S OUL E S Own evidence, for its own

IMMORTALITY.

In a very pleasant and learned discourse, Selected out of that excellent Treatise entituled, The trunesse of Christian Religion, against Atheists, Epicures, &c.

First compiled in French by Famous

Phillip Mornay, Lord of Plessie Marlie, afterward

turned into English by Eloquent Sir Phillip

Sydney, and his assistant, Master

Arthur Golden, Anno Domini

MD LXXX VII.

And now re-published.

By John Bachiler Master of Arts, somtimes of Emanuell
Colledge in Cambridge.

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To the Reader.

Udicious Reader, the iniquity of the times, having fo far corrupted the minds of fome, that the very immate and inbred principles of Nature (especially about a Deity, the sove-

rigne welfare and the Immortality of the Soule) feeme in amanner to be quite obliterated and extinet in them , I thought it would not be unseasonable, to recommend with most serious Meditations, that excellent Treatise mentioned in the Frontispiece, as an Antidote against the Atheisticall and dangerous Tenets now abroad.

The Noble Authour of it thou wilt soone find was a manof no meane parts, and of no common Learning. Delicary of Wit, frength of Reason, streams of Eloquence, with varieties both of folid and curious notions, come all flowing from him. Hee will tell thee more, even from the Ancient doctrine of the very Heathen, than happily thou ever heard'st of, or (at leastwise) evertookestmuch notice of, though borne and bred in so bright an Age, and among such too, as passe for no meane Proficients in Christianity. Those Mysterious (though glo-Hous) Truths, which like Mines of Gold under ground, run along more hiddenly, through the letter of the Scriptures, thou maist there meet with discussed at large, with as much fobriery as clearneffe. Doft:

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To the Reader.

Dost thou defire to know by what arguments, even of reason, thou maist prove a Deity? that Deity to be but one only? and yet distinguished by a Trinity of Beings. that which wee call a Trinity of persons, viz. Father, Son, and Spirit? if thou wilt take the pains, (I might fav. the pleasure rather) to gaine the knowledge of such high (yet necessary) points: In the first fix Chapters of the said Treatise, thou maist (more fully than thouant aware) instruct thy self.

Dost thou enquireafter the highest and most sove. reigne Good? wherein it lyeth, and wherein it lyeth not? in the 18 and 19 Chapters thou findest that also very

fweetly and fully refolved.

Lastly, next unto the knowledge of God what heeis in Himself, and what to His creatures, dost thou seek to understand thy Self, what once thou wert, and what still thou art; Read but this ensuing Paragraph, peculiarly felected out for thy present use, and thou shalt easily perceive what Divine a sparks lye raked up under ashes, within thine own besome, sparks which (when b once stirred up) do but blow a little, and thou shalt know farther, as well what the duration as the excellencie of thy Homer. Odys. being is, And that thou art a creature bearing in thee, besides a plurality of present lives, the very seed of Immortality.

In all which severall enquiries whilst thou readest and considerest, thou maist expect that, the reasonable part (darke and cloudy, no twithstanding as it may be) shall quickly receive an Irradiation, and that not onely from the intrinsecall operations of thine own minde, but also from the consent of the wifest men among all Nations.

To the Reader.

gooastres the Chaldean, Trismegistus the Ægyptian, orpheus the Greeke, Pherecides the Syrian, after them, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Porphyriu, Amelius, &c, all teach thee in their severall ages. And if that be not sufficient, Thou hast the confession of thevery Devils; viz. that there is a God, and but one God, with Trinity of persons in unitie of Essence. That the Soul is an Immortall substance, and the aforesaid Dairy, The sovereigne welfare of it, according to what thou believest from the only true facred oracle.

Let not then that Treatise, rare and singular, as it is beneglested by thee, for though it hath a long time layn obscurely, as a Diamond in the dark, little knowneand kselooked after, yet I dare say, by that time thou hast well examined it, and shalt have tasted the sublime Heavenly matter conteined in it, thou wilt estimate it at a very great value, even worthy (many passages of it) to

bewritten in characters of gold.

Buy it therefore and read it, that from the very light of nature, thou mayst be enabled to confute blasphemers: Judge the whole by this little piece, which if thou radest thorough, and with diligent attention, thou mayst benefit thy selfe, and therein answer the desire of him, who heartily wisheth the true good of

Thine Immortall soul:

JOHN BACHILER.

2 Igniculi feintillantes. Onuphr. de Anima. b Erique muede.

מיתבם י

גשמח

foen.2 7.

That the Soul of Man is immortall, or dyeth not.

Itherto I have treated of the world that is to be conceived in understanding, and of the sensible World (as the Fla-Lionists tearm them) that is to say, of God and of this World Now followeth the examining of the little World (as they tenne it) that is to say, of man. Concerning God, we have acknowledged him to be a Spirit: and as touching the world we have found it to be a body. In man we have an abridgement of both, namely of God in respect of spirit, and of the world in composition Manis both ofbody as though the Creator of purpole to fet forth a mirrour of Soul and body, his works, intended to bring into one little compatie both the infinitenesse of his own nature, and also the hugenesse of the whole world together. We see in mans body a wonderfull mixture of the source Elements, the veyns spreading forthlike Rivers to the uttermost members; as many inftruments of sense, as there be sensible natures in the world, a great number of finews, flesh-strings and knitters; a head by speciall priviledge directed up to Heavenward and hands ferving to all manner of fervices. Whatfoever he is that shall consider no more but onely this instrument, without life, without lense and without moving; cannot but thinke verily that it is made to very great purpose; and he must needs cry out as Hermes or as the Sarzin Ab tala doth, that man is a miracle which fit sumounteth, not onely these lower Elements, but also the very Heaven and all the ornaments thereof. But if he could (as it were out of himselfe) behold this body receiving life, and entering into the ute of all his motions with fuch forwardnesse, hands befliring themselves so nimbly, and after so fundry fashions, and the Senles attering their force fo far off, without ftirring out of their place: thinke you not that he would be wonderfully ravished, and somuch more wonderat the saidlife, moving and sense, than at the body, as he wondered afore at the body, to behold the excellencie of the proportion thereof above the masse of some stone? For what comparison is there betweenea Lute and a Lute-player, or between a dumbe instrument, and him that maketh it to found? What would hee fay then if he could afterward see how the same manbeing now quickned attaineth in one moment from the one side of the earth to the other, without thisting of place; descending downero the centre, of the world, and mounting up above the out-

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termost

termost circle of it both at once; present in a thousand places at one instant, imbracing the whole without touching it; keiping upon the earth, and yet containing it; beholding the Heavens from beweath, and being above the Heaven of Heavens, both at once Should henot bee compelled to fay, that in this filly body there dwelleth a greater thing then the body, greater then the earth, yes greater then the whole world together? Then let us fay with Plate. that man is double, outward, and inward. The outward manis that which we see with our eys, which forgoeth not his shape when it is dead, no more then a Lute forgoeth his shape when the Luteplayer ceafeth from making it to found howbeit that bothlife,moving, fense, and reason be out of it. The inward man is the Soule, and that is properly the very man, which with the body as an inflrument; whereunto though it be united by the power of God, yet doth it not remove when the body runneth. It feeth when the eyes be flut, and fomtimes feeth not when the eyes be wide open : It travelleth while the body resteth, and resteth when the body travelleth, that is to say, it is able of it selfe to performe his own actions, without the help of the outward man, whereas on the contrary part the outward without the help of the inward, that is to wit, the body without the presence of the Soule, hath neither sense, moving, life, no, nor continuance of being. In the outward man we havea Counterfet of the whole world, and if you rip them both up by piecemeale, ye shall finde a wonderfull agreement betwixt them. But my purpose in this book is not to treat of the things that pertain peculiarly to the body.

That the Soule of Man is

In the inward man wee have a summe of whatsoever life sence and moving is in all creatures, and moreover an Image or rather a shadow (for the Image is defaced by our sinne) of the Godhead it lelf. And that is the thing which wee have to examine in this Chapter. In Plants, we perceive that besides their bodies which wee ice, there is also an inward vertue which we see not, whereby they live, grow, bud, and beare fruit: which vertue wee call the quickening Soule, and it maketh them to differ from Stones and Metalls, which have it not. In fensitive living things, we finde the felfesame ventue, which worketh while they sleep and are after a fort as the Plants; and there withall we finde another certaine vertue or power which feeth, heareth, smelleth, tasteth, and feeleth; which also in many of them doth hoord up the things brought in by

the sences; which manner of power the Plants are void of. This do wetermethe sensitive Soule, because the estects thereof are discerved and executed by the Sences. In man we have both the quick- In Man are ning and the Sensitive, the former uttering it self in the nourish-three abilities ng and increasing of him, and the latter in the subtility of sence and of Soule. imagination, where through he is both Plant and Bealt together. Butyet moreover weesee also a Mind which considereth and beholdeth, which reapeth profit of the things that are brought in by the Sences, which by his feeing conceiveth that which it feeth not: which of that which w nor gathereth that which is & finally which milleth a man away both from earth and from all fensible things, rea and (after a fort) from hunfelf too. This doe we call the reafomble Soule, and it is the thing that maketh man to bee man, (and not a Plant or a brute Bealt as the other two do,) and also to be the Image or rather a shadow of the Godhead, in that (as we shall swhereaster) it is a Spirit that may have continuance of being alone by it felfe without the bodie. And by the way, whereas I fay that the inward man hath a quickening power as a Plant hath, a finitive power as a Beast hath, and a power of understanding wherby he is a man: my meaning is not that he hath three Soules but onely one Soule; that is to wit, that like as in the brute Beaft the kulitive Soule comprehendeth the quickening Soule; so in manthe reasonable Soule comprehendeth both the sensitive and thequickening, and executeth the offices of them all three, fo as it bohliveth, feeleth, and reasoneth even as well and after the same manner, as the mind of a man may intend to his own householdmatters, to the affaires of the Commonweale, and to heavenly things all at once. Or to speake more fitly, these three degrees of Soules are three degrees of life, whereof the second exceedeth and. conteineth the first, and the third exceedeth and conteineth both theother two. The one, without the which the bodie cannot live, is the Soule or life of the Plant, and is so tied to the bodie, that it sheweth not it selfe in any wiscout of it. The second, which cannot live without the bodie, is the Soule or life of the Beast, which doth wellutter forth his power and force abroad, but yet not otherwise then by the members and instruments of the body whereunto it is tyed. The third, which can of it selfelive and continue without the body, but not the body vvithout it, is the foule of man vvhich giveth life inwardly to all his parts, sheweth forth his life abroad

That the Soule of Man is in the perceiving of all things ful-ject to sence, and retaineth still his force (as shall be faid hereafter) yea and increaseth it, even when the strength of the body and the very livelinesse of the sences fail. And in very deed, you shall see a man forgoe all his sences one after another as the infirmments of them decay, and yet have fill both life and reason unappaired. The cause whereof is, that some of the instruments of life and sense doe faile, but the life it selfe which quickneth them fayleth not. And therefore the Beaft forgoeth not life in losing sense, but hee utterly forgoeth sence in forgoing life. And that is because life is the ground of the abilities of sense, and the sensitive life is a more excellent life than the quickning life, as wherein those powers and abilities are as in their voor. To be short, he that bereaveth man or beast of the use of sences, or man of the right use of reason, doth not thereby bereave him of life; but he that bereaveth the beaft or the oneward man of their life, doth therewithall bereave them of sence and reason. Therefore it is mest fure argument, that the soule which causeth a beast to live. and the foulethat causeth it to have sence, are both one, that isto wit, one certain kind of life more lively and more excellent than the life that is in Plants. And likewise that the soule which caufeth man to live, to have sence, and to reason, is but one, that is to vvit, one certain kinde of life more excellent, more lively, and of further reach, than the life of the Beaft. But like as sence is as it vvere the forme or Selfebeing (if I may fo termeit) of the life of a beaft; fo is reason or understanding the very forme and Selfebeing of the foule of man; and (to speak properly) it is the soule or life of the foule, life as the apple of our eye is the very eye of our eye. And in very deed, when the minde is earnestly occupied thesences are at a stay; and when the sences are overbusied, the nourishment and digeflion is hindered, and contrariwife which thing could not come to passe if the soule were any more than one substance, which by reason that it is but one, cannot utter his sorce alike in all places at once, but yeeldeth the leffe care one where so long as it is earnestly occupyed anotherwhere. In this soule of man (which yet notwithstanding is but one) the diversity of the powers and abilities is very apparant. The quickning power doth nourish, increde and mayntaine us; and Reason and Sence meddle not therewith, neyther have they power to impeach the working thereof. The truth whereof appeareth in this, that these things are best done

when our mind is at rest, and our sences are asleep; insomuch that oftentimes we forg'd the sence and moving of some parts by some Rheume or some Palsey, and yet the same parts ceasse not to be nourished still. Also, the sensitive life seeth and perceiveth a far off. vea oftentimes without fetting of the mind thereupon, or without confidering what the Sence conceiveth. Some men which have but weak Sences, have very quicke understanding; and likewise on the contrary part. Againe, some fall into a Consumption, which want not the perfect use of their Sences. Sometime the reasonable out is lo carnellly bent and occupied about the things that it liketh of that by the increasing of it selfe, it hurteth and diminisheth the part that quickneth. Also it standeth in argument against the Sences and reprove th them of fallhood, and conclude th contrary wheir information. And it may be that the man which hath his digestion perfect and his Sences found, hath not his wit or reason found in like case. Now, were the Soule but onely one ability, it could not be fo. But now is the fame divided manifeftly into wit or understanding, and will; the one serving to devise, and the other to treute. For we understand divers things which wee will not, and weewill divers things which we understand not : which contrary exations cannot be attributed both to one power. Nevertheleffe, the uniting of all these powers together is with such distinct nesse, and the diffinguishing of them is with such union, that ordinarily they meet altogether in one self-same action, the one of them as readily (by all likelihood) as the other, how beit that every of them doth his own work feverally by himselfe, and one afore another as intellect of their objects.

Thus have we three forts of men, according to the three powers orabilities of the inward man. Namely, the earthly man, which like the Plant mindeth nothing but fleeping and feeding, making all his senses and all his reason to serve to that purpose, as in whom the care of this present life onely, hath devoured and swallowed up his senses and understanding. The Sensuall man (as S. Pant himselfe termeth him) who is given wholly to these sensible things simbacing and casting down his reason so far, as to make it a head-slave to his sences and the pleasures and delights thereof: And the reasonable man, who liveth properly in spirit and minde, who interest into himselfe to know himselfe, and goeth out of timselfe to behold God; making this life to leeve to the attaument of a betalushed.

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reason. After as any of these three powers doe reigne and beare fway in man, that is to wit, after as a man yeeldeth himselfemore to one than to another of them; so becommeth he like unto the Spirits, the brute Beafts, or Plants, yea and the very Blocks and Stones. But it is our disposition even by kind, to be carried away by our corrupt nature, and by the objects which hemme us in on all fides; but as for against our nature yea or beyond our nature, our nature is not able to do any thing at all. Now, it is not enough for us to know that wee have a foule

whereby wee live, feele, and understand, and which being but one hath in it selfe alone so many fundry powers or abilities: for it will be demanded of us by and by what this foule properly is. And foothly if I should say, I cannot tell what it is, I should not belye my selfe a whit; for I should but confessemine own ignorance, as many greatlearned men have done aforeme. And I should doe no wrong at all to the Soule it felf; for fith we cannot deny the effects thereof, the leffe that wee be able to declare the nature and being thereof, the more doth the excellency thereof shine forth. Again, it is a plane case, that no thing can comprehend the thing that is greater than it selfe. Now, our Soule is after a fort leffe than it selfe, in as much as it is wrapped up in this body, in likewife at the man that hath gyves and fetters on his feet, is after a fort weaker thanhimselfe. Neverthelesse, let us assay to satisfie such demands as well as wee can. And for as much as it is the Image of God, not only in respect of the government and mayntenance of the whole World, but also even in the very nature thereof: as we said heretofore when we spake of the nature of God, if we cannot express or conceive what it is, let us at least wife be certified what it is not. The body and First of all, that the Soule and the Body bee not both one thing, the foul be not but two very far differing things, and also that the soule is no one self-same part of the body, it appeareth of it selfe without further proof. For if the foule were the body, or a part of the body, it should grow

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is not diminished by the moisinesse or slacknesse of the Lutestrings. nor increased by the over high straining and tight standing of them; but indeed in the one he cannot shew his cunning at all. and in the other hemay shew it more or lesse. Likewise the speech of children commeth with their teeth, howbeit that the speech doe manifestly utter it selfe first, in that they prattle many things which they cannot pronounce: and in old men it goethaway again with their teeth, and yet their eloquence is not abated thereby. Asfor Demofthenes, although hee furmounted all the Orators of his time, yet were there some letters which he could not pronounce. Give unto old age or unto infancie the same sinews and teeth, and as able and lufty limbs and members as youth hath; and the actions which the foule doth with the body and by the body, I meane so farre forth as concerne the abilities of sence and livelynes, shall be performed as wellin one age as in another. But haddest thou as great indifferencie in judging of the force and power of thyne owne foule, as of the cunning of a Lute-player, (Ifay not by the nimblenes of his fingers which are perchance knowed with the gent, but by the playne and fiveet Harmonie of his Tabul atorie as they terme it, which maketh thee to deeme him to have cunning in his head, although heccan no more utter it with his hands,) so as thou wouldest consider how thou hast in thy selfea defire to go, though thy feet be not able to beare thee; a differenon to judge of things that are spoken; though thyne eyes cannot convey it unto thee; a found eloquence, though for evant of thy teeth Thou cannot well expresse it; and which is above all the rest, a sub-Stanciall quicke and heavenly reason, even when thy body is most earthly and drooping. Thou wouldeft some conclude that the some and power of quickning, moving, and perceiving, is vyhole and found in thy foule, and that the default is altogether in thy body. Infomuch that if the had a nevy body and nevy infirments given unto her, he would be as lufty and cheerely as ever the was, and that the more she perceiveth the body to decay, the more shelaboureth to retire into her felf which is a plaine proofe of that the is not the body nor any part of the body, but the very life and in worker of the body.

And fith it is so, there needeth no long scanning whether the That the Soul is a substance. soul be a substance or a qualitic. For, seeing that qualities have no being but in another thing than themselves; the life vyhicheau6th another thing to be, cannot be a qualitie. Forasmuch then as the Soul maketh a man to be a man; who otherwise should be but a carcasse or carion: doubtlesse (unlesse we will say that the onely disference which is betwixt a man and a dead carcasse, is but in accidents) we must needs grant that the souleis a forming substance and a fubiliantial forme, yea and a most excellent substance infinitely pasfing the outward man, as which by the power and vertue thereof cauleth another thing to have being, and perfecteth the bodily subflance which seemeth outwardly to have so many persections.

But hereupon inseweth another controversie, whether this subfluxe be a bodily or an unbodily substance: which cause requireth somewhat longer examination. Soothly, if we consider the nature ofabody, it hath certain measurings, and comprehendeth not any thing which is not proportioned according to the greatnesse and capacity thereof. For, like as it selfe must be fain to have a place inanother thing; so must other things occupie some certain place init by reason whereof it commeth to passe, that things can have noplace therein if they be greater then it, without annoying the one theother. To be short, if the thing be lesse than the body that containeth it, the whole body shall not contain it, but onely some part thereof: And if it be greater, then must some part thereof needs be ontofit: for there is no measuring of bodies but by quantity. Now Bodileste.

wesce how our soule comprehendeth heaven and earth, without annoying either other; and likewife, time pall, prefent, and to come, without troubling one annother; and finally innumerable places, persons and towns, without cumbering of our understanding. The great things are there in their full greatnesse, and the small things in their uttermost smallnesse, both of them whole and found, in the foule whole and found, and not by piecemeale or onely but inpart of it. Moreover, the fuller it is, the more it is able to receive, the more things that are couched in it, the more it still coveteth; and the greater the things be, the fitter is shee to receive them even when they beat the greatest. It followeth therefore that the foule (which after a fort is infinite) cannot be a body. And so much the lesse can it so be, for that whereas it harboreth so many and so great things in it, it felfe is lodged in so small a body. Again, as a thoufand divers places are in the foule or minde without occupying any place; fo is the minde in a thousand places without changing of place; and that erewhiles not by succession of time, nor by turns,

but oftentimes altogether at one instant. Bid thy Soule or Mind goe to Constantinople, and forthwith to turne backe againe to Rome, and straight way to be at Paris or Lyons: Bid it passe the row Amercia, or to goe about Affricke; and it dispatcheth all these iourneys at a trice: looke whether soever thou directest it, there it is and or ever thou callest it backe, it is at home again. Now, is there a body that can be in divers places at once, or that can passe with. out removing, or that can move otherwise than in time, yea and in fuch timeas (within a little under or over) is proportioned both to his pace, and to the length of the way which it hath to goe: Then is it certain that our Soule is not a bodily substance; which thing appeareth so much the more plainly, in that being lodged in this body which is so movable, it remove th not with the body. Also it is a fureground, that two bodies connot mutually enter either into other, nor conteine either other: but the greater must alway needes conteine, and the leffer must needes be conteined. But by our Soules, we enter, not only either into others bodies, but also either into others minds, so as we comprehend either other by mutual lunderstanding, and imbrace either other by mutual loving It followeth then that this substance which is able to receive a bodilesse thing, can be no body; and that so much the rather, for that the body which feemeth to hold it, conteineth it not. Nay verily, this Soule of ours is to farre of from being a bodily fubstance, and is so manifeltly a Spirit; that to lodge all things in it selfe, it maketh them all after a fort spirituall, and bereveth them of their bodies; and if there were any bodylinesse in it, it were unable to enter into the knowledge of a bodie. So in a Glasse a thousand shapes are seene: but if the cleere of the Glasse had any peculiar shape of it owne, the Glasse could yeeld none of those shapes at all. Also all vifible things are imprinted in the eye; but if the fight of the eye had any peculiar colour of it owne, it would be a blemish to the fight, to as it should either not see at all, or else all things should seeme like to that blemish Likewise, whereas the Tongue is the discerner of alltasts; if it be not cleere but cumbered with humours, all things are of rafte like to the humour, fo as if it be bitter, they also be bitter; & if it be waterish, they be waterish to; yea and if it be bitter, it can not judge of bitternes it felf. That a thing may receive all shapes all colours, and all talls; it behoveth the same to be cleere from all Chapes, from all colour, and from all favour of it own. And that a

immortall, or dyeth not. thing may in understanding know and conceive all bodies, as our fuledoth, it behoveth the fame to be altogether bodileffe it felfer forhad it any bodilinesse at all, it could not receive any body into it. If we look yet more neerly into the nature of a body, we shall finde that no body receiveth into it the substantials forme of another body, without lofing or altering his own, ne paffeth from one form into another, without the marring of the first; as is to be seen in wood when it receiveth fire, in feeds when they spring forth into bud. and so in other things. What is to be said then of mans soul, which receiveth and conceiveth the forms and shapes of all things withoutcorrupting his own, and inoreover becommeth the perfecter by themore receiving? For the more it receiveth, the more it underflandeth; and the more it understandeth, the more perfect it is.

If it be a bodily substance, from whence is it and of what mixnure? If it be of the foure Elements, how can they give life, having nolife of themselves? Or how can they give understanding, having polence? If it be of the mixture of them, how may it be faid that of divers things which have no being of themselves, should be made athing that hath being? Or that of divers outfides should be made onebody? or of divers bodies, one Soul? or of divers deaths, one life? or of divers darknesses, one light? Nay rather, why say we not that he which beyond nature hath made the mixture of these bodies, hath for the perfecting of our body, breathed a Soul also into the body? Tobeshort, the property of a body is to suffer, and the property of our Soule is to doe. And if the body be not put forth by some other thing than it felf, it is a very block; whereas the mind that is in our Soul ceaseth not to stirup and down in it felfe, though it have nothing to move it from without. Therefore it is to be concluded by thefe reasons and by the like, that our Soul is a bodilesse substance, notwithstanding that it is united to our body.

And hercupon it followeth alfo, that our Soule is not any materiallthing, for as much as matterreceiveth not any forme or shape but according to his owne quantity, and but onely one forme at once, whereas our Soule receiveth all formes without quantity, cometherenever so many at once or so great. Againe, no matter admitteth two contrary formes at once; but our Soule contrariwife comprehendeth and receiveth them together, as fire and water, heat and cold, white and black; and not only together, but albothe better by the matching and laying of them together. To be

fliort,



short, seeing that the more wee depart from matter, the more wee understand: furely nothing is more contrary to the substance of our Soule, than is the nature of matter. Furthermore, if this reasons. ble soule of ours is neither a bodily nor a material thing, nor depending upon matter in the best actions thereof: then must it needs be of it self, and not proceed either from body or frommatter, For what doth a body bring forth but a body; and matter but matter: and materiall but materialls: And thereforeit is an unmateriall substance, which hath being of it selfe.

The Soulhath Treatife why God deferreth the punishment of the wicked.

But let us see whether the same be corruptible and mortallos being of it felf. no. Soothly, if Plutarch be to be beleeved, it is in vain to dispute Plusarch in his thereof. For he teacheth, that the dollrine of Gods providence, and the immortalitie of our Soules are so linked together, that the one is as an appendant to the other. And in very deed, to what purpose werethe World created, if there wereno body to behold it: Orto what end behold wee the Creator in the world, but to serve him Vacorruptible And why should we serve him upon no hope: And to what purpose hath he indewed us with these rare gifts of his, which for the most part doe but put us to pain and trouble in this life : if we perish like the brute Beast or the Hearbes, which know him not Howbeit, for the better fatisfying of the filly Soules which go on still like witheste Beastes, without taking so much leysure in all their life, as once to enter into themselves; let us indevour here by lively reasons to paint out unto them againe their true shape, which they labour to deface with fo much filthinesse. The Soule of man (as I have fayed afore) is not a body, neyther doth it increase ordecrease with the body:but contrary wise the more the body decayeth, the more doth the understanding increase; and the necrer thatthe body draweth unto death, the more freely doth the mind understand; and the more that the body abasesh in flesh, the more workfull is the mind. And why then should we think that the thing which becommeth the stronger by the weaknesse of the body, and which is advanced by the decay of the body, should returneto dust with the body: A mans Sences fayle because his eyes fayle, and his eyes fayle because the Spirits of them fayle : but the blind mans under-Randing increaseth, because his eyes are not buside : and the olde mans reason becommeth the more perfect by the losse of his fight, Therefore why fay we not that the body fayleth the Soul, and not the Soule the body; and that the Glaffer are out of the Spectacles

immortall, or dyeth noz. but the exfight is still good : Why should we decree Soule to beforgone with the Sences : If the eye be the thing that feeth, and theeare the thing that heareth; why doe we not see things double, andheare founds double, feeing we have two eyes and two ears? histhefoule then that feeth and hearerh; and these which wee uketo be our sences, are but the instruments of our sences. And if when our eyes be flut or picked out, we then behold a thousand things in our minde; yea , and that our understanding ir then most anick-fighted, when the quickest of our eyinght is as good as quenchd of flarke dead: how is it possible that the reasonable soule should be tyed and bound to the sences? What a reason is it to say that the foule dyeth with the fences, feeing that the true fences doe then grow and increase, when the instruments of sense doe die? And what a thing were it, to fay that a beaft is dead, because he bath loft his eyes, when we our felves fee, that it liveth after it hath forgone the eyes? Also I have proved that the soule is neither the body, nor an appertenance of the body. Sith it is to, why meafute we trust thing by the body, which measureth all bodies; or make that to die with the body, whereby the bodies that die, yearmany hundred years agoe, dee after a certain manner live still? Or what anhurt that thing, whom nothing hurteth or hindereth in the boby Though a man lose an arme, yet doth his soule abide whole All. Let him forgoe the one halfe of his body, yet is his foule as found as a fores for it is whole in it felfe, and whole in every part of itselle, united in itselfe and in the own substance, and by the force and power thereof it sheadeth it selfe into all parts of the body. Though the body rot away by piecemeal, yet abideth the Soule all one and undiminished. Let the bloud dreyn out, the moving wan wake, the fences faile, and the firength perifh; and yet abideth the mindenevertheleffe found and lively even to the end. Her house wust be pierced through on all sides, ere shee be discouraged; her walls must be battered down ere she fall to fleeting; and she never fothketh her lodging, till no room be left her to lodge in. True it is, that the brute beafts forgoe both life & action with their bloud. But as for our soule (if we consider the matter well) it is then gathered home into it felfe, and when our fences are quenched, then doth it most of all labour to furmount it felfe : working as goodly actions at the time that the body is at a point to fail it, yea and offentimes far goodlier also, than ever it did during the whole

life time thereof. As for example, it taketh order for it selfe, for our dinee to things most contrary? What then Want of food : How household, for the Common-weale, and for a whole Kingdome; and that with more uprightnesse, godlinesse, wisdome; and modera- whole world: Or how should that for sake food, which the fuller it tion, than ever it did afore, yea and perchance in a body fo far spent. so bare, so consumed, so withered without, and so putrified within that who foever looks upon him fees nothing but earth, and yet to buin things, but our mind feedeth upon all things. Take from it heare him speake would ravish a manup to heaven, yea, and about heaven. Now when a man fees fo lively a foule in fo weake and wretched a body, may be not say as is said of the hatching of chicken. that the shell is broken, but there commeth forth a chicken.

Also let us see what is the ordinary cause that things perish. Fin doth either goe out for want of nourishment, or is quenched by his contrary which is water. Water is resolved into aire by fire, which things. But what can fill our mind? Fill it as full as ye can with is his contrary. The cause why the Plant dyeth, is extremite of cold or drought, or unfeafonable cutting , or violent plucking up Also the living wight dyeth through contrarictic of humours, or for want of food, or by feeding upon something that is against the hall I say more : discharge our understanding from the minding. nature of it, or by outward violence. Of all these causes, which can we choose to have any power against our Soule : I say against the Malive. Againe, fill it with the knowledge of it selfe y and then doth Soule of man, which (notwithstanding that it be united to matter and to a bodie) is it felfe a substance unbodily, unmaterial, and only conceivable in understanding: The contrarietie of things: Nay, what can be contrarie to that which lodgeth the contraries aliket. qually in himfelfe: which understandeth the one of them by the o ther:which coucheth them all under one skill ? and (to be fhort) in whom the contrarieties themselves abandon their contrarieties, [6] as they doe not any more pursue but insue one another: Fireis hote, and water cold. Our bodies mislike these contraries, and are grieved by them ; but our mind linketh them together without elshet burning or cooling it selfe; and it setteth the one of them against the other to know them the better. The things which destroy one another through the whole world, do mainteine one another in out minds. Againe, nothing is more contrary to peace then warre is; and yet mans mind can skill to make or mainteine peace in preparing for warre, and to lay earnestly for warre in seeking or injoying of peace. Even death it felfe (which dispatcheth our life) cannot be contrary to the life of our Soule : for it feeketh life by death , and royle, whether it be of Thunderclap or of the falling of a River; death by life. And what can that thing meet withall in the whole and the fight, by looking upon the Sunne, upon Fire, and upon all world, that may be able to overthrow it, which can iniogne obe-

as that want food in the world, which can skill to feed on the is somuch the hungryer it is; and the more it hath digested the betut able it is to digest : The bodily wight feedeth upon some certhe fensible things, and the things of und retanding abide with it Allibercave it of earthly things , and the heavenly remayne abunlunly. Tobe short, abridge it of all worldly things, yea and of the world it selfe, and even then doth it feed at greatest ease, & maketh lest cheere agreeable to his ownen ature. Also the bodily wight filwhit selfe to a certain measure, and delighteth in some certain the knowledge of things, and it is fill eager and tharpe fee to rekive more. The more it taketh in, the more it still crayeth: and yet for all that, it never feeleth any rawnesse or lack of digestion. What sliggife, and then doth it live in him and of him in whom all things isfale it felle most empty, and sharpest fet upon defire of the others Nowthen, can that die or decay for want of food, which cannot be gluned with any thing, which is nourished and maintained with Althings, and which liveth in very deed upon him by whom all likthings which we wonder at here beneath aneupheld; would be see

And what else is violence, but a infilling of two bodies together: indhow can there be any fuch betweene a bodie & a spiritual I sub-Ance: yea or of two spirits one against another, seeing that oftenlocs when they would destroy one another, they uphold one another: And if the Soule cannot be pushed at , neither inwardly nor outwardly: is there any thing in nature that can naturally hint it a No: but it may perchance be weakened by the very force of his mounter, as we see it doth befall to our sences. For the more exelent and the more sensible the thing is in his kind which the sence miveth, so much the more also is the sence it selfe offended or grieled therewith. As for example, the feeling, by fire; the taft, by harfh-Mesthe smelling, by savours; the hearing, by the hideousnesse of hings that have a glistering brightnesse. I omit, that in the most



of these things, it is not properly thesense it selfe, but the outward festion thereof: The leffe corfinesse aman hath, the more hath he instrument of sense onely that is offended or hurt. But let us see if of reason and understanding. The leffe our minds be tred to these there bee the like in our reasonable soule. Nay, contrariwisether bodily things the more lively and cheerefull be ther. At a word, the more of under standing and excellencie that the thing is , the more full and perfect life thereof, is the full and utter withdrawing theredothit refresh and comfort our minde. If it bedarke so as weeunoffrom the bodie and what soever the bodie is made of. All these derstand it but by halves, it hurteth us not, but yet doth it not dethings are so cleere as they neede no proofe. Now, weeknow that light us. Nay, as we increase in understanding it, so doth it like us the better, and the higher it is, the more doth it fir up the pomer of our understanding, and (as you would say) reach sus the hand to draw us to the attainment thereof. As for them that are dimfighted, we forbid them to behold the things that are over-bright. But as for them that are of rawest capacity, wee offer them the things that are most understandable. When the sence beginnethto perceive most sharply, then it is fain to give over, as if it feltthe very death of it selfe. Contrariwise, when the minde beginneth to understand, then is it most desirous to hold on still. And whereof commeth that, but that our fenles work by bodily instruments, but our mind worketh by a bodilesse substance which needeth not the help of the body. And seeing that the nature, the nourishment and the actions of our foule, are so far differing, both from the me ture, nourishment, and actions of the body, and from all that everish done or wrought by the body, can there be any thing more child dish than to deem our foul to be mortall by the abating & decaying of our sences, or by the mortallity of our bodies? Nay contrativity it may be most foundly and substantially concluded thereupon that mans soule is of its own nature immortall, seeing that all deather

well violent as natural commeth of the body and by the body. What is death. Let us see further what death or corruption is. It is (sayther) a separating of the matter from his forme. And forasmuch as in man the foule is confidered to be the forme, and the body to beat the matter, the separation of the soule from the body is commonly calleddeath. Now then, what death can there be of the foult. fith it is immateriall, as I have faid afore, and a forme that abideth of it selfe? For (as one saith) a man may take away the roundnesse or squarenesse from a table of copper, because they have no abiding but in the matter: but had they fuch a round or square form, as might have an abiding without matter or stuffe wherein to be, out of doubt, such forme or shape should continue for ever. Nay (which more is) how can that be the corrupter of a thing, which is the per-

every thing worketh according to the proper being therof, and that the same which perfecteth the operations of a thing, perfecteth the hing thereof also. It followeth therefore, that fith the separation of the body from the Soule, and of the forme from the matter, perfelicth the operation or working of the foule (as I have fayd afore) it doth also make perfect and Arengthen the very being thereof and therefore cannot in any wife corrupt it. And what elfe is dying but to be corrupted? And what els is corrupting but suffering: And what els is suffering, but receiving: And how can that which iccivethall things without suffering, receive corruption by any thing? Fire corrupteth or marreth our bodies, and we fuffer in reciving it. So doth also extreme colde: but if we suffered nothing by it, it could not free feus. Our fences likewise are marred by the txellive force of the things which they light upon. And that is beculethey receive and perceive the thing that grieveth them, and forthat the manner of their behaving of themselves towards their blices, is subject to suffering. But as for the reasonable Soule; which receive thall things after one manner, that is to wit, by way of understanding, where through it alway worketh & is never wrought mo, how is it peffible for it to corrupt or mare it felfe: For what is the thing whereat our Soule suffereth ought in the lubstance thereof, I meane whereby the substance of our Soule is my whit impaired or hurt by minding or conceiving the same in understanding : As little doth the fire hurt it as the aire, and the

not be marred or burt by any thing. Again, what is death: The uttermost point of moving, and the

sire as the fire. As little hurt receiveth it by the frozen ice of Nor-

my, as by the scorching sands of Affricke. As little also doth vice

annoy it as vertue. For vice and vertue are so farre of from incom-

being the substance of the soule, that our mind doth never con-

silve or understand them better, than by setting them together one

against another. That thing therefore which doth no whit appaire

it selfe, but taketh the ground of perfecting it selfe by all things', can-

That the Soule of Man is uttermost bound of this life. For even in living we dye, and indying we live, and there is not that step which we set downe in this life, which doth not continually step forward unto death, after the manner of a Diallor a Clock, which mountingup by certain degrees forgoeth his moving in moving from Minuteto Minute. Take away moving from a body, and it dothno more live. Now let us fee if the foul also be carryed with the same moving. If it be caryed with the fame moving, then doth it undoubtedly move therewithall. Nay contrariwise, whether the mind rest, or whether it be buzyed about the proper operations thereof, it is not perceived either by any panting of hart, or by any beating of pulfes, or by any breathing of Lungs. It is then as a Ship that carieth us away with it, whether we walke or fitftill; the sticking fast whercofor the tying thereof to a poste, hindereth not our going up and downe in it still. Againe, if the soule be subject to the finall corruption of the body, then is itsubject to the alterations thereofalso; and if it be subject to the alterations, it is subject to time also. For alterations or changes, are spices, or rather consequents of moving, and movings are not made but in time. Now man in respect of the body hath certain full poynts or stops, at the which he receiveth manifest changes, and thereafter groweth or decayeth. Butcommonly where the decay of the body beginneth, there beginneth the chief strength of the mind ! Howbeit that in some men, not only their chimes are covered with down, but also their beards become gray, whole minds for want of exercise, shew no signe at all either of ripenesse or growing. Moreover, time (as in respect of the body) cannot be called againe, but in respett of the mind it is always present. Yea and time perfecteth, accomplisheth, and increasethour mind, and after a fort reneweth and fresheth it from day to day, whereas contrariwife it forweareth, washeth away and quight consumeth, both it selfe, and the body with the life thereof. It followeth then that the reasonable Soule is not subject to time, nor consequently to any of the changes and corruption that accompanictime. Nay we may fay thus much more; That nothing in the whole world is nourished with things better than it selfe; neither doth any of them contain greater things than it felfe; But the things that are corruptible do live of corruptible things, and cannot live without corrupting them: as for example, beafts liveby herbs, men by beasts, and so forth. And therefore things which

live by uncorruptible things, and can fo receive and digest them, as to turne them into the nourishment of their nature, and yet not coknupt them; are uncorruptible themselves to. Now the Soule of man. I meanethe reasonable soule or mind, conceiveth reason and muth, and is fed and frengthered with them. And reason and truth arethings unchangeable, not subject to time, place or alteration, butfleady, unchaungeable, and everlafting. For that twice two be fower, and that there is the same reason in the proportion of eight untofix that is of fower unto three, or that in a Triangle, the three inner angles are equall with the too right angles; and fuch like; are truths, which neither years, nor thousands of years can change; as true at this day, as they were when Enclide first spake them. And to forth of other things. It followeth then that the Soule comprehending reason and truth, which are things free from corrunion, cannot in any wife be subject to corruption.

Again, Who is he of all men that defireth not to be immortall? 'And how could any man defire it, if he understood not what it is? Or how could be be able to understand it, unlesse it were possible In him to attain unto it? Surely none of us coveteth to be beginningleffe, for none of us is fo; neither can any of us be fo. And as we cannot fo be, fo also can we not comprehend what it is. For who is hethat is not at his wits end, but onely to thinke upon eternitic without beginning? On the contrary part there is not so base a minde which covereth not to live for ever, insomuch that whereas welookenot for it by nature, we feeke to obtain it by skill and pollicie, some by books, some by Images, and some by other devices; and even the groffest fort can well imagine in themselves what immortality is, and are able both to conceive it, and to believeit. Whence comes this, but that our foules being created cannot conceive an everlastingnesse without beginning, and yet neverthelesse, that for a smuch as they be created immortall, they doe well conceive an immortality or everlastingnesse without end? And whereto serves this universall desire, if it be not natural? or how wit naturall if it be in vain? and not onely in vain, but also to bring us to helland to torment? Let us wade yet deeper. Who can dispute, or once so much as doubt whether the soule be imwortall or no, but hethat is capable of Immortality, And who can understand what difference is betwixt mortall and Immortall, but be that is Immortall? Man is able to discerne the difference be20

That the Soule of Man is tweene that which is reason, and that which is not, and thereupon we terme him reasonable. Whosoever would hold opinion that man is not reasonable, should need none other disproof than his own disputing thereof; for he would go about to prove it by reason. Man can skill to discerne the mortall natures from the immortall, and therefore we may well fay he is immortall. For he that should dispute to the contrary, shall be driven to bring such reasons, as shall of themselves make him to prove himselfe immortall. Thou sayest the foule cannot be immortall: and why? Because (sayst thou) that to be so, it would behave it to worke severally by it selfe from the body. When thou thinkest that in thy minde, consider what thy body doth at the same time. Nay, yet further, who hath taught thee so much of the immortall nature, if thou thy selfe be not immortall? Or what worldly wight can say what the inworking of a reasonable wight is but the wight which in it selfe hath the use of reason.

Yet sayest thou still, if the soule be immortall, it is free from fuch and fuch passions. How enterest thou so far into the Nature that is so far above thee, if thou thy selfe beest mortall? All the reasons which thou alleadgest against the immortality of the soule doe fight directly to the proofe of it. For if thy reason mounted no higher than to the things that are mortall, thou shouldest know neither mortall nor immortall. Now it is not some one covetous man above all other, that defireth immortality, nor fome one man excelling all others in wisdome, that comprehendeth it, but all mankind without exception. It is not then some one severall skill or some one naturall property, that maketh such difference between man and man as we see to be between many, but rather one selfefame nature common to all men, whereby they be all made to differ from other living wights, which by no deed doe shew any defire to over live themselves, ne know how to live, and therefore their lives doe vanish away with their bloud, and is extinguished with their bodies. If ever thou half looked to die, confider what discourse thou madest then in thy minde, thou never couldest perswadethy conscience, nor make thy reason to conceive, that the soule should dye with the body; but even in the selselame time when it disputeth against it selfe, it shiftethit selfe I wot not how from all thy conclusions, and faileth to consider in what state it shall be, and where it shall become when it is out of the body. The Epicure that hath disputed of it all his life long, when he commeth to death, bequeatheth

queathetha yearly pension for the keeping of a yearly feast on the day of his birth. I pray you to what purpose serve feathings for the bith of a Swine, feeing he esteemeth himselfe to be no better than M Nay, what else is this, than a crying out of his nature against him, which with one word confuteth all his vain arguments? Another laboureth by all means possible, to blot out in himselfe the opinion of immortallity; and because he hath lived wickedly in this world, he will needs beare himselfe on hand, that there is no Juficin the world to come. But then is the time that his own nawewaketh and starteth up, as it were out of the bottome of a wam, and at that instant painteth againe before his eyes, the selfesame thing which he tooke fo much pains to deface. And in good footh, what a number have we seen, which having been despisers of all Religion, have at the hower of death been glad to vow their foules to any Saint for reliefe; fo cleere was then the presence of the life weome before their eyes. I had lever (fayd Zeno) to fee an Indian Clevi. lib. 1. bone himselfe cheerfully, than to heare all the Philosophers of the World discoursing of the immortality of the soule; and in very deditis a much stronger and better concluded argument. Nay then, letus rather fay, I had lever fee an Atheist or an Epicure winnesse the immortallity of the soule, and willingly taking an hmourable farewell of nature upon a scaffold, then to heare all the Doctors of the world discoursing of it in their pulpits. For whatbegerthe Epicures fay there, they speake it advisedly and (as ye wouldfay)fresh and fasting; whereas all that ever they have spoken Altheirlife afore, is to be accounted but as the words of Drunkads, that is to wit, of men beforted and falne afleepe in the delights and pleasures of this world, where the wine and the excesse ofmeat, and the vapors that fumed up of them did ipeake, and not thementhemselves. What shall I say more? I have told you al. Three lives in tedy, that in the inward man there are (as ye would fay) three men, man. theliving, the Tensitive, and the reasonable. Let us say therefore that in the fame person there are three lives continued from one to Mother: namely, the life of the Plant, the life of the Beaft, and the life of the Man or of the Soule. So long as a man is in his mothers womb, he doth not onely live and grow; his spirit seemeth tofkep, and his fences feem to be in a flumber, fo as he feemeth tobe nothing else then a plant. Neverthelesse, if ye consider his ryes, his ears, his tongue, his sences, and his movings, you will calily

eafily judg that he is not made to be for ever in that prifon, where he neither seeth nor heareth, nor hath any room to walk in, but rather that he is made to come forth into an opener place, where heemay have what to fee and behold, and wherew th to occupy all the pow. ers which we see to be in him. As soon as he is come out, he begin. neth to see, to feel, and to move, and by little and little falleth to the perfect using of his limbs, and findeth in this world a peculiar object for every of them, as visible things for theeye, sounds for his hear. ing bodily things for his feeling and so forth. But besides al this we find there a mind; which by the eys as by windows beholdether world, and yet in all the world finding not any one thing worth to rest wholly upon, mounteth up to him that made it; which minut like an Empresse lodgeth in the whole world, and not alonely inthis body; which by the sences (and oftentimes also without the sences) mounteth above the sences, and streyneth it self to ga out of it self, at a child doth to get out of his mothers wombe. And therefore we ought furely to say that this Mind or Reason ought not to be ever in prison That one day it shall see cleerly, and not by these dimme and cloudy spettacles: That it shall come in place where it shall have theme object of understanding : and that hee shall have his life free from these fetters and from all the affections of the body. To beshort, that as man is prepared in his mothers wombe to be brought forthinto the world; so is he also after a fort prepared in this body and inthis world, to live in another world. We then understand it, when by ne ture it behoveth us to depart out of the world. And what childi there which (if nature did not by her cumning drive him out,) would of himself come out of his Covert, or that cometh not out as goods! forlorn and half dead; or that if he had at that time knowledgeard speech, would not call that death, which we call birth; and that adeparture out of life, which we call the entrance into it? As long as we be there, we see nothing though our eys be open. Many also done fo much as stir, except it be at some sodain scaring or some other like chance; and as for those that stir, they know not that they have either sence or moving. Why then should weethinkeit strange, that in this life our understanding feeth fo little, that many men dee never mind the immortall nature, untill they be at the last cast, ye, and some thinke not themselves to have any such thing, howest that even by so thinking they shew themselves to have partthereof? And imagine wee that the unborn babe hath not as much ador

manureto leave the poore skin that hee is mraptin, as wee have hinderance in our sences and in our imprisoned reason, when wee be athepoint to leave the goods and pleasures of this world, and the very fiesh it self which holdeth us as in a grave? Or had the babe fomelittle knowledge; would he not fay that no life were compaable to the life where he then is, as we fay there is no life to the life othis world wherein we be? Or would he not account the stage of our sences for a fable, as a great fort of us account the stage that is prepared for our Souls? Yes furely and therefore levus conclude where wee began, namely that man is both inward and outward. htheoutward man, which is the body, he resembleth the being and the proportion of all the parts of the world. And in the inner man he refembleth what soever kinde of life is in all things, or in anything that beareth life in the world. In his mothers womb he liveth the life of a plant, howbeit with this further, that he hath a tutain commencement of sense and moving which exceed the Plant, and doe put him in a readineffe to be indowed with Sences as a Beast is. In this life he hath Sense and moving in their perfectim, which is the property of a fensitive wight; but yet besides these, hehath alfo a beginning to reafon and understand, which are a beginning of another life, fuch as the sensitive wight hath not, and this Weis to be perfected in another place. In the life to come he hath hisalions free and full perfected, a large ground to worke upon, able to fuffice him to the full, and a light to his understanding in steadofalight to the eye. And like as in comming into the world, became as it were out of another world; so in going yet into another world, he must also goe out of this world. He commeth out of the first world into the second, as it were fayling in nourishment, butgrowing in strength unto moving and sense: and he goeth out of the fecend into the third, failing in fences and moving, but growingin reason and understanding. Now sceing we call the passage mof the first world into the second abirth, what reason is it that me sould call the passage out of the second into the third a death? Tobe short, he that considereth how all the actions of mans mind undto the time to come, without possibility of staying upon the present time, how pleasant and delightfull soever it be: we may wel diferent by them all, that his being (which in every thing (as fayth Aristotle) followeth the working thereof) is also wholy bent towards the time to come; as who would fay this present life were unto it but as a narrow grindle, on the further fide whereof (asi were on the bank of some Areame, or running water,) he werete finde his true dwelling place and very home in deed.

Gbjections.

But now is it time to fee what is fayd to the contrarie : where in we have to consider estsoons that which we spake of afore name. ly that if all that ever is in us were transitoric and mortall, we should not be so witty to examine the Immortalitie as we be: for of contraries the skill is all one, If a man were not mortall, that is to fay, if he had no life, he could not dispute of the mortallise neither could be speake of the immortall, if he himselfe also were not immortall. Therefore let us goe back retrive. Some man will fay, that the foule dyeth with the body, because the soule and the body are but one thing, and he believeth that they be both but one, because he seeth no more but the body. This argument is all one with theirs, which denyed that there is any God, because they faw him not. But yet by his doings thou mailt perceive that there is a God: discerne likewise by the dooings of thy soule, that thou hast a soule. For in a dead body thou scell the same pant remain, but thou feest not the same doings that were in it afore, When a man is dead, his eye feeth nothing at all, and yet is there nothing changed of his eye: but while he is alive he feeth infinite things that are divers. The power then which feeth is not of the body. Yet notwithstanding, how lively and quick-fighted soever the eye be; it feeth not it felfe. Wonder not therefore though thou have a foule, and that the same soule see not it selfe. For if thineey. fight faw it leffe, it were not a power or ability of feeing, butavifible thing : likewise, if thy soule saw it selfe, it were no morea Soule, that is to fay the worker and quickner of the body, buta very body, unable to doe any thing of it felfe, and a maffie substance subject to suffering. For we see nothing but the body and bodily substances. But in this thou perceivest somewhat else than a body (as I have faid afore) that if thine eye had any peculiar colourof it own, it could not discerne any other colour than that. Seeing then that thou conceived to many divers bodies at once in imagination : needs must thou have a power in thee which is not abody. Be it (fay they) that we have a power of sense; yet have we not? power of reason; for that which we call the power of reason or understanding, is nothing but an excellencie or rather a consequence offence, infomuch that when sense dyeth, the residue dyeth there-

immortall, or dyeth not. with alfo. Soothly in this which thou haft faid, thou haft furmounted sence; which thing thou haddest not done, if thou haddest nothing in thee beyond fence. For whereas thou fayeft, if the fence dve, the rest dyeth also; it is a reason that proceedeth from one seme to another, and it is a gathering of realons which conclude one thing by another. Now the sences do in deed perceive their obichs, but yet how lively fo ever they be, they reason not. Wee see a Smoake; to farre extendeth the sence. But if we inferre, therefore there must needs be fire, and thereupon seeke who was the kindler thereof: that furmounteth the ability of sence. Weo heare a piece of Musicke; that may any beast do as well as we. But his hearing of it is but as of a bare found; whereas our hearing thereof is as of anharmony, and we differenthe cause of the concords and discords, which cyther delight or offend our lence. The thing that heareth the found is the sence; but the thing that judgeth of that which the sence conceiveth, is another thing than the fence. The like is to be faid of Smelling, Tafting, and Feeling. Our finelling offents, our tafting of hyours, and our feeling of lubstances, is in deed the work of our fenes. But as for our judging of the inward vertue of the thing by the onward lent thereof, or of the wholfonnesse or unwholfonnesse of food by the tafte thereof, or of the homesse or vehemency of a Fever by feeling the Pulle; yea and our proceeding even into the my bowels of a man, whether the eye being the quickest of all sences is not able to attain; surely it is the worke of a more mighty power than the Sence is. And in very deed there are Bealts which do heare, see, smell, taste, and feel much better and quicklier than man doth. Yet not with standing none of them conferreth the contraries of colours, founds, fents and fayours, none forteth them out to theserving one of another, or to theserving of themselves. Whereby it appeareth, that man excelleth the beafts by another power than the sences, and that whereas aman is a Painter, A Musician, or a Phisician, he hash it from elsewhere then from his somes. Nay, I say farther, that ofcentimes were conclude clean contrary to the report of our fences. One eye perchance tellethus that a Tower which we see afar off is round, whereas our reason deemeth it to be square; or that a thing is small, which our reason teleth us is great: or that the ends of lines in a long walke doc meet in a point, whereas our reason certifieth us that they run right forth with equall distance one from another. For want of this

this discretion, certaine Elephants (layth Vitellio) which were pasfing overalong bridge, turned back being deceived; and yetthey wanted not fight no more then we doe. But they that lead them were not deceived. Their leaders then believes their eylight, had in them annother vertue or power which corrected their fight; and therefore ought to be of higher estimation. In like case is it with the rest of the other sences. For our hearing telleth us, that the thunder-clap is after the lightning; but skill affireth us that they be both together, for there is a certain power in us, which canskill to discerne what proportion is between hearing and seeing. Also the tongue of him that hathan ague; beareth him on hand that even fugar is bitter, which thing he knoweth by his reason to be untrue, To be short, those which have their sences most quick and lively, be not of the greatest wisdome and understanding, A man therefore differeth from a beaft, and excelleth man by some other power than fence. For whereas it is commonly layed, that fuch as have feen most are commonly of greatest skill, we see that many have travalled far both by Soa and land, which have come home as wife as they went forth. A horse hath as good eyes as he that rides upon him, and yet for all his travailing, neither he; nor peradventure his ridet whom he beareth become any whit the wifer by that which they have seene : whereby it appeareth that it is not enough to see things

unlesse a man doe also minde them to his benefit. Now there is great difference between the livelynesse of the Sence, and the power that governeth the Sense; like as the teport of a Spic is onething, and the Spie himselfe is another, and the wildome of the Captain that receiveth the report of the Spie is a third. Nay, who can deny, that sense and reason are divers things; or rather: who will not grant, that in many things they be clean contrary? Sense biddeth us shun and eshew griese; whereas reason willeth us to proffer our leg sometime to the Surgeon tobe cut off. Sense pluckethour hand out of the fire, and yet we our selves put fire to our bare skin. Hee that should see Scevola burn off his own hand, without so much as once gnashing his teeth at it, would think he were utterly senselesse : so mightily doth reason over-rule lense. To be short, Sense hath his peculiar inclination, which is appetite, and reason likewise hath his, which is will. And like as reafon doth often times over rule fenfe, and is contrary to it, fo will correcteth the fenfialli appetite or lust that is in us, and warreth

against it. For in an Ague we cover to drinke, and in an Apoplexic we cover to fleepe, and in hunger we cover to cate, and yet from all those things doth our will reftrain us. The more a man followeth his helt, the leffe is he led by will: and the more heift andeth upon thepleasing of his sences, the lesse reason useth he ordinarily.

Again, let us confider the brute beafts which have the fonfitive partus well as we. If we have no more than that, how commeth it topasse that a little child driveth whole flocks and heards of them whether he lifteth, and somtimes whether they would not? Whereof commeth it that every of them in their kind, doe, all live, neffle, and fing after one fort, whereas men have their Laws, Commonweales, manners of building, and formes of reasoning, not onely divers, but Mommonly contrary Now what can harbour these contrarieties together, but onely what which hath not any thing contrary unto it, and wherein all contrary things, doe lay away their contrariety? Surely it is not the fense that can doe it, whose proper or peculiar object is most contrary to the sense. Besides this (as I have faid afore) whereas we conceive wifdome, skill, vertue, and fuch other things which are all bodileffe, our fences have none other thing to work upon than the qualities of bodily hibstances. And whereas we make universall rules of particular things, the sences attain no farther thantotheparticular things themselves. And whereas we conclude of the causes by their effects, our sences perceive no more but the but effects: And whereas concerning the things that belong to understanding, the more understandable they be, the more they refresh us; contrariwife, the stronger that the lensible things are, the more doethey offend the sense: To be short, the self-same thing which we speak in behalte of the sences, proceedeth from elsewhere than from the Sences. And we will eafily differne, that he which denyeth that besides the common sence, there is in man a reason or underflanding, diftin& and severed from the sense, is voyd both of underflanding and of tence.

Butice here a groffe reason of theirs. This reason or power of understanding (lay they) which is in man, is corruptible as well as the power of perceiving by the Sences. I think I have proved the contrary already, nevertheleffe, let us examine their reasons yet further. The forme or shape of every thing (fay they) doth petish with the matter. Now the toule is as you would say the forme or shape of the body therefore it corrupteth with the body. This ar-

pument were rightly concluded, if it were meant of the material! forme. But I have proved that the foule is unmateriall, and hatha cotinuanceof it felf. And indeed the more it is discharged of matter. the more it retaineth his own peculiar forme. Therfore the corning on of the matter toucheth nor the foule at all. Again, if mens fouls live (fay they) after their bodies, then are they infinite, for the world is without beginning & without ending, and (as we know) nature can away with no infinite thing a therefore they live not after their bodies. Yes, fay I, for I have proved that the world hath a beginhing, and that with fo substantial reasons, as thou art not able to difprove. Therfore it followeth that the inconvenience which though le Igeft can have no place. Another fayth, If dead mens fouls live flit why come they not to tell us fo? And he thinketh he hath stumbed uron a wonderfull subtle device. But how doubthis follow inreal four? There hath nor come any man untous from the Indies a long timetergothere be no Indies. May not the fame argument ferve as well to prove that we our felves are not, because we never went thither? Again, what intercourse is there between things that have bodies, and things that have no bodies, or between heaven and earth, confidering that there is to final intercourse even between men which live under one selfesame Sun? He that is made a Magistrate In his own Countrey, doth netwillingly return to the place of his banishment Likewise the Soule that is lodged in the Lapof his God, and come home into his native foyle, for goeth the defire of these lower things, which to his sight beholding them from above, and lesse then the point of a needle. On the other fido, he that is put in close prilon, (how defirous foever he be) cannot goe out; fo the foule which is in the Jarle of his foveraign Lord God, hathnorespit or sporting timete come tell us what is done there. Unto the one, the beholding of the everlasting God is as a Paradice wherein he is willing to remain; and unto the other his own condemnation is an imprisonment of his will. But we would have God to fend both the one & the otherunto us to make us to believe. As who would fay, it food him greatlyon hand to have us to believe, and not rather us that we should believe. And in effect whatelfe is all this, but a defiring that fomeman might return into his mothers womb again, to incourage young babes against the pinches and pains which they abide in their birth, wherot they would be as shie as we be of death, if they had the like knowledge of them? But let us let fuch vanities passe, and come to the ground.

Yee beare us on hand (faythey) that the foul of man is but one, though it have divers powers. Whereof we fee the fensitive, and the growing powers to be corrupted and to perish: therefore ithould feeme that the understanding or reasonable power also should doe the like. At a word, this is all one as if a man should fay. routell mee that this man, is both a good man, a good Swordplayer, and a good luteplayer altogether, and that because his fword fills out of his hand, or his hand it felfe becommeth lame, therefore hecannot be a good or honest man still as you reported him to be. Nay though he lofe those instruments, yet cealeth he not therefore tobe an honest man, yea, and both a Sword-player, and a Luteplayer too, as in respect of skill. Likewise when our soules have forgone these exercises, yet cease they not to be the same they were afore. To inlighten this point yet more; of the powers of our Soule, some are exercised by the instruments of the body, and othersome vvithout any help or furtherance of the body at all. Those which are exercised by the body, are the sences and the powers of thesences, and the powers of the growing, which may carrie the sime likenesse that is between a Luter and a Lute. Breake the Luters Lute, and his cunning remaineth still, but his putting of it in practice faileth. Give him another Lute and hee falls to playng new again. Put outa mans eye, and yet the ability of feeing abideth still with him, though thevery act of feeing be disappointed, But give unto the oldelt Hag that is , the fame eyes that hehad when he was young, and he shall fee as well as ever he did, Atterthe fame manner is it with the growing or thriving power. Reflore unto it a good fromack, a foundliver, and a perfect heart; and it shall execute his functions as well as ever it did afore, The Pwer that worketh of it felfe and without the body; is the power. otreason or understanding, which if we will we may call the mind. And if thou yet fill doubt thereof, confider when thou mindell a thing earnefly what thy body furthereth thy minde therein, & thou holt perceive that the more fixedly thou thinkest upon it, the lesse thou feelt the things before thee, and the more thy minde wandereth themore thy body resteth: as who would say that the workings of thebody, are the greatest hinderance and impediment that can bee tothe peculiar doings of the minde. And this ability of under standmg may be likened to a man, which though he have loft both his hand and his lute; ceaseth not therefore to bee a man still, and to doc the true deeds of a man, that is to wit, to discourse of things, to and our imagination shall be pure : and so our understand shall minde them, to use reason and such like; yea, and to be both a Luter and a man as he was afore, notwithstanding that he cannot put his Lute-playing in exercise for want of instruments. Nay, (which with our bodies, which after a long sicknesse retain still more is) this understanding part groweth so much the stronger and greater, as it is lesse occupied and busied about these base and corruptible things, and is altogether drawn home wholy to it felfe. as is to be seen in those which want their eyes, whose mindes are commonly most apt to understand, and most firme to remember. Doe we debate of a thing in our selves? Neither our bodynor out fences are busied about it. Doe we will the same? As little doe they Hir for that too. To understand and to will (which are the operations of the minde.) the foule hath no need of the body, and as for working and being, they accompany one another fayth Ariffolle, Therefore to continue still in being, the soule hath not to doe with the body, nor any need of the body: but rather to worke well and to be well, the foule ought either to be without the body, or at leaftwife to be utterly unfubject to the body.

Yea (lay they) but yet we see men forgoe their reason, as fools and melancholie persons:& seeing it is forgon, it may also be corrupted; and if corrupted, it may also die; for what is death but an utter and full corruptnesse? Nay, thou shouldest fay rather; I have seen divers, which having seemed to have lost their right wits, have recovered themagain by good diet and medicinable drinks. But had they ben utterly lost and forgone, no physick could have restored them against and had they been utterly perished, the parties themselves should have had neither sense nor life remaining. Therefore of necessity the foule of them was as found as afore. But our foules we fee nototherwife than by the body and by the inftruments of the bodie as it were by Spectacles, and our minde which beholdeth and feeth through his imaginations as it were through a cloude, isaftera fort troubled by the dimming of the spectacles, and by the smoakicnesse of the imaginations. After that manner the Sun seemeth to be dimmed & eclipfed; & that is but by the coming of the moon or of fome clouds between him & us, for in his light there is no abatement at all. Likewise our cysight conceiveth things according to the speclacks wherethough it looketh or according to the colour that over thwatteth the things which it looketh upon. Take away the impediments, and our eyes shall see cleere, purge away the humors,

ke as bright as it did afore, even as the Sunne shineth after the nating away of the Clowdes. And it fareth not with our Soule's whera hardnesse of the Splene, or a shortnesse of breath, or a faling of the Rhewme upon the Lungs, or a skarre of some great would that cannot be worne out because of the breake that was made in the whole. For neither in their understanding, neither in heir willes do our Soules feele any abatement, faving that there abideth some maime or blemish in the instruments; to wit (as I will declare hereafter) so farre forth as it please th GOD for a just mishment, to put the Soule in subjection to the bodie whose sowreign it was created to have been, because it hath neglected the will of the Creator, to follow the lufts and likings of the bodic. Thisappeareth in Lunaticke folkes and fuch others, which have their witts troubled at times and by fitts. For they be not vexed but at the stirring of their humours, being at other times sober and well enough Hayed in their witts, The like is feene in them thathave the falling ficknesse. For their understanding seemeth tobeelipfed, and as it were fricken with a Thunderclap, during the time of their fitts; but afterward they be as discreet as though beyailed nothing. To be short, the body is subject to a thousand ditales, wherewith we see the understanding to be no whit altend, because they touch not the instruments of the Senceand of the Imaginations, which move the understanding. Troubled it is induced by those few things only, which infect the Sence and the Imagination, which by that meanes report the things unfaithfullywhereon the mind debateth. Therefore ye shall never see any bodrout of his witts orout of his right mind, in whom the Phifition may not manifeftly perceive, either some default of the infruments, as a mishapen and misportioned head; or els an overabounding of some melancholike humour, that troubled and mined his bodie afore it troubled or impaired his mind. And like as the wifest men being deceived by false Spies, do make wrong dliberations, howbeit yet grounded upon good reason, which thing they could not documeffe they were wife in deede : So the reason that is in our mind maketh false discourses, and gathereth wrong conclusions, upon the falle reports of the imagination; which it could not doe, if it were either duninished or impaired, or done a-

way. Whereunto accordeth this ancient faying, That there be certain follyes which none but wife men can commit, and certain Errours which none but learned men can fall into: because that in some cases, discretion and wisedom are requifite in the partie that is to be deceived; even to the intent he may be deceived; and learning is required in a man that he may conceive and hold a wrong opinion. As for example, to beguiled by a doubledealing Spy or by the surprising of a colening letter, belongeth to none but to a wifeman. For a grofheaded foole never breaketh his brain about such matters as might bring him to the making of falle conclusions by mistaking likelyhoods in stead of truth. Likewise to fall into Herefie by misconceiving some high and deepe point, befalleth not to an ignorant person; for heir not of capacitie, neither doth his understanding mount so high. To be short, Who soever saysh that mans Soul perisheth with the body, because it is troubled by the distemperature or misproportionatenesses the body; may as well uphold that the Child in the mothers wombedyeth with his mother, because he moveth with her, and is partaker with her of her harms and throws by reason of the streit conjunction that is between them; howbeit that many children have lived fafe and found, norwithstanding that their mothers have dyed; yea and some have come into the World even by the death of their mothers.

And whereas some say, that because our mind conceiveth not any thing here, but by helpe of Imagination; therefore when the Imagination is gone with the instruments whereunto it is tyed, the Soule cannot work alone by it felfe, nor confequently be alone by it selfe: surely it is alone as if they should say, that because the Chik being in his mothers wombe taketh nourifliment of her bloud by his navill; therefore he cannot live when he is come out her womb, if his navillstrings be cut off. Nay contrariwise, then is the time that the mouth, the tongue, and the other parts of the Childedot their dutie, which served erst to no purpose, saving that they were prepared for the time to come. After the same manner also doe we cherishour mind by Imagination in this second life; which inthe third life being (as ye would fay) scaped out of prison, shall begin towner his operations by himselfe, and that so much the more certainly, for that it shall not be subject to false reports, nor to the sences either inward or outward, but to the very things themselvs which it shall have seen and learned. To be short, it shall live, but not in prison; it shall

he but not through spectacles; it shall under st and, but not by reports; ushall lift, but not by way of lusting : the infirmity which the body caffeth upon it as now, shalthen be away: the force which it bring ethnow to the body, shall then be more fresh and lively than afore. Now then notwithstanding these vain reasons of theirs, let us conchide, That our sonle is an understanding or reasonable power; over the which neither death nor corruption have naturally any power, although it be fitted to the body to govern it. And if any man doubt hereof, let him but examine himfelfe, for even his own doubts will prove it unto him. Or if he will fland in contention flill, let him fall to ressoning with himselfe: for by concluding his arguments to prove his foule mortall, he shall give judgement himselfe that it is immortall. And if I have left any thing unalleadged which might make to this purpole, (for why may I not, seeing that even the selfesame things which I have been able to alleadge on the behalfe of mine adversaries, doedrive them thereunter) let us think also that he which feeleth himselfe convicted in himselfe, and for whose behoof and benefit it were greatly, both to believe it and to confesse it, necdeth no more diligent proof than hath been made already. But if anyman will yet of spight Rand wilfully Rill against himselfe, let him try how he can make answer to my foresaid arguments: and in the mean while let us fee what the said opinion of the wisest men, yea, and of the whole world hath been upon this matter.

immortall, or dyeth not.

CHAP. II.

That the immortality of the Soul hath been taught by the Phylosophers of old time, and believed by all people and Na-

Oothly it had been a very hard case, if this minde of ours which O searcheth so many things in nature, had not taken some leasure to fearch it felfe and the nature thereof, and by fearching attained to some poynt in that behalfe. And therefore as there have at all times beene men, so shall wee see also that men have at all times believed and admitted the immortality of the foule, I fay not some one man, or some one Nation, but the whole world with genetall confert, because all men universally and particularly have learned it in one schoole, and at the mouth of one Teacher, namely even their own knowledge in themselves. The holy Scripture which teacheth

That the immortality of the Soule teacheth us our falvation, uferh no school arguments to make us be-Heve that il ere is a God : and that is because we cannot step out of our felves never so little, but we must needs finde him present to all our fences. And it feemeth to speake unto us the leffe expressely of the immortality of our foules, specially in the first books thereof, because we cannot enter into our felus be it never fo little, but we must needs perceive it. But in as much as from the one endthereof to the other.

The opinion of the Men of old time.

it declareth unto us the will of God: in fo doing, it dothus to un. derstand, that it is a thing, whereof it is not lawfull for us to doubt. And whereas it setteth forth so precisely from age to age, the great and manifold troubles and pains, which good and godly men have fuffered in indeavouring to follow that will, it sheweth infalibly that their so doing was in another respect than for this present wreiched life. For who is he that would depart with any piece of his own liking in this life, but in hope of better things? and what were it for him to lose his life, if there were not another life after this? This ferveth to answer in one word to such as demand expresse texts of Scripture, and are loth to finde that thing in the Bible, which is contained there, not onely in every leaf, but almost in every line. For whereas God created man after the world was fully finished & perfecteds it was as much as if he had brought him into a Theater prepared for him, howbeit after another fort than all the other living things which were to doe him service. As for bealts, birds, plants, and such other things, the elements brought them forth, but man received his foule by inspiration from God. Also the brute beasts are put in subjection to man, but man is in subjection onely unto God. And the conveying of that good man Henocke out of this life for his godlinesse, was to none other end, but to set him in another life void of all The belief of evill, and full of all good. But when we read the perfecutions of No;

&c.

the Patriarks, the overthwartings of Abraham, the banishment and waysarings of Incob, and the diffresses of Joseph, Moses, and all the residewos the Fathers; they be all of them demonstrations, that they did certainly trust and believe that the soule is immortall, that there is another life after this, and that there is a judgement to come. For had they been of opinion that there is none other life after this; the flesh would have perswaded them to have held themselves inquiet here, and they would have liked nothing better than to have followed sweetly the comon trade of the world, Noe among his friends, Abeaham among the Chaldees, Moses in Pharoahs Court, and

hath bin taught by the Phylo fophers, &c. lofoorth. Sothen, although the Scripture Iceme to conceale it; yet doth it speake very loude thereof in deede, considering that all the crees of the good and godly, and all the desparres of the wicked which it describeth unto us, doe found none other thing unto us, if we have eares to heare it. And it may be, that in the fame refrect. this article of the Immortalitie of the Soule was not put into the ancient Creede of the Jews, nor also peculiarly into the Creede of us Christians, because we believe beyond reason, and this is within the bounds of reason; and whosoever treateth of Religion must needes presuppose God eternall and man immortall, without the which two, all Religion were in vayne. Also, when we see that Godlinesse, Iustice, and vertue were commended among the Heathen of all ages: it is all one as if we fould heare them preach in expresse words the Immortalitie of the Soule. For their so doing is builded every whit upon that, as upon a foundation without the which those things could not fland. I will spend my goodes or mylifefor the maintenance of Iustice. What is this Iustice but a vaine name, or to what end have I formany respects, if I looke for nothing out of this present world here: I will (fayd a man of olde time) rather lofe even the reputation of an honest man, than behave myselfe otherwise than honestly. But why should I doe so, if I looke fornogood in another world, seeing I have nothing but evill here: The wife Men Surely if there be none other thing than this life, then is vertue to be uled no further, than profit and commeditie may growe upon it; and so should it become a Chaffer and Merchandise, and not vertue in deed. Yet notwithstanding, those are the ordinary speeches, even of such as speake doutfully of the Immortalitie of the Soule. Therefore they doe but denye the ground and yet grant the confequence; which isall one as if a man having first bin burned should fall to disputing whether fire be kot or no. But now (which is better for us) I will here gather together their owne speeches one after another.

Hermes declareth in his Pamander, how at the voyce of the e- Hermes in his verlafting, the Elements yeelded forth all reasonlesse living, wights Pamander, as it had bin out of their bosomes. But when he commeth to man, arexists ris helayth, He made him like unto himselfe, he linked himselse to arboward o him as to his Sonne, (for he was beautifull and made after his 3.0 auto

owne Image) and gave him all his works to use at his pleasure. ion windon wie Againe, he exhorteth him to forfake his bodie, (notwithstanding 'sivo 76x00. that he wonder greatly at the cunning workmanship thereof) as

That the immortality of the Soule the very cause of his death, and to manure his soul which is capable of immortality, and to confider the original root from whence it sprang, which is not earthly but heavenly, and to withdraw himselfe even from his sences, and from their er ayterous allurements to gather himselfe wholy into that minde of his which hee hath from God and by the which, he following Gods word, may become as God. Discharge thy selfe (sayth he) of this body which thou bearest about thee, for it is but a cloke of ignorance, afoundation of infection, a place of corruption, a living death, a sensible carryon, a portable grave of a household thief. It flattereth thee because it hateth thee, and ithateth thee because it envieth thee. As long as that liveth it bereavesh thee of life, & thouhast not a greater enemie than that. Now, to what purpole were it for him to for fake this light, this dwelling place & this life, if he were nothere of a better in another world (as hehimfelfe fayth more largely afterward.) On the other fide, what is the Homes in his foule?) The foule (layth he) is the garment of the minde, and the

garment of the fonle is a certain spirit, whereby it is united to the

body. And this minde is the thing which we call properly the man,

that is to fay, a heavenly wight which is not to be compared with

heasts, but rather with the Gods of heaven, if he be not yetmore

than they. The heavenly cannot come down to the earth without

leaving the heaven, but man measureth the heaven without remo-

ving from the earth. The earthly man then is as a mortall God, and

the heavenly God is as an immortal man. To be short, his conclusion

is, That man is double, mortall as touching his body, and immortall

as touching his foule, which foule, is the substantial man, and the

very man created immediately of God (fayth he) as the light is bred

immediately of the Sunne. And Chalcidius fayth, that at his death

hespake these words. I goe home again into mine own countrey,

Pæmander, (a).10.

\$ wordshe

difference. Hermes in his Il feulapius.

AEneis Gaz. concerning the immortality of the Soulc. chaldeans.

where my better forefathers and kinsfolke be. Of Zoroastres who is yet of more antiquity than Hermes, we havenothing but fragments. Nevertheleffe, many report this argument to be one of his, That mens fouls are immortall, and that one day there shall be a generall rising again of their bodies; and the answers of the wise men of Chaldye (who are the heirs of his Doetrine) doe answer sufficiently for him. There is one that exhorteth men to return with speed to their heavenly father, who hath fent them from above, a soule endowed with much understanding, and another that exhorteth them to seeke paradice, as the peculiar dwel-

bathbintaught by the Phylophers, &c. ling place of the foule. A third fayth that the foule of man hath God as it were fout up in it, and that it hath not any mortality therein, For (fayth he) the foule is as it were drunken with God, and heweth forth his wonders in the harmonic of this mortall body. Andagain, another fayth, It is a cleere fire proceeding from the power ofthe heavenly father, an uncorruptible substance, and the mainniner of life, containing almost all the whole world with the full plenty thereof in his before. But one of them proceedeth yet further, affirming that he which feteth his minde upon godlineffe, shall fave bis body, fraile the ugh it be. And by those words he acknowledgeth the very glorifying of the body. Now, all these layings are reported by the Platonists, and namely The Grides.

by Pfelliss; and they refule not to be acknowne that Pythagoras and Platolearned them of the Chaldees; infomuch that some think, that the foresaid Hermes and Zoroastres, and the residue afore-mentioned, are the same of whom Plato speaketh in his second Epistle, and in his cleventh Book of Laws, when he fayth that the ancient and holy Oracles are to be believed, which affirme mens Souls to be Immortall, and that in another lifethey must come before a Judge that will require an account of all their doings: The effect whereof commeth to this, That the Soule of man proceedeth immediatly from God, that is to fay, that the father of the body is one, and the Father of the Soul is another: That the Soul is not a bodily subflance, but a Spirit and a Light : That at the departure the reoffrom hence, it is to go into a Paradife, and therefore ought to make hafte uno death: And that it is fo far from mortality, that it maketh even the body Immortall. What can we fay more at this day, even in the time of light wherein we be? Pherecydes the Syrian, the first that Pherecydes. was known among the Greeks to have written profe, taught the

fame. And that which Virgill fayth in his fecond Eglog concerning Affyrium vulgo the Drug or Spice of Affyria, and the growing thereof every whereis nafectur Amointerpreted of some men to be ment of the Immortalitie of the Soule, nium. the doctrine whereof Pherecydes brought from thence into Greeze; namely, that it should be understood everywhere throughout the whole world. Also Phocylides who was at the same time, speaketh Phocylides.

thereof in these words, Auxi & adarato & ayifus (ii Siù railo. That is to fay:

The Soul of man immortall is, and never weares away With any age or length of time, but liveth fiesh for aye.

And

That the immortality of the Soule

And again:

Deldara anoryopistar daisa Stol restloras, Αυχαί γάρ μίμνουσιν άκηρεοι αν φθιμάνοισιν.

The Remnants which remayn of men unburied in the grave. Become as Gods, and in the Heavens a life most blessed have.

For though their bodies turn to dust, as daily we do see, Their Souls live still for evermore from all corruption free.

And in another place he fays again: Kal raxa d'in paine expicour de cas exbeir.

We hope that we shall come again Out of the earth to light more playn.

And if yeaske him the cause of all this : he will answer you in another verse thus.

Husupa zap erl Sed Reffere Bentoles & endu. Because the Soul, Gods Instrument and Image also is. Which faying he seemeth to have taken out of this verse of Sibili.

Είκωυ ες Ι αιθρωπ Ο έμη λόρου ός θου ειχράσα. In very reason Man should be

The Image and the shape of me.

Of the same opinion also are Orphens, Theognis, Homer, He Pindar in the

lecond fong of fodus, Pindar, and all the Poets of old time; which may answer his Olympiads, both for themselves and their owne Countries, and for the residue Homer in the of their ages. Likewise Pythagoras 2 disciple of Pherecides, held Finerals of opinionthat the Soule is a bodylesse and immortall substance, put his Hiads. into this body as into a Prison for simming. And whereas the fleeting of foules out of one body into another, is fathered upon him;

although the opinion be not directly against the immortality of the foul, yet doe many men thinke that he hath wrong done unto him. And his Disciple Timens of Locres reporteth otherwiseof him. For what punishment were it to a voluptuous man, to have his Soule put into a beaft, that he might become the more volup-

tuous without remorfe of finne? Soothly it is all one as if in punishment of murther or theft, yee would make the murtherer to cut

the throats of his own father and mother, or the thiefe to commit treachery against God. How soever the case stand, he teacheth in his verses, that man is, of heavenly race, and that (as Jamblichus

reporteth) he is set in this world to behold God. And his Disciple Architas fayth, that God breatheth reason and understanding into Putt Aforts. hum. Likewise Philolaus affirmeth that the Divines and Prophets hathbintaught by the Phylophers. &c.

foldtime bear record, that the foule was coupled with the body Heraelitus as forher fins, and buried in the fame as in a grave. Of Epicharmus we he is reported have this faying. If thou beeft a good man in thy heart; death can doe by Philo.

have this taying. I show foule shall live happily in keaven, & c. Also of he is reported Heraclides we have this faying. We live the death of them (that is to by Clement of ty of the bleffed) his meaning is that we be not buried with our bo- Alexandria.

dies, and we dre their life, that is to say, we be still after this bodie of oursis dead. Of the like opinion are Thales, Anaxagoras, and Dio-Thales, Anaunes concerning this point; yea and fo is Zeno too, how beit that xagoras, Dioge-

hethought the foule to be begotten of man, wherein he wascontra- nes and zeno. y to himselfe. To be short, scarcely were there any to be found among the men of old time, fave onely Democritus and Epicurus, that Epicurus.

held the contrary way; whom the Poet Lucre imitated afterward in his Verses. Yet notwith flanding when Epicurus should

dye, he commanded an Annivertary or Teerminde to be kept in temembrance of him by his Disciples: so greatly delighted he in twinfhadow of immortality, having shaken off the very thing

islesse. And Lucrece (as it is written of him) made his book being Lucretius. mid, at fuch times; as the fits of his madnesse were off him, surelymore mad when hee thought himfelfe wifeft, than when the fits of his phrenfic were strongest upon him. Whosoever readeth the

goodly discourses of Socrates upon his drinking of poyson, as they Socrates, Phito be reported by Plato and Xenophon himselfe; cannot doubt of and Xenophon. hisopinion in this case. For he not onely believed it himself, but also persuaded many men to it with lively reasons, yea and by his own denh much more then by all his life. And so yee see webe come un-

to Plate and Aristotle, with consent of all the wife men of old time, ungainfaid of any, faving of a two or three malapart wretchs, whom the ungraciousnesse of our dayes would esteem but as dunken fots and disards. Certesse Plato (who might peradven. Plato in his we have heard speake of the Books of Moses) doth in his Ti- Timeus.

man bring in God giving commandement to the under-gods whom he created, that they should make man both of mortall and of immortall substances. Wherein it may be that he alluded to this laying in Genefis, Let us make man after our own image and likenesse. In which case the Jews say that GOD directed his

speech to his Augels; but our Divines say he spake to himselse. But anon after, both in the same book, and immany other places, Plate (as it were commming to himselfe again,) teacheth that GOD

Sittll.

Timeus, and in his third Booke of a Commonweal.

Plate in his matter of State, in his in the tenth Book of his

Plato in his fifth Book of Laws.

Gon created Man by himselfe, yea, and even his Liverand his Brain and all his Sences; that is to fay, the Soule of him, not onely endued with reason and understanding, but also with sence and ability of growing and increasing; and also the instruments whereby the fame doe worke. Moreover, he maketh fuch a manifelt difference betweene the Soule and the Body; as that he matcheth them not together as matter and forme, as Aristotle doth: but as a Pilot and a Ship, a Common-weale and a Magistrate, an Image and him that be weth it upon him. What greater thing can there be than to be like God? Now (fayth Plato in his Phadon) Phadon, in his The Soul of Man is very like the Godhead; Immortall, Reasonable, Uniforme, Undissoluble, and evermore of one sort, which are conditi-Alcibiades, and ons (fayth he, in his matters of State) that cannot agree but to things most divine. And therefore at his departing out of the World, hee willed his Soulto reinru home too her kinred and to her first originall. Commonweal that is to wit, (as he himself fayth there) to the wife and Immortall Godhend the Fountain of all goodnes, as called home from banishment into her own native Country. Hee termeth it ordinarily fur will sit, that is to fay, of Kynunto God, and consequently asy as a dard-Tois operupou, that is to say, Everlasting, and of one self-same name with the immortall ones, a Heavenly Plant and not a Earthly, rooted in & Heaven not in Earth, begotten from above and not heer beneath, and finally fuch as cannot dye heer for as much as it lively still in another place. To be short, seeing (fayth he)that it comprehendeth the things that are Divine and Immortall, that is to wil, the Godhead, and the things that are unchangeable and uncorruptible, as truth is: it cannot be accounted to be of any other nature than they. The same opinion doth Plut archalso attribute unto him, which appeareth almost in every lease of his Writings. As touching the ancienter fort of Platonifts, they agree all with one according the Immortality of the Soul, faying that some of them derive it from God, and some from the Soule of the World, some make but the Reason or Mind onely to be Immortall, and some the whole Soule: which disagreement may well be salved, if we say that the Soulall whole together is Immortall in power orability, though the execution and performance of the actions which are to be done by the body, be forgone with the instruments or members of the body.

The difagreement concerning this point among fuch as a man may vouchfafe to call by the name of Phylosophers, seemeth to have

hath bin taught by the Phylosophers. &c. begun at Aristotle, howbest that his Disciples count it a commendation to him, that he hath given occasion to doubt of his opinion in that behalfe: For it is certain that his new found Dectrine of the eternity or everlafting nesse of the world, hath distroubled his brain in many other things, as commonly it falleth out, that one error breedeth many other. Because nature (sayth he) could Aristott in his ut make every man particularly to continue for ever by second book of

limselfe, therefore shee continueth him in the kinde by matching living things. male and female together. This is spoken either grosely or doubtfully. But whereas he fayth that if the minde have any inworking of it own without any help of the Sences or of the body it may also continue of it selfe, concluding thereupon, that then imay also be leparated from the body, as an immortall thing from athing that is transitory and mortall: It followeth consequently allo, that the foule may have continuance of it felfe, as whereof heuttereth thele words, namely, That the foule commeth from Ariffotlein the without, and not of the feed of man, as the body doth, and that the third book of Soule is the onely part in us that is Divine, Now, to bee Divine the Soule. and to be Humane, to be of seed and to be from without, that is to ly from GOD; are things flat contrary, whereof the one fort is which to corruption, and theother not. In the tenth book of his Aristotle in his Moralls he acknowledgeth two forts of life in man; the one as in 10. book of respect that he is composed of body and soule, the other as in respectof minde onely, the one occupied in the powers which are calledhumane and bodily, which is also accompanied with a felicity inthislife, and the other occupied in the vertues of the minde, which is accompanied also with a felicity in another life, This which confifteth in contemplation, is better than the other; and the felicity thereto belonging, is peculiarly described by him in his books of Heaven above Time, as which confifteth in the franke and free working of the minde, and in beholding the foverain God. Andingood footh, fulwell doth Michael of Ephefus upon this Michael of Efaying of his conclude, that the foule is immortall; and fo must phesius upon allhis moralls allo needs doe, confidering that to live well, whether Ariffotles Moitbeto a mans selfe or towards other men, were else a vain thing, ralls. and to no purpose, but to vex our mindes in this life. In his books

of the foule, hee not onely separateth the body from the soule,

but also putteth a difference betwixt the soule it selfe and the mind,

hath bin taught by the Phylosophers, &c.

The Latines (as I have fayd before) fell to Philosophic some- The opinion what later then the Greeks. And as touching their common opi- of the Latine nion, the exercises of superstition that were among them, the man- Writers.

ner of speeches which we marke in their Histories, their contempt of death, and their hope of another life; can give ne sufficient warmuthereof, Cicero speaketh unto us in these words. The originall four foules and mindes, cannot be found in this low earth, for there cicero inhis

four joures and minues, cannot be journa in this tow earth, joi there first book of unot any mixture in them, or any compounding that may seeme to be his Tusculance bred or made of the earth. Neither is there any moisture, any min- Questions, and dinesses any fiery matter in them. For no such thing could have in it in his book of the power of memory, understanding, and conceit, to be are in minde Comfort. things past to foresee things to come, and to consider things pre-

lent, which are matters altogether divine. And his conclusion is, that therefore they bee derived from the minde of God, that is to lay, not bred or begotten of man, but created of God: not bodi-

ly, but unbodily; whereupon it followeth that the foule cannot becorrupted by these transitory things. The same Cicero in another cicero in his place fayth that between God and manthere is a kinred of reason, second book of uthere is between man and man a kinred of bloud. That the the nature of fellowship between man and man commeth of the mortall body, the Gods; and butthe fellowship between God and man, commeth of God himselfe, in his first who created the foule in us. By reason whereof (fayth he) we may lay we have aly ance with the heavenly fort, as folke that are discenadofthe same race and root, whereof that wee may ever more bee mindfull, we must looke up to heaven as to the place of our birth, whethe we must one day returne. And therefore yet once again he con-

therefore doth Simplicius gather thereof, the immortality of the dudeth thus of himselfe. Thinke not (fayth he) that thou thy felfe In Scipio's foule. For it dependeth upon this separation, and upon continuance at mortall, it is but thy body that is fo. For thou are not that which dreame. of being of itselfe. Besides this he sayth also, that hunting of beasts this cumard shape pretendeth to be, the minde of man is the man inis granted to man by the law of nature, because that thereby man deede, and not this lump mbich may be pointed at with ones finchallengeth nothing but that which naturally is his own. But what ger. Assure thy selfe therefore that thou art a God; For needs tight I prayyou, if there be no more in himselfe than inthem? And must that be a God, which liveth, perceiveth, remembreth, forewhat is there more in hun than in them; if they have a foule equal such, and finally raineth in thy body as the great God the maker of unto his? Hercunto make all his commendations of godlinesse, of Allthings doth in the univerfall world. For as the eternal God ru-Religion, of bleffednesse, and of contemplation. Forto what end leth and moveth this transitory world, so doth the immortall spirit of

serve all these, which doe but cumber us here below? Therefore our foule move and rule our frail body. Hereunto confent all the furely it is to be concluded, that as he spake doubtfully in some one writers of his time, as Ovid, Virgill and others, whose verses are place, so he both termed and also taught to speake better in many meyery mans remembrance. other places, as appeareth by his Disciple Theophrastus, who spea-

dus Q , Deois termining the foule the imvorking of the body, and of the bodily in] ouyorisur . Aruments, and the minde that reasonable substance which it in us, Bropinisur @, Whereof the doings have no fellowship with the doings of the boxuplerde aut dy, and whereof the soule is (as Plato fayth) but the garment. This

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Arepzeia.

Soule.

That the immortality of the Soule

mingled with it, it is of such substance as cannot be hurt or wrought

upon, it hash being and continuance actually and of it selfe, and even

when it is separated from the body, then is it immortall and everla-

sting. To be short, it hath not any thing like unto the body. For it is not

any of all those things which have being afore it understand them.

And therefore which of all bodily things can it be? And in another

place he fayth thus: As concerning the minde, and the contempla-

tive power, it is not yet sufficiently apparant what it is, Ne-

verthelesse, it seemeth to be another kinde of soule, and it is

that onely which can be separated from the corruptible, as the

which is Ayeverlasting. To bee short, when as hee putteth

this question, whether a Naturall Philosopher is to dispute of

all manner of Soules, or but onely of that Soule which is immor-

tall: it followeth that hee granteth that there is fuch a one.

And again, when as hee maketh this argument, Looke what

God is everlastingly, that are we in possibility, according to our

measure; but hee is everlastingly separated from bodily things,

therefore the time will come that we shall be so too. He ctakethit

that there is an image of God in us, yea even of the Divine na-

ture which hath continuance of it felfe. Very well and rightly

keth yet more evidently thereof than he.

vis, deadle, minde (fayth he) may be severed from the body, it is not in any wife

There

Ovidin his firft book of Metamorpho-

The ewanted yet the wight that (hould all other wights exceed. In lofty reach of stately minde, who like a Lord indeed Should over all the res' due reign, Then shortly came forth man Whom either he that made the World, and all things else began. Created out of feed divine, or elfethe earth yet young And lately parted from the Skie, the feede thereof uncloone Reteyred still in fruitfull wombe: which Japets sonne did sake And tempering it with water pure, a wight thereof did make. Which should resemble even the Gods which soverein state doe hold And where all other things the ground with groveling ere behold: He gave to man a stately look and full of Majesty. Commanding him with stedfast looke, to face the starry skie,

Seneca writing to Gallio and to Lucillus.

Here a man might bring in almost all Seneraes writings, but I will content my selfe with a few sayings of his. Our Souler (fayth he) are a part of Gods Spirit, and sparkes of holythings shineing upon the earth. They come from another place then this low one Whereas they seeme to be conversant in the bodie, yet is the bester part of them in heaven, alway neere unto him which fent them bother. And how is it possible that they should be from beneath, or f om any where elfe than from above, seeing they overpasse all these lower things as nothing, and hold scorn of all that ever we can hope or feare? Thus ye fee how he reacheth shar our fouls come into our bodies from above. But whether go they againe, when they Somea concer- depart hence: Let us here him what he fayes of the Lady Martian

nesse of this life. In his

comfort

ning the Lady Sonne that was dead. He is now everlasting (layth he) and in the Martines Son, best state, bereft of this earthly bag gage which was none of his, and and the flore- fer free to himfelfe. For thefe bones, thefe finewes, this coate of thin; this face, and these serviceable hands, are but festers and prisons of Questions and the foule, By them the foule is overwhelmed beaten downe, and chafed in his book of away. It hath not a greater battell, than with that masso of sligh. For fear of being torn in peeces, it laboureth to return from whence it came, where it halb readie for it an happie and everlasting rest. And again : This Coule cannot be made an Outlaw : for it is a kintothe Gods, equality the whole world, and to all time; and the thought or conceit thereof goeth about the whole Heaven, extending it felfe from the beginning of all time to the uttermost point of that which is

hathbintaught by the Phylophers, &c. usime. The wretched course being the Inyle and fetters of the soule. utoffed to and fro. Upon that are torments, murthers, and difeafes excuted. As for the foule, it is holy and everlasting, and cannot be landbandon. When it is out of this body, it is at libertie and fet free fim all bondage, and isconversant in that beautifull place (wherehever is be) which receive th mens foules into the bleffed rest thereof Bloone as they be delivered from hence. To be short, he secuneth to mickevery nere to the riling againe of the dead. For in a certain Epifile to Lucillus, his words are thefe. Death, whereof we be for nuch afraid , doth not bereve us of life , but only discontiner it for a time; and a day will come that shall bring ustolight againe. This . my fuffice to give us knowledge of the opinion of that great perfinet in whom we fee that the more he grew in age, the never he ame still to the truebirth. For in his latest bookes he treateth dwaies both more afforedly and more evidently thereof.

. Allothe faying of Phavorinus is notable. There is nothing great Phavorinus menth, (fayth he) but Man; and nothing great in Man, but his wheifthoumount up thether, thou mounteft above Heaven. And if the forpe downe agains to the bodie, and compare it with the Heaven; it is leffe than a Fly, or rather a thing of nothing. At one word, this is as much to fay, as that in this clod of clay, there dwelwha divine and uncorruptible nature : for how could it els bee grater than the, whole world?

Astouching the Nations of old time, we reade of them all, that The common theyhad certain Religions and divine Services, foas they belee- opinion of all udthat there is a Hell, and certain fieldes which they call the E- Nations, Manfields, as we fee in the Poets Pindarus, Diphilies, Sophodit Euripides and others. The more superstitious that they were, Porphyrius, in the more fufficiently doe they witheffe unto its what was in their his 4 book of Concience. For true Religion and Superflition have both one

gound, namely the foule of man; and there could be no Religion Which with mall, if the foule lived not when it is gone hence. We read of their own he Indians, that they burned themselves aforothey came to ex - hands made tene oldage, terming it the letting of men loofe, and the freeing of the fire coburn. beloule from the bodle : and the fooner that a man did it , the mi- their bodies for was he efteemed. Which custome is observed still at this day live the kind. among the people that dwell by the River Niger otherwise called led flame hepeople of Senega in Affricke , who offer themselves willingly that thould wheburyed quieke with their Masters. All the demonfrations of confinne their Logicke skin.

That the immortality of the Soule Logicke and Mathematicke (fayth Zeno) have not so much force to prove the immortalitie of the foule, as this only doing of theirs hath. Also great Alexander having taken prisoners ten of their Philosophers, (whom they call Gimnosophists) asked of one of them to try their wisedome, whether there were moe men alive or dead. The Philosopher answered, that there were more alive: Beeaufe (faydhe) there are none dead. Ye may well think they gave a dry mocke to all the arguments of Aristotle and Callisthems. which with all their Philosophie had taught their scholer Alexaider so evill. Of the Thracians, we reade that they so rowed at the brith of men and reiogeed at the death of them, yea even of their owne childen. And that was because they thought that which we

call death, not to be a death in deede, but rather a very happin birth And there be the people whom Henodorus reporteth to have been called the Neverdying Getes, and whom the Greekes called the Gobeleizie, that Neverdying Getes or Thractans. Who were of opinion that at is to fay, Regis their departing out of this world, they went to Zamolivi or Ges

fter or giver of heleixie , that is to fay (after the interpretation of the Gerifh or Ge ease and rest. tish tongue) to him that gave them health, saluation or welfare, and gathered them together. The like is fayd of the Galles, chiefly of the inhabiters about Marfilles and of their Druydes; of the Hetruscians and their Bishops; and of the Seythians and their Sages; of whom all the learning and wifedome was grounded upon this poynt. For looke how men did spread abroad, so also did this

doctrine, which is so deeply printed in man, that he caunot buttant it continually with him. Which thing is to be seene yetmore in that which we read concerning the heaters of Hegeliai the G. renian, who dyed willingly after they had heard him discourse of the state of mens soules after this life; and likewise concerning Cleombroiss the Ambracion, who flew himselfe when her had

read a certain treatife of the immortalitie of the foule. For had

it not been a doctrine most evident to mans wit, they would never have bin caried fo farre by it, as to the hurting of their bodies. And if among so many people, there be perchance some fewe wretched caytifes, that have borne themselves on hand the contrarie; which thing nevertheleffe they could never yet fully perfuade themselves

to be out of all doubt or question : surely we may believe that they had very much adoc and were utterly beforted like Drunkards, 2 fore they could come to that poynt : for as we may well fay of them

hathbintaught by the Phylophers, &c. B Hirrocle the Pythagorift layd : namely, That the wicked would Heroclesinhis ha have their foult to be immertall, to the intent they might not bee 10. Chap. unished for their faults. But yet that they prevent the sentence of their Judge, by condemning themselves unto death afore hand. But if they willnelther heare God, nor the whole world, nor themselves: let them at least wife hearken to the Devill as well as they doe in other

things; who (as faith Plutark) made this answer to Coran of Nanus Plutarke in his and others in these verses.

Itwere a great wickednesse for thee to say The Soule to be mortall or for to decay. Andunto Polytes he answered thus

Aslong as the Soule to the body is tyde. Though loth yet all forowes it needes must abyde. But when fro the body Death doth it remove. Toheaven by and by then it flyes up above.

And there ever youthfull in bliffe it doth rest, As God by his wifedome hath fet for the best.

Not that any faying of the Devills owne is to be alledged in witnesse of the truth; furtherfoorth thanto shew that hee speakes it by compulsion of Gods mightie power, as wicked men divers times doe when they be upon the Racke. Now we become to the time or nere to the time that the heavenly doctrine of Jesus Christ wasspredover the whole world, unto which time I have proved

the continual fuccession of that doctrine, which could not but be unseparably joyned with the succession of men. But from this time The opinion unseparably joyned with the juccetion or men. But from this time of the later forth it came fo to light among all Nations & all persons; that Saint Philosophers. Austinaster a short tryumphing over ungodlinesse, cryeth out in di-

vers places, faying: Who is now fo very a foole or fo wicked, as to doubt still of the immortalitie of the Soule? Epitterns a Stoikphilosopher, who washad in very great reputation among all the men of his time, is full of goodly fayings to the fame purpole. May we not be ashamed (sayth he) to leade an unhonest Epistetus.

life, and to suffer our selves to be vanquished by advertite? we datoaaouabe alved unto God, we came from thence, and we have leave bei. to returne thether from whonce we came. One while, as in respect of the soule, he termeth man the ofspring of GOD, or as it were a branch of the Godhead; and another while he calleth him adivine Impe or a spark of God: by all which words (howheir that they be fomewhat unproper) (for what words can a man finde to

flow punifiing of the wicked.

Simplicius.

Plotinus. Plotin. lib. 1. Ancad 4. concerning the being of the

of mans foule. And whereas the Philosopher Simplicius hath so diligently commented upon his bookes, it doth sufficiently anfwer for his opinion in that cale, without expressing his words here, Plorinus the excellenteft of all the Platonifts, hath made nine treatifes expressely concerning the trature of the soule, besides the things which he hath written dispersedly heere and there in other places. His chiefe conclusions are thefe. That mens soule pro-Soule, & lib. 2 ceede not of their bodies, nor of the feede of the Parent, but come cap. 1. 5 lib.3. from above, and are as ye would fay grafted into our bodies by the cap. 18,19,20, hand of God: That the foule is partly tyed to the body and to the eap. 11, and the instruments thereof, and partly franke, free, workfull, and comming seventh book of it selfe; and yet notwithstanding that it is neither a body northe throughout. harmonic of the body, but (if we confider the life and operation which it giveth to the body) it is after a fortthe perfection for rather the perfector of the body; & if we have an eye to the understanding whereby it guydeth the movings and doings of the body; it is as a Governour of the body: That the further it is withdrawne from the Sences, the better it discourseth of things; insemuch that when it is utterly separated from them, it understandeth things without discoursing, reasoning or debating, yea even in a moment; because this debating is but a certain lightening or brightnesse of the minde, which now taketh advisement in matter whereof it doubteth, & it doubteth wherefoever the body yeeldeth any impedements unto it; but it shall neither doubt nor, seek advisementary more when it is once out of the body, but shall conceive the truth without wavering: That the soule in the body is not properly there as in a place, or as in a ground, because it is not contained or comprehended therein, and may also be separated from it ; but rather if a man had eyes to fee it withall, he should see that the bodie is in the soule, as an accessary is in a principall, or as a thing contained in a container, or a sheding or liquid thing in a thing that is not liquid, because the Soule imbraceth the body, and quickneth it, and moveth it equally and alike in all parts. That every abilitie thereof is in every part of the bodie, as much in one partas in another, as a wholefoule in every part; notwithstanding that every severall abilitie thereof seeme to be severally in some particular member or part, because the instruments thereof are there; as the sensitive abilitieseemeth to rest in the head, the irefull intheheat,

hath bin taught by the Phylosophers, &c. and the quickning in the liver, because the finews, heart-fitings, and veins come from those parts : Whereas the reasonable power is not in any part, faving so far forthas it worketh and hath his operation there, neither hath it any need of place or inflrument for the executing of it felfe. And to be short, that the soule is a life by it selfe, a life all in one, unpartable, which causeth to grow, and groweth not it selfe; which goeth through the bodie, and yet is not contained of the body; which uniteth the fences, and is not divided by the Sences, and therefore that it is a bodileffe substance, which carnot be touched, neither from within nor from without, having no need of the body either ontwardly or inwardly, and con-

fequently is immortall, divine, yea and almost a very God : Which things he proveth by many reasons, which were too long to be theatfedhere. Year he proceedeth fo far as to fay, that they which Plotinus in his are passed into another world, have their memory still; notwith- Booke of the flanding that to forme mens feeling, it goe away with the fences Sences, and of Memory. En. asthe treasury of the sences. Howbeit he affirmeth it to be the more 4.86.2. and in excellent kinde of memory, nor that which calleth things again to his Booke of minde as already past, but that which holdeth and beholdeth them donbts confill as always present. Of which two forts this latter he calleth cerning the Mindfulneste, and the other he calleth Remembrance. I will add Soul, cap. 26,27

ctine. The foule (tayth he) bath had company with the Gods, and

is immortall, and forwould we say of it (as Placo affirmeth) if we saw

is faire and cleere. But for as much as we see it commonly troubled,

wethink it not to be either divine or immortall, howbeit that he which will discerne the nature of a thing perfectly, must consider it in the ve-

ryown substance or being, utterly unmingled with any other thing. Formhatsoever else is added unto it, doth linder the perfett discer-

ning of the same. Therefore let everyman behold himselfe naked,

but onely one fentence more of his for a full prefident of his Do-

without any thing fave himselfe, so as he look upon nothing else than his bare foule: and furely when he hath viewed himselfe in his own nature, meerly as inrespect of his minde, he shall believe himselfe to beimmortall. For he shall see that his minde aymeth not properly at the sensible and mortallthings, but that by a certain everlasting power, it taketh kold of the things that are everlassing, and of whatseever is possible to be conceived in understanding insomuch that even it selfe becommeth after a sort a very world of understanding andlight. This is against those which pretend a weaknesse of

That the immortality of the Soule the foule, by reason of the inconveniencies which it indureth very often in the body.

Of the same opinion are Numenius, Jamblichus, Porphirius

and Proclus, notwithstanding that now and then they passetheir bounds, suffering their wits to run ryot. For in their Philosophie they had none other rule, than onely the drift of their own reafon. It was commonly thought that Alexander of Aphrodise believed not the immortality of the foule, because hee defined it to be the forme of the body, proceeding of the mixture & temperature of the Elements. Surely those words of his docus to understand, either that he meant to define but the tensitive life onely (as many others do) and not the reasonable soule, or else that he varieth from himselse in other places. And in very deed he sayth immediately afterward, that he speaketh of the things which are subject togeneration and corruption. But speaking of the soule he saythit is feparable, unmateriall, unmixed, and voyd of passions, unlesse, perchance we may thinke as formedoe, that by this foule hee mean but onely God, and not also the soule that is in us; for the which thing hee is sharply rebuked by Themistims, who notwithstanding spake never a whit better thereof himselfe. Howsoever he deale elsewhere these words of his following are without any doubtful-

blemes.

Alexander of

Aphrodisc in

his Books of

the Soul.

In his fecond nesse at all. That the Soule (layth he) which is in us, comment Book of Pro- from without, and is uncorruptible. I sayuncorruptible because the nature thereof is such, and it is the very same that Atistotle affirmeth to come from without. And in his second Booke of Problems, fearthing the cause why the abilities of the soule are oftentimes impeached: If a mans brain be buck (layth he) the reasonable soule doth not well execute the actions that dependthereon. But yet for allthat, It abideth still in it selfe, unchangeable of nature, ability, and power, through the immortality thereof. And if it recover a found instrument, it putteth her abilities in execution as well as it did afore. But I will reason more at large hereaster against the opinion that is surhered upon him.

Galen in his Book of the Manners of the Soul.

What shall we say of Galen, (who fathereth the causes of all things as much as he can, upon the Elements, and the mixture and agreeable concord of them) if after his dilputing against his own foule, hee bee constrained to yield that it is immortall? Surely in his book concerning the manners of the foule, he doth the worlt

hath bin taught by the Phylosophers, ecc. that he can against Plato: and in another place he doubteth whether it be immortall, and whether it have continuance of it selfe or 10. Yet notwithstanding in his book of the doctrine of Hippornin and Plato, It mist needs be granted (fayth he) that the In his Book Sule is either a sheere body, and of the nature of the skie, (sas of the doctrine the Stoicks and Aristotle himselfe, are inforced to confesse) or else of Hippocrates abodilesse substance, whereof the body is, as it were, the Cha- and Plato. tion, and whereby it hath fellewship with other bodies. And In his Book of is appeareth that he inclineth to this latter part. For he maketh Conceptions A the vitall spirit to be the excellentest of all bodily things, and yet he granteth the soule to be a far more excellent thing than that. What shall wethen doe? Let us wey his words set down in his book of the conception of a childe in the mothers wombe. The Soule of man (fayth hee) is an influence of the univerfall Soule that discendeth from the heavenly Region, a substance that is capable of knowledge, which aspireth always to one substance like unto it felfe, which leaveth all thefe lower things to fecke the things that are above, which is partaken of the heavenly Gods had, and which by mounting up to the beholding of things that are above the heavens, putting it selfe into the presence of himthat ruleth all things. Were it reason then that such a substance comming from elsewhere than of the body, and mounting so far ; bovethe body, should in the end die with the body, because it with Theuniverfall theservice of the body?

Now hereunto I could adde infinite other fayings of the ancient Authors both Greeke and Latine Philosophers, Poets, and Orators from age to age, wherein they treat of the judgement to come, of the reward of good men, of the punishment of evill men, of Paradife and of Hell, which are appendants to the immortality of the Soule: but as now I will but put the reader in minde of them by the way, referving them to their peculiar places. To be flort, let us run at this day from East to West, and from North to In the Alco-South, I fay not among the Turks, Arabians or Persians; (for ran, Azo.25. their Alcoran teacheth them that mans foule was litreatherlance and 42 thank him of God, and confequently that it is uncorruptible) but event It appeared mong the most barbarous, ignorant, & beaftly people of the World, by the stories Imeane the very Caribies and Canniballs, and we shall finde this of the East & beliefe received and imbraced of them all. Which giveth us to un- West Indies. deritand that it is not a doctrine invented by speculations of some Phi-Pala. Нз

That the immortality of the Soule Philosophers, conveyed from Countrey to Countrey by their Disciples, periwaded by likelyhoods of reasons, or (to be short) entered into mans wit by his ears : but a mative knowledge, which every man finderb and readeth in himfelfe which he carryetheverywhere about with himselfe, and which is as easie to be perswaded unto all fuch as view themselves in themselves, as it is easie to perswades

man that never faw his own face, to believe that he hath a face? he causing him to behold himselfe in a glasse. " " There remain yet two opinions to bee conflitted. The one is Against Aver-Thoes.

the opinion of Aver, hoes, and the other is the opinion of Alexand der of Aphrodise, who affirme themselves to hold both of Aristothe: namely in that they uphold that there is but one universall reasonable soule or mind, which workerh all our discourses inushowbeit diverfly inevery feverall person. And this thing (if wee

believe Aventhoes) is done according to the diversity of the Phan-

tafies or imaginations wherewith the minde is ferved as with inframents. But if we believe Alexander, it is done according to der bear these the diversities of the capable minde, as they terme it, that is to say, terms & their of the ability or capability that is in men to understand things by fignifications in Mind, for all receiving the imprellion of the universall minde that workerh into

the discourse every of them which in respect thereof is called of them the workhere ensuing. er. Southly these opinions are such as may be disproved in one word. For this onely one minde, whether in possibility or inaction, could not have received or imprinted in every man one felfefame common beliefe and conceit of the immortality of the Soule, in to great diversity of imaginations, and in so many Nations, as we see doe believe it, considering that the very same conceitis directly repugnant against it. Nay, it may well be sayd that Averrhoes and Alexander had very divers conceits and imaginations one from another, and very contrary to all other mens, feeing they had so diverse and contrary opinions imprinted either in their mind or in their imagination. Howbeit for as much as there may be some, that will make a doubt of it; let us examine them severally yet more

advisedly. First, Averrhoes will needs bear Aristotle on hand, Averrhoes upthat Aristotle is of that opinion. Let us see how this surmile of on Aristotles third Book of his can agree with the propositions which Aristotle hath left us. the Soul, Aristotle telleth us that the soule is knir to the body astheforme or shape to the matter; that the soule hath three chiefe powers, namely, of life, of lente, and of understanding; and that the under-Handing

as a five square containeth both a foresquare and a Triangle. Whereuponit followeth, that it any one of the three powers of the Ariffolle in his follebe joyned to the body as a forme to the matter; all the three fecond Book bejoyned foto, as which are all in one foule as in their root. Now of the Soul. Avarhoes neither can not will deny that the powers of growing and of perceiving by the fences are joyned after that manner to the body; and therefore it followeth that the understanding power is to joined alfo, and confequently that according to Ariffaile, as every Arifforle in his boly hath his forme, fo every body hath his foule. The fame do first Book of rifule findeth fault with the former Philosophers for holding of the Soul. pinion that a foule might paffe out of one man into another : becaule (fayth he) that every certain foule must needs be appor-

uoned and appointed to some one certain body. Now looke by

what foule a man liveth, by the fame foule doth he understand a for it is but one foule indewed with three divers abilities, as hee himselfe teacheth openly. One understanding or minde therefore, mult (according to Aristotle) workebatin one severall body, and notinmany bodies. Also according to Aristotle, a manand a beast agreein this, that both of them have one sensitive power, and one defame imagination of things perceived by the sences, and that they differ in this, that man hath yet further aminde and reasonabore the beaft, which thing the beaft hath not. Now if this underflanding or minde be without the man, as the funne is without the chamber, that it shineth into and inlighteneth, then cannot he becalled reasonable, or indowed with understanding, neither doth heconsequently differ from a beaft. For the difference muft be in naure, and not in accident. And so should it insue that Aristolles. forefaid definition of a man is falle, as if he fhould define a chamber by the shiring of the same into it : Or say that a dog differeth not from a man in kinde; yea, and that beafts are capable of underflanding, for as much as they have imagination ready aforchand to eccive the influence thereof as well as we. But Aristole is always one in his defining both of beaft and of man; and Averrhoes also holdeth himselfe to it, without doubting thereof at all. This conclufiontherefore cannot in any wife be upheld by fuch grounds. Again, if there be not in every feverall man a feverall minde, but onely one universall minde common to all men, which becom-

meth divers by the onely diversity of our imaginations: Then in respect:

That the immortality of the Soule respect that we have fundry imaginations, we shall by fundry living wights; and in respect that we have all but one minde, we shall be all but one man. For man is not man in respect of the fensitive power, but in respect of the reasonable part which is the minde. But Aristotle granteth that we be not onely divers living wights, but also diversmen. And therefore he must needs mean also, that wee have not onely divers imaginations, but also divers minds. Now befides many other reasons that might be aleadged, yee might add this also. That otherwise Aristotles Moralls and his discourse concerning Justice, Freewill, the Immortality of the foule, the happie bliffe, the reward of the good, and the pains of the wicked were utterly fruitlesse and to no purpose : For as our fancies of imaginations did come and goe, so would all those things come and goelikewise, and so should they have no continuance of themselves, but onely be as a shadow and vain phantafied But let Aristotle at lone, (for he hath wrong) and let us come to the matter it felfe. The Philosophers doe ordinarily make a double minde; the one which they call possible or impossible, which is capable and of biling to understand things; and this they liken to a smooth table; theo. ther they call morking or morkefull, which bringeth the ability into act, whereas notwithstanding they be not two mindes, but twoseverall abilities of onely one minde. Now, as for this ability or polsibility of understanding, we affirme it to be in the soule of every man. Contrariwise, Averrhoes affirmed onely one universall capable minde to be shed abroad every where throughout all men, & that the same is diverfly perfected and brought into act in every severall man, according to the diversity of the imaginations which the man conceiveth, even by the help or influence of the saidmiverfall workfull minde, which he favth is also a substance severed, from man, and (in respect of the understanding in possibility) is as the funne is to the light of our eyes, and the understanding in polfibility is to the imaginations as the fight is unto colours. Now, I demand first of all, whether these universall minds of his, be substances created or uncreated. If they be created, where becommeth then his conclusion, That, the world is without beginning, and without ending, feeing that he will have them to be continued everlassingly in all men that have been, are, or shall be? If they bee

increated, how can to excellent substances be made subject to our fond in aginations, to yield influence, into them at their plealmes!

Or rather how happeneth it that they correct them not? How happeneth it that they leave them in fuch errors, year ven in the knowadgeofthemselves, seeing that by the erring of the imaginations, thevery understanding and reason themselves must also needs be so often beguiled? Again, as concerning these substances, which estend into so many places; are they Bodies or Spirits? How can sley be bodies, feeing they be in infinite places at one instant, and doeinsinite things, yea, and flat contraries? And if they be Spirits, dothit not follow the rupon, that they be wholy in all men & wholy in every man; that is to fay, that every man, hath them wholy to limfelfe? And therefore that if they be deceived by the fantasie of my one man, they be confequently deceived in all men? And whereofcomes it then, that one man overcommeth his imaginations, and another mannot? Or that one manresisteth them, and another liftereth himselfe to be carried away by them? Moreover, who can denythat a man willeth things, whereof he hath understanding; andlikewise that he willeth some things which he understandeth not; and that he understandeth some things which he willeth not? And alfo that he willeth things even contrary to his appetites, and concludeth oftentimes contrary to his imaginations, as commeth topasse in dreams and in looking-glasses; which thing the brute heasts doe not ? When a man willeth contrary to his appetites, willeth he not contrary to his sences, yea, and contrary to his imeginations too : for what els is fantafie or imagination, than the rebounding backe of the fences : And if this workfull understanding be the only worker in his possible understanding by meane of imasination; how commeth it to passe that a man willeth contrary to his imagination: Againe, when either in dreaming or in debating, tesson concludeth cleane contrary to that which fancie or imagination offereth; whereof commeth it that a man is contrary to himfe. f., or that the deede is contrary both to that which imprimed it, and to that wherein it is imprinted? Also what els is imagaination (according to the opinion of Averrhoes,) than a certain operation annexed to the bodie, Reaming up from the Hart to the Braine: And on the contrary part who can fay may, but that the Will and Vnderstanding are able to performe their operations without the infruments of the body, seeing that a man doth both will and debate Ariffollein his things that are most repugnant to the body : Yea and that (as A = tench Book of ristotle sayth) those be not actions which passe into the oneward supernaturals

man, but those which abide within & make perfect the inner man

And who can make Will and Vnderstanding to be things depen. determinations against it . Now , if we have nothing in usabove Imagination: then confidering that we doe both will and under stand, it must needes be that this power or abilitie to will and until derstand is shed into us from without. And if it but only one us

niverfally in all men; then feeling that the actions thereofare execut ted without the imagination, without the fences, and without the instruments of the bodie, yea and against them: it followeth that it willeth and understandeth in us whatsoever it liketh and listeth even in despite of all impediments and lets of the bodie; and that as

it is but one, fo it shall will but one teleferative thing, and likewife all so understand but one selfesame thing in all men. For if (as Ariforle confesseth) our imaginations make not our will and reason subject unto them; much lesse doe they make the foresayd universal mind subject to them as Averrhoes pretendeth. But now contrariwife we see therebe as many Willes as men, yea evenin one matter; and that the understandings of men are not onely divers but also contrarie. It followeth then that every particular person

hath in that behalfea particular substance, which willethand understandeth, franke and free from all imaginations when sover it listeth to retyre into it selfe; and not that there is but one universall mind which willeth and understandeth all things in all men. Befides this, by the judgement of Aristotle as I sayd afore, this univerfall mind could not worke will and understanding inus: forto will and understand (fayth he) are operations that passe not into the matter nor into the outward thing, but abide stil in the worker,

Let us yet againe take of that which hath bin layd afore. If the fayd univerfall only one working mind, have wrought from everlatting in the fayd univertall only one capable mind, by the Imaginations of men: then liath the knowledge of all things bin evermore imprinted in the fayd capable mind; for it shall evermore have brought the abilitie into act: And therwithall the working and perfection of the thing that is everlafting, shall have depended upoir a thing that is temporall; which is unpossible. And although Aver-

that is to fay in the mind, as actions and perfections thereof.

hath bin taught by the Phylosophers, &c. angthe faid capable minde which hath been fet aworke fo many

hundred years, by so many imaginations of men, and in so many ding upon linagination, feeing that both waking and fleeping and fairy Nations, could not now meet with any new thing whereall manner of ways els, they dayly utter infinite indgements and dithadnot the knowledge afore. For this capable mind (fayth Awerboes) is a certain spirituall substance, which spreadeth it selfe futhinto all men and into all ages, and the nature of fuch fort of

Whines is to be all in the whole, and all in every part thereof. Forthey be not tyed to any one place, but are wherefoever they worke, and their working is in respect of the whole, and not in refollofany one part, forasmuch as they be undividable. Therefore

ishould follow by his opinion (as I have fayd afore) that the one mirerfall capable minde is and worketh whole & unparted in every man And if it befo, then is that being of it there, not in way of meer billy or possibility onely, but in way of operation and perfect inworking, as a wicked spirit is in a witca, in a Pythonesse or in a

poffested perfor : which spirit (were he possessed of the man as he limfelfe poffeffeth the man, (after which manner Averrhoes affirmuhus to possesse the understanding in possibility, by our imagiminns;) would make the man capable of all that ever the Spirit limelle knoweth or is. Whereupon it will follow, that this undeflanding in possibility, shall everlastingly in all men from their stybirth, actually understand and know allthings that all men

inderstand, as well in the old as the young, and in the ignorant as heskillill; foas wee shall have no more need of sences; nor of magination to understand withall. To beshort, although Averthey, admitteth not the World to be without beginning : yet at lastwife he will not deny, but that by his reckoning they which some into the world at this day, should come far more skilfull then all their predecessors, and the shildren of them more skilfull then their fathers, and the offspring of those children more skilfull

henthole children themselves, and to forth on, because they should fuceed in the knowledge continued throughout all ages. Whereupon it will also infire, that all Sciences hall be equall in all men' that make profession of them, As for example, we will speak here, bir of lome one special Science, as Grammer and Arithmetick, Now if there be any divertity in the skill thereof, that divertity cannot come but of the divertity of the subject or ground wherein the skill is. Now the ground of the skill is the capacity of the minds or understanding (which Averrhess supposeth to be but on-

rhoes supposed not the World to be excelasting : yet not withstan-

10.03

Tient the immortality of the Soule

ly one, common to all men) and not the Imagination, which is but a reflexion or rebounding backe of the Sence. And so forasmuch as there is (by his flying) but one ground in all men; it followeth that the knowledge or skill of this or that Science must needes beet quall and alike in all mentor els that if it be not equall, but doe vary as we see it doth in divers degrees; then the same varying or

third book of the Soule.

diversitie happeneth through the diversitie of the ground where, in the skill is, and consequently that there is one particular under Handing or one peculiar mind in every man, and not one universal mind common to all men. Also it is a generall rule, that the recei-Aristotle in his ver of a thing hath not the thing afore he receive it. For (as Ari. ffotle fayth) that which is to receive a thing, must needes be first ut. terly voyde of the thing which it receiveth. Now afore that our Sence and Imagination had any being at all, this univerfall co. mon mind had received and possessed all things aforehand; and not only received them, but also kept them together. For as Arthuli hunselfe fayth, that manner of mind is the place of all under kindsand fortes of things, and thereto hath no leffe power than the Imagination, to reteine whatfoever the Sences receive. In vainetherefore should that universall mind understand by our Imaginations, confidering that it understandeth by it selfe: in vaine likewise should the Imaginations imprint those things in it, which were imprinted in it to long afore : and in vaine is Aristotles settingdowne of a workfull understanding, which should bring our understanding in abilitic, from possibilitie into action; if the sayd only one univerfall mind or understanding be perfect of it selfestomeverlasting, as it followeth to be upon the opinion of Averbul, Neither is it to fayd, that although the conceivable underkinds of things have been imprinted everlastingly in the layd unlyterall mind; yetnotwithstanding there needed and Imagination for the understanding of them, as there needeth now when foever we will use the things that we have seene or learned afore. For by that rekoning, to learne all manner of Sciences, we needed no more but to bethinke us by imagination, of the things that were already aforchand in the fayd only univerfall one mind, as we doe the things that have bene printed sometime in our memories, and aresomewhat slipped out of our remembrance; and so might we our selves learne all sciences without a teacher, because that in the layduniverfall mind of ours, we should have all the skill that ever any

hath bin taught by the Phylosophers, &c. man had attained to, in like manner as the person that hath once hadthe skill of Arithmetick or Cosmographie throughly settled in his mind, needeth no teacher to teach it him againe, but onely to overturn his owne imagination, and to search his memorie for the finding agains of that which he had layd up there. Now we knowe hat wholoever learneth nothing, knoweth nothig, and that ordinuily he which most studyeth, most learneth: and that all the tofling and turmoyling of a mans owne imagination that can be all hislife long, will never make him to attaine of himselfe to so much asthevery principles of the least science that is. By reason whereof it followeth, That we have not the skill of any science in us, untill we either be taught it or find it out by beating our wits about itand that our imagination serveth not to revive the Sciences inus, but to bring them intous, and to plant them in us, And forasmuch as all the Sciences should be in all men from the beginning, if there were but one universall mind in all men, [which is not fo] it followeth that there is in every particular person a particular and peculiar mind, and not any one universall mind commonto all men. Moreover, our mind attaineth after a fort to the understanding of it selfe: which thing it could not doe in very deede, ifthere were but one univerfall mind common to all men. For too understrinditselse, it must needes worke upon it selfe. But if we beleeve Averrhoes , our mind shall but onely be wrought upon and receive into it from the Imagination, as a Window receivehlight from the Sunne. Againe, the capacity of the universall understanding in possibilitie, could not doe that. For it behoved it to have some other thing besides itselse, to bring it selse into action. Andfurely Imagination could not helpe it , for it doin but offer up the sensible things unto it, and attaineth not so farre as to the things that are to be discerned by drift of reason. Yet notwithstanding we understand that weunderstand, and we reason and judge both of our Imagination, and also of our reasoning and understanding itfelfe. The thing then which doth so enter and pearce into itselfe, is another manner of power than an Imagination, or that an univerfallunderstanding in possibilitie. What is to be sayd to this, that of one selselame Imagination, one selsclame person concludeth now after one fort, and by-and-by after in another fort; and thereoutof draweth both contrarie arguments and contrarie determinations; or that divers person by divers imaginations doe close together in 100



That the immortality of the Soule one will and one minde? Is it possible that this should proceed of

an everlatting substance in one felfe same person, seeing that evertaftingrieffe is not subject to any change of time or place? Or that it should proceed of any one selfesame substance in many men, see, ing that the imaginations of them be so divers one from another?

Against Alexdije.

at least wife if the faid substance work not but by such instruments? As touching the opinion of Alexander of Aphrodise, who up. ander of Aphro holdeth a certain univerfall working mind that imprinteth things in the understanding in possibility, that is to fay, in every mans leverall capacity, and bringeth it forth into action: the most pare of the realons alleaged afore against Avery hoes, will also serve against him. Howbeit for as much as by this workfull minde, he feemeth to mean God himselfe, there is thus much more robe added unto it. That God who is altogether good, and altogether wife. would not imprint in our minde the fond and wicked conceits which we finde there, nor leave so great ignorance and darknelle as we feele there, but would in all men overcome the infection which the body bringeth : and although he inspired not all men alike with his gracious gifts, according to the diversity of their capacities after the manner of a planed Table, yet would henorat leastwife print the World with so many false Portratures and Trains, as every one of us may perceive to be in our felves. Again, were there any fuch inspiration or influence, it should be either continuall or but by times. If continuall or everlasting, wee should without labour and without curning understand all that ever our imagination offereth unto us. And if it be but at times, then should it not lie in us to list or to understand any thing stall, though we would never so fain. For contrariwise, wee have much adoe to understand some things, so as wee must be faintowin them from our ignorance by piecemeale, and there besomeother things, which we understand by and by as soon as they be putunto us, and when we lift our felves, There is then in us a power of Understanding, though very feeble; but yet never the later obedient to our will: which thing cannot be fathered upon God, Alfoif there be but onely one minde working in all men, there shall be but one selfesame understanding in all men, I meanenaturally, notwithstanding that it differ in degrees. For into what place loever the Sunne doth shead his beams, he doth both inlighten it and heat it, how belt diverfly according to the nature and condition of the pla-

hathbin taught by the Phylosophers, eg.c. wand things that receive him, fome more, and fome leffe, fome bighter, and some dimlyer. But howsoever the case stand, his light yieldeth no darknesse, nor his heat any cold. So then if the directities of mens imaginations do cante divertities of effects in the infpiration or influence that floweth into the capacitie of our understanding; furely it must needes be after this manner, namely that one man shall understand one selfcsame thing more, and anoherman leffe; but not in that any man shall take untruth for truth, unightfor right, or one thing for another. Now we feeunto how many errors wee be subject, I mean not in such things as this namely, that one man feeth better a far off, and another better at had; but that one man feeth white and another feeth black (which are things contrary) in one felfelune ground and at one felfelame time. It followeth therefore that divers and fundric mindes doe worke in divers perfons, and not one felfefame minde in all perfons. By force of which reasons and of such others, I say that every man hall finde in hunselse and of himselse, that every man hath apartoular foule by himfelfe, that is to fay, a spiritual substance united whisbody, which in respect of giving life to the body is as the formethoreof, and in respect of giving reason, is as the guide of our actions: That in every man there is a certain Sunbeam of reafor, whereby they conceive things and debate upon them; wherethough it commeth to paffe, that often times they agree both in thereason it selfe which is one, and in the manifest grounds thereof and in whatfoever dependeth evidently upon the fame : Thateretyman hath also a peculiar body by himselfe, and likewise pecubreomplexion, humours, imaginations, education, custome and nade of life : where of it commeth that every mantakes a diverse way, yea, and that one selfesame person swarveth diversly from the unity of reason whereof the path is but one, and the ways to stray fromitare infinite: That this Sunbeam of reason which shineth and sheadesh it selfe from our minde, is properly that understanding which is retraced, The understanding in ability or possibility, which is increased and augmented by all the things which it feeth, hereth, or lighteth upon, like fire, which gathereth increase of freigth by the abundance of the fewell that is put upon it, and becommeth after a fort infinite by spreading it selfe abroad: Also it is the same which otherwise we call the Memory of understanding, muindefull Memory, and it is nothing else but an abundance of Reason, and as it were a hoorder up of the continuallinfluence of the Mind: That the Mind from whence this floweth as from his foring, is properly that which they the fayd Averrhoes and Alex. ander do terme the working or workfull Mind, which is a cerecain power or force that can skill to extend reason from onething roanother, and to proceede from things fenfible to things unlenfible, from things movable to things unmovable, from bodily to spirituall, from effects to causes, and from beginnings to ends by the meane cause. This Mind is in respect of Reason, as cumning is inrespect of an Instrument or toole; and Reason, as in respectof imagination and of the things that are sensible, is as an Instrument or toole in respect of the matter or stuffe that it worker upon: Or to speake more fitly, this Mind is unto Reason, as the mover of a thing is to the thing that is movable, and Realon is to her objects, as the movable thing is to the thing whereunto it is moved! For to reason or debate, is nothing els but to proceed from a thing that is understoode, to a thing that is not understoode, of purpose to understand it : and the understanding thereof is a resting that infeweth upon it as a staying or resting aftermoving: That both of them as well the one as the other, are but onely one felfelamefubstance, & like as a man, both when he moveth, and when he resetth is all one and the same man, or as the power that moveth the sinews is one felfesame still, both when it stirreth them, and when ir holdeth them still, so the reasonable or understanding soulethat is in every man, is but onely one felfefame substance bodileseand immortall, executing his powers partly of it felfe, and partly by our bodies. And seeing that Averrhoes and Alexander, makelo great estimation and account of the effects which are wrought in us, that they be inforced to attribute them to some uncorruptible and everlasting minde; let us take of them, that in very truth the thing which worketh so great wonders in the body, can be neither sence, nor body, nor imagination, but a divine, uncorruptible and immortaliminde, as they themselves say.

But let us learn the thing of more then them, which all wife men teach us, and which every of us can learne of himlelfe; namely that this understanding or minde is not one universall thing as the funne is that shineth into all the windows of a Citie, but rather, a particular substance in every severall man, as a light to lead him in the darknesse of this life; for surely it was no more difficultie to

hath binitaught by the Phylosophers, &c. the everlasting G O D, to create many fundry foules, that every man might have one feverally alone by himselfe, than to have created but onely one foule for all men together. But it was far more for his glory, to be known, praised, and exalted of many squiles. yea and more for our welfare to praise, exalt, and know him, yea, indto live of our felves both in this life, and in the life to come : then if any other univertall spirit, soule or minde whatsoever, should have lived and understood either in us or after us. Now then for this matter let us conclude, both by reason and by antiquity, and by the knowledge that every of us hath of himselfe; That the soule and the body be things divers: that the foule is a spirit and not a body: That this spirit hath in man three abilities or powers, whereof two be exercised by the body, and the third worketh of itselfe without the body : That these three abilities are in the one onely soule as in their root: whereof two doe cease whensoever the body faileth them, and yet notwith standing the soule abideth whole without abatement of any of her powers, as a craftiman continueth amfilman though he want tools to work withall-And finally, that this foule is a substance that continueth of it selfe, and is unmaterial andspirituall, over the which neither death nor corruption can naturally have any power.

And for a conclusion of all that ever I have treated of hitherto in this book, let us maintain, That there is but onely one God, who by his own goodnesse and wildome is the Creator and Goremour of the world & of all that is therein: That in the world he treated Man after his own image as in respect of minde, and afterthe image of his other creatures as in respect of life, tenfe, and moving, mortall fo far forth as he holdeth the likenesse of a creatun, and immortall fo far forth as hee beareth the image of the Creator: That is to wit, in his foule: That he which goeth out of himselfe to see the world, doth forthwith see that there is a God, for his works declare him every where: That hee which will yet fill doubt thereof, needeth but to enter into himfelfe, and he shall meet him there, for he shall finde there a power which he feeth not: That he which believeth there is one God, believeth himselfe to be imwortall; for fuch confideration could not light into a mortall nature: and that he which believeth himself to be immortal, believeth that there is a God, for without the unutterable power of the one God,

That the immortality of the Soule the mortalland immortall could never joyne together: That he which seeth the order of the world, the proportion of man, and the harmonic that is in either of them compounded of so many contraries, cannot doubt that there is a Providence for the name which hath furnished them therewith, cannot be unfurnished theol it selfe; but as it once had a care of them, so can it not shake off the fame care from them. Thus have we three Articles which follow interchangeably one another. Infomuch that he which provethan one of them, doth prove them all three, not with standing that I have treated of every of them feverally by, it felfe. Now let us pray the everlasting God, that we may glorific him in his works in this world and he voutsafe of his mercie ro glorific us one day in the World to come.

AMEN.

Lower Break of the State Belling