come, with proper dignity, only from himſelf. And He, though for the firſt time, would be here but a Copier: I mean, of the example of that Firſt of Romans *; who being calumniated before the people by one Nævius, an obſcure Plebeian, when he came to make his defence, which happened to be on the anniverſary of the battle of Zama, addreſſed the aſſembly in this manner: "It was on this day, "Romans, that I ſubdued your mighty Rival for Empire, the "Carthaginian. Ill would it become the friends of Rome to "waſte ſuch a day in wrangling and contention. We ſhould "now be returning thanks to the immortal Gods for the ſignal "protection they afforded us in that glorious conflict. Let

* Scipio Africanus; who reſtored his country by carrying the war from Rome to Carthage.

" us leave then this fellow with himſelf, and aſcend together to " the capitol, to offer to Jupiter the Deliverer; who, on all occa- " ſions as well as this, hath, from my early youth, vouchſafed to " beſtow upon me the growing power and the conſtant diſpoſition " to ſupport the honour of my country. And let no God, auſpi- " cious to Rome, be left uninvoked, that the State, in its diſtreſſes, " may never want ſuch ſervants as I have ſtill endeavoured to ap- " prove myſelf." When he had ſaid this, he ſtept from the roſ- trum and left the forum empty; all the people following him to the capitol.

That *the people followed him* is not ſurely the marvellous part of the ſtory. The thing to be admired is, that a Stateſman ſhould lead the people to prayers.

This indeed is the laſt ſervice a Patriot-miniſter can render to his country. And I am well perſuaded (ſo exactly does the example fit the occaſion) that our illuſtrious Modern would have deemed it the crown of his labours to have animated his Fellow-citizens with a ſpirit of true piety towards GOD, as ſucceſsfully as he in- flamed them with a ſpirit of zeal and fortitude for the King and Conſtitution.

PRE-

PREFACE.

THE CONTEMPT of *Religion* ſoon followed the ABUSE; and both of them have exiſted almoſt ever ſince the firſt inſtitution of the thing itſelf. For, that corruption of heart, whoſe diſorder *Religion* was ordained to cure, has been ever ſtruggling againſt its Remedy.

I. In the days of Solomon, when *Wiſdom* was at its height, *Folly*, as we learn from many paſſages in the writings of that ſacred ſage, kept equal paces with it. Hence it is that, after he has given many lively paintings of the deformed features of Irreligion and Bigotry, he ſubjoins directions to the ſober advocate of Piety and Virtue how beſt to repreſs their inſolence and vanity. ANSWER NOT *a Fool* (ſays he) *according to his folly, leſt thou alſo be like unto him.* ANSWER *a Fool according to his folly, leſt he be wiſe in his own conceit* *.

Short, iſolated ſentences were the mode in which ancient wiſdom delighted to convey its precepts for the regulation of human conduct. But when this natural method had loſt the grace of novelty, and a growing refinement had new-coloured the candid ſimplicity of ancient manners, theſe inſtructive ſages found a neceſſity of giving to their moral maxims the ſeaſoning and poignancy of *paradoxes*. In theſe lively and uſeful ſports of fancy, the ſon of David,

* Prov. xxvi. ver. 4, 5.

we

we are told, moſt excelled. We find them to abound in the writings which bear his name; and we meet with frequent alluſions to them in all the parts of ſacred Writ, under the names of *Riddles*, *Parables*, and *Dark-ſayings*.

Now of all the examples of this ſpecies of inſtruction, there is none more illuſtrious, or fuller of moral wiſdom, than the *paradox* juſt now quoted; or which, in the happineſs of the expreſſion, has ſo artfully conveyed the key for opening the treaſures of it. But as a *dark* conceit and a *dull* one have a great proximity in modern wit; and a nice *difference* is not diſtinguiſhed from a *contradiction* in modern reaſoning; this paradox of the Sage has been miſtaken by his critics for an abſurdity of ſome of his tranſcribers, who forgot the negative in the latter member of the ſentence: and ſo, to be ſet right at an eaſier expence than unfolding *dark ſentences of old*; that is to ſay, by exchanging them for *clearer*, of a *modern* date: which *time* can make ANCIENT READINGS; and which a careful collation of its blunders may hereafter make the TRUE.

II. But they who chuſe to receive antiquity in its antique garb, will, perhaps, venture with me to try, if the apparent contradiction in the received text cannot be fairly unriddled without any other aid than of the words themſelves, in which the *dark ſaying* is conveyed.

Had the *folly* of theſe *fools* been only of one condition or denomination, then the advice *to anſwer*, and *not to anſwer*, had been repugnant to itſelf. But as their *folly* was of various kinds, in ſome of which, *to anſwer* might offend the dignity, and in others, *not to anſwer* might hurt the intereſts of Truth; *To anſwer*, and *not to anſwer*, is a conſiſtent, and may, for aught theſe critics know, be a very wiſe direction.

Had the advice been given ſimply and without circumſtance, *to anſwer the fool*, and *not to anſwer him*, a critic, who had a reverence for the text, would ſatisfy himſelf in ſuppoſing, that the different directions referred to the doing a thing *in and out of ſeaſon*. But when,

when, to the general advice about *answering*, this circumstance is added—*according to his folly*, that interpretation is excluded; and a difficulty indeed arises; a difficulty, which has made those who have no reverence for the TEXT, to accuse it of absurdity and contradiction.

But now, to each direction, reasons are subjoined, Why a *Fool should*, and why he *should not*, *be answered:* reasons, which, when set together and compared, are, at first sight, sufficient to make the critic suspect, that all the contradiction lies in his own incumbered ideas.

1. The reason given, why *a Fool should not be answered according to his folly*, is, *lest he* [the Answerer] *be like unto him:*

2. The reason given, why *he should be answered according to his folly*, is, *lest he* [the Fool] *be wise in his own conceit.*

The cause assigned, of *forbidding to answer*, therefore, plainly insinuates, that the Defender of Religion should not imitate the insulter of it in his *modes of disputation*; which may be comprised in *sophistry*, *buffoonry*, and *scurrility*. For what could so much *liken* the answerer to his idiot-adversary, as the putting on his fool's-coat in order to captivate and confound the rabble?

The cause assigned, of *directing to answer*, as plainly intimates, that the Sage should address himself to confute the fool upon *the fool's own false principles*, by shewing that they lead to conclusions very wide from the impieties he would deduce from them. And if any thing will prevent the *fool* from being *wise in his own conceit*, it must be the dishonour and the ridicule of having his own principles turned against him; while they are shewn to make for the very contrary purpose to that for which he had employed them.

The supreme wisdom, conveyed in the two precepts of this unravelled *paradox*, will be best understood by explaining the advantages arising from the observance of each of them.

III. We are *not to answer a fool according to his folly, lest we also be like unto him*—This is the reason given; and a good one it is; sufficient to make any sober man decline a combat, where even victory would bring dishonour with it. Now, if our *answer* be of such

ſuch a nature that we alſo (though with contrary intentions) do injury to truth, we become *like unto him* in the eſſential part of his character. And ſurely Truth is never more groſsly abuſed, nor its advocates more diſhonoured, than when they employ the fooliſh arts of *ſophiſtry*, *buffoonry*, and *ſcurrility*, in its defence.

1. To uſe *fallacious* and inconcluſive arguments in ſupport of Truth, is doing it infinite diſcredit. The practice tends to make men ſuſpect that the queſtioned Truth is indeed an impoſture, when it finds ſupport in the common tricks of impoſtors: the leaſt unfavourable inference will be, that the Truth is defended not for its own ſake, but for the ſake of the Defender: this will make the ſerious enquirer leſs attentive to the iſſue, and more jealous of the good faith of the advocate; which cannot but leſſen our reverence to the one, and increaſe unfavourable prejudices towards the other. It tends to reduce the two parties of *Wiſdom* and *Folly* to a level; when they ſtand on the ſame barren and deceitful ground. It tends to confound the diſtinction between *true* and *falſe*, and to make all terminate in that moſt malignant ſpecies of *folly*, Pyrronic doubt and uncertainty.

2. To employ *Buffoonry* in this ſervice, is to violate the majeſty of Truth, which can inforce its influence amongſt men no longer than while its ſanctity of character is kept ſafe from inſult.

Buffoonry deprives Truth of the only thing ſhe wants, in order to come off victorious; I mean, a *fair hearing*. To *examine*, Men muſt be ſerious; and to *judge*, they muſt be attentive to the argument. Buffoonry gives a levity to the mind, which makes it ſeek entertainment rather than inſtruction, in all that is offered to its inſpection. But let this poor talent be taken at its utmoſt worth, the uſe of it will ſtill raiſe a ſuſpicion, that the advocate has his cauſe little at heart, while, in the very heat of an important controverſy, he can allow himſelf to be amuſed and diverted by the levity of falſe wit; ſince, in matters that are underſtood to concern us moſt, we are wont to appear, as well as to be, moſt in earneſt: and this ſcandal given by the advocate, will always do prejudice to the cauſe.

3. Again,

3. Again, *perſonal abuſe*, that favourite *colour* which glares moſt in the fool's *rhetoric*, is carefully to be avoided. For nothing can ſo aſſimilate the anſwerer to the fool he is confuting as a want of *charity*, which this mode of defence ſo openly betrays. To *charity*, the fool makes no pretenſions. His very attempt is an avowed violation of it. He would deprive the world of what he himſelf confeſſes to be moſt uſeful to ſociety, and moſt pleaſing to the natural ſentiments of man; that is to ſay, *religion*. He would break down this barrier againſt evil, he would rob us of this conſolation of humanity; and in ſuch a ſervice he follows but his nature and his office, when he vilifies and calumniates all who ſet themſelves to oppoſe his impious projects. But the *end of the Commandment is charity*.

Theſe are the various modes of *anſwering* which are to be avoided, leſt the advocate of religion become *like* the impious caviller whom he addreſſes himſelf to confute.

IV. But then, *leſt the fool ſhould be wiſe in his own conceit*, we are, at the ſame time, bid, *to give him an anſwer*. But how can this be done, in the manner here directed, namely, *according to his folly*, and yet the anſwerer not become *like unto him*, but, on the contrary, be able to produce the effect here intimated? The cure of the fool's vain conceit of his ſuperior wiſdom, is a difficulty indeed; a difficulty worthy the advocate of truth to undertake: and which a maſter of his ſubject may hope to overcome, in contriving to confute the fool on his own *falſe principles*, by ſhewing that they lead to a concluſion very oppoſite to thoſe free conſequences he has laboured to deduce from them. And if any thing will allay the *fool's* vain *conceit* of himſelf, it muſt be the ſenſe of ſuch a diſhonour. For what can be more ſhameful than to have his own principles ſhewn to be deſtructive of his own concluſions? What more mortifying, than to have thoſe principles, in whoſe invention he ſo much gloried, or in whoſe uſe he ſo much confided, fairly turned, by all the rules of good logic, to his own confuſion? Nor is the partiſan of falſehood more

humbled than the cauſe of truth advanced, by thus anſwering a fool *according to his folly*. For that victory where the adverſary is thus made to contribute to his own overthrow is, in common eſtimation, always held to be moſt compleat: that ſyſtem being naturally deemed contemptible, whoſe moſt plauſible ſupport draws after it the ruin of what it was raiſed to uphold.

And thus, as the *wiſe man* directs, is this forward fool to be treated; whether it be by *ſilence* or *confutation*.

V. That, in general, his folly is to be repreſſed, *according to the dictates of* true *wiſdom*, the nature of the thing ſufficiently informs us: there was no need of a particular direction to inforce the expediency and neceſſity of ſuch a conduct. But then, beſides, it may ſometimes happen, that the intereſts of truth require his being *anſwered* even *according to his folly:* and, as our duty here is very liable to *abuſe*, it was expedient to obviate the danger. This, we may obſerve, the ſacred writer hath done; and with much art and elegance of addreſs.

It may indeed be ſaid, why this practiſed obliquity in defence of truth? Is not the purity of her nature rather defiled, than her real intereſts advanced by this indirection? And does not wiſdom ſeem to tell us, that it becomes her dignity to repreſs folly by thoſe arms only which wiſdom herſelf hath edged and tempered; that truth, by the information of her own light, points out the ſtraight road to her abode; and forbids us to riggle into her ſacred preſence through by-paths, and the cloudy medium of falſhood?

But they who talk thus do not ſufficiently reflect on the condition of our weak and purblind nature, which can ill bear the bright and unſhaded light of truth. On which account, it is ſo contrived, in the beautiful order of things, that *folly*, by thus adminiſtering to her own defeat, ſhould bring us back again into the ways of wiſdom, from which ſhe hath ſeduced us.

The REDEEMER of mankind, in condeſcenſion to the infirmities of thoſe he came to ſave, hath taken this very advantage of

that

that eſtabliſhed order: for, more effectually to ſilence thoſe *fools* who queſtioned his miſſion and his office, he *anſwers them according to their folly*; that is, he demonſtrates to them, on their own erroneous ideas of the nature and end of the LAW (formed on rabbinical traditions and the reveries of Greek philoſophers), he demonſtrates to them, I ſay, the truth and reaſonableneſs of the GOSPEL. The pure and unabated ſplendor of truth, uſhered in by wiſdom, would have only added to their judicial blindneſs: for to bear it undazzled, they had need of the preſence of that SPIRIT OF TRUTH, which was not yet come, but only promiſed to be ſent. Indeed, when this ſacred guide was come, and while he continued in an *extraordinary* manner, to enlighten the underſtandings of the faithful, there was no occaſion for this inforced miniſtry of *folly*, to contribute to her own deſtruction. And therefore the *firſt* propagators of the goſpel proceeded more directly to the eſtabliſhment of the truth, and on the ſolid principles of *wiſdom* only. Yet now again, in the *ordinary* communications of GRACE, this direction of the *wiſe man* will be as uſeful as ever, to the intereſts of virtue and religion, ANSWER A FOOL ACCORDING TO HIS FOLLY, LEST HE BE WISE IN HIS OWN CONCEIT.

A

DISCOURSE

ON THE

OFFICE AND OPERATIONS

OF THE

HOLY SPIRIT.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

THE bleſſed Jeſus came into the world ON THE PART OF GOD, to declare pardon and ſalvation to the forfeited poſterity of Adam. He teſtified the truth of his Miſſion by amazing miracles, and ſealed man's Redemption, in his Blood, by the more amazing ſacrifice of himſelf upon the croſs.

But as the REDEMPTION, ſo procured, could only operate on each individual, under certain conditions of FAITH and OBEDIENCE, very repugnant to our corrupt nature; the bleſſed Redeemer, on leaving the world, promiſed to his followers his interceſſion with the Father, to ſend amongſt them another divine Perſon ON THE PART OF MAN, namely the HOLY GHOST, called the *Spirit of Truth*,

Truth, and the *Comforter*; who, agreeably to the import of these attributes, should co-operate with man in establishing his FAITH, and in perfecting his OBEDIENCE; or, in other words, should *sanctify him to Redemption.*

This is a succinct account of the œconomy of grace; entirely consonant to our most approved conceptions of the Divine nature and of the human condition. For if man was to be reinstated in a FREE-GIFT, which had been justly forfeited, we cannot but confess, that as, on the one hand, the restoration might be made on what conditions best pleased the giver; so, on the other, that God would graciously provide that it should not be made in vain.

An atonement, therefore, for the offended Majesty of the FATHER, was first to be procured; and this was the work of the SON: and then, a remedy was to be provided for that helpless condition of man, which hindered the atonement from producing its effect; and this was the office of the HOLY GHOST: so that both were joint-workers in the great business of reconciling God to man.

What at present I propose to consider is, the *Office and Operations of the Holy Spirit*, as they are delivered to us in sacred Scripture.

His office in general is, as hath been observed, to establish our *faith*, and to perfect our *obedience*, both of which he doth by ENLIGHTENING THE UNDERSTANDING, and by RECTIFYING THE WILL. All this is necessarily collected from the words of Jesus, which contain this important PROMISE. *I will pray the Father* (says he) *and he shall give you another* COMFORTER, *that he may abide with you for ever; even the* SPIRIT OF TRUTH——*He dwelleth with you, and shall be in you———which is the* HOLY GHOST, *whom the Father shall send in my name. He shall* TEACH YOU ALL THINGS *.

* John xiv. 16, *& seq.*

By

By *teaching us all things* under the joint characters of the *Spirit of Truth* and of the *Comforter*, we are neceſſarily to underſtand *all things* which concern FAITH and OBEDIENCE.

Theſe two diſtinct branches of his office I ſhall conſider in their order.

CHAP. II.

FIRST of all, let us obſerve the method employed by divine wiſdom in manifeſting the operations of the HOLY GHOST, as the SPIRIT AND GUIDE OF TRUTH *.

The firſt extraordinary atteſtation of his deſcent was at the day of Pentecoſt, in the GIFT OF TONGUES.

Beſides the great and almoſt indiſpenſable uſe of this endowment on the firſt diſciples of Chriſt, who were to convey the glad tidings of the goſpel throughout the whole earth; the elegance and propriety in the choice of this miracle, to atteſt the real deſcent of that *Spirit* who was to *teach us all things*, can never be enough admired: for WORDS being the human vehicle of our knowledge, this gift was the fitteſt precurſor of the *Spirit of Truth*.

But this firſt opening ſcene of wonders, which was to prepare and influence all their ſubſequent labours, a late eminent writer would, from a SIGN, reduce to a *ſhadow*; in which he ſeems to think, fancy ſet itſelf on work, to produce a prodigy. "The "gift of tongues upon the day of Pentecoſt (ſays the learned "perſon) *was not laſting, but inſtantaneous and tranſitory*; not be-"ſtowed upon them for the conſtant work of the miniſtry, but as "an *occaſional ſign only*, that the perſon endowed with it was a "choſen miniſter of the goſpel: which ſign, as ſoon as it had "ſerved that particular purpoſe, ſeems to have ceaſed, and totally "to have vaniſhed †."

* John xvi. 13.

† Dr. Middleton's Eſſay on the Gift of Tongues, vol. II. of his works, p. 79.

Let

Let us examine now the grounds of this new interpretation, ſo apparently derogatory to the operation of the Holy Spirit.

The learned writer proceeds in order; firſt, to *reduce* the type or viſible ſign of the gift, the FIERY TONGUES: for having declared the gift itſelf to be inſtantaneous and tranſitory, he has, very conſiſtently, endeavoured to ſhew that the *ſign* of it was merely fanciful. He explains it to be no more than a ſudden flaſh of lightning, "which, he ſays, like all other phænomena of that "ſort, no ſooner appeared, than vaniſhed *."

His reaſon for this opinion is, "becauſe when the Diſciples "ſpoke in ſtrange tongues to the multitude, the concluſion they "drew from that circumſtance ſeems to ſhew, that the celeſtial "fire did not, at that time, ſit upon their heads †."

But the learned perſon has omitted to bring this other circumſtance into his account, that when the *cloven tongues appeared upon each of them*, they were aſſembled together in a private room, ſequeſtered and apart: and that it was not till the thing was *noiſed abroad*, and the *multitude come together*, to inquire into the truth of it, that the apoſtles *ſpoke with tongues as the Spirit gave them utterance*. Now between this viſible deſcent of the Holy Spirit, and their ſpeaking to the multitude, a conſiderable time muſt have intervened; ſufficient to convince the apoſtles, from the ſteady duration of the appearance, that it was not natural but miraculous. And this the original words well expreſs: ἐκάθισέ τε ἐφ' ἕνα ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, properly rendered by the phraſe of SITTING *upon each of them*: words ſo inconſiſtent with a momentary appearance, that it would be trifling with common ſenſe to deduce ſuch an interpretation from oblique circumſtances and collateral reaſoning. It is true the learned writer concedes, even from the ſign's being only *a ſudden flaſh, which vaniſhed almoſt as ſoon as it appeared*, that "it indicated ſomething miraculous and ſupernatural ‡." But I am afraid, that thoſe who are the readieſt to embrace his

* P. 81. † P. 82. ‡ P. 82.

phyſiology,

phyſiology, will not be the firſt to admire his theology; eſpecially as it is ſo gratuitouſly deduced. It may therefore not be improper to conſider the evangelical account of this viſible deſcent, with a little more exactneſs. In this place (we ſee) the *firey tongues* are ſaid, *to ſit upon each of them:* and other places of ſcripture, which mention the like deſcent of the Holy Spirit in viſible form, deſcribe it in ſuch terms as denote a very different appearance from a ſudden *flaſh of lightning*. St. Matthew tells us, that *the Spirit of God deſcended like a dove*, ὡσεὶ περιστερὰν; that is, with a dove-like motion; as birds, when about to ſettle upon any thing, firſt hover over it with quivering wings: it then *lighted upon Jeſus*, ἐρχόμενον ἐπ' αὐτόν. So, in the place in queſtion, the ſame Spirit is ſaid to deſcend under the appearance of *cloven tongues, like as of fire*, ὡσεὶ πυρός. In the former inſtance, only the *motion* of the deſcent is deſcribed: in this, both the *motion*, *figure*, and *colour*. And the term of *cloven tongues*, which the ſacred hiſtorian employs to deſcribe the *motion*, and which the learned writer takes up, to prove his hypotheſis of a momentary exiſtence of the phænomenon, proves it, in truth, to be of ſome continuance. "We cannot (ſays he) "think it ſtrange that fire flaſhing from Heaven, and ſuddenly va- "niſhing, ſhould yield ſome reſemblance of *tongues* to the eyes "of the MULTITUDE; for this is no more than what is *na- "tural*, and what we may obſerve, in ſome meaſure, from "every flame that flaſhes from the clouds, and breaks itſelf, *of "courſe*, in a number of ſmall pointed particles not remote from "that ſhape *."

To this, let us, in the firſt place, obſerve, that the thing ſeen, ὡσεὶ πυρὸς, on the heads of the apoſtles, was no more an elementary *fire*, than the thing ſeen, ὡσεὶ περιστερὰν, on the head of Jeſus, was a real *dove:* for, as only a *dove-like motion* is intimated in this latter expreſſion, ſo only a *flame-like motion* is intimated in the former; and what this was, the hiſtorian tells us in its effect, the

* P. 82.

appearance of cloven tongues. The learned perſon is certainly miſtaken in ſuppoſing *a ſudden flaſh of lightning* has *naturally* the appearance of cloven tongues. Such a phænomenon exhibits to the eye of the beholder only a line of light angularly broken into ſeveral directions; very different from the form of *tongues*, whether whole or *cloven*. Whenever a flame aſſumes this appearance, it is become *ſtationary*, as this was, which, the hiſtorian ſays, SAT *upon each of them*, ἐκάθισε: and then its *natural* motion being upwards, it repreſents, when divided lengthwiſe, a pyramidal or *tongue-like* figure, *cloven*. A demonſtration that the appearance in queſtion was not *momentary*, but of ſome continuance.

The learned writer having thus accounted for the precurſor of the gift, comes to conſider the gift itſelf; and attempts to ſhew that "the chief or SOLE END RATHER of the *gift of tongues* was "to ſerve as a ſenſible ſign in that *infirm ſtate* of the firſt Chriſ-"tians, that thoſe to whom it was vouchſafed were under a divine "influence, and acted by a divine commiſſion.——So that it is "not reaſonable to think that this *diverſity of tongues* was given to "the apoſtles for the ſake of converting thoſe people before whom "they then ſpoke *." Hence (ſays he) "it appears that the gift "was not of a ſtable or permanent nature †."—That is, it was no laſting endowment, to enable the apoſtles to perform their miniſtry amongſt thoſe whoſe language they had never learnt; but, a momentary power which ſerved that day for a *ſign* to the multitude: and conſequently, they had theſe languages to learn anew when they wanted the uſe of them. This, I ſay, appears to be his inference; for the arguments he brings to ſupport his principle will lead us to no other. At the ſame time it muſt be obſerved he has laid down the propoſition ſo looſely, and ambiguouſly, that, when conſidered alone, it may either mean, "that the power of ſpeaking ſtrange languages was only infuſed occaſionally, like the power of working miracles;" or elſe, "that the knowledge of the language,

* P. 87. † P. 89.

when

when infuſed, was not laſting, but momentary, like the cloven tongues; the inſpired linguiſt preſently falling back into his natural ſtate of idiotiſm."

In the firſt ſenſe, the aſſertion ſeems to be well founded: and from its ſobriety, and more eſpecially from the extravagance of the other meaning, which leaves but little diſtinction between the power of ſpeaking ſtrange tongues at the day of Pentecoſt, and the extatick ravings of modern fanaticks, one would wiſh to find was the ſenſe we could fairly aſcribe to it.

But then all the arguments employed by the learned perſon, for the ſupport of his propoſition, confine us, as we ſhall now ſee, to the other meaning.

1. His firſt argument is the *authority* of ſome modern critics *. But I may be excuſed, if I ſuffer theſe to have no more weight with me when they contradict a received interpretation, than they uſually have with him when they confirm it.

2. His ſecond argument is an inference from ſcripture itſelf. "It appears (he thinks) from the ſtories of Cornelius's family, and the diſciples at Epheſus (both of whom ſpoke with tongues on the Holy Ghoſt's deſcending on them, while Peter preached to one, and Paul baptiſed the other), that the gift was not laſting, but inſtantaneous; and given only for a ſign of their real admiſſion into the church of Chriſt:" for, as he truly obſerves, "here was no "room to ſuppoſe another uſe, the ſeveral aſſemblies being all of "the ſame ſpeech and language †."

But here the learned perſon from particular caſes draws a general inference: becauſe, in this caſe, he *ſees no other uſe* than for a *ſign*, he concludes the gift to be momentary in all other. By a better way of reaſoning therefore, he will ſuffer us to conclude, that where we do *ſee another uſe*, as in the gift at Pentecoſt, that there it was as laſting as the uſe to which it ſerved: and an equitable judge

* P. 89. † P. 85, 86.

will conclude for us both, that the ſame endowment which in one inſtance was tranſitory, might, in another, laſt for life.

The converts of the family of Cornelius, and the diſciples at Epheſus, were in a private ſtation in the church: ſo that an inſtantaneous exerciſe of the power fully anſwered its end: it was a *ſign* that theſe converts were indeed become members of Chriſt's myſtical body, the church, as well by the baptiſm of the Spirit as of Water. But the caſe was different with reſpect to the apoſtles: they were the appointed preachers of the goſpel to remote and barbarous nations: an office not to be diſcharged without a competent knowledge of the various languages of the earth. We find them, on the day of Pentecoſt, miraculouſly endowed with this knowledge. What are we to think, but that the PRINCIPAL end of the gift was to qualify them for their miſſion?

3. The learned writer's third argument in ſupport of his opinion, is taken from the ſtyle of ſcripture, and is to this purpoſe: "that were the gift of tongues laſting, it would have been employed in the compoſition of their *goſpels* and *epiſtles*: but that it was not there employed, appears from the barbarity of the ſtyle; ſince whatever comes from God muſt be perfect in its kind; ſo that, in this caſe, we ſhould be ſure to find the purity of Plato, and the eloquence of Cicero." But the conſideration of this argument coming more properly under another head of this diſcourſe, for that we ſhall reſerve it; and might here take leave of this ſubject, *the duration of the gift of tongues*; as the common opinion remains unimpaired by his attack, and is ſtill in poſſeſſion of all the circumſtances of credit in which he found it.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

YET ſince this new interpretation (which makes the gift ſo tranſitory, and the power conferred by it ſo momentary) may be applied by licentious men to purpoſes the learned perſon might never intend, it cannot be too carefully conſidered.

Who hath not heard of the wondrous powers of the imagination, when raiſed and inflamed by fanaticiſm? and though we be ignorant of its utmoſt force, yet we know enough of it to convince us, that this faculty of the mind, the nurſe and parent of enthuſiaſm, is able to put on every form of preternatural ſemblance. There are many well-atteſted caſes in modern hiſtory (although we ſhould agree that they have loſt nothing of the marvellous in the telling), where enthuſiaſts, in their extaſies, have talked very fluently in the learned languages, of which they had a very imperfect knowledge in their ſober intervals. "When I ſaw "(ſays the noble author of the *Characteriſtics*) the gentleman, who "has writ lately in defence of revived prophecy (and has ſince "fallen himſelf into the prophetic extaſies) lately under an *agita-* "*tion* (as they call it) uttering prophecy in a pompous Latin ſtyle, "of which out of his extaſy, it ſeems, he is wholly incapable, it "brought into my mind the Latin poet's deſcription of the Sibyl, "&c *." And it is remarkable, that inſtances of this kind have occurred ſo frequently, that Thyræus, a famous Popiſh exorciſt, as blinded as he was by the ſuperſtitious impiety of demoniacal poſſeſſions, has, in his *Directory*, expreſſly declared it to be the common opinion of his brotherhood, that the *ſpeaking ſtrange languages* is no certain ſign of a *poſſeſſion*, and warns the exorciſt againſt this illuſion †.

* Letter concerning Enthuſiaſm, § 6.

† De Dæmoniacis, c. xxii.

Now

Now were it generally believed that the *ſpeaking with ſtrange tongues* in the firſt ages of Chriſtianity, was a mere fleeting, tranſitory power, the bold licence of our times would be ready to conclude that it was much of the ſame kind with theſe feats of modern fanatics. For let us conſider how the matter would be thought to ſtand, on the repreſentation of this learned writer: a ſudden flaſh of lightning, under the fancied figure of *cloven-tongues*, kindles the firey imaginations of a number of enthuſiaſtic men, met together in a tumultuary aſſembly, and inflaming one another's fanaticiſm by mutual colliſion; and in this temper, *they began to ſpeak with tongues as the ſpirit gave them utterance.*

I ſhall therefore endeavour to ſhew, in the laſt place, that this new interpretation contradicts what SCRIPTURE itſelf expreſsly delivers of the USE and, by neceſſary inference, of the *duration* of this *gift of tongues* on the day of Pentecoſt.

The learned writer affirms, "that this knowledge was tranſitory, ſerving only for an occaſional ſign, and not intended for the uſe of the apoſtolic miſſion." Now Jeſus himſelf tells us, that it was intended for this uſe: who, on his leaving the world, comforts his diſciples with this promiſe:——*But ye ſhall receive* POWER, *after that the Holy Ghoſt is come upon you: and ye ſhall be* WITNESSES *unto me, unto the* UTTERMOST PART OF THE EARTH *, recorded by the evangelic writer, as an introduction to his narrative of the miraculous gift of tongues; which he conſiders as the completion of this promiſe; and that the *power to be received*, was the *power* then given: the uſe of which, as we ſee, was to enable the diſciples to become *witneſſes unto him, unto the uttermoſt part of the earth*. We find St. Paul had this *power*, not only in the fulleſt meaſure, but in a proportionable duration; for, endeavouring to moderate the exceſſive value which the Corinthians ſet upon *ſpiritual gifts*, he obſerves, that, with regard to the moſt ſplendid of them, the *gift of tongues*, he himſelf had the advantage of them all—

* Acts i. 8.

I thank

I thank my God (ſays he) *that I ſpeak with tongues more than you all* *. The occaſion ſhews that he conſidered this his acquirement as a *ſpiritual gift*: and his uſing the *preſent time*, ſhews that he boaſted of it as then in his poſſeſſion. But why did he ſpeak with more tongues than all of them? For a good reaſon; he was the peculiar apoſtle of the Gentiles; and was to preach the Goſpel amongſt remote and barbarous nations. Whom then ſhall we believe? Shall we take his word who promiſed the gift; ſhall we take his, on whom it was beſtowed; or ſhall we prefer to both, the conjectures of this learned and ingenious modern?

Would reaſon or the truth of things ſuffer us to be ſo compliant, we might concede to unbelievers all which they fancy the learned writer hath procured for them, "that the power of tongues was temporary, and, like the power of healing, poſſeſſed occaſionally," without being alarmed at any conſequence they will be able to deduce from it. For let it but be granted (and they muſt grant it, or prevaricate) that the gift of tongues returned as often as they had occaſion for it; and it is no great matter where the power reſided in the mean time.

But neither reaſon nor the truth of things will ſuffer us to be thus compliant. The power of healing or of working miracles (to which the learned writer compares the gift of tongues) is, during the whole courſe of its operation, one continued arreſt or diverſion of the general laws of matter and motion: it was therefore fitting that this power ſhould be given occaſionally. But the *ſpeaking with tongues*, when once the gift was conferred, became, from thenceforth, a natural power; juſt as the free and perfect uſe of the members of the body, after they have been reſtored, by miracle, to the exerciſe of their natural functions. Indeed, to have *loſt* the gift of tongues after this temporary uſe of it, would imply another miracle; for it muſt have been by actual deprivation, unleſs we ſuppoſe the apoſtles mere irrational organs through which divine ſounds

* c. xiv. ver. 18.—μᾶλλον γλώσσαις λαλῶν.

were

were conveyed. In a word, it was as much in the courſe of nature for an apoſtle, whom the Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecoſt had enabled to ſpeak a ſtrange language, ever afterwards to have the uſe of that language, as it was for the cripple, whom Jeſus had reſtored to the uſe of his limbs on the Sabbath-day, ever afterwards to walk, run, and perform all the functions of a man perfectly ſound and whole. In one thing, indeed, the power of healing, and of ſpeaking with ſtrange tongues coincided; as the diſciples could not heal at all times, ſo neither could they ſpeak at all times in what unknown dialect they ſhould chooſe to converſe: Yet when once, by the Holy Spirit, they had been enabled to ſpeak and underſtand a language, they could not but retain the uſe of it, with the ſame facility as if they had acquired it in the ordinary way of inſtruction. But the confuſion in this affair, and the learned perſon's embarras when he ſtates the queſtion, ariſe from not diſtinguiſhing, in theſe two caſes, between the *active power* and the *paſſive gift*. In healing, the apoſtles are to be conſidered as the workers of a miracle; in ſpeaking ſtrange tongues, as the perſons on whom a miracle is performed.

CHAP. IV.

THUS far with regard to this extraordinary deſcent of the Holy Ghoſt, as the GUIDE OF TRUTH. And this being as well the FIRST FRUITS as the TYPE and SEAL of all *inſpired knowledge*, the ſacred hiſtorian thought proper to give us a circumſtantial relation of ſo important an adventure.

The other endowments from the *ſpirit of truth* he hath mentioned only occaſionally. So that, had not the ſubject of one of St. Paul's epiſtles led the writer to enumerate thoſe various gifts, as they were afterwards diſtributed amongſt the faithful, we ſhould have had a very imperfect knowlege of their whole extent. The church of Corinth was fooliſhly elated by ſpiritual pride; which

St.

St. Paul endeavoured to mortify and humble: and in applying his remedy, he begins with reckoning up thoſe various graces, the credit of which they had abuſed, by their indulgence of this unhappy temper—*Concerning ſpiritual gifts* (ſays he) *I would not have you ignorant. Now there are diverſities of gifts, but the ſame ſpirit. To one is given by the ſpirit the* WORD OF WISDOM; *to another, the* WORD OF KNOWLEDGE *by the ſame ſpirit*; *to another, the* GIFTS OF HEALING *by the ſame ſpirit*; *to another,* WORKING OF MIRACLES; *to another,* PROPHECY; *to another,* DISCERNING OF SPIRITS *. And when he comes to apply his premiſſes, and to ſhew the inferiority of all theſe gifts to *charity*, he recapitulates the moſt diſtinguiſhed of them in the following manner:—*though I have the gift of* PROPHECY, *and underſtand all* MYSTERIES, *and all* KNOWLEGE; *and though I have all* FAITH *ſo that I could remove mountains, and have no charity, I am nothing* †.

In explaining the nature of theſe *gifts*, the two paſſages will afford light to one another.

The firſt he mentions, is the WORD OF WISDOM ‡. By which, I think, we muſt underſtand, *all the great principles of natural religion* §. The ancients uſed the term in this ſenſe: and we can hardly give it another, in the place before us, where we ſee it diſtinguiſhed from the WORD OF KNOWLEGE ||, which follows, and evidently means *all the great principles of the revealed*; the term γνῶσις being as peculiarly applied by Chriſtian writers to *revealed* Religion **, as σοφία is by the Pagan, to *natural:* and it is no leſs a generic term than the other, being mentioned in the next chapter,

* 1 Cor. xii. 1, & ſeq. † c. xiii. 2.

‡ Λόγος σοφίας.

§ In this ſenſe St. Paul uſes the word, Col. iv. 5. Ἐν σοφίᾳ περιπατεῖτε πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω.

|| Λόγος γνώσεως.

** St. Paul uſes it in this ſenſe, 2 Cor. xi. 6. Εἰ δὲ καὶ ἰδιώτης τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλ' οὐ τῇ ΓΝΩΣΕΙ. And St. Peter, 1ſt Ep. iii. 7. Οἱ ἄνδρες ὁμοίως, συνοικοῦντες κατὰ ΓΝΩΣΙΝ. From this term, thoſe early Heretics, who ſo much deformed the ſimplicity and purity of the Chriſtian faith by viſionary pretences to a ſuperior *knowledge* of Revelation, took their name.

with one of its ſpecies,—*all* MYSTERY *and all knowlege*: for *myſtery* is that part of *knowlege* which regards the interpretation of ſuch Jewiſh propheſies as concern the *new diſpenſation*. In a word, our apoſtle ſpeaking, in another place, of Chriſt, who perfected *Revelation*, built (from its firſt delivery and rudiments) on *natural Religion*, uſes the two terms in theſe aſſigned ſignifications.—*In whom* (ſays he) *are hid all the treaſures of* WISDOM *and* KNOWLEGE *.

In the recapitulation, FAITH, we ſee, is reckoned amongſt the gifts of the Spirit: and in the following chapter, where theſe graces are again mentioned, he explains its nature to us, in calling it a *Faith which could remove mountains*, or ſuch a *Faith* as was attended with the power of controlling nature; alluding to that want, with which Jeſus upbraids his diſciples, where he ſays,—*had ye Faith as a grain of muſtard-ſeed, ye ſhould ſay unto this mountain, Remove hence into yonder place, and it ſhall remove* †.

The two next gifts, of HEALING and WORKING MIRACLES, are two ſpecieſes of the foregoing genus. By *healing* is meant that ſalutary aſſiſtance adminiſtered to the ſick, in a ſolemn office of the church, as directed by St. James ‡: and by *working miracles*, a more private and extemporaneous exerciſe of the ſame power, though leſs confined in its objects §.

PRO-

* Ἐν ᾧ εἰσὶ πάντες οἱ θησαυροὶ τῆς ΣΟΦΙΑΣ καὶ τῆς ΓΝΩΣΕΩΣ ἀπόκρυφοι, Coloſſ. ii. 3. He uſes the word ἀπόκρυφοι, as having in the foregoing verſe called this *wiſdom and knowledge* τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ Θεοῦ. That the word σοφία is uſed in the ſenſe here contended for, is plain from his immediately ſubjoining a warning againſt vain philoſophy, βλέπετε μή τις ὑμᾶς ἔσται ὁ συλαγωγῶν διὰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας, &c. As much as to ſay, I preſent you with the treaſures of *true* wiſdom—οἱ θησαυροὶ τῆς σοφίας—take care that nobody deceive you with the *falſe*.

† Matt. xvii. 20.

‡ *Is any ſick among you? let him call for the Elders of the Church; and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord; and the prayer of Faith* [i.e. the *faith* mentioned juſt before] *ſhall ſave the ſick, and the Lord ſhall raiſe him up.* Gen. Epiſt. chap. v. 14.

§ The χαρίσματα ἰαμάτων properly expreſſes gifts belonging to the Church as ſuch, and ἐνεργήματα δυνάμεων implies virtue reſiding in the individual or particular Agent. Beſides

we

PROPHECY, which follows, plainly ſignifies, foretelling the future fortunes of the church, to the comfort and edification (as St. Paul expreſſes it) of the aſſembly. *He that* PROPHESIETH *ſpeaketh unto men, to edification, and exhortation, and comfort* *. And theſe effects, generally attending the act of *Prophecy*, in a little time aſſumed its name †. But the proper ſenſe of *Prophecy*, and that in which it is to be underſtood in this place, is the *foretelling things to come*; which Jeſus himſelf declares to be one eſſential part of the office of the Holy Spirit. *Howbeit, when the Spirit of truth is come, he will guide you into all truth—and he will* SHEW YOU THINGS TO COME ‡.

The laſt of theſe gifts, in the order of things, as well as in the apoſtle's enumeration of them, is the DISCERNING OF SPIRITS. The reputation attending the exerciſe of theſe extraordinary endowments would be a ſtrong temptation to impoſtors to mimic and belie their powers; as we ſee it was in the caſe of Simon the Magician. It graciouſly pleaſed the Holy Spirit, therefore, amidſt the bounty of theſe gifts, to beſtow one, whoſe property it was to bring all the others to the teſt §, by the virtue which the poſſeſſor of it had, of diſtinguiſhing between true and falſe inſpiration, where accidental ambiguity or deſigned impoſture had made the matter doubtful or ſuſpected.

Theſe gifts, St. Paul tells us, were ſeverally diſtributed amongſt the Faithful. But the apoſtles themſelves, as Scripture leads us to conclude, had them all in conjunction; exerciſed them in fuller

we may obſerve, *χαρίσματα ἰαμάτων* was a leſs degree of miraculous power than the *ἐνεργήματα δυνάμεων*, and is expreſsly intimated ſo to be, *ver.* 28.—*ἔπειτα δυνάμεις, εἶτα χαρίσματα ἰαμάτων.*

* 1 Cor. xiv. 3. † As Rom. xii. 6. 1 Cor. xiii. 9. xiv. 1. 24.

‡ John xvi. 13.—*καὶ τὰ ἐρχόμενα ἀναγγελεῖ ὑμῖν.*

§ *διακρίσεις πνευμάτων*—*διάκρισις* is uſed in other places in this ſignification—*μὴ εἰς διακρίσεις διαλογισμῶν*, Rom. xiv. 1.—*πρὸς διάκρισιν καλοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ*, Heb. v. 14.—*πνευμάτων*, of *ſpirits* or divine afflations. And ſo the Author uſes it, a little after, *πνεύματα προφητῶν*, c. xiv. 32.

measure; supported them by additional revelations *; and (as hath been proved of one of them at least) possessed them by a more lasting title.

But, for a fuller account of their *nature* and their *use*, we must have recourse to SCRIPTURE itself, which contains the history of their various fruits. And as the richest of these fruits is the INSPIRATION OF SCRIPTURE itself, I shall select this for the subject of what I have further to say of the primitive operations of the Holy Spirit; especially as this hath, in these *latter times*, been called in question.

CHAP. V.

WE may observe, that the Ministry of the Apostles consisted of these two parts: (1.) The temporary and occasional instructions of those Christians whom they had brought to the knowlege of, and faith in, Jesus, the Messiah: (2.) and the care of composing a WRITTEN RULE for the direction of the Church throughout all ages. Now it being granted, because, by the history of *the Acts of the Apostles*, it may be proved, that they were divinely inspired in the discharge of the temporary part; it must be very strong evidence indeed which can induce an unprejudiced man to suspect, that they were left to themselves in the execution of the other. Their preaching could only profit their contemporaries: For instructions conveyed to future ages by tradition are soon lost and forgotten; or, what is worse, polluted and corrupted with fables. It is reasonable therefore to think, that the church was provided with a WRITTEN RULE. The good providence of God hath indeed made this provision. And the Scriptures of the New Testament have been received

* *Now, Brethren, if I come unto you speaking with tongues, what shall I profit you, except I shall speak unto you either by* REVELATION, *or by knowledge, or by prophesying, or by doctrine*, 1 Cor. xiv. 6. And this additional gift of *Revelation*, which conveyed the further knowledge of God's will in the Gospel, seems properly to have been appropriated to the Apostles, with design to dignify their office.

by

by all the Faithful, as divine Oracles, as the inſpired dictates of the Holy Spirit; till ſuperſtition extending the notion of inſpiration to an extravagant length, over-cautious Believers joined with Libertines, who had taken advantage of the others' folly, to deny or bring in queſtion all inſpiration whatever. For extremes beget each other; and when thus begotten, they are ſuffered, in order to preſerve the balance of the *moral ſyſtem*, as frequently to ſupport as to deſtroy one another; that, while they ſubſiſt, each may defeat the miſchiefs which the other threatens; and when they fall, both of them may fall together.

I ſhall therefore take upon me to expoſe the extravagance of either folly; and then endeavour to ſettle the TRUE NOTION OF SCRIPTURE INSPIRATION.

1. We have ſeen how fully gifted the apoſtles were for the buſineſs of their miſſion. They worked miracles, they ſpake with tongues, they explained myſteries, they interpreted prophecies, they diſcerned the true from the falſe pretences to the Spirit: And all this, for the temporary and occaſional diſcharge of their miniſtry. Is it poſſible then, to ſuppoſe them to be deſerted by their divine Inlightener when they ſat down to the other part of their work; to frame a rule for the laſting ſervice of the church? Can we believe that that Spirit, which ſo bountifully aſſiſted them in their aſſemblies, had withdrawn himſelf when they retired to their private oratories: or that when their *ſpeech* was *with all power*, their *writings* ſhould convey no more than the weak and fallible dictates of human knowledge? To ſuppoſe the endowments of the Spirit to be ſo capriciouſly beſtowed, would make it look more like a mockery than a gift. And, to believe all this would be a harder task than what (the Deiſt tells us) religious credulity impoſes on us. No candid man therefore will be backward to conclude, that what powers the apoſtles had for the temporary uſe of their Miniſtry, they had, at leaſt in as large a meaſure, for the perpetual ſervice of the church.

2. St. Paul, where he recommends the ſtudy of the Scriptures of the Old Teſtament, to Timothy, expreſsly declares them to be INSPIRED, in that general propoſition, *All Scripture is given by inſpiration of God* *. Now if in the Moſaic diſpenſation, the written rule was *given by inſpiration of God*, where the church was conducted in every ſtep, at firſt by oracular reſponſes, and afterwards by a long ſeries and continued ſucceſſion of Prophets; and all this under an *extraordinary* adminiſtration of Providence, ſuch as might well ſeem to ſuperſede the neceſſity of a ſcriptural inſpiration; how confidently may we conclude, that the ſame divine Goodneſs would give the INFALLIBLE GUIDE of an inſpired Scripture to the Chriſtian Church, where the miraculous influence of the Holy Spirit is ſuppoſed to have ceaſed with the apoſtolic ages, and where the adminiſtration of Providence is only *ordinary?* Nor can it be ſaid, that what St. Paul predicates of *Scripture* muſt be confined to the LAW (whoſe very name indeed implies inſpiration), and what is prefatory to it: ſince the largeneſs of his terms, *all Scripture*, extends to the whole canon of the Old Teſtament, as then received by the two churches. And this general expreſſion was the more expedient, as the *hiſtoric* writings did not either by their nature, like the *Prophetic*, or by their name, like the *Legal*, neceſſarily imply their coming immediately from God. The Canonical books of the OLD Teſtament, therefore, being inſpired, Reaſon directs us to expect the ſame quality in the NEW. And, as in the *Old*, amongſt ſeveral occaſional writings, there was the fundamental record, or the GREAT CHARTER of the Pentateuch; and in the Volumes of the Prophets, the Oracular predictions of the future fortunes of the Church to the FIRST coming of the Meſſiah; ſo, in the *New*, there is, beſides the occaſional Epiſtles, the authentic Record or GREAT CHARTER of the Goſpel-Covenant; and in the Revelations of St. John, the ſame divine predictions continued to the SECOND coming of the Saviour of the world.

* 2 Tim. iii. 16.

3. The

3. The reaſon of the thing likewiſe ſupports us in concluding for this inſpiration. An univerſal Rule of human conduct implies as unlimited an obedience: the nature of ſuch a Rule requiring it to be received entire; and to be obſerved in every article. But when once it is ſuppoſed to come to us, though from heaven, yet not immediately, but through the canal of an uninſpired inſtrument, liable to error both in the receiving and in the diſpenſing of it, men would be perpetually tempted to own juſt as much as, and no more than, they liked to believe, or were diſpoſed to practiſe; and to reject the reſt as a mere human impoſition. Nay the very reaſons which the writers againſt this inſpiration give us, why it is not afforded, ſeem to ſhew the neceſſity why it ſhould: ſuch as the imperfect knowledge that the Apoſtles had of the genius of Chriſtianity; their diſputes and differences with one another; their miſtakes in matters of eaſy prevention, though of little conſequence, &c. for if the compoſers of a *Rule of Faith* for the univerſal Church were thus naturally defective in hiſtoric and religious knowledge, What ſecurity could we have for their not miſleading us in things of moment, unleſs prevented by the guard and guidance of the Holy Spirit, while they engaged themſelves in this important taſk?

I am enough ſenſible of the weakneſs and folly of that kind of reaſoning which concludes from *right* to *fact*; and aſſumes, that becauſe a thing is imagined to be expedient, uſeful, or neceſſary in God's moral Government, that therefore he hath indeed made proviſion for it. Thus the Papal Doctors, in their arguments for the *ſtanding power of Miracles* and the appointment of an *infallible guide*, having endeavoured to ſhew that the firſt is neceſſary for thoſe *without*, and the ſecond for thoſe *within*, would draw us to conclude with them, that the *true church* hath, in fact, the exerciſe and uſe of MIRACLES and INFALLIBILITY.

But the caſes are widely different. It is by no means agreed, that the Church, after the apoſtolic ages, was in the poſſeſſion of ſo large a portion of the Holy Spirit as to enable either this pretended HEAD, or its MEMBERS, to exert the powers in queſtion: Whereas it

it is confeſſed by all, that at the time theſe Scriptures were written, the compoſers of them were divinely inſpired for the occaſional work of the miniſtry: and the only queſtion in diſpute is, whether that Spirit which aided them in defending the goſpel before the tribunals of Kings and Magiſtrates *—in working miracles before the multitude of Unbelievers—and in prophecying and explaining myſteries to the aſſemblies of the faithful whether this Spirit, I ſay, did accompany, or deſert them, when they retired within themſelves, to compoſe a RULE OF FAITH for the perpetual ſervice of the Church?

4. But, laſtly, we have the clear teſtimony of Scripture for this inſpiration. And though the *bearing witneſs to itſelf* † might be reaſonably objected in an argument addreſſed to Unbelievers, yet being here inforced againſt ſuch of the faithful who doubt or heſitate concerning the inſpiration of the New Teſtament, it hath all the propriety we can deſire.

I venture therefore to ſay, that St. Paul, in the general propoſition quoted above, which affirms that *all Scripture is given by inſpiration of God* ‡, neceſſarily includes the ſcriptures in queſtion; what it predicates of *all Scripture* taking in the *new* as well as *old*; as well that which was to be written, as that which was already collected into a canon. For the term, *Scripture*, as the context leads us to underſtand it, is general, and means a religious rule, perfect in its direction, for the conduct of human life, in belief and practice: it being under this idea that he recommends the *Scriptures* to Timothy. The aſſertion therefore is univerſal, and amounts to this, "That *divine inſpiration* is an eſſential quality of every *Scripture*, which conſtitutes the LAW or RULE of a religion coming from God."

* *And when they bring you unto the Synagogues, and unto Magiſtrates and Powers, take ye no thought how or what thing ye ſhall anſwer, or what ye ſhall ſay: for the Holy Ghoſt ſhall teach you in the ſame hour what ye ought to ſay.* Luke xii. 11, 12.

† *If I bear witneſs of myſelf, my witneſs is not true.* John v. 31.

‡ Πᾶσα γραφὴ θεόπνευστος, &c.

On

On the whole then, we conclude, that *all the Scriptures of the New Teſtament were given by inſpiration of God.* And thus the prophetic promiſe of our bleſſed Maſter, that the *Comforter ſhould abide with us for ever*, was eminently fulfilled. For though, according to the promiſe, his ordinary influence occaſionally aſſiſts the faithful of all ages, yet his conſtant abode and ſupreme illumination is in the ſacred Scriptures of the New Teſtament *.

* The late Mr. William Law, who obſcured a good underſtanding by the fumes of the rankeſt enthuſiaſm, and depraved a ſound judgment, ſtill further, by the prejudices he took up againſt all ſobriety in religion, ſeized the above paragraph, as he found it detached from the diſcourſe in a quotation made of it, by an ingenious writer; and thus deſcants upon it: "Dr. Warburton's doctrine is this, that the inſpired books of the "New Teſtament is the Comforter or *ſpirit of truth and illuminator*, which is meant by "Chriſt's being always with the Church. Let us therefore put the Doctor's doctrine into "the letter of the text, which will beſt ſhow how true or falſe it is. Chriſt ſaith, *If any "man love me, my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with "him.* That is, according to the Doctor's theology, certain books of Scripture will "come to him, and make their abode with him; for he expreſly confineth the *conſtant "abode* and *ſupreme illumination* of God to the holy Scriptures. Therefore (horrible to "ſay) God's inward preſence, his OPERATING POWER OF LIFE and light in our ſouls, "his dwelling in us, and we in him, is ſomething of a lower nature, that only may occaſionally happen, and has leſs of God in it than the dead letter of Scripture, which "alone is the *conſtant abode* and *ſupreme illumination.* Miſerable fruits of a paradoxical genius!"——*A humble, earneſt, and affectionate addreſs to the Clergy*, p. 69, 70.

This poor man, whether miſled by his fanaticiſm or his ſpleen, has here fallen into a trap which his folly laid for his malice. In the diſcourſe, from whence the paragraph ſo ſeverely handled is taken, I treated diſtinctly of theſe two branches of the Holy Spirit; 1. As he *illuminates the underſtanding* under the title of the *Spirit of truth.* 2. As he *rectifies the will* under the title of the *Comforter*: by the firſt of which, he *eſtabliſhes our faith*; and by the ſecond, he *perfects our obedience.*

Now it is under the firſt branch in which this obnoxious paragraph is found. So that common ſenſe and common honeſty require, that when I ſay, the *conſtant abode and ſupreme illumination of the Holy Spirit is in the Sacred Scriptures of the New Teſtament*, I ſhould be underſtood to mean, that he is there only as the *illuminator of the underſtanding*, the *eſtabliſher of our faith.* But Mr. Law applies my words to the other branch of his office, as the *rectifier of the Will*, the *perfecter of obedience*; and ſo makes my obſervation nonſenſe in order to arraign it of impiety.

CHAP. VI.

IT remains only to be conſidered, in what ſenſe we are to underſtand this *inſpiration?*

A ſpurious opinion, begotten in the Jewiſh church by ſuperſtition, and nurſed up by miſtaken piety in the Chriſtian, hath almoſt paſſed into an article of faith, "That the language of Scripture was dictated by the holy Spirit in ſuch ſort that the writers were but the paſſive organs through which every word and letter were conveyed." And as ſuperſtition ſeldom knows where to ſtop, the Mahometans improved upon this fancy, and repreſented their Scriptures as ſent them down from Heaven ready written. Having got into ſo fair a train, the next theological queſtion in honour of the Alcoran was, whether it was *created* or *uncreated*; and the orthodox determination, we may be ſure, was in favour of the latter. But it was a rabbinical hyperbole, concerning the unvariable reading of the copies of the law, which ſeems to have given the Mahometan doctors a hint for this laſt conceit, concerning the phyſical nature of the Alcoran *.

But there are many objections to that idea of organic inſpiration, which miſtaken piety hath adopted.

1. It would be putting the holy Spirit on an unneceſſary employment; for much of theſe ſacred volumes being hiſtorical, and of facts and diſcourſes which had fallen under the obſervation of the writers, they did not need his immediate aſſiſtance to do this part of their buſineſs for them.

* Orobio, ſpeaking the language of the Rabbins, ſays,—Liber Moſis eſt ita perfectus et purus, atque ab erroribus alienus, ab ejus conditore per tot ſecula variis in nationibus ſervatus, ut *cætera naturalia* quæ Deus non corruptioni expoſita *creavit*; ut Cœli, Sol et Aſtra, quæ a ſua formatione non majore Providentia incorrupta, ſervantur et ſubſiſtunt, quam divini legis libri, qui nunquam aliquam mutationem experti fuerunt. Apud Limb. p. 147.

2. Had

2. Had the Scriptures been written under this organic inſpiration, there muſt have been the moſt perfect agreement amongſt the four Evangeliſts, in every circumſtance of the ſmalleſt fact. But we ſee there is not this perfect agreement. In ſome minute particulars, which regard neither faith nor manners, neither the truth nor certainty of the Hiſtory in general, the ſeveral writers vary from one another. A variation, which, though it diſcredits the notion of an organic inſpiration, yet (which is of much more importance) ſupports the fidelity of the hiſtorians; as it ſhews that they did not write in concert, or copy from one another; but that each deſcribed the proper impreſſions which the ſame facts had made upon himſelf.

3. Were this the true idea of Scripture-inſpiration, that each writer was but the mere organ of the Spirit, the phraſeology or turn of expreſſion had been one and the ſame throughout all the ſacred books written in the ſame language: whereas we find it to be very different and various; always correſponding to the conditions, tempers, and capacities of the writers.

4. Laſtly, the very words of Scripture muſt, in this caſe, have been preſerved, throughout all ages, perfectly pure and free from the corruptions and miſtakes of tranſcribers. For if it were expedient, uſeful and ſorting with the views of divine wiſdom, that every word and letter ſhould be inſpired, it was equally expedient that every word and letter ſhould be preſerved uncorrupt; otherwiſe the holy Spirit would appear to have laboured in vain. Now general experience aſſures us, that this is not the caſe; frequent tranſcribing hath occaſioned numerous variations in words and phraſes throughout all the Scriptures of the New Teſtament. But though this oppoſes the notion of organic inſpiration, yet the harmleſs nature of the variations, which never diſturb the ſenſe, nor obſcure a ſingle propoſition of Faith, or precept of good manners, affords us a noble inſtance of the gracious providence of God, in bringing down to us thoſe Scriptures, deſtined for an *infallible rule*, incorrupt and entire, in all eſſential and even material

points; though after eſcaping the impure hands of ſo many outrageous bigots, ſchiſmatic viſionaries, and heretical ſeducers, they had a long journey ſtill to run, through the dark cloiſters of dreaming ſuperſtition, and of ignorance but half awake.

From all this we conclude, that the notion of organic inſpiration muſt needs be falſe: and yet we have proved it to be an undoubted truth, that the Scriptures of the New Teſtament were *given by the inſpiration of God.*

CHAP. VII.

LET us conſider then, in what ſenſe this inſpiration is to be underſtood.—From the premiſes we can deduce no other notion of it but this, "That the Holy Spirit ſo directed the pens of theſe writers that no conſiderable error ſhould fall from them:—by enlightening them with his immediate influence in all ſuch matters as were neceſſary for the inſtruction of the Church, and which, either through ignorance or prejudice, they would otherwiſe have repreſented imperfectly, partially, or falſely; and by preſerving them by the more ordinary means of providence, from any miſtakes of conſequence, concerning thoſe things whereof they had acquired a competent knowledge by the common way of information. In a word, by watching over them inceſſantly; but with ſo ſuſpended a hand, as permitted the uſe, and left them to the guidance, of their own faculties, while they kept clear of error; and then only interpoſing when, without this divine aſſiſtance, they would have been in danger of falling."

This ſeems to be the true idea of the inſpiration in queſtion. This only doth agree with all appearances; and will fully anſwer the purpoſe of an inſpired writing, which is to afford an INFALLIBLE RULE for the direction of the Catholic Church.

But

But it is not only the nature and genius, the ſtate and condition of Holy Scripture, which ſupport this idea of inſpiration: the expreſs words of its compoſers lead to the ſame concluſion. St. Peter, ſpeaking of the Epiſtles of his fellow-labourer St. Paul, uſes this temperate expreſſion concerning their inſpiration; he hath written to you, ſays he, *according to the wiſdom given unto him* *: now, as on the one hand, by the character of this *wiſdom*, which is ſaid to be GIVEN, we muſt conclude it to be *that wiſdom coming immediately from above*; ſo, from this account of the Apoſtle's free uſe of it, who employed it as the regulator of his thoughts and conceptions, we muſt conclude on the other, that there was no inſpiration ruling irreſiſtibly, further than to ſecure the writer from error and miſtake. And the diffidence with which the Apoſtle himſelf ſpeaks, on a certain occaſion †, concerning his inſpiration, ſhews that it could not be organic, for this ſpecies excludes all doubt and uncertainty concerning its preſence.

But it may be ſaid, that, on this moderated idea of inſpiration, we ſhall never be able to diſtinguiſh which parts were written under the immediate influence of the Spirit, and which were the product of human knowledge only. What if we ſhall not? Where is the miſchief or inconvenience? While all we want to know is, that every ſentence of Scripture, which but remotely concerns either faith or practice, is infallibly true. It is of little conſequence to us to be inſtructed how or in what manner that truth came to be ſecured: whether by direct inſpiration: or by that virtual ſuperintendence of the Spirit, which preſerved the writers of it from error. Scripture is the rule of Chriſtian conduct; and if the rule be known to be unerring, this is all that is wanting to effectuate its end.

And yet I am perſuaded, licentious men have been the forwarder to contend for this moderated inſpiration, under the idea of a *partial*

* ΚΑΤΑ τὴν αὐτῷ ΔΟΘΕΙΣΑΝ σοφίαν——2 Pet. iii. 15.

† δοκῶ δὶ κἀγὼ πνεῦμα Θεοῦ ἔχειν. 1 Cor. vii. 40.

tial one, on the pleaſing fancy that it would ſupport them in believing no more than ſuited with their principles or their practice. But, what hath been obſerved on this head ſufficiently expoſes the vanity of all ſuch idle contrivances to let men looſe from any part of their faith or duty. For, be it admitted that this or that particular doctrine or precept was not delivered under the immediate influence of the Holy Spirit, but was conveyed to poſterity, in the common way of hiſtory, as the writer received it from his maſter, yet this takes nothing at all from that certainty of truth which attends directer inſpiration; ſince the rational idea of a *partial* influence implies, that the Spirit ſo watched over the authors of the New Teſtament, and ſo guided their pens, as to admit no mixture of material error in thoſe parts where they diſcharged no more than the function of ordinary hiſtorians.

In a word, it imports us little to be ſolicitous about the Scriptural DELIVERY of Goſpel truths; whether they be conveyed to us by means merely human, or by the more powerful workings of the Holy Spirit, ſo long as we are aſſured that divine Providence guarded that delivery from all approach of error. But then let us obſerve that this is a very different thing from the ORIGINE of the truths themſelves: for on this latter, the reality of our religion, indeed, depends; the very nature of it conſiſting in this, that the doctrines which it teacheth be not only truths SIMPLY, but truths REVEALED from Heaven. And indeed, even with regard to the *delivery*, when the writers propoſe any thing of *faith* or *practice*, explanatory of what their maſter taught, and not explicitly contained in his words, we muſt needs conclude, that ſo far forth they were under the immediate direction of the Holy Spirit, who was *to teach them all things:* and this influence the Apoſtle calls, *ſpeaking by revelation* *.

Thus we ſee the advantages reſulting from a PARTIAL INSPIRATION as here contended for and explained. It anſwers all the ends

* ἐὰν μὴ ὑμῖν λαλήσω ἐν ΑΠΟΚΑΛΥΨΕΙ. 1 Cor. xiv. 6.

of

of a Scripture univerſally and organically inſpired, by producing an UNERRING RULE of Faith and Manners; and, beſides, *obviates* all thoſe objections to *inſpiration* which ariſe from the too high notion of it: ſuch as trifling errors in circumſtances of ſmall importance; for the leaſt error is inconſiſtent with organic inſpiration, but may well ſtand with a virtual and cooperating influence: ſuch again, as the various readings in the ſeveral tranſcripts; and the various ſtyles amongſt the ſeveral authors of Scripture: inconſiſtencies which would never have been permitted, and contrarieties which could never have happened, under univerſal inſpiration; but which are the natural and harmleſs conſequences of the PARTIAL.

In a word, by admitting no more than this lower kind of inſpiration, ſo warmly contended for (and in terms as vague and indeterminate as the Scepticiſm of the uſers) by men who were in hopes that the admiſſion of it would end in no inſpiration at all, we ſecure and eſtabliſh the infallible word of Scripture; and free it from all thoſe embarraſſing circumſtances which have been ſo artfully and diſingenuouſly thrown out to its diſcredit.

CHAP. VIII.

BUT there is no idea of an inſpired Scripture which libertine men have not perverted to ſerve their evil purpoſes. Thus, when their own idea of a *partial inſpiration* hath failed in this ſervice, they have tried what miſchief that other, of our invention, an *organic inſpiration*, was likely to produce. In order to this, they have laid it down as a propoſition not likely to be conteſted, "that, on this idea, the work inſpired could be no other than a perfect model of eloquence, *pure*, *clear*, *noble*, *and affecting beyond the force of common ſpeech*." To this, it was thought enough to ſhew, that their

their principle was falſe; that, in the compoſition of ſacred Scripture, there was *no organic inſpiration:* and this, I preſume, I have ſufficiently performed.

But, luckily for their purpoſe, there is another circumſtance in the diſpenſation of Grace, which reſtores their objection, concerning *a perfect model of eloquence*, to its native force. This circumſtance therefore is now to be conſidered; the uſe made of it, fairly repreſented; and the proper reaſoning applied, to enervate its new recovered force.

The circumſtance is this: Several books of the New Teſtament are written by perſons who acquired the knowledge of the Greek tongue by miraculous infuſion, as at the day of Pentecoſt. "Now the Holy Ghoſt, ſay they, could not but inſpire the pureſt Greek, and the moſt perfect eloquence in the uſe of it; whatever they wrote therefore in any future time, in this language, muſt needs bear theſe marks of its celeſtial birth, whether they were aſſiſted in the compoſition by the Holy Spirit, or whether they wrote upon the fund of their formerly acquired knowledge. But the language of all the books of the New Teſtament is utterly rude and barbarous, and ſavours nothing of ſo high an original."

The learned perſon (whoſe reaſoning againſt the duration of the inſpired knowledge of language on the day of Pentecoſt, hath been conſidered above) lends the Libertine theſe arms, in his concluding argument, in ſupport of that notion; which argument I have reſerved to be conſidered in this place.

"If we allow (ſays he) the gift to be laſting, we muſt conclude "that ſome at leaſt of the books of Scripture were in this inſpired "Greek. But (ſays he) we ſhould naturally expect to find an in- "ſpired language to be ſuch as is worthy of God; that is, pure, "clear, noble, and affecting, even beyond the force of common "ſpeech; ſince nothing can come from God but what is perfect in "its kind. In ſhort, the purity of Plato, and the eloquence of "Cicero. Now (continues he) if we try the apoſtolic language "by this rule, we ſhall be ſo far from aſcribing it to God, that

"we

" we ſhall ſcarce think it worthy of Man, that is, of the liberal " and polite; it being utterly rude and barbarous, and abounding " with every fault that can poſſibly deform a language. And " though ſome writers, prompted by a falſe zeal, have attempted " to defend the purity of the Scripture-Greek, their labour has been " idly employed *."

Theſe triumphant obſervations are founded on two propoſitions, both of which he takes for granted, and yet neither of them is true.

1. The one, That an inſpired language muſt needs be a language of perfect eloquence.

2. The other, That eloquence is ſomething congenial and eſſential to human ſpeech. I ſhall ſhew the falſehood of both.

With regard to the firſt propoſition, I will be bold to affirm, that were the STYLE of the New Teſtament exactly ſuch as his very exaggerated account of it would perſuade us to believe, namely, that it *is utterly rude and barbarous, and abounding with every fault that can poſſibly deform a language*, this is ſo far from proving ſuch language not divinely inſpired, that it is one certain mark of this original.

I will not pretend to point out which books of the New Teſtament were or were not compoſed by thoſe who had the Greek tongue thus miraculouſly infuſed into them; but this I will venture to ſay, that the ſtyle of a writer ſo inſpired, who had not (as theſe writers had not) afterwards cultivated his knowledge of the language on the principles of Grecian eloquence, would be preciſely ſuch as we find it in the books of the New Teſtament.

For, if this only be allowed, which no one, I think, will conteſt with me, that a ſtrange language acquired by illiterate men, in the ordinary way, would be full of the idioms of their native tongue, juſt as the Scripture-Greek is obſerved to be full of Syriaſms and Hebraiſms; how can it be pretended, by thoſe who reflect upon

* Dr. Middleton's *Eſſay on the Gift of Tongues*, Works, vol. II. p. 91.

the nature of language, that a ſtrange tongue divinely infuſed into illiterate men, like that at the day of Pentecoſt, could have any other properties or conditions?

Let us weigh theſe caſes impartially. Every language conſiſts of two diſtinct parts; the ſingle terms, and the phraſes and idioms. The firſt, as far as concerns appellatives eſpecially, is of mere arbitrary impoſition, though on artificial principles common to all men: The ſecond ariſes inſenſibly, but conſtantly, from the manners, cuſtoms, and tempers of thoſe to whom the language is vernacular; and ſo becomes, though much leſs arbitrary (as what the Grammarians call *congruity* is more concerned in this part than in the other), yet various and different as the ſeveral tribes and nations of mankind. The firſt therefore is unrelated to every thing but to the genius of language in general; the ſecond hath an intimate connexion with the faſhions, notions, and opinions of that people only, to whom the language is native.

Let us conſider then the conſtant way which illiterate men take to acquire the knowledge of a foreign tongue, Do they not make it their principal, and, at firſt, their only ſtudy, to treaſure up in their memory the ſignification of the terms? Hence, when they come to talk or write in the ſpeech thus acquired, their language is found to be full of their own native idioms. And thus it will continue, till by long uſe of the ſtrange tongue, and eſpecially by long acquaintance with the owners of it, they have imbibed the particular genius of the language.

Suppoſe then this foreign tongue, inſtead of being thus gradually introduced into the minds of theſe illiterate men, was inſtantaneouſly infuſed into them; the operation (though not the very mode of operating) being the ſame, muſt not the effect be the ſame, let the cauſe be never ſo different? Without queſtion. The divine impreſſion muſt be made either by fixing the terms or ſingle words only and their ſignification in the memory; as for inſtance, Greek terms correſponding to the Syriac or Hebrew; or elſe, together with that ſimple impreſſion, another muſt be made, to inrich the mind

mind with all the ideas which go towards the compoſing the phraſes and idioms of the language ſo inſpired: But this latter impreſſion ſeems to require, or rather indeed implies, a previous one, of the tempers, faſhions, and opinions of the people to whom the language is native, upon the minds of thoſe to whom the language is thus imparted; becauſe the phraſe and idiom ariſes from and is dependent on the manners ariſing from thence: and therefore the force of expreſſion can be underſtood only in proportion to the knowledge of thoſe manners: and underſtood they were to be: the Recipients of this ſpiritual gift being not organical Canals, but rational Diſpenſers. So that this would be a waſte of miracles without a ſufficient cauſe; the Syriac or Hebrew idiom, to which the Diſciples were enabled of themſelves to adapt the words of the Greek or any other language, abundantly ſerving every uſeful purpoſe, all which centered in the communicating of CLEAR INFORMATION. We conclude, therefore, that what was thus inſpired was the TERMS, together with that grammatic congruity in the uſe of them, which is dependant thereon. In a word, to ſuppoſe ſuch kind of inſpired knowledge of *ſtrange tongues* as includes all the native peculiarities, which, if you will, you may call their *elegancies* (for the more a language is coloured by the character and manners of the native uſers, the more elegant it is eſteemed); to ſuppoſe this, is, as I have ſaid, an ignorant fancy, and repugnant to reaſon and experience.

Now, from what hath been obſerved, it follows, that if the ſtyle of the New Teſtament were indeed derived from a language divinely infuſed as on the day of Pentecoſt, it muſt be juſt ſuch, with regard to its ſtyle, which, in fact, we find it to be; that is to ſay, Greek terms very frequently delivered in Syriac and Hebrew idiom.

The concluſion from the whole is this, that a *nominal* or *local* barbarity of ſtyle (for that this attribute, when applied to ſtyle, is no more than nominal or local, will be clearly ſhewn under our

next head) is ſo far from being an objection to its miraculous acquiſition, that it is one mark of ſuch extraordinary original.

But the learned writer is ſo perfectly ſatisfied that this *barbarity* of ſtyle, which claims the title of inſpired, is a ſure mark of impoſture, that he almoſt ventures to foretel, it will prove the deſtruction of thoſe pretenſions, as it did to the *Delphic Oracles*. The parallel, he thinks, is a *curioſity*; and ſo do I; therefore the reader ſhall have it juſt as he himſelf has dreſſed it up. "It is ſomewhat "*curious* to obſerve, that there was a controverſy of the ſame kind "amongſt the Ancient Heathens concerning the ſtyle and compoſi- "tion of the *Delphic Oracles*. For as thoſe Oracles were delivered "in verſe, and the verſes generally rude and harſh, and offending "frequently both in the exactneſs of metre and propriety of lan- "guage, ſo men of ſenſe eaſily ſaw that *they could not be inſpired* "*by the Deity*: others, on the contrary, blinded by their prejudices, "or urged by their zeal, to ſupport the credit of the popular ſu- "perſtition, conſtantly maintained, that the verſes were really "beautiful and noble, and worthy of God; and that the contrary "opinion flowed from a falſe delicacy and ſickly taſte, which re- "liſhed no poetry, but what was ſoft and ſweet; and breathing "nothing, as it were, but ſpices and perfumes. The diſpute "however ſeems to have been compounded, and a diſtinction found, "in which all parties acquieſced, by allowing *ſome ſort of inſpira-* "*tion, and divine authority to the matter of the Oracle*, but leaving "all the reſt *to the proper talents and faculties of the Prophetеſs*: who "being tired at laſt with the continual labour of verſifying, began "to utter her Oracles in proſe, till the whole impoſture fell by de- "grees into an univerſal contempt, and ſo finally expired *."

A ſad ſtory! But, happily, the eſſential differences between theſe *oracular* pretenſions, and thoſe of the Chriſtian Evangeliſts (all of which the learned Writer has thought proper to overlook), will eaſe us of our fears; for any one of theſe differences is ſufficient to

* *Eſſay on the Gift of Tongues*, vol. II. of Middleton's Works, p. 91, 92.

ſhew,

ſhew, that though the objection may hold good againſt the Heathen Oracles, yet it has not the leaſt force againſt Scripture inſpiration.

1. Firſt then the *Delphic Oracles* were ſuppoſed to proceed from the fabled *God of verſe*, who having, according to the popular opinion, inſpired his *Poets* as well as *Prophets*, there was, in the writings of the moſt authentic of the *former*, a model of divine eloquence, on which the pretenſions of the *latter* might be eſtimated. But Scripture inſpiration came profeſſedly from a Deity who had declared that *his thoughts are not our thoughts, neither are our ways his ways. For as the heavens are higher than the earth*, &c *.

2. The Delphic Oracles were delivered in *verſe* or *meaſure*; for the compoſition of which, there were eſtabliſhed rules, formed on the writings of the ancient Poets: when therefore this ſpecies of eloquence was employed by the Delphic Propheteſs, if ſhe conformed not to the eſtabliſhed rules, but *offended againſt the metre*, which her own God originally inſpired, ſhe might be fairly adjudged an impoſtor. But the inſpired Penman diſclaimed all models of human eloquence, and *the enticing words of man's wiſdom.*

3. The Delphic Propheteſs was a *mere organ*, her Prophecies being delivered in a fit of extacy, when the *preſence* of the God was ſuppoſed to obliterate all the impreſſions of human ideas; ſo that every iota was to be placed to the account of the inſpiring God. But it was juſt otherwiſe with ſuch as were actuated by the Holy Spirit: Theſe, in the very moments of inſpiration, ſtill retained the free uſe of themſelves, and continued maſters of their rational and perſuaſive faculties; *the Spirits of the Prophets* (as St. Paul informs us, who ſpoke from his own experience,) *were ſubject to the Prophets* †! The Pagan Zealots therefore groſsly prevaricated, when, to cover the impoſture of the *Delphic Oracle*, they compromiſed the matter with their adverſaries, *by allowing ſome ſort of inſpiration, and divine authority, but leaving all the reſt to the proper talents and faculties of the Propheteſs.* But the Defenders of our holy Religion,

* Iſaiah, lv. 8, 9.

† 1 Cor. xiv. 32.

when

when they ſay the ſame thing in defence of ſacred Scripture, do neither prevaricate nor compromiſe; they advance, and they adhere to, a reaſonable and conſiſtent hypotheſis; which, in an examination of the preſent ſtate of the books of the New Teſtament as tranſmitted down to us from the earlieſt antiquity, I have ſhewn to be actually ſupported by fact.

On the whole then, we need not be too much alarmed at the hint which the learned Writer hath here given us, in the fate of the *Delphic Oracles*, though never ſo tragically related:—*The Propheteſs, tired at laſt with the continual labour of verſifying, began to utter her oracles in* PROSE, *till the whole impoſture fell by degrees into an univerſal contempt, and ſo finally expired*; I ſay we need not be much alarmed at this cataſtrophe, becauſe our Oracles hold nothing in common with the *Delphic*; and becauſe the diſgrace brought upon theſe was derived neither from their *bad verſe* nor *barbarous proſe*; but from very different cauſes; which the learned Perſon either did not know, or at leaſt did not care that his Reader ſhould.

In a word, there is but one ſingle mark of reſemblance in all this oſtentatious parallel; and that does not lie between the Pagan and Chriſtian Oracles, but between their Defenders; who, with equal indiſcretion, contended for purity, elegance, and beauty of ſtyle, where in one caſe it was not to be found, though pretended to; and in the other, neither pretended to, nor found. The defenders of the *Delphic Oracles*, the learned Perſon thus deſcribes, *that, blinded by their prejudices, or urged by their zeal to ſupport the credit of the popular ſuperſtition, they conſtantly maintained, that the verſes were really beautiful and noble, and worthy of God; and that the contrary opinion flowed from a falſe delicacy, and ſickly taſte, which reliſhed no poetry, but what was ſoft and ſweet, and breathing nothing but ſpices and perfumes.* The Defenders of Scripture eloquence he had before repreſented in the ſame light.—*And though ſome Writers, prompted by a falſe Zeal, have attempted to defend the purity of Scripture-Greek, their labours have been idly employed.*

Nothing,

Nothing, indeed, is more certain. Their labours have been very idly employed. One common deluſion has miſled the zealous defenders of all religions on this head, not only the *Pagan* and the *Chriſtian*, but, as we have ſeen, the *Mahometan* likewiſe. And here let me obſerve, what is well worth our notice, that that common imbecillity of our nature, which leads the profeſſors of all Religions into the ſame ſpecific abſurdities of the *marvelous*, though without imitating one another, has (when blundering on, in the obſcure of Superſtition, or the blind blaze of Fanaticiſm) generally been more ſucceſsful in the ſupport of falſe Religion than of the true. Of this I have occaſionally given divers inſtances elſewhere. One of them, which I juſt now chanced to mention, will deſerve to be explained. The Mahometan Doctors were (with their Maſter) under this common deluſion, that an inſpired writing muſt needs be a perfect model of eloquence. And they ſucceeded better than the Chriſtian; for they had advantages which our zealots had not. For firſt, Mahomet himſelf delivered the Alcoran to his followers under this character; and defied the Maſters of human eloquence to equal it; whereas the writers of holy Scripture diſclaim all theſe fantaſtic advantages. Secondly, when Mahomet retailed his Alcoran, there was no acknowleged model of Arabic eloquence; but when the books of the New Teſtament were compoſed, there were many, and of the higheſt authority; ſo that thoſe bold pretenſions eaſily obtained, and ſoon ſmoothed the way for its actually becoming ſuch a model. Laſtly, Enthuſiaſm, which had juſt done much greater things, eaſily induced the Saracens to believe, that they ſaw what their Prophet ſo confidently objected to their admiration, an all-perfect model of eloquence in the Chapters of the Alcoran. And they believed ſo long till the book became in fact, what at firſt they had only fancied it, as real and ſubſtantial a pattern of eloquence as any whatſoever; a paradox, which, like many others that I have had the odd fortune to advance, will preſently be ſeen to be only another name for Truth. But here in the North-

weſt,

weſt, our enthuſiaſm is neither ſo exalted, nor our habits ſo conſtant. We have neither the knack of perſuading ourſelves ſo readily, nor the humour of ſticking to a faſhion ſo obſtinately.

However fooliſh then our *falſe Zealots have ſhewn themſelves in attempting to defend the purity of the Scripture Greek*, it little became the learned Writer, of all men, to make them the ſubject of his deriſion; ſince the *ſame falſe principle*, which betrayed them into one extreme, hath miſled him into another. The principle I mean (and it has miſled many beſides) is that which lays it down for truth, *That an inſpired Scripture muſt be a model of perfect eloquence.*

CHAP. IX.

THIS brings us to the learned Writer's *ſecond* propoſition, which I promiſed to examine; and on which the principle, here delivered, is founded. It is this,

2. That eloquence is ſomething congenial and eſſential to human ſpeech; and inherent in the conſtitution of things.

This ſuppoſes, that there is ſome certain ARCHETYPE in nature, to which that quality refers, and on which it is to be formed and modeled. And, indeed, admitting this to be the caſe, one ſhould be apt enough to conclude, that when the Author of Nature condeſcended to inſpire one of theſe plaſtic performances of human art, he would make it by the exacteſt pattern of the *Archetype.*

But the propoſition is fanciful and falſe. Eloquence is not congenial or eſſential to human ſpeech, nor is there any Archetype in nature to which that quality refers. It is accidental and arbitrary, and depends on cuſtom and faſhion: It is a mode of human communication which changes with the changing climates of the earth; and is as various and unſtable as the genius, temper, and manners of its diverſified inhabitants. For what is PURITY but the uſe of

ſuch

ſuch terms, with their multiplied combinations, as the intereſt, the complexion, or the caprice of a Writer or Speaker of Authority hath preferred to its equals? What is ELEGANCE but ſuch a turn of idiom as a faſhionable fancy hath brought into repute? And what is SUBLIMITY but the application of ſuch images, as arbitrary or caſual connexions, rather than their own native grandeur, have dignified and ennobled? Now ELOQUENCE is a compound of theſe three qualities of Speech, and conſequently muſt be as nominal and unſubſtantial as its conſtituent parts. So that that mode of compoſition, which is a model of *perfect eloquence* to one nation or people, muſt appear extravagant or mean to another. And thus in fact it was. Indian and Aſiatic Eloquence were eſteemed hyperbolic, unnatural, abrupt, and puerile, to the more phlegmatic inhabitants of Rome and Athens. And the Weſtern Eloquence, in its turn, appeared nerveleſs and effeminate, frigid or inſipid, to the hardy and inflamed imaginations of the Eaſt. Nay, what is more, each ſpecies, even of the moſt approved genus, changed its nature with the change of clime and language; and the ſame expreſſion, which, in one place, had the utmoſt *ſimplicity*, had, in another, the utmoſt *ſublime*.

Longinus reading theſe words in the Septuagint, *God ſaid, Let there be light, and there was light*, and regulating his ideas on the genius of his own language, very acutely gave them as an example of the *ſublime*. We may be ſure the judgment of ſo accompliſhed a Critic would be eagerly laid hold on by our Doctor's *zealous Divines*, to exalt the credit of Moſes's elocution. Indeed, the ſublime introduction to the book of Geneſis paſſed, for a long time, unqueſtioned. At length Huetius and Le Clerc, more carefully attending to the original text, diſcovered that the words were ſo far from being *ſublime*, that they were of the utmoſt *ſimplicity*; and each of theſe Critics compoſed a long diſſertation to ſupport his opinion. So far was well; but not content with what they had done, they would needs prove that Longinus was miſtaken in his criticiſm of the Greek. This provoked the Poet Boileau, who had

juſt tranſlated that celebrated work, to ſupport his Author's judgment; and (as he was in the ſame deluſion with his adverſaries) he did it by endeavouring to prove the ſublime of the original expreſſion. This furniſhed matter for anſwers and replies in abundance: Whereas, had the diſputants but reflected, that the ſame expreſſion, which in one language was highly *ſublime*, might, in another, be extremely *ſimple*, the judgment of the Greek critic would have been confeſſed by Huetius and Le Clerc, and the biblical knowlege of theſe two learned Interpreters allowed of by Boileau. As the reaſon of all this ſerves to illuſtrate what is here advanced concerning *the nature of eloquence*, I ſhall endeavour to explain it. The ideas ariſing from the knowlege of the true God, and his attributes, were familiar to Moſes; and whenever ideas are familiar they raiſe no emotion; conſequently the expreſſion of ſuch ideas will naturally be cold and ſimple. There is the utmoſt ſimplicity in the words—*God ſaid, Let there be light, and there was light:* and nothing but their ſimplicity would be ſeen or felt by a Jewiſh Reader, to whom the ſame religious ideas were equally familiar. But let a Greek, brought up and educated in the groveling and puerile notions which his national Theology produced and ſupported, let ſuch a one, I ſay, raiſe himſelf with pain, by the ſtrong effort of a ſuperior genius,

"To the firſt Good, firſt Perfect, and firſt Fair,"

the new ideas, with which his mind is warmed and enlarged by the knowlege of the true God and his Attributes, naturally produce admiration; and admiration in a Genius, is the parent of *ſublime* expreſſion. So that when the ſubject is Creation, his point will be to convey the higheſt idea of Omnipotence: but the effect of divine power, immediately following its volition, gives that higheſt idea: therefore, in the midſt of his ſublime conceptions, he will hardly think of any other words to convey them than—*God ſaid, Let there be light, and there was light.* And every Greek Reader, to whom the ideas of true Theology were as novel and unfamiliar as they were

were to the Writer, would naturally eſteem that expreſſion, which ſo graphically deſcribes the inſtantaneous production of Omnipotence, to be infinitely SUBLIME.

Apply all this to the Books of the NEW TESTAMENT, an authoriſed collection, profeſſedly deſigned for the rule and direction of mankind. Now ſuch a rule demanded that it ſhould be inſpired of God. But inſpired writing, the Objectors ſay, implies the moſt *perfect eloquence.* What human model then was the Holy Ghoſt to follow? And a human model, of arbitrary conſtruction, it muſt needs be, becauſe there was no other: Or if there were another, it would never ſuit the purpoſe, which was to make an impreſſion on the minds and affections; and this impreſſion, ſuch an eloquence only as that which had gained the popular ear could effect. Should therefore the *eaſtern* eloquence be employed? But this would be too inflated and gigantic for the *Weſt.* Should it be the *weſtern?* But this would be too cold and torpid for the *Eaſt.* Or ſuppoſe the *generic* eloquence of the more poliſhed Nations was to be preferred, Which *ſpecies* of it was to be employed? The rich exuberance of the Aſiatic Greeks, or the dry conciſeneſs of the Spartans? The pure and poignant eaſe and flowing ſweetneſs of the Attic modulation, or the ſtrength and grave ſeverity of the Roman tone? Or ſhould all give way to that African torrent, which aroſe from the fermented mixture of the dregs of Greece and Italy, and ſoon after overflowed the Church with theological conceits in a ſparkling luxuriancy of thought, and a ſombrous rankneſs of expreſſion? Thus various were the ſpecieſes! all as much decried by a different Genus, and each as much diſliked by a different Species, as the eloquence of the remoteſt Eaſt and Weſt, by one another.

But it will be ſaid, Are there not ſome more ſubſtantial principles of eloquence, common to all?—Without doubt, there are.—Why then ſhould not theſe have been employed, to do credit to the Apoſtolic inſpiration? For good reaſons: reſpecting both the Speaker and the Hearers. For what *is* eloquence but a perſuaſive turn given to the elocution to ſupply that inward, that conſcious perſuaſion of

the Speaker, ſo neceſſary to gain a fair hearing? But the firſt Preachers of the Goſpel did not need a ſuccedaneum to that inward conſcious perſuaſion! And what is the *end* of eloquence, even when it extends no further than to thoſe more general principles, but to ſtifle reaſon, and inflame the paſſions? But the propagation of Chriſtian Truths indiſpenſably requires the aid of Reaſon, and requires no other human aid. And Reaſon can never be fairly and vigorouſly exerted but in that favourable interval which precedes the appeal to the paſſions. Theſe were the cauſes which forced the Maſters of Eloquence to confeſs, that the utmoſt perfection of their art conſiſts in keeping it concealed; for that the oſtentation of it ſeemed to indicate the abſence of Truth—*Ubicunque ars oſtendatur*, ſays the moſt candid and able of them all, *veritas abeſſe videatur* *. Hence ſo many various precepts to make their moſt artificial periods appear artleſs. Now ſurely that was a very ſuſpicious inſtrument for Heaven-directed Men, which, to preſerve its credit, muſt pretend abſence, and labour to keep out of ſight.

What, therefore, do our ideas of fit and right tell us is required in the *ſtyle* of an univerſal Law? Certainly no more than this—To employ thoſe aids which are common to *all* Language as ſuch; and to reject what is peculiar to *each*, as they are caſually circumſtanced. And what are theſe aids but CLEARNESS and PRECISION? By theſe, the mind and ſentiments of the Compoſer are intelligibly conveyed to the Reader. Theſe qualities are eſſential to language, as it is diſtinguiſhed from jargon: they are eternally the ſame, and independent on cuſtom or faſhion. To give a language *clearneſs*, was the office of Philoſophy; to give it *preciſion*, was the office of Grammar. Definition performs the firſt ſervice by a reſolution of the ideas which make up the terms; Syntaxis performs the ſecond by a combination of the ſeveral parts of ſpeech into a ſyſtematic congruity: theſe are the very things in language which are leaſt poſitive, as being conducted on the principles of Metaphyſics and Logic.

* Quint. l. ix. c. 3.

Whereas,

Whereas, all beſides, from the very power of the elements, and ſignification of the terms, to the tropes and figures of Compoſition, are arbitrary; and, what is more, as theſe are a deviation from thoſe principles of Metaphyſics and Logic, they are frequently vicious. This, the great Maſter, quoted above, freely confeſſeth, where ſpeaking of that ornamented ſpeech, which he calls σχήματα λέξεως, he makes the following confeſſion and apology — "eſſet "enim omne Schema VITIUM, ſi non peteretur, ſed accideret. "Verum auctoritate, vetuſtate, conſuetudine, plerumque defendi- "tur, ſæpe etiam RATIONE QUADAM. Ideoque cum ſit a ſimplici "rectoque loquendi genere deflexa, *virtus* eſt, ſi habet PROBABILE "ALIQUID quod ſequatur *."

Now theſe qualities of *clearneſs* and *preciſion*, ſo neceſſary to the communication of our ideas, eminently diſtinguiſh the writers of the New Teſtament; inſomuch that it might be eaſily ſhewn, that whatever difficulties occur in the ſacred volumes, they do not ariſe from any imperfection in the mode of conveying their ideas, occaſioned by this local or nominal *barbarity of ſtyle*; but either from the ſublime or obſcure nature of the things conveyed to the reader by words; or from the purpoſed conciſeneſs of the writer; who, in the occaſional mention of any matter unrelated, or not eſſential, to the diſpenſation, always affects a ſtudied brevity.

But further; ſuppoſe that, in ſome caſes, an authentic Scripture, deſigned for a religious rule, demanded this quality of local eloquence (for that, in general, it is not required, I have fully ſhewn above); let this, I ſay, be ſuppoſed, yet ſtill it would not affect the caſe in hand, ſince it would be altogether unſuitable to the peculiar genius of the GOSPEL. It might eaſily be known to have been the purpoſe of Providence (though ſuch purpoſe had not been expreſly declared), that the Goſpel ſhould bear all the ſubſtantial marks of its divine Original; as well in the circumſtances of it's promulgation, as in the courſe of it's progreſs. To this end, the

* Quint. l. ix. c. 3.

appointed

appointed Miniſters of it's conveyance were perſons, mean and illiterate, and choſen from amongſt the loweſt of the people; that when Sceptics and Unbelievers ſaw the world converted by the *fooliſhneſs of preaching*, as the learned Apoſtle, in great humility, thinks fit to call it, they might have no pretence to aſcribe the ſucceſs, to the parts, the ſtation, or the authority of the Preachers. Now had the language, infuſed into theſe illiterate men, been the ſublime of Plato, or the eloquence of Tully, Providence would have appeared to counteract it's own meaſures, and defeat the purpoſe beſt calculated to advance it's glory. But *God is wiſe, though man's a fool.* And the courſe of his Wiſdom was here, as every where elſe, uniform and conſtant. It not only choſe the weakeſt Miniſters of his Will, but kept out of their hands that powerful weapon of *contorted* words, which their adverſaries might ſo eaſily have wreſted to the diſhonour of the Goſpel. So much was Dr. Middleton miſtaken, when beſides *clearneſs* (which he might be allowed to expect), he ſuppoſes *purity*, *nobleneſs*, and pathetic *affection*, to be qualities inſeparable from an inſpired writing. St. Paul, who, amongſt theſe ſimple inſtruments, was, for the ſame wiſe purpoſes, made an exception to the general choice, yet induſtriouſly proſecuted that ſublime view, for the ſake of which the choice was made; by rejecting all other weapons but thoſe of the Spirit, to ſpread abroad the Conqueſts of the Son of God. *My ſpeech* (ſays he) *and my preaching was not with inticing words of man's wiſdom, but in the demonſtration of the Spirit and of Power.* As much as to ſay, "My ſucceſs was not owing to the ſophiſtical eloquence of Rhetoricians, but to the ſupernatural powers, with which I was endowed, of interpreting Prophecies and working Miracles." He ſubjoins the reaſon of his uſe of theſe means—*that their faith ſhould not ſtand in the wiſdom of men, but in the power of God*; i. e. Be converted not by force of Philoſophy and Eloquence, but of the ſupernatural gifts of the Spirit: *Therefore* (ſaith he again) *God hath choſen the fooliſh things of the World to confound the wiſe; and the weak things of the World*

World to confound the mighty *. And leſt it ſhould be ſaid, that this was an affectation of deſpiſing advantages which they themſelves could not reach, it pleaſed Providence that this declaration ſhould be made, not by one of the more ſordid and idiotic of the number: but by Him, to whom both nature and diſcipline had given powers to equal even the heights of Greek and Roman elocution. For we ſee, by what now and then accidentally flames out in the fervor of his reaſoning, that he had a ſtrong and clear diſcernment, a quick and lively imagination, and an extenſive and intimate acquaintance with thoſe Maſters in moral painting, the Greek Sophiſts and Philoſophers: all which he proudly ſacrificed to the glory of the *everlaſting Goſpel*. Nor does he appear to have been conſcious of any inconſiſtency between an *inſpired language* and it's *local barbarity of ſtyle*: for having had occaſion, in this very Epiſtle, to remind the Corinthians of the abundance of ſpiritual grace beſtowed upon him, he ſays, *I thank my God, I ſpeak with tongues more than you all* †; and yet he tells them that he is *rude in ſpeech* ‡. Which apparent inconſiſtency the reader may accept, if he pleaſes, for a further proof of the truth of what has been above delivered, concerning the natural condition of an inſpired language.

Thus we ſee, how unſuitable this quality of *local* eloquence would be to the peculiar genius of the Goſpel. Yet as there is, in the Old Teſtament, much of this ornament of ſtyle, and more imagined, it may not be improper to explain the reaſon of this diverſity, and ſhew how conſiſtent the uſe of it is, in thoſe places, with the principles already laid down.

1. Firſt, then, we may obſerve that Judaiſm was not an *univerſal* religion, but inſtituted for the uſe of a ſingle people; ſo that none of the inconveniencies mentioned above of a *local eloquence* could ariſe from the uſe of it in that religion.

* 1 Cor. ii. 4.

† 1 Cor. xiv. 18.

‡ 2 Cor. xi. 6.

2. The

2. The Jewiſh religion had a *public part* *; and conſequently abounded in ſuch Rites and Ceremonies, to which an ornamented ſtyle was well adapted.

3. The ſubjects of ſeveral of the Books of the Old Teſtament are in their nature *poetical*, ſeveral *rhetorical*, and ſo ſeem to have demanded a Style ſuitable to their genius.

CHAP. X.

AND now enough hath been ſaid to make a juſt eſtimate of the value of thoſe objections which two celebrated writers † have inforced, with all their art and addreſs, againſt the inſpiration of the New Teſtament, from it's local barbarity of ſtyle. Dr. Middleton's objection hath been conſidered already. I ſhall chuſe to cloſe this firſt part of my diſcourſe with an examination of that ſtill more ingenious objection of the noble Author of the CHARACTERISTICS; who hath employed all the powers of his wit and eloquence to expoſe the want of theſe qualities in the ſacred Volumes.

—— "It is NO OTHERWISE (ſays his Lordſhip) in the gram-
"matical art of Characters and PAINTED SPEECH than in the art
"of painting itſelf. I have ſeen, in certain Chriſtian Churches,
"an ancient piece or two, affirmed, on the ſolemn faith of prieſtly
"tradition, to have been *angelically* and divinely wrought by a ſu-
"pernatural hand and ſacred pencil. Had the piece happened to
"be of a hand like Raphael's, I could have found nothing certain
"to oppoſe to the tradition. But having obſerved the whole STYLE
"and manner of the pretended heavenly workmanſhip, to be ſo in-
"different as to vary, in many particulars, from the *truth of art*,

* See Div. Leg. Book V.

† Dr. Middleton and Lord Shafteſbury.

"I pre-

" I preſumed, within myſelf, to beg pardon of the tradition, and " aſſert, *confidently*, that *if the pencil had been heaven-guided it could* " *never have been ſo lame in it's performance:* it being a mere con- " tradiction to all divine and moral truth, that a *celeſtial hand*, ſub- " mitting itſelf to the rudiments of a human art, ſhould ſin againſt " the art itſelf, and expreſs falſehood and error inſtead of juſtneſs " and proportion *."

This tale of *St. Luke's painting*, like the ſtory of the DELPHIC ORACLES, needs no application. Every one ſees that it is given to diſcredit the inſpiration of holy Scripture. But as *confidently* as his Lordſhip ſays, he draws his concluſions from it, he gives them no other ſupport than this miſtaken conceit, which he erects into an axiom: *That it is no otherwiſe in the grammatical art of characters and painted ſpeech than in the art of painting itſelf:* or, in other words, that the *painted ſpeech of Characters* which repreſent ideas, and the *painted images of things*, are performances of the ſame kind. Now, in examining their natures by the principles of human ſpeech, before laid down and explained, it appears that they are of very different kinds, having nothing in common but the office of giving information, *truly* and *clearly*; one of them by repreſenting the images of corporeal things; the other by repreſenting the incorporeal ideas of the ſpeaker's or writer's mind. And what thing is there, in art or nature, which does not hold ſomething in common with another? But the difference between *theſe* is indeed no leſs than between things NATURAL and things POSITIVE, between conſtitutional and arbitrary; *painting* being IMITATION, and WORDS only SYMBOLS. The ſubject of the *firſt*, conſtant, unvariable, neceſſary; as having it's archetype in nature: the other unſtable, ſhifting, and capricious, as depending for it's exiſtence on the human will, under the direction of fancy and caprice. In PAINTING there is, properly ſpeaking, but *one true ſtyle*, and that is an exact imi-

* Charact. viii. p. 230.

t tion of nature. In SPEECH there are as many true ſtyles as there are tempers and humours, cuſtoms and faſhions, amongſt men. Eloquence, *or truth of ſtyle*, in ſpeaking or writing, being nothing elſe but the adapting the terms of human ſpeech to the various conceptions, fancies, and affections of the hearers; ſo that, as in *painting* there is but one true ſtyle, and that REAL, becauſe an imitation of nature; in *ſpeech* there are many true ſtyles, but all FANTASTIC, becauſe all are the creatures of arbitrary faſhion.

The noble Author himſelf ſeemed to ſuſpect that theſe two things had but a ſlender connexion in *nature*, and therefore endeavoured to ſtrengthen the tie by *art*. Hence his figurative expreſſions of PAINTED SPEECH, for *writing*, in order to clap up a forced alliance between writing and painting; and, on the contrary, STYLE, for manner of painting; to bring painting and writing related. A favourable Critic may poſſibly ſay, that the noble Writer had no other purpoſe, in the uſe of theſe elegant figures, than to ornament his language. Perhaps not. It is then only a remarkable example of the truth of an obſervation made above: "that the principal end of eloquence, as it is employed in human affairs, is to miſlead reaſon, and to cajole the fancy and affections."

On the whole then, all the concluſion we can reaſonably draw from this noble Author's remarks on HEAVENLY WORKMANSHIP in *painting* and in *ſpeech*, is only this, that if an inſpired Painter were to give us a Picture, it would indeed equal or excel the pencil of Raphael; becauſe here was a *real Archetype* to work by, that is to ſay, NATURE: but, if we may credit Reaſon, whoſe dictates, I am ſorry to ſay, are not always thoſe of his Lordſhip, an inſpired Writer would receive no more aſſiſtance from Heaven in his expreſſion, than what was neceſſary to give his ſpeech the eſſential qualities of all language, namely, CLEARNESS and PRECISION; becauſe here was no *real archetype* to follow; the various modes of eloquence being moſtly fantaſtic, as exiſting only in capricious cuſtom; and therefore unworthy the notice of a divine Inſpirer.

I have

I have now gone through the firſt part of my Diſcourſe; which propoſed to conſider the Office and Operations of the Holy Spirit as THE GUIDE OF TRUTH, who clears and enlightens the Underſtanding. In this part, I have endeavoured to vindicate his firſt Deſcent and his inſpiration of holy Scripture; I have diſtinguiſhed the mode of that inſpiration; I have explained the character of an inſpired language; I have inquired into the nature of human eloquence, and have carefully examined the force of our free Reaſoners, on every one of theſe diſtinct heads.

A

DISCOURSE

ON THE

OFFICE AND OPERATIONS

OF THE

HOLY SPIRIT.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

I NOW proceed to the ſecond branch of my Diſcourſe, which is, to conſider the Holy Spirit under the idea of THE COMFORTER, who purifies and ſupports the Will.

And here, his divine power manifeſted itſelf in the ſame miraculous Operations. Sacred Antiquity is very large and full in its accounts of the ſudden and entire change made by the Holy Spirit, in the diſpoſitions and manners of thoſe whom it had enlightened; inſtantaneouſly effacing all their evil habits, and familiarizing their practice to the performance of every virtuous and pious action.

To

To this illuſtrious and triumphant conviction of the truth of Chriſtianity, the very enemies and perſecutors of our holy Faith have been forced to bear witneſs: not only in the ſerious accounts which ſome * of them have given of the innocence and virtue of PRIMITIVE CHRISTIANITY; but even in the mockery and ridicule of others †, on the ſubject of the boaſted virtue of water-baptiſm; which was then commonly accompanied with, and ſometimes preceded by, theſe extraordinary effuſions of grace from the *Comforter*. "Come here (ſay theſe unhappy Libertines) and ſee the amazing efficacy of Chriſtian-baptiſm! whoever is immerged in this water, though before, he were an adulterer, a practiſed thief or murderer, riſes cleanſed and purified from all his crimes; and commences, on the inſtant, a life of temperance, of juſtice, and of charity." Thus did theſe impious ſcorners endeavour to diſguiſe their chagrin at the triumphs of the Spirit, over Vice and Paganiſm, by a ſarcaſtic parody of the grateful exultations of the Chriſtian Paſtors. In truth, it was all they had to ſay; for, after this, they were reduced to ſeek a forced conſolation in the poſſibility that ſome NATURAL CAUSE had produced ſo extraordinary a phænomenon.

It may be worth while, therefore, to enquire whether any ſuch cauſe can be reaſonably aſſigned.

The enemies of our Faith hope to find it in FANATICISM and SUPERSTITION, the two Paſſions which the ſtrong impreſſion of a *new* Religion begets, by it's HOPES and FEARS, on the mind of man.

Let us ſee, whether either, or both of theſe, will account for ſo *ſudden* and *laſting* a converſion, from vice and corruption, to a life of ſanctity and virtue.

SUPERSTITION, which only depraves the Reaſon without making any impreſſion on thoſe faculties of the mind that moſt incline the Will to a new bias, never effects any conſiderable change in the

* Pliny the younger, Suetonius, Tacitus, &c.

† Celſus, Julian, &c. ●

MANNERS. It's utmoſt force is but juſt enough to perſuade us, that an exact attention to the officious ceremonies of Religion will be of force to ſecure us from the evils denounced againſt vice and immorality; or, at leaſt, that ſome tranſient acts of penitence, as the approaches of Death alarm us, will be ſufficient to entitle us to the reward of a pure and well-ſpent Life.

FANATICISM, indeed, ſhakes and agitates the mind with greater violence: and by inſtigating thoſe faculties which moſt influence the Will, frequently forces the Manners from their bent; and ſometimes effaces, or obſcures, the ſtrongeſt impreſſions of cuſtom and nature. But this extraordinary fervour, though always violent, is rarely laſting: never ſo long as to turn the new Syſtem into a habit. So that when its rage ſubſides, as it very ſoon does, but where it drives the unhappy victim into downright madneſs, the late impreſſed bias on the Will keeps abating, till all the former habitudes recover their relaxed tone.

This is confirmed, not only by the general Hiſtory of paſt Fanaticiſm, but likewiſe of the preſent, where we commonly ſee the final iſſue of a ſudden converſion to be, either a return to an open profligacy of manners, or a deep hypocritical diſſimulation of them.

But now if we look into the hiſtory of thoſe early Converts, we ſhall find that their Virtue, from the very firſt impreſſion of it, had all the eaſe, ſobriety, and moderation of a ſettled habit; in this they perſevered; and adding *grace to grace*, they went on, through life, in one conſtant tenor, from the firſt baptiſmal profeſſion of their Faith by water, to the laſt awful confirmation of it in their blood. A dreadful period! when Nature, by the very ſhock, and in the ſtruggle, it then ſuffers, becomes enabled to diſſipate all the fumes of *mental*, as it is frequently obſerved to do, of *corporeal* intoxication. This it did, in the famous caſe of the virtuous SAVANAROLA of Florence: whoſe ſtory is ſo finely told by Guicciardini in the ſecond and third books of his Hiſtory. This Man, a genuine Fanatic, if ever there were any, had aſſumed the perſonage of

of a Prophet and inſpired Preacher. A Character which he had long and ſucceſsfully ſuſtained; taken up amidſt the diſtreſſes and diſtractions of his Country, and, without doubt, occaſioned by them. But loſing his credit in the new Revolutions of Italy, and being brought by his enemies to the ſtake, he died, after having diſavowed his pretenſions, on the rack, he died, I ſay, ſullen and ſilent, without any remaining ſymptom of his former Enthuſiaſm.

Nor could this ſudden converſion of the firſt Chriſtians be the effect of MERE rational conviction. We know it to be morally impoſſible for Reaſon, however refined and ſtrengthened by true Philoſophy, to root out, on the inſtant, the inveterate habits of Vice. All that this magiſterial Faculty can do is, by conſtantly repeating her dictates, and inforcing her concluſions, gradually to win over the Will; till, by little and little, the mind accuſtoms itſelf to another ſet of ideas, productive of other practices and other habits. A work of time and labour! as thoſe good men have ſufficiently experienced, who, on a mere rational conviction, have attempted and perfected a change in their lives and manners. When therefore we ſee the deepeſt impreſſions of evil cuſtom, and the darkeſt ſtains of corrupted nature, thus ſuddenly wiped out and effaced, to what muſt we aſcribe ſo total a reform but to the all-powerful operation of Grace?

But it may be objected, "That there are inſtances where Enthuſiaſm alone hath kept men ſteady in the practice of that virtue which a certain fanatic turn of mind firſt recommended." Doubtleſs there have been many good people, who, either through the weakneſs of their reaſon, or the force of their more refined paſſions, have been hurried into fanatic fervours, which have ſupported and confirmed them in their previous innocence of manners. But even here we have ſufficient marks to diſtinguiſh theſe better ſorts of Enthuſiaſts, from ſuch of the firſt Chriſtian Confeſſors, who were in the happy circumſtance of being *found* innocent, when they were led into the practice of all virtue by the Holy Spirit: whoſe office, as we have ſaid, conſiſted in this gracious combination, to enlighten the underſtanding,

derſtanding, and to rectify the will. Now, that genial ſplendour which conducted the firſt Chriſtians into the knowledge of *all truth*, ſufficiently diſcloſed the divine Inſpirer of *all righteouſneſs*. But we ſee none of that *ſhining light* ordained and employed to gild the *good works* of Grace, in the morals of innocent Enthuſiaſts. On the contrary, we often find a more than ordinary ignorance; and ſometimes, even an incapacity of making rational concluſions.

Thus was the firſt part of the promiſe to *ſend the* COMFORTER, fulfilled.

CHAP. II.

THE other part, that HE SHOULD ABIDE WITH US FOR EVER, comes next to be conſidered. We have obſerved how this likewiſe hath been verified by the ſure depoſite of the *Spirit of Truth* in ſacred Scripture. Yet this is not the whole of the completion. His preſent influence, together with the fruits of the paſt, make the entire ſubject of the promiſe. Hence we conclude that he abides with *the Church for ever*, as well PERSONALLY in his office of *Comforter*, in ſupporting the Will, as VIRTUALLY in his office of *Enlightener*, in directing the Underſtanding.

The only queſtion will be, whether, from the primitive ages down to theſe latter times, he hath continued to exerciſe either part of his office in the ſame extraordinary manner in which he entered upon it, when his deſcent on the Apoſtles was accompanied with all the ſenſible marks of the Divinity.

And this, as it tends to the deciſion of more than one important queſtion (not only the ſuperſtitious claim of CHURCH-MIRACLES, but the fanatic pretences to DIVINE INFLUENCE) ſhould be conſidered more at large.

But here, I ſhall venture to invert the method of thoſe Divines, who, in their inquiries concerning God's Diſpenſations, endeavour to

to prove thoſe ſuppoſed facts, which they have preconceived, from the *fitneſs* which they pretend to have diſcovered; that is, having determined of what is *fit* for God to do; they, on the credit of this, maintain that he hath done it. On the contrary, I deem it more rational, as well as modeſt, firſt to enquire of Scripture what God hath done: and, when that is known, it will be then time enough to explain the *fitneſs* of his doings.

Let us ſee now, what holy Scripture hath delivered concerning the DURATION of the extraordinary endowments of the Holy Spirit: Which, whether they reſted in the Recipient, and manifeſted themſelves in *Grace and Knowlege* tranſcending the powers of humanity; or whether they extended outwards, in the *gifts of healing*, to the relief of others' infirmities, may, with equal propriety, be called and be accounted MIRACULOUS. In the one caſe, the *gifted* perſon was paſſive; in the other, active.

Now the Holy Spirit, by the mouth of Paul, has, I preſume, determined this queſtion for us, where, in the paſſage quoted before, on another occaſion, he recapitulates the various prerogatives of the Apoſtolic age. This deciſive paſſage is in theſe words—*Charity never faileth: but whether there be* PROPHECIES, *they ſhall fail; whether there be* TONGUES, *they ſhall ceaſe; whether there be* KNOWLEGE, *it ſhall vaniſh away* *.

It was the Apoſtle's purpoſe, in this place, to exalt CHARITY above all other Chriſtian Graces; and therefore, having, in the preceding words, ſhewn its ſuperiority to the reſt, from its QUALITIES and attributes; he proceeds to urge the advantage ſtill further, from the conſideration of its DURABILITY——*Charity never faileth, &c.*

The queſtion is, Whether the ſuperior *duration*, here aſcribed to *Charity* over *Prophecies*, *Tongues*, and *Knowlege*, reſpects only the progreſs of the Goſpel HERE; or whether it extends to the completion of it in its triumphant ſtate, HEREAFTER? The common

* 1 Cor. xiii. 8.

opinion is, that it reſpects another life; ſupported, as ſhould ſeem, by the Apoſtle's inforcing his argument on this obſervation, that *now we ſee through a glaſs darkly; but then face to face: now we know in part; but then ſhall we know even as we are known* *; where the different condition of the *two ſtates* are plainly ſet in oppoſition to one another.

But the other ſenſe appears to me to be the true; and gives us the Apoſtle's meaning to this effect: "The virtue of *Charity* is to accompany the Chriſtian Church throughout all its ſtages here on earth; whereas the gifts of *prophecy*, of ſtrange *tongues*, of ſupernatural *knowlege*, are only tranſitory graces, beſtowed upon the Church during its infirm and infant ſtate, to manifeſt its divine birth, and to ſupport it againſt the deluſions and the Powers of darkneſs."

As the words, conſidered in this ſenſe, convey a moſt important Doctrine, viz. *the ceſſation of the miraculous operations of the Holy Spirit after the eſtabliſhment of the Chriſtian faith*, and as this perhaps is the only expreſs declaration of it, recorded in ſacred Scripture; I ſhall endeavour to ſupport my interpretation by conſiderations drawn from its coherence, in this ſenſe, and in this ſenſe only, with what precedes and follows in the courſe of the Apoſtle's argument.

The Church of Corinth, though abundantly enriched with all divine Graces, would not yet ſuffer the Holy Ghoſt to do his *perfect work*, in the enlargement of the heart by univerſal benevolence: but, elated with SPIRITUAL PRIDE (whoſe property is not to bear with thoſe who differ from us, and to deſpiſe thoſe who are beneath us in ſublime attainments), ſplit and divided themſelves into oppoſite Sects and Factions: And this unhappy ſituation not only rendering all their endowments vain and fruitleſs, but reflecting diſhonour on the *Giver of all good things*, the Apoſtle addreſſes himſelf to expoſe their folly with the utmoſt of his force and vigour of reaſoning.

* 1 Cor. xiii. 12.

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He proves the ſuperior excellence of *Charity* above all other ſpiritual graces whatſoever, both in its QUALITIES and its DURATION. The *firſt three verſes* * of his argument declare that the other graces without Charity, are neither of uſe nor ornament in the Chriſtian life: The *next four* † ſpecify the ſuperior qualities of Charity: and the *remaining ſix* ‡ (of which, the words in queſtion make the *firſt* §), conſider Charity under the ſingle advantage of its continuance, when all thoſe other graces, with which they were ſo fooliſhly elated, ſhould be withdrawn. *Charity never faileth: but whether there be Prophecies, they ſhall fail; whether there be Tongues, they ſhall ceaſe; whether there be Knowlege, it ſhall vaniſh away.* In the next two verſes || he gives the reaſon, *For we know in part, and we prophecy in part, but when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part ſhall be done away.* As much as to ſay: When that CHRISTIAN LIFE, the lines of which are marked out by the Goſpel, ſhall, by the vital powers of CHARITY on which it is erected, arrive to its full vigour and maturity, then thoſe temporary aids of the Holy Spirit (ſuch as *Tongues*, *Prophecy*, and *Knowlege*, beſtowed with a purpoſe to ſubdue the prejudices and ſcepticiſm of thoſe without, and to ſupport the weakneſs and infirmities of thoſe within; and given too, but imperfectly, in proportion to the defects of the human Recipients) ſhall, like the ſcaffolding of a Palace now compleated, be taken down and removed. And to ſhew, that the loſs of theſe things will be no longer regretted, when the Church hath advanced from a ſtate of Infancy to Manhood, in the ſteady exerciſe of the CHRISTIAN LIFE OF CHARITY, he illuſtrates this truth by an elegant ſimilitude—*When I was a Child, I ſpake as a Child, I underſtood as a Child: but when I became a man, I put away Childiſh things* **. Yet no one will be ſo abſurd to ſuppoſe that it was the Apoſtle's intention to diſgrace theſe ſpiritual Gifts by ſo

* Ver. 1, 2, 3.
† Ver. 4, 5, 6, 7.
‡ Ver. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13.
§ Ver. 8.
|| Ver. 9, 10.
** Ver. 11.

low a compariſon? It was the ABUSE of them only (to which theſe Corinthians were ſo prone) that was deſigned to be corrected by it.

But the Apoſtle, having repreſented theſe extraordinary gifts to be as defective in themſelves as they are contemptible in their abuſe, thought fit to add, that this defect did not proceed from any penurious influx of the Holy Spirit, but from the narrowneſs of the human recipient; the paſſages to the Soul being ſo clogged up with corporeal obſtructions, as to be unable to convey to the Senſory any more than an oblique glimpſe of the SOVEREIGN GOOD: But that, when we have ſhaken off this mortal incumbrance, and regained the regions of light and liberty, we ſhall then intuitively comprehend the whole œconomy both of NATURE and of GRACE. *For now* (ſays he) *we ſee through a glaſs darkly* *, *but then face to face: Now I know in part, even as alſo I am known.* And this obſervation, which evidently reſpects a *future ſtate*, led men to underſtand the Apoſtle as taking in another life, on which to found that ſuperior *duration* which he gives to *Charity*, the ſubject of his general argument. But they ſeem to have miſtaken the drift of his remark concerning the defects in human knowlege, which was not

* Βλέπομεν γὰρ ἄρτι δι' ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι—the *ſeeing through*, or *in a glaſs, by an Enigma*, ſeems, at firſt view, an odd and incongruous expreſſion, ſince information by a ſpeculum, of what kind ſoever, conveys the natural or real image of the reflected object, though that image be ſeen only faintly and obſcurely. But an *Enigma* is not the natural image of the object conveyed, but an arbitrary mark which, under very foreign ideas, is myſteriouſly made to ſtand for the natural image. Yet, if we attend carefully to the ſubject, we ſhall find the expreſſion to be very elegant. The Apoſtle is comparing the knowlege of ſpiritual things, gained *here*, with that knowlege which we ſhall gain *hereafter*. Now all our preſent knowlege being conveyed through the Organs of Senſe, the Apoſtle, by his ἐν αἰνίγματι, would inſinuate, that our moſt correct and ſublime ideas of ſpiritual things are no more the real images of ſpiritual things, than Enigmas, or myſteriouſly contrived marks, are the natural or real images of thoſe things to which they are put as Signs. A *glaſs*, or *ſpeculum*, is therefore uſed by the Apoſtle, in this place, to ſignify the *corporeal organs*; and an *Enigma*, to ſignify the *repreſentative knowlege*, which the corporeal organs are only capable of producing, when employed about ſpiritual things.

made

made (as they ſuppoſe) for a *direct* inforcement of the argument in the eighth verſe, *Charity never faileth, &c.* but was an *occaſional* anſwer to an objection, which naturally aroſe from his management of one of the topics in the eleventh, *when I was a child, &c.* For it might have been objected to the Apoſtle, "By this ſimilitude, you ſeem to repreſent the Goſpel as firſt ſpringing up in an infant-ſtate, and needing time and culture to bring it to perfection." "No (replies the Apoſtle); this laſt Law of God, like the firſt created Man, came perfect from the hands of its Almighty Framer. But man, to whom it was given, by reaſon of the imperfections of his preſent ſtate, arrived only by degrees to the more perfect knowlege and practice of it: and to this gradual advance, from obſcure to intuitive ſcience, does the ſimilitude refer." This, I ſay, ſeems to have been the ſource of the error: and yet the Apoſtle's concluding obſervation was ſufficient to have ſet theſe critics right, and to have ſhewn them, that the ſuperior duration of Charity referred to the preſent life only.—*And* NOW *abideth* FAITH, HOPE, and CHARITY, *theſe three; but the greateſt of theſe is Charity.* Which is in effect to ſay, "You may now perhaps object, that this quality of *ſuperior duration* is not peculiar or confined to *Charity*, but belongs equally to thoſe two other Chriſtian graces, *Faith* and *Hope*, which travel through with the Church of God, and continue to ſupport and adorn it, in all its revolutions here on earth, when *Prophecy*, *Tongues*, and *Knowlege*, ſhall long have *failed* and *ceaſed*, and *vaniſhed away*: So that, with regard to DURATION, *Faith* and *Hope* ſhare with *Charity*, in this advantage, over the other tranſient endowments of the Spirit." "I agree, replies the Apoſtle, thus far to the Objection, that they are all three joint ſharers in this prerogative; but ſtill, I ſay, THE GREATEST OF THESE IS CHARITY: And in the beginning of my argument (ſays he) I have given the reaſon, in the obſervation, that *Though I have all* FAITH *ſo that I could remove mountains, and though I give my body to be burned* [in ſure and certain HOPE of a reſurrection] *and have no Charity, it profiteth me nothing.* The reaſon is on account of the ſuperior qualities

qualities of *Charity*: it hath thoſe which *Faith* and *Hope* have not, *ſhe ſeeketh not her own*, &c. as well as thoſe which *Faith* and *Hope* have, and are moſt eſſential to them, for *ſhe* BELIEVETH *all things*, *ſhe* HOPETH *all things*." It is thus the Apoſtle anſwers concealed objections; and at the ſame time inſtructs the unwary reader with what caution and application he ſhould come to the ſtudy of that profound reaſoning with which all his Epiſtles abound.

But now, ſuppoſe the *ſuperior duration* of Charity to take in the conſideration of another life, and the Apoſtle never could have ſaid, that *Faith* and *Hope* had the prerogative of *remaining*, or of having an equal *abiding* with *Charity*, when both *faith* and *hope* will be ſwallowed up in fruition *.

From the whole, then, of this account of *Charity*, it evidently appears, that THE MIRACULOUS POWERS OF THE CHURCH WERE TO CEASE ON ITS PERFECT ESTABLISHMENT; as well thoſe which relieved corporeal, as thoſe which adminiſtered aid to ſpiritual, diſtreſſes: and conſequently, that SUPERSTITION and FANATICISM equally laboured under the wound inflicted on them by the hand of the Apoſtle, when he made this virtual Declaration of the total withdrawing of thoſe *Powers*.

* The late Biſhop of London, Dr. Sherlock, in his firſt volume of Sermons, contends for the common interpretation of this paſſage; and, to remove the difficulty of *faith* and *hope's* being ſaid to *abide* with *Charity* in a future ſtate, argues thus — "*Charity* and univerſal benevolence is the very grace and ornament of Heaven. Nor can *faith* and "*hope* ever be parted from TRUE RELIGION; for there is no Being ſo great as not to "depend on *faith in God*, in his power and wiſdom, or to be above *hoping any thing* from "his goodneſs and benevolence," p. 377. Here St. Paul is ſpeaking of one thing, and the Biſhop, as uſual, of another. The Apoſtle's *faith* and *hope* are CHRISTIAN GRACES; that is, Faith in the *Meſſiah the Redeemer*, and Hope in the *Reſurrection of the dead*, both of which hereafter will be, as is ſaid above, ſwallowed up in fruition. The Preacher, in order to ſupport a point, puts the change upon us, and, for the Apoſtle's *faith and hope*, gives us his own: a *faith and hope* at large, and in the air: ſuch as will *abide* indeed, while we have any being, but ſuch as, on the ſame principles of interpretation, will give abidance to *Knowlege* likewiſe, although the ſacred Writer expreſsly tells us, *it is to vaniſh away*.

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Here especially, all the *superstitious* and *fanatical* pretences of the Church of Rome, to supernatural powers, are detected and exposed; not only the gift of INFALLIBILITY, which comprehends *all Mysteries and all Knowlege*; and the work of TRANSUBSTANTIATION, which comprehends *all Faith*, not *to remove*, but to *make*, *mountains*; but likewise all the LEGENDARY MIRACLES of their Hierarchy in general, and of their canonized Saints in particular. In which pretences, to observe it by the way, the blunder seems to be as glaring as the imposture: St. Paul reckons the STATE OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION not to be the STATE OF MIRACLES, but that of CHARITY. *For we know in part* (says he) *and we prophecy in part: but when* THAT WHICH IS PERFECT *is come, then that which is in part shall be done away**. What is *that perfect* thing *which was to come*; and which the Corinthians of this time so much wanted? What but that which he had so highly extolled, the State of CHARITY? So that as this advanced, the imperfect state of MIRACLES was to recede, and *be done away*. Yet in the Church of Rome, the state of SAINTSHIP, which is *their state of perfection*, is supported by miracles; whilst *St. Paul's State* of *perfection*, that of CHARITY, was so little acknowleged or understood, that one of their greatest Saints, and most abounding in *miraculous* endowments, was St. Dominic, the founder of the INQUISITION. Indeed, if the Apostle's reasoning would bear this inference, that *Miracles* were not only to remain till *Charity* had done *its perfect work*, but till it had perfectly done its work, I know of no Church that has a better claim to the continued exercise of those Powers than the CHURCH OF ROME. But whatsoever need she may have, she fails so wretchedly in her most pompous exhibitions of them, that we may well regard ROMISH MIRACLES in the lowest rank of those *childish things*, which, the Apostle says, men and churches should be ashamed of, and *put away*, when they come to years of discretion.

* Ver. 9, 10.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

HAVING now eſtabliſhed the FACT, that *miraculous gifts* were to paſs away with the firſt ages of the Church, we may ſafely and reaſonably inquire into the FITNESS OF THE THING.

There appears to have been two cauſes of the *extraordinary* operations of the Holy Spirit: The manifeſtation of his Miſſion as it was predicted, and the comfort and inſtruction of a ſuffering Church, as it was promiſed.

To the firſt, we have obſerved, that in the early propagation of our holy Faith, it was fit the SANCTIFIER, as well as the REDEEMER, ſhould ſupport his preſence by Miracles. But the ſame conſiderations which ſhew this *fitneſs* to be no more, in the one caſe, ſhew it likewiſe in the other. For the DIVINE ORIGINAL of our *Faith* being once eſtabliſhed, it ſupports itſelf ever after on the ſame credibility of human teſtimony, which all other truths do, that are founded on facts.

1. As to his extraordinary operations for the comfort and inſtruction of the Church, we may obſerve that, on his firſt deſcent upon the Apoſtles, he found their minds rude and uninformed; ſtrangers to all celeſtial knowlege; prejudiced in favour of a *carnal Law*, and utterly averſe to the genius of the *everlaſting Goſpel*. The minds of theſe he illuminated; and, by degrees, led into all the truths neceſſary for the Profeſſors of the Faith to know, or for the Propagators of it to teach. For *a rule of Faith* not being yet compoſed, ſome extraordinary infuſion of his Virtue was ſtill neceſſary, both to regulate the Faith of him who received it, and to conſtitute the Authority of him who was to communicate, of what he had received, to others. But when now the *Rule of faith* was perfected in an authentic collection of the Apoſtolic Writings, part of this

this office was transferred upon the Sacred Canon*; and his enlightened grace was not to be expected in so abundant an effusion as would make the Recipients *infallible Guides* to others, but only in a measure adequate to the direction of themselves.

These reasons for the change of œconomy, in the dispensations of the Holy Spirit, are sufficient to discredit the false confidence of modern FANATICS, who pretend to as high a degree of divine communications as if no such *Rule of Faith* was in being; or at least, as if that Rule was so obscure as to need the further assistance of the Holy Spirit to explain his own meaning; or so imperfect as to need a new inspiration to supply its wants. — But these men read the History of the dispensations to the first Propagators of our holy Faith: they look with admiration on the privileges and powers conferred on those chosen Instruments: their imagination grows heated: they forget the difference between the *present* and the *past* œconomy of things: they seem to feel the impressions they hear of; and they assume the airs, and mimic the Authority of Prophets and Apostles.

2. Again, the nature and genius of the Gospel were so averse to all the religious Institutions of the World, that the whole strength of human prejudices was set in opposition to it. To overcome the obstinacy and violence of these prejudices, nothing less than the power of the *Holy One* was sufficient. HE did the work of Man's Conversion; and reconciled an unbelieving world to God. At present, whatever there may be remaining of the bias of prejudice (as such will mix itself even with our best conclusions), it draws the other way. So much then of his task was finished; and the Faith, from thenceforth, had a favourable hearing. Indeed, were we to make our estimate of the present State of the religious World from the Journals of modern Fanatics, we should be tempted still to think ourselves in a land of Pagans, with all their prejudices full blown upon them. For the account they give us of their provin-

* See p. 565.

cial Miſſions always runs on in ſuch ſtrains as theſe—The *name of Jeſus* is preached up in this City; the *glad tidings of the Goſpel* conveyed to that Hamlet; a *new light ſprings up* in a land of darkneſs; and *life and immortality* is now firſt offered to thoſe who *ſit in the ſhadow of death.*

3. A further reaſon for the abatement of the influences of the ſupporting ſpirit of Grace is the peace and ſecurity of the CHURCH. There was a time when the Powers of this world were combined together for its deſtruction. At ſuch a period, nothing but ſuperior aid from Above could ſupport humanity in ſuſtaining ſo great a conflict as that which the holy Martyrs encountered with joy and rapture; the horrors of death in torment. But now the profeſſion of the Chriſtian Faith is attended with eaſe and honour; and the conviction, which the weight of human teſtimony, and the concluſions of human reaſon afford us, of its truth, is abundantly ſufficient to ſupport us in our religious perſeverance.

But the obſtinate and continued claims of FANATICS in all Ages, to this primitive abundance of the Spirit, may make it expedient to examine their pretenſions yet more minutely and exactly. And to this inquiry, Scripture itſelf, which foreſaw and foretold the evil, directs us to the remedy, where it exhorts us to TRY THE SPIRITS. *Beloved, believe not every ſpirit* (ſays St. John), *but try the Spirits whether they be of God; becauſe many falſe Prophets are gone out into the World**. At the time this precept was given there was a more than ordinary attention requiſite to guard againſt the deluſions of falſe Prophets: For, the abundant effuſion of the Holy Spirit on the riſing Religion gave encouragement to Impoſtors to counterfeit, and a handle to Enthuſiaſts to mimic, all that was equivocal in its operations.

Hence we find that, amongſt the various endowments of the primitive Church, ſome of which were to correct Gainſayers, and others to edify Believers, there was one of the mixed kind, of ſpe-

* 1 John iv. 6.

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cial uſe to ſupport the dignity, and to vindicate the divine original of all the reſt; by detecting Impoſtors, who crept in amongſt the truly inſpired: and this, we have ſeen, the Apoſtle called, the DISCERNING OF SPIRITS. With this Gift, Peter detected Simon the Magician; and with this, Paul confounded Elymas the Sorcerer.

But when *extraordinary inſpiration* itſelf had ceaſed, the falſe pretence to it, for ſome wiſe ends of Providence, to us unknown, ſtill continued to infect the Church with its impious Mummeries; and while that Virtue *(the diſcerning of Spirits)*, whoſe office was to detect them, was withdrawn with the reſt of the inſpired graces, the Command *to try the Spirits whether they were of God* ſtill remained in force. But to *try* without a faculty of *diſcerning* would be a dangerous, or at beſt, an impertinent employment.

Now from this unreaſonable taſk we are delivered by the gracious providence of the Holy Spirit; who provided that thoſe whom he had endowed with the gift of *diſcerning of Spirits* ſhould leave behind them ſome Rules whereby the Faithful of all ages might be qualified to *try the Spirits*, and be thereby enabled to defend themſelves from the ſeduction of error and impoſture: becauſe, ſays the advice, *many falſe Prophets are gone out into the World.*

If the *falſe Prophet* pretend to a *character foretold*, then we are bid to *ſearch the Scriptures* *, to ſee if they *teſtify* of ſuch a Character. Thus the *Bereans* are eſteemed of more *noble* and generous ſentiments than their Neighbours, for this very point of wiſdom, *the ſearching the Scriptures daily to find whether thoſe things were ſo* †.

But if the *falſe Prophet* pretend only to ſome extraordinary meaſure of the Spirit, then we are directed to *try* that *Spirit* by applying to it the following Characters of real inſpiration.—THE WISDOM THAT IS FROM ABOVE IS FIRST PURE; THEN PEACEABLE,

* John v. 39. *Search the Scriptures, for they teſtify of me.*

† Acts xvii. 11.

GENTLE, AND EASY TO BE INTREATED, FULL OF MERCY AND GOOD FRUITS, WITHOUT PARTIALITY, AND WITHOUT HYPOCRISY *.

It is worthy our notice, that, in this rule or direction for the *trial of Spirits*, the marks of real inſpiration are to be applied only NEGATIVELY: that is, we may ſafely pronounce, that the man in whom they are not found, hath not the Spirit of God, or *the wiſdom which is from above*: while on the other hand, we are not to conclude, that he in whom any or all of them are found, is, from this circumſtance alone, endowed with any *extraordinary* meaſure of the Holy Spirit; ſince they may be no other than thoſe ordinary graces which ariſe from the knowledge of, and obedience to, God's Will as contained in ſacred Scripture. So that although ſuch a one may be truly ſaid to be poſſeſſed of *the wiſdom which is from above*, it is not that which comes to him by way of inſpiration, the thing here in queſtion.

Thus we ſee, the Apoſtle's Rule carries, in its very nature, the evidence of its divine original: for the aſſiſtance wanted in the *trial of Spirits*, ſince theſe extraordinary powers were withdrawn, was only ſuch a ſet of Marks as was rather fitted to detect Impoſtors, than to aſſure the truth of a Character not now to be expected.

This the Reader ſhould have in mind, when we bring him to apply theſe marks to the features of modern Fanaticiſm; eſpecially as they are ſeen in the famed Leader of the METHODISTS, Mr. JOHN WESLEY; and not *ſeen* neither, as Sancho Pancho *ſaw* his miſtreſs, *by hearſay* (which indeed has been too much the cuſtom, in the repreſentations of this tranſcendant man), but as he appears in perſon in his own JOURNALS: for by thoſe indelible marks alone, there traced out, and by his own pen, I propoſe to TRY, in him, chiefly, THE SPIRITS of all modern Pretenders to ſupernatural Powers.

* James iii. 17.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

AND that I may not be ſuſpected of combating a Fantom, it will be proper firſt of all to ſhew that this extraordinary man hath, in fact, laid claim to almoſt every Apoſtolic gift and grace; and in as full and ample a meaſure as they were poſſeſſed of old.

But as a good Actor will firſt prepare his Scene, he hath carried us back, by the magic of his dramatic powers, into all the wonders of the primitive Times; where we meet the Devil unchained and let looſe, to exert his laſt efforts againſt the *new* Religion: As, on the other hand, to oppoſe to his infernal rage, we ſee, with the ſame evidence, an abundant effuſion of the Holy Spirit poured out upon this *riſing* Church. And now, every thing being well prepared, Both theſe Powers ſtand ready to act their parts, by the time our Apoſtle thinks fit to appear upon the Stage.

His JOURNALS are full of the Alarms which he gave the Devil, and of the mortifications which the Devil gave him.—"The "Devil (ſays he) knew his kingdom ſhook, and therefore ſtirred "up his ſervants to ring bells, and make all the noiſe they could *." —"The *Devil's Children* fought valiantly for their Maſter, that "his kingdom ſhould not be deſtroyed: And many ſtones fell on "my right hand and on my left †." "Some or other of the "*Children of Belial* had laboured to diſturb us ſeveral nights before ‡." Nay, ſo accuſtomed was he to theſe conflicts with the *Evil One*, that it was even matter of ſurpriſe to him, to find the Enemy, once upon a time, reſerved and *ſtill*; till he reflected, that it was becauſe *his Goods were in peace*. "I preached—as yet I have "found only one perſon amongſt them, who knew the love of

* Journal from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 37.
† Ibid. p. 82. ‡ Ibid. p. 31.

"God,

"God, before my Brother came. No wonder the Devil was ſo "ſtill: for *his Goods were in peace* *." Another inſtance which he gives us, of this peaceable convention between his Congregation and the Devil, is in one of his northern excurſions. "Wed. "29, I preached at Durham to a QUIET, STUPID Congregation †." But this never laſted long wherever he came; for he had always the ſkill of curing the ſpiritual lethargy by a frenzy.

When the Devil had ſet the mob on work, he then, like other Politicians, retired to better company; ſuch as the two Mr. Weſleys and the Saints. But, as this ſad and ſolemn meeting was not to his taſte, he tried to *buffet* them into a better humour. "I "was a little ſurpriſed at ſome who were *buffetted* of Satan in an "unuſual manner by ſuch a *ſpirit of laughter*—I knew the ſame "thing ten or eleven years ago. Part of Sunday my Brother and "I then uſed to ſpend in walking in the meadows and ſinging "Pſalms. But one day, juſt as we were beginning to ſing, he "burſt out into a *loud laughter*. I began to be very angry, and "preſently after to laugh as loud as he.—We were ready to tear "ourſelves in pieces, but were forced to go home without ſing-"ing another line ‡." From the Head, theſe *buffettings* (which, not to overload the Devil, I will, for once, venture to call *hyſterical*) deſcended, and were plentifully beſtowed, upon the Members. And, "one evening (ſays he) ſuch a *Spirit of laughter* was amongſt "us, that many were much offended. But the attention of all "was ſoon fixed upon poor L——a S——; one ſo violently and "variouſly torn of the EVIL ONE did I never ſee before. Some-"times ſhe *laughed*, then broke out into curſing and blaſpheming, "&c. §." On this occaſion, he relates a fact, which, though He ſeems not to have turned to a proper uſe, the ſober and atten-

* Journ. from Nov. 25, 1746, to July 20, 1750, p. 29.
† Journ. from July 20, 1750, to Oct. 28, 1754, p. 16.
‡ Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 37.
§ Ibid. p. 38.

tive

tive Reader may.—"Our outward trials indeed were now re-
"moved, and peace was in all our borders. But ſo much the
"more did inward trials abound, *and if one member ſuffered, all*
"*the members ſuffered with it.* So ſtrange a SYMPATHY did I ne-
"ver obſerve before: whether conſiderable temptation fell on
"any one, unaccountably ſpreading itſelf to the reſt. So that
"exceeding few were able to eſcape it *." In theſe various ſtrug-
gles, the Devil was at length tired out; and Mr. Weſley forces
him into cloſe quarters; to betake himſelf to the bodies of friend or
foe indifferently, juſt as he could find opportunity or entertainment.
And now comes on the ſhining part of our Apoſtle's exploits, the
driving him out, in the face of the whole Congregation, by EXOR-
CISMS and ſpiritual Ejectments.

But if Evil thus abounded, Grace did much more abound in this
memorable Æra, when Mr. John Weſley firſt went out upon his
Miſſion. The Spirit overcame all reſiſtance, broke down all the
ſtrong-holds of *Sin*, and, what Mr. Weſley was much more
ſet againſt, of INSENSIBILITY.——"So many living Witneſſes
"(ſays he) hath God given, that *his hand is* STILL *ſtretched out to*
"*heal*, and that *ſigns and wonders are even* NOW *wrought by his holy*
"*Child, Jeſus* †." For, *out of the mouths of babes and ſucklings*,
it once again, as of old, *perfected praiſe*; the *young men ſaw viſions*,
and the old men dreamed dreams.

"Amongſt the poor Colliers at Placey, John Lane, then *nine or*
"*ten years old*, was one of the firſt who found peace with God.
"From that hour he continued to walk day and night in the light
"of his countenance. I ſaw him laſt year longing to be with
"Chriſt, &c. ‡."—"I enquired more particularly of Mrs. N. con-
"cerning her little Son. She ſaid, He appeared to have a continual
"fear of God, and an awful ſenſe of his preſence; that he

* Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 37.
† Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739.
‡ Journ. from July 20, 1739, to Oct. 28, 1754, p. 18.

"frequently

" frequently went to prayers by himſelf: that he had an exceeding " great tenderneſs of Conſcience, being ſenſible of the leaſt ſin.— " A few days ſince he broke out into prayers aloud, and then ſaid, " Mamma, I ſhall go to Heaven ſoon — and you will go there too, " and my Pappa; but you will not go ſo ſoon." On which Mr. Weſley very judiciouſly obſerves, " When the Holy Ghoſt teaches, " is there any delay in learning? This Child was then juſt *three* " *years old.* A year or two after he died in peace *."

——" I heard (ſays he) a ſurpriſing account of a young wo- " man of Mancheſter, which I received from her own mouth. She " ſaid, I was ſitting in the houſe while one read the paſſion hymn. " I had always gone to Church, and had never heard any of the " methodiſt preachers. On a ſudden I ſaw our Saviour on the " Croſs, as plain as if it had been with my bodily eyes.—Then " I ſaw as it were Heaven open, and God ſitting upon his Throne. " And I ſaw a large book, in which all my ſins were written, " &c. †" But this was nothing to the viſion of S—— T——, (a girl of *ten years and three quarters old*), which takes up between three and four pages in the telling; ſo that partly for the length, but principally becauſe I ſuſpect Mr. J. Weſley intended it only for the ſolace of his *babes and ſucklings*, for whoſe uſe this diſcourſe is not intended, I ſhall only point to the Journal where the wonderful adventure is related ‡. For the ſame reaſon I ſhall paſs over many of the *Dreams and Viſions*.

All theſe wonders were not worked for nothing. The Spirit of the Lord was gone out,, and it did not ſtop till it had manifeſted itſelf, in the laſt efforts of its power, THE NEW BIRTH: But it went not out, as of old, in the *ſtill, ſmall voice*, but in ſtorms and tempeſts, in cries and extacies, in tumults and confuſion; and when Nature was exhauſted, then Grace had done its work.

* Journ. from Oct. 27, 1734, to Nov. 17, 1746, p. 133.
† Journ. from Nov. 25, 1746, to July 20, 1750, p. 94.
‡ Journ. from Oct. 27, 1743, to Nov. 17, 1746, p. 141, *& ſeq.*

work. But he tells us, his correſpondents hearing of *this ſtrange* affair, enquired of him *how can theſe things be?* They cautioned him *not to regard viſions or dreams, or to fancy people had remiſſion of ſins becauſe of their cries or tears*, &c. To this, he tells us, he anſwered; "You deny that God does now work theſe effects: at leaſt that he "works them in this manner. I affirm both. I have ſeen "very many perſons changed in a moment from the ſpirit of "fear, horror, deſpair, to the ſpirit of love, joy, and peace.—What "I have to ſay touching *viſions* or *dreams* is this: I know ſeveral "perſons in whom this great change was wrought in a dream, or "during a ſtrong repreſentation to the eye of their mind, of Chriſt "either on the Croſs or in glory *."

But here unhappily, as is uſual in theſe matters, the ſymptoms of *Grace* and of *Perdition* were ſo interwoven and confounded with one another, that our Apoſtle himſelf is ſometimes at a loſs to diſtinguiſh the hand; and to determine, with certainty, who had the largeſt ſhare in the WORK, GOD or the DEVIL; inſomuch that a Manichean might have greatly availed himſelf of this untoward circumſtance. Mr. J. Weſley had been grieved, and the Spirit of God had been grieved likewiſe, at the ſcandal given by ſome of his OWN flock, who "blaſphemed the work, and imputed it "either to Nature or the force of Imagination and Animal-ſpirits, "or even to the deluſion of the Devil †." – "Many (ſays he) were "deeply convinced; but none were delivered from that painful "conviction. *The Children came to the* BIRTH, *but there was not "ſtrength to* BRING FORTH. I fear we have grieved the Spirit of "the jealous God by queſtioning his work ‡." Yet theſe pangs of the NEW BIRTH becoming, on certain occaſions, more violent, and more general than ordinary, and even found to be taking and infectious,—the Apoſtle himſelf was ſtaggered, and ſeemed ready to recant. "Theſe ſymptoms I can no more impute to any natural

* Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 48, 49.
† Ibid. p. 59. ‡ Ibid. p. 68.

" cauſe than to the Spirit of God. I make no doubt it was SATAN " tearing them as they were coming to Chriſt. And hence " proceeded thoſe grievous cries, whereby he might deſign both " to diſcredit the work of God, and to affright fearful people from " hearing that word whereby their Souls might be ſaved *." But ſince theſe Symptoms were univerſal and inſeparable from the *new birth*, I rather think, and I will venture to ſay, as it is only raiſing the Catachreſis one ſtep higher, that the Devil was here only in the office of *Man-Midwife* to the *new birth*. And Mr. Weſley himſelf, on ſecond thoughts, ſeems not much averſe to this conceit, as appears from the following relation.—" I viſited (ſays " he) a poor old woman a mile or two from the Town. Her " trials had been uncommon; inexpreſſible agonies of mind joined " with all ſorts of bodily pain, not (it ſeemed) from any natural " cauſe, but the *direct operation of Satan*: Her joys were now as " uncommon; ſhe had little time to ſleep, having for ſeveral " months laſt paſt ſeen, as it were, the *unclouded face of God*, and " praiſed him day and night †."

CHAP. V.

SUCH was the EVANGELIC STATE of things when Mr. J. Weſley firſt entered on this Miniſtry: who, ſeeing himſelf ſurrounded with ſubjects ſo harmoniouſly diſpoſed to obey the touch of a maſter, thus triumphantly exults:—" Full as I was, I " knew not where to begin, till my Teſtament opened on theſe " words, *I came not to call the Righteous, but Sinners, to repentance*: " In applying which, my ſoul was ſo enlarged, that methought I " could have cried out (in another ſenſe than poor, vain Archimedes)

* Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743.

† Journ. from July 20, 1749, to Oct. 30, 1751, p. 60.

" *Give*

"*Give me where to ſtand, and I will* SHAKE THE EARTH *." A bravado that would have ſuited Ignatius Loiola in his firſt ſlippery extacies in the mire, as the World has ſufficiently experienced. How it became our adventurer, on his firſt ſetting out, the World may be brought to know in good time.

Here then was a Scene well prepared for a good Actor, and excellently fitted up for the part he was diſpoſed to play, which, as we have ſaid, was that of an APOSTLE. And, to do him juſtice, he hath exhibited it with ſuch ſplendor, that, of all the Apoſtolic gifts and graces, there is but one with which we find him not adorned, viz. the *gift of tongues*; and as to this, the learned Mr. J. Weſley may reply with the learned Paul, *he already ſpoke with tongues more than they all.* For the reſt, whether they were *prophecy—ſupernatural aids in his miniſtry—healing the ſick—caſting out Devils*—or *inflicting divine vengeance on his oppoſers*, he had them all, as we underſtand by his *journals*, in abundant meaſure.

We will begin (as is fitting) where he himſelf began, with declaring his MISSION. "A multitude of people got together in the "houſe, yard, and ſtreet, far more than my voice could reach. I "cryed aloud to as many of them as could hear, *All things are* "*ready: come ye to the marriage.* I then DELIVERED MY MES- "SAGE. So before ten we took boat, &c. †." Yet, like Moſes, he was at firſt a little mutinous.—"From the directions I received "from God this day, touching an affair of the greateſt importance, "I could not but obſerve the miſtake of thoſe who aſſert, 'God "will not anſwer your prayer unleſs your heart be wholly reſigned "to his will.' *My heart was not entirely reſigned to his will.* Yet "I know and am aſſured, he heard my voice, and ſent forth his "light and his truth ‡."

* Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739.

† Journ. from Nov. 25, 1746, to July 20, 1750, p. 29.

‡ Journ. from his embarking for Georgia, to his return to London, p. 37.

Prophesy or *Speaking by the Spirit*, the firſt and moſt eſſential quality of a divine Meſſenger, he had at will. "We had (ſays he) "a watch night at the Chapel: being weak in body, I was afraid I "could not go through it. But the longer I ſpoke, the more "ſtrength I had. Inſomuch that at twelve a clock all my weari- "neſs and weakneſs was gone; and I was as one refreſhed with "wine *."—"Several of the Gentry deſired to ſtay at the meeting "of the Society, to whom I explained the nature of inward Reli- "gion, *words flowing upon me faſter than I could ſpeak* †."—"I in- "tended to have given an exhortation to the Society. But as ſoon "as we met, the *Spirit of Supplication fell upon us*, ſo that I could "hardly do any thing but pray and give thanks, till it was time "for us to part ‡." But the Spirit ſoon came down in a torrent that took away all utterance.—"In the evening the word of God "was indeed quick and powerful. Afterwards, I deſired the men "as well as women to meet. But I could not ſpeak to them. *The* "*Spirit of prayer was ſo poured upon us all*, that we could only "ſpeak to God §."

The *exterior* aſſiſtances in his Miniſtry were no leſs ſignal than the *interior*.—"Many were ſeated on a large wall adjoining, which "being built of looſe ſtones, in the middle of the Sermon all fell "down at once. *I never ſaw, heard, nor read, of ſuch a thing* "*before*. The whole wall and the perſons ſitting upon it ſunk "down together, none of them ſcreaming out, and very few al- "tering their poſture. And not one was hurt at all; but they ap- "peared ſitting at the bottom, juſt as they ſat at the top. Nor "was there any interruption either of my ſpeaking, or of the at- "tention of the hearers ‖." The next riſes in due gradation. An unruly *mob* became of a ſudden as harmleſs as the *ſtones*. Though,

* Journ. from. Nov. 25, 1746, to July 20, 1750, p. 32.

† Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 87.

‡ Journ. from Nov. 25, 1746, to July 20, 1750, p. 84, 85.

§ Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 104.

‖ Journ. from Nov. 25, 1746, to July 20, 1750, p. 23.

had

had they met, and oppoſed the miniſtry, *together*, one does not know what might have happened.—" The mob had juſt broke " open the door, when we came into the lower room; and exactly " while they burſt in at one door, we walked out at the other. *Nor* " *did one man take any notice of us*, though we were within five " yards of each other *." Without doubt they were ſtruck *blind*; though, in imitation of the modeſt ſilence of the Evangeliſt, who relates the like adventure of the bleſſed Jeſus, he forbears the expreſs mention of this ſtupendous miracle —The next and more powerful operation was on his female friends; and theſe, he as fairly ſtruck *dumb*—" The whole multitude were ſilent, while I " was ſpeaking. Not a whiſper was heard. But the moment I had " done, the *Chain fell off their tongues.* I was really ſurprized. " Surely never was ſuch a cackling made on the banks of Cayſter, " or the Common of Sedgmoor †." And *to chain up the tongues* of five hundred cackling goſſips, he held, and with great reaſon, an exploit worth recording. Indeed he appears to have taken the moſt effectual method with them, that is, to *out-clamour* them: For thus he meaſures out his own Stentoronic voice.—" Obſerving that " ſeveral ſat on the ſide of the oppoſite hill, I afterwards deſired one " to meaſure the ground; and we found it was ſevenſcore yards " from the place where I had ſtood. Yet the people there heard " perfectly well. I did not think any human voice could have " reached ſo far ‡." And as, on proper occaſions, every courteous Knight-Errant has condeſcended to let his *horſe* into a ſhare of the adventure, ſo our Spiritual Martialiſt, unwilling to break ſo good a cuſtom, has divided (as St. Martin did his cloak with the Beggar) the next exploit of price with his Beaſt. " My horſe was ex- " ceeding lame—we could not diſcern what it was that was amiſs, " and yet he could ſcarce ſet his foot on the ground.—My head " ached more than it had done for ſome months (what I here aver

* Journ. from Nov. 25, 1746, to July 20, 1750, p. 57.

† Ibid. p. 96.

‡ Journ. from July 20, 1753, to Oct. 28, 1754, p. 10.

" is

" is the naked fact; let every man *account for it* as he sees good).
" I then thought, 'Cannot God heal either man or beast, by any
" means, or *without any!*' Immediately my weariness and head-
" ache ceased, and my Horse's lameness *in the same instant*. Nor
" did he halt any more either that day or the next. *A very odd*
" *accident this also* *."

Come we next to his Gift of Healing. One of his miracles of this kind, had, it seems, been brought in question; on which occasion, he thus explains himself—" Miracle or no Miracle, the " fact is plain. W. Kirkman is, I apprehend, still alive and able " to certify for himself, that he had that cough threescore years, " and since that time [viz. the miraculous aid afforded him] it had " not returned †." In the pamphlet where this extraordinary case was first recorded, Mr. Wesley asks, Whether any one could suppose, that if he had performed it by his skill in physic, he should not have been ready to do honour to himself rather than transfer that honour to another? If Mr. Wesley be serious in this question, he is the dupe of his spiritual ambition. The Character of a great Saint is infinitely more flattering to the Head of a Sect than that of a great Physician. — But to proceed. — " I administered the Sacra-
" ment to R. A. Some years ago he found peace with God, and
" was freed at once without any human means from a distemper
" *naturally incurable* ‡." But acute as well as chronical disorders fly his sacred presence.—" I found (says he) Mr. Lunell in so violent
" a fever that there was little hope of his life. *He revived the mo-*
" *ment he saw me*, and fell into a breathing sweat. He began to
" recover from that time. *Perhaps for this also was I sent* §." " In
" the evening I called upon Anne Calcut. She had been speechless
" for some time. But almost as soon as we began to pray, God re-
" stored her speech. She then witnessed a good confession indeed.

* Journ. from Oct. 27, 1743, to Nov. 17, 1746.
† Journ. from Nov. 25, 1746, to July 10, 1750, p. 123.
‡ Journ. from July 20, 1749, to Oct. 30, 1751, p. 34.
§ Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 34.

" I ex-

" I expected to see her no more. *But*, FROM THAT HOUR, THE " FEVER LEFT HER, and in a few days she arose and walked, glo- " rifying God *." —I visited several of the Sick. Most of them " were ill of the spotted Fever; which, they informed me, had " been extremely mortal, few persons recovering from it. But " God had said, HITHERTO SHALT THOU COME. I believe there " was NOT ONE *with whom we were, but he recovered* +." —" They " told me the Physician said, he did not expect Mr. Meyrick would " live till the morning. I went to him, but his pulse was gone. " He had been speechless and senseless for some time. A few of " us immediately joined in prayer (I relate *the naked fact*). Before " we had done, his sense and his speech returned. Now he that " will account for this by *natural causes*, has my *free leave*. I chuse " to say, THIS IS THE POWER OF GOD ‡." However, gracious as this *free leave* is, I would not, Reader! be the man to advise you to trust to it. Saints are vindictive: He has fairly told you what he *chuses* to call it. And after this, who can tell how far he may think the honour of God concerned in making so free with his Messenger as to take him at his word, having before solemnly assured you, of " many living witnesses which God hath given, that " *His hand is* STILL *stretched out to heal*; *and that signs and wonders* " *are* even NOW, wrought by his holy Child JESUS §?"

From the cure of *natural* diseases, proceed we to the *supernatural*, or, saving your presence, to the CASTING OUT OF DEVILS. Having related, by way of prelude, the extravagances of a furious female Demoniac of nineteen or twenty years of age, whom he set to rights without much ceremony; he proceeds immediately to another of the same Sex; but her he exorcises in form, and according to the true Roman fashion.—" I was sent for to one in Bristol—She " lay on the ground furiously gnashing her teeth, and after a while

* Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 34.
† Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 61.
‡ Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 81.
§ Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 40.

" roared

" roared aloud. It was not eaſy for three or four perſons to hold " her, *eſpecially when the name of Jeſus was named.* We prayed; " the violence of her ſymptoms ceaſed, *though, without a compleat* " *deliverance.* In the evening being ſent for to her again, I was un- " willing, indeed afraid to go; thinking it would not avail, unleſs " ſome, who were *ſtrong in faith*, were to wreſtle with God for " her. I opened my Teſtament on theſe words—*I was afraid, and* " *went and hid my talent in the earth.* I ſtood reproved, and went " immediately. She began ſcreaming before I came into the room, " then broke out into a horrid laughter mixt with blaſphemy, " grievous to hear. One who, from many circumſtances, appre- " hended a preternatural Agent to be concerned in this, asking, " How didſt thou dare to enter into a Chriſtian? was anſwered, " *She is no Chriſtian. She is mine.* Q. Doſt thou not tremble at " the name of Jeſus? No words followed, but *ſhe ſhrunk back and* " *trembled exceedingly.* Q. Art thou not encreaſing thy own dam- " nation? It was faintly anſwered, *Ay, ay:* which was followed " by freſh curſing and blaſpheming. My Brother coming in, ſhe " cried out, *Preacher! Field-Preacher, I do not love field-preaching.* " This was repeated two hours together, with ſpittings and all the " expreſſions of ſtrong averſion. And now it was that God ſhewed " he heareth the Prayer—She was filled with peace, and knew that " the *Son of Wickedneſs was departed from her.*"—This is very well: The next is not inferior—" I was ſent for to Kingſwood again" [namely to the young woman with whom he preludes theſe at- chievements.] " A violent rain began juſt as I ſet out, ſo that I " was thoroughly wet in a few minutes. Juſt at that time the " woman (then three miles off) cried out, *Yonder comes Weſley gal-* " *loping as faſt as he can.* When I was come, I was quite cold " and dead, and fitter for ſleep than prayer. She burſt out into a " horrid laughter, and ſaid, *No power, no power; no faith, no faith:* " *She is mine. Her Soul is mine, I have her, and will not let go.* " We begged of God to increaſe our faith.—One, who was clearly

" convinced

" convinced this was no natural diſorder, ſaid, *I think Satan is let*
" *looſe*. I FEAR HE WILL NOT STOP HERE; and added, I command
" thee in the name of the Lord Jeſus, to tell if thou haſt com-
" miſſion to torment any other Soul. It was immediately anſwered, *I*
" *have*; *L——y C——r and S——h J——s*, two who lived at ſome
" diſtance, and were *then* in perfect health *." In which, I dare ſay, they did not long continue, after the Exorciſt had thus conſigned them over to Satan, now *let looſe* to do Mr. Weſley honour. But what is moſt material (if we may believe Him or his ſpiritual Coadjutor) is, that Mr. Weſley's *new birth only* makes the *Chriſtian*; and that the Devil hates *field-preaching*. To evince theſe great Truths ſeems to have been the end both of the Poſſeſſions and of the Exorciſms. POPERY and PURITANISM, it is to be obſerved, have, at times, for the like righteous ends, received equal credit from the ſame reverend Teſtimonies, the Devil and the Prieſt: as the curious may read with pleaſure in the *Detection* of two famous impoſtures carried on in each of thoſe Quarters, and recorded by the elegant pen of Dr. Samuel HARSNET †, biſhop of Norwich, and afterwards Archbiſhop of York. By which we may gather, that the Inhabitants below are divided into Sects as well as thoſe above; and that there are *Popiſh*, *Puritan*, and *Methodiſt*, DEVILS; who have all, in their turns, been forced to anſwer to Interrogatories; and to depoſe in honour of the Sect they perſecuted, at the expence of that to which they belonged.

Such were the bleſſings which Mr. Weſley beſtowed upon his Friends: for his Enemies he had other things in ſtore; and thoſe no ſmall ones, the exterminating JUDGMENTS OF HEAVEN. Yet ſtill the treatment was ſtrictly Apoſtolical. " I preached (ſays he)
" at Darlaſton, late a den of Lions: But moſt of the fierceſt of
" them *God had called away by* A TRAIN OF AMAZING STROKES;

* Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 92, 93, & ſeq.

† *A declaration of egregious Popiſh impoſtures*, &c. Lond. 1603. Q. *Declaration of Puritan impoſtures, in the caſe of Darrel*, &c. Lond. 1599. Q.

" and thoſe that remain are now as lambs *." The corrections, we ſee, as thoſe of Heaven ſhould, had their proper effect.—" I " preached at R——, once a place of furious riot and perſecution; " but quiet and calm, ſince the *bitter Rector is gone to give* AN AC- " COUNT OF HIMSELF TO GOD †."—" Hence we rode to T——, " where the Miniſter was ſlowly recovering from a violent fit of " the Palſy, with which he was ſtruck *immediately* after he had been " preaching a virulent Sermon againſt the *Methodiſts* ‡."—" The " Rev. Mr. ——— preached and inveighed very much againſt the " novel ſect, the upſtart *Methodiſts*—Shortly after, he was to preach " [the ſame ſermon again]. He had named the text twice, when " he was ſuddenly ſeized with a rattling in his throat, attended with " a hideous groaning. He fell backward againſt the door of the " pulpit; was carried away, as it ſeemed, dead into the veſtry. In " two or three days he recovered his ſenſes, and the Sunday follow- " ing, DIED §."

" One of the chief of thoſe who came to make the diſturbance " on the firſt inſtant, had HANGED HIMSELF. A ſecond of them " had been for ſome days in ſtrong pain, and had many times ſent " to deſire our prayers. A third came to me himſelf and confeſſed, " he was hired that night and made drunk on purpoſe: But when " he came to the door, *he knew not what was the matter*, he could " not *ſtir* nor *open his mouth* ||." Here, by ill luck, the miracle ſuffers; for drunkenneſs alone is but too apt to deprive a man of his faculties of ſpeech and local motion. " I was quite ſurprized " when I heard Mr. R—— preach. That ſoft, ſmooth, tuneful " voice, which he ſo often employed to *blaſpheme the Work of God*, " was loſt without hope of recovery. All means had been tried, " but none took place. He now ſpoke in a manner SHOCKING TO

* Journ. from July 20, 1749, to Oct. 30, 1751, p. 81.
† Journ. from July 20, 1750, to Oct. 28, 1754, p. 11.
‡ Ibid. p. 23.
§ Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 103, 104.
|| Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741.

" HEAR, &c. *—" Mr. C. ſpoke ſo much in favour of the Rioters, " that they were all diſcharged—a few days after Mr. C. walking " over the ſame field *dropt down and ſpoke no more*. Surely the " MERCY of God would not ſuffer a well-meaning man to be any " longer a tool to *Perſecutors* †."—" Calling at Newgate [in Briſ- " tol] I was informed that the poor wretches under ſentence of " death were earneſtly deſiring to ſpeak with me; but that it could " not be: Alderman Beecher having juſt then ſent an expreſs order, " that they ſhould not. I CITE *Alderman Beecher to anſwer for theſe* " *Souls at the judgment ſeat of Chriſt* ‡."

In reviewing theſe JUDGMENTS (though fulminated with the air of one who had the divine Vengeance at his diſpoſal) I find ſome difference between his and thoſe inflicted by the Apoſtles.

1. Their terrors fall upon Cheats and Impoſtors, ſuch as *Ananias* and *Sapphira*; *Elymas* the Sorcerer, and *Simon* the Magician: Whereas the judgments of this new Apoſtle ſtrike only the members of his own Church, for oppoſing the tumults of *field-preaching*, and the freaks of, what he calls, THE NEW BIRTH. 2. The Enemies of the infant Church were the Jewiſh Leaders; and they perſecuted in good earneſt; yet all theſe, the Apoſtles left untouched, and reſerved them for a future reckoning. Mr. Weſley's Enemies are his own fellow-members; and they perſecute in jeſt; that is, they beat drums, they ring bells, and roar with the rabble; yet theſe, with unrelenting rage, he *cuts off for troubling him:* while the anger of the holy Apoſtle, on the like occaſion, never roſe higher than a paſſionate wiſh §. Theſe differences, I leave Mr. Weſley to reconcile. There is another, which, I think, I may be able to account for myſelf. 3. When the Apoſtles puniſhed publicly, they as publicly pronounced ſentence. Thus to Sapphira, *Behold the feet of them which buried thy huſband are at the Door and ſhall carry thee out*; to Simon, *Thy money periſh* WITH THEE; and to Elymas,

* Journ. from Nov. 25, 1746, to July 20, 1750, p. 79.
† Ibid. p. 108. ‡ Ibid. p. 31.
§ *I would they were even cut off which trouble you*, Gal. v. 12.

Now behold the hand of the Lord is upon thee, and thou ſhalt be blind— But, in this very important affair, Mr. Weſley appears to have followed a better model, the practice of the INQUISITION; where, though the *Execution* be with all the open pomp of bitter and uncharitable piety, the *Sentence*, it is well known, is ever pronounced *in ſecret*. In one inſtance indeed, he varies from his model; and, at Briſtol, commences, as we have ſeen, a regular proceſs againſt Mr. *Alderman Beecher*; whom he ſummoneth, to give an account for *loſt Souls, at the judgment ſeat of Chriſt:* But whether the Alderman demurred; or whether he excepted to the juriſdiction; or indeed what became of him, after he had been ſo fairly *cited*, we no where learn.

Theſe are ſome of the extraordinary Graces of which Mr. J. Weſley aſſumes the Privileges. But let not this faithful view of them, delivered in his own words, be miſtaken for a confutation. My purpoſe, here, is only to ſhew that he lays claim to them, and ſo becomes a proper Subject of the APOSTOLIC TEST, by which we are enabled to diſcriminate all ſublunary *Wiſdom* from that which is *from above*. And if, on the application now to be made, he cannot bear the *touch*, it will be our fault not to ſee him for the future, in his genuine FORM of Deluder and Fanatic; which he has been long ſuſpected to have covered with another, namely, the FORM OF GODLINESS.

CHAP. VI.

WE come now to the application of this Sovereign Teſt, the Scourge and Confuſion of Impoſture.

This WISDOM FROM ABOVE, of which the Apoſtle ſo highly predicates, is, we ſee, the ſame as *Wiſdom revealed immediately from Heaven*; but, deſcending to Man, is adapted to the capacity of his Powers. So that *heavenly* and *earthly* wiſdom have this in common,

common, to be COMMUNICABLE, that is, TO BE UNDERSTOOD. For to communicate nonſenſe, which is a nothing, is no communication. When therefore we find a pretender to inſpiration, ſuch as JACOB BEHMEN, delivering to us, under this Character, a heap of unmeaning, or, what amounts to the ſame thing, unintelligible words, we reaſonably conclude, that if indeed, this *Wiſdom* did come from above, it hath ſo degenerated in its way down, as to be ever unfit to return; but muſt be content, with the other lapſed Entities of celeſtial original, to ſeek employment amongſt fools and knaves, here below. Nor will the Apology of his illuminated Diſciple *, in his book called *The Way to divine Knowlege*, at all mend the matter. "When Jacob, (ſays he) like Elijah, in his FIREY "CHARIOT, is caught up into ſuch heights, and ſees and relates "ſuch things as I cannot yet comprehend, I love and reverence "him for being where I never was, and ſeeing ſuch things as "he cannot make me ſee; juſt as I love and reverence St. Paul, "&c. †." The compariſon, we ſee, is honourable; though leſs appoſite than one could wiſh: For here lies the difference between *Jacob* and *Paul:* the *Roſecrucian* talks largely of what he knew his reader could not underſtand; and the *Apoſtle*, as Maſter of himſelf, though not of his Subject, more ſagely obſerves a religious

* Mr. William Law.

† *The way to* DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, &c. p. 88.—Mr. John Wesley indeed, though no enemy to theſe ſuperb Vehicles, ſpeaks very diſreſpectfully of Jacob's *fiery Chariot*: "I can and muſt ſay thus much [of his Myſterium magnum.] and that with as full "evidence, as I can ſay that two and two make four, it is moſt ſublime nonſenſe, "inimitable bombaſt, fuſtian not to be paralleled." Journal from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743. Another writer, who had the beſt means of being well informed, aſſures us, that this *fiery Chariot* was not of Jewiſh but of German conſtruction. "Jac. "Böhmius Sutor Gorlicenſis--Hic cum natura ipſa proclivis eſſet ad res abditas per-"veſtigandas, et Rob. Fluddii ac Roſæcrucianorum ſcita cognovisset, Theologiam, *igne* "*duce*, imaginatione comite invenit, ipſis Pythagoricis numeris et Heraclitî notis ob-"ſcuriorem—ita enim Chymicis imaginationibus et tanta verborum confuſione et cali-"gine omnia miſcet, ut ipſe ſibi obſtrepere videatur." J. L. Moſheimii Inſt. Hiſt. Eccl. ant. & recent.

ſilence *.

ſilence *. But ſo will not Mr. *William Law*, who is Maſter of neither. And who, without the *bleſſed Jacob's fiery Chariot*, can ſoar like him to the lunar region of loſt intellects; from whence he brings us theſe curioſities, – *a hungry, wrathful, material fire— ſpiritual materiality* – a mirrour *of ſound—wrath turned into Sun and Stars – darkneſs into Earth* – and *mobility into Air:* And informs us of theſe ſecrets, that *life is deſire*; that *rage is the cauſe of hardneſs in a flint*; *meekneſs, of fluidity in water*; that *earthly ſerpents are but tranſitory out-births of covetouſneſs, envy, pride and wrath*; and laſtly, that *body is only coagulated* or curdled *ſpirit:* with much more to the ſame purpoſe, that would diſgrace even Bedlam at full moon.

CHAP. VII.

HAVING ſhewn this *Wiſdom* to be, in its nature, COMMUNICABLE, and ſo, cut off all the bold pretenſions of theſe MYSTICS, we come to what St. James makes its firſt and eſſential quality; *The wiſdom from above*, ſays he, *is* FIRST, PURE; πρῶτον μὲν ἁγνή ἐστιν—i. e. *pure*, both from *carnal* and *ſpiritual* pollution. Now as Mr. *Wm. Law* begot METHODISM †, and Count *Zinzendorf* rocked the Cradle, it may not be improper, firſt of all, to examine *their* pretenſions to this eſſential quality of heavenly wiſdom, *purity*.

As *purity* reſpects *practice*, thoſe followers of the Count, the MORAVIANS, give us little trouble. For to paſs by their open *Hymn-book*, a heap of blaſphemous and beaſtly nonſenſe; if we may

* ἄῤῥητα ῥήματα ἃ οὐκ ἐξὸν ἀνθρώπῳ λαλῆσαι. 1 Cor. xii. 4.

† "Meeting with Mr. *Law's Chriſtian Perfection and ſerious Call*—the light flowed in ſo "mightily on my ſoul, that every thing appeared in a new View, &c. &c." Journ. from Feb. 1, 1737-8, *to his return from Germany*, p. 29.

give

give credit to the yet unconfuted relations both in Print and in MS. (compoſed by their own Members, the Participants of their moſt ſacred myſteries), their practices in the conſummation of marriage, or, as their Ritual calls it, the *Marriage Oeconomy*, are ſo horribly, ſo unſpeakably flagitious *, that this People ſeems to have no more pretence to be put into the number of Chriſtian Sects than the TURLUPINS of the thirteenth Century; a vagabond crew of miſcreants, who rambled over Italy, France, and Germany, under the title of *Brothers and Siſters of the free Spirit*; who, in ſpeculation, profeſſed that ſpecies of Atheiſm, called *Pantheiſm*; and in practice, claimed an *exemption* from all the obligations of morality and religion.

The BEHMENISTS, indeed, have not extended the FREEDOM of their *Spirit* to this length; yet the Leader of the ſect, amongſt us, though manifeſting an exemplary abhorrence of all *carnal impurity*, has fallen into the loweſt dregs of the *Spiritual*; and hath written a large diſcourſe to recommend PANTHEISM, a Doctrine ſo much ennobled by the *Turlupins*, of the thirteenth Century; ſo learnedly explained by the Carteſian Spinoſiſts, and ſo politicly concealed by the Chineſe Virtuoſi: which teaches, that there is but one univerſal Subſtance exiſting, of which, the Creature and Creator (if, after this, they are to be diſtinguiſhed) participate in common. The general principles of this unhappy Philoſophy, the Reader may find in the note below †.

But

* Mr. J. Weſley, in a *melancholy account*, which, he ſays, he received of theſe Wretches at Bedford, inſerts the following particular—"Mr. Rimius has ſaid nothing to what might "have been ſaid concerning their MARRIAGE OECONOMY. I know [ſaith the informer] a "hundred times more than he has written. But the particulars are too ſhocking to "relate. I believe no ſuch things were ever practiſed before, no not amongſt the moſt "barbarous Heathens." Journ. from July 20, 1750, to Oct. 28, 1754, p. 74.

† "It is the ſame impoſſibility for a thing to be created *out of* nothing, as to be "created *by* nothing. It is no more a part or prerogative of God's omnipotence "to create a Being out of nothing, than to make a thing to be without any one "quality of Being, in it—Every creature is nothing elſe than NATURE put into a "certain

But next to this *impurity* of fanatic *Wiſdom* which ſets NATURE in the throne of GOD, is that other, which ſeparates REASON from

" certain form of exiſtence." *An Appeal to all that doubt or diſbelieve the truths of the Goſpel*, by W. Law, M. A. 1742, p. 8.

" That which thinks and wills in the ſoul, is that VERY SAME unbeginning breath " which thought and willed in God, before it was breathed into the form of a human " ſoul; and therefore it is, that Will and Thought cannot be bounded.—The eſſences " of the ſoul were a breath in God before they became a living ſoul, they lived in God " before they lived in the created ſoul; and therefore the ſoul is a partaker of the " eternity of God, and can never ceaſe to be." P. 10.

" The creation of a ſoul is the bringing the powers of thinking and willing out of their " eternal ſtate in the one God, into a beginning ſtate of ſelf-conſcious life, diſtinct from " God. And this is God's omnipotent creating ability, that he can make the powers " of his own nature become creatural, living perſonal images of what he is in himſelf, " in a ſtate of DISTINCT PERSONALITY from him." P. 12.

" It is no more a property of the divine omnipotence to be able to annihilate a " ſoul, than to be able to make an eternal truth become a fiction of yeſterday. And " to think it a leſſening of the power of God, to ſay, that he cannot annihilate the " ſoul, is as abſurd as to ſay, that it is a leſſening of the light of the Sun, if it cannot " deſtroy or darken its own rays of light." P. 17.

" To ſuppoſe this or any other MATERIAL world to be made out of nothing, has " all the ſame abſurdities in it as the ſuppoſing angels and ſpirits to be created out of " nothing. All the qualities of all beings are eternal.—All qualities, properties, or " whatever can be affirmed of God, are ſelf-exiſtent and neceſſarily-exiſtent. Self and " neceſſary exiſtence is not a particular attribute of God, but is the general nature " of every thing that can be affirmed of God. All qualities and properties are ſelf- " exiſtent in God.—It follows undeniably that EVERY CREATED THING MUST HAVE " ITS WHOLE NATURE FROM, AND OUT OF, THE DIVINE NATURE." P. 23, 24.

" Properly and ſtrictly ſpeaking, nothing CAN BEGIN to be. The beginning of every " thing is nothing more than its beginning to be in a *new ſtate*.—No quality or " power of nature then began to be; but ſuch qualities and powers as had been " from all eternity began then to be in a *new ſtate*. Aſk what fire, light, darkneſs, air, " water, and earth are; they are and can be nothing elſe but ſome ETERNAL THINGS, " BECOME groſs, finite, meaſurable, diviſible and tranſitory: For if there could be a " temporal fire that did not ſpring out of eternal fire, then there might be time that " did not come out of eternity." P. 114, 115.

" Will any one now call theſe things *whimſical ſpeculations?* Can any thing be thought " of, more WORTHY of God, more CONFORMABLE to Nature, or more CONSONANT to " all revealed Religion?" P. 118.

GRACE.

GRACE. It is "a point we CHIEFLY INSIST UPON, (ſays Mr. J. "Weſley, the pillar and ground of *Methodiſm*) that orthodoxy or "RIGHT OPINION is, at beſt, but a very ſlender part of Religion, "IF ANY PART OF IT AT ALL *." Here we ſee REASON is, as it were, diſcarded from the ſervice of RELIGION, and from its attendance on GRACE: though one part of the office of the Holy Spirit be *to lead us into all truth.* For when Reaſon is no longer employed to diſtinguiſh between *right* and *wrong* in *Opinions*, Religion hath no further connexion with it. And what occaſion for its ſervice when the diſtinction, we are told, is of ſo little conſequence? And yet if we once agree to *ſeparate* Reaſon from Religion, *Piety* will ſoon degenerate into Superſtition or Fanaticiſm. But the Piety of the firſt ages had a different eſſence: it was then the glory of the Goſpel to be a *reaſonable Service.* By this quality it was diſtinguiſhed from the various modes of Gentile Worſhip, which entirely conſiſted in the fanatic Raptures of their Prophets, and the Superſtitious Rites of their Prieſts. Articles of belief, or a formula of Faith, they left to thoſe Innovators who had now pretended to bring in *Reaſon* for the regulation of Religion; *orthodox or right Opinion being* (on the principles of theſe antient Maſters of the Mob, the ſupporters of Paganiſm) *at beſt but a very ſlender part of Religion, if any part of it at all.* On the other hand, St. PAUL conſidered *right Opinion* as a full third part, at leaſt, of Religion; where ſpeaking of the three great ſupports which the Maſter-builder, the HOLY SPIRIT, had provided for the Chriſtian-Church, he makes this, of *right opinion*, to be one. *The fruit of the Spirit* (ſays he) *is in all* GOODNESS *and* RIGHTEOUSNESS *and* TRUTH †. For by *Goodneſs* ‡ is meant the conduct of Particulars to the Whole; and conſiſts in the exemplary habits of *ſocial* virtue: and this refers to CHRISTIAN PRACTICE. By *righteouſneſs* § is meant the conduct of the Whole to Particulars; and conſiſts in that

* Mr. J. Weſley's *Plain account*, &c p. 4.

† Eph. v. 9. ‡ Ἀγαθωσύνη. § Δικαιοσυνη.

equal gentleneſs of Government, where Church-Authority is made to coincide with the private rights of Conſcience; and this refers to CHRISTIAN DISCIPLINE. And by *Truth* * is meant the conduct of the Whole and of Particulars to one another, mutually; and conſiſts in *Orthodoxy* or *right Opinion*; and this refers to CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. So different an Idea had St. Paul of RELIGION from what this over-zealous man hath been led to entertain of it. No leſs was the difference, which the firſt *Reformers* from the errors of Popery, entertained of it; who, for the ſake of *right opinion*, occaſioned ſo many revolutions in *Civil* as well as in *ſpiritual* Syſtems; the perverſity of men turning, as it had before done, the meſſage of *peace* into a *ſword* †. How much then had all theſe to anſwer for, if *right opinion be at beſt but a ſlender part of Religion, if any part of it at all.* Without doubt, Mr. Weſley has, by this declaration, provided well for the fortune of his own Sect, amongſt all denominations of Chriſtians. But what obligations the Church of England (of which he profeſſes himſelf a member) has unto him for thus ſhortening the labours of the Popiſh Miſſionaries, he would do well to conſider. Such eſcapes as theſe, I ſuppoſe, they were, which occaſioned the reports of his preaching *Popery* to his Followers; a calumny of which he bitterly complains: and not without reaſon: for, to do him juſtice, I believe he has as little regard to the intereſts of Popery as any of his hearers; and as much to his Own: the truth ſeems to be this. He could not find a better mean of ſecuring the honour of his own pretenſions than by this extraordinary declaration. He ſaw the exact reſemblance there is between his Saints and thoſe of the Church of Rome, at the time of the NEW BIRTH. This might lead reflecting men to conclude, that the Original of both was the ſame. Yet as the Popiſh and Proteſtant opinions, or Articles of faith, are very oppoſite to one another, the God of Truth (while *Truth* was ſuppoſed to conſti-

* Ἀλήθεια.

† Matt. x. 34. *Think not that I am come to ſend peace on earth, I came not to ſend peace, but a ſword.*

tute

tute a principal part of Religion) could never be believed to have any thing to do with the *new birth*, whether Popiſh or Proteſtant. Nothing then was left for thoſe who had deſerted *Nature*, but to aſcribe both to *Enthuſiaſm* or *Demonianiſm*. To avoid this diſgrace, Mr. Weſley rather chuſes to let Popery ſhare with him in the glory of divine communications, and expreſly vouches for the Miracles wrought at the tomb of *Abbé Paris* *. Now this conceſſion could be no otherwiſe ſupported than by inculcating the notion, that errors in Faith have ſo little to do with Religion, that they are no bar or impediment to the higheſt favours of the Holy Spirit. *It is the point* (ſays he) *we chiefly inſiſt upon, that Orthodoxy or right opinion is at beſt but a very ſlender part of Religion, if any part of it at all.* Great reaſon likewiſe had he to INSIST ON THIS POINT, on another account, namely the Character he hath given of his own Saints. "The more (ſays he) I converſe with this People, "the more I am amazed. That God had wrought a great work "is manifeſt. And yet the main of them — are not able to give a "*rational account of the plaineſt principles of Religion.*" Nor is this obſervation confined to the People. He had made a proſelyte of Mr. D. vicar of B. And to ſhew he was no diſcredit to his Maſter, he delivers him to us under this Character — "He ſeemed to ſtag-"ger at nothing; though as yet his *underſtanding is not opened* †." He then attempts at the cauſe of this ſtrange Phenomenon. "It is "plain, God begins his work at the *Heart*; then the inſpiration "of the Higheſt giveth *underſtanding* ‡." But this ſolution, though it be in Scripture language, is neither Scripture doctrine nor hiſtory. In the firſt propagation of Religion, God began with the *underſtanding*; and rational conviction won the *heart*. When the Holy Ghoſt fell on the Diſciples at the day of Pentecoſt, *the devout men of every nation under heaven* heard them ſpeak in their own tongues.

* Journ. from July 20, 1749, to Oct. 30, 1751, p. 23.
† Journ. from July 20, 1750, to Oct. 28, 1754, p. 11.
‡ Journ. from Nov. 25, 1746, to July 20, 1750, p. 121.

But what? Not the jargon of fanatic movements, but the *wonderful works of God*, i. e. they heard them give a rational account of the various parts of God's religious Diſpenſations to Mankind. It was juſt the ſame on all other occaſions: when the Spirit firſt fell upon Believers, they *propheſied*; that is, they explained the Scriptures of the Prophets. But the diſſenſion amongſt the Corinthians ſet this matter in the cleareſt light, and ſhews that the *firſt* effect of inſpiration is to *give underſtanding*. Their underſtanding was ſo inlarged by all ſpiritual gifts, that the work not having been begun at the *heart*, they abuſed theſe advantages to the violation of Charity. But, for this diſcordancy, between *his* Miſſion and St. Paul's, he has a ſalvo: he obſerves occaſionally, in ſeveral places of his journal, "that God *now* not only does a *new work*, but by "*new ways*." This ſolution of our ſpiritual Empiric, puts one in mind of the Quack in Moliere, who having placed the *liver* on the left ſide, and the *heart* on the right, and being told that the ſtructure of the parts was certainly otherwiſe, replied, Oui, cela étoit autre fois ainſi; mais nous avons changé tout cela, & nous faiſons maintenant la médecine d'une methode toute nouvelle. — But though he talks of the *underſtanding* coming after, this is only to put off his *babes of grace*, to *latter lammas*: Which he has plainly enough inſinuated in a parallel between the WORK carried on in England and in America. "I now (ſays he) looked over Mr. Prince's *Chriſ-*
"*tian Hiſtory*. What an amazing difference is there in the manner
"wherein God has carried on his *work* in England and in America!
"*There*, above an hundred of the eſtabliſhed Clergy, men of age
"and experience, and of the greateſt note for ſenſe and learning
"in thoſe parts, are zealouſly engaged in the *work*. *Here*, almoſt
"the whole Body of the aged, experienced and learned clergy,
"are zealouſly engaged againſt it: a few, but a handful of raw
"young men, engaged in it: without name, learning, or EMI-
"NENT SENSE! And yet by that large number of honourable men
"the *work* ſeldom flouriſhed above ſix months at a time; and
"then

" then followed a lamentable and general decay, before the next " revival of it: Whereas that which God hath wrought by theſe " deſpiſed inſtruments hath continually increaſed for fifteen years " together *." Now, what is this but to tell us, that the *underſtanding hath* nothing, and *will have* nothing, to do in the WORK?

On the whole, therefore, we conclude, That that *Wiſdom* which diveſts the Chriſtian Faith of its *Truth*, and the teſt of this Truth, *Reaſon*, and reſolves all into internal feelings, into myſtic ſpiritualiſm, and extatic raptures, inſtead of giving it the manly ſupport of MORAL DEMONSTRATION, That this, I ſay, can never be *the wiſdom which is from above*, whoſe characteriſtic attribute is *Purity*. Thus, on a fair trial, theſe illuminated Doctors have, at their very firſt entrance, excluded themſelves from their high pretenſions: Principles like theſe always coming from *Spiritual impurity*: and often leading, as we have ſeen, into the very ſink of the *carnal*.

CHAP. VIII.

BUT now, had it been our good fortune to have found the matter otherwiſe; and that the *Wiſdom* enquired after had reſted upon that foundation on which *celeſtial Wiſdom* muſt neceſſarily ſtand (and this it might well do, though it came not immediately from the Fountain-head of Purity; as the *unbroken Ciſterns* of Holy Writ were amply ſufficient to ſupply theſe *living waters)*; our next buſineſs would be to proſecute the inquiry, and to apply the other apoſtolic marks to theſe pretending Sectaries.

Of theſe marks, the firſt only (which has been ſo amply diſcuſſed) namely *purity*, reſpects the NATURE of the *Wiſdom* from above; or, in other words, *the Doctrines* taught. All the reſt, which follow, concern the MANNER of teaching, or the Conduct of

* Journ. from July 20, 1750, to Oct. 28, 1754, p. 43.

the

the Teachers. We are not therefore to ſtop ſhort in our enquiry, becauſe we may have found that the mark of *purity* has anſwered to the touch; though Mr. J. Weſley (who aſſures us that he preaches nothing but the doctrine of the Church of England) thinks this ſufficient to ſatisfy all reaſonable men concerning his conduct. "I "ſimply deſcribed (ſays he) the *plain old Religion of the Church of* "*England*, which is now almoſt every where ſpoken againſt, under "the name of METHODISM *." If *Methodiſm* be *ſpoken againſt*, thoſe who cenſure it, could mean neither an *old* nor a *new* Religion, ſince the word ſignifies only the *manner of propagating* either one or the other. And, of all men, Mr. Weſley ſhould beſt know the meaning of the term; ſince it was not a nick-name impoſed on the Sect by its enemies, but an appellation of honour aſſumed by, and beſtowed upon, themſelves. If therefore they preach only *the plain old Religion of the Church of England*, they could mean nothing, by *Methodiſm*, but the *manner of preaching* it; for the thing itſelf needed no other name of diſtinction than that which it had already. Why then will Mr. J. Weſley ſo groſsly miſrepreſent his Adverſaries as to ſay, that when they *ſpeak againſt Methodiſm*, they *ſpeak againſt the plain old Doctrine of the Church of England?* ſince he himſelf has taught them to call *methodiſm* (and they might well have called it by a harder name) the *manner*, in which he and his followers attempt to propagate this *plain old Religion*.

However, ſtrip him of his prevarication and his ſophiſtry, and we find him plainly enough declaring, "That the *manner* of preach-"ing, ſo it be *truth* which is preached, ought to give no offence." And, to this purpoſe, he relates the following converſation: "A "ſerious Clergyman deſired to know, In what point we differed "from the Church of England? I anſwered, To the beſt of my "knowlege, in none. The Doctrines we preach are the Doctrines "of the Church of England. Indeed, the fundamental doctrines of "the Church, clearly laid down both in her Prayers, Articles, and "Homilies †."

* Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 90. † Ibid. p. 81.

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Be this never ſo true, yet it will ſtill be as true that the moſt holy things may be depraved, in paſſing through impure hands; and that, RIGHT OPINION, which inſpires wiſdom and promotes peace, may then ſerve for nothing but to turn the heads and hearts of men to folly and diſſention, otherwiſe naturally framed and diſpoſed to profit by the truth. Indeed, a FANATIC MANNER of preaching, though it were the doctrine of an Apoſtle, may do more harm, to Society at leaſt, than a modeſt revival of *old* ſpeculative hereſies, or, than the invention of *new*; ſince it tends to bewilder the Reaſon of ſome, to inflame the Paſſions of others; and, in that ſtate of things, to ſpread diſorder and diſturbance throughout the whole Community. And in ſubjection to the civil Community was the Goſpel firſt preached; and under the protection of it was it, at length, every where eſtabliſhed. For, what does FIELD-PREACHING (for inſtance) imply, but a *famine of the Word*, occaſioned by a total neglect in the ſpiritual Paſtors appointed by Law? And what can it produce, but ſtrong reſentments in behalf of the Miniſters of Religion, thus injuriouſly treated? What can be the iſſue of the NEW BIRTH, attended with thoſe infernal throes and frightful agitations ſo graphically deſcribed in the Journals of Mr. J. Weſley, but high ferments in behalf of Religion itſelf, thus ſcandalouſly diſhonoured and traduced?

The ſacred Writer himſelf, who delivered this TEST for the trial of theſe Mens pretenſions, was unqueſtionably in theſe ſentiments, "that a *fanatic* Spirit did more miſchief in the *mode* of teaching, than an *erroneous* one, in the *matter* taught;" ſince, of half a dozen marks recommended for this purpoſe, the firſt only is applicable to the *doctrine*; all the reſt concern the *manners* of the Teacher.

Nay, what is more, we have Mr. J. Weſley himſelf, for once, on the ſide of the Apoſtle, where he ſays, that *it is a point he chiefly inſiſts upon, that* ORTHODOXY *or* RIGHT OPINION *is, at beſt, but a very ſlender part of Religion, if any part of it at all.* The Operation of Religion on the heart therefore (which with him is the ſame as

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on the fancy, and manifeſts itſelf in corporeal agitations) is the principal point. But *this*, altogether reſolves itſelf into the *manner* of propagating the Faith.

Yet ſtill it may be diſputed, Who it is that becomes anſwerable for the diſorders accaſioned by this *new mode* or *method* of propagating Religion? Is it Mr. J. Weſley, or is it his Adverſaries? He, I make no queſtion, will exculpate himſelf by the direction of St. Paul to Timothy—*to preach the word, in ſeaſon, and out of ſeaſon.* Which implies, he thinks, that the *manner* can never be amiſs, or made chargeable with blame.

But he would infer more from the Text than it will bear; and miſapply it, into the bargain. This direction relates to *time* only, which is but one of the many circumſtances attending the *manner of preaching*; and *that one*, in which the abuſe is leaſt material. The application (as we ſay) is no leſs faulty. The direction is confined to the ſtate of things *then* exiſting; when the ſuffering Church had ſo few opportunities to preach the word, that all, whether *ſeaſonable* or *unſeaſonable*, were with reaſon to be laid hold on. When the Church was once eſtabliſhed, and *fixed* and *ſeaſonable* times were appointed for holy offices, then (as every one may ſee) to fly to the *unſeaſonable* would be factious, and a breach of the diſcipline of that Church, of which the tranſgreſſor profeſſed himſelf a member. To judge, therefore, of the integrity of Mr. J. Weſley's conduct, we muſt turn from the directions which St. Paul gives *for his own times*, to thoſe which St. James gives *for all times*.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

AND this leads us on, in our Enquiry. The Wiſdom from above (ſays this Apoſtle) *is firſt pure, then* PEACEABLE.—To be PEACEABLE is a leading quality in its general Character. A Choir of Angels uſhered in the Advent of the Son of God, with *peace, good-will towards men* *. And He himſelf, on his departure from us, bequeathed it to us, as his deareſt legacy: *Peace I leave with you; my peace I give unto you* †. Now that which the FATHER proclaimed, which the SON beſtowed, muſt needs be of the office of the HOLY GHOST to maintain. Whatever *form of godlineſs*, therefore, hath not this Characteriſtic mark, can never reaſonably be deemed of heavenly extraction.

That the propagation of *Methodiſm* hath occaſioned many and great violations of *peace*, Mr. Weſley hath amply ſhewn in the journalary hiſtory of his Adventures.

But as in all conteſts between party and party, the blame is reciprocally thrown upon one another; before we come more directly to adjuſt the ſhare which may be fairly caſt upon *Methodiſm*, it may be uſeful previouſly to inquire into that *temper which makes for peace*; for we may be reaſonably well aſſured, that the fault lieth not in that quarter where ſuch a temper is found. Now our bleſſed Redeemer, who ſo earneſtly recommends *his peace* to us, hath given us directions how to preſerve it: *Be ye therefore wiſe* [φρόνιμοι, PRUDENT] *as Serpents, and harmleſs as Doves* ‡.

And he, who gave his Followers no precept, regarding life and manners, which he did not eminently recommend by his own example, was the moſt perfect pattern of *innocence*, under the direc-

* Luke ii. 14. † John xiv. 27.

‡ Matt. x. 16. So again, *Who is that faithful and wiſe* [φρόνιμος, *prudent*] *Servant?* Matt. xxiv. 45.

tion of PRUDENCE; as appears in his dextrous evaſions to captious queſtions of the Jewiſh Leaders, who wanted matter to inflame the people againſt him; in his avoiding the People when thus inflamed; and, above all, in his declining an untimely promulgation of his *Meſſiah-Character*; which would either have occaſioned civil commotions, or have endangered his life before he had compleated his Miniſtry. The firſt inſtance of this conſummate *prudence* is too important not to be more particularly explained. "There came to "him (ſays St. Mark) the Chief Prieſts and Scribes, and the "Elders, and ſay unto him, By what authority doſt thou theſe "things? and who gave thee this authority? And Jeſus anſwered "and ſaid unto them, I will alſo ask of you one queſtion, and "anſwer me, and I will tell you by what authority I do theſe "things. The baptiſm of John, was it from Heaven, or of Men? "anſwer me. And they reaſoned with themſelves, ſaying, If we "ſhall ſay, From heaven; he will ſay, Why then did ye not "believe him? But if we ſhall ſay, Of men; they feared the "People: For all men counted John that he was a Prophet in-"deed. And they anſwered and ſaid unto Jeſus, We cannot tell. "And Jeſus anſwering, ſaith unto them, Neither do I tell you, by "what authority i do theſe things *."

A direct anſwer to this queſtion, apparently reaſonable, and urged by thoſe who had authority to demand it, muſt have immaturely revealed what the deſtined Miniſtry of Jeſus made neceſſary to be kept ſecret. And yet, to evade the queſtion, in ſuch a manner as was ſufficient to ſatisfy Authority, needed all that divine prudence with which the Author of our Salvation was endowed. He therefore replies, "Firſt, anſwer me this queſtion concerning John." The queſtion was reaſonable, conſidered in the view of an argument *ad hominem*; it was reaſonable, from the force it had in itſelf: For if it ſhould appear, that that queſtion had not been determined in the caſe of John, it was evident from their own conduct, that

* Chap. xi. 27, *& ſeq.*

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the juriſdiction of the Sanhedrim was not violated by any man's declining to anſwer one of the ſame import. Further, the queſtion was reaſonable and proper in itſelf. John publicly profeſſed himſelf the forerunner of Jeſus: So that if it were neceſſary for the Sanhedrim to come at the true knowlege of the general Caſe, they ſhould have begun with John. This, the natural order of a judicial proceeding required. Nor would the Chief Prieſts have been backward to anſwer it, in either view. But here lay the difficulty; the People were of one opinion concerning John, and the Sanhedrim of another. This embarras ſilenced them. And in our Saviour's taking advantage of that circumſtance conſiſts the divine dexterity of his exemplary prudence. *Neither do I tell you* (ſays he) *by what authority I do theſe things.* As much as to ſay, "Both on my principles and on your own, a previous queſtion is firſt to be reſolved, namely, concerning *the baptiſm of John.* When you have anſwered this, then comes my time to anſwer yours: But till then, you have no right to inſiſt upon an anſwer."—Such inſtances of Prudence, and ſo divinely managed, made St. Paul, where in his Epiſtle to the Epheſians he diſtinguiſhes (in the twofold Character of the bleſſed Jeſus) between his office of *Redeemer* from Sin, and *Preacher* of Righteouſneſs, expreſs his latter office in theſe emphatic words, *He hath abounded towards us in all wiſdom and* PRUDENCE *, σοφίᾳ καὶ φρονήσει. Which, as appears by what follows, the Apoſtle makes to conſiſt in his Maſter's ſuiting and adapting the various Revelations of his Will to the peculiar ſeaſons and occaſions when the knowlege of it was become uſeful to the furtherance of the Faith. *Having* (ſays St. Paul) *made known unto us the Myſtery of his will according to his good pleaſure, which he hath purpoſed in himſelf; that in the diſpenſation of the fulneſs of time he might gather together in one, all things in Chriſt, &c.* By which the Apoſtle ſeems principally to have in mind that obſcure and backward intimation, which, for ſome time, kept hid from his Diſciples this

* Chap. i. 8.

myſtery of his will; the uſual title given by the ſacred Writers to the calling in of the Gentiles into the Church of Chriſt. The *prudence* of which conduct is obvious. The Goſpel was to be firſt offered to the Jews. But their reception of it was ſo unkind, that, had the Apoſtles been then acquainted with this *Myſtery*, they had been tempted to turn to the Gentiles, before the miſſion to the Jews had been fairly compleated. When that was accompliſhed, the *myſtery* was revealed, in all its ſplendor, to St. Peter.

On the whole, therefore, we ſee, that THE PEACEFUL CHARACTER IS THAT, WHERE INNOCENCE IS UNDER THE DIRECTION OF PRUDENCE. Emancipated from this direction, *Innocence* becomes a prey both to itſelf and to others; and is, either actively or paſſively, the perpetual ſource of Diſcord.

Let us ſee, now, the regard our new Miſſionaries *profeſs to pay* to this precept and example of their Maſter. HUMAN PRUDENCE has, ſome how or other, ſo highly offended Mr. J. Weſley, that he ſcruples not to call it, the MYSTERY OF INIQUITY and the OFFSPRING OF HELL.—"I believe (ſays he) it pleaſed God to bleſs the "firſt Sermon moſt, becauſe it gave moſt offence, being indeed an "open defiance of that *myſtery of iniquity* which the World calls "PRUDENCE *." As he here informs us, Who gave it that Name, one might be apt to ſuppoſe he meant, the *Prudence* of the *unjuſt Steward*, which is indeed the *myſtery of Iniquity*, did not he himſelf forbid us to underſtand it in this ſenſe, by fairly telling us that he meant, what the *World* calls CHRISTIAN *Prudence*. And as bad as the *World* is, I think it never qualified the *prudence* of the *unjuſt Steward* with that attribute.—"God, deliver me, and all that ſeek "him in ſincerity, from what the World calls CHRISTIAN PRU-"DENCE †." And again, to a friend who approved not of his *field-preaching*, "—I fear that *offspring of Hell*, worldly or myſtic "PRUDENCE, hath drawn you away from the ſimplicity of the

* Journ. from Feb. 1, 1737-8, to his return from Germany, p. 12.

† Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 13.

"Goſ-

" Goſpel *." If his averſion to *Prudence* be thus great, his enmity to thoſe, amongſt whom it is uſually found, can ſcarce be thought leſs, from the hard words he gives whenever he ſpeaks of them.— " Mrs. Baddiley (ſays he) deſired me to go up to her Son, who had " been out of order for ſome days. For a year or two he was a " pattern to all the family, till he began to converſe more with " GOOD SORT OF MEN. He then grew cooler and cooler in the " ways of God, and in a few months quitted the Society †."—" It " is abſolutely needful for ſuch a one as me to follow the wiſe ad- " vice of Mr. Herbert. And this, I bleſs God, I can, in ſome " meaſure, do, while I avoid that BANE OF ALL RELIGION, the " Company of GOOD SORT OF MEN, as they are called, Perſons " who have a liking to, but no SENSE of, Religion;" [i. e. no ex- tatic feelings or the pains of the *new birth*, &c.] " But theſe in- " ſenſibly undermine all my reſolution, and ſteal away what little " ZEAL I have ‡;" i. e. perſuade him to be *peaceable*.

And again, ſpeaking of one of his Backſliders, he ſays—" but indulging himſelf in HARMLESS COMPANY he firſt made ſhipwreck of his ZEAL, and then of his FAITH §." In this I think he is right. The *Zeal* and the *Faith* of a FANATIC are ſuch exact tallies to one another that I have no conception how either can exiſt alone. They came into the World together to diſturb Society and diſhon- our Chriſtianity; and they muſt go out together before the One can regain its peace, or the other its dignity.

On the whole, we find that Mr. J. Weſley is, by his own con- feſſion, entirely deſtitute of that temper *which makes for peace*: If therefore his preaching be attended with tumults and diſorders, we cannot but aſcribe it to the want of that quality, which the Founders of our holy Religion made eſſential to the ſucceſsful pro- pagation of the *Goſpel of Peace*, namely, PRUDENCE. It is true,

* Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 56, 57.
† Journ. from Nov. 25, 1746, to July 20, 1750, p. 31.
‡ Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 31.
§ Journ. from his embarking for Georgia, to his return to London, p. 41.

Mr.

Mr. Wesley, as we have seen, throws the whole fault of these tumults on the DEVIL; and this may be allowed him in the sense that every paultry Pilferer and Sabbath-breaker is used to do. But if we seek for the more immediate cause, we shall find it much nearer hand. The Roman Satirist pretended,

——— Nullum Numen abest, si sit PRUDENTIA.

Where PRUDENCE governs, *no God is wanting to keep the world in order*. We may say, with more sobriety and truth, that where IMPRUDENCE takes the lead, there needs no *Devil* to throw it into confusion. What, for instance, more strongly tends to tumult and disorder than for One who professes to propagate only the *plain old Religion of the Church of England*, to set at nought its established Discipline, by invading the province of the parochial Minister; by assembling in undue places and at unfit times; by *speaking evil of Dignities*, in scurrilous invectives against the Governors and Pastors of the national Church? Insolences of this nature provoke warm and ill-instructed men to demand justice on the offenders: Which not being at hand (as the interests of Society will not, always, permit the Magistrate to enforce it, where the insults on his office are covered with the pretences of Religion), Particulars are but too apt to seek that in a tumultuary and criminal way, which all the providence of Government, and all the equity of Law, are but barely sufficient to adjust, with such discretion, as, that while the dignity of the State is vindicated, the rights of Religion are not infringed.

Nor will that fanatic Apology, which is ever at hand, be any excuse for them in the commission of their disorders; namely, "That the violation *of peace amongst men* serves to advance the *peace of God*; our blessed Master having himself declared, that *he was not come to send Peace on earth, but a sword.*" Now the same Spirit which disposes them to apply to their own case all those declarations concerning the first extraordinary state of the Gospel, hinders them from seeing, that these words of Jesus respect only the accidental

accidental and tranſient ſtruggle of the then expiring Powers of darkneſs; but that the heavenly Proclamation of *peace towards men*, declares the genuine and conſtant fruits of *God's good-will to* his Creatures: that the *firſt* only predicted the early fortunes of a ſuffering Church; and that the *other* deſcribed the eſſential nature, the eternal genius, of an all-beneficent Religion. But Enthuſiaſts, hurried on by the fervours of an inflamed fancy, loſe ſight of a Chriſtian land, and a believing Magiſtrate; and have nothing before their eyes but a Country of Pagans and Idolaters, with the Princes of this world riſen up to ſuppreſs and perſecute the *Word of life*. Under theſe deluſions, it is no wonder that they deſpiſe order, inſult Government, and ſet their Rulers at defiance.

But PEACE is the cure of FANATICISM, as *Fanaticiſm* is the bane of *Peace*. Sectaries muſt either kick or be kicked. They muſt either perſecute, or they muſt provoke perſecution. To be in this turbulent ſtate, is living in their proper element.

As every *Libertine* aſpires to be on the *laughing* ſide, ſo every *Zealot* would fain be on the *perſecuting*. But Zealots, as well as other Adventurers, muſt take their chance in this world, whatſoever ſecurity they have made for the other. We ſee METHODISM, at preſent, under a well-eſtabliſhed watchful Government, where it is obliged to wear a leſs audacious look. To know its true character, and native diſpoſition, we ſhould ſee it in all its fortunes. And this our own Country, productive of every ſtrange thing, hath given us ample means to contemplate. For They, who now go under the name of METHODISTS, were, in the days of our Fore-fathers, called PRECISIANS; terms of their own deviſing, and (as the fruits of the ſame ſpirit) nearly ſynonymous, importing that the bearers of them had carefully ſquared out their Religion by line and level. The *elder Methodiſm*, on its firſt appearance, put on the ſame ſuffering exterior, which we ſee the younger Brother wear at preſent. During the firm adminiſtration of Elizabeth it diſguiſed, and but barely diſguiſed, its native ferocity, in a feigned ſubmiſſion; after having invited perſecution with the air of a perſecutor. Thoſe

times,

times, we may be ſure, would not ſuffer it to wait long for what it wanted. And then, as a precious Metal, which had undergone its trial in the fire, and left all its droſs behind, the Sect, with great propriety, changed its name, from PRECISIAN to PURITAN. But in the weak and diſtracted times of Charles the Firſt, it ventured to throw off the maſk; and, under the name of INDEPENDENT, became the chief Agent of all the dreadful diſorders which terminated that unhappy reign. For INDEPENDENCY was a name as well ſuited to the weakneſs of that Government, which it defied and overturned, as METHODISM is to the ſtrength of This, of which it ſtands in awe. Nor is this Pedigree, which makes *Methodiſm* of the younger Houſe to *Independency*, invented, like heraldic fictions, to ennoble my ſubject. Whoever reads the large accounts of the *Spiritual ſtate of the Regicides* while under condemnation (written and publiſhed, at that time, by their friends, to make them paſs, with the People, for Saints and Martyrs), and compares them with the circumſtantial Journals of the *Methodiſts*, will find ſo exact a conformity in the frenzy of ſentiment, and even in the cant of expreſſion, upon the ſubjects of Faith, Grace, Redemption, Regeneration, Juſtification, &c. as may fully ſatisfy him, that they are both of the ſame Stock; and ready, on a return of the like kindly ſeaſon, to produce the ſame fruits. All the difference, which diſtance of times and variety of circumſtances have effected, is only this: The *Methodiſt* is now, an *Apoſtolic Independent*; and the Independent was then, a *Mahometan Methodiſt*.

Indeed, it hath been Mr. J. Weſley's miſhap, with every other requiſite of a ſkilful Leader, to fall upon times very unpropitious to the fortunes of a new Sect.

He found himſelf in a Government whoſe equity abhorred Perſecution for Religion; and whoſe firmneſs, on the other hand, would not ſuffer its principles of Toleration to be abuſed, to the diſturbance of Society. Here was little room for the exertion of that quality by which a Sectary may be properly ſaid to exiſt, namely, ZEAL active or paſſive. He wanted to be perſecuted; but Perſecution

ſecution would not come at his call. Yet, it muſt be owned, he uſed every extraordinary method to provoke it: The time was now paſt, when it could be ſaid of this *Demon*, as of the leſs miſchievous ones of old, "Vocatus, aut non vocatus, audit." The advantages of *perſecution* to a new Sect, Mr. J. Weſley is not at all ſhy in confeſſing.—"About one, I preached at Holton, where like-"wiſe all is now calm, after a violent ſtorm of ſeveral weeks, "wherein many were beaten and wounded, and outraged various "ways; *but* NONE MOVED *from their ſtedfaſtneſs*. In the evening I "preached at Armley, *to many who want a ſtorm, being quite* UN-"NERVED *by conſtant Sunſhine* *." It is the ſame conſcious want which makes him complain of ill treatment; and yet be diſſatisfied with good—"We came to St. Ives before morning prayers, and "walked to Church without ſo much as one huzza. How ſtrangely "has one year changed the ſcene in Cornwall! This is now a "peaceable, nay honourable ſtation. They give us good words in "almoſt every place. *What have we done, that the World ſhould be "ſo civil to us* †?"

Is not this the language of a man whom nothing can pleaſe, when he is defeated in a ſecret purpoſe, which he is aſhamed to own? He languiſhed, we ſee, for good WHOLESOME SEVERITIES. Many (as he well expreſſes it) *wanted a ſtorm, being quite* UNNERVED *by conſtant Sunſhine*. To ſupply this want, which the Magiſtrate ſo cruelly denied, he is forced to make the beſt of thoſe mock perſecutions, the *Drums* and *Huzzas* of the Rabble. And ſo bloody always are his ideas, by a conſtant meditation on this ſubject, that, ſpeaking of the miſnomers of the Grand Jury of Cork, in their preſentment of his Brother, and half a ſcore more itinerant Preachers, as vagrants and perſons of ill fame, &c. he thus expreſſes himſelf—"The names (only moſt of them *miſerably mangled and mur-*

* Journ. from Nov. 25, 1746, to July 20, 1750, p. 88.

† Ibid. p. 31.

dered) were deſigned for the names of eight Preachers, &c. *" The future Martyrologiſt whom favouring Deſtiny has appointed to collect together the Saints and Martyrs of this afflicted Church, will, if he be wiſe, never ſuffer himſelf to be miſled into a belief that this *mangling and murdering* can refer to *names*; or indeed to any thing leſs than to an *Iriſh Maſſacre*, charitably diſguiſed by our meek Apoſtle, under a figure, not to ſay a deformity of Speech. To give theſe *Perſecutions* all the *relief* in his power, he expatiates on every adventure with ſuch circumſtance, that there is hardly a turnip-top thus ſacrilegiouſly employed, which has not had the honour of being recorded. But this is for Poſterity: Something more was to be done for the ſake of the *unnerved* Brethren. This ſmall pittance of *perſecution*, poor as it is, muſt be turned to uſe while time ſerved, leſt, like a flame of ſtraw, it ſhould go out as ſoon as it was put into a blaze. He therefore contrives to keep *perſecution* alive by *proſecuting his Perſecutors:* And, to make his revenge the ſweeter, he does it on the *toleration act*; the *Law* which does him ſo much miſchief, in depriving him of a real Perſecution. This he notably turns againſt itſelf, and makes an Inſtrument to ſupport and keep up a ſhadowy Perſecution, in the Shouts and Revels of the Mob.

Of this contrivance, and of the ſucceſs of this contrivance, he has given us many curious examples in his Journals. Abundantly ſufficient to evince, that though he who perſecutes, breaks the Peace, yet as he is but the tool and Inſtrument of him who invites and provokes *perſecution*, the crime at length comes home to him who ſet the Rioter on work.

* Journ. from July 20, 1749, to Oct. 30, 1751, p. 4.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

THE next mark of celeſtial Wiſdom is, its being GENTLE AND EASY TO BE INTREATED. That is, neither a rigid reprover of the indifferent manners of others, nor obſtinately tenacious of its own: but, as far as Truth and Honeſty will permit, compliant and even obſequious to all men. The great Apoſtle of the Gentiles fully approves his pretenſions to this *Wiſdom*, in the account he gives of his conduct, *in becoming all things to all Men, that he might gain ſome* *. For the truth of which, he appeals to thoſe who were beſt acquainted with his life and converſation. But amongſt our modern Apoſtles the Scene is ſhifted. We find them ſevere condemners of thoſe innocent manners of their fellow-citizens, which they themſelves have abſtained from, on pretence of their being leſs profitable and edifying, or, perhaps, obſtructive of that perfection which they pretend to aim at. Nor are they leſs ſevere exactors of conformity to their own obſervances.

They tell us what we are to think of them, in the very appellation they aſſume. For METHODISM (as we have ſaid) implies a ſet of manners, marked out by the rule and compaſs; and, when made a name of diſtinction, it declares thoſe manners are to be religiouſly and invariably obſerved, as the ſacred badge of the Brotherhood. Hence Mr. J. Weſley in a letter *to the Church of God at Hernhuth in Upper Luſatia*, having reproved them for teaching, "that it does imply *Liberty* to conform to the world, by talking "on uſeleſs, if not trifling ſubjects, and by joining in worldly di-"verſions, *in order to do good*," they juſtify themſelves by ſaying, "We believe it much better to diſcourſe out of the news-papers, "than to chatter about holy things to no purpoſe." To which he

* 1 Cor. ix. 22.

replies, "Perhaps ſo. But what is this to the point? I believe "both one and the other to be uſeleſs, and therefore AN ABOMI-"NATION TO THE LORD *." Nay, he puſhed this matter ſo far, as to come to a ſolemn reſolution, NEVER TO LAUGH: and, to guard himſelf againſt the approaches of this paltry infirmity, *never to ſpeak a tittle of worldly things.* And certainly, he who carries his diſſociability to this extreme, is in no danger of being EASILY INTREATED. He was now fit company only for the Devil (with whom, as we have ſeen, he had a great deal to tranſact); indeed, not for him neither, till the more ſociable Fiend had a little relaxed his muſcles: for the firſt trick Satan played him, after they grew acquainted, was, as he himſelf tells us, to make him burſt out into an *immoderate fit of Laughter* †. But he was ready *to tear himſelf to pieces* for his frailty.

Our Apoſtle's GENTLENESS may, by this time, be eaſily gueſſed at. But he ſaves us the trouble. We learn it fully in his *encauſtic Paintings* of his Adverſaries. He met with one of theſe in a violent ſtorm at Sea. Yet the common danger of this dreadful hour could not abate the more violent tempeſt in his mind—"For who "ſhould be there (ſays he) but the famous Mr. Gr—— of Car-"narvonſhire. A clumſy, overgrown, hardfaced man; whoſe "countenance I could only compare to that (which I ſaw in Drury-"Lane, thirty years ago) of one of the *Ruffians in Macbeth* ‡——"I walked over (ſays he) to Egham, where Mr. —— preached "one of the moſt miſerable ſermons I ever heard: Stuffed ſo full "of dull, ſenſeleſs, improbable lies of thoſe he complimented "with the title of the Prophets §."—"At St. Ives we were "ſaluted, as uſual, with a Huzza, and a few ſtones *or* pieces "of dirt:" Yet, for want of a better, he has dignified even

* Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 103.

† See p. 610 of this Diſcourſe

‡ Journ. from July 20, 1749, to Oct 30, 1751, p. 31.

§ Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 88.

this

this with the name of a *Perſecution.* "The *Perſecution* here (ſays "he) was owing in great meaſure to the indefatigable labours of "Mr. *Hoblin* and Mr. *Simmons*; Gentlemen worthy to be had in "everlaſting remembrance for their unwearied endeavours to de-"ſtroy Hereſy.

"Fortunati ambo! Siquid mea pagina poſſit,
"Nulla dies unquam memori vos eximet ævo *."

Here he tells us, without diſguiſe, that it is his holy purpoſe, to gibbet up the *Names* of theſe his two Perſecutors, to everlaſting Infamy: while, by the moſt unregenerate malice in the world, he dips his curſes in the gall of irony; and, that they may ſtrike the deeper, fletches them with a prophane claſſical Parody.

Yet this is the man who ſays,—"God forbid that I ſhould RAIL, "at a Turk, Infidel, or Heretic. I would point out their Errors, "and I truſt, in the SPIRIT OF MEEKNESS †." Yea, *this* SPIRIT was ſo ſtrong in him, that he bleſſes God for his goodneſs, in directing all temptations to fall on this *ſide*; which, though it may be called his *blind ſide*, (as he always winks at his injuries; ſometimes, indeed, to take the better aim) he aſſures us, is not his *weak ſide*——"I cannot but ſtand amazed at the goodneſs of God. "Others are moſt aſſaulted on the *weak ſide* of their Soul. But "with me it is quite otherwiſe. If I have any ſtrength at all, "IT IS IN FORGIVING INJURIES. And on this very ſide am I "aſſaulted more frequently than any other ‡." By which, with uncommon modeſty, he would inſinuate that though his *perſecutions* abound, yet his *forgiveneſs, in the Spirit of meekneſs*, does much more abound.

St. Paul and St. James may be reconciled. But he is a bold man who will undertake to reconcile St. Paul and Mr. Weſley. The

* Journ. from Oct. 17, 1743, to Nov. 17, 1746, p. 22.
† Journ. from Nov 1, 1730, to Sept 3, 1741, p. 112.
‡ Journ. from July 20, 1750, to Oct. 28, 1754, p. 39.

Reader,

Reader, perhaps, will be better employed in turning his attention upon *ancient* and *modern* SAINTSHIP, at large: where, in one general view, he will ſee *God's grace* in the Firſt, and, in the Second, *Man's nature* ſeverally aſſerting their Rights throughout the whole progreſs. The genial Spirit of God could breathe nothing but the balm of *gentleneſs and eaſe*. The peſtilent heat of Fanaticiſm raiſes an inflammation and a tumour in the mind, whoſe Symptoms are an obdurate rigour, and impatience under the probe. The Heaven-ſtruck Heart is affected like the purer metals, which eaſily ſoften, and run ſpeedily at the touch of the etherial Ray. But the Fanatic Spirit, ſelf-heated by its own firey nature, retains the property of its congenial earth, which grows harder and more intractable as it burns.

CHAP. XI.

TO proceed. St. James, in his account of celeſtial *Wiſdom*, advances from grace to grace. It is *peaceable:* this is its loweſt quality. It is *Gentle and eaſy to be intreated:* this is a further advance in its Character. The firſt only implies the not giving umbrage or offence to our Brother; but the ſecond declares a readineſs to conſult his pleaſure and convenience. The Apoſtle's next recommendation of this Wiſdom riſes ſtill higher: it is, he ſays, FULL OF MERCY AND GOOD FRUITS. It would have been a poor account of the *Wiſdom from above*, that it amounted only to an obſequious *eaſe* and *gentleneſs* of Manners: a diſpoſition of heart little more than the ſhadow or out-line of Benevolence, that harmony of the affections, which the Chriſtian Faith calls CHARITY; and which the Apoſtle, by a beautiful periphraſis, terms, the being *full of mercy and good fruits*.

Let

Let us enquire then into the MERCY and GOOD FRUITS of modern Saintſhip. The *mercy* of the Sufferer is *forgiveneſs*; the *mercy* of the Inflicter is *forbearance*.

Of Mr. Weſley's *forgiveneſs* under ſufferings, we have ſeen many examples in the Language he beſtows on his Oppoſers; who paſs with him under no other title than that of the *Devil's Servants* and the *Devil's Children*: of his *forbearance*, when compleatly armed with the Vengeance of Heaven, we have ſeen many more, in his diſpatching the Principal of theſe *Children of the Devil*, without mercy, to their *Father*. For one ſure mark of the hypocondriac ſpirit under a Fanatic ferment, is the readineſs to diſpenſe, and the raſhneſs to fling about, the exterminating Judgments of God: and when an Enthuſiaſt *calls down fire from Heaven*, the leaſt of his concern is, his being heard. So that every diſaſter, befallen his Oppoſers, is conſidered by him as God's *owning the Cauſe*, and he would eſteem it ingratitude to his Maſter to give it any other name than that of a JUDGMENT; juſt as *Witches*, when a miſchief happens to thoſe whom they have often curſed, aſcribe it to the Avenger of their quarrels, their truſty Coadjutor the Devil. For under the agitations of wrath and revenge, the *fruits of this Spirit* are much the ſame, whether Heaven or Hell be called to their aſſiſtance. Do I wrong theſe Men? See what has been ſaid above of this matter*: and if that does not ſuffice, turn again to Mr. J. Weſley's *Journals*. "Wedneſday 15. I went to Bedlam at the "repeated requeſt of Mr. S. who had been confined there above "two years. This was the Perſon, who, while he was ſpeaking "againſt my Brother and me, to the Society at Kingſwood, was in "a *moment ſtruck raving mad*. But, it ſeems, *God is at length in-* "*treated for him*, and has reſtored him to a ſound mind†." Again, "One J——n H——n, a weaver——zealous for the Church and "againſt Diſſenters of every denomination——He laboured much

* P. 621—623.

† Journ. from Oct. 27, 1743, to Nov. 17, 1746, p. 33.

"to

" to convince his acquaintance that the *ſtrange fits, into which people* " *at the Societies fell*, was a deluſion of the Devil. We were going " home when one met us in the ſtreet, and informed us, That " J——n H——n was fallen *raving mad*.——Between one and " two, I came in and found him on the floor, the room being full " of people, whom his wife would have kept out, but he cried " aloud, No, let the world ſee the *juſt Judgment of God*. Two or " three men were holding him as well as they could. He imme- " diately fixed his eyes upon me, and ſtretching out his hands, " cried, Oh! this is he who, I ſaid, was a deceiver of the People. " But *God has overtaken me* *."—And again,—" I was informed of " an *awful providence*. A poor wretch who was here the laſt " week, curſing, blaſpheming, and labouring with all his might " to hinder the *word of God*, had afterwards boaſted to many, " that he would come again on *Sunday*, and no man ſhould ſtop " his mouth then. But on Friday *God laid his hand* upon " him, and on Sunday he was buried †.—I ſaw a poor man, *(once* " *joined with us)* who wanted nothing in this world, but the peace " the world cannot give. A day or two before, *he hanged himſelf*, " but was cut down before he was dead. He has been crying out " ever ſince, *God had left him, becauſe he had left the Children of* " *God* ‡. But he is inexorable to all who apoſtatize.—" I buried " the body of Lucy Godſhall——after preſſing toward the mark " for more than two years——*She became weary and faint*——*I* " *put her out of the hand*,——God bleſſed this to her ſoul."—— But how?——" She fell down on her knees, and delivered up her " ſoul and body into the hands of God. In the inſtant the uſe of " all her limbs was taken away, and ſhe was in a burning fever.— ' She cried out on *Satan*—was in *darkneſs*—was in *light*—cloſed " her eyes and died §."——" I was preſſed to viſit Nicholas Palmer,

* Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 44.
† Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 59, 60.
‡ Journ. from Oct. 27, 1743, to Nov. 17, 1746, p. 91.
§ Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 71.

" one

" one who had *ſeperated from us*, and behaved with a great *bit-*
" *terneſs*, till *God laid his hand* upon him. He had ſent for me
" ſeveral times, ſaying he could not die in peace till he had ſeen
" me.——We wreſtled with God in his behalf——his ſoul was
" comforted; and a few hours after quietly fell aſleep *."

Their GOOD FRUITS come next to be conſidered. Mr. J. Weſley's idea of *true Religion* doth not promiſe much. He ſaith, " It doth " not conſiſt in any or all theſe three things, *the living harmleſs*— " *uſing the means of Grace – and doing much good.* A man, he ſays, " may do all this, and yet have *no true Religion at all* †."

Yet St. JAMES talks another language. *Pure Religion* (and, I ſuppoſe, *pure* and *true* differ only in ſound) *and undefiled before God and the Father, is this, to viſit the fatherleſs and widows in their affliction, and to keep himſelf unſpotted from the World* ‡.

Now, what is *viſiting the fatherleſs and widows*, but *the doing much good?* And what is *keeping one's ſelf unſpotted from the world*, but *uſing the means of Grace?* In what a fearful taking then, muſt Mr. Weſley's Zealots be, who, miſled by the Bible, have ſo long miſtaken *true Religion?* The leaſt it will do is to drive them to *deſpair*. But this is the very ſtate in which their Maſter delights to take them up. And his aſſurance, that *true Religion* conſiſts *in God's dwelling and reigning in the Soul* §, ſoon makes way for a happier madneſs: the Jaws of Hell begin to cloſe, the Gates of Heaven to open.—But, what the over-laboured imagination ſuffered, during the courſe of this operation, requires the hand of a Maſter to deſcribe. I ſhall give it therefore in Mr. J. Weſley's own words: and as theſe his ſpiritual cures (which he reports with the exact-neſs of an Hippocrates or a Sydenham) are all the GOOD FRUITS he pretends to, he will not be diſpleaſed to have a few of the choiceſt of them ſet in a fair light.

* Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 5.
† Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 11, 12.
‡ St. James, c. i. ver. 27. § P. 11. ut ſup.

The condition of his Audience, on his firſt operation upon them, is thus graphically deſcribed—" I preached in an open place, two " or three miles from Newcaſtle. The wind was high and ex- " tremely ſharp: but I ſaw none go away till I went. Yet I ob- " ſerved none ſeemed to be much convinced; only STUNN'D, AS " IF CUT IN THE HEAD *." This was in order. They were firſt to be *ſtunned*; the Watchman, Reaſon, was to be laid aſleep before he could ſet fire to their Imaginations. But he brings them to their ſenſes with a vengeance, the vengeance of the Devil. " I felt the FIRE OF HELL already kindled in my breaſt (ſays one), " and all my body was in as much pain as if I had been in a " burning firey furnace †."—" I was interrupted (ſays he) by the " cries of one who was *pricked at the heart*." One of thoſe, I ſuppoſe, who had before been *cut in the head*: and having now got poſſeſſion both of the *head* and *heart*, the game begins.——" Another " perſon dropped down——a little boy near him was ſeized in the " ſame manner. A young man who ſtood behind fixed his eyes " on him, and ſunk down himſelf as one dead. But ſoon began " to roar out and beat himſelf on the ground, ſo that ſix men " could ſcarcely hold him.—Mean while many others began to cry " out to the Saviour of all, that he would come and help them, " inſomuch that all the houſe, and indeed all the ſtreet for ſome " ſpace, was in an uproar.—I was called after ſupper to one who " feeling in herſelf ſuch a Conviction as ſhe had never known be- " fore, had run out of the Society in all haſte, *that ſhe might not* " *expoſe herſelf*. But the hand of God followed her ſtill, &c. ‡." This fear of *expoſing herſelf*, Mr. J. Weſley, we ſee, takes much amiſs. He ſpeaks with ſome reſentment, but more contempt, of her delicacy. Yet it ſeems hard that he would not ſuffer the young Woman to underſtand the nature of *her own feelings*, and conſe-

* Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 82.

† Ibid. p. 83.

‡ Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 50, 51.

quently

quently to be the beſt judge of the danger ſhe was in, of *expoſing herſelf*.—" Forty or Fifty of thoſe who were ſeeking ſalvation, de-" fired leave to ſpend the night together in the ſociety room. Be-" fore ten, I left them, and laid down."—For our Engineer had ſo amply provided them with combuſtibles, and ſo fitly laid his train, that he knew they would take fire from their own colliſions. He was not diſappointed.—" Between two and three in the morn-" ing he was awaked, and deſired to come down ſtairs. I imme-" diately (ſays he) heard ſuch a confuſed noiſe, as if a number " of men were all putting to the Sword. It increaſed, when I " came into the room, and began to pray, &c. *."—" Thence I " went to a poor woman who had been long in *deſpair*. I was glad " to meet with Mrs. R. there; the perſon mentioned in Mr. " Whitefield's Journal, who after *three* years *madneſs* (so CALLED) " was ſo deeply convinced of Sin, &c. †."—" Another of Dr. " Monro's patients came to deſire my advice; I found no reaſon " to believe ſhe had been otherwiſe *mad* than every one is, who is " deeply convinced of Sin ‡."—" A middle-aged woman deſired me " to return thanks for her to God; who, as many witneſſes then " preſent teſtified, was, a day or two before, really *diſtracted*, and, " as ſuch, *tied down in her bed*. But upon prayer made for her, " ſhe was inſtantly relieved, and reſtored to a ſound mind §."—" *I* " *could not but be under ſome concern* with regard to one or two per-" ſons, who were tormented in an unaccountable manner, and " ſeemed to be indeed *Lunatics*, as well as ſore vexed ||." Here, for the firſt time, Humanity ſeems to have recovered a little of its rights, amidſt theſe ſcenes of horrour. Mr. J. WESLEY himſelf confeſſes, *he could not but be under ſome concern*. But invigorated by the *new Man*, he ſoon ſhakes off the *human pity* of the *old*, and makes a joke even of the very *Lunacy*, he had pretended to lament.

* Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 51, 52.
† Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 8.
‡ Ibid. p. 83. § Ibid. p. 4.
|| Ibid. p. 88.

" Two or three who were at the Devanden (a high hill two or three " miles from Chepſtow) *are gone quite diſtracted*, i. e. they mourn " and refuſe to be comforted till they have Redemption, &c. *"— " I deſired one who had ſeen affliction herſelf to go and viſit Mrs. " G—— in *Bedlam* (put there by her huſband as a *mad woman)*, " where it pleaſed God greatly to knit their hearts together, and " with his comforts to refreſh their ſouls †."—" Amongſt the " hearers was one, who ſome time before had been deeply convinced " of her ungodlineſs, inſomuch that ſhe cried out day and night, " *Lord, ſave, or I periſh!* All the neighbours agreeing that ſhe " was *ſtark mad*, her huſband put her into a Phyſician's hands, " who blooded her largely, and laid on ſeveral bliſters. But all this " proving without ſucceſs, ſhe was in a ſhort time judged to be *in-* " *curable*. When Mrs. Johnſon came, ſhe ſoon ſaw the nature of " the diſeaſe, having herſelf *gone through* the ſame. She ordered all " the medicines to be thrown away, and exhorted the Patient to " *look unto Jeſus* ‡."

And with this ſpiritual *madneſs* he is ſo enamoured, that he calls it, when at its height, A GLORIOUS TIME. " I preached at Wea- " vers Hall. IT WAS A GLORIOUS TIME. Several dropped to the " ground, as if ſtruck with lightning, &c. &c. §" And where this is wanting, though every other thing be to his wiſh, he is ſo diſ- ſatisfied, that it is as much as ever his ſubmiſſion to the divine Will can obtain of him, *to let God do as ſeemeth him good*.—" I ſaw none " of that *triumph of Faith*, which has been ſo COMMON in other " places. But the Believers go on *calm and ſteady*.—LET GOD DO " AS SEEMETH HIM GOOD ||."

* Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 90.
† Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 54.
‡ Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 53.
§ Ibid. p. 27.
‖ Ibid. p. 78.

But

But though Mr. J. Wesley does so ably, in this new Trade of *turning fools into mad-men*, yet his Craft's-master is certainly one Mr. Wh——y, of whom Mr. Wesley tells this extraordinary tale· "A poor woman gave an account of what I think ought never to "be forgotten." Truly, I think so too—"It was four years, sh "said, since her Son, Peter Shaw, then nineteen or twenty years "old, by hearing a Sermon of Mr. Wh—y, fell into great uneasi- "ness. She thought he was ill, and would have sent for a Physi- "cian. But he said, No, no, send for Mr. Wh—y. He was sent "for, and came; and, after asking a few questions, told her, *The "Boy is mad*, get a Coach and carry him to Dr. M——, *use my "name, I have sent several such to him* *."—Who this Mr. Wh—y is, or what he is, I know not. But, we see, he sends his People to Monro, with the same unconcern in search of lost brains, that one would enquire of Sir J. Fielding for a lost portmanteau.

Such are the exploits which Mr. J. Wesley calls, in the place last quoted, BLESSINGS FROM GOD: and which therefore we may well call the GOOD FRUITS of his Ministry; those by which St. James directs us to judge of his *Mission*. For what the Apostle calls *good fruits*, namely, *doing much good*, Mr. J. Wesley plainly tells us, belong not to *true Religion*: What belongs not to true religion he rightly deems superfluous: And whatever is superfluous he makes solemn resolutions to avoid †.

* Journ. from Nov. 1, 1759, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 56.

† Journ. from Feb. 1, 1737-8, to his return from Germany, p. 13.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

HITHERTO the Marks delivered by St. James, to judge of a pretended Miſſionary from Heaven, conſider him as urging his pretenſions fairly and with good faith; though poſſibly in a fanatic or enthuſiaſtic way: But what follows—WITHOUT PARTIALITY AND WITHOUT HYPOCRISY—repreſents the pretender to ſuch a character as capable of acting in a maſk, and uſing the mere worldly arts of fraud and deceit. And this ſuppoſition is made with admirable judgment and knowlege of human Nature.

ENTHUSIASM, ſo indiſpenſable a requiſite in the ſucceſsful leading of a Sect, muſt always be accompanied with craft and knavery. There is a neceſſity for this odd combination; and the thing itſelf, as ſtrange as it may ſeem, is very naturally to be accounted for.

A meer cool-headed Projector, without any tincture of innate enthuſiaſm, can never ſucceed in his Deſigns, becauſe ſuch a one can never exhibit thoſe ſurprizing freaks, which a heated imagination, working on a *diſordered*, though, for this purpoſe, *fitly framed* temper of body, ſo ſpeciouſly produces. For the ſpirits of the People, who are to be taken in, can never be allured, but by raiſing their *admiration*, and keeping up their confidence in an inſpired Leader. Beſides, new doctrines and new ideas are never ſo readily received as when the Teacher of them is in earneſt, and believes *Himſelf*: For then there is ſomething ſo natural in his conduct as eaſily to conciliate belief; there is ſomething ſo alluring that it acts even like an Incantation.

On the other hand, a *mere Enthuſiaſt*, who, by virtue of this faculty, hath gone ſo far in his purpoſe as to raiſe the admiration, and to captivate the ſpirits, of the People, muſt here begin to fail, if he be without the other quality, *ſectarian Craft*: For his *fanaticiſm* not being under the controul of his *judgment*, he will want the

the proper dexterity to apply the different views, tempers, and purſuits of the People, now enflamed and ready to become his Inſtruments, to the advancement of his Projects.

But when theſe two talents of *Fraud* and *Fanaticiſm* unite to furniſh out the Leader of a Sect, great will be the ſucceſs of his undertakings. And when ſuch a one feels the ſtrength of this union, it is no wonder he ſhould be ready to cry out with Mr. J. Weſley, *Give me whereon to ſtand, and I will ſhake the whole earth* *. For now the ſallies of his Enthuſiaſm will be ſo corrected by his Cunning, as to ſtrengthen and confirm his ſupernatural pretences; and the cold and ſlow advances of a too cautious policy will be warmed and puſhed forward by the force of his *Fanaticiſm*. *His craft* will enable him to elude the enquiries and objections of the more Rational; and his Viſions will irrecoverably ſubdue all the warmer Noddles. In a word, they will mutually ſupport and ſtrengthen each other's force, and cover and repair each other's defects. St. Jerom ſeems to have had a true idea of this extraordinary combination, when he ſaid, "Nullus poteſt Hæreſin ſtruere, "niſi qui ARDENTIS INGENII eſt, et habet DONA NATURÆ †." Which may be thus paraphraſed – *No Heretic will ever be able to raiſe a Sect, but he, in whoſe conſtitution Nature has enabled Fraud and Fanaticiſm to act in concert.*

Several things concur to facilitate this happy conjunction. An Enthuſiaſt conſiders himſelf as an Inſtrument employed by Providence to attain ſome great End, for the ſake of which he was ſent out. This makes him diligent in his work; impatient under any lett or obſtruction; and attentive to every method for removing it. Perſuaded of the neceſſity of the End, and of the divine Commiſſion intruſted to the Inſtrument, he begins to fancy that ſuch a one, for the obtaining ſo great a purpoſe, is diſpenſed with, in breaking, nay is authorized to break, the common Laws of Mora-

* See p. 615 of this Diſcourſe.

† See The Divine Legation, Book III. Sect. 6.

lity;

lity; which, in the cant of thoſe times, when Fanaticiſm had its full play, was called the BEING ABOVE ORDINANCES. In the firſt application of theſe *means*, the People are the Dupes of their Leader: But the ſucceſs being frequently far beyond even his own conception, he becomes, in his turn, the Dupe of himſelf; and begins in good earneſt to believe that the trick which he played them, was indeed not of his own contrivance, but the inſpired inſtigation of Heaven *. This will explain an obſcure paſſage of Tacitus, where ſpeaking of this ſort of Character, in his oracular way, he ſays, FINGUNT SIMUL CREDUNTQUE. Let me add, that this ſeems to have been much the caſe of OLIVER CROMWELL, from his firſt mounting into the Saddle and the Pulpit, to his laſt reveries on his death-bed †.

Again, *Enthuſiaſm* is a kind of ebullition or critical ferment of the mind, which a vigorous nature ſometimes works through, and by ſlow degrees is able to ſurmount. Hence the moſt ſucceſsful Impoſtors, who have ſet out in all the blaze of Fanaticiſm, have compleated their Schemes amidſt the cool depths and ſtillneſs of Politics. Though this, in ſome degree, be common to them all, yet I know of none who exemplifies the caſe ſo fully as the famous IGNATIUS LOIOLA. This wonderful Perſon began his *extaſies* in the mire, and finiſhed his courſe in the direction and execution of Councils, which, even in his own life-time, were ready to give Law to Chriſtendom. Mr. J. Weſley appears to have ſtudied this great

* That great obſerver of Nature CERVANTES, having made Sancho (to ſave himſelf from the vexation of a ſleeveleſs errand) palm upon his Maſter a ſuppoſititious Dulcinea; When the Squire comes to relate this adventure to the Dutcheſs, ſhe extols his ingenuity ſo highly, that he begins to ſuſpect himſelf to be tricked into his own contrivance: and that the Inchanters had preſented him with a *true* Dulcinea in maſquerade, when he thought he was impoſing a *falſe one* barefaced on his Maſter.

† Thurloe tells us, that the Protector, on his death-bed, foretold his recovery, as an inſpiration from Heaven. Had it proved true, he had gained much by obtaining to himſelf the uſeful Character of Prophet: and he loſt nothing by the conviction of its falſehood.

Maſter

Maſter well: though, by a common practice of thoſe who ſet up for themſelves, he kicks away the ſteps by which he mounted. "I "rode (ſays he) to Oxford—in riding I read over that ſurpriſing "book, the life of IGNATIUS LOIOLA. Surely one of the greateſt "men that ever was engaged in the ſupport of a *bad cauſe*. *I won-* "*der any man ſhould judge him to be an Enthuſiaſt.* No: but he "knew the people with whom he had to do. And ſetting out like "Count Z. with a FULL PERSUASION *that he might* USE GUILE TO "PROMOTE THE GLORY OF GOD *." Now I deſire to know, how any, but an ENTHUSIAST, could have a *full perſuaſion*, i. e. be perſuaded, bona fide, *that he might uſe guile to promote the glory of God?* Or how any, but a KNAVE, could ſucceed in this *perſuaſion?*—Cicero obſerves that the *Eye*, which ſees all other things, ſees not itſelf; This inſtance will ſhew it to be equally true, that the *Mind*, which plays ſuch ſtrange tricks, is often very inattentive to its own frame and operations.

Modern Saintſhip then being ſo ſubject to theſe odd traverſes, it is well for BOTH SOCIETIES, that we have an unerring Rule whereon to eſtimate its Claim. For the Apoſtle having declared that *the wiſdom from above is without* PARTIALITY *and without* HYPOCRISY; if ſuch qualities be found in thoſe who pretend to derive all, immediately, from *above*, we need no further evidence of the impoſture. And, now, having hitherto uſed this famed Head of his Sect for an Example, it would be unkind to drop him here, and not ſuffer him to finiſh, as he began, his Apoſtolical career.

PARTIALITY conſiſts in diſpenſing an *unequal meaſure*, in our tranſactions with Others:

And HYPOCRISY in attempting to cover that *unequal meaſure* by prevarication and falſe colours.

The Reader muſt have been very inattentive to what hath been produced from Mr. J. Weſley's JOURNALS, not to have obſerved the many convincing marks of the writer's *partiality* and *hypocriſy*.

* Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 67.

The paſſages have indeed been given to convict him of other *fanatic qualities*, equally inconſiſtent with the *wiſdom which is from above*; but many of them will, at the ſame time, ſerve to ſhew how ably he availed himſelf of theſe two political Accompliſhments.

We have ſeen in general, that his Followers are always the *Children of God*; and his Oppoſers, the *Children of the Devil.* But the firſt being directed by inward feelings and the impulſe of an inflamed fancy, and the other by the outward teſtimony of Scripture, interpreted by human reaſon, it is no great wonder that Mr. J. Weſley, who ſaw them ſo much unlike, ſhould marſhal them under two different Leaders. But what ſhall we think, when we find him ſaying the worſt of his Friends that his Enemies have ſaid of him, as ſoon as ever he ſees them preſume to play over his own pranks in any other Name? If they follow not him, they are *Fanatics* and *Enthuſiaſts*, how like ſoever they be in all other things to their ghoſtly Pattern.—"I was with two perſons (ſays Mr. J. "Weſley) who, I doubt, are properly *Enthuſiaſts.* For firſt they "think to attain the end without the means, which is *enthuſiaſm*, "properly ſo called: again they think themſelves inſpired by God, "*and are not.* But falſe imaginary inſpiration is *enthuſiaſm.* That "theirs is only imaginary inſpiration appears hence, it contradicts "*the Law and the Teſtimony* *." Theſe are wiſe words: but what do they amount to? Only to this, That theſe two Perſons would not take out their Patents of Inſpiration from his Office; and, therefore, he has advertiſed them, for Counterfeits. However, thus much we gain by them, that all modern pretences to Inſpiration are, by the acknowlegement of Mr. J. Weſley himſelf, to be tryed by the *Law and the Teſtimony.* He cannot, then, ſurely, refuſe to have his own pretenſions tried before that Judicature to which we have appealed him.

Miſs Gr—, one of the holy, had told another Miſs, that Mr. J. Weſley was a *Papiſt*, perhaps on account of the honour he does to

* Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 23.

auricular

auricular confeſſion, one kind of which he recommends to his BANDS. Upon this Miſs Gr— is anathematized. And we are told, that, in conſequence, "ſhe had lately been *raving mad*; that as ſuch, ſhe "was tied down in her bed *." Yet all theſe circumſtances of *madneſs* have, in the opinion of the ableſt Phyſicians, befallen Mr. J. Weſley's favourite Saints; whom he has vindicated from that Opprobrium; he has laughed at the ignorance of the faculty; and declared thoſe equivocal marks to be the conſtant Symptoms of the NEW BIRTH.

He pronounces Sentence of *Enthuſiaſm* upon another: And tells us, Wherefore, without any diſguiſe.—"Here (ſays he) I *took* "*leave* of a poor, mad, *original Enthuſiaſt*, who had been ſcattering "abroad LIES in every quarter †." By which we find, that, even in Mr. J. Weſley's own opinion, *Fanaticiſm* and *Knavery* are very near neighbours.

"I had much converſation with Mr. Simpſon, an *original Enthu-* "*ſiaſt*.—I deſired him in the evening to give an exhortation—He "did ſo, and ſpoke *many good things, in a manner peculiar to him-* "*ſelf*. When he had done, I ſummed up what he had ſaid, me- "thodizing and explaining it. O what pity is it that this well- "meaning man ſhould ever ſpeak without an Interpreter ‡!"—and that Mr. J. Weſley ſhould not be he!

In theſe two laſt paſſages, we are preſented with two ORIGINAL ENTHUSIASTS. But how differently do we find them treated! The firſt is accuſed of doing the work of the Devil, of ſpreading *lies* of his Maſter; on which account his Maſter *takes his leave of him*: a gentle expreſſion, to ſignify, the thruſting him out, head and ſhoulders, from the Society of Saints: The other likewiſe, whoſe *original enthuſiaſm* is made to conſiſt only in want of *Method*, or, to ſpeak more properly, want of *Methodiſm*, is only lamented, as having the ill luck to *ſpeak without an Interpreter*. That is, without

* Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 73, 74.
† Journ. from Oct. 27, 1743, to Nov. 17, 1746, p. 71.
‡ Ibid. p. 91.

having his doctrine regulated on the dictates of his Master. But the First set his Master at defiance: the Second *spoke many good things*, that is, he professed a doctrine agreeable to Mr. Wesley; indeed, *in a manner peculiar to himself*, that is, not on Mr. Wesley's Authority, but his own. Now, there were some hopes of Him; but none at all of the other. Therefore though they are pronounced ORIGINAL ENTHUSIASTS alike, yet we must distinguish, and rate their Titles very differently. The first *Original* was of his original the Devil, *a scatterer abroad of lies in every quarter:* The second was worth recovering. His *Original Enthusiasm* was a foundation, like *Original Sin*, to erect upon it a monument of Grace.

But the most *genuine instance of enthusiasm*, which, he tells us, he will give, and which, without doubt, he does give, with the utmost reluctance, is the following. He preached at *Tanfield-Leigh*. "But so dead, *senseless*, unaffected a congregation (says he) have I "scarce seen, except at *Wickham*. Whether Gospel or Law, or "English or Greek, seemed all one to them." Yet he *spoke*, he tells us, *strong rough words*. But why is *want of sense* put into this *rough* description of their unregenerate State? He owns, that numbers of the Godly were without any. And why would he elicite *sense* from these Gentiles, when, upon their conversion, they were finally to be deprived of it, in *extacies* and *new births?* However, as ungrateful as the Soil appeared, — "Yet the seed sown even "there was not quite lost. For on Thursday morning, between "four and five, *John Brown*, then of *Tanfield-Leigh*, was *waked* "*out of sleep* by the voice that raiseth the dead; and ever since he "has been full of love and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost." But now see what comes of *waking these sleepers*. This same J— B—, who had received the Holy Ghost but at the latter end of November, became so *freakish* by the beginning of December, that he even forced Mr. J. Wesley (for the honour of Methodism itself) to pronounce *him* likewise a *genuine Enthusiast*, and to throw aside this precious Saint, as flawed by over-bakeing, amongst the useless rubbish of his Shop.

"I was

"I was both ſurpriſed and grieved"—here, Reader, thou mayeſt ſafely believe him—" at a *genuine* inſtance of *Enthuſiaſm*. J— B— " of Tanfield-Leigh, who had received a SENSE of the love of God " a few days before, came riding through the town, *hollowing* and " *ſhouting*" [the inſeparable ſymptoms of the *new birth*] " and driving " all the People before him, telling them, *God had told him he* " *ſhould be a* KING, *and ſhould tread all his enemies under his* " *feet* *."

Now this being the only FRUIT of the *ſeed ſown* in this place, had it not been better to have let theſe honeſt people alone? who appear amiable, even through the ſarcaſtic abuſe he ſo liberally pours over them.—" At Wickham, I ſpoke ſtrong rough words: but I " did not perceive that any regarded what was ſpoken. The Peo- " ple indeed were exceeding quiet, and *the cold kept them from fall-* " *ing aſleep*; till, before two, I left them very *well ſatisfied with* " *the Preacher and with themſelves* †." And why ſhould they not! Why is this poor ſatisfaction, in themſelves, which they had ſo liberally expreſſed towards him, begrudged them? A reaſonable Man deſires no more, than that his friends be ſatisfied with him; he does not expect, nay, he would be ſorry, to find them diſſatiſfied with themſelves. But ſuch an equality of mind and meaſure, as in the good people of Wickham, is deſtructive of all the ſchemes of a Fanatic Leader: Who muſt find, or *make*, a People deſperate, and ready to hang themſelves, before they can be prepared and rightly tempered for the ſacred Mold of Methodiſm.

We ſhall end, where every Fanatic Leader ends—with his HYPOCRISY. And if *evaſion* and *prevarication*, in the moſt eſſential points of his Miniſtry, may be called by that name, I cannot ſee how Mr. J. Weſley will eſcape from having this concluding mark of impoſture fixed upon him.

* Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 79.
† Ibid. p. 78.

I. We

I. We have wearied ourſelves and Readers, in recounting the numberleſs MIRACLES by which He and his affairs have been ſupported, amidſt a *cloud of Witneſſes* well diſpoſed to magnify the ſcene. Yet, after all this, with a WORLDLY PRUDENCE which one would not expect in a man who calls it *the myſtery of Iniquity*, he thinks fit to ſecure himſelf a retreat, in caſe all theſe wonders ſhould become problematical. For after having heaped them upon one another, Olympus-high, throughout nine copious Journals, he ſneaks away under the cover of a puny Wonder, and leaves the defence of all his Giant-miracles in the lurch! "About five (ſays he) "I began, near the Keelman's Hoſpital, many thouſands ſtanding "round, or ſitting on the Graſs. The wind was high juſt before; "but ſcarce a breath was felt, all the time we aſſembled before "God. I praiſe God for this alſo. Is IT ENTHUSIASM TO SEE "GOD IN EVERY BENEFIT *which we receive* ?*" Certainly it is not. The *Enthuſiaſm* conſiſts in believing thoſe *benefits* to be *miraculouſly* conferred by a change in the eſtabliſhed order of Nature. This is the *Enthuſiaſm* with which he is charged; and this Charge almoſt every page of his Journals will ſupport. But here, by the neateſt addreſs, he covertly inſinuates (as a Word to the Wiſe) that he meant no more by his *Miracles* than the *ſeeing of God in every benefit we receive*. A certain Philoſopher † of great name fancied he had explained the nature of viſion well, on the principle of *ſeeing all things in God*. And if the World be content to be paid in ſuch coin, our Divine will not be long in its debt. He can explain *Miracles*, as well as the other explained *Nature*, by the knack he has of *ſeeing God in all things*. This then goes a great way towards ridding his hands of Miracles when the Inquiſitive become troubleſome. But as he well knew it might be ſaid of him, "If you part with your Miracles, you ſtrip yourſelf of the credentials of your Miſſion," he has a fetch for this alſo; a Friend to help him at a dead lift; whoſe opinion, "he wiſhes all calm and impartial men "would conſider—Not to eſtabliſh the power of *working Miracles*

* Journ. from July 20, 1750, to Oct. 28, 1754, p. 18. † Malebranche.

"as

" as the great Criterion of a divine Miſſion; when Scripture *teaches* " *us that the agreement of doctrines with truth as taught in thoſe* " *Scriptures*, is the only infallible Rule *." Suppoſe now any ſenſe could be drawn out of theſe gallimatias of *Scripture's teaching that the agreement of doctrines with truth as taught in thoſe Scriptures, is the only infallible rule:* And that it might mean, " that Scripture teaches us, that the conformity of its doctrines with the truths diſcoverable by natural light, is the only Criterion." I then aſk, Where SCRIPTURE teacheth this? I aſk it, I ſay, Becauſe REASON teacheth another thing: for, from the Premiſſes, of the *conformity of Scripture doctrines with truth*, Her Concluſion is only this, That Scripture doctrines are true; not that they were immediately derived from Heaven. I am *afraid* therefore, that *Scripture* is here much ſcandalized, by making it talk a language ſo diſſonant to *Reaſon*. And I am the more confirmed in this opinion, ſince Scripture, from the mouth of Jeſus himſelf, expreſsly ſays, that the *power of working miracles*, and not *the conformity of Scripture doctrines to truth*, is the great *criterion of a divine Miſſion*. The words of Jeſus are theſe: " If I had not done amongſt them the " works which no other man did, they had not had Sin: But now " have they both ſeen and hated me and my Father †." But why, in caſe *no miracles had been worked* amongſt them them, *had they not had Sin?* For this reaſon, and only for this, that, without *Miracles*, there was *no ſufficient criterion* of a DIVINE MISSION. And *Sin* could not be imputed to them for rejecting a Character which did not bring its full credentials with it. From what I can ſee then, Mr. J. Weſley muſt either ſtick to his *Miracles*, or give up his *Miſſion*.

II. But he ſhifts and doubles no leſs with regard to the *Extacies*, and the *New-birth* of his Saints. Sometimes they are undoubtedly of *God*; ſometimes again as certainly of the *Devil*: but he is

* Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 72.

† John, chap. xv. ver. 24.

conſtant

conſtant in this, that *Natural cauſes* have no hand in them. The reaſon is plain: He could make both God and the Devil conducive to his purpoſes; but Nature is the ſure deſtruction of every fanatic frolic.—The Saints met in Fetter-lane to humble themſelves before God for *grieving the Holy Spirit*.—To the ſeveral offences aſſigned, Mr. J. Weſley adds—" But above all, by blaſ-
" pheming his works amongſt us, imputing it either to Nature,
" to the force of imagination and animal Spirits, or even the *delu-*
" *ſion of the* Devil.—At that hour we found God with us as at
" the firſt. *Some fell proſtrate upon the ground. Others burſt out,*
" *as with one conſent, into a loud praiſe and thankſgiving.* And
" many openly teſtified, there had been *no ſuch day as this*, ſince
" January the firſt, preceding *." – " On Friday many were deeply
" convinced; but none were delivered from that painful convic-
" tion. The Children came to the *birth*; but there was not ſtrength
" to bring forth. *I fear we have grieved the Spirit of the jealous*
" *God by queſtioning his work* †."

—" Innumerable cautions were given me, not to regard *Viſions*
" or *Dreams*, or to fancy people had remiſſion of Sins, becauſe
" of their *Cries*, or tears, or outward profeſſions. – The Sum of
" my anſwer was as follows: You deny that God does now
" work theſe effects: at leaſt that he works them in this manner.
" I affirm both: becauſe I have heard theſe things with my
" own ears, and ſeen them with my own eyes. I have ſeen very
" many perſons changed in a moment from the Spirit of fear,
" horror, deſpair, to the Spirit of love, joy, and peace. – What I
" have to ſay touching *Viſions* or *Dreams* is this: I know ſeveral
" perſons in whom this great change was wrought in a *dream*, or
" during a *ſtrong repreſentation to the eye of the mind*, of Chriſt,
" either on the Croſs or in Glory. This is the fact ‡."——Nay,
he is ſo convinced of its being the *work* of God, that the horrid

* Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p 59.
† Ibid. p. 16. ‡ Ibid. p. 49.

blaſ-

blaſphemies which enſued, he aſcribes to the abundance of joy, which God had given to a poor mad woman of his flock. "I met with "one, who having been lifted up with the abundance of joy which "God had given her, had fallen into blaſphemies and vain ima- "ginations *as are not common to men.* In the afternoon I found "another inſtance, nearly, I fear, of the ſame kind——She had "her *private revelations* ſo called, &c *." But now, on a ſud- den, he gives us the reverſe of the Medal, and directly revokes all he had advanced.—"I told them they were not to judge of "the Spirit whereby any one ſpoke, either by *appearances* or by "*common report*, or by their own *inward feelings.* No, nor by "any *Dreams*, *Viſions*, or Revelations ſuppoſed to be made to their "ſoul, any more than by their tears, or any *involuntary effects* "*wrought upon their bodies.* I warned them, all theſe were in them- "ſelves of a DOUBTFUL DISPUTABLE NATURE. They *might* be "from GOD, or they *might* not †." The Reader cannot but be much ſurprized to find ſo formal a recantation of what he had ſaid ‡ juſt above concerning *inward feelings*, *dreams*, *viſions*, and *extacies*; and of his own *confidence* in affirming theſe to be the work of God, from his *having both heard theſe things with his own ears, and from his having ſeen them with his own eyes*; for here he denies *common report*, (and are not other people's *ears* and *eyes* as good as his?) or *appearances*, or even *feelings*, to be a ſufficient ground of aſſurance: of this, I can give no better account, and perhaps the Reader will deſire no better, than this, that when our Apoſtle thought fit thus to unſay what he had ſo confidently affirmed before, it was in a deſponding hour, when he *was in much doubt whether God would not lay him aſide and ſend other Labourers into his harveſt* §. Under theſe fears he ſeemed reſolved, at leaſt, that theſe new *Labourers* ſhould not reap what he had ſown: and therefore, at all adventures, thought proper to cut the ground from under their feet.

* Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 54.
† Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1. 1739, p. 60, 61.
‡ See p. 668. § Journ. ibid. p. 60.

At length, finding his Cauſe ſufficiently diſgraced by the unruline ſs of theſe *divine Agitations*; and knowing (as we ſhall ſee preſently) how to make a better uſe of them; he fairly gives them all to the DEVIL. "I enquired (ſays he) into the caſe of thoſe who "had, almoſt every night the laſt week, *cried out aloud*, during the "preaching. I found that all of them were perſons in perfect "health, and had not been ſubject to Fits of any kind till they were "thus affected: that this had come upon every one of them in a "moment, without any previous notice, while they were either "hearing the word of God, or thinking on what they had heard: "that in that moment they dropt down, loſt all their ſtrength, "and were ſeized with violent pain. This they expreſſed in dif-"ferent manners. Some ſaid, they felt juſt as if a ſword was "running through them: others, that they thought a great "weight lay upon them, as if it would ſqueeze them into the "Earth. Some ſaid they were quite choaked, ſo that they could "not breathe; others, that their hearts ſwelled ready to burſt: and "others, that it was as if their Heart, as if all their Inſide, as if "their whole Body was tearing all to pieces. Theſe *Symptoms* I "can no more impute to any NATURAL CAUSE than to the SPIRIT "OF GOD. I can make no doubt but it was SATAN TEARING THEM "as they were coming to Chriſt. And hence proceeded thoſe "*grievous cries* whereby he might deſign both to DISCREDIT the "Work of God, and to affright fearful People from hearing that "Word, whereby their ſouls might be ſaved *."

Now, the Reader ought to take notice, that theſe were the very *Symptoms* which Mr. J. Weſley had before aſcribed to the *ſpirit of God.*——But by this time he was ſenſible, and ſo he confeſſes in this very place, that they had DISCREDITED the *Work*. They were therefore to be ſent to the DEVIL, from whence they came; yet ſtill upon Mr. J. Weſley's Errand. For there is nothing, except NATURE, as we obſerved above, which he cannot put to

* Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 91.

ſome

ſome good uſe or other. And this new Donation of the *extacies of the Saints* was a noble foundation for what he was now projecting, the Farce of DIABOLISMS and EXORCISMS. Well, therefore, might he exult over this Old Miſchief-maker, *as not having wit enough to diſcern* that he was over-matched; and that Mr John Weſley was too hard for him. *I wonder* (ſays he) *the Devil has not wiſdom enough to diſcern that he is deſtroying his own Kingdom* *. Indeed, he has fairly turned the tables upon SATAN: and ſhewn us, that he can make full as good an uſe of a POSSESSION from below †, as of an INSPIRATION from above.

III. The Reader remembers how contemptuouſly Mr. Weſley has ſpoken of *Orthodoxy*, or *true belief*; even to the queſtioning whether it makes *any part of Religion at all*; certain is he, that, at beſt, it makes *but a very ſlender part*. "It is a point, ſays he, "we chiefly inſiſt upon, that Orthodoxy, or right Opinion, is at "beſt but a very ſlender part of Religion, if any part of it at all ‡." This was done to *take in* as many as he could, from amongſt the *Sectaries*; but when he wants to *take off* as many as he can, from amongſt the *Churchmen*, then *Orthodoxy*, or true belief, is like *Methodiſm*, the *Unum Neceſſarium*: or, to ſpeak more properly, *Orthodoxy* and *Methodiſm* are but two words for the ſame thing. "About a thouſand people ſtood patiently while I ſimply de- "ſcribed the *plain old Religion of the Church of England*, which "is now almoſt every where ſpoken againſt, under the new name "of *Methodiſm* §."

IV. We have ſeen him (in the true Spirit of a Sectary) inviting and even provoking *Perſecution*, as the only means of making the *good ſeed take root*: for, after having ſown it in the mud and

* Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 56.

† See p. 619—621.

‡ Mr. Weſley's plain Account, &c. p. 4.

§ Journ. from Aug. 12 1738 to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 90.

ſlime of *field preaching*, he then, by a kind of Ægyptian Huſbandry *, draws together whole droves of obſcene Animals, who ruſh furiouſly in, and trample it about; but this, as that Mother-ſeat of Arts may have informed him, only made it ſpring up the better.——" The Mob, ſays he, gathered in great numbers " about my door, and quite cloſed me in. *I rejoiced and bleſſed* " *God, knowing this was the time I had long been looking for* †."

But, miſtake him not. A *Perſecution* he certainly wiſhed, and as diligently ſought. But it was for his beloved Saints, who, as he ſays, wanted it ‡, who hungered after it; nor for himſelf, who had no ſtomach to it, eſpecially when it grew ſerious, as once upon a time it did.

In his ramble to *Georgia*, he got acquainted with one Mrs. Williamſon (ſo he himſelf tells his ſtory), to whom he refuſed the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper. She had done ſome *wrong*, it ſeems, *to her neighbour*. What it was, he does not tell us. The Uncle (he ſays) deſired he would declare in the Court-houſe, why he expelled Mrs. Williamſon from the holy Communion. But he declined it, as apprehending *many ill conſequences* might ariſe from ſo doing. What He would not declare, the Uncle did; and ſaid, that it was *in revenge for rejecting his*, Mr. Weſley's, *propoſals of marriage, and marrying Mr. Williamſon*. The Huſband proſecuted him for *defamation*: and the Wife, ſays Mr. Weſley, " ſwore and " ſigned an affidavit, *inſinuating much more than it aſſerted*, but aſſert- " ing, that he, Mr. Weſley, had many times propoſed marriage " to her, all which propoſals ſhe had rejected."

In conſequence of this, " He is preſented by the *Grand Jury*, " upon oath, as having broken the Laws of the Realm by ſpeaking " and writing to Mrs. Williamſon againſt her huſband's conſent; " by repelling her from the holy Communion, &c." The matter

* ———in ſuum quiſque rus jacto ſemine, Sues immittit, et ſatis conculcato a Suibus ſemine, meſſem deinde expectat. Herod. l. ii. c. 14.

† Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 56.

‡ See p. 645.

was

was now growing ſerious; the Georgians, he found, did not underſtand raillery, in the affair of ſpiritual Gallantry. It was time for him to look about him. In this diſtreſs, he began to have recourſe, as uſual, to his *revelations*—"I conſulted my friends, *whe-* "*ther God did not call me* to return to England. The reaſon for "which I left it had now no force, there being no poſſibility, as "yet, of inſtructing the Indians: neither had I, as yet, found or "heard of any Indians on the continent of America, who had the "leaſt deſire of being inſtructed.——After deeply conſidering theſe "things; *they were unanimous that I ought to go; but not yet.*" However, the Magiſtrate quickened his pace. He was declared *an Enemy to, and Hinderer of, the public peace.*—"I again (ſays "he) conſulted my friends, who agreed with me, *that the time* "*we looked for was now come.*" The Reader, who has ſeen him ſo long *languiſh for perſecution*, will conclude, he was now preparing to meet it with the conſtancy of a Martyr. No ſuch matter. He was preparing for his flight. But to hide his poltronery in a bravado, he gave public notice of his Apoſtolical intention. On which the Magiſtrates ordered that he ſhould firſt find ſecurity to appear, when ſummoned, to anſwer the Charge brought againſt him. But he refuſing, they publiſhed a Placart, "requiring "all the Officers and Centinels to prevent his going out of the "Province; and forbidding any perſons to aſſiſt him in ſo doing." Things were now come to a Criſis: and Mr. J. Weſley, on the whole, thought it beſt to retreat without beat of drum; and to ſteal a march upon the Enemy.——"I ſaw clearly (ſays he) the "hour was come for leaving this place. And as ſoon as *Evening* "*Prayer* was over, [for Prayer muſt always make a part in his "Stratagems], about *eight o'clock*, the tide then ſerving, *I ſhook off* "*the duſt of my feet* *." A very pleaſant way, truly, of acting the *Apoſtle*. But if he made the path eaſy for himſelf, he took care to render it doubly perplexed for his Followers. He left, we ſee, his

* Journ. from his embarking for Georgia, to his return to London, p. 46—56.

little

little Flock in the lurch, to anſwer, as they could, for the crimes objected to their runaway Paſtor.

But had his *longings for perſecution* been *without Hypocriſy*, he had here the faireſt occaſion of honeſtly indulging himſelf to the full. He had gone as far as *Georgia* for it. The truth of his Miſſion was brought in queſtion by the Magiſtrate, and decried by the People; not ſo much for his falſe doctrines, as his *falſe morals*. The honour of the Goſpel was wounded through the Sides of its pretended Miſſionary. There was but one way to ſupport its credit, the way the firſt Chriſtian Preachers always took, the offering up themſelves for the Truth they preached, and for the Integrity they profeſſed. Inſtead of this, our paltry Mimic thinks he had diſcharged an Apoſtolic office, when he applied to himſelf an Apoſtolic phraſe,—*I ſhook off the duſt of my feet*, ſays he; much eaſier done than ſhaking off his infamy. Jeſus, indeed, orders his Followers to *ſhake off the duſt of their feet*, where the inhabitants would not receive their Doctrine, that they might not throw away their time in vain: but he never directed it as a Trial-ordeal of innocence when they were accuſed of immoralities, and the honour of the Miſſion concerned. When Paul and Silas had been impriſoned, and otherwiſe evil intreated at Philippi, neither the *Miracle* nor the *Magiſtrate* (when each, in their turn, had ſet open the Priſon doors) could perſuade them to ſtir a ſtep till they had procured all honourable ſatisfaction to their injured Characters *. But what do I ſpeak of the caſes, in which the *prudence*, recommended by our great Maſter, directs his Diſciples to *avoid*, or the *courage*, with which he inſpires and enables them to *dare*, the rage of Persecution? We are now on the detection of a Hypocrite, who expreſſed his longings for *perſecution*; who invited it, who provoked it, in a Country where the Magiſtrate reſtrained and forbad it; and yet ran away from it when his own honour, as well as that of his *little flock*, ſhould have induced him to oppoſe himſelf to it; and where the Magiſtrate, by

* Acts xvi.

his

his own account, was forward enough and ready to oblige him. But he ran away, like a Coward, on the wings of *Prayer* and the *Tide:* henceforth, the hatred of this unhoſpitable Shore, and the horrour of the entertainment there prepared for him, made ſuch an impreſſion on his temper and his fancy, that he lets ſlip no occaſion of revenge. For when the good man was got back to Europe, and even forced to beat it on the hoof as far as Hernhuth, in Germany, before he could get into a *Land of Chriſtians* *, he overtook, as he tells us, in a little village on the road, "a large number of *Swit-* "*zers*, Men, Women, and Children, ſinging, dancing, and making "merry, being all going to make their fortunes in GEORGIA. "*Looking upon them* (ſays he) AS BEING DELIVERED INTO MY "HANDS BY GOD, I plainly told them, what manner of place it "was. If they now leap into the Fire with open eyes, their *blood* "*is on their own head* †." It would be hard to gueſs how he came to *look upon theſe Switzers as delivered into his hands by God*, unleſs he believed, God was bound to revenge all his ſquabbles with the young Wenches of his *Bands*, (which, by his Journals, we find were not a few) and that therefore *God prepared* theſe Switzers for the Inſtruments of his Vengeance. He made a proper uſe of them; he *opened their eyes*; and ſo, in all likelihood, deprived a Britiſh Colony of many uſeful hands.

V. We have ſeen above, how he ſet *wordly prudence*, *Chriſtian prudence*, and, in a word, every thing which bears the name of PRUDENCE, at defiance; denouncing it to be the *Bane of Religion*, and the *Inſtrument of the Devil.* This was but neceſſary to inflame the *madneſs* of his Followers. But a very different language is required when the *ambition* of his RIVALS is to be reſtrained. Then

* "At Weymar, we came before I know not what great man (I believe the "Duke) who, after many queſtions, aſked, what we were going ſo far as *Hernhuth* "for? I anſwered, to SEE THE PLACE WHERE THE CHRISTIANS LIVE. He looked "hard, and let us go." Journ. from Feb. 1, 1737-8, to his return from Germany, p. 45.

† Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 6.

PRUDENCE

Prudence is the very balm of Gilead, the aſſuager of hurt Minds, and the great reſtorative of ſickening Peace.

But we ſhould take the affair from its beginning. So early as in the year thirty-nine, he began to ſuſpect, that he ſhould have Rivals in his Apoſtolic office.—" I came into my old Room at Oxford, from " which I went to Georgia. Here, muſing on the things that " were paſt, *and remembering how many that came after me were* " *preferred before me*, I opened my Teſtament, &c *." For you muſt know, Reader, that, of all the *Superſtitions* (and they were not a few) which ſtruggled for Dominion with *fanaticiſm* in the Microcoſm of this holy Man, the Sortes Sanctorum were the Chief; a ſpecies of Divination to which, St. Auſtin tells us, the good Chriſtians of his time had recourſe, rather than conſult the Devil, like their Pagan Neighbours. To this favorite folly, our Miſſionary refers all his doubts. It is his Urim and Thummim; and he applies it as freely and irreverently to his occaſions, as a Village Conjurer does his *Sieve* and *Sheers*. At this time, indeed, it afforded him but ſmall relief. He ſunk ſo far in his deſpondency, *as to doubt whether God would not lay him aſide, and ſend other la-bourers into his harveſt* †. We ſoon ſee what it was that gave him theſe cruel twitches: a *Rival*, and he no ſmall One, the famed Mr. Whitefield; who now began to ſet up for himſelf; and, indeed, as much the madder of the two, to ingroſs the favour of the Rabble. While the Rivalſhip continued on a tolerable footing, Mr. J. Weſley contented himſelf with, now and then, giving his *beloved in Chriſt* a fly wipe of contempt, as occaſion preſented; and under the ſaintly ſymbol of *praiſing God for him*.——" I read " prayers, and Mr. *Whitefield* preached. How wiſe is God in giv-" ing *different talents* to different Preachers! even the *little impro-*" *prieties both of his language and manner*, were a means of profiting " many who would not have been touched by a *more correct diſ-*

* Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 14, 15.
† Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 60.

" *courſe*,

"*courſe*, or a *more calm and regular* manner of ſpeaking *." This, we ſee, was full in his teeth; and by a ſide wind came up to that *Maſter-Preacher*, who is inſinuated to be more correct, and calm, and graceful, in his Pulpit-Manners. Notwithſtanding this, Mr. *Whitefield* went on triumphantly; and being ambitious to advance himſelf on the necks of his Fellows, taught FAITH ALONE; and offered FREE GRACE to a People little diſpoſed to purchaſe it. Mr. J. Weſley was an Advocate for WORKS: but he muſt do them himſelf, if he expected any good from them, in this Contention. For an equivalent, therefore, to Mr. Whitefield's *ſpiritual Graces*, He, like another Moſes, diſpenſed his *temporal Bleſſings*. Particularly, in the ART of Healing; for he would truſt no longer to the GIFT, full as his Journals are of his *miraculous Cures*. It was now, he found, high time to ſet up a *regular Practice*. Accordingly, he told his People how deeply read he was in Medicine, which he had ſtudied at Oxford. And to prove himſelf no Quack, he publiſhed a whole book of Receipts or Remedies for all the common Diſtempers of life. At the ſame time, he let the better Sort underſtand, he was well ſkilled in the *medicina Mentis*. He had given innumerable flirts of contempt, in his Journals, againſt HUMAN LEARNING: and, indeed, of what uſe could Learning be in a Religion like that which he propagated? In which, as he aſſures us, *Orthodoxy or right belief made a very ſlender part, if any part at all.* Yet when now he had to ſtruggle with a Rival *pro aris & focis*, no means were to be left untried to ſecure his Dominion. He therefore plainly enough informs them, that he was ready to teach, in a better and more expeditious way than was hitherto known, even to the UNIVERSITIES, two eminent parts of this decried Learning, namely, *Rhetoric* and *Ethics*. "This week (ſays he) "I read over with ſome young men a Compendium of *Rhetoric*, "and a Syſtem of *Ethics*. I ſee not why a man of tolerable un- "derſtanding may not learn, in ſix months time, more of *ſolid*

* Journ. from July 20, 1749, to Oct. 30, 1751, p. 24.

"*Philoſophy* than is learned at Oxford in four (perhaps ſeven) "years *." Did ever JESUIT play his part better? Yet even this would not do. FREE GRACE bore down all before it; and Mr. Weſley was at laſt forced, as in a deſperate caſe, to have recourſe to that paltry quack remedy, which he had ſo much ſcorned and execrated, I mean PRUDENCE.—"I believed (ſays he) both "love and juſtice required that I ſhould ſpeak my ſentiments freely "to Mr. Wh—— concerning the Letter he had publiſhed, ſaid "to be *in anſwer to my ſermon on free Grace.* The ſum of what "I obſerved to him was this: 1. That it was quite IMPRUDENT "to publiſh it at all, as being only *the putting of weapons into "their hands, who love neither the one nor the other.* 2. That if he "was conſtrained *to bear his teſtimony*, AS HE TERMED IT, againſt "the error I was in, he might have done it by publiſhing a treatiſe "on this head without ever calling my name in queſtion."—Here our Journaliſt can treat with ſcorn that very cant in which himſelf ſo much abounds, the applying Scripture phraſes to the impertinence of modern occurrences.—"However (adds Mr. Weſley) "he had ſaid enough—to make an open (and probably irrepa-"rable) breach between him and me: ſeeing, *for a treacherous "Wound and for the* BEWRAYING OF SECRETS *every friend will "depart* †."

Without doubt, the Reader will be curious to know what theſe *Secrets* were, which had been ſo ill kept between theſe two *Free Maſons.* But the purpoſe of this Diſcourſe is not to prejudice the Readers againſt this extraordinary Man, from anecdotes on tradition, or from *ſecrets bewrayed*; but to enable them to form a judgment of his pretences, from what he himſelf has openly recorded of himſelf, and frequently repeated to the World. What I would have them obſerve on the laſt quoted paſſage, is only this, that Mr. J. Weſley, after ſo total an eſtrangement from WORLDLY PRUDENCE,

* Journ. from Nov. 25, 1746, to July 20, 1750, p. 14.

† Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 78.

has,

has, at length, in his diſtreſſes, been forced to take ſhelter with her. And for his firſt viſit, it muſt be owned, he acquits himſelf very well after ſo long an abſence.—The Letter Mr. Whitefield had written ſhould not have been publiſhed, as "*it was putting* "*Weapons into the hands of the common Enemy.*"—It ſhould not have been publiſhed, as it tended to a *Schiſm* in the Society.—If he muſt needs publiſh it, "*he ſhould not have called Mr. Weſley's name in* "*queſtion,*" as this tended to a breach between theſe two faſt friends.—And if he (Mr. Weſley) ſhould never conſent to have this breach cloſed, he was juſtified in PRUDENCE, ſince the *Wiſe man* ſays, *from a treacherous wound and bewraying ſecrets every friend will depart*; which he underſtands to ſignify, *every friend ought to depart.* Indeed, the Reader may object, that there was one expedient of PRUDENCE left untried, which was, the *meeting his quondam friend half way.* Mr. Weſley was no enemy to this uſe of PRUDENCE, as we ſhall ſee preſently. But Mr. Whitefield was too formidable a Rival with whom to compromiſe, or even to yield an inch. A leſs conſiderable Oppoſer might be managed this way, without danger; and then his PRUDENCE directs him to purſue it.—"I laboured (ſays he) to convince Mr. G—— that he had "*not done well in confuting* (as he termed it) the Sermon I had "preached the Sunday before. But he was abſolutely above con-"viction *."—Would not *prudence* now have juſtified him in leaving a man *above conviction*, to the error of his own ways? Surely a leſs conſummate *prudence* than Mr. J. Weſley's would have done ſo. But he will not leave Mr. G—— ſo unkindly. "I then aſked "(ſays he) *Will you meet me half way?* I will never *preach pub-*"*lickly* againſt you. Will not you againſt me? But he diſ-"claimed any ſuch agreement."—When PRUDENCE would have adviſed him not to *preach publickly* againſt the Body of that Clergy to which, he ſays, he belongs, then is PRUDENCE the *bane of Religion*, the *myſtery of Iniquity*, and the Whore of Babylon her-

* Journ. from July 20, 1750, to Oct. 28, 1754, p. 81.

ſelf. But when ſhe prompts him to tempt a Brother of the ſame trade to *meet half way*, and not to *preach publickly* againſt him, then is PRUDENCE of heavenly birth, and ſent for the aſſiſtance of the Saints: at preſent, indeed, honeſtly employed in the charitable errand of inviting Mr. G—— to play the *Hypocrite* with him: for he declares Mr. G—— to be *abſolutely above conviction*; that is, in conſcience unable to ſtir a ſtep; which, too, was his own caſe: yet, in the ſame breath, he propoſes *to meet him half way*. But Mr. G—— approved himſelf the honeſter man. From all this we have reaſon to conclude, that Mr. J. Weſley, amidſt his warmeſt exclamations againſt *Worldly* PRUDENCE, againſt *Chriſtian* PRUDENCE, and againſt PRUDENCE of every denomination, had it ſtill in petto to employ a ſuccedaneum, on a preſſing occaſion: which he, indeed, calls PRUDENCE; but which, to ſave the credit of his conſiſtency, he had better have let go under its true name of CRAFT.

Thus have I endeavoured to tear off the Maſk from the furious and deformed viſage of Fanaticiſm and Seduction. The power of Religion hath enabled me: and the intereſts of Religion have excited me to this attempt; nothing ſo much diſcrediting the *Doctrine of* GRACE as theſe counterfeit impreſſions of the Spirit of God. For, ſince the deſcent of the Holy Ghoſt was no longer in *the ruſhing mighty wind*, but in *the ſtill ſmall voice*, licentious men have been but too apt to conclude, either that GRACE was an imaginary Power; or at moſt, that it was no other than that aſſiſtance which the divine attribute of *Goodneſs*, as diſcoverable by natural light, was always ready to impart to diſtreſſed and helpleſs Mortals; juſt as they would perſuade themſelves that REDEMPTION is nothing elſe than that reſtoration to God's favour, which his mercy, diſcoverable too by the ſame light, prepares and lays open to repentant Sinners.

The Reader, in concluſion, will take notice, that the order I have here followed, is that which is beſt adapted to ſhorten the controverſy, and to cut off all chicane and evaſion.

5. I have

1. I have ſingled out the Founder and Leader of the Sect, that no one may have pretence to ſay, that what, He is here ſhewn to teach and practiſe, is not true and genuine METHODISM.

2. I have confined my remarks to his own adventures, recorded by his own pen, and here fairly quoted in his own words; that no one may have pretence to ſay, I have fooliſhly confided in falſe or uncertain reports: or unjuſtly made the Sect anſwerable for the indiſcretions and abſurdities of every obſcure FIELD-PREACHER.

3. I have taken the Methodiſts at their word, when they call themſelves members of the Church of England, that I might not run the hazard of confounding both the Reader and myſelf with long and blind ſcholaſtic diſputations on *original Sin*, *irreſiſtible Grace*, and *juſtifying Faith*; on *Regeneration*, *Election*, *Reprobation*, and *the immerit of good Works*. To their MODE of teaching, and not to the *things* taught, I confine my diſcourſe. Of *that*, every reader can judge; and of *that*, he has a ſure rule to judge by, the MARKS delivered by the holy Apoſtle St. James of the *Wiſdom which is from above*: MARKS, which (for weighty reaſons already explained) refer moſtly to the *mode* of teaching; and which, if not found in this new *mode* of methodiſt-teaching, are ſufficient to convict it of impoſture.

A DIS-

A

DISCOURSE

ON THE

OFFICE AND OPERATIONS

OF THE

HOLY SPIRIT.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

I NOW turn, for what remains of this Diſcourſe, to thoſe ſober Miniſters of the Eſtabliſhed Church, who hold themſelves bound to obey its DISCIPLINE as well as to profeſs its DOCTRINES.

If any good uſe can be made of what has been already ſaid, it will be chiefly promoted by theſe Reverend Men, who, in honour of the Church which they ſerve, and in gratitude to the State by which they are protected, will make it their firſt care to ſupport that moſt juſt of all Public Laws, the Law of TOLERATION: which, how long ſoever obſtructed in its paſſage to us, and how late

late ſoever arrived amongſt us, is certainly of DIVINE ORIGINAL: Nor will ſuch Men ever venture to *refine* upon it (which will always be to *weaken* it) by idle diſtinctions between the *letter* and the *ſpirit* of the Law. For between theſe, in well-compoſed Laws, there is no difference; the *letter* being no other than the language and expreſſion of the *ſpirit*. Indeed, one would wonder, they ſhould ever have been oppoſed, did we not know how ready *Superſtition* has always been to ſupport the intereſts of bad Policy, in vitiating both the intellects and the morals of Mankind. God once gave a *preparatory Religion* to a ſelect People, under the name of LAW, by which the future diſpenſation was half-revealed and half-hidden. In ſuch a *Law* the *letter* and the *ſpirit* were neceſſarily different. A difference, which the Miniſters to whom the propagation of this future Religion has been intruſted have been much accuſtomed to inculcate. Hence Superſtition, in this, as in many other caſes of the Jewiſh Law ill underſtood, very abſurdly applied that diſtinction, to Civil Laws and compacts; where the full meaning was inſtant, and ſhould be obvious; and where, as far as there was any real difference, ſo far were theſe Laws of defective Compoſition.

The Friend of *Toleration* therefore will not, I ſay, make any diſtinction, or contend for any difference, between the *letter* and the *ſpirit* of this Sovereign Law of Nature. This miſchievous employment will be the talk of him who regards it but as a temporary expedient, forced upon us, to prevent greater evils. And as, amongſt the friends of *Toleration*, the Engliſh Clergy, ſeduced by a common error, were not amongſt the firſt to give it a cordial reception, it ſeems incumbent on their Succeſſors (who were however amongſt the firſt to detect that *common error*), to obliterate the memory of the old prejudices of their Order, by the warmeſt patronage and ſupport of what their more reaſonable principles now ſo much approve.

Their friendly attachment to this Law will be beſt ſeen by their regarding it, firſt, as doing honour, in a *ſpiritual view*, to a

CHRISTIAN

CHRISTIAN CHURCH; implying confidence in the truth of its conſtitution, and that it will receive no detriment by a compariſon with any other, how near or cloſe ſoever they may be ſet together.

And ſecondly, as beſtowing benefit, in an *eccleſiaſtical view*, on the NATIONAL CHURCH; it being a certain Maxim that an *Eſtabliſhed Religion*, under a *Toleration* and a *Teſt*, will always go on enlarging its bounds; ſince the reſtraint which this latter Law impoſes, is ſo light, that it is conſidered rather as a ſmall inconvenience than an injury; a burthen ſo eaſy as not to exaſperate, but barely to excite in men a diſpoſition to remove it.

In a word, the CHURCH in which religious liberty is cordially entertained and zealouſly ſupported, may be truly called CHRISTIAN: for if *the mark of the beaſt* * be PERSECUTION, as the ſacred volumes decypher it; well may we put TOLERATION as the *ſeal of the living God* †. This then is our preſent boaſt.

True philoſophy, ſo lately cultivated, and now happily made ſubſervient to the Truths of Religion, hath rectified many of thoſe Doctrines which the ſtill-miſapplied aid of the *falſe* had deformed. Nor ſhould the HIERARCHY (much honoured of late in the happy recovery of its ancient Ornaments, the Prelates of high birth and noble lineage) be denied the praiſe, ſo juſtly due, for its ſhare in this reform. To men of Family, we are taught, by experience, to aſcribe an innate generoſity of mind, which inclines them to whatever is polite and decent in *private* life; and, in *public*, diſpoſes them to ſupport the rights of humanity and ſociety. They are reckoned to be the low-born and Cell-bred *number*, in whoſe minds Bigotry and bitter Zeal are apt to get root and overſpread. So that the Church may promiſe to itſelf great advantages from the genial luſtre which this fair Acceſſion to the ſacred College is now deriving to it. DECUS ET TUTAMEN, is the motto inſcribed on every Prelate's mitre; moſt certain to be read in every Prelate's breaſt. The

* Revel. xvi. 2. † Revel. vii. 2.

firſt

firſt ſhines naturally out in the birth and manners of every noble Dignitary; the *latter*, his ſolemn engagements will make him ſtudious to diſcharge.

But this great Work will not be done by Talents at large, but by that ſort of Talents only, which is ſuited to its ſacred nature. Every Order and Station in Society hath its appropriated and proper *tone*; where a conſent in one common key makes that harmony which gives perfection to the Whole. It ſhould be the care therefore of every Member of that Whole, to fit his manners and accompliſhments to the natural *tone* of the Body which he honours, or by which he may think himſelf honoured. This is ſo true, that manners and accompliſhments, foreign to the Profeſſion, nay, though in general eſtimation of a ſuperior kind, yet, when thus prepoſterouſly introduced, deſtroy all that concord which maintains its *dignity* and *uſe*.

On this occaſion, hear an old Grecian Tale. A muſician at Athens became famous for a ſacred Lyre, deſcending to him, through a long race of Anceſtors, from the firſt Heroes and Demy-gods of Attica. Its Tone was ſo raviſhing, and the ſkill of the Maſter, in calling it out, ſo delicate and profound, that the Artiſt and his Lyre were always called upon to bear a principal part in the high Solemnities of that religious City. It happened, that in the midſt of one of theſe Celebrations, a chord of the Lyre broke. It was ſtrung in the ordinary manner with nerves, or what our muſical neighbours call, *corde de boyau*. But the enamoured Owner, to do all honour to ſo rare a wonder, unadviſedly ſupplied the broken ſtring with one of SILVER. The conſequence proved fatal. The Lyre loſt all its harmony and ſweetneſs: it grew harſh and diſcordant. The People abhorred what before they had dwelt upon with raptures; and the unhappy Lyre, now the public execration, was hung up, a neglected thing, a ſilent monument of the folly of the too-fond Poſſeſſor.

Nor ſhould the great Body of the *Clergy* be forgotten on this occaſion. They who have approved themſelves no way *inferior* in an

honeſt zeal for the ſupport of Chriſtian Liberty. If any ſtale particles of the *old leaven* ſtill remain, they lie perfectly inactive. A new Start-up Sect, indeed, will be apt to put them into a momentary ferment: and, on ſuch an occaſion, they will be eager to expoſe their evil nature.

Thus, the firſt appearance of METHODISM began to heat and irritate the miſtaken Zeal of ſome ill-inſtructed men, againſt a new ſpecies of Fanaticiſm, which pretended to be of the Church, and yet inſolently affronted its *diſcipline*; diſdaining to ſhelter itſelf under the peaceable ſhade of a legal Toleration: For theſe men, in their hearts, were enemies to this Law, as fanatic Sects generally are; who contend for religious Liberty, not becauſe they would obey conſcience, but becauſe they, an' pleaſe you, are the Advocates of Truth; *Liberty*, as well as *Dominion*, being, in their opinion, founded in GRACE. This, indeed, was a trying occaſion. But had thoſe good men conſidered that the *Methodiſts* provoked the Public patience merely to procure to themſelves a *mock perſecution*; for to more (as they very well knew) it could never amount in a State where the *honour* of the national Religion was ſecured by a *Toleration*, and the *ſafety* of it, by a *Teſt*; had they conſidered this, I ſay, they would have left theſe factious men to their own inventions.

Beſides, a fairer opportunity never offered itſelf, to do the Clergy credit. Had we appeared eaſy only with thoſe who had qualified themſelves to claim a legal Toleration, our acquieſcence might have been imputed to our impotency in contending with it. But by bearing patiently with *Methodiſm*, the Clergy might have ſhewn the World, that the *Toleration-Act* had their hearts, as well as their outward obedience; for this Sect profeſſed to be of the Church, and yet, at the ſame time, dared to inſult its Diſcipline, and ſet its Governors at defiance; practices which no equitable indulgence would ſcreen from puniſhment. This was the time for the Clergy to vindicate their character from the calumnies of their enemies; and in general they wiſely laid hold on it: So that now they can be no longer

longer ſuſpected of malevolence to the *Law of Toleration*, when in a caſe where they were free from its influence, they yet bore with temper, and though provoked by inſolent defiance, connived at the behaviour of a Sect of Fanatics, over whom all Laws, divine and human, had given them juriſdiction.

But then, if we ſhew ourſelves thus rightly diſpoſed in favour of this divine principle of Toleration, where the Law hath left offenders againſt Church Government to the juſtice of its Rulers; much more diſ oſed ſhall we be to ſuffer the honeſt Sectary, who hath legally qualified himſelf for the enjoyment of his religious liberty, to poſſeſs it without trouble or controul.

When the Law of *Toleration* had once recognized this univerſal Right, it ſoon became apparent, that that other Law of prior date, the TEST (for the formation of *civil* Syſtems does not always, like the *natural*, begin at the right end) was now, by ſecuring the Rights of the national Church, become more neceſſary than ever for the peace of the State. For, by this Law, Sectaries were reſtrained from the exerciſe of certain *civil Offices*, which ſome men have been pleaſed to call *natural Rights*: and we will not diſpute with them about a word, for to no more does it amount, ſince it is confeſſed that Society could never have been formed without men's giving up ſome of their *natural rights*, in order to ſecure the peaceable enjoyment of the reſt.

But it may ſo happen, by the Cuſtom or Conſtitution of *Corporate Bodies*, that the conditional reſtraint which the *Teſt* impoſeth, ſhall, by accident, become a benefit or advantage; as when a Sectarian member of a Corporation is appointed by his Body to diſcharge a very important though very onerous Office; and yet not permitted by the State to enter on it, but on conditions which his religious principles will not ſuffer him to comply with. For it having been, a long time, the cuſtom for the Member, when nominated to this Office, to purchaſe, of the Body, an exemption, at a large price, called a *Fine*: when this came to be demanded of a diſſenting Member, he naturally replied, that it could not equitably

regard any but Such who *willingly* declined a permitted Office; certainly, not Thoſe whom the *Law* had forbidden, by ſevere penalties, to diſcharge it. But to this ſo plauſible a plea, it was thought a ſufficient anſwer, "That the Law, of whoſe reſtraint the diſſenting Member would thus avail himſelf, was never intended for his advantage or emolument."

The queſtion therefore to be decided was this, "Whether he "who *cannot* ſerve is equally obnoxious to the Fine, with him who "*will not* ?" and, to this day, it remains undetermined *.

Now I humbly conceive, this queſtion can never be rightly reſolved, till the *true nature* of the TEST LAW be previouſly ſettled; and when that is done, it will, I ſuppoſe, be no longer diſputable.

Were this Law enacted to draw, or to drive, Diſſenters into the National Church, the prohibition, of ſerving Civil Offices, was certainly intended for a PUNISHMENT. If the Law were enacted only to keep Diſſenters out of thoſe Stations, in which, by hurting the Church, they would violate the peace of the State, it was as certainly intended for a RESTRAINT, only; and becomes a *puniſhment* but by accident.

Now were it intended for a PUNISHMENT, the *Fine* is moſt juſt and equitable: And then the reaſoning of the Body againſt the Member, "That the Legiſlature, by this Law, never intended "the Diſſenter ſhould receive Civil benefit and advantage," will not be without its force; For a *benefit* defeats the end of the Law.

But if the Teſt impoſe a RESTRAINT only, and it become a *puniſhment* but by *accident*, it may, without the leaſt evil influence on the Law, become a *benefit* likewiſe by *accident*. Nay, to hinder this fair Chance would be highly unjuſt. For if, from the inevitable condition of human things, Particulars receive *damage* by a Law which reſpects the General, and which never had ſuch damage in its intention, it is but fit they ſhould have the ſame chance of a *benefit*, though equally without the intention of the Legiſlature.

* In the Spring of 1762.

Indeed,

Indeed, where the unprovided-for, or unthought-of, Conſequence tends naturally to defeat the purpoſe of the Law, there the Interpreters of it will interpoſe, and declare the advantage taken to be againſt the Law; or, which amounts to the ſame thing, to be unſupported by it. But an accidental *benefit*, which ariſes from the *reſtraint* impoſed, ſeems better calculated to effect the end of the *Teſt law* (which is to keep the enemies of the Church from office in the State) than a *damage*, which might tempt them to violate their conſcience: The *benefit* is, indeed, liable to abuſe (and what is there in civil matters which is not ſo?) but this abuſe does not affect the purpoſe of the Law, which is to keep Sectaries out of Office. But let me not be miſunderſtood, as if any thing here ſaid, in favour of the ſectarian Member, was meant to include the *Occaſional Conformiſt*. For if ſuch a one think that he may, with his conſcience unhurt, *conform*, for the ſake of *lucrative* employments, he can never be permitted, on pretence of Conſcience, to plead the reſtrictive law, in order to evade thoſe which are *onerous*. And here let me further obſerve, that the Diſſenters will not ſeem to be in the propereſt circumſtances to claim the advantage of the diſtinction here laid down in their favour, till they have a little reformed their ideas of a *Teſt-law*. For they have, I think, in order to throw the greater odium upon it, generally repreſented the prohibition, which it impoſes, as inflicted for a *Puniſhment*. Now we have ſhewn, that if our Law-givers intended a *Puniſhment*, it defeats their purpoſe, to connive at its becoming an *accidental benefit*. I only remark this for the ſake of a general obſervation, That when Bodies of men, whether civil or eccleſiaſtical, ſuffer themſelves to be miſled by their paſſions and prejudices, their intereſts or reſentments, the errors, they fall into, will always, ſooner or later, turn upon themſelves.

Now it appears, both from Reaſon and Fact, that the TEST is a *reſtrictive*, and not a *penal* Law, in the proper meaning of theſe terms.

1. If

1. If a Law may be underſtood in two ſenſes, one of which ſupports its equity, while the other betrays its injuſtice Reaſon directs us to adopt the firſt. To *puniſh* Sectaries, in order to bring them over to the national Religion, is plainly wrong: But to *reſtrain* Sectaries from hurting the national Religion is as plainly right. Therefore, though the intention of the Legiſlature had in this particular inſtance been doubtful, yet a general Law of a free People would admit of no other interpretation.

2. But the intention of the Legiſlature was not doubtful: and the reaſon of the thing is ſupported by fact. When this Law was made, the *national Church* was deemed, in the public Opinion, to be in much danger both from Proteſtant and Popiſh Sectaries. In the early days of its eſtabliſhment indeed, the Government had endeavoured to bring Both into it; and many *penal Laws* were enacted for that purpoſe: But, at the time the *Teſt* became a Law, that viſionary and unjuſt project had been long dropt; and Government was content to confine its care to the *protection*, rather than *extenſion* of the national Church. Had this latter point been their aim, it was to be effected only by the vigorous execution of the old *penal* Laws then in being. The *Teſt* added no force to thoſe; but, on the contrary, greatly relaxed their vigour, by diſpoſing Government to repoſe their chief confidence, and ſeek their only remedy for diſorders, in this new-made Law.

And now may be ſeen the ſtrength of that Objection made to the *Teſt*, as it is legally inforced to affect the intereſts of Proteſtant Diſſenters, viz. "that its original and direct intention (a fact no one will deny) was to oppoſe to the machinations of Popery; and that therefore, thoſe being included only by accident, may very reaſonably be overlooked." But if the idea here given of the *Teſt-law* be the true, it is apparent, that the general, though not immediate purpoſe of the Legiſlature, in this Law, was to provide for the ſafety of the national Church, and that for the ſake of the State, from what quarter ſoever the danger might ariſe. At one ſeaſon it might ſpring from *Popery*; at another from *Puritaniſm*; but

but the various civil miſchiefs, conſequent on religious quarrels, were to be repelled, as they ſprung up, with equal vigilance and vigour. But let no one by this imagine, that a compariſon is here inſinuated between Popery and Puritaniſm. As Religions, they can no more be compared together, than a body irrecoverably corrupted, with one but ſlightly tainted. Yet, with regard to the civil miſchiefs which religious differences occaſion, we have experienced, that the lighteſt matters often produce as great, as the moſt important: And the ſurplice and croſs in baptiſm have alienated fellow Citizens againſt one another as fiercely as the tyrannic claim of a Supremacy, or the ſuperſtitious worſhip of dead men deified.

However, the nature and genius of the two Sects is ſufficiently diſcriminated by *tolerating* the one, and only (under ſuſpended penal laws) *conniving* at the other: But ſtill on the ſame *civil principles*; theſe laws not being directed againſt the religious errors of the *Church*, but the political perverſities of the *Court*, *of* ROME; which will not ſuffer its Subjects to give any reaſonable ſecurity for their allegiance to the ſupreme Magiſtrate: For with religious errors as ſuch, the State hath nothing to do, nor any right to attempt to repel or ſuppreſs them. They are the *civil miſchiefs* with which civil Society is concerned, the miſchiefs ariſing from religious quarrels when the two Parties are near equal in Power (as I ſuppoſe they would ſoon be under a Toleration without a Teſt-law), and are ſet upon repreſſing one another's *errors*.

And now, ſince ſo much hath been urged in behalf of the Diſſenters, their Civil and Religious Rights, they will bear to be reminded of one thing, in their turn; neither to abuſe the *Toleration* themſelves, nor to ſcreen others in abuſing it. And the caſe I am about to give of One, who, it is pretended, was thus ſkreened, will, I hope, excuſe this freedom. It is indeed the caſe of One who, without doing much injury to our diſſenting Brethren, can never be reckoned in their number. This miſerable Buffoon, of whom I would be underſtood to ſpeak, was ſuffered for near thirty

years.

years together to turn all RELIGION and MORALITY into ridicule; once, and, for ſome time, twice a week, in a licenſed place of Devotion in the Capital of the Kingdom. A matter ſo much to the diſgrace of Society, that They, on whom the ſcandal fell, thought proper to give out, that a vigorous proſecution of this Offender was ordered to be commenced; but that when it was known, the Diſſenters took the alarm, as if the *Law of Toleration* was in danger, ſince this Impoſtor acted under the common protection of a Licence from *Hicks's Hall.*

Yet, whoever hindered the proſecution, could not but confeſs, that this was a very vile *abuſe* of a moſt ſacred Law: They could not but apprehend that for an abuſed Law to ſcreen the Abuſer from puniſhment, was making Law to EXECUTE itſelf, in a very different ſenſe from what crafty Politicians have ſometimes projected.

But from all that has been here ſaid in behalf of the *Law of Toleration*, let me not be underſtood as if I could ſuppoſe, or would inſinuate, that this Law has altered the nature of the crime going under the name of SCHISM, which is an unneceſſary ſeparation from the national Church; or, becauſe it hath taken all civil puniſhment from the offender, that therefore *Schiſm* is become harmleſs, and an empty name: and that the Law in favour of *Schiſmatics*, like the Law in favour of WITCHES, had diſſipated only a frightful Fantom. It is true, that, in both Caſes, the Legiſlature acted for the ſame end, the reſtraint of injuſtice; but it was on very different principles: In the firſt caſe, they took off civil puniſhment from a *real crime*, not cognizable by a human Judicatory: and, in the latter, they removed an opprobrium from the Statute Book, which expreſſed a ſanguinary reſentment againſt an *imaginary one.*

Schiſm, or a cauſeleſs ſeparation from the national Church, is a crime, which, on all the principles of Law and Reaſon, deſerves condign puniſhment. But, of this ſeparation, whether with or without cauſe, there is no adequate Judge, but that Power who can diſtinguiſh between a well and an ill informed Conſcience. Very juſtly

juſtly therefore did this Free Government remit the queſtion to a wiſer Tribunal. But in ſo doing it did not mitigate, but, by its indulgence, rather aggravate the Guilt, wherever it ſhall be found, hereafter, to exiſt. And how wiſely ſo doubtful a point was remitted thither, we may, in part, ſee from the anſwer of the *foreign Divines*, to whoſe judgment, at the beginning of our Reformation (when the quarrel between the Puritans and the Churchmen about Ceremonies and Diſcipline ran high), both Parties agreed to ſubmit. Thoſe prudent and honeſt men, when thus appealed unto, gave it as their opinion, that "the Puritans ought to conform, rather than make a ſchiſm; and that the Churchmen ought to indulge the others' ſcruple, rather than hazard one." A wiſe deciſion, and reaching much further, in religious matters, than to the ſingle caſe to which it was applied.

Schiſm therefore is no leſs a crime now, that the Law conſigns over its puniſhment to a proper Judicature, than it was when civil Authority, blindly and ineffectually, interfered to vindicate the honour of Religion from this unhappy ſcandal.

Thus have we ſeen what *reputation* accrues to the Church of England, from the eſtabliſhment of this ineſtimable Law; and what *benefits* may further accrue to it by the prudent conduct of our Clergy, in its ſupport.

CHAP. II.

WHAT remains of my Subject, will be more particularly addreſſed to the Miniſters of Religion: who are ſurrounded with Enemies from various quarters; and inſulted both by the attacks of INFIDELITY and FANATICISM.

Their defence, therefore, is indeed of neceſſity to be as much diverſified; but it ſhould ſtill be under the ſafe conduct, and with the ſimple Armour of TRUTH only. For it is not the honour of a fan-

taſtic *Sect of Philoſophy* which We are intruſted to ſupport; better committed to the care of thoſe who exerciſe the talents of its old Patrons, the Sophists; neither is it the credit of a *Traditional Orthodoxy*, which, ſome of thoſe who are called Fathers of the Church have, of old, defended with the like arts and arms: But it is the ſimple Gospel of Jesus, equally abhorrent of *refinement* and *deceit*.

I cannot, nor indeed have I any juſt reaſon to ſuſpect, that the Engliſh Clergy will diſhonour ſo noble a Cauſe by any premeditated fraud. Yet the moſt Upright, in the heat of controverſy (provoked, and perhaps alarmed at the extravagant powers which Libertines and Fanatics reciprocally aſcribe to Reason and to Grace), have been but too apt to run into deſtructive extremes, depreciating, and even annihilating, ſometimes the One, and ſometimes the Other, as beſt ſerved the purpoſe they were then purſuing. Of which egregious folly, their Adverſaries have never failed to take advantage, by turning their own ill-faſhioned and worſe-fabricated Arms againſt them. And this was eaſily done; ſince *Revealed Religion* derives its whole ſupport from the joint operation of theſe two Principles, *Reaſon* and *Grace*, acting on the human mind with equal and unremitted vigour.

But to underſtand more ſenſibly the miſchiefs ariſing from ſuch ill-judged defences of Religion, I ſhall ſet before the Reader a capital Example of each of theſe extremes, of which we are now ſpeaking. From whence we may learn the uſe and neceſſity of keeping within that equal mean, which moſt effectually ſerves to detect and to expoſe the errors of either Adverſary.

It hath ever been amongſt the principal arts of Infidelity to make the moſt extravagant encomiums on human Reason; and, conſequently, to profeſs the utmoſt regard and reverence for, what Unbelievers are pleaſed to call, natural religion. Under this cover, by the pooreſt ſophiſtry and hypocriſy imaginable, they have accuſtomed themſelves to undermine revelation. But now, What expedient, think you, did ſome warm defenders of Revelation

tion employ to uphold its credit? You will naturally ſay, they took care to moderate the extravagant repreſentations of theſe falſe friends of *Reaſon* and *natural Religion*; by marking out the juſt bounds of the human Faculties, and ſhewing, how far Reaſon extends her juriſdiction, and in what ſhe herſelf preſcribes ſubmiſſion: by explaining how neceſſary a foundation *natural Religion* is to the *Revealed*; how it coincides with it, is compleated by it, and ſo inſeparably annexed to it (as the foundation to its ſuperſtructure) that nothing can hurt the One which does not injuriouſly affect the Other; there being no objection, which the Logic of miſapplied *Reaſon* can bring againſt *Revealed Religion*, which does not hold at leaſt equally ſtrong againſt the *Natural*.

This they did, you ſay, becauſe This they ought to have done. Alas! they took a very different courſe. They declaimed againſt *human Reaſon*; they depreſſed it as extravagantly as their Adverſaries had advanced it.—"Should you be ſo fooliſh, they told you, as to take it for your Guide, it would lead you to nothing but to ſin and miſery: that the Goſpel diſclaimed it, and went entirely on the ſurer ground of FAITH: that its confeſſed impotency in defence of *truths revealed*, may ſhew the abſurdity of relying on it to diſcover *truths unrevealed*." Hence, they aſſured you, "that the Deiſts boaſted Syſtem of *natural Religion* was a Chimera; and that what (under this name) they recommended to the adoration of their followers, was an Impoſtor, made up of juſt ſo much of the *revealed* as was of uſe to them in combating the reſt:" Finally, they ſaid, "that all religious knowlege of the Deity, and of man's relation to him, was *revealed*; and had deſcended traditionally down (though broken and disjointed in ſo long a paſſage) from the *firſt Man*; who received it as he came out freſh from the forming hands of his Creator."

When our Enemies had gotten theſe indiſcreet friends of Revelation at this advantage, they changed the attack, (for all Arms are indifferent to *them*, but in proportion to their preſent power of

doing miſchief) and now tried, how *Revelation* was to be further ſhaken, on theſe new and extravagant principles of its Defenders.

I. Accordingly a certain maſked Buffoon undertook to turn *one part* of this Paradox againſt them, in a Diſcourſe to prove that REVELATION WAS NOT FOUNDED ON ARGUMENT; and tempered his irony with ſo grave and ſolemn a tone, that many good men miſtook this arch-enemy of all godlineſs to be, at worſt, but an over-warm promoter of it. He had two ends in this worthy attempt; the one, to diſcredit Religion; the other, to excite and encourage Fanatics to diſcredit it ſtill more.

A fairer Writer againſt Religion, becauſe a more open, took up the *other part* of the Paradox, with the ſame righteous deſign. And as the Buffoon had undertaken to ſhew that *Revealed Religion was not founded in argument*, ſo the Declaimer * ſets himſelf to prove that *natural Religion was not founded in common Senſe*: for, its exiſtence *depending on the moral attributes* of the Deity, his *juſtice* and *goodneſs*, this broacher of the laſt runnings of the FIRST PHILOSOPHY labours to ſhew that *juſtice* and *goodneſs* belong not to him, whoſe entire eſſence conſiſts in the *natural attributes* of *wiſdom* and *power* only. Hence, under the name of *natural Religion*, he ſlurs in upon us an *irreligious* NATURALISM. And now *Revelation*, deprived of its foundation, *natural Religion*, and of its beſt defence and ornament, *human Reaſon*, lies a ſcorn to Unbelievers, and a prey to Fanatics and Enthuſiaſts.

But all this hath not yet taught theſe wayward Divines, wiſdom. We have lately ſeen them, even at the Fountain of Science, the Univerſity †, attempting to ſupport in good earneſt the wretched paradox which Mr. —— had ſo miſchievouſly advanced in jeſt. And yet one ſhould be utterly at a loſs to gueſs in what the wit or wiſdom of it lay, whether advanced in earneſt or in jeſt. But a miſchievous Heart will at any time riſque the reputation of its head-piece to give the alarm to ſober piety; and a warm Head diſcloſes, without fear or wit, the rancour of its boſom, to vilify and beſpatter

* Lord Bolingbroke. † Oxford.

ſuperior

ſuperior Reaſon. Otherwiſe, to aſk, *Whether Chriſtianity was founded in Reaſon or in Faith*, would be deemed juſt as wiſe a queſtion as *Whether St. Paul's Clock was founded in Mechaniſm or in Motion?* Since, if it be found to have *motion*, we neceſſarily conclude that *motion* to be regulated by *mechaniſm*: So, if the vital principle of Chriſtianity be *Faith*, we neceſſarily conclude it to be ſuch a *Faith*, as was formed, and may be ſupported, on the rules and principles of *human Reaſon*. A wild Indian, perhaps, might imagine that the *Clock* was animated by a Spirit; and an Enthuſiaſt, ſtill wilder than he, may, for aught I know, conclude that *Chriſtianity* riſes only out of internal impulſe. But ſurely none but a Buffoon or a Fanatic would, for his credit in jeſt, or for his intereſt in good earneſt, diſcard the uſe of Reaſon in conſulting for his *future* happineſs, when he has already found it ſo uſeful in procuring his *preſent*. Both the future and the preſent are acquired by the right adaption, of means to ends; and this adaption, I ſuppoſe, will be confeſſed by all to be in the ſole province of REASON. Nor has this heaven-appointed Guide ever given any juſt cauſe of complaint or jealouſy. When men ſee themſelves bewildered, they ought to ſuſpect themſelves: and, I believe, on enquiry, they will always find, that they had been directing *Reaſon* when they ſhould have been directed by her. But the Paſſions and Affections, which have occaſioned *her* diſcredit, go on, in their illuſions, to excite *our* diſtruſt.

II. Again, theſe indiſcreet friends of Religion, while they were thus puſhing the common Adverſary, with theſe imaginary advantages gained by the depreſſion of human reaſon, did not advert to the miſchiefs they were letting in, at the oppoſite quarters of *Superſtition* and *Fanaticiſm*. POPERY can only ſtand and flouriſh on the foundation of *implicit faith*; and the fervours of ENTHUSIASM ſoon riſe into madneſs, when unchequed by Reaſon. The PRIEST expects of you to renounce your Underſtanding before he will undertake to reconcile you to the Church of Rome; but, indeed, when that is over, he permits you to take up as much of it again, as will ſerve you to juſtify your Apoſtaſy. The quarrel, which the FANATIC

has

has to it, is more ſerious. He is ever feeling its ill effects; and therefore his averſion to it is immortal. When *Ignatius Loyola* was in the Meridian of his Fervours, ſome of the writings of *Eraſmus* chanced to fall into his hands. He was at firſt ſeduced, by the charms of the compoſition, to look into them; but finding they had, before he was aware, inſenſibly damped the inflammation of his Zeal; he caſt them from him with abhorrence and execration. The very ſame diſaſter, Mr. *J. Weſley* informs us, once befell himſelf, in his converſe with the ſober followers of *Eraſmus*; inſomuch that he was ſoon forced, he tells us, to avoid them, as the *bane of all Religion.* "I avoid that BANE OF ALL RELIGION, the *company of good ſort of men, as they are called. Theſe inſenſibly undermine all my reſolution, and ſteal away what little* ZEAL *I have* *." If this be true, though they *ſteal but Traſh*, yet they *leave him poor indeed*; as his quondam Maſter has lately obſerved. "Your "ſtrictures upon Meſſieurs of the Foundery, and the Tabernacle, &c. "(ſays he to a friend) are very juſt. Theſe gentlemen ſeem to have "no other bottom to ſtand upon but that of ZEAL †." Indeed, againſt ſo dangerous an Enemy as SOBER SENSE, the *Fanatic* cannot be too carefully guarded. And therefore, he never thinks himſelf ſecure from the miſchiefs of *Reaſon*, till he has, with the ſame hoarſe clamours that the metamorphoſed Clowns in the Fable purſued Latona and her godlike Iſſue; driven away from the neighbourhood of the Saints, both *Reaſon*, and her fair and celeſtial Offſpring, NATURAL RELIGION and HUMAN LEARNING.

Mr. J. WESLEY, who is ready to exhibit to us every feature of Fanaticiſm in its turn, has, I fear, been kept ſo long upon the Scene, as to tire out his Audience; he ſhall therefore be only once again exhibited, to teſtify, in a word or two, his civilities to *natural Reaſon* and *natural Religion*; and then diſmiſſed for good. As to the firſt, he frankly tells us, the Father of *lies* was the Father

* Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 31.
† Mr. W. Law's Collection of Letters, &c. p. 189.

of

of *reaſonings* alſo: "I obſerved, (ſays he) every day more and "more, the advantage *Satan* had gained over us. Many were "thrown into idle *reaſonings*."—And again—"Many of our Siſ-"ters are ſhaken. Betty and Eſther H. are *grievouſly torn* by *rea-*"*ſonings* *."—His civilities to NATURAL RELIGION, and to that eminent Writer who has ſo well explained the nature of this firſt great gift of God to Man, follow next: "Meeting with a French "man of New Orleans (ſays Mr. Weſley), he gave us a full and "particular account of the *Chicaſaws*:—And hence we could not "but remark, what is THE RELIGION OF NATURE, *properly ſo* "*called, or that Religion which flows from natural Reaſon, unaſſiſted* "*by Revelation.*" He then ſpeaks of their manners in War.—Their way of living in Peace follows in theſe words; "They do nothing "but eat and drink and ſmoak from Morning till Night, and in "a manner from Night till Morning. For they riſe at any hour of "the night when they wake, and, after eating and drinking as much "as they can, go to ſleep again. See THE RELIGION OF NATURE "*truly* DELINEATED †." What is chiefly curious in this account is, that Mr. Weſley profeſſes to ſhew us what that Religion is which is *properly called natural, or that which flows from* NATURAL REASON *unaſſiſted by* REVELATION, and yet he gives us, in its ſtead, only man's *natural manners*, which flow not from his *reaſon*, but from his *paſſions and appetites* only; in an example, where *Reaſon* may be rather ſaid to have a capacity of exiſtence than actually to exiſt, as being alike inert and void of power whether the *Chicaſaw* be waking or aſleep.

As to HUMAN LEARNING, if the zealous Mr. W. Law does not aſſault this more rudely than his forward Pupil has inſulted NATURAL RELIGION, yet he returns much oftener to the Charge. The laſt Legacies, which this bountiful Gentleman hath beſtowed upon the Public, are *A Collection of Letters*, &c. and *An Addreſs*

* Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 8, and 17.

† Journ. from his embarking for Georgia, to his return to London, p. 44, 45.

to the Clergy, &c. In theſe two Works the hapleſs Author of the *Divine Legation* is pointed at on every occaſion of *abuſe*, and held up as the grand Apoſtate from *Grace* to *Human Reaſon*; and this chiefly, for denying (what indeed, I neither deny nor affirm, for I take it to be nonſenſe) That "*Divine Inſpiration is* ESSENTIAL *to* "*Man's firſt created ſtate, and vainly thinking to find out a middle way*, "between this and no inſpiration at all, *namely, that the Spirit's or-*"*dinary influence occaſionally aſſiſts the faithful* *." For this, and for ſome few things beſides, ſuch as a charge of Spinoziſm on his beloved Behmeniſm, I have the honour to be plentifully, though *ſpiritually* railed at, whenever he fancies he ſees me in the Retinue of HUMAN LEARNING.

He lays it down as a Poſtulatum, "That whatever comes not "IMMEDIATELY from GOD can have nothing *godly* in it. There-"fore what comes IMMEDIATELY from SELF, ſuch as NATURAL "REASON, however outwardly coloured, can have no better a na-"ture within than the very Works of the DEVIL †."

Now the fruit of *natural reaſon* being HUMAN LEARNING (indeed, according to this account, more properly than men were aware of, called *prophane Learning*); he thus deſcants upon it.

Firſt of all, he aſſures us, it has nothing to do with Religion. "Where can God's *Kingdom be come*, but where every other power, "but his, is at an end, and driven out?——What now have "Parts and Literature and the natural Abilities of man to do here? "juſt as much as they can do at the Reſurrection of the dead; for "all that is to be done here is nothing elſe but *Reſurrection* and "*Life*.——Yet vain man would be thought to do *ſomething* in this "*kingdom of Grace*--becauſe he has happened to be made a Scholar, "has run through all the Languages and Hiſtories, has been long "exerciſed in conjectures and criticiſms, and has his head full of all "notions, theological, poetical, and philoſophical, as a Dictionary

* See p. 12 and 25 of the Addreſs to the Clergy.

† Addreſs, p. 57.

"is

" is full of all ſorts of words. Now let this ſimple queſtion decide " the whole matter here: Has this great Scholar any more power " of ſaying to this mountain, *Be thou removed hence and caſt into* " *the Sea*, than the illiterate Chriſtian hath *?" To this reaſoning againſt *human Learning*, in its uſe to Religion, little can be oppoſed. For it is very certain *human Learning* can neither *raiſe the Dead*, nor *remove Mountains*.

But it is not only uſeleſs in *Religion*, but is of infinite miſchief.

For 1. It nouriſheth PRIDE. " The piercing Critic may, and " naturally will, grow in *pride*, as faſt as his ſkill in words diſco- " vers itſelf. And *every kind of knowlege* that ſhews the Orator, " the Diſputer, the Commentator, the Hiſtorian, his own powers " and abilities, are the ſame temptation to him that Eve had from " the ſerpent," &c. †.

2. It nouriſheth *Contention*.—" *Grammar*, *Logic* and *Criticiſm*, " each knoweth nothing of Scripture but its words; bringeth " forth nothing but its *own wiſdom* of words, and a Religion of " wrangle, hatred, and contention about the meaning of them ‡."

3. It turneth Religion to a *trade*.——" Where *ſelf*, or the *natural* " *man* is become great in *religious Learning*, there, the greater " the Scholar, the more firmly will he be fixed in their Religion, " *whoſe God is their belly* §."

4. It is *the abomination of deſolation*.—" *Genius* and *Learning* en- " tered into the pale of the Church——Behold, if ever, *the* " *abomination of deſolation* ſtanding in the holy place.——Chriſt " has no where ſpoken one ſingle word, or given the leaſt power " to *Logic*, *Learning*, or the *natural powers of man* IN HIS KING- " DOM ||." By this, we find, that CHRIST'S KINGDOM may be uſurped as well by *claſſic Learning* as by CHURCH DISCIPLINE. It is certain, our modern ideas of *religious Liberty* can conſiſt with

* Addreſs, p. 96, 97.
‡ Addreſs, p. 122.
|| Ibid. p. 114.
† Letters, p. 187.
§ Ibid. p. 59.

neither of them, for this *Liberty* claims an exemption both from REASON and OBEDIENCE.

5. It chuſeth *darkneſs rather than light*.——"But now, Who "can more reject this divine light" [i. e. the *light of the world*, re-illuminated by the *bleſſed Jacob*, as he calls him] "or more "plainly chooſe darkneſs inſtead of it, than he who ſeeks to have "his mind enriched, the faculties of his fallen ſoul cultivated, by "the literature of Poets, Orators, Philoſophers, Sophiſts, Sceptics, "and Critics, born and bred up in the worſhip and praiſes of Idol-"Gods and Goddeſſes?"

6. Finally, it is a total *Apoſtacy* from God and Goodneſs.—— "The practice of all Churches for many ages, has had recourſe to "*Learning*, *Art*, and *Science*, to qualify Miniſters for the preaching "of the Goſpel—To this more than to any other cauſe, is the "*great Apoſtacy* of all Chriſtendom to be attributed.—The death "of all that is good in the Soul, have now and always had their "chief nouriſhment and ſupport from the ſenſe of the merit and "ſufficiency of literal accompliſhments—And the very *life of Jeſus* "*in the Soul* is by few people leſs earneſtly deſired, or more hard "to be practiſed, than by *great Wits*, *Claſſical-Critics*, *Linguiſts*, "*Hiſtorians*, and *Orators* in holy orders *."—And again—"This "empty *letter-learned knowledge*, which the natural man can as "eaſily have of the Sacred Scripture and human matters, as of "any other books or human affairs, this being taken for *divine* "*knowledge* has ſpread ſuch darkneſs and deluſion all over Chriſ-"tendom, as may be reckoned no leſs than a GENERAL APOSTASY "from the Goſpel ſtate of *divine illumination* †." We ſee by this, that the grand miſtake of Scholars has hitherto been, in ſuppoſ-ing, that the true ſenſe of Scripture is to be diſcovered by the ap-plication of thoſe Principles which enable us to find out the mean-ing contained in other ancient Books.

* Letters, p. 37. † Addreſs, p. 94.

And

And now the good man having worked up his *enthuſiaſm* into a poetical ferment (for, as it has been ſaid, that a Poet is an Enthuſiaſt in jeſt, ſo, he ſhews us, that an Enthuſiaſt may be a Poet in good earneſt) he adorns theſe powerful reaſonings with a ſtring of as beauteous Similes, in diſcredit of *human Learning*.

1. It is compared to the *fall of man*.—"Look (ſays he) at the "preſent ſtate of Chriſtendom, glorying in the light of *Greek and* "*Roman Learning*, and you will ſee the *fall* of the preſent Church "from its *firſt Goſpel-ſtate*, to have much likeneſs to the *fall of the* "*firſt divine man*, from the glory of paradiſiacal innocence, and hea-"venly purity, into an earthly ſtate and beſtial life of worldly craft "and ſerpentine ſubtilty *."

2. It is directly compared to the *old Serpent*—"What a poverty "of ſenſe in ſuch, to ſet themſelves down at the feet of a *Maſter* "*Tully*, and a *Maſter Ariſtotle!* who only differ from the meaneſt "of all other corrupt men, as the *teaching Serpent* differed from "his fellow-animals, by being *more ſubtle than all the beaſts of the* "*field* †."

3. It is compared to the *Tower of Babel*——"A *Tower of Babel* "may, to its builders eyes, ſeem to hide its head in the clouds; "but as to its *reaching of Heaven*, it is no nearer to that than the "earth on which it ſtands. It is thus with all the buildings of "Man's wiſdom—He may take the *logic* of Ariſtotle, add to that "the *rhetoric* of Tully, and then aſcend as high as he can on the "ladder of *Poetic* imagination, yet no more is done to the reviving "the loſt life of God in his Soul, than by a Tower of Brick and "Mortar, to reach Heaven ‡."

4. Again, it is compared to *Idolatry*—"What is it that moſt "of all hinders the *death of the old man?*—It is the fancied riches "of *Parts*, the glitter of *genius*, the flights of *imagination*, the "glory of *Learning*, and the ſelf-conceited ſtrength of *natural*

* Addreſs, p. 98.
† Ibid, p. 139, 140.
‡ Ibid. p. 104.

" *Reaſon*: theſe are the *ſtrong holds* of fallen Nature, the Maſter-
" builders of *Pride's Temple*, and which, as ſo many *Prieſts*, keep
" up the *daily worſhip* of IDOL SELF *."

But, now his poetical Enthuſiaſm has blazed itſelf out; and he comes again to himſelf.—We know how the lucid intervals of a Fanatic are wont to be employed; generally in covering the madneſs of the *Hot* fit with the moſt deliberate and unbluſhing falſehoods of the *Cold*.

From what hath paſt, raſh Divines might be apt to charge this holy man, ſo meek of Spirit, with *Enthuſiaſm*, — with a brutal ſpite to *Reaſon*,—and with more than Vandalic rage againſt *human Learning*. But they wrong him greatly, 1. As to *Enthuſiaſm*, he ſays,—" What an argument would this be; *Enthuſiaſts* have made
" a bad uſe of the doctrine of being *led by the ſpirit of God*; ergo,
" He is *Enthuſiaſtical* who preaches up the doctrine of being *led by*
" *the ſpirit of God*. Now abſurd as this is, was any of my Accuſers,
" as high in *Genius*, as bulky in *Learning*, as *Coloſſus* was in
" Stature, he would be at a loſs to bring a ſtronger argument than
" this to prove me an *Enthuſiaſt*, or an abetter of them †." This is plainly unanſwerable, unleſs you read, as his Accuſer wrote it, for—*who preaches up the doctrine* — *who* ABUSIVELY *preaches up the doctrine*.

2. " Another Charge (ſays he) upon me, equally falſe, and, I may
" ſay, more ſenſeleſs, is, that I am a declared Enemy to the *uſe of Rea-*
" *ſon in Religion*. And, why? Becauſe in all my writings I teach that
" Reaſon *is to be denied*. I own it, and this, becauſe Chriſt has ſaid,
" *Whoever will come after me, let him deny himſelf*. For how can a man
" *deny himſelf* without denying *his reaſon*, unleſs *reaſon* be no part of
" himſelf ‡?" Now I am at a loſs to know, How any one can become an enemy to another more declared, than by *denying* or *renouncing* that other. Were I to *deny* my Sovereign, I ſhould be

* Addreſs, p. 110.
† Ibid. p. 51.
‡ Ibid. p. 52.

ſoon

ſoon taught to know, that he conſidered me as his enemy, and would probably treat me accordingly. But Sovereign-Reaſon has no *Attorney-General*, unleſs perhaps, it be that *Coloſſus* he ſpeaks of, and ſo loudly defies.—However, if human *Reaſon* can argue no better than Mr. Law, I am ready to *deny* her too.—For, a Man's *ſelf*, I have been taught, has a two-fold acceptation; his *Reaſon* may be called, *himſelf*, and ſo may his *Paſſions*. If therefore he be commanded to *deny himſelf*, I ſhould conclude, it was not his *better* ſelf, his *Reaſon*, but the *worſe*, his *Paſſions*, to which the divine Command refers.

3. Then as to *human Learning*, the Charge, he tells us, is as *falſe and ſenſeleſs* as the reſt.—"Shew me a Scholar as full of *learn-*
"*ing* as the Vatican is of Books, and he will be juſt as likely to
"give all that he hath for the *Goſpel-Pearl*, as he would be, if he
"was as rich as Crœſus. LET NO ONE HERE IMAGINE I AM
"WRITING AGAINST ALL HUMAN LITERATURE, *arts, and ſciences*,
"or that I wiſh the World to be without them. *I am no more an*
"*Enemy to them*, than to the common uſeful labours of life. *It is*
"*literal Learning, verbal contention, and critical ſtrife* about the
"things of God that I charge with folly, and miſchief to Religion.
"And, in this, I have all learned Chriſtendom, both Popiſh and
"Proteſtant, on my ſide; for they both agree in charging each
"other, with a bad and falſe Goſpel-ſtate, becauſe of that, which
"their Learning, Logic, and Criticiſm do for them *."' There are no ſuch proficients in *ſophiſtry* as the declared enemies of *Reaſon*; nor any ſo dextrous in legerdemain as the meereſt bunglers in Mechanics —He is not an Enemy, he tells us, to *human literature*, but to *literal learning* only: That is, he approves of Learning contained in Letters, but not of Letters contained in Learning. The truth is, he would willingly in this diſtreſs take ſhelter, did he know how, even in the *graceleſs* company of *Men of Taſte*; who, like him, to hide their ignorance, are always ſcoffing at the Pedantry of *literal learning and verbal criticiſm*, with the

* Addreſs, p. 152.

ſame

ſame good ſenſe that an Artificer abuſes thoſe Tools of his trade which he knows not how to work with.——Again, do *Popiſh* and *Proteſtant* Diſputers ever ſay to one another—*You ſupport a bad and falſe Goſpel by Learning, Logic, and Criticiſm?* Do not their reciprocal accuſations of one another's errors turn upon the WANT *of Learning, Logic, and Criticiſm?* Or was Mr. Law, indeed, ſo ignorant as he pretends, when he ſuppoſes there are now *two* Kinds of Learning, Logic, and Criticiſm, a Popiſh and a Proteſtant; inſtead of *one*, founded and perfected on Principles, held by both Parties in common?—All that they charge on one another is the *abuſe* of theſe Principles.

But to draw towards an end with this furious Behmeniſt——In all this ribaldry, the only chance he has of miſleading illiterate and weak Mortals, is by the repeated inſinuations, that all religious diſſenſions are owing to theſe miſchief-makers, *Reaſon* and *Human Learning*; aud that, in their abſence, there is a perfect accord in Religion. But this is the fancy of none but Bards or Enthuſiaſts; who never ſaw, but in poetic, or extatic Viſions, that time when

" Chriſtians and Jews one heavy Sabbath kept;
" And all the Weſtern World believ'd and ſlept."

Before *mortals either writ or read*, the quarrels of Dunces were as fierce as thoſe of Wits. In Religion, the diſſenſions amongſt the *irrational Sects* have ever been as implacable as thoſe amongſt the *Rational*. And if, in thoſe miſerable conflicts, the wounds of the latter went deeper, it was becauſe their force was greater and their weapons better.

To conclude, When I reflect on the wonderful infatuation of this ingenious man, who has ſpent a long life in hunting after, and, with an incredible appetite, devouring, the traſh dropt from every ſpecies of Myſticiſm, it puts me in mind of what Travellers * tell us of a horrid Fanaticiſm in the Eaſt, where the Devotee makes a

* Tavernier.

ſolemn

ſolemn vow never to taſte of other food than what has paſſed through the entrails of ſome impure or Savage Animal. Hence their whole lives are paſſed (like Mr. Law's amongſt his Aſcetics) in Woods and Foreſts, far removed from the converſe of mankind.

And now, to turn back to our FREETHINKER. As profeſſed an Adorer as he would be thought of his Sovereign Miſtreſs, REASON, we ſhall ſee, that the modern Infidel, like the Pagans of old, when their Gods proved unkind, can himſelf, on occaſion, treat his favourite IDOL with the utmoſt ignominy and contempt; for as one of the moſt ingenuous of this holy Brotherhood has freely confeſſed, *When Reaſon is againſt a Man, a Man will always be againſt Reaſon**.

They had ſo long boaſted of the Power of this their favorite Idol, They had ſo loudly trumpeted the virtue of her Orient beam for driving away thoſe Fantoms conjured up by *Revelation*, in the dark Regions of *Superſtition*, that the able and ſober Divine thought it high time to check their impertinent triumphs; and ſhew the World, On which ſide REASON had declared herſelf. In order to this, they inforced and illuſtrated (defecated from the droſs of the SCHOOLS) the invincible arguments of their Predeceſſors in ſupport of Revelation; to which they added large and noble acceſſions of their own. What was now to be done? The Deiſt could not directly degrade that *Reaſon* which he had already inthroned. Yet finding Her in this ſervice, he thought he had a right to inſinuate that ſhe was no better than ſhe ſhould be; and had, like other common Proſtitutes, changed her name, and affected to be called POLEMIC DIVINITY.

It muſt be confeſſed, that the unguarded manner in carrying on Theologic controverſy had ſubjected it to much deſerved cenſure. This, joined to the ſort of Learning employed in divers of the more early defences of Religion, where, both the faſhion and ſtandard ſmelt ſtrongly of the barbarous form and baſe alloy of the

* Hobbes.

SCHOOLS,

Schools, gave them a large handle to run down all the defences that followed. Some parts of Polemic Divinity, appeared, on their Principles, to be trifling; other parts bore hard upon their Concluſions; ſo they took advantage of what was faulty in itſelf, and ſought advantage of what appeared impertinent to them, to ridicule the whole. Hence *Polemic Divinity* became the whetſtone of their wit, and the conſtant Butt of their malice. As the credit of Deiſm advanced, this cant grew familiar, and ſpread itſelf into the faſhionable World. Nor could the divine Genius of thoſe Maſters of Reaſon, a Grotius, or an Episcopius, a Hooker, or a Chillingworth, when once nick-named *Polemic Divines*, hinder them from being enrolled amongſt *Scotiſts* and *Thomiſts*, and the verieſt rabble of the Schoolmen, by ſome of the more ignorant or indiſcreet of all Parties. But the thing moſt to be lamented is, to ſee any well-meaning Clergyman of affected taſte and real ignorance, go out of his depth, as well as out of his Profeſſion, to exert his ſmall talents of ridicule on the ſame ſubject, merely for the ſake of being in the faſhion; and, free from all malice as well as wit, treat *Polemical Divinity* (which, for all the hard name, is indeed nothing but a critical examination of the doctrines of our Faith) as cavalierly as ever did Collins or Tindal, Lords Shaftſbury or Bolingbroke. Yet, had theſe ſmall-dealers in ſecond-hand Ridicule but the leaſt adverted on their doings, they muſt have ſeen the abſurdity as well as miſchief of ſo unweighed and wanton a conduct.

Their Adversaries had *ſufficient provocation*, and were not without a *plauſible pretence* for their quarrel with Polemic Divinity, whether it were employed in ſupporting Revelation in general againſt the common Enemy, or in defending the Goſpel-truths againſt the errors of Sectaries.

The provocation they had received was not ſmall. The Friends of *Revelation* having a Religion to defend which was founded on the Authority of a Divine Meſſenger, who appealed to *Miracles* performed, and to *Prophecies* fulfilled, They ſuppoſed the moſt

ſimple

ſimple and natural method was to prove the truth of this Religion, as all other human tranſactions are proved, by FACTS. This was at length ſo invincibly performed, that their Enemies were forced to have recourſe to their favourite Deity, REASON, to undo the knot, and free them from their Embarras. Her power, they had long objected to believers, as the only barrier againſt *Superſtition*; and now was the time to preſs it home. "You urge us with *facts*, ſay they, and the *teſtimony of Antiquity*; Supports too ſlender to bear the unnatural load of *Revelation*. A thing impoſſible in itſelf, as it contradicts the eſtabliſhed order of Providence: a thing impoſſible under the Bible-repreſentation of it, as ſeveral paſſages in that Book directly oppoſe our common notices of God's Attributes. Would you have us give credit to your fond notions of Revelation, let us ſee you ſupport it on our common principles of Philoſophy, natural, dialectic, and metaphyſical. When you have done this, we ſhall be ſatisfied, for on theſe principles only will REASON allow us to ſubmit." This was what they pretended to expect; and Divines took them at their word; and immediately entered upon, and ſoon compleated a defence of Revelation, on this new preſcribed method of proof. How effectually, the prevarication of their Adverſaries, of which I am going to ſpeak, amply evinces. For no ſooner was that done which they had ſo vainly repreſented as impoſſible, than they changed their tone, and now attempted to ridicule it as a very impertinent atchievement. "It is aſtoniſhing (ſays "the Goliah of their party) how Divines could take ſo much filly "pains to eſtabliſh myſtery on metaphyſics, revelation on philoſo-"phy, and matters of fact on abſtract Reaſoning. Religion, ſuch "as the Chriſtian, which appeals to facts, muſt be proved as all "other facts that paſs for authentic are proved. If they are thus "proved, the Religion will prevail without the aſſiſtance of ſo "much profound Reaſoning *." This was what the learned Divine got for his pains! not only to have his Compliance laughed at,

* Lord Bolingbroke's *Letters concerning the Study and Uſe of Hiſtory*.

but, what is the common attendant on Ridicule, to have it falſified. *Divines*, we ſee, are repreſented as *applying their metaphyſics, philoſophy, and profound reaſoning, to Prophecies, and Miracles*. How groſs the miſrepreſentation! They had more wit, they had more honeſty, than to take that *ſilly pains*. They employed their Philoſophy as became ſuch Maſters of Reaſon, not to matters of *fact*, but of *right*. It was pretended that God could not give a *Revelation*; that he could not ſelect a *Choſen People*; that he could not accept a *vicarious Atonement*: And againſt theſe bold aſſertions, the Chriſtian Divine directed all the force and evidence of TRUE PHILOSOPHY. With what ſucceſs, a better poſterity ſhall tell with gratitude. This is the *ſpite*, I meant, which Unbelievers bear to that part of *Polemic Divinity*, which concerns the Being and Nature of Revelation.

The PLAUSIBLE PRETENCE they had to ridicule and contemn the reſt, which is employed in ſettling and adjuſting the various MODES of Religion, comes next to be conſidered. Theſe men holding *Religion* itſelf to be viſionary and fantaſtic, laughed, and naturally enough, to ſee ſuch a buſtle made about its *modes*; which, on their ideas, was a diſpute, about a Nothing once removed.

But now, to ſee the *Friends* of Revelation diſpoſed to laugh with them, and to ridicule either one or other of theſe parts of *Polemic Divinity*, is not amongſt the leaſt of thoſe abſurd perverſities, in which common life, at preſent, ſo much abounds. For is that which makes *our Hope not aſhamed*, and ſupports the *Faith which is counted for righteouſneſs*, is that, I ſay, the natural, the reaſonable object of a *Chriſtian man's* contempt? But as this latter part is more generally known by the name of *Polemic Divinity*, and is the more uſual topic of faſhionable ridicule, it may be proper to add a word or two on the extreme folly of imitating the airs of our Adverſaries, on this occaſion. We have obſerved that the Freethinker was not without ſome excuſe in laughing at this part of *religious Controverſy*, ſince, on his ideas, it was diſputing about the *modes* of a *non-entity*. But the Chriſtian Divine takes his FAITH for a Reality; and

and therefore can never deem the *modes* of it to be indifferent; but muſt hold, that, of the various opinions ariſing from thence, ſome, with their truths, may be uſeful, and ſome, with their errors, hurtful to Society: So that when, about theſe *modes*, Churches differ, they become as reaſonably the ſubject of ſerious enquiry, as any other real entities whatſoever; and have their importance in proportion to their good or bad influence on Truth and Virtue. In a word, POLEMIC DIVINITY is, in the fancy of a Libertine, a ſquabble for preference between two Falſehoods; in which, there is room enough for ridicule: But on the Principles of a Believer, it is a conteſt between Truth and Falſehood; in which, there is nothing to be laughed at, though much to be lamented.

CHAP. III.

BUT there was never yet *extravagance*, either of UNBELIEVER or FANATIC, which the over-zealous Advocate of Religion and ſober Piety hath not unhappily oppoſed by a contrary, and frequently by as *miſchievous* an *extreme*.

We have ſeen how unwarily ſome of them have been drawn in to depreciate and to degrade HUMAN REASON, when their Adverſaries had too extravagantly advanced it. They have, at other times, advanced it as extravagantly, when their Adverſaries were in an humour to vilify and diſgrace it.

To underſtand what I mean, we muſt go a little back in the Hiſtory of *Fanaticiſm*: And They, whom this matter moſt concerns, will need no other proof of the folly of ſuch a conduct than what ariſes from the hiſtorical detection of it.

The REDEMPTION OF MANKIND by the death of Chriſt, and the SACRIFICE of himſelf upon the Croſs, together with its conſequent Doctrine of JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH ALONE, were the

great Goſpel-principles on which PROTESTANTISM was founded, on the firſt general Separation from the *Church of Rome:* by ſome, perhaps, carried too far, in their zeal for ſetting it at a mortal diſtance from the *Popiſh* Doctrine of *Merits*; the Puritanic ſchiſm amongſt us being made on a pretence that the Church of England had not receded far enough from *Rome.* However, being Goſpel-Principles, they were held to be the badge of true Proteſtantiſm by all: When the Puritans (firſt driven by Perſecution from religious into civil Faction, and by theſe Factions heated, on both ſides, into Enthuſiaſm) carried the doctrine of *Juſtification by Faith alone* into a dangerous and impure *Antinomianiſm*: For it is of the very nature of Enthuſiaſm to run all its notions to extremes. The ſpeculation was ſoon after reduced to practice, by means of that knavery which always mixes itſelf with Enthuſiaſm, when once the *Fanatic* becomes engaged in Politics. The confuſions which enſued are well known: And no ſmall ſhare of them has been aſcribed to this impious abuſe of the doctrine of *Juſtification by Faith alone*; firſt, by depreciating MORALITY, and then by *diſpenſing* with it.

When the CONSTITUTION was reſtored, and had brought into credit thoſe few learned Divines whom the madneſs of the preceding times had driven into obſcurity, the Church of England, ſtill ſmarting with the wounds it had received from the *abuſe* of the great Goſpel-principles of FAITH, very wiſely laboured to reſtore MORALITY, the other eſſential part of the Chriſtian Syſtem, to its Rights, in the joint direction of the Faithful. Hence, the encouragement the Church gave to thoſe noble Diſcourſes, which did ſuch credit to Religion, in the licentious times of Charles the Second, compoſed by theſe learned and pious men, whom Zealots abuſed by the nick-name of LATITUDINARIAN Divines. But the reputation they acquired by ſo effectually ſuppreſſing theſe rank Seeds of Fanaticiſm, made their Succeſſors ambitious of ſharing with them in the ſame honours: a laudable ambition! but men have ever a vain paſſion for improving upon thoſe who went before. The Church was now triumphant; the Sectaries were humbled;

ſometimes

ſometimes oppreſſed; always regarded with an eye of jealouſy and averſion; till at length this Goſpel-principle of FAITH came to be eſteemed by many, as *Fanatical:* And they, who underſtood its true Original, found ſo much difficulty in adjuſting the diſtinct Rights of GRACE and MORALITY, that, by the time this Century commenced, things were come to ſuch a paſs (MORALITY was advanced ſo high, and FAITH ſo frittered into nonſenſe), that a new definition of our Religion, in oppoſition to its Founder's, and unknown to its early Followers, was grown to be the faſhionable tenet of the times: and *Chriſtianity*, which till now had been underſtood as but coeval with REDEMPTION, was henceforth to be eſteemed *as old as the* CREATION: an eminent Divine having, in a public Diſcourſe, aſſerted, without circumſtance or reſtriction, that *Chriſtianity was a republication of the Religion of Nature.* Thus, between the two oppoſite Parties of Divines, we were, at the ſame time, left without either *natural* or *revealed* Religion. The one, we ſee, denied the very being of the *natural*; and the other aſſured us that the *revealed* was nothing elſe than that exploded non-entity.

This REPUBLICATION had, in effect, been talked of before, by many others of equal reputation: but being now explained, and ready to be received as the eſtabliſhed Syſtem, our Adverſaries began to think it time to check ſo ridiculous a triumph; and to *diſcredit Religion* (which they have always done with much ſucceſs) *on the Principles of its Defenders.* For with the wanton Libertine,

——" It is the ſport, to ſee
" The Engineer hoiſt with his own Petar."

And one of the Party, an Enemy, equally determined, to *Grace* and *Morality*, compoſed that famous Book, intituled, *Chriſtianity as Old as the Creation*, to decry all *Revelation* whatſoever, on this very principle of a REPUBLICATION; ſo unhappily conceived by modern Orthodoxy, as the ſureſt way of evincing the *reaſonableneſs* of the GOSPEL.

The

The like Advantage (to put things of a ſort together, for the better illuſtration of the Subject) had, about the ſame time, been taken of our indiſcretions by another of theſe men; and as the reaſoning of TINDAL was directed to depreciate the Work of REDEMPTION, ſo the argument of COLLINS was inforced to inſult the Character of the REDEEMER. The general body of the PROPHECIES which relate to JESUS, were, for certain great ends of Providence, ſo contrived, as to have a *primary* accompliſhment in the events of the Moſaic Diſpenſation, and a *ſecondary* and final completion in the birth and miniſtry and ſufferings of *Jeſus the Meſſiah*. But the admirable contrivance of divine Wiſdom, in giving to thoſe Predictions a *primary* and a *ſecondary* accompliſhment, being either ſoon forgotten, or generally overlooked, it produced large ſwarms of fanciful and fanatic Allegoriſts, who filled the Church with extravagant whimſies equally diſhonourable to *Reaſon* and *Religion*. Amidſt ſo thick a cloud of nonſenſe, the *logical propriety* as well as *moral fitneſs* of a *ſecondary ſenſe* in the Prophecies relating to Jeſus, being ſwallowed up and loſt, ſome bold and haſty men, ever leaſt qualified to diſtinguiſh between the uſe and the abuſe of a poſitive inſtitution, ventured to condemn *all ſecondary* ſenſes, as irrational and fanatical; and finding but few Prophecies which relate to the MESSIAH, in the *primary*, they were forced upon the deſperate expedient of holding, that the Jews, or other Enemies of Chriſtianity, had adulterated and corrupted the whole body of theſe Prophecies, as they ſtand at preſent in our Bibles. But no ſooner had Mr. Collins got theſe raſh Men at this advantage, than he inſulted them with his Diſcourſe on the *Grounds and Reaſons of the Chriſtian Religion*: In which he attempts to overthrow the Goſpel on theſe two principles. 1ſt, That (by the confeſſion of his Adverſaries) a *ſecondary* ſenſe of Prophecies is irrational and fanatical. And 2dly, That (by the confeſſion of all ſober men) the Jews had not corrupted or adulterated their Bible. His concluſion is, that the *Chriſtian Religion* ſtands on no ſolid *grounds or reaſons*; Jeſus not having, as he pretended, been foretold under the Character of the

MESSIAH

MESSIAH of the Jews.—And here, let it be obſerved, that theſe works of *Tindal* and *Collins*, both riſing on the advantage taken of our follies, are the two moſt artful and deſperate attacks on Revelation, that were ever made ſince the times of *Celſus* and *Porphyry*.

I have attempted to give a good Account of Mr. Collins's *Grounds and Reaſons of the Chriſtian Religion* elſewhere *, by confuting his firſt Propoſition, on which the whole attack riſes, and ſhewing the *logical propriety* and *moral fitneſs* of SECONDARY ſenſes of Prophecy. I ſhall hereafter have occaſion to do equal juſtice to Mr. Tindal's *Chriſtianity as Old as the Creation*. For the only effectual way of anſwering theſe, as indeed all others of the like kind, is to renounce all fanciful Syſtems, and to preſerve inviolate the great Principles of the *Moſaic Law* and the *Goſpel of Jeſus*; Principles which diſcover themſelves, and indeed obtrude themſelves upon us, on a careful ſtudy of thoſe two connected Diſpenſations. When theſe Principles are once forſaken, there is no hurtful indiſcretion to which the ableſt Divines are not ſubject; and of which Unbelievers have not taken advantage. I ſhall, from amongſt many, ſelect an inſtance or two, leaſt likely to give offence. The Advocates of the Church of *Rome*, to evade the charge of Idolatry, with which they are urged by the *Reformed*, pretend that this crime conſiſts in giving the worſhip, due to the ſupreme GOD, to inferior Beings. The excellent Biſhop Stillingfleet, in oppoſing this ſubterfuge, attempted to prove, that the moſt civilized Pagans, who are confeſſed to be Idolaters, did not give the honours due to the *firſt Cauſe* to their inferior Gods; the *firſt Cauſe*, as he pretends, being worſhipped by them, as ſuch: An aſſertion, which, if true, would confute all that the Prophets and Apoſtles ſay concerning the ſtate and condition of the Pagan World. Again, the very learned Dr. Prideaux, to do honour to his exiled Jews, adopts, from Hyde and a rabble of lying Orientaliſts, the idle fable of a Philoſophic Zoroaſ-

* Divine Legation, B. VI. § 5, 6.

ter,

ter, the ſubverter of Idolatry in Perſia: Little attentive the while, to the more plauſible concluſion of Unbelievers, from the ſame fact; who pretend, that theſe Jews, ſo prone to Idolatry before their *Captivity*, were inſtructed during its continuance, by this Zoroaſter, in a better Theology, which gave them juſter notions of the Divine Nature, and conſequently, of a Crime that, ever afterwards, they held in abhorrence. A concluſion puſhed with great advantage by *Collins* and *Morgan*, on the ground thus prepared by Hyde, and further ſmoothed for them by Dr. Prideaux.

But to go on with our ſubject, Tindal's *Chriſtianity as old as the Creation.*

This terrible advantage taken of a Principle become faſhionably orthodox, greatly alarmed all ſerious men; and the feeble Anſwers given to it, on that Principle, were ſo little ſatisfactory, that a commendable effort was made, by ſome whoſe Stations ſupported them in the attempt, to bring back the ſlighted Doctrine of Redemption, and to reinſtate it in its ancient Credit. And a worthy Biſhop of London was amongſt the firſt to repair the miſchief, which the miſtaken labours of his no leſs worthy Succeſſor had unwittingly occaſioned. So that, in a little time, we had regained much of the ground that had been loſt, and were ready to replace the national *Faith* once again on its old Goſpel-foundation; in ſpite of the ſilly pains of a very equivocal Divine, who publiſhed a Book, in oppoſition to the returning Current, intituled, *The Scripture Doctrine of Redemption*, which was to prove that in reality there was no ſuch thing: When the old puritan Fanaticiſm revived under the new name of *Methodiſm*; and, as it ſpread, carried once more (as far as the difference of times would allow) thoſe Goſpel-principles to their old abuſive extremes.

This ſoon put a ſtop to the recovery of that middle way, in which *Grace* and *Morality* are preſerved in their reſpective rights: an unhappy diſpoſition now appearing in ſeveral Oppoſers of this late revived fanaticiſm, to return back to the old *latitudinarian* exceſſes.

And

And now comes in (I hope, not improperly) the Caution, for the ſake of which I have given this long detail of our former miſcarriages, to warn men againſt a repetition of them.

For theſe oppoſed doctrines of a REDEMPTION and a REPUBLICATION are not matters of ſo ſlight moment that either of them may be taken up, or laid down at pleaſure, juſt as we are preſſed, on the one hand, by *Infidelity*, or, on the other, by *Fanaticiſm*.

The DOCTRINE OF REDEMPTION, is the *primum mobile* of the Goſpel-Syſtem. To this the Church muſt ſteadily adhere, let the ſtorm, againſt it, beat from what quarter it may. It is the firſt duty of the Miniſters of Religion, to ſecure this great Foundation: They may then, with ſafety, and not with the leſs ſucceſs, puſh the Enemies of the Church, the Enemies of their Order, nay, even the Enemies of their own peculiar opinions, with all the force they are able; but ever, as we ſay, in ſubſerviency to the EVERLASTING GOSPEL, whoſe main Pillar is this *Doctrine of Redemption*.——How eſſential a part it is of the Goſpel-Oeconomy (interpreted by God's general Diſpenſation, revealed to mankind, of which the Goſpel-Oeconomy is the completion), and how agreeable it is to what the beſt and moſt received Philoſophy teacheth us, concerning the relations between the creature and the Creator, ſhall be conſidered at large in its proper place *.

I. What better ſuits the melancholy ſubject we are now upon, namely, the advantages given to the common Enemy by thoſe who, to get rid of ſome urgent difficulty, are apt to forſake their Foundations, will be to ſhew the various and unthought-of miſchiefs which ariſe from the folly of attempting to change the nature of the Goſpel-Oeconomy from a *Redemption of Mankind* to a *Republication of the Religion of Nature*. A folly, by which the great Author of our Salvation becomes diſhonoured, and the Chriſtian Faith expoſed to the perpetual Inſults of Libertines and Unbelievers.

* Divine Legation, Book IX.

1. For he who conſiders Jeſus only in the light of a *Republiſher* of the Law of Nature, can hardly entertain a higher opinion of the SAVIOUR OF THE WORLD than ſome have done of SOCRATES, whom Eraſmus eſteemed an object of devotion, and many a better Proteſtant hath thought to be divinely inſpired. For was not Socrates, by his preaching up *moral virtue*, and by his dying to bear witneſs to the *unity* of the Godhead, *made*, to the Grecian People, and (by means of their extended commerce of politeneſs) to the reſt of mankind, *Wiſdom and Righteouſneſs?* And what more was Jeſus, though the Apoſtle adds to thoſe two attributes, theſe two other, of *Sanctification* and *Redemption?* for, according to the principles of this paganized Chriſtianity, his titles of MESSIAH and REDEEMER are reduced to mere figurative and *accommodated* terms.

2. As this Theology degrades Jeſus to the low condition of a Grecian Sophiſt; ſo it renders his Religion obnoxious to the inſults of every daring Impoſtor.

He was ſent, ſay theſe new Doctors of the Church, to teach mankind the worſhip of the true God, and the practice of moral righteouſneſs *.

"This will be readily allowed, replies an underſtanding MAHOMETAN: And on this very principle, WE hold, that when Jeſus had done his office; and mankind had again relapſed, into *antichriſtian* Idolatry and Polytheiſm, as before into *Pagan*, God ſent OUR PROPHET, who worked the like ſudden and ſenſible reformation in the NORTH-EAST, that your Prophet did in the NORTH-WEST."

* A celebrated Frenchman, who writes on all ſubjects, and, on all, with equal judgment and capacity, knew better, perhaps, what he was about than theſe Divines, when he went further, and affirmed, That Chriſtianity is not only no more than the Religion of Nature perfected, but that *it could not poſſibly* be any more.—"Nôtre Re-"ligion revélée n'eſt même, et *ne pouvoit etre*, que cette Loi naturelle perfectionnée." *Diſcours ſur le Theiſme*, par M. de Voltaire.

And

And this reply, he makes on the very principles of his ALCORAN; which (with profeſſions of the higheſt veneration for the character of JESUS) denies his proper Divinity, and at the ſame time, his death on the croſs. But why, it may be aſked, was this averſion to the PASSION of One whom the Alcoran makes a Mortal? For this plain reaſon: *Mahomet*, who wanted the refinement of our modern *Accommodators*, plainly ſaw that the doctrine of REDRMPTION followed the *paſſion*; compleated the *Scheme of Revelation*; and ſhut out all his bold pretences.

Mr. Otter, an intelligent Frenchman of the Academy Royal of Inſcriptions, &c. tells us of a conference he had with a learned Perſian. The Muſſulman ſaid, They reverenced all our ſacred Writings except thoſe of St. PAUL——*qu'ils reſpectent tous, excepté Saint Paul* *. Why this *exception?* I anſwer, On the Mahometan Principle, that *Chriſtianity is only a republication of the Religion of Nature*: for St. PAUL is full of the doctrine of REDEMPTION; explains the Chriſtian Syſtem by it, and makes the whole Faith depend upon it.

What now has our rational *Republiſher* to oppoſe to this modeſt Apology for Iſmaeliſm?

All he has to ſay is this, "That Jeſus and his Apoſtles have every where intimated, that the *Goſpel* is the laſt of God's Diſpenſations; on the terms of which our final doom is to be decided: ſo that all future Pretenders to the like Office and Character muſt needs be deemed Impoſtors."

But here a DEIST would come in, to take advantage of our diſtreſs; for (as we have ſaid more than once) it may be obſerved alike of all theſe ſhifting defences, on fanciful, and unſcriptural Syſtems, that they only ſupply new arms to the various Adverſaries of our Faith; a *Deiſt*, I ſay, would be ready to reply, "That it is indeed true that Jeſus hath declared his own Miſſion to be the LAST: but

* Voiage en Turque et en Perſe, vol. i. p. 22.

that this is a fly contrivance, put in use by every pretended Messenger from Heaven, in order to perpetuate his own Scheme, and to obviate the danger of an antiquated authority. The Impostor, Mahomet himself, hath done it. He, who here obtrudes his *armed* pretensions upon us, hath secured the duration of his sensual Religion by the very same expedient: a thing, in his ideas, so much of course, that he did not even object to Jesus's use of it, who employed it before Him; and for no other purpose than to cut off all following pretensions to the like Character. On the contrary, He avowed and maintained the general truth of the Nazarite's Commission. Now (pursues the Deist) a method employed by a confessed Impostor is taken up with an ill grace by the defender of true Religion. But I draw a further consequence (says he) against the Gospel, from this representation of Christianity. For if the preaching of moral truth and righteousness were the whole of Jesus's Character and Office, then his Mission did not answer its end, the lasting reformation of mankind, in the *knowledge of God*, and in the *practice of Virtue*: since the world soon fell back again into the state from which Jesus had delivered it; as appears from the history of the times in which Mahomet appeared, and the advantages he made of that degeneracy."

II. Thus subjected to the insults and injuries of all sorts of Impostors, who set themselves to delude the credulous, either by inventing NEW Revelations or by decrying the OLD, do these *Republishers* expose the holy faith of Jesus: that *Faith*, which, we are told, was *founded on a rock*, impregnable to Men and Demons; to the sophisms of Infidelity, and the prestiges of Imposture! And so, indeed, it is, if we will take it as we find it; if we will receive it as it came from above; if we will preserve it pure and entire as it was delivered to the Saints, under the idea of THE REDEMPTION OF THE WORLD, BY THE SON OF GOD, IN THE VOLUNTARY SACRIFICE OF HIMSELF UPON THE CROSS.

This

This ſecures the Character of JESUS from the inſults of falſe Pretenders; and his GOSPEL from the injuries of falſe Reaſoners.

1. For, firſt of all, if JESUS did, indeed, *redeem* Mankind, and reſtore them to their loſt Inheritance; the ſcheme and progreſs of Revelation is compleated: which beginning at the LAPSE, naturally and neceſſarily ends in the reſtoration and recovery of LIFE AND IMMORTALITY by the death and paſſion of our Lord. CHRISTIANITY conſidered in this view (and in this view only, does SCRIPTURE give it us to conſider) ſoon detects all the artful pretences of Impoſture; and ſecures its own honour by virtue of its very *Eſſence*: the great ſcene of Providence being now cloſed, in a full completion of its One, regular, entire, and eternal purpoſe.

2. Secondly, if JESUS did indeed *redeem* mankind, then did he neither preach nor die in vain: it not being in man's power, with all his malice and perverſeneſs, to defeat or make void the great purpoſe of his Coming. For though one part of his Miſſion (according to Paul) was to inſtruct the world in *Wiſdom* * and *Righteouſneſs*, which it was in man's power to forget and neglect; yet, what (Paul tells us) is chiefly eſſential in his Character, and peculiar to his Office, the *Sanctification* and *Redemption* of the World, Man could not fruſtrate nor render ineffectual: For it is not in man's power to make that to be undone which is once done and perfected.

The faſtidious Caviller † therefore hath employed his pains to little purpoſe in attempting to diſcredit Revelation from this topic, *The moral ſtate of the world, before and ſince the coming of Chriſt.* For, beſides what one might venture to affirm, that, when the compariſon is fully and impartially ſcrutinized, the advantage will be found to lie on the ſide of our Religion: yet, ſuppoſing the Truths preached by JESUS, and the Aſſiſtance given by the Holy SPIRIT, have not much improved the general morals of mankind; How

* 1 Cor. i. 30.

† Lord Bolingbroke,

does

does this tend to the diſcredit of the Goſpel? unleſs it can be ſhewn that the Goſpel hath no natural tendency to make men better. But this is ſo deſperate an undertaking, that, I believe, Infidelity will hardly be perſuaded to engage in it. Indeed the contrary is ſo true, that, (as I have ſhewn elſewhere) when you lay together the ſtate of PAGAN and CHRISTIAN Morals, one manifeſt and eſſential difference is found between them; which is this, That in the Gentile world, men often acted wrong UPON PRINCIPLE; in the Chriſtian always AGAINST PRINCIPLE*. Now, not to inſiſt upon the neceſſary reſtraint this muſt needs be upon Vice; it plainly demonſtrates that the NATURAL TENDENCY of the *Goſpel* is to make men virtuous: And, to draw them by a *ſtronger* attraction, did not ſuit the genius of a rational Religion, whoſe objects were free Agents.

But the proper anſwer to this idle cavil ariſes from the explanation given above. To Inſtruct the world in *Wiſdom* and *Righteouſneſs* was but the *ſecondary* end of Chriſt's Miſſion. The FIRST and primary, was to become its SANCTIFICATION and REDEMPTION; *That* muſt needs be common to every Revelation coming from God; *This* is peculiar to the Chriſtian: and *this*, as we have ſhewn, cannot poſſibly be fruſtrated, or rendered ineffectual.

To conclude from what hath been ſaid: As we ſhould not affect to pry into the nature of thoſe things which God hath been pleaſed to withhold from our ſearch, and to cover with the ſacred veil of Myſtery; ſo neither ſhould we reject a Truth, expreſly delivered, becauſe we may not fully comprehend the whole reaſon on which it ſtands. In a word, as we ſhould not venture to go on where the ſilence of Scripture directs us to ſtop; ſo neither ſhould we preſume to ſtop where, with ſo loud a voice, it commandeth us to go on.

The ſum of all then is this: REASON biddeth us to keep a MEAN: The great Philoſopher informeth us that NATURE is not able to

* Div. Leg. Book iv. § 2.

keep

keep a MEAN *. What remains but that we fly to GRACE, which, the greater Apoſtle aſſures us, is able: for, *the Spirit helpeth our infirmities* †. Nor will there be any danger (when, in ſuch a diſpoſition, we apply to this *Guide of truth*) of abuſing its credit by fanatical extremes; for, to *eſtabliſh the heart with Grace*, the ſame Apoſtle informs us, is the only way to prevent our being *carried about with the divers and ſtrange Doctrines* of Deceivers ‡.

* *Natura modum tenere neſcia eſt.* BAC.

† Rom. viii. 26. ‡ Heb. xiii. 9.

END OF THE FOURTH VOLUME.

ERRORS OF THE PRESS IN VOL. IV.

P. 86. *l.* 9. nor to do, r. not to do.
175. *n. l.* 1. for fare aver, r. faire avec.
177. *l.* 20. for a*a*d, r. a*n*d.
179. *n. l.* 4. for civis, r. civi*l*is.
184. *l.* 5. from the bottom, *For every politic society*, r. For *of every*, &c.
230. *l.* 9. deduced *by* the, r. deduced the.
275. *l.* 2. from the bottom, for conſtirure, r conſtiture.
317. *l.* 8. from the bottom, for præ*d*ationem, r. præ*l*ationem.
336. *l.* 15, 16. for deciſion, r. deciſions.
365. *l.* 18. And part again by the admirable contrivance of divine wiſdom. Both oppoſed &c. r. And part again, by the admirable contrivance of divine wiſdom, both oppoſed &c.
517. *n. l.* 5. oraculis, feruntur r. oraulis ferantur, &c
611. *l.* 5. for wh*e*ther, r. wh*a*tever.