AN ABRIDGMENT OF Mr. *LOCKE*'s ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

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Franz Mayer

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TO

To the much Esteemed

Mr. *JOHN LOCKE.*

Honoured Sir,

I Send you this imperfect Draught of your excellent *Essay* concerning *Human Understanding*; which, I must confess, falls as much short of the Perfection, as it does of the Length of the Original. Nevertheless, as I lately intimated to you (and you were pleased to think, that what I proposed in Reference to this Design, would not be wholly lost Labour) I am not without Hopes, that it may in this contracted *Form*, prove in some Measure serviceable to that noble End, which you have so successfully aimed at in it, viz. *The Advancement of real and useful Knowledge.* The Inducement which moved me to think of abridging it, was a Consideration purely extrinsical to the Work itself, and in

Effect no other than this; that it would be better ſuited to the Eaſe and Convenience of ſome Sort of Readers, when reduced into this narrow Compaſs. In Order to this, I thought the *Firſt Book*, which is employed in refuting the common Opinion of *innate Notions* and *Ideas*, might be beſt ſpared in this Abridgment; eſpecially ſince the Reader may be convinced by what he ſhall find here, that ſuch a Suppoſition is at leaſt needleſs, in Regard he may attain to all the Knowledge he has, or finds himſelf capable of, without the Help of any ſuch *innate Ideas*. Beſides this, I have retrenched moſt of the larger Explications; and ſome uſeful Hints, and inſtructive Theories I have wholly omitted; not becauſe they are leſs conſiderable in themſelves, but becauſe they ſeemed not ſo neceſſary to be inſiſted on in an *Abridgment*, it being conſidered as a previous Inſtrument, and preparatory Help to guide and conduct the Mind in its *Search after Truth and Knowledge*, which is ſo effectually accompliſhed in the Original, that it muſt be conſidered as the higheſt of Neglects, in thoſe who omit the fair Opportunity you have given them. The Importance of ſome Chapters has laid me under the Neceſſity of giving them entire, while in others not more is omitted, than the Recapitulation of their

Sub-

Subjects, which from the Influence you had over it, they have apprehended in different Lights. This I hope will prove no Prejudice to the *Essay* itself, since none, I presume, will think it reasonable to form a Judgment of the whole Work from an Abridgment of it; for as far as a Copy is removed from its Original, so far is it distant from Authenticity, since this universally holds good, in what other Light can an Abridgment be esteemed but in that which has been already mentioned, that of preparing the Mind for a Free Conception of the Original. And I persuade myself, that few *Readers* will be content with this *Epitome*, who can conveniently furnish themselves with the *Essay* at large. However, I am apt to think, that this alone will serve to make the Way to Knowledge somewhat more plain and easy; and afford such Helps for the Improvement of Reason, as are perhaps in vain sought after in those Books, which profess to teach the *Art of Reasoning*: But nevertheless, whether you shall think fit to let it come abroad under the Disadvantages that attend it in this *Form*, I must leave you to judge. I shall only add, that I think my own Pains abundantly recompensed by the agreeable as well as instructive Entertainment, which this nearer View and closer Inspection into your *Essay* afforded

afforded me: And I am not a little pleased, that it has given me this Opportunity of expressing the just Value and Esteem I have for it, as well as the Honour and Respect I have for its Author.

I am,

Oxon, Ap. 17,
1695.

Honoured SIR,

Your very Humble

And Obliged Servant,

JOHN WYNNE.

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INTRODUCTION.

I. SINCE it is the *Underſtanding* that ſets Man above the Reſt of ſenſible Beings, and gives him all the Advantage and Dominion which he has over them; it is certainly a Subject, even for its Nobleneſs, worth the enquiring into.

II. My Purpoſe therefore is to enquire into the *Original*, *Certainty*, and *Extent* of Human Knowledge; together with the Grounds and Degrees of *Belief*, *Opinion*, and *Aſſent*, which I ſhall do in the following Method.

III. *Firſt*, I ſhall enquire into the *Original* of thoſe *Ideas* or Notions, which a Man obſerves, and is conſcious to himſelf he has in his Mind, and the *Ways* whereby the Underſtanding comes to be furniſhed with them.

Secondly, What *Knowledge* the Underſtanding hath by thoſe Ideas; and the Certainty, Evidence, and Extent of it.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, I ſhall make ſome Enquiry into the Nature and Grounds of *Faith* and *Opinion*.

IV. If by this Enquiry into the Nature of the Underſtanding, I can diſcover the Powers thereof, *how far* they reach, and where they fail us, it may be of Uſe to prevail with the buſy Mind of Man to be more cautious in meddling with Things exceeding its Comprehenſion, to ſtop when it is at the utmoſt Extent of its Ability, and to ſit down in a quiet Ignorance of thoſe Things, which upon Examination are found to be beyond the Reach of our Capacities. We ſhould not then perhaps be ſo forward out of an Affectation of *Univerſal Knowledge*, to perplex ourſelves with Diſputes about Things to which our Underſtandings are not ſuited; and of which we cannot frame in our Minds any clear or diſtinct Perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happened) we have not any Notions at all: But ſhould learn to content ourſelves with what is attainable by us in this State.

V. For though the *Comprehenſion* of our Underſtanding comes exceeding ſhort of the vaſt Extent of Things; yet we ſhall have Cauſe enough to magnify the bounti-

ful

ful *Author* of our Being, for that Portion and Degree of Knowledge he has beſtowed on us ſo far above all the reſt of the Inhabitants of this our Manſion. Men have Reaſon to be well ſatisfied with what God hath thought fit for them, ſince he has given them (as St. *Peter* ſays, πάντα πρὸς ζωὴν καὶ εὐσέβειαν) whatſoever is neceſſary for the Conveniencies of *Life*, and Information of *Virtue*; and has put within the Reach of their Diſcovery, the comfortable Proviſion for this Life, and the Way that leads to a better. How ſhort ſoever their Knowledge may come of an univerſal, or perfect Comprehenſion of whatever is, it yet ſecures their great Concernments, that they have Light enough to lead them to the Knowledge of their *Maker*, and the Sight of their own *Duties*. Men may find Matter ſufficient to buſy their Heads, and employ their Hands with Variety, Delight and Satisfaction; if they will not boldly quarrel with their own Conſtitution, and throw away the Bleſſings their Hands are filled with, becauſe they are not big enough to graſp every Thing. We ſhall not have much Reaſon to complain of the Narrowneſs of our Minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of Uſe to us; for of that they are very capable: And it will be an unpardonable, as well as childiſh Peeviſhneſs,

Peevishness, if we undervalue the Advantages of our Knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the Ends for which it was given us, because there are some Things that are set out of the Reach of it. It will be no Excuse to an idle and untoward Servant, who would not attend his Business by Candle-light, to plead that he had not broad Sunshine. The Candle that is set up in us, shines bright enough for all our Purposes. The Discoveries we can make with this, ought to satisfy us. And we shall then use our Understandings right, when we entertain all Objects in the Way and Proportion, that they are suited to our Faculties; and upon those Grounds they are capable of being proposed to us; and not peremptorily or intemperately require *Demonstration*, and demand *Certainty*, where *Probability* only is to be had, and which is sufficient to govern all our Concernments. If we will disbelieve every Thing, because we cannot certainly know all Things; we shall do as wisely as he did who would not use his Legs, but sat still and perished because he had not Wings to fly.

VI. When we know our own *Strength*, we shall the better know what to undertake with Hopes of Success. And when we have well surveyed the *Powers* of our own Minds,

we

we ſhall not be inclined either to ſit ſtill, and not ſet our Thoughts on Work, in deſpair of knowing any Thing; nor on the other Side, queſtion every Thing, and diſclaim all Knowledge, becauſe ſome Things are not to be underſtood. Our *Buſineſs* here, is not to know all Things, but thoſe Things which concern our Conduct. If we can find out thoſe Meaſures whereby a *rational Creature*, put into that State which Man is in, in this World, may and ought to govern his Opinions and Actions depending thereon, we need not be troubled that ſome other Things eſcape our Knowledge.

VII. This was that which gave the firſt *Riſe* to this *Eſſay* concerning the Underſtanding. For I thought that the firſt Step towards ſatisfying ſeveral Enquiries the Mind of Man was very apt to run into, was to take a Survey of *our Underſtandings*, examine our own *Powers*, and ſee to what Things they were adapted. Till that was done, I ſuſpected we began at the wrong End, and in vain ſought for Satisfaction in a quiet and ſecure Poſſeſſion of Truths that moſt concerned us, whilſt we let looſe our Thoughts in the vaſt *Ocean* of Being, as if all that boundleſs Extent were the natural and undoubted Poſſeſſions of our Underſtand-

ſtandings; wherein there was nothing exempt from its Deciſions, or that eſcaped its Comprehenſion. Thus Men extending their Enquiries beyond their Capacities, and letting their Thoughts wander into thoſe Depths where they can find no ſure Footing, it is no wonder that they raiſe *Queſtions*, and multiply *Diſputes*, which never coming to any clear Reſolution, are proper only to continue and increaſe their Doubts, and to confirm them at laſt in perfect *Scepticiſm*. Whereas were the Capacities of our Underſtandings well conſidered, the Extent of our Knowledge once diſcovered, and the *Horizon* found, which ſets Bounds between the enlightened and dark Parts of Things, between what is, and what is not comprehenſible by us, Men would perhaps with leſs Scruple acquieſce in the avowed Ignorance of the *One*, and employ their Thoughts and Diſcourſe, with more Advantage and Satisfaction in the *Other*.

BOOK

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

Of Ideas in general, and their Original.

BY the Term *Idea*, I mean whatever is the Object of the Understanding, when a Man *Thinks*; or whatever it is which the Mind can be employed about when Thinking.

I presume it will be easily granted me, that there are such *Ideas* in Mens Minds: Every one is conscious of them in himself; and Mens Words and Actions will satisfy him that they are in others. Our *first Inquiry* then shall be, how they come into the Mind.

It is an established Opinion amongst some Men, that there are in the Understanding certain *Innate Principles*, some primary Notions (Κοιναὶ Ἔννοιαι) *Characters*, as it were stamped upon the Mind of Man, which the Soul receives in its very first Being, and brings into the World with it.

This Opinion is accurately discussed, and refuted in the *First* Book of this *Essay*, to which I shall refer the Reader, that desires Satisfaction in this particular.

It shall be sufficient here to shew, how Men barely by the Use of their *natural Faculties*, may attain to all the Knowledge they have, without the help of any *Innate* Impressions; and may arrive at Certainty without any such original Notions or Principles. For I imagine, any one will easily grant, That it would be impertinent to suppose the *Ideas* of *Colours* innate in a Creature to whom God hath given *Sight*, and a Power to receive them by the Eyes from external Objects. I shall shew by what Ways and Degrees all other *Ideas* come into the Mind; for which I shall appeal to every one's own Experience and Observation.

Let us then suppose the Mind to be, as we say, *white Paper*, void of all Characters, without any *Ideas*: How comes it to be furnished? Whence has it all the Materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer, in one Word, from *Experience* and *Observation*. This when employed about external sensible Objects, we may call *Sensation*: By this we have the *Ideas* of *Bitter*, *Sweet*, *Yellow*, *Hard*, &c. which are commonly called *sensible Qualities*, because conveyed into the Mind by the *Senses*. The same *Experience*, when employed about the internal Operations of the Mind, perceived, and reflected on by us, we may call *Reflection*. Hence we have the *Ideas* of *Perception*, *Thinking*, *Doubting*, *Willing*, *Reasoning*, &c.

These two, *viz.* *External material Things*, as the Objects of *Sensation*; and the *Operations of our own Minds*, as the Objects of *Reflection*, appear to me the only *Originals* from whence all our

our *Ideas* take their Beginnings. The Understanding seems not to have the least Glimmering of *Ideas*, which it doth not receive from one of these two *Sources*. These, when we have taken a full Survey of them, and their several *Modes* and Compositions, we shall find to contain our whole Stock of *Ideas*; and that we have nothing in our Minds which did not come in one of these two Ways.

'Tis evident that Children come by degrees to be furnished with *Ideas* from the Objects they are conversant with. They are so surrounded with Bodies that perpetually and diversly affect them, that some *Ideas* will (whether they will or no) be imprinted on their Minds. *Light* and *Colours*, *Sounds*, and *Tangible* Qualities, do continually sollicit their proper *Senses*, and force an Entrance into the Mind. It is commonly late before *Children* come to have *Ideas* of the Operations of their Minds; and some Men have not any very clear or perfect *Ideas* of the greatest part of them all their Lives. Because, though they pass there continually; yet, like floating Visions, they make not deep Impressions enough to leave in the Mind clear and lasting *Ideas*, till the Understanding turns inward upon its self and *reflects* on its own Operations, and makes them the Objects of its own Contemplation.

When a man *first perceives*, then he may be said *to have Ideas*; having *Ideas*, and Perception signifying the same thing. It is an Opinion maintained by some, That the *Soul always thinks*, and that it always has the actual Perception of *Ideas* as long as it exists: And that *actual Thinking* is as inseparable from the Soul, as *actual Extension* is from Body. But I cannot con-

ceive it any more necessary for the Soul always to *think*, than for Body always to *move*: The Perception of *Ideas* being (as I conceive) to the Soul, what Motion is to Body, not its *Essence*, but one of its *Operations*: And therefore, though Thinking be never so much the proper Action of the Soul, yet it is not necessary to suppose, that it should always think, always be in Action. That perhaps is the Privilege of the infinite *Author* and Preserver of all Things, *who never slumbers nor sleeps*; but is not competent to any *finite* Being. We know certainly by Experience, that we sometimes think; and thence draw this infallible Consequence, that there is something in us that has a Power to think; but whether that Substance perpetually thinks or no, we can be no farther assured than Experience informs us.

I would be glad to learn from those Men, who so confidently pronounce, that the Human Soul always thinks, how they come to know it: Nay, how they come to know that they themselves think, when they themselves do not perceive it? The most that can be said of it, is, That 'tis possible the Soul may always think; but not always retain it in *Memory*: And, I say, it is as possible the Soul may not always think; and much more probable that it should sometimes not think, than that it should often think, and that a long while together, and not be conscious to it self the next Moment after that it had thought.

I see no Reason therefore to believe, that the Soul thinks before the Senses have furnished it with *Ideas* to think on; and as those are increased

creased and retained, so it comes by Exercise to improve its Faculty of Thinking, in the several Parts of it; as well as afterwards by *Compounding* those *Ideas*, and *reflecting* on its own Operations,-it increases its *Stock*, as well as Facility in Remembring, Imagining, Reasoning, and other *Modes* of Thinking.

CHAP. II.

Of Simple Ideas.

OF Ideas some are *Simple*, others *Complex*. A *Simple Idea* is one uniform Appearance or Conception in the Mind, which is not distinguishable into different *Ideas*. Such are the *Ideas* of *sensible Qualities*, which though they are in the Things themselves so united and blended, that there is no Separation, no Distance between them; yet the *Ideas* they produce in the Mind, enter by the Senses simple and unmixed. Thus tho' the Hand feels *Softness* and *Warmth* in the same piece of *Wax*; yet the *simple Ideas* thus united in the same Subject, are as perfectly *distinct* as those that come in by different Senses.

These *Simple Ideas* are suggested no other Way than from the two Ways above-mentioned *viz.* *Sensation* and *Reflection*.

The Mind being once stored with the *simple Ideas*, has the Power to repeat, compare, and unite them to an infinite Variety: And so can make at pleasure new *complex Ideas*. But the most enlarged Understanding cannot frame one

new *simple Idea*; nor by any Force destroy them that are there.

CHAP. III.

Of Ideas of one Sense.

IDEAS with Reference to different Ways wherein they approach the Mind, are of *four Sorts*.

First, There are some which come into our Minds by *one Sense* only.

Secondly, There are others conveyed into the Mind by *more Senses than one*.

Thirdly, Others that are had from *Reflection* only.

Fourthly, There are some suggested to the Mind by all the ways of *Sensation* and *Reflection*.

First, Some enter into the Mind only by one Sense peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus *Colours*, *Sounds*, *Smells*, &c, come in only by the *Eyes*, *Ears*, and *Nose*. And if any of these Organs, are so disordered as not to perform their Functions, they have no Postern to be admitted by; no other way to bring themselves in view, and be perceived by the Understanding. It will be needless to enumerate all the particular *simple Ideas* belonging to each *Sense*; nor indeed is it possible; there being a great many more than we have *Names* for.

CHAP. IV.

Of Solidity.

I SHALL here mention one which we receive by our *Touch*, becauſe it is one of the chief Ingredients in many of our *complex Ideas*, and that is, the Idea of *Solidity*; It ariſes from the Reſiſtance one Body makes to the Entrance of another Body into the Place it poſſeſſes, till *it* has left it. There is no Idea which we more conſtantly receive from *Senſation* than this. In whatever Poſture we are, we feel ſomewhat that ſupports us, and hinders us from ſinking downwards: And the Bodies we daily handle, make us perceive, that while they remain between them, they do by an unſurmountable Force hinder the Approach of the Parts of our Hands that preſs them. This Idea is commonly called *Impenetrability*. I conceive *Solidity* is more proper to expreſs it, becauſe this carries ſomething more of *Poſitive* in it than *Impenetrability*, which is *negative*, and is perhaps more a Conſequence of Solidity, than Solidity it ſelf. This ſeems to be the moſt *eſſential* Property of Body, and that whereby we conceive it to fill Space: The Idea of which is, that where we imagine any Space taken up by a ſolid Subſtance, we conceive it ſo to poſſeſs it, that it excludes all other ſolid Subſtances. This Reſiſtance is ſo great that no Force can ſurmount it. All the Bodies in the World preſſing a *Drop of Water* on all Sides, will never be able to overcome the Reſiſtance it makes to their approaching one another, till it be removed out of their Way.

The Idea of Solidity is diſtinguiſhed from that of *pure Space*, in as much as this *latter* is neither capable of Reſiſtance, nor Motion: It is diſtinguiſhed from *Hardneſs*, in as much as Hardneſs is a firm Coheſion of the ſolid Parts of Matter making up Maſſes of a ſenſible Bulk, ſo that the whole doth not eaſily change its Figure. Indeed, *Hard* and *Soft*, as commonly apprehended by us, are but *Relative* to the Conſtitutions of our Bodies: That being called *Hard* which will put us to Pain ſooner than change its Figure, by the Preſſure of any Part of our Bodies; and that *Soft*, which changes the Situation of its Parts upon an eaſy and unpainful Touch.

This Difficulty of changing Situation among the Parts, gives no more *Solidity* to the hardeſt Body, than to the ſofteſt; nor is an *Adamant* one Jot more ſolid than *Water*: He that ſhall fill a yielding ſoft Body well with *Air* or *Water* will quickly find its Reſiſtance. By this we may diſtinguiſh the Idea of the Extenſion of *Body*, from the Idea of the Extenſion of *Space*: That of *Body*, is the Coheſion or Continuity of ſolid, ſeparable and moveable Parts; that of *Space*, the Continuity of unſolid, inſeparable, and immoveable Parts. Upon the Solidity of Bodies depends their mutual *Impulſe*, *Reſiſtance* and *Protruſion*. Of *pure Space* and *Solidity* there are ſeveral (among which I confeſs myſelf one) who perſuade themſelves they have clear and diſtinct Ideas: And that they can think on *Space* without any thing in it that reſiſts, or is protruded by Body, as well as on ſomething *that fills Space*, that can be protruded by the Impulſe of other Bodies, or reſiſt their Motion; the Idea of the

Diſtance

Diſtance between the oppoſite Parts of a concave Surface, being equally clear without, as with the Idea of any ſolid Parts between. If any one aſk what this *Solidity* is, I ſend him to his Senſes to inform him: Let him put a *Flint* or *Football* between his Hands, and then endeavour to join them, and he will know.

CHAP. V.

Of Simple Ideas of divers Senſes.

SOME Ideas we get into the Mind by *more than one Senſe*, as *Space*, *Extenſion*, *Figure*, *Reſt*, and *Motion*, Theſe are perceivable by the Eyes and Touch.

CHAP. VI.

Of Simple Ideas of Reflection.

SOME are had from *Reflection* only: Such are the Ideas we have of the *Operations* of our Minds: Of which the two principal are *Perception* or *Thinking*; and *Volition* or *Willing*. The Powers of producing theſe Operations are called *Faculties*, which are the *Underſtanding* and *Will*; the ſeveral *Modes* of thinking, *&c.* belong to this Head.

CHAP. VII.

Of Simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection.

THERE are some Simple Ideas conveyed into the Mind by all the ways of *Sensation* and *Reflection*; such are *Pleasure, Pain, Power, Existence, Unity, Succession.* Pleasure or Delight, Pain or Uneasiness accompany almost every Impression on our Senses, and every Action or Thought of the *Mind.* By *Pleasure* or *Pain* we mean whatever delights or molests us, whether it arises from the Thoughts of our Minds; or any thing operating on our Bodies. Satisfaction, Delight, Pleasure, Happiness, and Uneasiness, Trouble, Torment, Misery, *&c.* are but different Degrees, the one of Pleasure, the other of Pain.

The Author of our Being having given us a Power over several Parts of our Bodies, to move or keep them at rest as we think fit; and also by their Motion to move ourselves and other contiguous Bodies; having also given a Power to our Mind in several Instances, to chuse amongst its Ideas which it will think on: To excite us to these Actions of *Thinking* and *Motion,* he has joined to several Thoughts and Sensations a *Perception of Delight:* Without this we should have no Reason to prefer one Thought or Action to another, Motion to Rest. In which State, Man, however furnished with the Faculties of Understanding and Will, would be a very idle, unactive Creature, and pass his Time only in a lazy, lethargick Dream.

Pain

Pain has the ſame Efficacy to ſet us on work that Pleaſure has; ſince we are as ready to avoid that, as to purſue this. This is worth our Conſideration, that *Pain is often produced by the ſame Objects and Ideas that produce Pleaſure* in us. This their near Conjunction gives us new Occaſion of admiring the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of our *Maker*, who deſigning the Preſervation of our Being, has annexed Pain to the Application of many things to our Bodies, to warn us of the Harm they will do us, and as Advices to withdraw us from them. But he not deſigning our Preſervation barely, but the Preſervation of every Part and Organ in its Perfection, hath in many Caſes annexed Pain to thoſe very Ideas which delight us. Thus *Heat* that is very agreeable to us in one Degree, by a little greater Increaſe of it, proves no ordinary Torment: Which is wiſely ordered by *Nature*, that when any Object does by the Vehemence of its Operation diſorder the Inſtruments of Senſation, whoſe Structures cannot but be very delicate, we might by the Pain be warned to withdraw before the Organ be quite put out of order. That this is the *End of Pain*, appears from this Conſideration; that though great Light is inſufferable to the Eyes, yet the higheſt Degree of *Darkneſs* does not at all diſeaſe them; becauſe *that* cauſes no diſorderly Motion in that curious Organ the Eye. But Exceſs of *Cold* as well as *Heat* pains us; becauſe it is equally deſtructive to the Temper which is neceſſary to the Preſervation of Life.

Another Reaſon why God hath annexed ſeveral Degrees of Pleaſure and Pain to all the Things that

that environ and affect us, and blended them together in all Things that our Thoughts and Senses are concerned in is, that we finding Imperfection and Dissatisfaction, and want of compleat Happiness in all the Enjoyments of the Creatures, might be led to seek it in the Enjoyments of Him *with whom is Fulness of Joy, and at whose right Hand are Pleasures for evermore.* Though what is here said concerning *Pleasure* and *Pain* may not perhaps make those Ideas clearer to us than our own Experience does, yet it may serve to give us due Sentiments of the Wisdom and Goodness of the *Sovereign* Disposer of all Things, which is not unsuitable to the main End of these Enquiries: The Knowledge and Veneration of Him being the *chief End* of all our Thoughts, and the proper Business of all Understandings.

Existence and *Unity* are two other Ideas suggested by every Object without, and every Idea within. When Ideas are in our Minds, we consider them as being actually there, as well as we consider things to be actually without us; which is, that they *exist*, or have Existence: And whatever we consider as *one thing*, whether a *real Being* or *Idea*, suggests the Idea of *Unity*.

Power is another Idea derivded from these Sources: For finding in ourselves that we can *think*, and *move* several parts of our Bodies at pleasure; and observing the *Effects* that natural Bodies produce in one another: By both these Ways we get the Idea of *Power*.

Succession is another Idea suggested by our Senses, and by Reflection on what passes in our Minds.

Minds. For if we look into ourſelves, we ſhall find our *Ideas* always whilſt we are awake, or have any Thought, paſſing in train, one going and another coming, without Intermiſſion.

CHAP. VIII.

Some farther Conſiderations concerning Simple Ideas.

WHatſoever is able by affecting our Senſes, to cauſe any Perception in the Mind, doth thereby produce in the Underſtanding a *Simple Idea*; which whatſoever be the Cauſe of it, is looked upon as a *real poſitive Idea* in the Underſtanding. Thus the Ideas of *Heat* and *Cold*, *Light* and *Darkneſs*, *Motion* and *Reſt*, &c. are equally poſitive in the Mind, though ſome of their Cauſes may be mere *Privations*. An Enquiry into their Cauſes belongs not to the Ideas as in the Underſtanding; but to the Nature of the Things exiſting without us. Thus a *Painter* has diſtinct Ideas of White and Black, as well as the Philoſopher, who tells us what kind of Particles, and how ranged in the Surface, occaſioned thoſe Colours.

That a *Privative* Cauſe may produce a *Poſitive* Idea; appears from Shadows; which (though nothing but the Abſence of Light) are diſcernable; and cauſe clear and poſitive Ideas. The natural Reaſon of which may be this, *viz.* That ſince Senſation is produced only by different Degrees and Modes of Motion in our animal Spirits, variouſly

riouſly agitated by external Objects; the Abatement of any former Motion muſt as neceſſarily produce a new Senſation, as the Increaſe and Variation of it; and thereby introduce a new Idea. We have indeed ſome *negative* Names which ſtand not directly for poſitive Ideas, but for their Abſence; ſuch as *inſipid*, *Silence*, which denote poſitive Ideas, *viz.* *Taſte* and *Sound*, with a Signification of their Abſence.

It will be uſeful to diſtinguiſh *Ideas* as they are *Perceptions* in our Minds, from what *they are in the Bodies* that cauſe ſuch Perceptions in us: For we are not to think the former exact Images and Reſemblances of ſomething inherent in the Subject, moſt of thoſe of *Senſation* being in the Mind, no more the Likeneſs of ſomething exiſting without us, than the Names that ſtand for them are the Likeneſs of our Ideas, which yet upon hearing, they are apt to excite in us.

Whatſoever the *Mind perceives in itſelf*, or is the immediate Object of Perception, Thought or Underſtanding, that I call an Idea: And the Power to produce any Idea in our Mind, I call the *Quality of the Subject* wherein that Power is: Thus a *Snow-ball* having the Power to produce in us the Ideas of *white*, *cold* and *round*, thoſe *Powers* as they are in the Snow-ball, I call *Qualities*; and as they are *Senſations* or *Perceptions* in our Underſtandings, I call them *Ideas*: Which Ideas if I ſpeak of ſometimes, as in the Things themſelves, I would be underſtood to mean thoſe *Qualities* in the Objects which produce them in us. Theſe *Qualities* are of *two Sorts*, Firſt, *original* or primary, ſuch are *Solidity*, *Extenſion*,

Motion

Motion or *Reſt*, *Number* and *Figure*. Theſe are inſeparable from Body, and ſuch as it conſtantly keeps in all its Changes and Alterations: Thus take a Grain of *Wheat*, divide it into two Parts, each Part has ſtill *Solidity*, *Extenſion*, *Figure*, *Mobility*: Divide it again, and it ſtill retains the ſame Qualities, and will do ſtill, though you divide it on till the Parts become inſenſible.

Secondly, *ſecondary Qualities*, ſuch as *Colours*, *Smells*, *Taſtes*, *Sounds*, &c. which whatever Reality we by miſtake may attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the Objects themſelves, but *Powers* to produce various Senſations in us; and depend on the Qualities before-mentioned.

The *Ideas* of *primary* Qualities of Bodies are Reſemblances of them: And their Patterns really exiſt in Bodies themſelves: But the Ideas produced in us by *ſecondary* Qualities, have no Reſemblance of them at all: And what is *ſweet*, *blue*, or *warm* in the Idea, is but the certain Bulk, Figure, and Motion of the inſenſible Parts in the Bodies themſelves, which we call ſo.

Thus we ſee that Fire at one diſtance produces in us the Senſation of *Warmth*, which at a nearer Approach cauſes the Senſation of *Pain*. Now what Reaſon have we to ſay that the Idea of *Warmth* is actually in the Fire, but that of *Pain* not in the Fire, which the ſame Fire produces in us the ſame way? The Bulk, Number, Figure and Motion of the Parts of Fire, are really in it, whether we perceive them or no; and therefore may be called *real* Qualities, becauſe they really exiſt in that Body. But *Light* and *Heat* are no more really in it, than Sickneſs or Pain:

Pain: Take away the Senſation of them; let not the Eyes ſee Light or Colours, nor the Ear hear Sounds; let the Palate not taſte, or the Noſe ſmell, and all *Colours*, *Taſtes*, *Odours* and *Sounds*, as they are ſuch particular Ideas, vaniſh and ceaſe, and are reduced to their Cauſes (that is) Bulk, Motion, Figure, *&c.* of Parts.

Theſe *ſecondary* Qualities are of two Sorts, Firſt, *immediately perceivable*, which by immediately operating on our Bodies, produce ſeveral different Ideas in us. Secondly, *mediately perceivable*, which by operating on other Bodies, change their primary Qualities, ſo as to render them capable of producing Ideas in us different from what they did before. Theſe laſt are Powers in Bodies which proceed from the particular Conſtitution of thoſe primary and original Qualities, to make ſuch a Change in the *Bulk*, *Figure*, *Texture*, &c. of another Body, as to make it operate on our Senſes different from what it did before; as in Fire to make Lead fluid: Theſe two laſt being nothing but Powers relating to other Bodies, and reſulting from the different Modifications of the original Qualities, are yet otherwiſe thought of; the former being eſteemed *real Qualities*; but the latter barely *Powers*: The Reaſon of this Miſtake ſeems to be this; That our Ideas of ſenſible Qualities containing nothing in them of Bulk, Figure, *&c.* we cannot think them the Effect of thoſe primary Qualities which appear not to our Senſes to operate in their Productions, and with which they have not any apparent Congruity, or conceivable Connexion: Nor can Reaſon ſhew how Bodies by their Bulk, Figure, *&c.* ſhould produce

in

in the Mind the Ideas of *warm, yellow*, &c. But in the other case, when Bodies operate upon one another, we plainly see that the Quality produced hath commonly no Resemblance with any thing in the Thing producing it, and therefore we look upon it as the Effect of Power: But our Senses not being able to discover any Unlikeness between the Idea produced in us, and the Quality of the Object producing it, we imagine that our Ideas are Resemblances of something in the Objects, and not the Effects of certain Powers placed in the Modification of the primary Qualities, with which primary Qualities the Ideas produced in us have no Resemblance.

This little Excursion into Natural Philosophy was necessary in our present Enquiry, to distinguish the *primary* and real Qualities of Bodies which are always in them, from those *secondary* and imputed Qualities, which are but the Powers of several Combinations of those primary ones, when they operate without being distinctly discerned; whereby we learn to know what Ideas are, and what are not Resemblances of something really existing in the Bodies we denominate from them.

CHAP. IX.

Of Perception.

PERception is the first Idea we receive from Reflection: It is by some called *Thinking* in general: though *Thinking*, in the Propriety of the

the *Engliſh* Tongue, ſignifies that ſort of Operation of the Mind about its Ideas, wherein the Mind is active; where it conſiders any thing with ſome degree of voluntary Attention: for in bare *Perception* the Mind is for the moſt part only *paſſive*; and what it perceives it cannot avoid perceiving. What this is, we cannot otherwiſe know, than by reflecting on what paſſes in our Minds when we *ſee*, *feel*, *hear*, &c.

Impreſſions made on the outward Parts, if they are not taken notice of within, cauſe no *Perception*: as we ſee in thoſe whoſe Minds are intently buſied in the Contemplation of certain Objects. A ſufficient Impulſe there may be upon the Organs of Senſation: but if it reach not the Obſervation of the Mind, there follows no Perception: ſo that wherever there is Senſe or Perception, there ſome Idea is actually produced and preſent in the Underſtanding.

We may obſerve that the Ideas we receive from Senſation, are often in grown People altered by the Judgment without our taking notice of it. Thus a Globe of any uniform Colour (as of Gold or Jet) being ſet before our Eyes, the *Idea* thereby imprinted is of a flat Circle variouſly ſhadowed. But being accuſtomed to perceive what kind of Appearances convex Bodies are wont to make in us; the Judgment alters the Appearances into their Cauſes; and from that variety of Shadow or Colour, frames to its ſelf the Perception of a convex Figure of one uniform Colour. This in many Caſes by a ſettled Habit is performed ſo readily, that we take that for the Perception of our Senſation, which is but

but an Idea formed by the Judgment: so that one serves only to excite the other, and is scarce taken notice of its self. As a Man who reads or hears with Attention, takes little notice of the Characters or Sounds, but of the Ideas that are excited in him by them. Thus Habits come at last to produce Actions in us, which often escape our Observation.

The Faculty of *Perception* seems to be that which puts the Distinction between the Animal Kingdom and the inferior Parts of Nature: Since Vegetables many of them have some degrees of Motion, and upon the different Application of other Bodies to them, do very briskly alter their Figures and Motions, and thence have obtained the Name of *sensitive Plants*: which yet is, I suppose, but bare *Mechanism*, and no otherwise produced, than the shortening of a Rope by the Affusion of Water. But Perception, I believe, is in some degree in all sorts of Animals: though I think we may from the Make of an *Oyster* or *Cockle*, reasonably conclude that it has not so many nor so quick Senses as a Man, or several other Animals.

Perception is also the first Step and Degree towards Knowledge, and the Inlet of all the Materials of it: so that the fewer Senses any Man has, and the duller the Impressions that are made by them are, the more remote he is from that Knowledge which is to be found in other Men.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Of Retention.

THE next Faculty of the Mind whereby it makes a farther Progreſs towards Knowledge, I call *Retention:* which is the keeping of thoſe Ideas it has received: which is done two ways.

Firſt, By keeping the Idea which is brought into the Mind for ſome time actually in View, which is called *Contemplation.*

Secondly, By reviving thoſe Ideas in our Minds which have diſappeared, and have been as it were, laid out of Sight: and this is *Memory*, which is as it were the Store-houſe of our Ideas; for the narrow Mind of Man not being capable of having many Ideas under view at once, it was neceſſary to have a Repoſitory to lay up thoſe Ideas which at another time it may have Uſe of. But our *Ideas* being nothing but actual Perceptions in the Mind which ceaſe to be any thing, when there is no Perception of them, this laying up of our *Ideas* in the Repoſitory of the Memory, ſignifies no more than this, That the Mind has a Power in many Caſes to revive Perceptions it has once had, with this additional Perception annexed to them, that it has had them before. And it is by the Aſſiſtance of this Faculty, that we are ſaid to have all thoſe Ideas in our Underſtandings, which we can bring in ſight, and make the Objects of our Thoughts, without

without the help of thoſe ſenſible Qualities which firſt imprinted them there.

Attention and *Repetition* help much to the Fixing of *Ideas* in our Memories: but thoſe which make deepeſt and moſt laſting Impreſſions, are thoſe which are accompanied with *Pleaſure* or *Pain*. *Ideas* but once taken in and never again repeated are ſoon loſt; as thoſe of Colours in ſuch as loſt their Sight when very young.

The Memory in ſome Men is tenacious even to a Miracle: but yet there ſeems to be a conſtant decay of all our *Ideas*, even of thoſe which are ſtruck deepeſt; and in Minds the moſt retentive: So that if they be not ſometimes renewed, the Print wears out, and at laſt there remains nothing to be ſeen. Thoſe *Ideas* that are refreſhed by frequent Returns of the Objects or Actions that produce them, fix themſelves beſt in the Memory, and remain longeſt there: Such are the *original Qualities of Bodies*, viz. Solidity, Extenſion, Figure, Motion, *&c.* and *thoſe that almoſt conſtantly affect us*, as Heat and Cold: and thoſe that are the *Affections of all kind of Beings*, as Exiſtence, Duration, Number: theſe and the like are ſeldom quite loſt while the Mind retains any *Ideas* at all.

In Memory the Mind is oftentimes more than barely *paſſive*; for it often ſets itſelf on work to ſearch ſome hidden *Ideas*; ſometimes they ſtart of their own Accord: and ſometimes turbulent and tempeſtuous Paſſions tumble them out of their Cells.

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The Defects of the Memory are *two*.

First, That it loses the *Idea* quite, and so far it produces perfect *Ignorance*.

Secondly, That it moves slowly, and retrieves not the *Ideas* laid up in store quick enough to serve the Mind upon Occasions. This, if it be to a great Degree, is *Stupidity*. In the having of *Ideas* ready at hand on all Occasions, consists what we call *Invention*, *Fancy*, and *Quickness of Parts*.

This Faculty other *Animals* seem to have to a great degree, as well as *Man*, as appears by Birds learning of Tunes, and their Endeavour to hit the Notes right. For it seems impossible that they should endeavour to conform their Voices (as it is plain they do) to Notes, whereof they have no *Ideas*.

CHAP. XI.

Of Discerning and other Operations of the Mind.

ANother Faculty of the Mind is, That of *discerning between its Ideas*: on this depends the Evidence, and Certainty of several even general Propositions, which pass for *Innate Truths*: whereas indeed they depend on this clear discerning Faculty of the Mind, whereby it perceives two *Ideas* to be the same or different. In being able nicely to distinguish one thing from

from another, where there is the least Difference, consists in a great Measure that *Exactness* of *Judgment* and *Clearness of Reason*, which is to be observed in one Man above another; which is quite opposite to *Wit*, which consists most in the Assemblage of *Ideas*, and putting those together with Quickness and Variety, which have the least Resemblance to form agreeable Visions: whereas Judgment separates carefully those *Ideas*, wherein can be found the least Difference to prevent Error and Delusion.

To the well distinguishing our *Ideas*, it chiefly contributes that they be clear and determinate; and when they are so, it will not breed any Confusion or Mistake about them, though the Senses should convey them from the same Object differently on different Occasions.

The *comparing* of our *Ideas* one with another in respect of *Extent*, *Degree*, *Time*, *Place*, or any other Circumstances, is another Operation of the Mind about its *Ideas*, which is the Ground of *Relation*. Brutes seem not to have this Faculty in any great degree. They have probably several *Ideas* distinct enough; but cannot compare them farther than some sensible Circumstance, annexed to the Objects themselves. The Power of comparing general *Ideas*, which we may observe in Men, we may probably conjecture *Beasts* have not at all.

Composition is another Operation of the Mind, whereby it combines several of its Simple *Ideas* into *Complex* ones: under which Operation we may reckon that of *Enlarging*, wherein we put several

ſeveral *Ideas* together of the ſame kind, as ſeveral Units to make a *Dozen*. In this alſo I ſuppoſe Brutes come far ſhort of Man, for though they take in and retain together ſeveral Combinations of Simple *Ideas*, as poſſibly a Dog does the *Shape*, *Smell* and *Voice* of his Maſter; yet theſe are rather ſo many diſtinct Marks, whereby he knows him, than one *Complex Idea* made out of thoſe ſeveral ſimple ones.

Abſtraction is another Operation of the Mind, whereby it forms general from particular *Ideas*, received from particular Objects, which it does by conſidering them as they are in the Mind ſuch Appearances, ſeparate from all other Exiſtences, and the Circumſtances of real Exiſtence, as *Time*, *Place*, &c. Theſe become general *Repreſentatives* of all of the ſame kind, and their Names applicable to whatever exiſts conformable to ſuch abſtract *Ideas*. Thus the Colour which I receive from *Chalk*, *Snow* and *Milk*, is made a Repreſentative of all of that kind; and has a Name given it (*Whiteneſs*) which ſignifies the Quality wherever to be found or imagined. And thus *Univerſals* both *Ideas* and *Terms* are made.

This conſtitutes the great Difference between Man and Brutes: They ſeem to reaſon about particular Objects, and *Ideas*, but there appear no Footſteps of *Abſtraction* in them, or of making *General Ideas*.

CHAP.

CHAP XII.

Of Complex Ideas.

IN the Reception of ſimple Ideas, the Mind is entirely *Paſſive*, having no Power to frame any one to its ſelf, nor has it any Idea which does not wholly conſiſt of them. But in reſpect to theſe ſimple Ideas it exerts ſeveral Acts of its own, whereby out of them as the Materials and Foundations the others are framed: The Acts of the Mind, wherein it exerts its Power over its ſimple Ideas, are chiefly theſe three: Firſt, it combines ſeveral ſimple Ideas into one Compound one, and thus all *complex Ideas* are formed. Secondly, It brings two Ideas whether *Simple* or *Complex* together, and ſets them by one another, ſo as to take a View of them at once, without uniting them into one; by which way it gets all its Ideas of Relations. Thirdly, It ſeparates them from all other Ideas that accompany them in their real Exiſtence; this is called *Abſtraction:* And thus all its *General Ideas* are made. I ſhall here begin with the firſt of theſe, in the conſideration of *complex Ideas*, and come to the other two in their due Places. As *ſimple Ideas* are obſerved to exiſt in ſeveral Combinations united, not only as they are really united in external Objects, but as itſelf has joined them. *Ideas* thus made up of ſeveral ſimple ones put together, I call *complex* as *Man*, *Army*, *Beauty*, *Gratitude*, &c. By this Faculty of repeating and joining together its

Ideas, the Mind has great Power in varying and multiplying the Objects of its Thoughts, infinitely beyond what sensation or reflection can furnish it with. But it is still confined to those simple *Ideas* which it received from the two Sources of *Sensation* and *Reflection*. It can have no other *Ideas* of sensible Qualities, than what come from without by the Senses, nor any other *Ideas* of the Operations of a thinking Substance, than what it finds in it self: but having once got these simple *Ideas*, it can by its own Power, put them together and make new *Complex ones*, which it never received so united.

Complex *Ideas* however compounded, and decompounded, though their Number be infinite and their Variety endless, may all be reduced under these three Heads, First, *Modes*, Secondly, *Substances*, Thirdly, *Relations*.

Modes, I call such complex *Ideas* which contain not the Supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as Dependences on, and Affections of Substances, as *Triangle*, *Gratitude*, *Murder*, &c. These Modes are of two Sorts, First, *Simple*, which are different Combinations of the same Simple *Idea*, without the mixture of any other, as a *Dozen*, *Score*, &c. which are but the *Ideas* of so many distinct Units put together. Secondly, *Mixed*, which are compounded of simple *Ideas* of several kinds, to make one complex one; as *Beauty*, which consists in a certain Composition of Colour and Figure, causing Delight in the Beholder. *Theft*, which is the concealed Change of the Possession of any thing without the Consent of the

the Proprietor. *These* visibly contain a Combination of *Ideas* of several kinds: and these I call *mixed Modes*.

Secondly, *Substance*, the *Ideas* of Substances are only such Combinations of simple *Ideas* as are taken to represent distinct particular Things subsisting by themselves; in which the confused *Idea* of Substance is always the Chief. Thus a Combination of the *Ideas* of a certain Figure, with the Powers of Motion, Thought, and Reasoning joined to Substance, make the ordinary *Idea* of Man.

These again are either of *single Substances*, as *Man*, *Stone*; or of *collective*, or several put together, as an *Army*, *Flock* which collective *Ideas*, of several Substances thus put together, are as much each of them one single *Idea*, as that of a *Man*, or an *Unit*.

Thirdly, *Relations*, which consist in the Consideration and comparing one *Idea* with another. Of these several kinds we shall treat in their Order.

C H A P XIII.

Of Simple Modes, and first of the simple Modes of Space.

Concerning *simple Modes* we may observe that the Modifications of our *Simple Ideas*, are as perfectly different and distinct Ideas in the

Mind, as those of the greatest distance or contrariety; Thus *Two* is as distinct from *Three*, as *Blueness* from *Heat*. Under this Head I shall first consider the Modes of *Space*.

Space is a simple Idea which we get both by our Sight and Touch. When we consider it barely in length between two Bodies it is called *Distance*; when in Length, Breadth, and Thickness, it may be called *Capacity*. When considered between the Extremities of Matter, which fills the capacity of Space with something solid, Tangible and Moveable, it is called *Extension*; and thus *Extension* will be an *Idea* belonging to Body: But *Space* may be conceived without it.

Each different *Distance* is a different Modification of Space; and each *Idea* of any different Space is a *simple Mode* of this *Idea*. Such are an *Inch*, *Foot*, *Yard*, &c. which are the *Ideas* of certain limited Lengths which Men settle in their Minds for the use, and by the custom of measuring. When these *Ideas* are made familiar to Mens Thoughts, they can in their Minds repeat them as often as they will, without joining to them the *Idea* of Body, and frame to themselves the *Ideas* of Feet, Yards, or Fathoms beyond the utmost Bounds of all Bodies, and by adding these still one to another, enlarge their *Idea* of Space as much as they please. From this Power of repeating any *Idea* of Distance, without being ever able to come to an end, we acquire the *Idea* of *Immensity*.

Another Modification of *Space* is taken from the *Relation* of the parts of the Termination of Extension

Extenſion or circumſcribed Space, have amongſt themſelves: and this is what we call *Figure*: This the *Touch* diſcovers in ſenſible Bodies, whoſe Extremities come within our Reach, and the *Eye* takes both from Bodies and Colours, whoſe Boundaries are within its View; where obſerving how the Extremities terminate either in ſtreight Lines, which meet at diſcernable Angles; or in crooked Lines, where no Angles can be perceived; by conſidering theſe as they relate to one another in all parts of the Extremities of any Body or Space, it has that Idea we call *Figure*; which affords to the Mind infinite Variety.

Another *Mode* belonging to this Head, is that of *Place*. Our Idea of *Place* is nothing but the relative Poſition of any Thing with Reference to its Diſtance from ſome fixed and certain Point. Whence we ſay, that a Thing has or has not changed *Place*, when its Diſtance either is or is not altered with Reſpect to thoſe Bodies with which we have Occaſion to compare it. That this is ſo, we may eaſily collect from hence; that we can have no Idea of the Place of the *Univerſe*, though we can of all its Parts. To ſay that the World is *ſomewhere*, means no more, than it does *exiſt*. The Word *Place* is ſometimes taken to ſignify that *Space*, which any Body takes up; and ſo the Univerſe may be conceived in a Place.

CHAP XIV.

Of Duration and its Simple Modes.

THere is another sort of *Distance*, the *Idea* of which we get from the fleeting, and perpetually perishing parts of Succession, which we call *Duration*. The simple Modes of it are, any different Lengths of it, whereof we have distinct *Ideas*, as *Hours*, *Days*, *Years*, &c. *Time* and *Eternity*.

The *Idea* of *Succession* is got by reflecting on that Train of *Ideas* which constantly follow one another in our Minds as long as we are awake. The distance between any part of this *Succession* is what we call *Duration*: and the Continuation of the Existence of our Selves, or any thing else *commensurate* to the Succession of any *Ideas* in our Minds, is what we call our *own Duration*, or *that* of another thing co-existing with our Thinking. That this is so, appears from hence, that we have no Perception of the Succession or Duration of our *Ideas*, when that Succession *ceases*, as in *Sleep*: The Moment that we leave off to think, till the Moment we begin again, seems to be joined and to have no Distance. And possibly it would be so to a waking Man, could he fix upon one *Idea* without Variation, and the Succession of others. And we see that they whose Thoughts are very intent upon one Thing, let slip out on their Account a good part of that *Duration*, and think that time shor-

ter

ter than it is. But if a Man during his Sleep *dreams*, and a Variety of *Ideas* make themselves perceptible in his Mind, one after another, he hath then, during such dreaming, a Sense of *Duration* and of the Length of it.

A Man having once got this *Idea* of Duration, can apply it to Things which exist while he does not think: and thus we measure the time of our Sleep, as well as that wherein we are awake.

Those who think we get the *Idea* of *Succession* from our Observation of Motion, by our Senses, will be of our Opinion, when they consider that Motion produces in the Mind an *Idea* of Succession, no otherwise than as it produces there a continued Train of distinguishable *Ideas*. A Man that looks upon a Body really moving, perceives no Motion, unless that Motion produces a constant *Train of successive Ideas*. But wherever a Man is, though all things be at rest about him, if he thinks, he will perceive the various Ideas of his own Thoughts in his Mind, appearing one after another, and be *conscious* of *Succession* without perceiving any Motion. Hence Motions very *slow* are not perceived by us; because the Change of Distance is so slow, that it causes no new *Idea* in us, but after a long Interval. The same happens in things that move very *swift*, which not affecting the Sense with several distinguishable Distances of their Motion, cause not any Train of *Ideas* in our Minds, and consequently are not perceived. Thus any thing that moves round in a Circle in less time than our *Ideas* are wont to succeed one another in our Minds, is not perceived to move, but

feems to be a perfect entire Circle of that Matter which is in Motion. Such a Part of Duration as takes up the time of only one *Idea* in our Minds, wherein we perceive no Succeſſion, we call an *Inſtant*.

Duration, as marked by certain Periods and Meaſures, is what we moſt properly call *Time*: which we meaſure by the Diurnal and Annual *Revolutions* of the the Sun, as being conſtant, regular, and univerſally obſervable by all Mankind, and ſuppoſed equal to one another.

It is not neceſſary that Time ſhould be *meaſured by Motion*: any conſtant periodical appearance in ſeemingly equidiſtant Spaces, may as well diſtinguiſh the Intervals of *Time* as what we make uſe of. For ſuppoſing the Sun to be lighted, and then extinguiſhed every day: and that in the Space of an annual Revolution, it ſhould ſenſibly increaſe in Brightneſs, and ſo decreaſe again; ſuch a regular appearance would ſerve to meaſure out the diſtances of Duration, to all that could obſerve it, as well without, as with motion. The freezing of Water, the blowing of a Plant returning at equidiſtant Periods in all the Parts of the Earth would ſerve for the ſame purpoſe. In effect, we find that a People of *America* counted the Years by the *coming* and *going away* of Birds at certain Seaſons.

The Mind having once got ſuch a meaſure of *Time* as the annual Revolution of the Sun, can eaſily apply it to Duration wherein that Meaſure it ſelf did not exiſt: and the *Idea* of *Duration* equal to an *annual Revolution of the Sun*, is eaſily

ſily applicable in our Thoughts to Duration where no Sun, nor Motion was, as the *Idea* of a *Foot* or *Yard* to Diſtances beyond the Confines of the World.

By the ſame Means, and from the ſame Original that we come to have the *Idea* of Time, we have alſo that *Idea* which we call *Eternity*: For having got the *Ideas* of certain Lengths of Duration, we can in our Thoughts add them to one another as oft as we pleaſe, without ever coming to an End.

And thus it is plain, that from the two Fountains of all Knowledge before-mentioned, *viz.* *Senſation* and *Reflection*, we get the Ideas of *Duration*, and the ſeveral Meaſures of it. For,

1. By obſerving what paſſes in our Minds, how our Ideas there in train conſtantly vaniſh, while others being to appear, we acquire the Idea of *Succeſſion*.

2. By obſerving a Diſtance in the Parts of this Succeſſion we get the Idea of *Duration*.

3. By obſerving certain Appearances at regular and ſeemingly equidiſtant Periods, we get the Ideas of certain Lengths or Meaſures of Duration, as *Minutes*, *Hours*, *Days*, &c.

4. By being able to repeat theſe Meaſures of Time, as often as we will, we can come to imagine *Duration, where nothing does really endure or exiſt*: Thus we imagine to morrow, next Year, or ſeven Years hence.

5. By being able to repeat any ſuch Idea of any Length of Time, as of a Minute, Year, *&c.* as often as we will, and add them one to another without ever coming to an end of ſuch Addition, any nearer, than we can to the End of Numbers, to which we can always add, we come by the Idea of *Eternity*.

6. By conſidering any Part of infinite Duration, as ſet out by periodical Meaſures, we come by the Idea of what we call *Time* in general.

CHAP. XV.

Of Duration and Expanſion conſidered together.

TIME is to *Duration*, as *Place* is to *Space* and *Expanſion*. They are ſo much of thoſe boundleſs Oceans of *Eternity* and *Immenſity* as are ſet out and diſtinguiſhed from the reſt, as it were by Land Marks; and ſo are made uſe of to denote the Poſition of finite real Beings, in Reſpect one to another in thoſe infinite Oceans of Duration and Space.

Time and *Place* taken thus for determinate diſtinguiſhable Partitions of theſe infinite Abyſſes of *Space* and *Durations*, ſet out or ſuppoſed to be diſtinguiſhed from the Reſt by Marks, and known Boundaries, have each a twofold Acceptation.

Firſt,

First, Time in general is taken for so much of infinite Duration as is co-existent with the Universe, and measured out by the motions of its great Bodies; in this Sense Time begins and ends with the Frame of the sensible World, as in the Pharases *before all Time*, or *when Time shall be no more*.

Place is likewise sometimes taken for that *Portion* of infinite Space, which is possessed by, and comprehended within the material World; and is thereby distinguished from the rest of Expansion; though this might be more properly called *Extension* than *Place*. Within *these two* are confined the particular Time or Duration, Extension or Place of all corporeal Beings.

Secondly, Time is sometimes applied to Parts of that infinite Duration that were not really measured out by real Existence, but such as we upon Occasion do suppose equal to certain Lengths of measured Time, as in the *Julian Period*, which makes an Excursion of seven hundred and sixty four Years beyond the Creation. Thus we may speak of Place or Distance in the great *Inane*, beyond the Confines of the World, wherein I can conceive a Space equal to, or capable of receiving a Body of any assigned Dimensions.

Where and *when* are Questions belonging to all finite Existences, and are by us always reckoned from some known Parts of this sensible World, and from some certain Epochs marked out to us by the Motions observable in it. Without

out ſome ſuch fixed Parts or Periods, the Order of Things would be loſt, to our finite Underſtandings, in the boundleſs invariable Oceans of Duration and Expanſion; which comprehend in them all finite Beings, and, in their full Extent, belong only to the Deity. And therefore we are not to wonder, that we comprehend them not, and do ſo often find our Thoughts at a Loſs, when we would conſider them, either abſtractedly in themſelves, or as any Way attributed to the firſt incomprehenſible Being. But when applied to any particular finite Beings, the Extenſion of any Body is ſo much of that infinite Space, as the Bulk of that Body takes up. And Place is the Poſition of any Body, when conſidered at a certain Diſtance from ſome other. As the Idea of the particular Duration of any Thing, is an Idea of that Portion of infinite Duration, which paſſes during the Exiſtence of that Thing; ſo the Time when the Thing exiſted is the Idea of that Space of Duration, which paſſed between ſome known and fixed Period of Duration, and the being of that Thing. One ſhews the Diſtance of the Extremities of the Bulk, or Exiſtence of the ſame Thing, as that it is a Foot Square, or laſted two Years; the other ſhews the Diſtance of it in Place, or Exiſtence from the other fixed Points of Space or Duration; as that it was in the Middle of Lincoln's-Inn-Fields.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Numbers.

THE Complex *Ideas* of *Numbers* are formed by adding several *Units* together. The *Simple Modes* of it are each several Combinations, as, *Two*, *Three*, &c, These are of all others most distinct, the nearest being as clearly different from each other as the most remote; *Two* being as distinct from *One*, as Two Hundred. But it is hard to form distinct *Ideas* of every the least Excess in Extension. Hence Demonstrations in Numbers are more general in their Use, and more determinate in their Application than those of Extension.

Simple Modes of Numbers, being in our Minds but so many Combinations of Units which have no Variety, nor are capable of any other Difference, than *more* or *less*: *Names* for each of these distinct Combination, seem more necessary than in any other of our *Ideas*. For without such *Names* or *Marks*, to distinguish their precise Collection, or Number of Units, it will be hardly possible to keep them from being a heap of Confusion. Hence some *Americans* have no distinct Idea of any *Number* beyond Twenty; so that when they are discoursed with of greater Numbers, they shew the Hairs of their Head. So that to reckon right two Things are required:

First,

First, that the Mind distinguish carefully two *Ideas* which are different one from another, only by the Addition or Substraction of one Unit.

Secondly, That it retain in Memory the Names or Marks of the several Combinations from an Unit to that Number; and that not confusedly, and at Random, but in that exact Order, the Numbers as they follow one another. In either of which if it fails, the whole Business of *Numbering* will be disturbed; and there will remain only the confused *Idea* of *Multitude:* but the Ideas necessary to distinct Numeration will not be obtained or conceived.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Infinity.

THE *Idea* signified by the Name *Infinity*, is best examined, by considering to *what* Infinity is by the Mind more immediately attributed, and then *how* it frames it. *Finite* and *Infinite* then are considered by the Mind, as the Modes of Quantity, and attributed primarily to Things that have Parts, and are capable of Increase or Diminution, by the *Addition* or *Substraction* of any the least Part. Such are the *Idea* of *Space*, *Duration* and *Number*.

When we apply this Idea to the *Supreme Being*, we do it primarily in respect of his Duration and

and Ubiquity; but more figuratively when applied to his *Wisdom*, *Power*, *Goodness*, and other Attributes which are properly *inexhaustible* and *incomprehensible:* For when we call them Infinite, we have no other *Idea* of this Infinity, but what carries with it some Reflection on the *Number*, or the *Extent* of the *Acts* or *Objects* of God's Power and Wisdom, which can never be supposed so great or so many, that these Attributes will not always surmount and exceed, though we multiply them in our Thoughts, with the Infinity of *endless Number*. I do not pretend to say, how these Attributes *are in God*, who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow Capacities: but this is our Way of *conceiving them*, and these our Ideas of their Infinity.

The next Thing to be considered, is *how we come* by the *Idea* of Infinity. Every one that has any *Idea* of any stated Lengths of Space, as a *Foot*, *Yard*, &c. finds that he can repeat that *Idea*, and join it to *another*, to a *Third*, and so on, without ever coming to an End of his Additions: From this Power of enlarging his *Idea* of Space, he takes the *Idea* of infinite Space or *Immensity*; so, by being able to repeat the *Idea* of any Length of Duration (we have in our Minds,) with all the endless Addition of Number, we come by the *Idea* of *Eternity*.

If our Idea of *Infinity* be got by repeating without End our own *Ideas*; why do we not attribute it to other *Ideas*, as well as those of *Space* and *Duration*; since they may be as easily and as often repeated in our Minds as the other: Yet no body ever thinks of infinite *Sweetness* or *White-*

Whiteness, though he can repeat the *Idea* of Sweet or White as frequently as those of *Yard* or *Day?* I answer, that those *Ideas* that have Parts, and are capable of Increase, by the Addition of any Parts, afford us by their repetition, an *Idea* of *Infinity*; because with the endless Repetition there is continued an Enlargement, of which there is no End; but it is not so in other *Ideas*: For if to the perfectest *Idea* I have of *White*, I add another of equal *Whiteness*; it enlarges not my *Idea* at all, and therefore the different Ideas of Whiteness, &c. are called *Degrees*; but those Ideas, that consist of Parts, are capable of being augmented by every Addition of the least Part, and without any the least Confusion. Those *Ideas* that consist not of Parts, cannot be augmented to what Proportion Men please, or be stretched beyond what they have received by their Senses: But *Space*, *Duration*, and *Number* being capable of Increase by Repetition, leave in the Mind an *Idea* of an endless Room for more; nor can we conceive any where a Stop to a farther Addition or Progression, and so those *Ideas* alone lead the Mind towards the Thought of *Infinity*.

We are carefully to distinguish between the *Idea* of the *Infinity of Space*, and the *Idea* of a *Space Infinite*. The first is nothing but a supposed endless Progression of the Mind over any repeated *Idea* of a Space. But to have actually in the Mind the *Idea* of a Space Infinite, is to suppose the Mind already passed over, and actually to have a View of all those repeated *Ideas* of Space, which an endless Repetition can never totally

totally represent to it, which carries in it a plain Contradiction.

This will be plainer, if we consider *Infinity in Numbers*. The Infinity of Numbers, to the End of whose Addition every one perceives there is no Approach easily, appears to any one that reflects on it: But how clear soever this *Idea* of the Infinity of Number be, there is nothing yet more evident, than the Absurdity of the actual *Idea* of an infinite Number.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of other Simple Modes.

THE Mind has several distinct *Ideas* of *Sliding*, *Rolling*, *Walking*, *Creeping*, &c. which are all but the different Modifications of Motion. *Swift* and *Slow* are two different *Ideas* of Motion, the Measures whereof are made out of the distances of Time and Space put together.

The like Variety we have in *Sounds*: Every articulate Word is a different Modification of Sound: as are also Notes of different Length put together, which make that Complex *Idea* called a *Tune*.

The Modes of *Colours* are also very various; some of which we take Notice of, as the different Degrees, or as they are termed Shades of the same Colour. But since we seldom

dom make Assemblages of Colours, without taking in Figure also, as in Painting, *&c.* those which are taken Notice of, do most commonly belong to mixed Modes, as being made up of Ideas of divers Kinds, *viz.* Figure and Colour, such as *Beauty*, *Rainbow*, &c.

All compounded *Tastes* and *Smells* are also Modes, made up of the simple *Ideas* of those Senses: But they being such as generally we have no Names for, cannot be set down in Writing, but therefore must be left without Enumeration to the Thoughts and Experience of the Reader.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the Modes of Thinking.

WHEN the Mind turns its View inwards upon its self, *Thinking* is the first *Idea* that occurs, wherein it observes a great Variety of Modifications; and thereof frames to itself distinct *Ideas*. Thus the Perception annexed to any Impression on the Body made by an external Object, is called *Sensation*. When an *Idea* recurs without the Presence of the Object, it is called *Remembrance*. When sought after by the Mind, and brought again in View, it is *Recollection*. When held there long, under attentive Consideration, it is *Contemplation*. When *Ideas* float in the Mind, without Regard or Reflection; it is called in French *Resverie*, our Language has scarce a Name for it. When the

the *Ideas* are taken Notice of, and as it were registred in the Memory, it is *Attention*. When the Mind fixes its View on any one *Idea*, and considers it on all Sides, it is *Intention* and *Study*. *Sleep*, without Dreaming is Rest from all these. And *Dreaming* is the Perception of *Ideas* in the Mind, not suggested by any external Objects, or known Occasions; nor under any Choice or Conduct of the Understanding. Of these various Modes of thinking, the Mind forms as distinct *Ideas*, as it does of White and Red, a Square or a Circle.

CHAP. XX.

Of the Modes of Pleasure and Pain.

Pleasure and *Pain* are simple *Ideas* which we receive both from Sensation and Reflection. There are Thoughts of the Mind, as well as Sensations, accompanied with Pleasure or Pain. Their Causes are termed *good* or *evil*. For things are esteemed good or evil only in reference to Pleasure or Pain. That we call *Good* which is apt to cause or increase Pleasure, or diminish Pain in us; to procure or preserve the Possession of any Good, or Absence of any Evil: And on the contrary, that we call *Evil*, which is apt to produce or increase any Pain, or diminish any Pleasure in us; or else to procure us any Evil, or deprive us of any Good. By Pleasure and Pain, I would be understood to mean of *Body* or *Mind*, as they are commonly distinguished, though in truth they are only different

ferent Conſtitutions of the Mind, ſometimes occaſioned by Diſorders in the Body, ſometimes by Thoughts of the Mind. *Pleaſure* and *Pain*, and their Cauſes *Good* and *Evil*, are the Things upon which our Paſſions turn: by reflecting on the various Modifications or Tempers of Mind, and the internal Senſations which Pleaſure and Pain, Good and Evil produce in us, we may thence form to ourſelves the *Ideas* of our Paſſions. Thus by reflecting upon the Thought we have of the Delight, which any preſent or abſent Thing is apt to produce in us, we have an *Idea* we call *Love*: and on the contrary, the Thought of the Pain, which any Thing preſent or abſent produces in us, is what we call *Hatred*. *Deſire* is that Uneaſineſs which a Man finds in himſelf upon the Abſence of any Thing, the preſent Enjoyment of which carries the *Idea* of Delight with it. *Joy* is a Delight of the Mind ariſing from the Conſideration of the preſent or aſſured approaching Poſſeſſion of a Good. *Sorrow* is an Uneaſineſs of the Mind, upon the Thought of a Good loſt, or Senſe of a preſent Evil. *Hope* is a Pleaſure in the Mind upon the Thought of a probable future Enjoyment of a Thing which is apt to delight. *Fear* is an Uneaſineſs of the Mind upon the Thought of a future Evil likely to beſal us. *Anger* is a Diſcompoſure of Mind upon the Receipt of any Injury, with a preſent Purpoſe of Revenge. *Deſpair* is the Thought of the Unattainableneſs of any Good. *Envy* is an Uneaſineſs of Mind, cauſed by the Conſideration of a Good we deſire, obtained by one we think ſhould not have had it before us.

By

By *Pleasure* and *Pain*, Delight and Uneasiness, I must all along be understood (as I have intimated) to mean, not only bodily Pain and Pleasure, but whatsoever *Delight* or *Uneasiness* is felt by us, whether arising from any grateful, or unacceptable Sensation or Reflection.

It is to be considered, that in Reference to the Passions, the Removal or Lessening of a Pain, is considered, and operates as a Pleasure; and the Loss or Diminishing of a Pleasure, as a Pain. And farther, that the Passions in most Persons operate on the Body, and cause various Changes in it: But these being not always sensible, do not make a necessary Part of the *Idea* of each Passion. Besides these Modes of Pleasure and Pain which result from the various Considerations of Good and Evil, there are many others, I might have instanced in other Modes of Pleasure and Plain more simple than these, as the *Pain* of *Hunger* and *Thirst*, and the Pleasure of *Eating* and *Drinking* to remove them; and of *Musick*, &c. but I rather chose to instance in the Passions, as being of much more Concernment to us.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Power.

THE Mind being every Day informed by the Senses, of the Alteration of those simple

ſimple *Ideas* it obſerves in Things without; reflecting alſo on what paſſes within it ſelf, and obſerving a conſtant Change of its *Ideas*, ſometimes by the Impreſſion of outward Objects on the Senſes, and ſometimes by the Determination of its own Choice; and concluding from what it has ſo conſtantly obſerved to have been, that the like Changes, will for the future, be made in the ſame Things, by the ſame Agents, and by the like Ways, conſiders in one Thing, the Poſſibility of having any of its ſimple *Ideas* changed; and in another, the Poſſibility of making that Change, and ſo comes by that *Idea* which we call *Power*. Thus we ſay *Fire* has a Power to *melt Gold*, and make it fluid, and *Gold* has a Power to be *melted*.

Power thus conſidered is two fold, *viz.* as able to make, or able to receive any Change; the one may be called *active*, the other *paſſive Power*. Of *paſſive Power* all ſenſible things abundantly furniſh us with *Ideas*, whoſe ſenſible Qualities and Beings we find to be in a continual Flux, and therefore with Reaſon we look on them as liable ſtill to the ſame Change. Nor have we of *active Power* fewer Inſtances; ſince whatever Change is obſerved, the Mind muſt collect a Power ſomewhere able to make that Change. But yet if we will conſider it attentively, Bodies by our Senſes do not afford us ſo clear and diſtinct an Idea of *active* Power, as we have from Reflection, or the Operations of our Minds. For all Power relating to Action, and there being but two ſorts of *Action*, viz. *Thinking* and *Motion*, let us conſider whence we

have

have the clearest Ideas of the Powers which produce these Actions.

Of *Thinking*, Body affords us no Idea at all: it is only from Reflection that we have that; neither have we from Body any Idea of the Beginning of Motion. A Body at Rest affords us no Idea of any *active* Power to move; and when it is set in Motion itself, that Motion is rather a Passion than an Action in it. The Idea of the Beginning of Motion we have only by reflecting on what passes in ourselves; where we find by Experience that barely by willing it, barely by a Thought of the Mind, we can move the Parts of our Bodies, which were before at rest. This would lead us to think the Mind did receive its Idea of active Power clearer from reflecting on its own Operations there, than it doth from any external Sensation.

We find in ourselves a Power to begin or forbear, continue or end several Actions of our Minds, and Motions of our Bodies, barely by a Thought or Preference of the Mind. This Power which the Mind has thus to order the Consideration of any Idea, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the Motion of any Part of the Body to its Rest, and *vice versa* in any particular Instance, is that we call the *Will*. The actual Exercise of that Power, by directing any particular Action, or its Forbearance, is, that which we call *Volition* or *Willing*: The Forbearance or Performance of that Action, consequent to such Order or Command of the Mind, is called *Voluntary*: And whatsoever Action

tion is performed without ſuch a Thought of the Mind, is called *Involuntary*.

The Power of Perception is that we call the *Underſtanding*. *Perception*, which we make the Act of the Underſtanding, is of *three* Sorts. *Firſt*, the Perception of Ideas in our Minds. *Secondly*, the Perception of the Signification of Signs. *Thirdly*, the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of any diſtinct Ideas, theſe are more particularly attributed to the *Underſtanding*. Theſe Powers of the Mind, *viz.* of *perceiving* and *preferring*, are uſually called by another Name; and the ordinary Way of ſpeaking is, that the Underſtanding and Will are two *Faculties* of the Mind: A Word proper enough, if it be uſed ſo as not to breed any Confuſion in Mens Thoughts, by being ſuppoſed, (as I ſuſpect it has been) to ſtand for ſome real Beings in the Soul that performs thoſe Actions of Underſtanding and Volition.

From the Conſideration of the Extent of the Power of the Mind over the Actions of the Man, which every one finds in himſelf, ariſe the Ideas of *Liberty* and *Neceſſity*: So far as a Man has a Power to think or not to think, to move or not to move, according to the Preference or Direction of his own Mind, ſo far is a Man *free*. Wherever any Performance or Forbearance are not equally in a Man's Power wherever doing or not doing will not equally follow upon the Preference of his Mind, directing it there he is not *free*, though perhaps the Action may be *voluntary*. So that the Idea of *Liberty* is the Idea of a Power in any Agent to

or

do or forbear any Action according to the Determination or Thought of the Mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other; where either of them is not in the Power of the Agent to be produced by him, according to his *Volition*, there he is not at *Liberty*; that Agent is under *Necessity*. So that *Liberty* cannot be where there is no *Thought*, no *Volition*, no *Will*; but there may be Thought, there may be Will, there may be Volition, where there is no *Liberty*. Thus a *Tennis-ball*, whether in Motion by the Stroke of a Racket, or lying at Rest, is not by any one taken to be a free Agent; because we conceive not a *Tennis-ball* to think, and consequently not to have any Volition or Preference of Motion to Rest, or *vice versa*. So a Man striking himself or his Friend by a convulsive Motion of his Arm, which is not in his Power by Volition or the Direction of his Mind to stop, or forbear; nobody thinks he has in this *Liberty*, every one pities him as acting by *Necessity* and *Constraint*. Again, suppose a Man to be carried whilst fast asleep into a Room, where is a Person he longs to see, and be there locked fast in, beyond his Power to get out; he awakes, and is glad to see himself in so desirable Company, which he stays willingly in; that is, prefers his staying to going away. Is not this Stay voluntary? I think no Body will doubt it, and yet by being locked in, he is not at Liberty not to stay, he has not Freedom to be gone. So that *Liberty* is not an Idea belonging to Volition or Preferring, but to the Person having a Power of doing or forbearing to do, according as the Mind shall chuse or direct.

As it is in the Motions of the Body, so is it with the Thoughts in our Mind: For where we are so situated, that we have Power to employ the Mind upon any one Thought, or to lay it by, according to the Preference of the Mind, there we are at Liberty. A waking Man being under the Necessity of having some Ideas constantly in his Mind, is not at Liberty to think, or not to think, no more than he is at Liberty, whether his Body shall touch any other or no: But whether he will remove his Contemplation from one Idea to another, is many Times in his Choice. And then he is, in respect of his Ideas, as much at Liberty, as he is in respect of Bodies he rests on. He can at Pleasure remove from one Place to another: But yet some Ideas to the Mind, like some Motions to the Body, are such, as in certain Circumstances it cannot avoid or retire from, by the utmost Effort it can use. Thus a Man on the Rack is not at Liberty to lay by the Idea of *Pain*, and entertain other Contemplations.

Where-ever Thought is wholly wanting, or the Power to act or forbear according to the Direction of Thought, there *Necessity* takes place. This in an Agent capable of Volition, when the Beginning or Continuation of any Action is contrary to that Preference of his Mind, is called *Compulsion*; when the hindering or stopping any Action is contrary to his Volition, it is called *Restraint*: Agents that have no Thought, no Volition at all, are in every thing necessary Agents.

And

And thus I have in a *ſhort* Draught, given a View of our *Original Ideas*, from whence all the reſt are derived, and of which they are made up: And which may be all reduced to theſe few primary and original Ones, *viz. Extenſion, Solidity*, and *Mobility*, the Power of being moved, which by our Senſes we receive from Body: *Perceptivity*, the Power of *Perception* or *Thinking*; *Motivity*, the *Power of moving*, which we receive from our Minds by *Reflection*; to which if we add *Exiſtence, Duration, Number*, which belong both to the one and to the other, we have perhaps all the original Ideas, on which the reſt depend. By theſe I imagine might be explained the Nature of *Colours, Sounds, Taſtes, Smells*, and all other *Ideas* we have; if we had but Faculties acute enough to perceive, the ſeveral modifyed Extenſions and Motions of theſe minute Bodies, which produce thoſe ſeveral Senſations in us.

C H A P. XXII.

Of Mixed Modes.

HAving treated of *ſimple Modes* in the foregoing Chapters, and given ſeveral Inſtances of ſome of the moſt conſiderable of them, to ſhew what they are, and how we come by them; we are now, in the next Place, to conſider thoſe we call *Mixed Modes*; ſuch are the complex *Ideas*, we mark by the Names *Obligation, Drunkenneſs*, a *Lye*, &c. which, conſiſting of ſeveral Combinations of ſimple *Ideas* of different Kinds, I have called *Mixed Modes*, to

guiſh them from the more ſimple Modes, which conſiſt only of ſimple Ideas of the ſame Kind. Theſe mixed Modes being alſo ſuch Combinations of ſimple Ideas, as are not looked upon to be characteriſtical Marks of any real Beings that have a ſteady Exiſtence, but ſcattered and independent Ideas, put together by the Mind, are thereby diſtinguiſhed from the complex Ideas of Subſtances.

That the Mind, in Reſpect of its ſimple Ideas, is wholly paſſive, and receives them all from the Exiſtence and Operations of Things, ſuch as Senſation or Reflection offers them, without being able to make any one Idea, Experience ſhews us. But if we attentively conſider theſe Ideas I call mixed Modes, we are now ſpeaking of, we ſhall find their Original quite different. The Mind often exerciſes an active Power in making theſe ſeveral Combinations: For it being only furniſhed with ſimple *Ideas*, it can put them together in ſeveral Compoſitions, and ſo make a Variety of complex Ideas, without examining whether they exiſt ſo together in Nature. And hence I think it is, that theſe Ideas are called *Notions* or *Conceptions*, as if they had their original and conſtant Exiſtence more in the Thoughts of Men than in the reality of Things: And to form ſuch Ideas it ſufficeth that the Mind put the Parts of them together, and that they were conſiſtent in the Underſtanding, without conſidering whether they had any real Being. There are three Ways whereby we get the complex Ideas of *mixed Modes*.

Firſt,

First, By *Experience* and Obſervation of Things themſelves; thus by ſeeing two Men wreſtle, we get the *Idea* of wreſtling.

Secondly, By *Invention* or voluntary putting together, ſeveral ſimple *Ideas* in our Minds; ſo the Perſon that firſt invented *Printing*, had an *Idea* of it in his Mind, before he ever exiſted it.

Thirdly, Which is the moſt uſual Way, by *explaining* the Names of Actions we never ſaw, or Notions we cannot ſee; and by enumerating, and thereby, as it were, ſetting before our Imaginations all thoſe *Ideas* which go to the making them up, and are the conſtituent Parts of them. For having, by Senſation and Reflection, ſtored our Minds with ſimple Ideas, and by Uſe got the Names that ſtand for them, we can by thoſe Names repreſent to another any complex Idea we would have him conceive; ſo that it has in it no ſimple Ideas but what he knows, and has, with us, the ſame Name for. For all our complex Ideas are ultimately reſolvable into ſimple Ideas, of which they are compounded, and originally made up, though perhaps their immediate Ingredients, as I may ſay, are alſo complex Ideas. Thus the mixed Mode which the Word *Lye* ſtands for, is made up of twelve ſimple *Ideas*: Firſt, *Articulate Sounds*. Secondly, *Certain* Ideas *in the Mind of the Speaker*. Thirdly, *Thoſe Words, the Signs of theſe* Ideas. Fourthly, *Thoſe Signs put together* by Affirmation or Negation, otherwiſe than the *Ideas* they ſtand for, are in the Mind of the Speaker. Since

Languages are made, *complex Ideas* are usually acquired by the Explication of those Terms that stand for them: For since they consist of simple *Ideas* combined, they may by Words standing for those simple *Ideas*, be represented to the Mind of one who understands those Words, tho' that Combination of simple *Ideas* was never offered to his Mind by the real Existence of Things.

Mixed Modes have their *Unity* from an Act of the Mind, combining their several simple *Ideas* together, and considering them as one complex *Idea*: The *Mark* of this Union is one *Name* given to that Combination. Men seldom reckon any Number of *Ideas* to make one complex one; but such Collections as there be Names for. Thus the *killing of an old Man*, is as fit to be united into one *complex Idea*, as that of *a Father*: Yet there being no Name for it, it is not taken for a particular complex *Idea*; nor a distinct Species of Action, from that of killing any other Man.

Those Collections of *Ideas* have generally Names affixed to them, which are of great Use in Conversation; as Men are enabled by them to communicate their Thoughts to one another with all possible Dispatch. Those other Ideas which they have seldom Occasion to mention, they unite not together, nor are they particularised by having Names given them.

This shews the Occasion, why there are Words in every Language, which cannot be rendered by any single Word of another. For the Fashions and Customs of one Nation, make several

veral Combinations of *Ideas* familiar in one, which another had never any Occasion to make. Such were Ὀστρακισμὸς among the *Greeks*, and *Proscriptio* among the *Romans*. This also occasions the *constant Change* of Languages; for the Change of Custom and Opinions, bring with them new Combinations of *Ideas*, which, to avoid long Descriptions of, have new Names annexed to them, and so they become *new Species* of *mixed* Modes.

Of all our simple *Ideas*, those that have had most *mixed Modes* made out of them, are *Thinking*, and *Motion*; (which comprehend in them all Action) and *Power*, from whence these Actions are conceived to flow. For Actions being the great Business of Mankind, it is no wonder if the several Modes of Thinking and Motion should be taken Notice of, the *Ideas* of them observed and laid up in the Memory, and have Names assigned them. For without such *complex Ideas* with Names to them, Men could not easily hold any Communication about them. Of this Kind are the Modes of Actions distinguished by their *Causes*, *Means*, *Objects*, *Ends*, *Instruments*, *Time*, *Place*, and other Circumstances; as also of the Powers fitted for those Actions: Thus *Boldness* is the Power to do or speak what we intend without Fear or Disorder; which Power of doing any Thing, when it has been acquired by the frequent doing the same Thing, is that *Idea* we call *Habit*; when forward and ready upon every Occasion to break into Action, we call it *Disposition*: Thus *Testiness* is a Disposition or Aptness to be angry.

Power being the Source of all Action, the Substances wherein these Powers are, when they exert this Power, are called *Causes*; and the Substances thereupon produced, or the simple *Ideas* introduced into any Subject, *Effects*. The Efficacy whereby the new Substance or *Idea* is produced, is called in the Subject exerting that Power, *Action*; in the Subject wherein any simple *Idea* is changed, or produced, *Passion*: which Efficacy in *intellectual Agents*, we can, I think, conceive to be nothing else but Modes of Thinking and Willing: In *corporeal Agents*, nothing else but Modifications of Motion. Whatever Sort of Action, besides these produces any Effect, I confess myself to have no Notion, or *Idea* of. And therefore many Words which seem to express some Action, signify nothing more, but barely the Effect of the Action, with some Circumstances of the Subject wrought on, or Cause operating. Thus *Creation*, *Annihilation*, contain in them no *Idea* of the Action, or Manner, whereby they are produced, but barely of the Cause, and the Thing done. And when a Countryman says the Cold *freezes Water*, tho' the Word *Freezing* seems to import some Action, yet it truly signifies nothing but the Effect, *viz.* That Water that was before *fluid*, is become *hard*, and *consistent*, without containing any *Idea* of the Action whereby it is done.

I think I shall not need to remark here, that though Power and Action make the greatest part of mixed Modes, marked by Names, and familiar in the Minds and Mouths of Men; yet other

other ſimple Ideas, and their ſeveral Combinations, are not excluded; much leſs, I think, will it be neceſſary for me to enumerate all the mixed Modes, which have been ſettled, with Names to them. That would be to make a Dictionary of the greateſt part of the Words made uſe of in Divinity, Ethics, Law, and Politics, and ſeveral other Sciences. All that is requiſite to my preſent Deſign, is, to ſhew what ſort of Ideas thoſe are which I call *mixed Modes*; how the Mind comes by them; and that they are Compoſitions made up of ſimple Ideas got from Senſation and Reflection; which, I ſuppoſe, I have done.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of our complex Ideas *of Subſtances.*

THE Mind obſerving ſeveral ſimple *Ideas* to go conſtantly together, which being preſumed to belong to one Thing, are called, ſo united in one Subject, by one Name, which we are apt afterwards to talk of and conſider as one ſimple *Idea*, which indeed is a Complication of many *Ideas* together. We not conceiving how theſe ſimple *Ideas* can ſubſiſt by themſelves, ſuppoſe ſome *Subſtratum*, wherein they ſubſiſt, which we call *Subſtance*. The *Idea* of pure Subſtance is nothing but the ſuppoſed unknown Support of theſe Qualities, which are capable of producing ſimple *Ideas* in us; which Qualities are called *Accidents*.

The *Ideas* of *particular Sorts of Substances* are composed out of this obscure and general *Idea* of Substance, together with such Combinations of simple *Ideas*, as are observed to exist together, and supposed to flow from the particular internal Constitution and unknown Essence of that Substance. Thus we come by the *Ideas* of *Man*, *Horse*, *Gold*, &c. Thus the sensible Qualities of *Iron*, or a *Diamond*, make the complex *Ideas* of those Substances, which a Smith or a Jeweller commonly knows better than a Philosopher.

The same happens concerning the Operations of the Mind, *viz. Thinking*, *Reasoning*, &c. which we concluding not to subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to Body, or be produced by it; we are apt to think them the Actions of some other Substance, which we call *Spirit*; of whose Substance or Nature we have no clearer Conception than that of Body; the one being but the supposed *Substratum* of the simple *Ideas* we have from without; as the other is, of those Operations which we experience in ourselves within: So that the *Idea* of *corporeal Substances* in Matter, is as remote from our Conceptions as that of *spiritual Substances* in the Mind.

Hence we may conclude that he has the most perfect *Idea* of any particular Substance, who has collected most of those simple *Ideas* which do exist in it; among which we are to reckon its *active Powers*, and *passive Capacities*, though not strictly *simple Ideas*.

Secon-

Secondary Qualities serve principally to distinguish Substances. For our Senses failing us in the Discovery of the *Bulk*, *Figure*, *Texture*, &c. of the minute Parts of Bodies, on which their real Constitutions and Differences depend; Secondary Qualities are nothing more but the bare Powers of Substances with their Relations to our Senses. The *Ideas* that make our complex Ones of corporeal Substances, are of three Sorts. First, The *Ideas* of primary Qualities of Things, which are discovered by our Senses: Such are *Bulk*, *Figure*, *Motion*, &c. *Secondly*, The sensible secondary Qualities, which are nothing but Powers to produce several *Ideas* in us by our Senses; which Ideas are not in the Things themselves, otherwise than as any Thing is in its Cause. *Thirdly*, The Aptness we consider in any Substance to give, or receive such Alterations of primary Qualities, as that the Substance so altered, should produce in us different *Ideas* from what it did before: These are called *active* and *passive Powers*: All which, as far as we have any Notice or Notion of them, terminate in sensible *simple Ideas*.

Had we Senses acute enough to discern the minute Particles of Bodies, and the real Constitution on which their sensible Qualities depend, it is not to be doubted, but they would produce quite different *Ideas* in us; as we find in viewing Things with *Microscopes*. Such Bodies as to our naked Eyes appear clouded and opaque, will through *Microscopes* appear pellu-

cid.

cid. *Blood* to the naked Eye appears all red; but by a good *Microſcope* we ſee only ſome red Globules ſwimming in a tranſparent Liquor.

The *infinite wiſe Author* of our Being has fitted our Senſes, Organs and Faculties to the Conveniencies of Life, and the Buſineſs we have to do here: We may by our Senſes know and diſtinguiſh Things, ſo far as to accommodate them to the Exigencies of this Life. We have alſo Inſight enough into their admirable Contrivances, and wonderful Effects, to admire and magnify the Wiſdom, Power and Goodneſs of their Author. Such a Knowledge as this, which is ſuited to our preſent Condition, we want not Faculties to attain; and we are fitted well enough with Abilities to provide for the Conveniencies of Living here, and as far as we are connected with this World.

Beſides the complex *Ideas* we have of material ſenſible Subſtances, by the ſimple *Ideas* taken from the Operations of our Minds, we find from Experience a Power in ourſelves, of *Thinking*, *Underſtanding*, *Willing*, *Knowing*, &c. co-exiſting in the ſame Subſtance, from which we frame the complex *Idea* of *Spirit*. And the *Idea* of an *immaterial Subſtance*, we have as clear a Perception of, by putting together the Ideas of Thinking, Perceiving, Willing, and the Power of moving, &c. as of a *material*, by putting together the Ideas of Extenſion, Figure, Solidity, &c. By joining the former with Subſtance, (of which we have no diſtinct *Idea*) we have the *Idea* of an immaterial Spirit: and by putting together the

Ideas

Ideas of coherent ſolid Parts, and Power of being moved, joined with Subſtance, (of which likewiſe we have no poſitive *Idea*) we have the *Idea* of *Matter*. The one is as clear and diſtinct an Idea as the other. The Subſtance of *Spirit* is unknown to us; and ſo is the Subſtance of *Body* equally unknown: Two primary Qualities or Properties of Body, *viz. ſolid, coherent Parts*, and *Impulſe*, we have diſtinct, clear *Ideas* of: So likewiſe have we, of two primary Qualities or Properties of Spirit, *Thinking* and a *Power of Action*. We have alſo clear and diſtinct *Ideas* of ſeveral Qualities inherent in Bodies, which are but the various Modifications of the extenſion of cohering ſolid Parts, and their Motion. We have likewiſe the *Ideas* of the ſeveral Modes of Thinking, *viz.* Believing, Doubting, Hoping, Fearing, *&c.* as alſo of willing and moving the Body conſequent to it.

If this Notion of Spirit may have ſome Difficulties in it, not eaſy to be explained, we have no more Reaſon to deny or doubt of the *Exiſtence of Spirit*, than we have to deny or doubt of the *Exiſtence of Body:* becauſe the Conception of Body is incumbered with ſome Difficulties very hard, and perhaps as impoſſible to be explained or underſtood by us. The *diviſibility in infinitum*, for inſtance, of any finite Extenſion, involves us, whether we grant or deny it, in Conſequences impoſſible to be explicated, or made conſiſtent to our Apprehenſions. We have therefore as much Reaſon to be ſatisfied with our Notion of *Spirit*, as with our Notion of *Body*; and the Exiſtence of the one, as well

as

as of the other. We have no other *Idea* of the *Supreme Being*, but a complex one of *Existence*, *Power*, *Knowledge*, *Duration*, *Pleasure*, *Happiness*, and of several other Qualities, Infinite and Eternal; which are all distinct *Ideas*, and some of them being relative, are again compounded of others; all which, as has been shewn, are originally got from Sensation, and Reflection, and go to make up the Idea or Notion we have of God, and these to that vastness, to which Infinity can extend them.

In which complex *Idea* we may observe that there is no simple one, excepting *Infinity*, which is not a part of our complex *Idea* of other Spirits; because in our *Ideas*, as well of Spirits as other Things, we are restrained to those we receive from *Sensation* and *Reflection*.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of collective Ideas *of Substances.*

THERE are other *Ideas* of Substances which may be called *Collective*, and are made up of many particular Substances considered as united into one *Idea*, as a *Troop*, *Army*, &c. which the Mind makes by its Power of Composition. These *collective* Ideas are but the artificial Draughts of the Mind bringing

Things

Things remote, and independent on one another, into one View, the better to contemplate and discourse of them, united into one Conception, and signified by one Name. For there are no Things so remote, nor so contrary, which the Mind cannot by this Art of Composition, bring into one *Idea*, as is visible in that signified by the Name *Universe*.

CHAP. XXV.

Of Relation.

BESIDES the Ideas, whether simple or complex, that the Mind has of Things, as they are in themselves, there are others it gets from their Comparison one with another. The Understanding, in the Consideration of any Thing, is not confined to that precise Object: It can carry any Idea, as it were, beyond itself, or, at least, look beyond it, to see how it stands in Conformity to any other. When the Mind so considers one Thing, that it does, as it were, bring it to, and set it by another, and carry its View from one to the other: This is, as the Words import, *Relation* and *Respect*; and the Denominations given to positive Things, intimating that *Respect*, and serving as Marks to lead the Thoughts beyond the Subject itself denominated, to something distinct from it, are what we call *Relatives*; and the Things so

ſo brought together, *related.* Thus when the Mind conſiders *Cajus*, as ſuch a poſitive Being, it takes nothing into that Idea, but what really exiſts in *Cajus*; *v. g.* when I conſider him as Man, I have nothing in my Mind, but the complex Idea of the Species, Man. So likewiſe, when I ſay *Cajus* is a white Man, I have nothing but the bare Conſideration of Man, who hath that white Colour. But when I give *Cajus* the Name *Huſband*, I intimate ſome other Perſon; and when I give him the Name *Whiter*, I intimate ſome other Thing. In both Caſes my Thought is led to ſomething beyond *Cajus*, and there are two Things brought into Conſideration. And ſince any Idea whether ſimple or complex, may be the Occaſion why the Mind thus brings two Things together, and, as it were, takes a View of them at once, though ſtill conſidered as diſtinct; therefore any of our *Ideas* may be the Foundation of Relation.

Where Languages have failed to give correlative Names, there the Relation is not ſo eaſily taken Notice of: As in *Concubine*, which is a relative Name as well as *Wife*.

The *Ideas* of Relation may be the ſame, in thoſe Men who have very different *Ideas* of the Things that are related or compared. Thus thoſe who have different *Ideas* of *Man*, may agree in that of a *Father*.

There is no *Idea* of any Kind, which is not capable of an almoſt infinite Number of Conſiderations, in Reference to other Things: And there-

therefore this makes no ſmall Part of Mens Words and Thoughts. Thus one ſingle Man may at once ſuſtain the Relations of *Father*, *Brother*, *Son*, *Huſband*, *Friend*, *Subject*, *General*, *European*, *Engliſhman*, *Iſlander*, *Maſter*, *Servant*, *Greater*, *Leſs*, &c. to an almoſt infinite Number; he being capable of as many Relations as there may be Occaſions of comparing him to other Things in any Manner of Agreement, Diſagreement, or Reſpect whatſoever.

The *Ideas* of Relations are much *clearer* and more *diſtinct* than of the Things compared; becauſe the Knowledge of one ſimple *Idea* is oftentimes ſufficient to convey the Notion of the Relation: But to the knowing of any ſubſtantial Being, an accurate Collection of ſundry *Ideas* is neceſſary.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Cauſe and Effects, and other Relations.

IN the Notice that our Senſes take of the conſtant *viciſſitude of Things*, we cannot but obſerve, that ſeveral Particulars, both Qualities and Subſtances, begin to exiſt; and that they receive their Exiſtence from the due Application and Operation of ſome other Beings. From this Obſervation we get our *Ideas* of *Cauſe* and *Effect*. That which *produces* any ſimple or com-

complex Idea, we denote by the general Name *Cause*; and that which is *produced*, *Effect*. Thus finding, that in that Substance which we call Wax, *Fluidity* which is a simple Idea, that was not in it before, is constantly produced by the Application of a certain Degree of Heat, we call the simple Idea of Heat, in Relation to Fluidity in Wax, the Cause of it, and Fluidity, the Effect.

Having thus, from what our Senses are able to discover, in the Operations of Bodies on one another, got the Notion of Cause and Effect; *viz.* **A *Cause* is that, which makes any other Thing, begin to be; whether a simple Idea, Substance or Mode, and an *Effect* is that, which had its beginning from some other Thing: the Mind finds no great Difficulty to distinguish the several Originals of Things into two Sorts.**

First, When the Thing is wholly made new, so that no Part thereof did ever exist before, as when a new Particle of Matter doth begin to exist, which had before no Being, this we call *Creation*.

Secondly, When a Thing is made up of Particles which did all of them before exist, but that very Thing so constituted of pre-existing Particles, had not any Existence before, which considered all together make up such a Collection of simple *Ideas*, as this *Man*, this *Egg*, this *Rose*, &c. This, when referred to a Substance, produced in the ordinary Course of Nature, by an internal Principle, but set on Work by some external

external Agent or Cause, and working by insensible Ways which we perceive not, is called *Generation*.

When the Cause is extrinsical, and the Effect produced by a sensible Separation, or Juxta-position of discernible Parts, we call it *making*; and such are all artificial Things. When any simple *Idea* is produced, which was not in that Subject before, we call it *Alteration*.

The Denominations of Things taken from *Time*, are for the most part only Relations. Thus when it is said that Queen *Elizabeth* lived Sixty Nine, and reigned Forty Five Years, no more is meant, than that the Duration of her Existence was equal to Sixty Nine, and of her Government to Forty Five annual Revolutions of the Sun: And so are all Words answering, *How long*.

Young and *Old*, and other Words of Time, that are thought to stand for positive *Ideas*, are indeed relative; and intimate a Relation to a certain Length of Duration, whereof we have the *Idea* in our Minds. Thus we call a Man Young or Old, that has lived little or much of that Time that Men usually attain to. This is evident from our Application of these Names to other Things; for a *Man* is called Young at Twenty, but a *Horse* Old, *&c.* The Sun and Stars, though they have out-lasted several Generations of Men, we call not Old, because we know not what Period God has set to these Sorts of Beings.

There

There are other *Ideas*, that are truly *relative*, which we ſignify by Names that are thought *poſitive* and *abſolute*; ſuch as *great* and *little*, *ſtrong* and *weak*. The Things thus denominated, are referred to ſome Standards, whereby to denominate the Bulk and Degrees of others, with which we compare them. Thus we call an *Apple great*, that is bigger than the ordinary Sort of thoſe we have been uſed to, and a Man is ſaid to be *weak*, that has not ſo much Strength or Power to move as Men uſually have, or uſually thoſe of his own Size have.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of Identity and Diverſity.

ANother Occaſion the Mind takes of comparing, is the very *Being of Things:* when conſidering any Thing as exiſting at any certain Time, or Place, and comparing it with itſelf as exiſting at any other Time, *&c.* it forms the *Ideas* of *Identity* and *Diverſity*. When we ſee any Thing, in any certain Inſtant of Time, and Place, we are ſure, it is that very Thing, and no other, how like ſoever it may be in all other Reſpects, to another, which at the ſame Time exiſts in another Place, however like and undiſtinguiſhable it may be in all other Reſpects; and in this conſiſts *Identity*.

We conceiving it impoſſible, that two Things of the ſame Kind ſhould exiſt together in the ſame

ſame Place, at the ſame Time we rightly conclude that whatever exiſts any where, at any Time, excludes all of the ſame Kind, and is there itſelf alone: When therefore we demand whether any Thing be the *ſame*, or no, it refers always to ſomething that exiſted ſuch a Time, in ſuch a Place, which it was certain at that Inſtant was the ſame with itſelf and no other, from whence it follows that one Thing cannot have two Beginnings of Exiſtence, nor two Things one Beginning, it being impoſſible for two Things of the ſame Kind, to be or exiſt in the ſame Inſtant, in the very ſame Places, or one and the ſame Thing in different Places.

We have *Ideas* but of three Sorts of Subſtances, Firſt, God. Secondly, *Finite Intelligences*. Thirdly, *Bodies*.

Firſt, God is without beginning Eternal, unalterable, and every where, wherefore concerning his *Identity*, there can be no Doubt.

Secondly, Finite Spirits having had their determinate Time and Place of beginning to exiſt, the Relation to that Time and Place will always determine to each of them their *Identity*, as long as they exiſt.

Thirdly, The ſame will hold of every Particle of Matter to which no Addition or Subſtraction of Matter is made. For though theſe three Sorts of Subſtances, as we term them, do not exclude one another out of the ſame Place, yet we cannot conceive but that they muſt *neceſſarily* each exclude thoſe of the ſame Kind,

out

out of the ſame Place; or elſe the Notions and Names of *Identity* and *Diverſity* would be in vain, and there could be no ſuch Diſtinction of Subſtances.

The Identity and Diverſity of *Modes* and *Relations* are determined after the ſame Manner that Subſtances are; only as to Things whoſe Exiſtence is in Succeſſion, ſuch as the Actions of finite Beings, as *Motion* and *Thought*, both of which conſiſting in a Train of Succeſſion, concerning their Diverſity, there can be no Queſtion: becauſe each periſhing the Moment it begins, they cannot exiſt in different Times or in different Places, as permanent Beings can at different Times exiſt in diſtant Places; therefore no *Motion* or *Thought*, conſidered as at different Times, can be the ſame, each Part thereof having a different beginning of Exiſtence.

From whence it is plain, that Exiſtence itſelf is the *Principium individuationis*, which determines a Being to a particular Time and Place, incommunicable to two Beings of the ſame Kind. Thus, ſuppoſe an *Atom* exiſting in a determined Time and Place; it is evident that conſidered in any Inſtant of its Exiſtence, it is in that Inſtant the ſame with itſelf, and will be ſo as long as its Exiſtence continues. The ſame may be ſaid of two, or more, or any Number of Particles, while they continue together. The *Maſs* will be the ſame however jumbled; but if one Atom be taken away, or one added, it is no longer the ſame Maſs, or the ſame Body.

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In *Vegetables* and living Creatures, their Identity depends not on the ſame Maſs, of the ſame Particles, but on ſomething elſe; for in them the Variation of great Parcels of Matter alters not their Identity. The Reaſon of this is the Difference between an animate Body, and a Maſs of Matter; *the* latter being only the Coheſion of Particles any how united; *the other*, ſuch a Diſpoſition and Organization of Parts, as is fit to receive and diſtribute Nouriſhment, ſo as to continue and frame the Wood, Bark, Leaves, *&c.* of an *Oak*, in which conſiſts the vegetable Life. That therefore which has ſuch an Organization of Parts partaking of one common Life, continues to be the ſame *Plant*, tho' that Life be communicated to new Particles of Matter vitally united to the living Plant. The Caſe is not ſo much different in *Brutes*, but that any one may hence ſee what makes an *Animal*, and continues it the *ſame*. Something like this we have in Machines, and may ſerve to illuſtrate it. For Example, what is a Watch? It is plain it is nothing but a fit Organization, or, Conſtruction of Parts, to a certain End, which, when a ſufficient Force is added to it, it is capable to attain. If we would ſuppoſe this Machine one continued Body, all whoſe organized Parts were repaired, increaſed, or diminiſhed, by a conſtant Addition or Separation of inſenſible Parts, with one common Life, we ſhould have ſomething very much like the Body of an Animal, with this difference, that in an Animal, the fitneſs of the Organization and the Motion wherein Life conſiſts, begin together, the Motion coming from within; but in Machines, the

Force

Force coming ſenſibly from without, is often away when the Organ is in order, and well fitted to receive it.

This ſhews wherein the Identity of the *ſame Man* conſiſts; *viz.* in nothing but a Participation of the ſame continued Life, by conſtantly fleeting Particles of Matter, in Succeſſion, vitally united to the ſame organized Body.

To underſtand *Identity* aright, we muſt conſider what Idea the Word it is applied to ſtands for. It being one Thing to be the *ſame Subſtance*, another the *ſame Man*, and a third the *ſame Perſon*, if Perſon, Man, and Subſtance, are three Names ſtanding for three different Ideas; for ſuch as is the Idea belonging to that Name, ſuch muſt be the Identity: which, if it had been a little more carefully attended to, would poſſibly have prevented a great Deal of that confuſion, which often occurs about this matter, with no ſmall ſeeming Difficulties eſpecially concerning perſonal Identity, which therefore we ſhall, in the next place, a little conſider.

An *Animal* is a living organized Body; and conſequently the ſame Animal, is the ſame continued Life communicated to different Particles of Matter, as they happen ſucceſſively to be united to that organized living Body; and our Notion of *Man* is but of a particular Sort of Animal.

To find wherein perſonal Identity conſiſts, we muſt conſider what *Perſon* ſtands for; which is

is a thinking, intelligent Being, that reasons and reflects, and can consider itself the same Thing in different Times and Places; which it performs by that *Consciousness* that is inseparable from Thinking, and essential to it; it being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive. By this every one is to himself what he calls *Self*, without considering whether that *Self* be continued in the same, or divers Substances. In this consists *personal Identity*, or the Sameness of a rational Being: And so far as this Consciousness extends backward to any past Action, or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person. It is the same *Self* now, it was then: And it is by the same *Self*, with this present one, that now reflects on it, that the Action was done.

Self is that conscious thinking Thing, (whatever Substance made up of, whether spiritual, or material, simple or compound, it matters not,) which is conscious of Pleasure or Pain, capable of Happiness or Misery; and so is concerned for itself, as far as that Consciousness extends. That with which the Consciousness of this present thinking Thing can join itself, makes the same Person, and is one Self with it; and so attributes to itself, and owns all the Actions of that Thing, as its own, as far as that Consciousness reaches, and no farther; as every one who reflects, will perceive.

In this *personal Identity*, is founded all the Right and Justice of Reward and Punishment; Happiness and Misery being that for which

every one is concerned for himself. For as it is evident, if the *Consciousness* went along with the little Finger, when that was cut off, it would be the same Self that was just before concerned for the whole Body.

This may shew us, that personal Identity is not in the Identity of Substance, but in the Identity of Consciousness, for, if the same *Socrates*, waking and sleeping, did not partake of the same Consciousness, he would not be the same *Person*. *Socrates* waking, could not be in Justice accountable for what *Socrates* sleeping did, no more than one *Twin*, for what his Brother *Twin* did, whereof he knew nothing, because their Outsides were so like, that they could not be distinguished.

But suppose I wholly lose the Memory of some Parts of my Life, beyond a Possibility of retrieving them, so that I shall never be conscious of them again; am I not the *same Person* that did those Actions, tho' I have now forgot them? I answer, that we must here take Notice what the Word *I* is applied to, which in this Case is the Man only: And the same Man being presumed to be the same Person, *I* is easily here supposed to stand also for the same Person. But if it be possible for the same Man to have distinct incommunicable Consciousnesses at different Times, the same Man would, at different Times make different Persons. Which we see is the Sense of Mankind in the most solemn Declaration of their Opinions, human Laws not punishing the Madman for the sober Man's Actions, nor the sober Man for what

what the Madman did; thereby making them two Persons, which is somewhat explained by our Way of speaking in *English*, when we say such a one *is not himself*, or is *besides himself*, in which Phrases it is insinuated, that *self* is changed, and the *self same Person* is no longer in that Man.

But is not a Man drunk or sober the same Person? Why else is he punished for the Crimes he commits when drunk, tho' he should never afterwards be conscious of them? He is just as much the same Person; as a Man that walks and does Things in his Sleep, is the same Person, and is as answerable for any Mischief he may do in it. Human Laws punish both with a Justice suitable to their Way of Knowledge; for in these Cases they cannot distinguish with Certainty what is real, and what is counterfeit; and so the Ignorance in Drunkenness or Sleep, is not admitted as a Plea: For tho' Punishment is annexed to Personality, and Personality to Consciousness; and the Drunkard perhaps is not conscious of what he did, yet human Judicatures justly punish him because the Fact is proved against him; but Want of Consciousness cannot be proved for him. But in the great Day, wherein the *Secrets of all Hearts shall be laid open*, it may be reasonable to think, no one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing of, but shall receive his Doom, his *own Conscience accusing*, or else *excusing him*.

To conclude, whatever Substance begins to exist, it must during its Existence necessarily be the same, whatever Compositions of Substances

begin to exist, during the Union of those Substances, the Concrete must be the same. Whatsoever Mode begins to exist, during its Existence, it is the same: And so if the Composition be of distinct Substances, and different Modes, the same Rule holds. Whence it appears that the Difficulty or Obscurity that has been about this Matter, rather arises from *Names* being improperly *used*, than from any *Obscurity in the Things* themselves; for whatever makes the specifick Idea, to which the Name is applied, if that Idea be steadily kept to, the Distinction of any Thing into the *same*, and *diverse*, will easily be conceived, and there can arise no Doubt concerning it.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of other Relations.

ALL simple Ideas, being capable of Parts or Degrees, afford an Occasion of comparing the Subjects wherein they are to one another, in Respect of those simple Ideas. As *whiter*, *sweeter*, *more*, *less*, &c. These depending on the Equality, and Excess of the same simple Idea, in several Subjects may be called, *proportional Relations.*

Another Occasion of comparing Things is taken from the Circumstances of their Origin, or Beginning; which not being afterwards to be altered, make the Relations depending thereon as lasting as the Subjects to which they belong; as

as *Father, Son, Brother,* &c. These may be called *natural Relations,* which are of great Use, marking out to Mankind the Relationship they have to each other, there being Occasion for it, both in Law, and other Communications, one with another; from whence also arise the Obligations of several Duties amongst Men, and which are properly distinguished by the Names affixed to them.

Sometimes the Foundation of considering Things, is some Act whereby any one comes by a moral Right, Power or Obligation, to do something: Such are *General, Captain, Burgher;* these are *instituted* and *voluntary Relations,* and may be distinguished from the *Natural,* in that they are alterable and separable from the Persons to whom they sometimes belonged, tho' neither of the Substances so related be destroyed, which is otherwise in natural Relations, they holding good as long as their Subjects, as has been just observed.

Another Relation is the Conformity or Disagreement of Mens voluntary Actions to a Rule to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of: These may be called *moral Relations.* It is this Conformity or Disagreement of our Actions to some Law (whereby *Good* or *Evil* is drawn on us from the Will and Power of the Law-maker, and is what we call *Reward* or *Punishment*) that renders our Actions morally good or evil.

These deserve well to be examined, there being no Part of Knowledge wherein we should

be more careful to get determined Ideas, and avoid, as much as possible, Obscurity and Confusion. Human Actions, when with their various Ends, Objects, Manners and Circumstances, are framed into distinct complex Ideas, are, as has been shewn, so many mixed Modes, a great Part whereof have Names annexed to them. Thus, Gratitude, is a Readiness to acknowledge and return, Kindnesses received.

Of these *moral Rules*, or Laws, to which Men generally refer, and by which they judge of the Rectitude or Pravity of their Actions, there seem to be three Sorts, with their three different Enforcements, or Rewards and Punishments. For, since it would be utterly in vain to suppose a Rule set to the free Actions of Man, without annexing to it some Enforcement of Good and Evil to determine his Will, we must, where-ever we suppose a Law, suppose also some Reward or Punishment annexed to that Law. It would be in vain for one intelligent Being to set a Rule to the Actions of another, if he had it not in his Power to reward the Compliance with, and punish a Deviation from his Rule, by some good and evil, that is not the natural Product and Consequence of the Action itself: for that being a natural Convenience, or Inconvenience, would operate of itself without a Law. This, if I mistake not, is the Nature of all *Law*, properly so called.

The *Laws* that Men generally refer their Actions to, to judge of their Rectitude, or Obliquity, seem to me to be these three. 1. The *divine Law*. 2. The *civil Law*. 3. The *Law of*

of Opinion or Reputation, if I may so call it. By the Relation they bear to the first of these, Men judge whether their *Actions* are *Sins*, or *Duties*; by the second, whether they be *criminal*, or *innocent*; and by the third, whether they be *Virtues* or *Vices*.

First, By the *Divine Law*, I mean that Law which God has set to the Actions of Men, whether promulgated to them by the Light of Nature, or the Voice of Revelation.

That God has given a Law to Mankind, seems undeniable, since he has, *First*, a Right to do it, as we are his Creatures. *Secondly*, Goodness and Wisdom to direct our Actions to what is best. *Thirdly*, Power to enforce it by Reward, and Punishment of infinite Weight and Duration, in another Life. This is the only true Touchstone of moral Rectitude, and by which Men judge of the most considerable moral Good or Evil of their Actions: That is, whether as Duties or Sins they are like to procure to them Happiness or Misery from the Hands of the Almighty.

Secondly, The *civil Law* is the Rule set by the Commonwealth, to the Actions of those that belong to it. This Law no body overlooks; the Rewards and Punishments being ready at Hand to enforce it, extending to the protecting or taking away of Life, Liberty, and Estate of those who observe or disobey it; which are the Punishments of Offences against this Law.

Thirdly, The Law of Opinion or Reputation. *Virtue* and *Vice* are Names ſuppoſed every where to ſtand for Actions in their own Nature, right or wrong. As far as they are really ſo applied, they ſo far are co-incident with the divine Law. But this is viſible that theſe Names *Virtue* and *Vice*, in the particular Inſtances of their Application, through the ſeveral Nations and Societies of Men, are conſtantly attributed only to ſuch Actions as in each Country and Society are in Reputation or Diſcredit. So that the Meaſure of what is every where called and eſteemed *Virtue* and *Vice*, is the Approbation or Diſlike, Praiſe or Blame, which by a tacit Conſent eſtabliſhes itſelf in the Societies and Tribes of Men in the World; whereby ſeveral Actions come to find Credit or Diſgrace among them, according to the Judgment, Maxims, or Cuſtoms of the Place.

That this is ſo, appears hence: That tho' that paſſes for Virtue in one Place, which is elſewhere accounted Vice; yet every where *Virtue and Praiſe*, *Vice* and *Blame* go together, *Virtue* is every where that which is thought praiſe-worthy; and nothing elſe but that which has the Approbation of public Eſteem, is called *Virtue*. Theſe have ſo cloſe an Alliance, that they are often called by the ſame Name.

'Tis true, Virtue and Vice do in a great Meaſure every where correſpond with the unchangeable Rule of right and wrong, which the Laws of God have eſtabliſhed; there being nothing that ſo directly and viſibly ſecures and advances the

the general Good of Mankind, in this World, as Obedience to the Laws he has set them, and nothing that breeds Mischief and Confusion so much as the Neglect of them; and therefore Men without renouncing all Sense and Reason, and their own Interest, could not generally mistake in placing their Commendation and Blame on that Side that deserved it not.

They who imagine Commendation and Disgrace not sufficient Motives to engage Men to accommodate themselves to the Opinions and Rules of those with whom they converse, seem little skilled in the History of Mankind; the greatest Part whereof he will find to govern themselves chiefly by this *Law of Fashion*.

The Penalties that attend the Breach of God's Laws are seldom seriously reflected on, and those that do reflect on them, while they break the Law, entertain Thoughts of future Reconciliation. And for the Punishment due from the Laws of the Commonwealth, Men flatter themselves with the Hopes of Impunity: But no Man escapes the Punishment of Censure and Dislike who offends against the Fashion and Opinion of the Company he keeps, and would recommend himself to; nor is there one of Ten Thousand who is stiff and insensible enough to bear up under the constant Dislike and Condemnation of his own Club.

These three then, 1. The Law of God, 2. The Law of political Societies, 3. The Law of Fashion, or private Censure, are those to which Men variously compare their Actions: and it is

by their Conformity to one of these Laws, that they take their Measures, when they would judge of their moral Rectitude, and denominate their Actions good or bad.

Whether the Rule, to which, as to a Touchstone, we bring our voluntary Actions, to examine them by, and try their Goodness, and accordingly to name them; which is, as it were, the Mark of the Value we set upon them: whether, I say, we take that Rule from the Fashion of the Country, or the Will of a Law-maker, the Mind is easily able to observe the Relation any Action hath to it; and to judge, whether the Action agrees, or disagrees with the Rule; and so hath a Notion of *moral Goodness or Evil*, which is either Conformity, or not Conformity of any Action to that Rule: And therefore is often called moral Rectitude. This Rule being nothing but a Collection of several simple Ideas; the Conformity thereto is but so ordering the Action, that the simple Ideas belonging to it, may correspond to those which the Law requires. By which we see how moral Beings and Notions are founded on, and terminated in the simple Ideas we have received from Sensation and Reflection. For Example, let us consider the complex Idea signified by the Word *Murder*; and when we have taken it asunder, and examined all the Particulars, we shall find them to amount to a Collection of simple Ideas derived from Reflection and Sensation, *viz.* First from Reflection, we have the Ideas of *willing, considering, purposing, Malice*, &c. Also of *Life, Perception* and *Self Motion*. Secondly from Sensation, we have the Collection of those simple

ſimple ſenſible Ideas which are to be found in a *Man*, and of ſome Action whereby we put an End to that Perception and Motion in the *Man*, all which ſimple Ideas, are comprehended in the Word *Murder*. This Collection of ſimple Ideas being found to agree or diſagree with the Eſteem of the Country I have been bred in, and to be held worthy of Praiſe or Blame, I call the Action *virtuous* or *vicious*. If I have the Will of a ſupreme inviſible Law-maker for my Rule, then, as I ſuppoſe the Action commanded or forbidden by *God*, I call it Good or Evil, *Sin* or *Duty*: If I compare it with the civil Law, the Rule made by the Legiſlature of the Country, I call it *lawful* or *unlawful*, a Crime or no Crime. So that whenceſoever we take the Rule of Moral Actions, or by what Standard ſoever we frame in our Minds the Ideas of Virtues or Vices, they conſiſt only, and are made up of Collections of ſimple Ideas, which we originally received from Senſe or Reflection, and their Rectitude or Obliquity conſiſts in the Agreement or Diſagreement with thoſe Patterns preſcribed by ſome Law.

To conceive rightly the Rectitude of Moral Actions, we muſt take Notice of them under this twofold Conſideration.

Firſt, As they are in themſelves a Collection of ſimple Ideas. Thus Drunkenneſs or Lying ſignifies ſuch a Collection of ſimple Ideas, which I call mixed Modes; in which Senſe they are poſitive abſolute Ideas.

Secondly,

Secondly, Our Actions are considered as *Good*, *Bad* or *Indifferent*: In this Respect they are *relative*, it being their Conformity or Disagreement with some Rule that makes them to be so. We ought carefully to distinguish between the positive Idea of the Action, and the Reference it has to a Rule: Both which are commonly comprehended under one Name, which often occasions Confusion, and misleads the Judgment.

Thus the taking from another what is his without his Consent, is properly called *stealing*: But that Name being commonly understood to signify also the moral Pravity of the Action, Men are apt to condemn whatever they hear called *Stealing*, as an ill Action, disagreeing with the Rule of Right. And yet the privately taking away a Madman's Sword to prevent his doing Mischief, tho' it be properly denominated *Stealing*, as agreeing with the *Parts* that compose such an *Act* or *mixed Mode*; yet when compared to the Law of God, it is no Sin or Transgression, tho' the Name *Stealing* ordinarily carries such an Intimation with it.

And thus much for the Relation of human Actions to a Law, which therefore I call *moral Relations*.

It would be a Work of infinite Labour to go over the great Variety of Relations; I have here mentioned some of the most considerable, and such as may serve to let us see, from whence we get our Ideas of Relations, and wherein they are founded.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of clear, obscure, distinct and confused Ideas.

HAving shewn the Original of our Ideas, and taken a View of their several Sorts; I shall offer some few other Considerations concerning them. The first is, that some are *clear*, others *obscure*, some *distinct*, and others *confused*.

Our simple Ideas are *clear*, when they are such as the Objects themselves from whence they were taken, did in a well-ordered Sensation or Perception present them. Whilst the Memory retains them thus, and can produce them so to the Mind when it has Occasion to consider them, they are *clear Ideas*.

Our *complex* Ideas are *clear*, when the Ideas that go to their Composition are clear: And the Number and Order of those simple Ideas, that are their Ingredients, is determinate and certain.

The Cause of *Obscurity* in simple Ideas seems to be either dull Organs, or slight Impressions made by the Objects, or a Weakness in the Memory, not able to retain them as received,

As a clear Idea is that whereof the Mind has such a full and evident Perception, as it receives from an outward Object duly operating on

on a well-disposed Organ; so a *distinct* Idea is that wherein the Mind perceives a Difference from all other: And a *confused*, such an one as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another from which it ought to be different. *Obscurity* is opposed to *Clearness*, *Confusion* to *Distinctness*.

This Confusion incident to Ideas, is only in Reference to their Names. For every Idea a Man has, being visibly what it is, and distinct from all other Ideas but itself, that which makes it *confused* is, when it is such, that it may as well be called by another Name as by that by which it is expressed, the Difference which keeps the Thoughts distinct, and makes them to belong rather to the one, than to the other of those Names being left out; so that the Distinction which was intended to be kept up, by these different Names, is quite lost.

Confusion is chiefly occasioned by the following Defaults.

First, When any *complex* Idea (for *complex* Ideas are most liable to Confusion) is made up of too small a Number of simple Ideas, and such as are common to other Things, whereby the Differences that make it, deserve a different Name, are left out. Thus he that has an Idea made up of barely the simple ones, of a Beast with Spots, has but a confused Idea of a *Leopard*, not being sufficiently distinguished from a *Panther*, and other Sorts of Beasts that are spotted. Where the Ideas, for which we use different Terms, have not a Difference answerable

ſwerable to their diſtinct Names, and ſo cannot be diſtinguiſhed by them, there it is that they are truly confuſed.

Secondly, When the Ideas are ſo jumbled together in the complex one, that it is not eaſily diſcernible, whether it more belongs to the Name given it, than to any other. We may conceive this Confuſion by a Sort of Pictures uſually ſhewn, wherein the Colours mark out very odd and unuſual Figures, and have no diſcernible Order in their Poſition. This, when ſaid to be the Picture of a *Man* or *Cæſar*, we reckon confuſed, becauſe it is not diſcernible in that State, to belong more to the Name *Man* or *Cæſar*, than to the Name *Baboon* or *Pompey*. But when a cylindrical Mirrour rightly placed, hath reduced thoſe irregular Lines on the Table, into their due Order and Proportion, then the Eye preſently ſees that it is a *Man* or *Cæſar*, that is, that it belongs to thoſe Names, and is ſufficiently diſtinguiſhable from a *Baboon* or *Pompey*; that is, from the Ideas ſignified by thoſe Names.

Thirdly, When any one of our *Ideas* ſignified by a Name, is uncertain and undetermined. Thus he that puts in, or leaves out an Idea of his complex one, of *Church* or *Idolatry*, every Time that he thinks of either, and holds not ſteady to any one preciſe Combination of Ideas, that makes it up, is ſaid to have a confuſed Idea of Church or Idolatry. Confuſion always concerns two Ideas, and thoſe moſt, which moſt approach one another. To avoid Confuſion therefore, in any Idea, we ought to examine what other

Idea

Idea it is in Danger to be confounded with, or which it cannot be easily separated from; and that will be found an Idea belonging to another Name, and so should be a different Thing, from which yet it is not sufficiently distinct, and so keeps not that Difference from that other Idea, which the different Name imports.

It is to be observed that our *complex* Ideas may be very clear and distinct in one Part, and very obscure and confused in another; thus in a *Coiliaedrum* or Body of a *thousand Sides*, the Idea of the Figure may be confused, tho' that of the Number be very distinct: We can discourse and demonstrate, concerning that Part of this *complex* Idea, which depends on the Number thousand; tho' it is plain we have no precise Idea of its Figure, so as to distinguish it by that, from one that has but Nine Hundred and Ninety Nine Sides. The not observing this, causes no small Error in Mens Thoughts, and Confusion in their Discourses.

CHAP. XXX.

Of real and fantastical Ideas.

OUR Ideas in Reference to Things from whence they are taken, or which they may be supposed to represent, come under a *threefold* Distinction, and are, First, either *real* or *fantastical*. Secondly, *adequate* or *inadequate*. Thirdly, *true* or *false*.

By

By *real* Ideas I mean ſuch as have a Foundation in Nature, ſuch as have a Conformity with the real Being and Exiſtence of Things, or with their Archetypes.

Fantaſtical are ſuch as have no Foundation in Nature, nor any Conformity with that Reality of Being, to which they are referred as to their *Archetypes*. By examining the ſeveral Sorts of Ideas we ſhall find, that, Firſt, our *ſimple* Ideas are all real; not that they are Images or Repreſentations of what does exiſt; for though Whiteneſs and Coldneſs are no more in Snow, than Pain is; yet thoſe Ideas of Whiteneſs and Coldneſs, Pain, &c. being in us the certain Effects of Powers in Things without us, ordained by our Maker, to produce in us ſuch Senſations; they are real Ideas in us, whereby we diſtinguiſh the Qualities that are really in Things themſelves.

This Reality lies in the ſteady Correſpondence they have, with the diſtinct Circumſtances of real Beings. But whether they anſwer to them, as *Cauſes* or *Patterns* it matters not; it ſuffices that they are conſtantly produced by them. And thus our ſimple Ideas are all real and true, becauſe they anſwer and agree to thoſe Powers of Things which produce them in our Minds, that being all that is requiſite to make them real, and not fictious at Pleaſure. For in ſimple Ideas, as has been ſhewn, the Mind is wholly confined to the Operation of Things upon it, and can make to itſelf no ſimple Idea, more than what it has received.

Though

Though the Mind be wholly passive, in Respect of its simple Ideas; yet, I think, we may say, it is not so in Respect of its *complex* Ideas, for those being arbitrary Combinations of *simple* Ideas put together, and united under one general Name, in forming of which the Mind uses its Liberty; we must enquire which of these are real, and which imaginary Combinations, and to this I say, that,

First, mixed Modes and Relations having no other reality than what they have in the Minds of Men, nothing more is required to make them real, but a possibility of existing conformable to them. These Ideas being themselves Archetypes, cannot differ from their Archetypes, and so cannot be chimerical; unless any one will jumble together in them inconsistent Ideas. Those indeed that have Names assigned them in any Language, must have a Conformity to the ordinary Signification of the Name that is given them, that they may not be thought fantastical, as if a Man would give the Name of *Justice* to that Idea, which common Use calls *Liberality*.

Secondly, Our complex Ideas of Substances being made, in Reference to Things as they exist without us, whose Representations they are thought, are no farther real, than as they are such Combinations of simple Ideas, as are really united, and co-exist in Things without us. Those are fantastical which are made up of several Ideas, that were never found united, in Nature, as a *Centaur*, &c.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Ideas *adequate* or *inadequate*.

REAL Ideas are either *adequate* or *inadequate*; *First*, *adequate*, which perfectly represent those Archetypes which the Mind supposes them taken from, and which it makes them to stand for, and to which it refers them. *Secondly*, *inadequate*, are such which do but partially or incompleatly represent those Archetypes to which they are referred: Whence it appears,

First, That all our *simple* Ideas are *adequate*; for they being but the Effects of certain Powers in Things fitted and ordained by God, to produce such Sensations in us, they cannot but be correspondent and adequate to such Powers, and we are sure they agree to the Reality of Things. For if Sugar produce in us the Ideas we call Whiteness and Sweetness, we are sure there is a Power in Sugar to produce those Ideas in our Minds, or else they could not have been produced there; which as we have just remarked, are no other than Powers to excite such Ideas in us; and are therefore called *Qualities* in, or of Sugar. But these being nothing, in Truth, but Powers to excite such Ideas in us, we must, in that Sense, be understood, when we speak of *secondary Qualities*, as being in Things; or of their Ideas, as being in the Objects themselves, that excite them in us. This Manner

Manner of Expreſſion we are under the Neceſſity of following to accommodate ourſelves to the Capacity of the human Mind, in Order to be underſtood; yet ſignifying not the Reality of ſuch Ideas exiſting in Bodies, but truly their Power of producing them in us, ſo long as we are fitted with Organs, for ſuch Conceptions, and which do exiſt no otherwiſe; but Solidity, and Extenſion, and the Termination of it, Figure, with Motion and Reſt, whereof we have Conception, would be really in the World as they are, whether there were any ſenſible Being to perceive them or not, which therefore we are to conſider as the real Modifications of Matter, and ſuch as are the exiſting Cauſes of all our various Senſations of Bodies.

Secondly, Our *complex* Ideas *of Modes* being voluntary Collections of *ſimple* Ideas, which the Mind puts together without Reference to any real Archetypes, cannot but be *adequate* Ideas. They are referred to no other Pattern, nor made by any Original, but the Inclination and Will of him that makes the Combination; theſe muſt be conſidered as perfect, having the different Combinations, the Mind which firſt framed them intended they ſhould have. If indeed one would conform his Ideas to thoſe which are formed by another Perſon, they may be wrong or *inadequate*, not correſponding in every Particular with that deſigned by another, as their Archetype and Pattern. In which Reſpect only, any Ideas of Modes can be wrong, imperfect or inadequate, as that mixed Mode, denominated by the Word, *Goodneſs*, may be differently compounded in different Minds.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, Our *Ideas of Substances*, have in the Mind a double Reference: *First*, They are sometimes referred to a supposed real Essence, of each Species of Things; *Secondly*, They are designed for Representations in the Mind, of Things that do exist, by Ideas discoverable in them: In both which Respects they are *imperfect* and *inadequate*.

First, If the Names of Substances stand for Things, as supposed to have certain real Essences, whereby they are of this or that Species, (of which real Essences, Men are wholly ignorant and know nothing) it plainly follows that the Ideas they have in their Minds being referred to real Essences, as *Archetypes* which are unknown, they must be so far from being adequate, that they cannot be supposed to be any Representation of them at all. Our complex Ideas of Substances are, as has been shewn, nothing but certain Collections of simple Ideas that have been observed, or supposed constantly to exist together. But such a complex Idea cannot be the real Essence of any Substance: For then the Properties we discover in it would be deducible from it, and their necessary Connection with it be known, as all the Properties of a *Triangle* depend on, and are deducible from the complex Idea of *three Lines including a Space*, but it is certain that in our complex Ideas of Substances, are not contained such Ideas on which all the other Qualities that are to be found in them depend.

Secondly,

Secondly, Those that take their Ideas of Substances from their sensible Qualities, cannot form adequate Ideas of them; because their Qualities and Powers are so various, that no Man's complex Idea can contain them all. Most of our simple Ideas, whereof our complex ones of Substances do consist, are Powers which being Relations to other Substances; we cannot be sure we know all the Powers, till we have tried what Changes they are fitted to give and receive from other Substances, in their several Ways of Application: which being not possible to be tried upon one Body, much less upon all, it is impossible we should have adequate Ideas of any Substance, made of a Collection of all its Properties. For since the Powers or Qualities, that are observable by us, are not the real Essence of that Substance, but depend on it, and flow from it, any Collection whatsoever of these Qualities, cannot be the real Essence of that Thing. Whereby it is plain, that our Ideas of Substances are not adequate; are not what the Mind intends them to be. Besides, a Man has no Idea of Substance in general, nor knows what Substance is in itself.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of true and false Ideas.

TRUTH and *Falshood* in Propriety of Speech belong only to Propositions; and when Ideas are termed *true* or *false*, there is some secret

cret or tacit Proposition, which is the Foundation of that Denomination. Our Ideas being nothing but bare *Appearances* or *Perceptions* in the Mind, can in Strictness of Speech, no more be said to be true or false, than mere Names of Things can be said to be true or false. The Idea of *Centaur* has no more Falshood in it when it appears in our Minds, than the Name *Centaur* when it is pronounced or writ upon Paper. For Truth or Falshood lying always in some Affirmation or Negation, our Ideas are not capable of either of them, until the Mind passes some Judgment on them; that is, affirms or denies something of them. In a *metaphysical* Sense, of the Word *Truth*, both Ideas and Words may be said to be true, that is, to be really such as they exist, bare Perceptions of the Mind, tho' in Things called true, even in that Sense, there is perhaps a secret Reference to some Ideas, looked upon as the Standards of that Truth, which amounts to a *mental Proposition*.

When the Mind refers any of its Ideas to any Thing extraneous to it, they are then capable of being true or false: Because in such a Reference the Mind makes a tacit Supposition, of their Conformity to that Thing; which Supposition, as it is true or false, so the Ideas themselves come to be denominated. This happens in these Cases.

First, When the Mind supposes its Idea conformable to that in other Mens Minds, called by the same Name, such as that of *Justice*, *Virtue*,

tue, &c. to be the ſame, with what other Men give thoſe Names to.

Secondly, When the Mind ſuppoſes any Idea conformable to ſome real Exiſtence. Thus that of *Man* is true, that of *Centaur* falſe, the one having a Conformity to what has really exiſted; the other not.

Thirdly, When the Mind refers any of its Ideas to that real Conſtitution, and Eſſence of any Thing whereon all its Properties depend: And thus the greateſt Part, if not all our Ideas of *Subſtances*, are falſe.

As to the *Firſt*, when we judge of our Ideas by their Conformity to thoſe of other Men, of the ſame Name, they may be any of them falſe. But ſimple Ideas are leaſt liable to be ſo miſtaken, from the Regularity of their Appearance in the Objects they are found; we ſeldom miſtake *green* for *blue*, or *bitter* for *ſweet*, much leſs do we confound the Names belonging to different Senſes, and call a Colour by the Name of a *Taſte*. Complex Ideas are much more liable to Falſhood in this particular; and thoſe of mixed Modes more than thoſe of Subſtances; becauſe in Subſtances there are ſome remarkable ſenſible Qualities that ſerve ſufficiently to diſtinguiſh one Sort from another, and eaſily preſerves them when Names are uſed with Caution, and not applied to other Sorts of Subſtances; but in mixed Modes we are more uncertain, and we may call that *Juſtice* which ought to be called by another Name. The Reaſon of this is, that the abſtract Ideas of mixed Modes, being

being Mens voluntary Combinations of ſuch a *preciſe Collection of ſimple Ideas, ſo that the* Eſſence of each Species being made by Man alone; we have nothing elſe to refer our Ideas of mixed Modes to as Standards; but the Ideas of thoſe who are thought to uſe their Names in their moſt proper Signification: And as our Ideas conform to, or differ from them, they paſs for true or falſe.

As to the *Second*, when we refer our Ideas to the real Exiſtence of Things, none can be termed falſe, but our complex Ideas of Subſtances. For our ſimple Ideas being nothing but Perceptions in us anſwerable to certain Powers in external Objects, their Truth conſiſts in nothing but ſuch Appearances, as are produced in us ſuitable to thoſe Powers: Neither do they become liable to the Imputation of Falſhood, whether we judge theſe Ideas to be in the Things themſelves or no. For God having deſigned theſe as Marks by which we diſtinguiſh one Thing from another; they well anſwer the Purpoſe, and enable us to chuſe them as we have Occaſion: It alters not the Nature of our ſimple *Ideas*, whether we think the *Idea* of *blue* (for Inſtance,) to be in the *Violet* itſelf, or in the Mind only: And it is equally from that Appearance to be denominated *blue*, whether it be that real Colour, or only a peculiar Texture in it, that cauſes in us that *Idea*; ſince the Name *blue* ſignifies properly nothing more than that Mark of Diſtinction, that is in a Violet, diſcernible only by our Eyes, whatever it conſiſts in.

Neither would our ſimple Ideas be *falſe*, if from the Structure of our Organs it was ſo ordered, that the ſame Object ſhould produce in ſeveral Mens Minds, different Ideas. Of this from our Situations, we cannot have any Certainty, but with the higheſt Aſſurance we may ſuppoſe, that external Objects conſtantly operate, according to the Structure of the Organs, by which they are conveyed, and that their Appearances are in every Man's Mind the ſame. Names of ſimple *Ideas* may be miſapplied, as a Man ignorant in the *Engliſh* Tongue may call *Purple*, *Scarlet*; but this makes no Falſhood in the *Ideas*.

Complex *Ideas* of Modes cannot be falſe, in Reference to the Eſſence of any Thing really exiſting; as they have not any Reference or Patterns already exiſting, or made by Nature; being as we before obſerved, voluntary Combinations of the Mind, to which they are wholly indebted for their Exiſtence.

Our complex *Ideas* of Subſtances, being all referred to Patterns or Things exiſting without us, may be falſe. They are ſo, *Firſt*, when looked upon as Repreſentations of the Eſſence of Things, of which Eſſence we are entirely ignorant. *Secondly*, when they put together ſimple *Ideas* which in the real Exiſtence of Things, have no Union: As a *Centaur*. *Thirdly*, when from any Collection of ſimple *Ideas*, that do always exiſt together, there is one ſeparated or left out of the Number of ſimple *Ideas*, which are conſtantly joined and perceived to exiſt together. Thus, if from Extenſion, Solidity, Fixedneſs,

ednefs, Malleablenefs, Fufibility, &c. we leave out the Colour obferved in *Gold.*

If this Idea be only left out of the complex one of *Gold,* it is to be looked on as an inadequate and imperfect, rather than a falfe one: Since, tho' it contains not all the fimple Ideas, that are united in Nature, yet it puts none together, but what really exift together.

Upon the whole, I think that our Ideas as they are confidered by the Mind, either in Reference to the proper Signification of their Names, or in Reference to the Reality of Things, may more properly be called *right* or *wrong Ideas,* according as they agree or difagree with thofe Patterns to which they are referred. The *Ideas* that are in Mens Minds, fimply confidered, cannot be wrong, unlefs fuch *complex Ideas,* wherein inconfiftent Parts are jumbled together. All other Ideas are in themfelves right, and the Knowledge about them right, and true Knowledge, as exifting in the Mind. But when we come to refer them to Patterns, or Archetypes, then they are capable of being wrong, as far as they agree or difagree with fuch Archetypes.

C H A P. XXXIII.

Of the Affociation of Ideas.

THERE is fcarce any one that does not obferve fomething that feems odd to him, and is in itfelf really extravagant in the Opini-

ons, Reasonings, and Actions of other Men. The least Flaw of this Kind, if at all different from his own, every one is quick-sighted enough to perceive, and forward to condemn; and tho' he should be guilty of much greater Unreasonableness in his own Tenets and Conduct, it will pass unobserved by him, of which should it be pointed out, he will hardly be convinced.

This Sort of Unreasonableness is usually imputed to Education and Prejudice, and, for the most Part, truly enough; tho' that reaches not the Bottom of the Disease, nor shews distinctly enough whence it rises, or wherein it lies. Education is often rightly assigned for the Cause; and Prejudice is a good general Name for the Thing itself; but yet I think he ought to look a little farther, who would trace it to the Root it springs from, and so explain it, as to shew whence this Flaw has its Original in very sober and rational Minds, and wherein it consists. For this being a Weakness to which all Men are liable, and a Taint which universally infects Mankind, the greater Care should be taken to lay it open.

Some of our Ideas have a natural Correspondence and Connection one with another: It is the Office and Excellency of our Reason to trace these, and hold them together in that Union and Correspondence which is founded in their peculiar Beings. Besides this, there is another Connection of Ideas wholly owing to Chance or Custom; Ideas that in themselves are not at all of a Kin, yet come to be so united in some Mens Minds, that 'tis very hard to separate them; they always keep Company, and the one no sooner

ſooner comes into the Underſtanding, but its *Aſſociate* appears with it; and if they are more than Two, the whole Gang, always inſeparable, ſhew themſelves together. This ſtrong Combination of Ideas not allied by Nature, the Mind makes in itſelf either voluntarily, or by chance: And hence it comes in different Men to be very different, according to their different *Inclinations*, *Educations*, *Intereſts*, &c. Cuſtom ſettles Habits for Thinking in the Underſtanding, as well as of determining in the Will, and of Motions in the Body; all which ſeem to be but a Train of Motions in the animal Spirits, which once ſet a going, continue on in the ſame Tract they have been uſed to: Which by often treading is worn into a ſmooth Path, when the Motion in it becomes eaſy, and as it were natural. As far as we can comprehend Thinking, our Ideas ſeem to be thus produced in our Minds; or if they are not, this may ſerve to explain their following one another in an habitual Train, when once they are put into that Tract, as well as it does to explain ſuch particular Motions of the Body.

This Connection of Ideas (in our Minds in themſelves looſe and independent one of another) is of ſo great Force as to ſet us awry in our Actions, as well moral as natural, influencing our Paſſions, Reaſonings, and Conceptions, and ſo much, that perhaps there is not any one Thing that deſerves more to be looked after or mend our Attention. Thus the Ideas of *Goblins* and *Sprights* have really no more to do with Darkneſs than Light; yet let but a fooliſh Maid inculcate theſe often on the Mind of a Child,

and raiſe them there together, poſſibly he ſhall never be able to ſeparate them again ſo long as he lives; but Darkneſs ſhall ever afterwards bring with it thoſe frightful Ideas. So likewiſe, if a Man has ſuffered Pain or Sickneſs in any Place; or ſeen his Friend die in ſuch a Room; tho' theſe have in Nature nothing to do one with another, yet when the Idea of the *Place* occurs to his Mind, it brings that Pain and Diſpleaſure with it, that he formerly ſuffered there, he confounds them in his Mind, and can as little bear the one as the other.

Intellectual Habits, and Defects this Way contracted are not leſs frequent and powerful, but leſs obſerved. Let the Ideas of *Being* and *Matter* be ſtrongly joined either by Education or much Thought, whilſt theſe are ſtill combined in the Mind, what Notions, what Reaſonings will there be about ſeparate Spirits? Let Cuſtom from the very Childhood but have joined Figure and Shape to the Idea of God, and what Abſurdities will that Mind be liable to about the Deity? Let the Idea of *Infallibility* be joined to any Perſon, and theſe two conſtantly together poſſeſs the Mind, and then one Body in two Places at once, ſhall be ſwallowed for a certain Truth, whenever that imagined infallible Perſon dictates and demands Aſſent without Enquiry.

Some ſuch wrong Combinations of Ideas will be found to eſtabliſh the irreconcileable Oppoſition between different Sects of Philoſophy and Religion: For we cannot imagine every one of their Followers to impoſe wilfully on himſelf, and knowingly refuſe Truth offered by plain Reaſon.

Reason. Interest, tho' it does a great deal in the Case, yet cannot be thought to affect whole Societies of Men to so universal a Perverseness, as that every one of them should knowingly maintain Falshood: Some at least must be allowed to do what all pretend to; *i. e.* to pursue Truth sincerely. That therefore which captivates their Reasons, and leads Men of Sincerity blindfold from common Sense, will, when examined, be found to be, what we have just mentioned: Some independent Ideas, are by Education, Custom, and the constant Din of their Party so coupled in their Minds, that they always appear there together, and they can no more separate them in their Thoughts, than if they were but one Idea; and they operate as if they were so. This gives Sense to Jargon, Demonstration to Absurdities, and Consistency to Nonsense, and is the Foundation of the greatest, I had almost said of all the Errors in the World: Or if it does not reach as far, it is at least the most dangerous one, since so far as it obtains this Influence, it hinders Men from seeing and examining with that Freedom and Independence they should. The Confusion of two different Ideas which a customary Connection of them in their Minds hath to them in Effect made but one, this cannot but fill Mens Heads with false Views, and their Reasonings with false Consequences.

Having thus given an Account of the *Original Sorts* and *Extent* of our Ideas, which are the Instruments or Materials of our Knowledge, I should immediately proceed to shew, what Use the Understanding makes of them, and

what Knowledge we have by them. But upon a nearer Approach, I find that there is ſo cloſe a Connection between Ideas and *Words*; and our abſtract Ideas and general *Words* have ſo conſtant a Relation one to another, that it is impoſſible to ſpeak clearly and diſtinctly of our Knowledge, which all conſiſts in Propoſitions, without conſidering firſt, the Nature, Uſe and Signification of *Language*, which therefore muſt be the Buſineſs of the next Book.

BOOK

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Of Words or Language in general.

GOD having designed Man for a sociable Creature, made him not only with an Inclination, and under a Necessity to have Fellowship with those of his own Kind, but furnished him also with *Language*, which was to be the great Instrument and common Tie of Society. Man therefore had by Nature his Organs so fashioned, as to be fit to frame *articulate Sounds* which we call Words.

But besides articulate Sounds (which Birds may be taught to imitate) it was further necessary that he should be able to use *these Sounds* as Signs of *internal Conceptions*, and make them stand as Marks of the Ideas in his Mind, whereby they might be made known to others.

But it is not enough for the Perfection of Language, that Sounds can be made Signs of Ideas, unless these can be made use of, so as to comprehend several particular Things; for the Multiplication of Words would have perplexed their Use, had every particular Thing need of a distinct Name to be signified by. To remedy this Inconvenience, Language had yet a farther Improvement in the Use of *general Terms*, whereby one Word was made to mark a Multi-

tude of particular Existences; which advantageous Use of Sounds was obtained only by the Difference of the Ideas they were made Signs of. Those Names becoming *general*, which are made to stand for *general Ideas*; and those remaining *Particular*, where the Ideas they are used for are *Particular*. There are other Words which signify the *Want* or *Absence* of Ideas, as *Ignorance*, *Barrenness*, &c. which relate to *positive Ideas*, and signify their Absence.

It is observable that the Words which stand for Actions and Notions quite removed from Sense, are borrowed from sensible Ideas, *v. g.* to imagine, apprehend, comprehend, understand, adhere, conceive, instil, Disgust, Disturbance, Tranquillity, *&c.* which are all taken from the Operations of sensible Things, and applied to *Modes* of *Thinking*. *Spirit*, in its primary Signification, is no more than Breath; *Angel*, a Messenger. By which we may guess what Kind of Notions they were, and whence derived; which filled the Minds of the first Beginners of Languages, and how Nature, even in the naming of Things unawares, suggested to Men the Originals of all their Knowledge: Whilst to give Names that might make known to others any Operations they felt in themselves, or any other Ideas, that came not under their Senses, they were fain to borrow Words from the ordinary and known Ideas of *Sensation*.

The better to understand the *Use* and *Force* of Language, as subservient to Knowledge, it will be necessary to consider,

First,

First, To what it is that *Names* in the Use of Language are immediately applied.

Secondly, Since all (except proper Names) are *General*, and so stand not for this or that single Thing, but for *Sorts* and *Ranks*; it will be necessary to consider what those Sorts and Kinds of Things are; wherein they consist, and how they came to be made: This shall be considered in the following Chapters.

CHAP. II.

Of the Significations of Words.

MAN, though he has great Variety of Thoughts, yet are they all within his own Breast invisible and hidden from others, nor can of themselves be made to appear. It was necessary therefore, for the Comfort and Advantage of Society, that Man should find out some *external Signs*, whereby those invisible Ideas might be made known to others. For which Purpose nothing was so fit, either for Number or Quickness, as those *articulate Sounds*, he found himself able to make. Hence *Words* came to be made Use of by Men, as Signs of their Ideas: Not upon Account of any *Natural* Connection between articulate Sounds, and certain Ideas; for then there would be but one Language amongst all Men; but a voluntary Imposition, whereby such a Word is made *Arbitrarily* the Mark of such an Idea. The Use then of Words, is

is to be ſenſible Marks of our Ideas; and the Ideas they ſtand for, are their *proper* and *immediate Signification*: In which they ſtand for nothing more but the Ideas in the Mind of him that uſes them. For when a Man ſpeaks to another, it is that he may be underſtood; that is, that his Sounds may make known his Ideas to the Hearer.

Words being voluntary Signs, cannot be impoſed on Things we know not: This would be to make them Signs of nothing, Sounds without Signification. A Man cannot make his Words the Signs, either, of *Qualities* in Things, or of *Conceptions* in the Mind of another, whereof he has no Ideas in his own.

Words in all Mens Mouths (that ſpeak with any Meaning) ſtand for the Ideas which thoſe that uſe them have, and which they would expreſs by them. Thus a Child that takes notice of nothing more in the Metal he hears called *Gold*, than the *Yellow Colour*, calls the ſame *Colour* in a Peacock's Tail *Gold*. Another, that hath better obſerved, adds to ſhining Yellow, great Weight; and then the Sound *Gold* ſtands, when he uſes it for a *complex Idea* of a ſhining Yellow, and very weighty Subſtance.

Though Words ſignify properly nothing but the Ideas in Mens Minds, yet they are in their Thoughts, ſecretly referred to *Two* other Things.

Firſt, They ſuppoſe their Words to be Marks of Ideas in the Minds of other Men with whom

whom they communicate; else they could not discourse intelligibly with one another: In this Case Men do not trouble themselves to examine, whether their Ideas, and those of other Men are the same; they think it sufficient that they use the Word in the common Acceptation of that Language.

Secondly, They suppose their Words to stand also for the *Reality of Things*.

Words then being immediately the Signs of Mens Ideas, whereby they express their Thoughts and Conceptions to others, there arises, by constant Use, such a Connection between certain *Sounds*, and the *Ideas* they stand for, that their Names are no sooner heard, than they almost as readily excite certain Ideas, as if the Objects themselves, were present to the Senses.

And because we do not examine precisely the Signification of Words, we often, by an inattentive Consideration, set our Thoughts more on Words than Things: Nay, some (because we often learn Words before we know the Ideas they stand for) speak several Words no otherwise than *Parrots* do, without any Meaning at all. But so far as Words are of Use and Signification, so far there is a constant Connection between the *Sound* and the *Idea*; and a Designation that the one stands for the other; without which Application of them, they are nothing but insignificant Noise.

Since

Since then Words ſignify only Mens peculiar Ideas, and that by an *arbitrary Impoſition*, it follows that every Man has an inviolable Liberty to make Words ſtand for what Ideas he pleaſes. It is true common Uſe, by a tacit Conſent appropriates certain Sounds to certain Ideas in all Languages; which ſo far limits the Signification of each Sound, that unleſs a Man applies it to the ſame Ideas, he cannot *ſpeak properly*: And unleſs a Man's Words excite the ſame Ideas, in the Hearer, which he makes them ſtand for in ſpeaking, he cannot *ſpeak intelligibly*. But whatever is the Conſequence of any Man's Uſe of Words, different either from their publick Uſe, or that of the Perſons to whom he addreſſes them, this is certain, their Signification in his Uſe of them is limited to his Ideas, and they can be Signs of nothing elſe.

CHAP. III.

Of General Terms.

ALL Things that exiſt being Particulars, it might be expected that Words ſhould be ſo too in their Signification: But we find it quite otherwiſe; for moſt of the Words that compoſe all Languages are *General Terms*. This is the Effect of Reaſon and Neceſſity, For,

Firſt, It is impoſſible that every particular Thing ſhould have a diſtinct peculiar Name, becauſe of the Impoſſibility to have a diſtinct Idea of

of every particular Thing, to retain its Name, with its peculiar Appropriation to that Idea.

Secondly, It would be *Uſeleſs*, unleſs thoſe we converſe with could be ſuppoſed to have theſe ſame Ideas in their Minds. For Names applied to particular Things, whereof I alone have the Ideas in my Mind, could not be ſignificant or intelligible to another, who is not acquainted with all thoſe particular Things which had fallen under my Notice.

Thirdly, It would be of no great *Uſe* for the *Improvement of Knowledge*: Which though founded in particular Things, enlarges itſelf by general Views; to which Things, reduced into Sorts under general Names, are properly ſubſervient. In Things where we have occaſion to conſider and diſcourſe of *Individuals*, and Particulars, we uſe proper Names; as in *Perſons*, *Countries*, *Cities*, *Rivers*, *Mountains*, &c. Thus we ſee that Jockeys have particular Names for their Horſes, becauſe they often have occaſion to mention, this or that particular Horſe, when he is out of Sight.

The next Thing to be conſidered, is how *general Words* come to be made. Words become general by being made Signs of *general Ideas*: Ideas become general by ſeparating from them the Circumſtances of Time, Place, or any other Ideas that may determine them to this or that particular Exiſtence. By this way of *Abſtraction* they become capable of repreſenting more Individuals than one: Each of which having

having a Conformity to that abſtract Idea, is of that Sort.

But it may not be amiſs to trace our Notions and Names from their Beginning; and obſerve by what Degrees we proceed and enlarge our Ideas, from our firſt Infancy. It is evident, that the firſt Ideas Children get are only particular, as of the *Nurſe* or *Mother*, and the Names they give them are confined to theſe Individuals. Afterwards obſerving that there are a great many other Things in the World that reſemble them in Shape and other Qualities, they frame an Idea which they find thoſe many Particulars do partake in; to that they give, with others, the Name *Man*, for Example; in this they make nothing *new*, but only leave out of the complex Idea they had of *Peter*, *James*, *Mary*, &c. that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to all. And thus they come to have a general *Name*, and a general *Idea*.

By the ſame Method they advance to more general Names and Notions. For obſerving ſeveral Things that differ from the Idea of *Man*, and cannot therefore be comprehended under that Name, to agree with Man in ſome certain Qualities, by retaining only thoſe Qualities, and uniting them into one Idea, they have another more general Idea, to which giving a Name, they make a *Term* of a more comprehenſive Extenſion. Thus by leaving out the Shape, and ſome other Properties ſignified by the Name *Man*, and retaining only a Body with Life, Senſe, and ſpontaneous Motion, we form

form the Idea signified by the Name *Animal*. By the same Way the Mind proceeds to *Body*, *Substance*, and at last to *Being*, *Thing*, and such universal Terms which stand for any Ideas whatsoever. Hence we see that the whole Mystery of *Genus* and *Species* is nothing else but *abstract Ideas*, more or less comprehensive, with Names annexed to them.

This shews us the Reason why in defining Words we make Use of the *Genus*; namely, to save the Labour of enumerating the several simple Ideas, which the next general Term stands for. From what has been said it is plain, that *General* and *Universal* belong not to the *real* Existence of Things; but are Inventions of the Understanding, made by it for its own Use, and concern only Signs, either *Words* or *Ideas*.

It must be considered, in the next Place, what Kind of Signification it is that general Words have. It is evident that they do not barely signify one particular Thing; for then they would not be general Terms, but proper Names: Neither do they signify a *Plurality*; for then *Man* and *Men* would signify the same Thing, or certain Species; but that which they signify is a *Sort* of Things, and this they do by being made a Sign of an *abstract Idea* in the Mind, to which Idea, as Things existing are found to agree, so they come to be ranked under that Name, or to be of that Sort. The *Essences* then of the Sorts, or Species of Things, are nothing but these *abstract Ideas*.

It is not denied here that Nature makes Things alike, and so lays the Foundation of this Sorting

ing and Classing: But the *Sorts* or *Species* themselves are the Workmanship of Human Understanding; so that every distinct *abstract Idea* is a distinct *Essence*, and the Names that stand for such distinct Ideas, are the Names of Things essentially different. Thus *Oval*, *Circle*, *Rain* and *Snow*, are essentially different. To make this clearer, it may not be amiss to consider the several Significations of the Word *Essence*.

First, It may be taken for the very Being of any Thing whereby it is, what it is, and gives it its Existence: Thus the real internal (but unknown) Constitution in *Substances*, may be called their *Essence*. This is the proper Signification of the Word.

Secondly, In the *Schools* the Word Essence has been almost wholly applied to the artificial Constitution of *Genus* and *Species*: It is true, there is ordinarily supposed a real Constitution of the Sorts of Things; and it is past Doubt there must be some real Constitution, on which any Collection of *simple* Ideas co-existing, must depend. But it being evident, that Things are ranked into Sorts, under Names only as they agree to certain *abstract* Ideas, to which we have annexed those Names, the Essence of each *Genus* or *Species* is nothing but the *abstract* Idea, which the Name stands for; this the Word *Essence* imports in its most familiar Use, without any Regard to its real Constitution.

These two Sorts of *Essence* may not be unfitly termed the one *real*, the other *nominal*. Between the nominal Essence and the Name, there is so near a Connection, that the Name of any Sort

Sort of Things cannot be attributed to any particular Being but what has this Essence, whereby it answers that *abstract* Idea, whereof that Name is the Sign.

Concerning the real Essences of corporeal Substances, there are two Opinions.

First, Some using the Word *Essence* for they know not what, suppose a certain Number of those *Essences*, according to which all natural Things are made, and of which they equally partake, and do become of this or of that Species.

Secondly, Others look on all natural Things to have a real, but unknown Constitution of their insensible Parts, from whence flow their sensible Qualities, which serve us to distinguish them one from another; and according to which we rank them into Sorts, under common Denominations. The former Supposition seems irreconcileable with the frequent Production of Monsters, in all the Species of Animals: Since it is impossible that two Things partaking of the same real *Essence*, should have different *Properties*. But were there no other Reason against it, yet the Supposition of *Essences* which cannot be known, and the making them to be that which distinguisheth the Species of Things, is so wholly useless and unserviceable to any Part of *Knowledge*, that that alone were sufficient to make us lay it by.

We may further observe, that the nominal and real Essences of *simple* Ideas and Modes are always the same; but in *Substances*, always quite different.

different. Thus a Figure, including a Space between Three Lines, is the real as well as nominal Essence of a Triangle; it being that Foundation from which all its Properties flow, and to which they are inseparably annexed: But it is far otherwise in *Gold*, or any other Sort of *Substance*; it is the real Constitution of its insensible Parts, on which depend all those Properties that are to be found in it; of which Constitution or insensible Parts since we know not, nor have any particular Idea, we can have no Name that is the Sign of it. But yet it is its *Colour*, *Weight*, *Fusibility*, and *Fixedness*, &c. which makes it to be *Gold*, or gives it a Right to that Name; which is therefore its nominal *Essence*, since nothing can be called *Gold*, but what has a Conformity to that abstract, complex Idea, to which that Name is annexed.

That Essences are but abstract Ideas, may farther appear by their being held ingenerable and incorruptible. This cannot be true of the real Constitution of Things. All Things in Nature (save the *AUTHOR* of it) are liable to change: Their real *Essences* and Constitutions are destroyed and perish: But as they are Ideas established in the Mind, they remain immutable. For whatever becomes of *Alexander*, or *Bucephalus*, the Ideas of Man and Horse remain the same. By these Means, the Essence of a *Species* rests safe and entire, without the Existence of one *Individual* of that Kind.

It is evident then, that this Doctrine of the Immutability of Essences proves them to be only abstract Ideas, and is founded on the Relation

on eſtabliſhed between them and certain Sounds, as Signs of them, and will always be true, as long as the ſame Name can have the ſame Signification.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Names of ſimple Ideas.

WORDS tho' they ſignify nothing immediately, but the Ideas in the Mind of the Speaker; yet we ſhall find that the Names of ſimple *Ideas*, mixed *Modes*, and natural *Subſtances* have each of them ſomething peculiar: And,

Firſt, The Names of *ſimple Ideas* and *Subſtances*, with the abſtract Ideas in the Mind, intimate ſome *real Exiſtence*, from which they were derived as their Original, and Pattern: But the Names of *mixed Modes* terminate in the Idea that is in the Mind, not extending the Thoughts any further.

Secondly, The Names of *ſimple Ideas* and *mixed Modes* ſignify the *real* as well as *nominal* Eſſences of their Species: The Names of *Subſtances* ſignify rarely, if ever any Thing, but barely the *nominal Eſſences* of thoſe Species.

Thirdly, The Names of *ſimple Ideas* are not capable of *Definitions*; thoſe of *complex Ideas* are: The Reaſon of which I ſhall ſhew from the

the Nature of our Ideas, and the Signification of Words.

It is agreed that a *Definition* is nothing else but the shewing the Meaning of one Word by several other, *not synonymous Terms*. The Meaning of Words being only the Ideas they are made to stand for; the Meaning of any Term is then shewed, or the Word defined, when by other Words the Idea it is made the Sign of, is, as it were, represented or set before the View of another, and thus its Signification ascertained. The Names then of *simple* Ideas are incapable of being defined, because the several Terms of a Definition signifying several Ideas, they can altogether by no Means represent an Idea which has no Composition or Parts at all, and therefore a Definition, which is but the shewing of the Meaning of one Word, by several others not signifying each the same Thing, can in the Names of simple Ideas have no Place.

The not observing this Difference in our Ideas, has occasioned those *trifling* Definitions which are given us of some simple Ideas; such as is that of *Motion*, viz. *The Act of a Being in Power, as far forth as in Power.*

The Atomists who define Motion to be a *Passage* from one Place to another, what do they more than put one synonymous Word for another? For what is *Passage* other than Motion? Nor will the successive Application of the Parts of the Superficies of one Body to those of another, which the *Cartesians* give us, prove a much

much better Definition of Motion when well examined.

The Act of Perspicuous, as far forth as perspicuous, is another *peripatetick* Definition of a simple Idea, which it is certain can never make the meaning of the Word *Light*, which it pretends to define, to be understood by a blind Man. And when the *Cartesians*, tell us that Light is a great Number of little Globules, striking briskly on the Bottom of the Eye; these Words would never make the Idea the Word Light stands for, known to a Man that had it not before.

Simple Ideas then can only be got by the Impressions Objects themselves make on our Minds, by the proper *Inlets* appointed to each Sort. If they are not received this Way, all the Words in the World, will never be able to produce in us the Ideas, they stand for. Words being Sounds, can produce in us no other simple Ideas than of those very Sounds, nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary Connection, which they have with some Ideas, that common Use has made them the Signs of: And therefore he that has not before received into his Mind, by the proper Inlet, the simple Idea, which any Word stands for, can never come to know the Signification of that Word, by any other Words or Sounds whatsoever.

But in *complex* Ideas which consist of several simple ones, the Case is quite otherwise; for Words standing for those several simple Ideas, that make up the Composition, may imprint complex Ideas in the Mind, that never were there

there before, and so make their Names to be understood. In them Definitions take Place. Thus the Word *Rainbow*, to one who knew all those Colours, but yet had never seen that *Phænomenon*, might, by enumerating the *Figure*, *Largeness*, *Position*, and *Order* of the *Colours*, be so well defined, that it might be perfectly understood.

The Names of simple *Ideas*, *Substances*, and *mixed Modes* have also this Difference, that those of *mixed Modes* stand for Ideas perfectly arbitrary, being wholly the Creatures of the Mind: Those of *Substances* are not perfectly so, but refer to a Pattern, tho' with some Latitude; and those of simple Ideas are perfectly taken from Objects without us, to them we are entirely dependent for their Existence, the Mind in this Case being wholly passive.

The Names of *simple Modes* differ little from those of *simple Ideas*.

C H A P. V.

Of the Names of mixed Modes and Relations.

THE Names of mixed Modes being general, they stand, as has been shewn, for Sorts or Species of Things, each of which has its peculiar Essence. The Essence of these Species also, as has been shewed, are nothing but the abstract Ideas in the Mind, to which the Name is annexed. Thus far the Names and

Essences

Essences of mixed Modes, have nothing but what is common to them, with other Ideas: but if we take a nearer Survey of them, we shall find that they have something peculiar, which may deserve our Attention.

And *First*, The Ideas they stand for, or the Essences of the several Species of mixed *Modes*, are made by the Understanding; wherein they differ from those of *simple* Ideas.

Secondly, They are made arbitrarily, without Patterns, or Reference to any real Existence, wherein they differ from those of *Substances*. The Mind unites and retains certain Collections, as so many distinct specifick Ideas, whilst other Combinations that as often occur in Nature, and are as plainly suggested by outward Things, pass neglected without particular Names, or Specifications.

The Mind in forming these complex Ideas, makes no new Idea, but only puts together those which it had before, wherein it performs *three* Things. *First*, it chuses a certain Number. *Secondly*, it gives them Connection, and combines them into one Idea. *Thirdly*, it unites them together by a Name; all which may be done before any one Individual of that Species of Modes ever existed: As the Ideas of *Sacrilege* or *Adultery* might be framed, before either of them was committed; and we cannot doubt but Legislators have often made Laws about Species of Actions, which were only the Creatures of their own Understandings.

But though *mixed Modes* depend on the Mind, and are made arbitrarily; yet they are not made at random, and jumbled together without any Reason at all, but are always made for the Convenience of Communication, which is the chief End of Language, and therefore such Combinations are only made, as Men have frequent Occasions to mention them. Thus Men having joined to the Idea of *Killing*, the Idea of *Father* and *Mother*, and so made a distinct Species from the killing of a Man's *Son* or *Neighbour*, because of the different Heinousness of the Crime, and the distinct Punishment due to it, found it necessary to mention it by a distinct Name, which is the End of making that distinct Combination.

In *mixed Modes* it is the Name that seems to preserve their Essences, and to give them their lasting Duration. The Collection of Ideas is made by the Mind, but the Name is as it were the *Knot* which ties them fast together: Hence we seldom take any other for distinct Species of *mixed Modes*, but such as are expressed by Names. We must observe that the Names of *mixed Modes* always signify the real Essences of their Species, which being nothing but the abstract complex Ideas, and not referred to the real Existence of Things; there is no Supposition of any Thing more signified by any Name of a *mixed Mode*, but barely that *complex* Idea the Mind itself has formed, which is all it would express by it, and is that on which all the Properties of the *Species* depend, and from which alone they flow; and

and therefore in these the *real* and *nominal* Essence are the same.

This also shews the Reason why the *Names* of *mixed Modes* are commonly got, before the Ideas they stand for are perfectly known: Because there being no Species of these ordinarily taken Notice of, but such as have Names, and those Species being *complex* Ideas made arbitrarily by the Mind, it is convenient, if not necessary, to know the Names, before we learn the *complex* Ideas; unless a Man will fill his Head with a Number of abstract *complex* Ideas, which others having no Names for, he has nothing to do with, but to lay by and forget again. In the Beginning of Languages it was necessary to have the Idea before one gave it the *Name*; and so it is still, where a new *complex* Idea is to be made, and a Name given it. But this concerns not the Languages in Use, which have provided for the Ideas Mankind want to communicate to each other; and in such, Children learn the Names of *mixed Modes* before they acquire their Ideas. In simple Ideas and Substances I grant it is otherwise; which being such Ideas as have a real Existence and Union in Nature, the Ideas or Names are got, one before the other, as it happens.

What has been said here of *mixed Modes*, is with very little Difference applicable to *Relations* also: Which since every Man himself may observe, I need not enlarge on.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Names of Substances.

THE common *Names* of *Substances* stand for Sorts as well as other general Terms; that is, for such *complex* Ideas, wherein several particular Substances do, or might agree, by Virtue of which they are capable of being comprehended in one common Conception, and be signified by one Name; I say, *do* or *might agree*, for tho' there be but one *Sun* existing, yet the Idea of it being abstracted, so that more Substances, if there were several, might each agree in it; is as much a *Sort*, as if there were as many Suns as there are Stars.

The Measure and Boundary of each Sort whereby it is constituted that *particular Sort*, and distinguished from others, is what we call its Essence; which is that abstract Idea to which the Name is annexed, so that every Thing contained in that Idea, is essential to that Sort. This I call *nominal Essence*, to distinguish it from that real Constitution of *Substances*, on which this *nominal Essence*, and all the Properties of that Sort depend, and may be called its *real Essence*: Thus the *nominal Essence* of *Gold* is that complex Idea the Word *Gold* stands for, let it be for Instance a *Body*, yellow, weighty, malleable, fusible, and fixed: But its real *Essence* is the Constitution of its insensible Parts, on which those Qualities and all its other

Properties

Properties depend, which are wholly unknown to us.

That *Essence*, in the ordinary Use of the Word, relates to *Sorts*, appears from hence, that if we take away the abstract Ideas by which we sort Individuals, and rank them under common Names, then the Thought of any Thing essential to any of them instantly vanishes: We have no Notion of the one without the other, which plainly shews their Relation. No Property is thought essential to any Individual whatsoever, 'till the Mind refers it to some *Sort* or *Species* of Things, and then presently, according to the abstract Idea of that Sort, something is found essential; so that essential or not essential, relates only to our abstract Ideas, and the Names annexed to them, which shews, that whatever particular Thing has not in it those Qualities contained in the *abstract Idea* which any general Term stands for, cannot be ranked under that Species, nor called by that Name; since that *abstract Idea* is the very Essence of that *Species*. Thus if the Idea of *Body* with some People be bare Extension, or Space, then Solidity is not essential to Body: If others make the Idea to which they give the Name *Body* to be Solidity and Extension; then Solidity is essential also to *Body*. That alone therefore is considered as essential, which makes a Part of the *complex Idea* the Name of a Sort stands for, without which no particular Thing can be reckoned of that Sort, nor be entitled to that Name.

Substances are distinguished into *Sorts* and *Species* by their *nominal Essence*; for it is that alone, that the Name which is the Mark of the Sort signifies: And the *Species* of Things to us are nothing but the ranking them under distinct Names, according to the *complex Ideas* in *Us*, and not according to precise, distinct, *real Essences* in *Them*.

We cannot rank and sort Things by their *real Essences*, because we know them not: Our Faculties carry us no farther in the Knowledge of Substances, than a Collection of those sensible Ideas we observe in them. But the internal Constitution whereon their Properties depend, is utterly unknown to us. This is evident when we examine the *Stones* we tread on, or the *Iron* we handle: We soon find that we know not their Make, and can give no Reason of the different Qualities we find in them; and yet how infinitely these come short of the fine Contrivances and inconceivable real Essences of *Plants* and *Animals*, every one knows. The Workmanship of the all-wise and powerful GOD, in the great Fabrick of the Universe, and every Part thereof, farther exceeds the Comprehension of the most inquisitive and intelligent Man, than the best Contrivance of the most ingenious Man, doth the Conceptions of the most ignorant of rational Creatures. In vain therefore do we pretend to range Things into *Sorts*, and dispose them into certain *Classes*, under Names by their *real Essences*, that are so far from our Discovery or Comprehension.

But

But tho' the *nominal Essences* of Substances are made by the Mind, they are not yet made so arbitrarily as those of mixed Modes. To the making of any *nominal Essence*, it is necessary,

First, That the Ideas whereof it consists, have such an Union as to make but one Idea, how compounded soever.

Secondly, That the particular Ideas so united be exactly the same, neither more nor less: For if two abstract complex Ideas differ either in *Number* or *Sorts* of their component Parts, they make two different, and not one and the same Essence.

In the *First* of these, the Mind in making its *complex* Ideas of Substances, only follows *Nature*, and puts none together which are not supposed to have an Union in Nature. For Men observing certain Qualities always joined and existing together therein copy Nature, and of Ideas so united, make their complex Ones of Substance.

Secondly, Tho' the Mind in making its complex Ideas of Substances, never puts any together that do not *really*, or are not supposed to co-exist: Yet the Number it combines depends upon the various Care, Industry or Fancy of him that makes it. Men generally content themselves with some few obvious Qualities, and often leaves out others as material and as firmly united as those that they take in.

In Bodies organized and propagated by Seeds, as *Vegetables* and *Animals*, the *Shape* is that which to us is the leading Quality, and moſt characteriſtical Part that determines the *Species*: In moſt other Bodies not propagated by Seed, it is the *Colour* we chiefly fix on, and are moſt led by. Thus where we find the Colour of *Gold*, we are apt to imagine all the other Qualities comprehended in our complex Idea of *Gold*, to be there alſo.

Tho' the *nominal* Eſſences of Subſtances are all ſuppoſed to be copied from Nature, yet they are all, or moſt of them very imperfect: And ſince the Compoſition of the complex Ideas is in ſeveral Men very different, we may conclude that theſe Boundaries of Species are as *Men*, and not as *Nature* makes them; if at leaſt there are in Nature any ſuch prefixed Bounds.

It is true, that many particular Subſtances are ſo made by Nature, that they have an Agreement and Likeneſs one with another, and ſo afford a Foundation of being ranked into Sorts: But the *ſorting* of Things by us, being in Order to naming and comprehending them under general Terms, I cannot ſee how it can be properly ſaid, that Nature ſets the *Boundaries* of the Species of Things. But if it be ſo, our *Boundaries* of Species, are not exactly conformable to Nature.

If the firſt Sorting of Individuals depends on the Mind of Man, variouſly collecting the ſimple Ideas, that make the *nominal* Eſſence of the

lowest Species; it is much more evident that the more *comprehensive Classes*, called *Genera*, do so. In forming more general Ideas they may comprehend different Sorts, the Mind leaves out those Qualities that distinguish them, and puts into its new Collection only such Ideas as are common to several Sorts. Thus by leaving out those Qualities which are peculiar to Gold, Silver, *&c.* and retaining a complex Idea, made up of those that are common to each Species, there is a new *Genus* constituted, to which the Name *Metal* is annexed.

So that in this whole Business of *Genera* and *Species*, the *Genus* or more comprehensive is but a partial Conception of what is in the *Species*, and the *Species* but a partial Idea of what is to be found in each *Individual*: In all which there is no new Thing made, but only more or less comprehensive Signs, whereby we may be enabled to express in a few Syllables great Numbers of particular Things, as they agree in more or less general Conceptions, which we have framed for that Purpose. If these *abstract general* Ideas be thought to be complete, it can only be in Respect of a certain established Relation between them, and certain Names, which are made Use of to signify them, and not in Respect of any Thing existing as made by Nature.

This is adjusted to the true End of Speech, which is to be the easiest and shortest Way of communicating our Notions. This is the proper Business of *Genus* or *Species*: And this Men do without any Consideration of real Essences

and ſubſtantial Forms, which come not within the Reach of our Knowledge, when we think of thoſe Things; nor within the Signification of our Words when we diſcourſe with others.

CHAP. VII.

Of Particles.

BESIDES Words, which are the Names of Ideas in the Mind, there are others made Uſe of to ſignify the *Connection* that the Mind gives to Ideas or Propoſitions one with another, and to intimate ſome particular *Action* of its own at that Time, relating to thoſe Ideas. This it does ſeveral Ways; as *is*, *is not*, are Marks of the Mind affirming or denying. Beſides which, the Mind in declaring its Sentiments to others connects not only the Parts of Propoſitions, but whole Sentences one to another, with their ſeveral Relations and Dependencies, to make a coherent Diſcourſe.

The Words ſignifying that Connection the Mind gives to ſeveral Affirmations and Negations, which it unites in one continued Reaſoning or Narration, are called *Particles*. And it is in the right Uſe of theſe, that more particularly conſiſts the Clearneſs and Beauty of a *good Style*. To expreſs the Dependence of his Thoughts and Reaſonings one upon another, a Man muſt have Words to ſhew what Connection, Reſtriction, Diſtinction, Oppoſition, Emphaſis,

phasis, &c. he gives to each respective Part of his Discourse.

These cannot be understood rightly, without a clear View of the Postures, Stands, Turns, Limitations, Exceptions, and several other Thoughts of the Mind: Of these there are a great Variety, much exceeding the Number of Particles that most Languages have to express them by; for which Reason it happens that most of these Particles have divers and sometimes almost opposite Significations. Thus the Particle *But* in *English*, has several very different Significations; as, *But to say no more:* Here it intimates a Stop of the Mind in the Course it was going, before it came to it. *I saw but two Planets:* Here it shews that the Mind limits the Sense to what is expressed with an Exclusion of all other: *You Pray, but it is not that God would bring you to the true Religion, but that he would confirm you in your own.* The former of these intimates a Supposition in the Mind of something otherwise than it should be: The latter shews, that the Mind makes a direct Opposition between that and what goes before. *All Animals have Sense, but a Dog is an Animal.* Here it signifies the Connection of the latter Proposition with the former. To these, divers other Significations of this Particle might be added, if it were necessary to examine it in its full Latitude.

I intend not here a full Explication of this Sort of Signs, the Instances I have produced in this one may give Occasion to reflect on their Use and Force in Language, and lead us into the Contemp-

Contemplation of ſeveral Actions of our Minds in diſcourſing, which it has found a Way to intimate to others by theſe *Particles*, ſome whereof conſtantly, and others in certain Conſtructions, have the Senſe of a whole Sentence contained in them.

CHAP. VIII.

Of abſtract and concrete Terms.

THE Mind, as has been ſhewn, has a Power to *abſtract* its Ideas whereby the Sorts of Things are diſtinguiſhed: Now each *abſtract* Idea being diſtinct, ſo that the one can never be the other, the Mind will, by its intuitive Knowledge perceive their Difference; and therefore in Propoſitions, no two whole Ideas can ever be affirmed one of another: Nor does the common Uſe of Language permit that any two abſtract Words or Names of *abſtract* Ideas, ſhould be affirmed one of another, *viz. Humanity* is *Rationality*. All our Affirmations are only *inconcrete*, which is the affirming one *abſtract* Idea to be joined to another: Which *abſtract* Ideas in *Subſtances*, may be of any Sort, tho' the moſt of them are of *Powers*: As a *Man is white*, ſignifies, that the Thing, that has the Eſſence of a Man, has alſo in it the Eſſence of *Whiteneſs*, which is only a Power to produce the *Idea* of Whiteneſs in one, whoſe Eyes can diſcover common Objects. In all the reſt theſe are little elſe but *Relations*.

This

This Diſtinction of Names ſhews us alſo the Difference of our Ideas: For, if we obſerve them, we ſhall find, that our ſimple Ideas have all *abſtract* as well as *concrete* Names: The one whereof is (to ſpeak in the Language of Grammarians) a Subſtantive, the other an Adjective; as *Whiteneſs*, *white*, *Sweetneſs*, *ſweet*, &c. The like alſo holds in our Ideas of Modes and Relations, as *Juſtice*, *juſt*, *Equality*, *equal*, &c. But as to our Ideas of Subſtances, we have very few abſtract Names at all. Thoſe few that the Schools have invented, as *Animalitas*, *Humanitas*, &c. hold no Proportion with the infinite Number of Names of Subſtances, and could never get Admittance into common Uſe, or obtain the Licence of publick Approbation; which ſeems to intimate the Confeſſion of all Mankind, that they have no Ideas of the real Eſſences of Subſtances, ſince they have no Names for ſuch Ideas. It was only the Doctrine of *ſubſtantial* Forms, and the Confidence of miſtaken Pretenders to a Knowledge they had not, which firſt coined, and then introduced *Animalitas*, *Humanitas*, and the like: which yet went very little farther than their own Schools, and could never get to be current amongſt underſtanding Men. Indeed, *Humanitas* was a Word familiar amongſt the *Romans*; but in a far different Senſe, and ſtood not for the abſtract Eſſence of any Subſtance; but was the abſtract Name of a Mode, and its concrete *Humanus* not *Homo*.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Imperfection of Words.

TO examine the *Perfection* or *Imperfection* of Words, it is necessary to consider their Use and End, which is twofold, *First*, to *record* our own Thoughts: *Secondly*, to *communicate* our Thoughts to others: The *First* is for the Help of our own Memories, whereby we do as it were talk to ourselves: For this Purpose any Words may serve our turn: Words being *arbitrary Signs*, we may use which we please for this Purpose; and there will be no Imperfection in them, if we constantly use the same *Signs* for the same *Idea*.

Secondly, As to *Communication* by Words; that too has a double Use: *First*, their *civil Use*, which is such a Communication of Thoughts and Ideas by Words, as may serve in common Conversation and Commerce, about the ordinary Affairs and Occurrences of civil Life. *Secondly*, the *Philosophical* Use of Words, by which I mean such an Use of them, as may serve to convey the precise Notions of Things, and to express certain and undoubted Truths in general Propositions; which the Mind may rest upon, and be satisfied with, in its Search after true Knowledge: These two Uses are very distinct, and much less Exactness will serve in the one, than in the other.

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The End of Language in Communication is to be *underſtood*; that is, to excite by Sounds in the *Hearer*, the ſame Ideas which they ſtand for in the Mind of the *Speaker*. The Doubtfulneſs and Uncertainty of their Signification, which is the Imperfection we are here ſpeaking of, has its Cauſe more in the Ideas themſelves than in any Incapacity in the *Sounds* to ſignify them; for in that Regard they are all equally perfect. That then which makes the Difference, is the Difference of Ideas they ſtand for, which muſt be learned and retained by thoſe who would diſcourſe together intelligibly. Now this is difficult in theſe Caſes.

Firſt, Where the Ideas they ſtand for are very complex. Hence the Names of *mixed Modes* are liable to great Uncertainty and Obſcurity in their Signification; for here the Idea being made up of many Parts, it is not eaſy to form and retain it exactly. Of this Sort chiefly are moral Words, which have ſeldom in two different Men, the ſame preciſe Signification.

Secondly, Where the Ideas they ſtand for, have no certain Connection in Nature, and therefore no ſettled *Standard* to rectify and adjuſt them by. This again is the Caſe of the Names of *mixed Modes*, which are Aſſemblages of Ideas put together at Pleaſure. Common Uſe indeed regulates the Meaning of Words pretty well for common Converſation, but it is not ſufficient to adjuſt them to Philoſophical Diſcourſes, there being ſcarce a Name of any very *complex Idea*, which in common Uſe has

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not a great Latitude; and is not made the Sign of far different Ideas.

The Way of learning these Names greatly contributes to the Doubtfulness of their Signification. For we may observe that Children are taught the Names of simple Ideas, and Substances, by having the Things shewn them; and then they repeat the Name that stands for it; as *White*, *Sweet*, *Milk*, *Sugar*, &c. But in *mixed Modes* the Sounds are learned first, and Men are to learn afterwards their Signification, by their own Observation and Industry, or the Explication of others, which is the Reason that these Words are little more than *bare Sounds* in the Minds of most, because few are at the Pains to settle their Ideas and Notions precisely; and those which are, make them the Signs of Ideas, different from what others understand by them, which is the Occasion of most Disputes.

Thirdly, Where the Signification of a Word is referred to a *Standard* which is not easily known: This is the Case of the Names of *Substances*, which being supposed to stand for their *real Essences*, must needs be of uncertain Application, because these Essences are utterly unknown; and it will be impossible to know what is, or is not *Antimony*, when that Word is to stand for the real Essence of it; whereof we have no Idea at all.

Or suppose these Names only stand for simple Ideas, as found to co-exist in *Substances*, yet thus they will be liable to great Uncertainty too: Because these simple Ideas being very numerous,

merous, Men frame different Ideas of the ſame Subjects, by putting different Ideas into their complex one; of ſuch Subſtances, ſeveral Men obſerve ſeveral Properties in the ſame Subſtance, and none of them all; who having but imperfect Deſcriptions of Things, can have but uncertain Significations of Words.

Fourthly, Where the Signification of the Word, and the real Eſſence of the Thing, are not the ſame, which is ſtill the Caſe of Subſtances. From hence we may obſerve,

Firſt, That the Names of ſimple Ideas are leaſt liable to Miſtakes: *Firſt*, Becauſe the Ideas they ſtand for, being each but one ſingle Perception, are eaſier got, and more clearly retained, than the more complex ones of Subſtances and mixed Modes. *Secondly*, Becauſe they are not referred to any other Eſſence, but barely that Perception they immediately ſignify.

Secondly, Names of *ſimple Modes* are next to *ſimple Ideas*, leaſt liable to Doubt or Uncertainty, eſpecially thoſe of *Figure* and *Number*, of which Men have ſo clear and diſtinct *Ideas*.

Thirdly, In *mixed Modes*, when they are compoſed of a few and obvious ſimple Ideas, their Names are clear and diſtinct enough; but when they comprehend a great Number of ſimple Ideas, are commonly of a very doubtful and uncertain Signification.

Fourthly, The Names of *Subſtances* being annexed to *Ideas*, that are neither the real Eſſen-

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ces, nor exact Representations of Things, are liable to still greater Imperfection, when we come to a philosophical Use of them.

CHAP. X.

Of the Abuse of Words.

BESIDES the Imperfection that is naturally in Language, and the Obscurity and Confusion that are so hard to be avoided in the Use of Words, there are several wilful Faults and Neglects which Men are guilty of, in this Way of Communication, whereby they render these Signs less clear and distinct in their Signification, than they ought to be.

First, In this Kind, the first and most palpable Abuse is, the using of Words, without clear and distinct Ideas; or, which is worse, Signs without any Thing signified. Of these there are two Sorts:

I. One may observe, in all Languages, certain Words, that, if examined, will be found, in their first Original, and their appropriated Use, not to stand for any clear and distinct Ideas. These, for the most part, the several Sects of Philosophy and Religion have introduced. For their Authors, or Promoters, either affecting somewhat singular, and out of the Way of common Apprehensions, or to support some strange Opinions, or cover some Weakness of their Hypothesis, seldom fail to coin

coin new Words, and ſuch as, when they come to be examined, may juſtly be called *inſignificant Terms*. For, having either had no determinate Collection of Ideas annexed to them, when they were firſt invented; or at leaſt ſuch as, if well examined, will be found inconſiſtent, it is no Wonder if afterwards, in the vulgar Uſe of the ſame Party, they remain empty Sounds, with little or no Signification, amongſt thoſe who think it enough to have them often in their Mouths, as the diſtinguiſhing Characters of their Church, or School, without much troubling their Heads to examine what are the preciſe Ideas they ſtand for. I ſhall not need here to heap up Inſtances, every one's Reading and Converſation will ſufficiently furniſh him: or, if he wants to be better ſtored, the great Mint-maſters of theſe Kind of Terms, I mean the School-men and Metaphyſicians, (under which, I think, the diſputing natural and moral Philoſophers of theſe latter ages may be comprehended,) have where-withal abundantly to content him.

II. Others there are, who extend this Abuſe yet farther, who take ſo little Care to lay by Words, which, in their primary Notation, have ſcarce any clear and diſtinct Ideas which they are annexed to, that by an unpardonable Negligence, they familiarly uſe Words, which the Propriety of Language has affixed to very important Ideas, without any diſtinct Meaning at all. *Wiſdom*, *Glory*, *Grace*, *&c.* are Words frequent enough in every Man's Mouth; but if a great many of thoſe who uſe them, ſhould be aſked what they mean by them, they would be at

at a Stand, and not know what to anſwer: A plain Proof, that though they have learned thoſe Sounds, and have them ready at their Tongue's End, yet there are no determined Ideas laid up in their Minds, which are to be conveyed to others by them.

Men having been accuſtomed from their Cradles to learn Words, which are eaſily got and retained before they knew, or had framed the complex Ideas, to which they were annexed, or which were to be found in the Things they were thought to ſtand for, they uſually continue to do ſo all their Lives, and without taking the Pains neceſſary to ſettle in their Minds determined Ideas, they uſe their Words for ſuch unſteady and confuſed Notions as they have, contenting themſelves with the ſame Words other People uſe; as if their very Sound neceſſarily carried with it conſtantly the ſame Meaning. This, though Men make a Shift with in the ordinary Occurrences of Life, where they find it neceſſary to be underſtood, and therefore they make Signs till they are ſo: yet this Inſignificancy in their Words, when they come to reaſon concerning either their Tenets or Intereſt, manifeſtly fills their Diſcourſe with Abundance of empty unintelligible Noiſe and Jargon, eſpecially in moral Matters, where the Words, for the moſt Part, ſtanding for arbitrary and numerous Collections of Ideas, not regularly and permanently united in Nature, their bare Sounds are often only thought on, or at leaſt very obſcure and uncertain Notions annexed to them. Men take the Words they find in Uſe amongſt their Neighbours; and that they may

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not seem ignorant what they stand for, use them confidently, without much troubling their Heads about a certain fixed Meaning; whereby, besides the Ease of it, they obtain this Advantage, that as in such Discourses they seldom are in the right, so they are as seldom to be convinced that they are in the wrong; it being all one to attempt to draw those Men out of their Mistakes, who have no settled Notions, as to dispossess a Vagrant of his Habitation, who has no settled Abode. This I guess to be so; and every one may observe in himself and others, whether it be or no.

Secondly, Another great Abuse of Words is, *Inconstancy* in the Use of them. It is hard to find a Discourse written of any Subject, especially of Controversy, wherein one shall not observe, if he read with Attention, the same Words (and those commonly the most material in the Discourse, and upon which the Argument turns) used sometimes for one Collection of simple Ideas, and sometimes for another, which is a perfect Abuse of Language. Words being intended for Signs of my Ideas, to make them known to others, not by any natural Signification, but by a voluntary Imposition, it is plain Cheat and Abuse, when I make them stand sometimes for one Thing, and sometimes for another; the wilful Doing whereof, can be imputed to nothing but great Folly, or greater Dishonesty. And a Man, in his Accompts with another, may, with as much Fairness, make the Characters of Numbers stand sometimes for one, and sometimes for another Collection of Units, (*v. g.* this Character 3 stand sometimes

for

for three, ſometimes for four, and ſometimes for eight) as in his Diſcourſe, or reaſoning, make the ſame Words ſtand for different Collections of ſimple Ideas. If Men ſhould do ſo in their Reckonings, I wonder who would be concerned with them? One who would ſpeak thus, in the Affairs and Buſineſs of the World, and call 8 ſometimes Seven, and ſometimes Nine, as beſt ſerved his Advantage, would preſently be called by one of the two Names Men conſtantly are diſguſted with. And yet in Diſputation, and learned Conteſts, the ſame Sort of Proceeding paſſes commonly for Wit and Learning, but to me it appears a greater Diſhoneſty than the miſplacing of Counters, in the caſting up a Debt; and the Cheat is the greater, in Proportion as Truth is of greater Concernment and Value than Money.

Thirdly, Another Abuſe of Language is, an *affected Obſcurity*, by either applying old Words to new and unuſual Significations, or introducing new and ambiguous Terms, without defining either; or elſe putting them ſo together, as may confound their ordinary Meaning. Though the Peripatetic Philoſophy has been moſt eminent in this Way, yet other Sects have not been wholly clear of it. There is ſcarce any of them that are not cumbered with ſome Difficulties, (ſuch is the Imperfection of human Knowledge) which they have been fain to cover with Obſcurity of Terms, and to confound the Signification of Words, which, like a Miſt before Peoples Eyes, might hinder their weak Parts from being diſcovered. That *Body* and *Extenſion*, in common Uſe, ſtand for two diſtinct

diſtinct Ideas, is plain to any one that will but reflect a little. For, were their Signification preciſely the ſame, it would be as proper and intelligible to ſay, the *Body of an Extenſion*, as the *Extenſion of a Body*; and yet there are thoſe who find it neceſſary to confound their Signification. To this Abuſe, and the Miſchiefs of confounding the Signification of Words, Logic and the liberal Sciences, as they have been handled in the Schools, have given Reputation; and the admired Art of diſputing hath added much to the natural Imperfection of Languages, whilſt it has been made Uſe of and fitted to perplex the Signification of Words, more than to diſcover the Knowledge and Truth of Things: And he that will look into that Sort of learned Writings, will find the Words there much more obſcure, uncertain, and undetermined, in their Meaning, than they are in ordinary Converſation.

This is unavoidably the Caſe, where Mens Parts and Learning are eſtimated by their Skill in diſputing. And if Reputation and Reward ſhall attend theſe Conqueſts, which depend moſtly on the Fineneſs and Niceties of Words, it is no Wonder if the Wit of Men ſo employed, ſhould perplex, involve and ſubtilize the Signification of Sounds, ſo as never to want ſomething to ſay, in oppoſing or defending any Queſtion; the Victory being adjudged not to him who had Truth on his Side, but the laſt Word in the Diſpute.

This, though a very uſeleſs Skill, and that which I think the direct Oppoſite to the Ways of

of Knowledge, hath yet paſſed hitherto under the laudable and eſteemed Names of *Subtilty* and *Acuteneſs*; and has had the Applauſe of the Schools, and Encouragement of one Part of the learned Men of the World. And no Wonder, ſince the Philoſophers of old, (the diſputing and wrangling Philoſophers, I mean, ſuch as *Lucian* wittily and with Reaſon taxes,) and the Schoolmen ſince, aiming at Glory and Eſteem, for their great and univerſal Knowledge, eaſier a great deal to be pretended to, than really acquired, found this a good Expedient to cover their Ignorance, with a curious and unexplicable Web of perplexed Words, and procure to themſelves the Admiration of others, by unintelligible Terms, the apter to produce Wonder, becauſe they could not be underſtood: Whilſt it appears in all Hiſtory, that theſe profound Doctors were no wiſer, nor more uſeful than their Neighbours; and brought but ſmall Advantage to human Life, or the Societies wherein they lived: Unleſs the coining of new Words, wherein they produced no new Things to apply them to, or the perplexing or obſcuring the Signification of old Ones, and ſo bringing all Things into Queſtion and Diſpute, were a Thing profitable to the Life of Man, or worthy Commendation and Reward.

For, notwithſtanding theſe learned Diſputants, theſe all-knowing Doctors, it was to the unſcholaſtic Stateſman, that the Governments of the World owed their Peace, Defence, and Liberties; and from the illiterate and contemned Mechanic, a Name of Diſgrace, that they received the Improvements of uſeful Arts.

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Nevertheleſs, this artificial Ignorance, and learned Gibberiſh, prevailed mightily in theſe laſt Ages, by the Intereſt and Artifice of thoſe, who found no eaſier Way to that Pitch of Authority and Dominion they have attained; than by amuſing the Men of Buſineſs, and ignorant, with hard Words, or employing the ingenious and idle in intricate Diſputes, about unintelligible Terms, and holding them perpetually entangled in that endleſs Labyrinth. Beſides, there is no ſuch Way to gain Admittance, or give Defence to ſtrange and abſurd Doctrines, as to guard them round about with Legions of obſcure, doubtful and undefined Words: which yet make theſe Retreats more like the Dens of Robbers, or Holes of Foxes, than the Fortreſſes of fair Warriors; which if it be hard to get them out of, it is not for the Strength that is in them, but the Briars and Thorns, and the Obſcurity of the Thickets they are beſet with. For untruth being unacceptable to the Mind of Man, there is no other Defence left for Abſurdity, but Obſcurity.

Thus learned Ignorance, and this Art of keeping, even inquiſitive Men, from true Knowledge, hath been propagated in the World, and hath much perplexed, whilſt it pretended to inform the Underſtanding. For we ſee, that other well-meaning and wiſe Men, whoſe Education and Parts had not acquired that Acuteneſs, could intelligibly expreſs themſelves to one another; and in its plain Uſe, make a Benefit of Language. But though unlearned Men well enough underſtood the Words *white* and *black*, &c. and had conſtant Notions of the Ideas ſig-

nified by those Words; yet there were Philosophers found, who had Learning and Subtilty enough to prove, that *Snow was black*, *i. e.* to prove, that *white was black*; whereby they had the Advantage to destroy the Instruments and Means of Discourse, Conversation, Instruction, and Society; whilst, with great Art and Subtilty, they did no more but perplex and confound the Signification of Words, and thereby render Language less useful, than the real Defects of it had made it a Gift, which the illiterate had not attained to.

These learned Men did equally instruct Mens Understandings, and profit their Lives, as he who should alter the Signification of known Characters, and, by a subtle Device of Learning, far surpassing the Capacity of the illiterate, dull, and vulgar, should, in his Writing, shew, that he could put A for B, and D for E, *&c.* to the no small Admiration and Benefit of his Reader. It being as senseless to put *black*, which is a Word agreed on to stand for one sensible Idea, to put it, I say, for another, or the contrary Idea, *i. e.* to call *Snow black* as to put this mark A, which is a Character agreed on to stand for one Modification of Sound, made by a certain Motion of the Organs of Speech, for B, which is agreed on to stand for another Modification of Sound, made by another certain Motion of the Organs of Speech.

Nor hath this Mischief stopped in logical Nicetics, or curious empty Speculations; it hath invaded the great Concernments of human Life and Society; obscured and perplexed the material

material Truths of Law and Divinity; brought Confusion, Disorder, and Uncertainly into the Affairs of Mankind; and if not destroyed, yet in a great Measure rendered useless, those two great Rules, Religion and Justice. What have the greatest part of the Comments and Disputes upon the Laws of God and Man served for, but to make the Meaning more doubtful, and perplex the Sense? What has been the Effect of those multiplied curious Distinctions, and acute Niceties, but Obscurity and Uncertainty, leaving the Words more unintelligible, and the Reader more at a Loss? How else comes it to pass, that Princes, speaking or writing to their Servants, in their ordinary Commands, are easily understood; speaking to their People, in their Laws, are not so? And, as I remarked before, doth it not often happen, that a Man of an ordinary Capacity, very well understands a Text, or a Law, that he reads, till he consults an Expositor, or goes to Council; who, by that Time he hath done explaining them, makes the Words signify either nothing at all, or what he pleases?

Whether any by-interests of these Professions have occasioned this, I will not here examine; but I leave it to be considered, whether it would not be well for Mankind, whose Concernment it is to know Things as they are, and to do what they ought, and not to spend their Lives in talking about them, or tossing Words to and fro; whether it would not be well, I say, that the Use of Words were made plain and direct; and that Language, which was given us for the Improvement of Knowledge, and Bond

of Society, ſhould not be employed to darken Truth, and unſettle Peoples Rights; to raiſe Miſts, and render unintelligible both Morality and Religion? Or that at leaſt, if this will happen, it ſhould not be thought Learning or Knowledge to do ſo?

Fourthly, Another great Abuſe of Words is, *the taking them for Things*. This though it in ſome Degree concerns all Names in general, yet more particularly affects thoſe of Subſtances. To this Abuſe, thoſe Men are moſt ſubject, who confine their Thoughts to any one Syſtem, and give themſelves up into a firm Belief of the Perfection of any received Hypotheſis; whereby they come to be perſuaded, that the Terms of that Sect are ſo united to the Nature of Things, that they perfectly correſpond with their real Exiſtence. Who is there, that has been bred up in the Peripatetic Philoſophy, who does not think the ten Names, under which are ranked the ten Predicaments, to be exactly conformable to the Nature of Things? Who is there of that School, that is not perſuaded, that *ſubſtantial Forms*, *vegetative Souls*, *Abhorrence of a Vacuum*, *intentional Species*, &c. are ſomething real? Theſe Words Men have learned from their very Entrance upon Knowledge, and have found their Maſters and Syſtems lay great Streſs upon them; and therefore they cannot quit the Opinion, that they are conformable to Nature, and are the Repreſentations of ſomething that really exiſts. The Platoniſts have their *Soul of the World*, and the Epicureans their *Endeavour towards Motion* in their Atoms, when at reſt. There is ſcarce any Sect in Philoſophy

losophy that has not a distinct Set of Terms that others understand not. But yet this Gibberish, which is the Weakness of human Understanding, serves so well to palliate Mens Ignorance, and cover their Errors, comes by familiar Use amongst those of the same Tribe, to seem the most important Part of Language, and of all other the Terms the most significant: and should *aerial* and *ætherial Vehicles* come once, by the Prevalency of that Doctrine, to be generally received any where, no Doubt those Terms would make Impressions on Mens Minds, so as to establish them in the Persuasion of the Reality of such Things, as much as Peripatetic Forms and intentional Species have heretofore done.

How much Names taken for Things are apt to mislead the Understanding, the attentive Reading of Philosophical Writers would abundantly discover; and that, perhaps, in Words little suspected of any such misuse. I shall instance in one only, and that a very familiar one. How many intrinsic Disputes have there been about *Matter*, as if there were some such Thing really in Nature, distinct from *Body*; as it is evident, the Word *Matter* stands for an Idea distinct from the Idea of *Body*? For, if the Ideas these two Terms stood for were precisely the same, they might indifferently in all Places be put one for anothers. But we see, that though it be proper to say, there is *one Matter of all Bodies*, one cannot say, there is *one Body of all Matters*: we familiarly say, one Body is bigger than another; but it sounds harsh (and, I think, is never used) to say, one Matter is

bigger than another. Whence comes this then? *viz.* from hence, that though Matter and Body be not really diſtinct, but wherever there is the one, there is alſo the other; yet Matter and Body ſtand for two different Conceptions, whereof the one is incomplete, and but a Part of the other. For Body ſtands for a ſolid extended figured Subſtance, whereof Matter is but a partial and more confuſed Conception, it ſeeming to me to be uſed for the Subſtance and Solidity of Body, without taking in its Extenſion and Figure: and therefore it is, that, ſpeaking of Matter, we ſpeak of it always as one, becauſe in Truth, it expreſly contains nothing but the Idea of a ſolid Subſtance, which is every where the ſame, every where uniform. This being our Idea of Matter, we no more conceive, or ſpeak of different Matters in the World, than we do of different Solidities; though we both conceive, and ſpeak of different Bodies, becauſe Extenſion and Figure are capable of Variation. But ſince Solidity cannot exiſt without Extenſion and Figure, the taking Matter to be the Name of ſomething really exiſting under that Preciſion, has no Doubt produced thoſe obſcure and unintelligible Diſcourſes and Diſputes, which have filled the Heads and Books of Philoſophers concerning *materia prima*; which Imperfection or Abuſe, how far it may concern a great many other general Terms, I leave to be conſidered. This, I think, I may at leaſt ſay, that we ſhould have a great many fewer Diſputes in the World, if Words were taken for what they are, the Signs of our Ideas only, and not for Things themſelves. For, when we argue about Matter, or any the like Term,

Term, we truly argue only about the Idea we expreſs by that Sound, whether that preciſe Idea agree to any Thing really exiſting in Nature, or no. And if Men would tell, what Ideas they make their Words ſtand for, there could not be half that Obſcurity, or Wrangling, in the Search or Support of Truth, that there is.

But whatever Inconvenience follows from this Miſtake of Words, this I am ſure, that by conſtant and familiar Uſe, they charm Men into Notions far remote from the Truth of Things. It would be a hard Matter to perſuade any one that the Words which his Father or Schoolmaſter, the Parſon of the Pariſh, or ſuch a reverend Doctor uſed, ſignified nothing that really exiſted in Nature: Which, perhaps, is none of the leaſt Cauſes, that Men are ſo hardly drawn to quit their Miſtakes, even in Opinions purely Philoſophical, and where they have no other Intereſt but Truth. For the Words they have a long Time been uſed to, remaining firm in their Minds, it is no Wonder, that the wrong Notions annexed to them ſhould not be removed.

Fiftbly, Another Abuſe of Words, is the ſetting them in the Place of Things, which they do or can by no Means ſignify. We may obſerve, that in the general Names of Subſtances, whereof the nominal Eſſences are only known to us, when we put them into Propoſitions, and affirm or deny any Thing about them, we do moſt commonly tacitly ſuppoſe, or intend they ſhould ſtand for the real Eſſence of a certain

Sort of Subſtances. For when a Man ſays *Gold is malleable*, he means and would inſinuate ſomething more than this, that *what I call Gold is malleable*, (though truly it amounts to no more) but would have this underſtood, *viz.* that *Gold*, i. e. *what has the real Eſſence of Gold, is malleable*; which amounts to thus much, that *Malleableneſs depends on, and is inſeparable from the real Eſſence of Gold.* But a Man not knowing wherein that real Eſſence conſiſts, the Connexion in his Mind of Malleableneſs is not truly with an Eſſence he knows not, but only with the Sound *Gold* he puts for it. Thus when we ſay, that *Animal rationale* is, and *Animal implume bipes latis unguibus*, is not a good Definition of a Man; it is plain, we ſuppoſe the Name *Man* in this Caſe to ſtand for the real Eſſence of a Species, and would ſignify, that a *rational Animal* better deſcribed that real Eſſence than *a two legged Animal with broad Nails, and without Feathers.* For elſe, why might not *Plato* as properly make the Word ἄνθρωπος or *Man*, ſtand for his complex Idea, made up of the Ideas of a Body, diſtinguiſhed from others by a certain Shape, and other outward Appearances, as Ariſtotle makes the complex Idea, to which he gave the Name ἄνθρωπος or *Man*, of Body, and the Faculty of Reaſoning joined together; unleſs the Name ἄνθρωπος or *Man*, were ſuppoſed to ſtand for ſomething elſe, than what it ſignifies; and to be put in the Place of ſome other Thing than the Idea a Man profeſſes he would expreſs by it?

It is true, the Names of Subſtances would be much more uſeful, and Propoſitions made in them

them much more certain; were the real Essences of Substances the Ideas in our Minds, which those Words signified. And it is for Want of those real Essences, that our Words convey so little Knowledge or Certainty in our Discourses about them: And therefore the Mind, to remove that Imperfection as much as it can, makes them, by a secret Supposition, to stand for a Thing having that real Essence, as if thereby it made some nearer Approaches to it. For, though the Word *Man* or *Gold*, signify nothing truly but a complex Idea of Properties, united together in one Sort of Substances; yet there is scarce any Body in the Use of these Words, but often supposes each of those Names to stand for a Thing having the real Essence, on which those Properties depend. Which is so far from diminishing the Imperfection of our Words, that by a plain Abuse it adds to it, when we would make them stand for something, which not being in our complex Idea, the Name we use can no Ways be the Sign of.

This shews us the Reason why in mixed Modes any of the Ideas that make the Composition of the complex one, being left out or changed, it is allowed to be another Thing, *i. e.* to be of another Species, as is plain in *chance-medley*, *Man-slaughter*, *Murder*, *Parricide*, &c. The Reason whereof is, because the complex Idea signified by that Name, is the real, as well as nominal Essence; and there is no secret Reference of that Name to any other Essence but that. But in Substances it is not so. For, though in that called *Gold*, one puts into his complex Idea what another leaves out, and *vice*

versa; yet Men do not usually think that therefore the Species is changed: Because they secretly in their Minds refer that Name, and suppose it annexed to a real immutable Essence of a Thing existing, on which those Properties depend. He that adds to his complex Idea of Gold, that of fixedness or solubility in *aqua regia*, which he put not in it before, is not thought to have changed the Species; but only to have a more perfect Idea, by adding another simple Idea, which is always in Fact joined with those other, of which his former complex Idea consisted. But this Reference of the Name to a Thing, whereof we have not the Idea, is so far from helping at all, that it only serves the more to involve us in Difficulties. For by this tacit Reference to the real Essence of that Species of Bodies, the Word *Gold* (which, by standing for a more or less perfect Collection of simple Ideas, serves to design that Sort of Body well enough in civil Discourse) comes to have no Signification at all, being put for somewhat, whereof we have no Idea at all, and so can signify nothing at all, when the Body itself is away. For however it may be thought all one; yet, if well considered, it will be found a quite different Thing, to argue about Gold in Name, and about a Parcel of the Body itself, *v. g.* a Piece of Leaf Gold laid before us; though in Discourse we are fain to substitute the Name for the Thing.

That which I think very much disposes Men to substitute their Names for the real Essences or Species, is the Supposition before mentioned, that Nature works regularly in the Production

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tion of Things, and sets the Boundaries to each of those Species, by giving exactly the same real internal Constitution to each Individual, which we rank under one general Name. Whereas any one who observes their different Qualities can hardly doubt, that many of the Individuals, called by the same Name, are, in their internal Constitution, as different one from another, as several of those which are ranked under different specific Names. This Supposition, however, that the same precise internal Constitution goes always with the same specific Name, makes Men forward to take those Names for the Representatives of those real Essences, though indeed they signify nothing but the complex Ideas they have in their Minds when they use them. So that, if I may so say, signifying one Thing, and being supposed for, or put in the Place of another, they cannot but, in such a Kind of Use, cause a great deal of Uncertainty in Mens Discourses; especially in those who have thoroughly imbibed the Doctrine of substantial Forms, whereby they firmly imagine the several Species of Things to be determined and distinguished.

But however preposterous and absurd it be, to make our Names stand for Ideas we have not, or, which is all one, Essences that we know not, it being in Effect to make our Words the Signs of nothing; yet it is evident to any one, who ever so little reflects on the Use Men make of their Words, that there is nothing more familiar. When a Man asks whether this or that Thing he sees, let it be a drill, or a monstrous Fœtus, be a Man, or no; it is evident, the

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Question is not, whether that particular Thing agree to his complex Idea, expressed by the Name *Man*: But whether it has in it the real Essence of a Species of Things, which he supposes his Name *Man* to stand for. In which Way of using the Names of Substances, there are these false Suppositions contained:

1st, That there are certain precise Essences, according to which Nature makes all particular Things, and by which they are distinguished into Species. That every Thing has a real Constitution, whereby it is what it is, and on which its sensible Qualities depend, is past Doubt: But, I think, it has been proved, that this makes not the Distinction of Species, as we rank them; nor the Boundaries of their Names.

2dly, This tacitly also insinuates, as if we had Ideas of these proposed Essences. For, to what Purpose else is it, to enquire whether this or that Thing have the real Essence of the Species *Man*, if we did not suppose that there were such a specific Essence known? Which yet is utterly false: And therefore such Application of Names, as would make them stand for Ideas which we have not, must needs cause great Disorder in Discourses and Reasonings about them, and be a great Inconvenience in our Communication by Words.

Sixthly, There remains yet another more general, though perhaps less observed, Abuse of Words; and that is, that Men having, by a long and familiar Use, annexed to them certain Ideas,

Ideas, they are apt to imagine ſo near and neceſſary a Connexion between the Names and the Signification they uſe them in, that they forwardly ſuppoſe one cannot but underſtand what their Meaning is; and therefore one ought to acquieſce in the Words delivered, as if it were paſt Doubt, that in the Uſe of thoſe common received Sounds, the Speaker and Hearer had neceſſarily the ſame preciſe Ideas. Whence preſuming, that when they have in Diſcourſe uſed any Term, they have thereby, as it were, ſet before others the very Thing they talk of. And ſo likewiſe taking the Words of others, as naturally ſtanding for juſt what they themſelves have been accuſtomed to apply them to, they never trouble themſelves to explain their own, or underſtand clearly others Meaning. From whence commonly proceeds Noiſe and Wrangling, without Improvement or Information; whilſt Men take Words to be the conſtant regular Marks of agreed Notions, which in Truth are no more but the voluntary and unſteady Signs of their own Ideas. And yet Men think it ſtrange, if in Diſcourſe, or (where it is often abſolutely neceſſary) in Diſpute, one ſometimes aſks the Meaning of their Terms: Though the Arguings one may every Day obſerve in Converſation, make it evident, that there are few Names of complex Ideas, which any two Men uſe for the ſame juſt preciſe Collection. It is hard to name a Word which will not be a clear Inſtance of this. *Life* is a Term none more familiar. Any one almoſt would take it for an Affront, to be aſked what he meant by it. And yet if it comes in Queſtion, whether a Plant, that lies ready formed in the Seed, have Life; whether

whether the Embrio in an Egg before Incubation, or a Man in a Swoon without Sense or Motion, be alive, or no? It is easy to perceive, that a clear distinct settled Idea does not always accompany the Use of so known a Word, as that of *Life* is. Some gross and confused Conceptions Men indeed ordinarily have, to which they apply the common Words of their Language, and such a loose Use of their Words serves them well enough in their ordinary Discourses or Affairs. But this is not sufficient for Philosophical Enquiries. Knowledge and Reasoning require precise determinate Ideas. And though Men will not be so importunately dull, as not to understand what others say, without demanding an Explication of their Terms; nor so troublesomely critical, as to correct others in the Use of the Words they receive from them; yet where Truth and Knowledge are concerned in the Case, I know not what Fault it can be to desire the Explication of Words, whose Sense seems dubious; or why a Man should be ashamed to own his Ignorance, in what Sense another Man uses his Words, since he has no other Way of certainly knowing it, but by being informed. This Abuse of taking Words upon Trust, has no where spread so far, nor with so ill Effects, as amongst Men of Letters. The Multiplication and Obstinacy of Disputes, which has so laid waste the intellectual World, is owing to nothing more than to this ill Use of Words. For, though it be generally believed, that there is great Diversity of Opinions in the Volumes and Varieties of Controversies the World is distracted with; yet the most I can find, that the contending learned Men

Men of different Parties do, in their Arguings one with another, is, that they ſpeak different Languages. For I am apt to imagine, that when any of them quitting Terms, think upon Things, and know what they think, they think all the ſame: Though perhaps what they would have, be different.

To conclude this Conſideration of the Imperfection and Abuſe of Language; the Ends of Language in our Diſcourſe with others being chiefly theſe three: 1. To make known one Man's Thoughts or Ideas to another. 2. To do it with as much Eaſe and Quickneſs as is poſſible. And, 3. Thereby to convey the Knowledge of Things. Language is either abuſed, or deficient, when it fails of any of theſe three.

Firſt, Words fail in the firſt of theſe Ends, and lay not open one Man's Ideas to another's View. 1. When Men have Names in their Mouths without any determined Ideas in their Minds, whereof they are the Signs: Or, 2. When they apply the common received Names of any Language to Ideas, to which the common Uſe of that Language does not apply them: Or, 3. When they apply them very unſteadily, making them ſtand now for one, and by and by for another Idea.

Secondly, Men fail of conveying their Thoughts, with all the Quickneſs and Eaſe that may be, when they have complex Ideas, without having diſtinct Names for them. This is ſometimes the Fault of the Language itſelf, which has not

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in it a Sound yet applied to ſuch a Signification; and ſometimes the Fault of the Man, who has not yet learned the Name for that Idea he would ſhew another.

Thirdly, There is no Knowledge of Things, conveyed by Mens Words, when their Ideas agree not to the Reality of Things. Though it be a Defect, that has its Original in our Ideas, which are not ſo conformable to the Nature of Things, as Attention, Study, and Application might make them; yet it fails not to extend itſelf to our Words too, when we uſe them as Signs of real Beings, which yet never had any Reality or Exiſtence.

Firſt, He that hath Words of any Language, without diſtinct Ideas in his Mind, to which he applies them, does, ſo far as he uſes them in Diſcourſe, only make a Noiſe without any Senſe or Signification, and how learned ſoever he may ſeem by the Uſe of hard Words, or learned Terms, is not much more advanced thereby in Knowledge, than he would be in Learning, who had nothing in his Study but the bare Titles of Books, without poſſeſſing the Contents of them. For all ſuch Words, however put into Diſcourſe, according to the right Conſtruction of Grammatical Rules, or the Harmony of well turned Periods, do yet amount to nothing but bare Sounds, and nothing elſe.

Secondly, He that has complex Ideas, without particular Names for them, would be in no better a Caſe than a Bookſeller, who had in his Ware-houſe Volumes that lay there unbound, and

and without Titles; which he could therefore make known to others, only by ſhewing the looſe Sheets, and communicate them only by Tale. This Man is hindered in his Diſcourſe for Want of Words to communicate his complex Ideas, which he is therefore forced to make known by an Enumeration of the ſimple Ones that compoſe them; and ſo is fain often to uſe twenty Words to expreſs what another Man ſignifies in one.

Thirdly, He that puts not conſtantly the ſame Sign for the ſame Idea, but uſes the ſame Words ſometimes in one, and ſometimes in another Signification, ought to paſs in the Schools and Converſation for as fair a Man, as he does in the Market and Exchange, who ſells ſeveral Things under the ſame Name.

Fourthly, He that applies the Words of any Language to Ideas different from thoſe to which the common Uſe of that Country applies them, however his own Underſtanding may be filled with Truth and Light; will not by ſuch Words be able to convey much of it to others, without defining his Terms. For however the Sounds are ſuch as are familiarly known, and eaſily enter the Ears of thoſe who are accuſtomed to them; yet ſtanding for other Ideas than thoſe they uſually are annexed to, and are wont to excite in the Mind of the Hearers, they cannot make known the Thoughts of him who thus uſes them.

Fifthly, He that hath imagined to himſelf Subſtances ſuch as never have been, and filled

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his Head with Ideas which have not any Correſpondence with the real Nature of Things, to which yet he gives ſettled and defined Names, may fill his Diſcourſe, and perhaps another Man's Head, with the fantaſtical Imaginations of his own Brain, but will be very far from advancing thereby one Jot in real and true Knowledge.

He that hath Names without Ideas, wants Meaning in his Words, and ſpeaks only empty Sounds. He that hath complex Ideas without Names for them, wants Liberty and Diſpatch in his Expreſſions, and is neceſſitated to uſe Periphraſes. He that uſes his Words looſely and unſteadily, will either be not minded, or not underſtood. He that applies his Name to Ideas different from their common Uſe, wants Propriety in his Language, and ſpeaks Gibberiſh. And he that hath Ideas of Subſtances, diſagreeing with the real Exiſtence of Things, ſo far wants the Materials of true Knowledge in his Underſtanding, and hath inſtead thereof Chimeras.

In our Notions concerning Subſtances, we are liable to all the former Inconveniences: *v. g.* he that uſes the Word *Tarantula*, without having any Imagination or Idea of what it ſtands for, pronounces a good Word; but ſo long means nothing at all by it. 2. He that in a new diſcovered Country ſhall ſee ſeveral Sorts of Animals and Vegetables, unknown to him before, may have as true Ideas of them, as of a Horſe, or a Stag; but can ſpeak of them only by a Deſcription, till he ſhall either take the

Names

Names the Natives call them by, or give them Names himself. 3. He that uses the Word *Body* sometimes for pure Extension, and sometimes for Extension and Solidity together, will talk very fallaciously. 4. He that gives the Name *Horse* to that Idea which common Usage calls *Mule*, talks improperly, and will not be understood. 5. He that thinks the Name *Centaur* stands for some real Being, imposes on himself, and mistakes Words for Things.

In Modes and Relations generally we are liable only to the four first of these Inconveniences, *viz.* 1. I may have in my Memory the Names of Modes, as *Gratitude*, or *Charity*, and yet not have any precise Ideas annexed in my Thoughts to those Names. 2. I may have Ideas, and not know the Names that belong to them; *v. g.* I may have the Idea of a Man's Drinking, till his Colour and Humour be altered, till his Tongue trips, and his Eyes look red, and his Feet fail him, and yet not know, that it is to be called *Drunkenness*. 3. I may have the Ideas of *Virtues* or *Vices*, and Names also, but apply them amiss: *v. g.* when I apply the Name *Frugality* to that Idea which others call and signify by this Sound, *Covetousness*. 4. I may use any of those Names with Inconstancy. 5. But in Modes and Relations, I cannot have Ideas disagreeing to the Existence of Things: For Modes being complex Ideas, made by the Mind at Pleasure; and Relation being but my Way of considering or comparing two Things together, and so also an Idea of my own making, these Ideas can scarce be found to disagree with any Thing existing; since they are not in the Mind,

Mind, as the Copies of Things regularly made by Nature, nor as *Properties inſeparably flowing* from the internal Conſtitution or Eſſence of any Subſtance; but, as it were, Patterns lodged in my Memory, with Names annexed to them, to denominate Actions and Relations by, as they come to exiſt. But the Miſtake is commonly in my giving a wrong Name to my Conceptions; and ſo uſing Words in a different Senſe from other People, I am not underſtood, but am thought to have wrong Ideas of them, when I give wrong Names to them. Only if I put in my Ideas of mixed Modes or Relations, any inconſiſtent Ideas together, I fill my Head alſo with Chimeras; ſince ſuch Ideas, if well examined, cannot ſo much as exiſt in the Mind, much leſs any real Being be ever denominated from them.

Since Wit and Fancy finds eaſier Entertainment in the World, than dry Truth and real Knowledge, figurative Speeches, and Alluſion in Language, will hardly be admitted, as an Imperfection or Abuſe of it. I confeſs, in Diſcourſes, where we ſeek rather Pleaſure and Delight than Information and Improvement, ſuch Ornaments as are borrowed from them, can ſcarce paſs for Faults. But yet, if we would ſpeak of Things as they are, we muſt allow, that all the Art of Rhetoric, beſides Order and Clearneſs, all the artificial and figurative Application of Words Eloquence hath invented, are for nothing elſe but to inſinuate wrong Ideas, move the Paſſions, and thereby miſlead the Judgment, and ſo indeed are perfect Cheat:

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And therefore however laudable or allowable Oratory may render them in Harangues and popular Addresses, they are certainly, in all Discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided; and where Truth and Knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great Fau't, either of the Language or Person that makes Use of them. What, and how various they are, will be superfluous here to take Notice; the Books of Rhetoric which abound in the World, will instruct those who want to be informed. Only I cannot but observe, how little the Preservation and Improvement of Truth and Knowledge, is the Care and Concern of Mankind; since the Arts of Fallacy are endowed and preferred. It is evident how much Men love to deceive, and be deceived, since Rhetoric, that powerful Instrument of Error and Deceit, has its established Professors, is publicly taught, and has always been had in great Reputation: And, I doubt not, but it will be thought great Boldness, if not Brutality, in me to have said thus much against it. Eloquence, like the Fair Sex, has too prevailing Beauties in it, to suffer itself ever to be spoken against. And it is in vain to find Fault with those Arts of deceiving, wherein Men find Pleasure to be deceived.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuses.

THE natural and improved Imperfections of Languages, we have juſt given at large; and Speech being the great Bond that holds Society together, and the common Conduit, whereby the Improvements of Knowledge are conveyed from one Man, and one Generation to another, it would well deſerve our moſt ſerious Thoughts, to conſider what Remedies are to be found for theſe Inconveniences.

The Inconvenience juſt mentioned, is much increaſed, in an ill Uſe of Words, Men ſuffer in their own private Meditations; but much more manifeſt are the Diſorders which follow from it, in Converſation, Diſcourſe, and Arguings with another. For Language being the great Conduit whereby Men convey their Diſcoveries, Reaſonings, and Knowledge, from one to another, he that makes an ill Uſe of it, though he does not corrupt the Fountains of Knowledge, which are in Things themſelves; yet he does, as much as in him lies, break or ſtop the Pipes, whereby it is diſtributed to the public Uſe and Advantage of Mankind. He that uſes Words without any clear and ſteady Meaning, what does he but lead himſelf and others into Errors? And he that deſignedly does

does it, ought to be looked on as an Enemy to Truth and Knowledge. And yet who can wonder, that all the Sciences and Parts of Knowledge, have been so over-charged with obscure and equivocal Terms, and insignificant and doubtful Expressions, capable to make the most attentive or quick-sighted, very little or not at all the more knowing or orthodox; since Subtility in those who make Profession to teach or defend Truth, hath passed so much for a Virtue. A Virtue, indeed, which consisting for the most Part, in nothing but the fallacious and illusory Use of obscure or deceitful Terms, is only fit to make Men more conceited in their Ignorance, and obstinate in their Errors.

To remedy the Defects of Speech beforementioned, to some Degree, and to prevent the Inconveniences that follow from them, I imagine the Observation of these following Rules may be of Use, till some Body better able shall judge it worth his while, to think more maturely on this Matter, and oblige the World with his Thoughts on it.

First, A Man should take Care to use no Word without a Signification, no Name without an Idea for which he makes it stand. This Rule will not seem altogether needless, to any one who shall take the Pains to recollect how often he has met with such Words; as Instinct, Sympathy, and Antipathy, *&c.* in the Discourse of others, so made Use of, as he might easily conclude, that those that used them had no Ideas in their Minds to which they applied them; but spoke them only as Sounds.

Secondly,

Secondly, It is not enough a Man uſes his Words as Signs of ſome Ideas, thoſe Ideas he annexes them to, if they be ſimple, muſt be clear and diſtinct; if complex, muſt be determinate, *i. e.* the preciſe Collection of ſimple Ideas ſettled in the Mind, with that Sound annexed to it, as the Sign of that preciſe determined Collection, and no other. This is very neceſſary in Names of Modes, and eſpecially moral Words; which having no ſettled Objects in Nature, from whence their Ideas are taken, as from their Original, are apt to be very confuſed. *Juſtice* is a Word in every Man's Mouth, but moſt commonly with a very undetermined loofe Signification: which will always be ſo, unleſs a Man has in his Mind a diſtinct Comprehenſion of the component Parts, that complex Idea conſiſts of; and if it be decompounded, muſt be able to reſolve it ſtill on, till he at laſt comes to the ſimple Ideas that make it up: And unleſs this be done, a Man makes an ill Uſe of the Word, let it be *Juſtice*, for Example, or any other.

In the Names of Subſtances, for a right Uſe of them, ſomething more is required than barely determined Ideas: In theſe the Names muſt alſo be conformable to Things, as they exiſt: This Exactneſs is abſolutely neceſſary in Enquiries after Philoſophical Knowledge, and in Controverſies about Truth.

Thirdly, It is not enough that Men have Ideas, determined Ideas, for which they make theſe Signs ſtand; but they muſt alſo take Care to ap-

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ply their Words, as near as may be, to ſuch Ideas as common Uſe has annexed them to. For Words, eſpecially of Languages already framed, are no Man's private Poſſeſſion, but the common Meaſure of Commerce and Co[illegible] nication, and therefore it is not for a[illegible] Pleaſure, to change the Stamp they a[illegible] in; nor alter the Ideas they are affix[illegible]d to, leaſt when there is a Neceſſity to do ſo, [illegible] bound to give Notice of it, in Order to be und[illegible] ſtood, eſpecially in the Names of *moral* Words.

Fourthly, When common Uſe has left the Signification of a Word uncertain and ambiguous, or where it is to be uſed in a peculiar Senſe; or where the Term is liable to any Doubtfulneſs or Miſtake, there it ought to be defined, and its Signification aſcertained.

As the Ideas Mens Words ſtand for, are of different Sorts; ſo the Way of making known the Ideas they ſtand for, when there is Occaſion, is alſo different. For though defining be thought the proper Way to make known the proper Signification of Words; yet there are ſome Words, that will not be defined, as there are others, whoſe preciſe Meaning cannot be made known, but by Definition; and, perhaps, a third, which partake ſomewhat of both the other, as we ſhall ſee in the Names of ſimple Ideas, Modes and Subſtances.

Words ſtanding for ſimple Ideas as has been ſhewn, not being *definable*, their Signification muſt be ſhewn either, *Firſt*, By a ſynonymous Word, but ſhould that fail, he may ſhew it.

Secondly, By naming a Subject, wherein that simple Idea is to be found. *Thirdly*, By presenting to the Senses that Subject, which may produce it in the Mind, and make him actually have the Idea that Word stands for. Mixed Modes may be perfectly defined, by exactly enumerating those Ideas that go to each Composition. This ought more especially to be done in mixed Modes belonging to Morality; since Definition is the only Way whereby the precise Meaning of *moral* Words can be known; and yet a Way whereby their precise Meaning may be known certainly, and without leaving any Room for Contest about it.

For they being Combinations of several Ideas that the Mind of Man has arbitrarily put together, (as we do a *Triangle*, or any other Mathematical Figure, whose Dependance is on our *Will*, for its *Existence*,) without Reference to any Archetypes, Men may, if they please, exactly know the Ideas that go to each Composition, and so both use these Words in a certain and undoubted Signification, and perfectly declare, when there is Occasion, what they stand for. This, if well considered, would lay great Blame on those, who make not their Discourses about moral Things very clear and distinct.

Upon this Ground I think that *Morality* would be as capable of Demonstration as *Mathematicks*; since the precise real Essence of the Things moral Words stand for, may be perfectly known: But this is otherwise in *natural Subjects*, where doubtful Terms are hardly to be avoided, as our Ideas are made up of

of particular Sorts of Subſtances, by collecting ſuch Combinations of ſimple Ideas, as are, by Experience and the Obſervation of Mens Senſes, taken Notice of to exiſt together, and are therefore ſuppoſed to flow from the particular internal Conſtitution, or unknown Eſſence of the Subſtance, of which we can have no other Idea, than an unknown Support of the Qualities, we find exiſting in ſuch Objects that at any Time are preſented to our Senſes, the Qualities of which we imagine cannot ſubſiſt, *ſine re Subſtante*, without ſomething to ſupport them, this we call *Subſtantia*, which in Engliſh is no other, than *ſtanding under or upholding*.

For the explaining the Signification of the Names of Subſtances as they ſtand for the Ideas we have of their diſtinct Species, both the forementioned Ways, *viz.* of ſhewing and defining, are requiſite, in many Caſes, to be made uſe of. For there being ordinarily in each Sort ſome leading Qualities, to which we ſuppoſe the other Ideas, which make up our complex Idea of that Species, annexed, we forwardly give the ſpecific Name to that Thing, wherein that characteriſtical Mark is found, which we take to be the moſt diſtinguiſhing Idea of that Species. Theſe leading or characteriſtical (as I may ſo call them) Ideas, in the Sorts of Animals and Vegetables, is, as has been before remarked, moſtly figure, and in inanimate Bodies Colour, and in ſome both together.

Now theſe leading Qualities are beſt made known by ſhewing, and can hardly be made

known otherwise. The Shape of a *Horse* or *Cassowary* will be but imperfectly imprinted on the Mind by Words: The Sight of the Animals doth it much better. And the Idea of the particular Colour of Gold is not to be got by any Description of it, but only by the frequent Exercise of the Eyes about it. The like may be said of those other simple Ideas, peculiar in their Kind to any Substance, for which precise Ideas there are no peculiar Names.

But because many of the simple Ideas, which make up our specifick Ideas of Substances, are Powers which lie not obvious to our Senses in the Things, as they ordinarily appear; therefore in the Signification of our Names of Substances, some Part of the Signification will be better made known, by enumerating those simple Ideas, than in shewing the Substance itself. For he that to the *yellow, shining Colour of* Gold, got by Sight, shall, from my enumerating them, have the Ideas of great *Ductility*, *Fusibility*, *Fixedness*, and *Solubility* in *Aqua Regia*, will have a more perfect Idea of Gold than he can have by seeing a Piece of Gold, and thereby imprinting in his Mind only its obvious Qualities. But if the formal Constitution of this shining heavy, ductile Thing, (from whence all these its Properties flow) lay open to our Senses, as the formal Constitution, or Essence of a Triangle does, the Signification of the Word *Gold* might as easily be ascertained as that of a *Triangle*.

It were therefore to be wished, that Men, versed in Physical Enquiries, and acquainted with the several Sorts of natural Bodies, would set

set down those simple Ideas, wherein they observe the Individuals of each Sort constantly to agree. This would remedy a great deal of that Confusion which arises from several Persons applying the same Name to a Collection of a smaller or greater Number of sensible Qualities, proportionably as they have been more or less acquainted with, or accurate in examining the Qualities of any Sort of Things, which come under one Denomination. But a Dictionary of this Sort, containing, as it were, a natural History, requires too many Hands, as well as too much Time, Cost, Pains, and Sagacity, ever to be hoped for; and till that be done, we must content ourselves with such Definitions of the Names of Substances, as explain the Sense Men use them in. And it would be well, where there is Occasion, if they would afford us so much. This yet is not usually done; but Men talk to one another, and dispute in Words, whose Meaning is not agreed between them, out of a Mistake, that the Signification of common Words is certainly established, and the precise Ideas, they stand for, perfectly known; and that it is a Shame to be ignorant of them.

Such Words standing for Things, which are known and distinguished by their outward Shapes, should be expressed by little Draughts and Prints made of them. A Vocabulary made after this Manner, would perhaps with more Ease, and in less Time, teach the true Signification of many Terms, especially in Languages of remote Countries, or Ages; and settle truer Ideas in Mens Minds of several Things, whereof we

read the Names in ancient Authors, than all the large and laborious Comments of learned Criticks. *Naturalists* that treat of *Plants* and *Animals*, have found the Benefit of this Method, and not insensible of the Advantage, have been careful in their Works to give the same Helps; and he that consults them will find that he has a clearer Idea of *Apium* and *Ibex*, from a little Print of that Herb or Beast, than he could have from a long Definition of the Names of either of them; and so no Doubt he would have of *Strigil* and *Sistrum*, if instead of a *Curry-comb* or *Cymbal*, which are the *English* Names Dictionaries render them by, he could see stamped in the Margin small Pictures of these Instruments, as they were in Use amongst the Ancients.

Fifthly, The last Rule that I shall mention is, that in all Discourses, wherein one Man pretends to instruct or convince another, he should use the same Word, constantly in the same Sense; if this were done (which no Body can refuse without great Disingenuity) many of the Books extant might be spared; many of the Controversies in Dispute would be at an End; several of those great Volumes swollen with ambiguous Words, now used in one Sense, and by and by in another, would shrink into a very narrow Compass: And many of the Philosophers (to mention no other) as well as *Poets* Works might be contained in a *Nutshell*.

But however, the Provision of Words is so scanty in Respect of that infinite Variety of Thoughts,

Thoughts, that Men, wanting Terms to suit their precise Notions, will, notwithstanding their utmost Caution, be forced often to use the same Word in somewhat different Senses. And though in the Continuation of a Discourse, or the Pursuit of an Argument, there be hardly Room to digress into a particular Definition, as often as a Man varies the Signification of any Term; yet the Import of the Discourse will, for the most Part, if there be no designed Fallacy, sufficiently lead candid and intelligent Readers, into the true Meaning of it: But where that is not sufficient to guide the Reader, there it concerns the Writer to explain his Meaning, and shew in what Sense he there uses that Term.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

Of Knowledge in general.

SINCE the Mind, in all its Thoughts and Reasonings, has no other immediate Object but its own Ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate; it is evident that our Knowledge is only conversant about them. *Knowledge* then seems to be nothing but *the Perception of the Connection and Agreement, or Disagreement and Repugnancy of any of our Ideas*, in this alone it consists. Where this Perception is, there is Knowledge; and where it is not, there, though we fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of Knowledge. When we know that *White is not Black*, what do we else but perceive that these two Ideas do not agree? When we possess ourselves, with the utmost Certainty of the Demonstration, that the three Angles of a *Triangle*, are equal to two right Ones; what do we more but perceive, that Equality to two right ones, does necessarily agree to, and is inseparable from, the three Angles of a Triangle? But to understand a little more distinctly, wherein this Agreement or Disagreement consists; we may reduce it all to these four Sorts; First, *Identity* or *Diversity*; Secondly, *Relation*; Thirdly, *Co-existence*, or necessary *Connection*; Fourthly, *Real Existence*.

First,

First, As to the first Sort of Agreement, or Disagreement, *viz. Identity* or *Diversity*. It is the first Act of the Mind, when it has any Sentiments or Ideas at all, *to perceive its* Ideas; and so far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby also to perceive their Difference; that is, that one is not the other: And this it does without any Pains or Deduction; but at first View, by its natural Power of Perception and Distinction. This is what Men of Art have reduced to these general Rules, *viz. What is, is.* And, *It is impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be.* But no *Maxim* can make a Man know clearer, that *Round* is not *Square*, than the bare Perception of those two Ideas, which the Mind at first Sight perceives to disagree. This then is the first Agreement or Disagreement, which the Mind perceives in its Ideas; which it always perceives at first Sight: And if there ever happen any Doubt about it, it will always be found to be about the Names, and not the Ideas themselves, whose Identity and Diversity will always be perceived, as soon and as clearly as the Ideas themselves are; nor can it possibly be otherwise.

Secondly, The *second* Sort of Agreement or Disagreement the Mind perceives in any of its Ideas, may be called *Relative*, and is nothing but *the Perception of the Relation, between any two Ideas*, of what Kind soever. For since all distinct Ideas must eternally be known not to be the same, and so be universally and constantly denied one of another, there could be no Room for any positive Knowledge at all, if we could

not perceive any Relation between our Ideas, and find out the Agreement or Disagreement they have one with another, in several ways the Mind takes of comparing them.

Thirdly, The *third* Sort of Agreement, or Disagreement to be found in our Ideas, which the Perception of the Mind is employed about, is *Co-existence*, or *Non-co-existence* in the same Subject; and this belongs particularly to Substances. Thus when we pronounce concerning Gold, that it is fixed, it amounts to no more but this; that Fixedness, or a Power to remain in the Fire unconsumed, is an Idea that always accompanies that particular Sort of *Yellowness*, *Weight*, *Fusibility*, &c. which makes our complex Idea signified by the World *Gold*.

Fourthly, The *fourth* and last Sort is, that of *actual real Existence* agreeing to any Idea. Within these four Sorts of Agreement or Disagreement, is, I suppose, contained all the Knowledge we have, or are capable of: For all the Enquiries that we can make concerning any of our Ideas, all that we know or can affirm concerning any of them, is, that it is, or is not the same with some other; that it does, or does not always co-exist with some other Idea in the same Subject; that it has this or that Relation to some other Idea; or that it has a real Existence without the Mind. Thus *Blue is not Yellow*, is of Identity. *Two Triangles upon equal Basis, between two Parallels are equal*, is of Relation. *Iron is susceptible of magnetical Impressions*, is of Co-existence; God is, is of real Existence. Though Identity and Co-existence are truly nothing

thing but Relations, yet they are so peculiar Ways of Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas, that they deserve well to be considered as distinct Heads, and not under Relation in general.

There are several Ways wherein the Mind is possessed of Truth, each of which is called Knowledge. *First*, There is *actual Knowledge*, when the Mind has a present View of the Agreement or Disagreement of any of its Ideas, or of the Relation they have one with another. *Secondly*, A Man is said to know any Proposition, when having once evidently perceived the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas whereof it consists, and so lodged it in his Memory, that whenever that Proposition comes to be reflected on again, the Mind assents to it without Doubt or Hesitation, and is certain of the Truth of it. And this may be called *habitual Knowledge:* And thus a Man may be said to know all those Truths which are lodged in his Memory, by a foregoing, clear, and full Perception, whereof the Mind is assured past Doubt, as often as it has Occasion to reflect on them. For our finite Understandings being able to think clearly and distinctly, but on one Thing at once, if Men had no Knowledge of any more than what they actually thought on, they would all be very ignorant: And he that knew most, would know but one Truth, that being all he was able to think on at one Time.

Of *habitual Knowledge* there are two Sorts: The one is of such Truths laid up in the Memory, as whenever they occur to the Mind, it actually

actually perceives the Relation that is between those Ideas. And this is in all those Truths, whereof we have an intuitive Knowledge, where the Ideas themselves, by an immediate View, discover their Agreement or Disagreement one with another. The other is of such Truths, whereof the Mind having been convinced, it retains the Memory of the Conviction, without the Proofs. Thus a Man that remembers certainly, that he once perceived the Demonstration, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones; knows it to be true, when that Demonstration is gone out of his Mind, and possibly cannot then recollect it: But he knows it in a different Way from what he did before; namely, not by the Intervention of those intermediate Ideas, whereby the Agreement or Disagreement of those in the Proposition was at first perceived; but by remembering, *i. e.* knowing that he was once certain of the Truth of this Proposition, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right Ones. The Immutability of the same Relations between the same immutable Thing, is now the Idea that shews him, that if the three Angles of a Triangle were once equal to two right Ones, they will always be so. And hence he comes to be certain, that what was once true is always true; what Ideas once agreed, will always agree; and consequently, what he once knew to be true, he will always know to be true, as long as he can remember that he once knew it. But because the Memory is not always so clear as actual Perception, and does in all Men more or less decay in Length of Time, this

this amongst other Differences is one, which shews, that *demonstrative Knowledge* is much more imperfect than *intuitive*.

CHAP. II.

Of the Degrees of our Knowledge.

ALL our Knowledge consists in the View the Mind has of its own Ideas, which is the utmost Light, and greatest Certainty we are capable of: The *different Clearness of our Knowledge*, seems to lie in the different Way of Perception the Mind has of the Agreement or Disagreement of any of its Ideas.

When the Mind perceives this Agreement or Disagreement of two *Ideas immediately* by themselves, without the Intervention of any other; we may call it *intuitive Knowledge*, in which Cases the Mind perceives the Truth, as the Eye doth Light, only by being directed towards it. Thus the Mind perceives that *White is not Black*, that *Three are more than Two*, and *equal to One and Two*. This Part of Knowledge is irresistible, and like the bright Sun-shine, forces itself immediately to be perceived as soon as ever the Mind turns its View that Way. It is on this *Intuition*, that depends all the Certainty and Evidence of our other Knowledge; which Certainty every one finds to be so great, that he cannot imagine, and therefore not require a greater. He that demands a greater Certainty than this, demands he knows not what, and shews

ſhews only that he has a Mind to be a Sceptic, without being able to be ſo. Certainty depends ſo wholly on this Intuition, that in the next Degree of *Knowledge*, which I call *Demonſtrative*, this Intuition is neceſſary in all the Connections of the intermediate Ideas, without which we cannot attain Knowledge and Certainty.

The next Degree of Knowledge is, where the Mind perceives not this Agreement or Diſagreement, immediately, or by the *Juxta-poſition* as it were of the Ideas, becauſe thoſe Ideas concerning whoſe Agreement or Diſagreement the Enquiry is made, cannot by the Mind be ſo put together, as to ſhew it. In this Caſe the Mind is fain to diſcover the Agreement or Diſagreement which it ſearches, by the Intervention of other Ideas: And this is that which we call *Reaſoning*; and thus if we would know the Agreement or Diſagreement in Bigneſs, between the three Angles of a Triangle, and two right Angles; we cannot by an immediate View, and comparing them do it; becauſe the three Angles of a Triangle cannot be brought at once, and be compared with any other one, or two Angles. And ſo of this, the Mind has no immediate or intuitive Knowledge. But we muſt find out ſome other Angles, to which the three Angles of a Triangle have Equality, and finding thoſe equal to two right ones, we come to know the Equality of theſe three Angles to two right ones. Thoſe intervening *Ideas*, which ſerve to ſhew the Agreement of any two others, are called *Proofs*. And where the Agreement or Diſagreement is by this Means plainly and clearly perceived, it is called *Demonſtration*. A Quick-

neſs

nefs in the Mind to find thofe *Proofs*, and to apply them right, is, I fuppofe, that which is called *Sagacity*.

This Knowledge, though it be certain, is not fo clear and evident as *intuitive Knowledge*. It requires Pains and Attention, and fteady Application of Mind, to difcover the Agreement or Difagreement of the *Ideas* it confiders, and there muft be a Progreffion by Steps and Degrees, before the Mind can in this Way arrive at Certainty, and perceive the Agreement or Repugnancy between two Ideas that need Proofs and the Ufe of Reafon to fhew it. Before Demonftration there was a Doubt, which in *intuitive Knowledge* cannot happen to the Mind, that has its Faculty of Perception left to a Degree capable of diftinct *Ideas*, no more than it can be a Doubt to the Eye (that can diftinctly fee *White* and *Black*) whether this Ink and Paper be all of a Colour.

Now in every Step that Reafon makes in *Demonftrative Knowledge*, there is an *intuitive Knowledge* of that Agreement or Difagreement it feeks with the next intermediate *Idea*, which it ufes as a Proof; for if it were not fo, that yet would need a Proof; fince without the Perception of fuch Agreement or Difagreement, there is no Knowledge produced, if it be perceived by itfelf, it is intuitive Knowledge: If it cannot be perceived by itfelf, there is Need of fome intervening Idea, as a common Meafure to fhew their Agreement or Difagreement. By which it is evident, that every Step in Reafoning, that produces Knowledge, has *intuitive Certainty*; which

which when the Mind perceives, there is no more required but to remember it, to make the Agreement or Disagreement of the *Ideas* concerning which we enquire, visible and certain, so that to make any Thing a Demonstration, it is necessary to perceive the immediate Agreement of the intervening Ideas, which is then *intuitive Knowledge*. This *intuitive Perception* of the Agreement or Disagreement of the intermediate *Ideas* in each Step and Progression of the Demonstration, must also be exactly carried in the Mind; and a Man must be sure that no Part is left out; which in long Deductions, the Memory cannot easily retain; so that this Knowledge becomes more imperfect than *intuitive*; and Men often embrace Falshoods for Demonstrations.

It has been generally taken for granted, that *Mathematicks* alone are capable of demonstrative Certainty. But to have such an Agreement or Disagreement as may be *intuitively* perceived, being as I imagine not the Privilege of the *Ideas* of *Number*, *Extension* and *Figure* alone; it may possibly be the Want of due Method and Application in us, and not of sufficient Evidence in Things, that Demonstration has been thought to have so little to do in other Parts of Knowledge. For in whatever *Ideas* the Mind can perceive the Agreement or Disagreement immediately, there it is capable of *intuitive Knowledge*: And where it can perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of any two *Ideas*, by an *intuitive Perception* of the Agreement or Disagreement they have with any intermediate *Ideas*, there the Mind is capable of Demonstration, which is not limited

limited to the *Ideas* of Figure, Number, Extension or their Modes. The Reason why it has been generally supposed to belong to them only, is because in comparing their Equality or Excess, the *Modes of Numbers* have every the least Difference, very clear and perceivable: And in *Extension*, tho' every the least Excess is not so perceptible, yet the Mind has found out Ways to discover the just Equality of two Angles, Extensions or Figures; and both, that is, Numbers and Figures can be set down by visible and lasting Marks, wherein the Ideas under Consideration are perfectly determined, which for the most Part they are not, where they are marked only by Names and Words.

But in other simple *Ideas*, whose Modes and Differences are made and counted by Degrees, and not Quantity, we have not so nice and accurate a Distinction of their Differences, as to perceive or find Ways to measure their just Equality, or the least Differences. For those other simple *Ideas* being Appearances or Sensations produced in us, by the *Size*, *Figure*, *Number*, and *Motion*, of minute Corpuscules singly insensible; their different Degrees also depend on the Variation of some, or all of those Causes; which since it cannot be observed by us in Particles of Matter, whereof each is too subtile to be perceived, it is impossible for us to have any exact Measures of the different Degrees of these simple *Ideas*. Thus, for Instance, not knowing what Number of Particles, nor what Motion of them is fit to produce any precise Degree of *Whiteness*; we cannot demonstrate the certain Equality of any two Degrees of *White*-

Whiteness, because we have no certain Standard to measure them by, nor Means to distinguish every the least Difference: The only Help we have being from our own Senses, which in this Point fail us.

But where the Difference is so great as to produce in the Mind *Ideas* clearly distinct; there *Ideas* of *Colours*, as we see in different Kinds, *Blue* and *Red* (for Instance) are as capable of Demonstration, as *Ideas* of Number and Extension. What is here said of Whiteness and Colours, I think, holds true in all secondary Qualities. These two then, *Intuition* and *Demonstration*, are the Degrees of our *Knowledge*; whatever comes short of one of these, with what Assurance soever embraced, is but *Faith*, or *Opinion*, not *Knowledge*; at least in all *general Truths*. There is indeed another Perception of the Mind employed about the *particular Existence of finite Beings* without us, which going beyond Probability, but not reaching to either of the foregoing Degrees of Certainty, passes under the Name of Knowledge.

Nothing can be more certain, than that the *Idea* we receive from an external Object is in our Minds: This is *intuitive Knowledge*; but whether we can thence certainly infer the Existence of any Thing without us, corresponding to that *Idea*, is that whereof some Men think there may be a Question made, because Men may have such an *Idea* in their Minds, when no such Thing exists, no such Object affects their Senses. But 'tis evident that we are invincibly conscious to ourselves of a different Percep-

Perception, when we look upon the *Sun* in the Day, and think on it by Night; when we actually taste *Wormwood*, or smell a *Rose*, or only think on that *Savour* or *Odour*: So that I think we may add to the two former Sorts of Knowledge, this also of the Existence of particular external Objects, by that Perception and Consciousness we have, of the actual Entrance of *Ideas* from them, and allow these three Degrees of Knowledge, *viz. Intuitive*, *Demonstrative* and *Sensitive*: In each of which, there are different Degrees and Ways of Evidence and Certainty.

But since our Knowledge is founded on, and employed about our *Ideas* only, will it not follow thence, that it must be conformable to our *Ideas*, and that where our *Ideas* are clear and distinct, obscure and confused, there our Knowledge will be so too? *I answer No*: For our Knowledge consisting in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of any two *Ideas*; its Clearness or Obscurity consists in the Clearness or Obscurity of that Perception, and not in the Clearness or Obscurity of the *Ideas* themselves. A Man (for Instance) that has a clear *Idea* of the Angles of a Triangles, and of Equality to two right ones, may yet have but an obscure Perception of their Agreement; and so have but a very obscure Knowledge of it. But obscure and confused *Ideas* can never produce any clear or distinct Knowledge; because, as far as any *Ideas* are obscure or confused, so far the Mind can never perceive clearly, whether they agree or disagree: Or, to express the same Thing in a Way less apt to be misunderstood;

He

He that hath not determined *Ideas* to the Words he uſes, cannot make Propoſitions of them, of whoſe Truth he can be certain.

CHAP. III.

Of the Extent of Human Knowledge.

FROM what has been ſaid concerning Knowledge, it follows *Firſt*, That we can have no Knowledge farther than we have *Ideas*.

Secondly, That we have no Knowledge farther than we can have Perception of that Agreement, or Diſagreement: Which Perception being, 1. Either by *Intuition*, or the immediate comparing any two Ideas; or, 2. By *Reaſon*, examining the Agreement or Diſagreement of two Ideas, by the Intervention of ſome others: Or, 3. By *Senſation*, perceiving the Exiſtence of particular Things: Hence it alſo follows,

Thirdly, We cannot have an *intuitive* Knowledge that ſhall extend itſelf to all our *Ideas*, and all that we would know about them; becauſe we cannot examine and perceive all the Relations they have one to another, by Juxtapoſition, or an immediate Compariſon one with another. Thus we cannot *intuitively* perceive the Equality of two Extenſions, the Difference of whoſe Figures makes their Parts incapable of an exact, immediate Application; and therefore there is need of ſome intervening Quanti-

ties

ties to measure them by, which is Demonstration, or rational Knowledge.

Fourthly, Our *rational* Knowledge cannot reach to the whole Extent of our *Ideas*, because between two different *Ideas* we would examine, we cannot always find such *Proofs* as we can connect one to another, with an *intuitive Knowledge* in all the Parts of the Deduction; and wherever that fails, we come short of Knowledge and Demonstration.

Fifthly, *Sensitive* Knowledge reaching no farther than the Existence of Things actually present to our Senses, is yet much narrower than either of the former.

Sixthly, From all which it is evident, that the *Extent of our Knowledge*, comes not only short of the Reality of *Things*, but even of the Extent of our own *Ideas*. We have the *Ideas* of a *Square*, a *Circle* and *Equality*, and yet perhaps shall never be able to find a *Circle equal to a Square*, and certainly know that it is so.

However human Knowledge, under the present Circumstances of our Beings and Constitutions may be carried much farther, than it hitherto has been, if Men would sincerely, and with Freedom of Mind, employ all that Industry and Labour of Thought, in improving the Means of discovering Truth, which they do for the Colouring or Support of Falshood, to maintain a System, Interest, or Party, they are engaged in.

The

The Affirmations or Negations we make concerning the *Ideas* we have, being reduced to the four Sorts above-mentioned, *viz Identity*, *Co-existence*, *Relation*, and *real Existence*; I shall examine how far our Knowledge extends in each of these.

First, As to *Identity and Diversity*, our *intuitive Knowledge* is as far extended as our *Ideas* themselves; and there can be no *Idea* in the Mind, which it does not presently, by an *intuitive Knowledge*, perceive to be what it is, and to be different from any other.

Secondly, As to the Agreement or Disagreement of our *Ideas* in *Co-existence*: In this our Knowledge is very short, tho' in this consists the greatest and most material Part of our Knowledge, concerning *Substances*; for our *Ideas* of *Substances* being, as I have shewn, nothing but certain *Collections of simple* Ideas united, and *Co-existing in one Subject*, (our *Idea of Flame*, for Instance, is a Body *hot*, *luminous* and *moving upward*) When we would know any Thing farther concerning this or any other Sort of Substance, what do we but enquire what other Qualities or Powers these Substances have or have not? which is nothing else but to know what other simple *Ideas* do, or do not *co-exist* with those that make up that complex *Idea*. The Reason of this is, because the simple *Ideas* which make up our complex *Ideas* of Substances, which for the most Part have no visible necessary Connection or Inconsistence with other simple *Ideas*, whose Co-existence with them we would inform ourselves about.

about. These *Ideas* being likewise for the most Part *secondary Qualities* which depend upon the *primary* Qualities of their minute or insensible Parts, or on something yet more remote from our Comprehension; it is impossible we should know which have a necessary Union, or Inconsistency one with another, since we know not the Root from whence they spring, or the Size, Figure and Texture of Parts on which they depend, and from which they result.

Besides this, there is no *discoverable Connection* between any *secondary* Quality, and those *primary* Qualities that it depends on. And if we know these primary Qualities of Bodies, we might have Reason to hope, we might be able to know a great deal more of these Operations of them one upon another: But our Minds not being able to discover any Connexion betwixt these primary Qualities, of Bodies, and the Sensations that are produced in us by them, we can never be able to establish certain and undoubted Rules, of the Consequence or Co-existence of any secondary Qualities, though we could discover the Size, Figure, or Motion of those invisible Parts, which immediately produce them. We are so far from knowing what Figure, Size or Motion produces (for Instance) a *yellow Colour*, or *sweet Taste*, or a *sharp Sound*, that we can by no Means conceive how any *Size*, *Figure* or *Motion* can possibly produce in us the *Idea* of any *Colour*, *Taste*, or *Sound* whatsoever; and there is no conceivable Connection between the one and the other.

Our

Our Knowledge therefore of Co-existence reaches little farther than *Experience*. Some few indeed of the *primary* Qualities have a necessary Dependence, and visible Connection one with another: As *Figure* necessarily supposes *Extension, receiving or communicating Motion by Impulse*, supposes *Solidity* But Qualities co-existent in any Subject, without this Dependence and Connection, cannot *certainly* be known to co-exist any farther, than Experience by our Senses informs us: Thus, tho' upon Trial we find *Gold* yellow, weighty, malleable, fusible and fixed, yet because none of these have any evident Dependence, or necessary Connection with the other; we cannot certainly know, that where any *four* of these are, the *fifth* will be there also, how highly probable soever it may be: But the highest Degree of *Probability*, amounts not to *Certainty*; without which there can be no true Knowledge: For this Co-existence can be no further known, than it is perceived; and it cannot be perceived, but either in *particular* Subjects, by the Observation of our Senses; or in *general*, by the necessary Connection of the *Ideas* themselves.

As to *Incompatibility*, or *Repugnancy to Co-existence*, we may know that any Subject can have of each Sort of *primary* Qualities, but one Particular at once. One Extension, one Figure; and so of sensible *Ideas* peculiar to each Sense: For whatever of each Kind is present in any Subject, excludes all others of that Sort: For Instance, one Subject cannot have *two Smells*, or *two Colours* at the same Time. For, it is as impossible

impoſſible that the very ſame Particle of any Body, ſhould, at the ſame Time, differently modify or reflect the Rays of Light, as that it ſhould have two different Figures and Textures at the ſame Time.

As to *Powers of Subſtances*, which make a great Part of our Enquiries about them, and are no inconſiderable Branch of our Knowledge: Our Knowledge as to theſe reaches little farther than *Experience*; becauſe they conſiſt in a Texture and Motion of Parts, which we cannot by any Means come to diſcover; and I doubt whether with thoſe *Faculties* we have, we ſhall ever be able to carry our general Knowledge much farther in this Part. *Experience* is that which in this Part we muſt depend on; and it were to be wiſhed that it were more improved: We find the Advantages ſome Mens generous Pains, have this Way brought to the Stock of *natural Knowledge*. And if others, eſpecially the *Philoſophers by Fire* who pretend to it, had been ſo acute in their Obſervations, and ſincere in their Reports, as thoſe who call themſelves *Philoſophers* ought to have been: Our Acquaintance with the Bodies here about us, and our Inſight into their Powers and Operations would have been yet much greater.

As to the third Sort, the *Agreement* or *Diſagreement of our* Ideas *in any other Relation*: This is the largeſt Field of Knowledge, and it is hard to determine how far it may extend. This Part depending on our Sagacity in finding intermediate Ideas, that may ſhew the Habitudes and Relations of Ideas: It is an hard Matter to tell

when we are at an End of ſuch Diſcoveries. They that are ignorant of *Algebra* cannot imagine what Wonders in this Kind are to be done by it: And what farther Improvements and Helps, advantageous to other Parts of Knowledge, the ſagacious Mind of Man may yet find out, it is not eaſy to determine. This at leaſt I believe, that the Ideas of *Quantity*, are not thoſe alone that are capable of Demonſtration and Knowledge: And that other, and perhaps more uſeful Parts of Contemplation, would afford us Certainty, if Vices, Paſſions, and domineering Intereſt did not oppoſe or menace Endeavours of this Kind.

The Idea of a *ſupreme Being*, infinite in Power, Goodneſs and Wiſdom, whoſe Workmanſhip we are, and on whom we depend; and the Idea of *ourſelves*, as underſtanding rational Creatures, being ſuch as are clear in us, would, I ſuppoſe, if duly conſidered, afford ſuch Foundations of our *Duty*, and *Rules of Action*, as might place *Morality* among the Sciences capable of Demonſtration: Wherein I doubt not but from Principles as inconteſtable as thoſe of the *Mathematicks*, by neceſſary Conſequences, the Meaſure of *right* and *wrong* might be aſcertained, to any one that will apply himſelf with the ſame Indifference and Attention to the One, as he does to the other of theſe Sciences. The Relations of other Modes may certainly be perceived as well as thoſe of Number and Extenſion, and I cannot ſee why they ſhould not alſo be capable of Demonſtration, if due Methods were thought on to examine, or purſue their Agreement or Diſagreement. *Where there is no Property*,

perty, there is no Injustice, is a Proposition as certain as any Demonstration in *Euclid:* For the Idea of *Property*, being a Right to any Thing; and the Idea of *Injustice*, being the Invasion or Violation of that Right: It is evident that those Ideas being thus established, and these Names annexed to them, I can as certainly know this Proposition to be true, as that a *Triangle has three Angles equal to two right Ones.* Again, *No Government allows absolute Liberty.* The Idea of *Government* being the Establishment of Society upon certain Rules or Laws which require Conformity to them; and the Idea of *absolute Liberty*, being for any one to do whatever he pleases, I am as capable of being certain of the Truth of this Proposition, as of any in *Mathematicks.*

That which has given the Advantage to the Ideas of *Quantity*, whether of *Extension* or *Number*, and made them thought more capable of *Certainty* and *Demonstration*, is,

First, That they can be represented by sensible Marks, which have a nearer Correspondence with them, than any Words or Sounds. *Diagrams* and *Cyphers* drawn on Paper, are Copies of the Ideas in the Mind, and not liable to the Uncertainty that Words carry in their Signification; moreover they can be reconsidered and examined, without any Danger of the least Alteration or Change in the Idea, occasioned by their Representation. This cannot be done in *moral Ideas*, as we have no sensible Marks that resemble them, whereby we can set them down; we have nothing but Words to express them by;

which though, when written, they remain the ſame; yet the Ideas they ſtand for, may change in the ſame Man; and it is very ſeldom that they are not different in different Perſons.

Secondly, Moral Ideas are commonly more complex than Figures; whence theſe two Inconveniences follow: *Firſt*, that their Names are of more uncertain Signification; the preciſe Collection of ſimple Ideas they ſtand for, not being ſo eaſily agreed on, and ſo the Sign that is uſed for them in Communication always, and in Thinking often, does not ſteadily carry with it the ſame Idea, as in a given Number, or a many ſided Figure, where the leaſt Variation in either is ſo perceptible, as with Eaſe to avoid Deception. *Secondly*, The Mind cannot eaſily retain thoſe preciſe Combinations ſo exactly and perfectly as is neceſſary; in the Examination of the Habitudes and Correſpondencies, Agreements or Diſagreements of ſeveral of them one with another, eſpecially where it is to be judged of by long Deductions, and the Intervention of ſeveral other complex Ideas, to ſhew the Agreement or Diſagreement of two remote ones, in which Particulars Mathematicks has the Advantage.

Now one Part of theſe Diſadvantages in *moral Ideas*, which has made them be thought not capable of Demonſtration, may, in a good Meaſure, be remedied by *Definitions*, ſetting down that Collection of ſimple Ideas which every Term ſhall ſtand for, and then uſing the Terms ſteadily and conſtantly for that preciſe Collection. But much of this is not to be expected,

whilſt

whilst the Desire of Esteem, Riches, or Power, makes Men espouse the well endowed Opinions in Fashion, and then seek Arguments, either to make good their Beauty, or varnish over and cover their Deformity. Nothing being so beautiful to the Eye, as Truth is to the Mind; nothing so deformed and irreconcilable to the Understanding, as a Falsehood?

As to the fourth Sort of Knowledge, *viz. of the real actual Existence of Things*, we have an *intuitive* Knowledge of our *own Existence*: a *demonstrative* Knowledge of *the Existence of God*; and a *sensitive* Knowledge of the *Objects that present themselves to our Senses*, which extends no farther than as our Senses are affected by their Appearances.

From what has been said, the State of our Mind is discoverable, and if we look a little into the dark Side, and take a View of our Ignorance; which being infinitely larger than our Knowledge, may serve much to the Quieting of Disputes, and Improvement of useful Knowledge. The clearest and most enlarged Understandings of thinking Men, find themselves puzzled, and at a Loss, in every Particle of Matter. We shall the less wonder to find it so, when we consider the Causes of our Ignorance, which from what has been said, I suppose, will be found to be chiefly these three: *First*, Want of Ideas; *Secondly*, Want of a discoverable Connection between the Ideas we have; *Thirdly*, Want of tracing and examining our Ideas.

First, There are some Things, and those not a few, we are ignorant of for *want of Ideas*. All the simple Ideas we have, are confined to those we receive from corporeal Objects by *Sensation*, and from the Operations of our own Minds as the Objects of *Reflection*. But how much these few and narrow Inlets are disproportionate to the whole vast Extent of all Beings, will not be hard to persuade those who are not so foolish as to think their Span the Measure of all Things. What other Ideas it is possible other Creatures may have, by the Assistance of other Senses, and Faculties more or perfecter than we have, or different from ours, it is not for us to determine; but to say or think there are no such, because we conceive nothing of them, is no better an Argument, than if a blind Man should be positive in it, that there was no such Thing as Sight and Colours, because he had no Manner of Idea of any such Thing. What Faculties therefore other Species of Creatures have to penetrate into the Nature and inmost Constitutions of Things, we know not. This we know, and certainly find, that we want other Views of them, besides those we have, to make Discoveries of them more perfect. And we may be convinced that the Ideas, we can attain to by our Faculties, are very disproportionate to Things themselves, when a positive, clear, distinct one of Substance itself, which is the Foundation of all the rest, is concealed from us. The *intellectual* and *sensible* World are in this perfectly alike, that the Parts which we see of either of them, hold no Proportion with that we see not; and whatsoever we can reach with

with our Eyes, or our Thoughts of either of them, is but a Point, almoſt nothing, in Compariſon of the reſt.

Secondly, Another great Cauſe of Ignorance, is the *Want of* Ideas *that we are capable of*. As the want of Ideas, which our Faculties are not able to give us, ſhuts us wholly from thoſe Views of Things, which it is reaſonable to think other Beings, perfecter than we have, of which we know nothing; ſo the want of Ideas, I now ſpeak of, keeps us in Ignorance of Things we conceive capable of being known to us. *Bulk*, *Figure*, and *Motion*, we have Ideas of. But though we are not without Ideas of theſe primary Qualities of Bodies in general, yet not knowing, what is the particular Bulk, Motion and Figure of the greateſt Part of the Bodies of the Univerſe, we are ignorant of the ſeveral Powers, Efficacies and Ways of Operation, whereby the Effects which we daily ſee, are produced. Theſe are hid from us in ſome Things by being *too remote*, in others by being *too minute*.

When we conſider the vaſt Diſtance of the known and viſible Parts of the World, and the Reaſons we have to think that what lies within our Knowledge, is but a ſmall Part of the immenſe Univerſe; we ſhall then diſcover an huge Abyſs of Ignorance. What are the particular Fabricks of the great Maſſes of Matter, which make up the whole ſtupendous Frame of corporeal Beings, how far they are extended, and what is their Motion, and how continued, and what Influence they have upon one another,

are Contemplations that at first Glimpse our Thoughts lose themselves in. If we confine our Thoughts to this little Canton, I mean this System of our Sun, and the grosser Masses of Matter that visibly move about it; what several Sorts of Vegetables, Animals and intellectual corporeal Beings, infinitely different from those of our little Spot of Earth, may there probably be in other *Planets*, to the Knowledge of which, even of their outward Figures and Parts, we can no way attain, whilst we are confined to this Earth, there being no natural Means, either by Sensation or Reflection, to convey their certain Ideas into our Minds?

There are other Bodies in the Universe, no less concealed from us by their *Minuteness*, than those we have just mentioned for their Remoteness. These insensible Corpuscules being the active Parts of Matter, and the great Instruments of Nature, on which depend all their *secondary* Qualities and Operations, our want of precise distinct Ideas of their primary Qualities, keeps us in incurable Ignorance of what we desire to know about them. I doubt not but if we could discover the Figure, Size, Texture, and Motion of the minute constituent Part of any two Bodies, we should know without Trial several of their Operations one upon another, as we do now the Properties of a Square, or a Triangle. Did we know the mechanical Affections of *Rhubarb* and *Opium*, we might as easily account for their Operations of *Purging* or *causing Sleep*, as a Watch-maker can for the Motions of his Watch. The dissolving of Silver in *Aqua Fortis*, or Gold in *Aqua Regia*, and not *vice-*

vice-versâ, would be then perhaps no more difficult to know, than it is to a *Smith*, to understand why the turning of one Key will open a Lock, and not the turning of another. But whilst we are destitute of Senses acute enough to discover the minute Particles of Bodies, and to give us Ideas of their mechanical Affections, we must be content to be ignorant of their Properties and Operations; nor can we be assured about them any farther, than some few Trials we make, are able to reach: But whether they will succeed again another Time, we cannot be certain. This hinders our certain Knowledge of universal Truths concerning natural Bodies: And our Reason carries us herein very little beyond particular Matters of Fact. And therefore I am apt to doubt, that how far soever human Industry may advance useful and *experimental Philosophy* in physical Things, yet *scientifical* will still be out of our Reach; because we want perfect and adequate Ideas of those very Bodies which are nearer to us, and most under our Command. Distinct Ideas of the several Sorts of Bodies, that fall under the Examination of our Senses, perhaps, we may have: But adequate Ideas, I suspect, we have not of any one amongst them. And though the former of these will serve us for common Use and Discourse, yet whilst we want the latter, we are not capable of scientifical Knowledge; nor shall ever be able to discover general, instructive, unquestionable Truths concerning them. Certainty and Demonstration are Things we must not, in these Matters, pretend to.

This, at first Sight, shews us how disproportionate our Knowledge is to the whole Extent, even of *material* Beings: To which, if we add the Consideration of that infinite Number of Spirits that may be, and probably are, which are yet more remote from our Knowledge, whereof we have no Cognizance; we shall find this Cause of Ignorance, conceal from us, in an impenetrable Obscurity, almost the whole *intellectual* World; a greater certainly and a more beautiful World than the *material*. Excepting some very few, and those, if I may so call them, superficial Ideas, of Spirit, which by Reflection we get of our own, and from thence, the best we can collect, of the *Father of all Spirits*, the eternal, independent Author of them, and us, and all Things; we have no certain Information, so much as of the Existence of other Spirits, but by Revelation. But that there are Degrees of Spiritual Beings between us and the great God, who is there, that by his own Search and Ability can come to know? Much less have we distinct Ideas of their different Natures, States, Powers, and several Constitutions, wherein they agree or differ one from another, and from us. And therefore in what concerns their different Species and Properties, we are under an absolute Ignorance.

The *second* Cause of Ignorance is the *Want of discoverable Connection* between those Ideas we have; where we want that, we are utterly incapable of universal and certain Knowledge; and are, as in the former Case, left only to *Observation* and *Experiment*: Which, how narrow and

and confined it is, how far from general Knowledge, we need not be told. Thus the mechanical Affections of Bodies, having no Affinity at all with the Ideas they produce in us, (there being no conceivable Connexion between any Impulse of any Sort of Body, and any Perception of a Colour or Smell, which we find in our Minds,) we can have no distinct Knowledge of such Operations beyond our Experience, and can reason no otherwise about them, than as the Effects or Appointment of an infinitely *wise Agent*, which perfectly surpass our Comprehensions.

As the Ideas of sensible secondary Qualities, which we have in our Minds, can, by us, be no way deduced from bodily Causes, nor any Correspondence or Connection be found between them and those primary Qualities which (Experience shews us) produce them in us; so on the other Hand, the Operation of our Minds upon our Bodies, is as unconceivable. How any *Thought* should produce a Motion in *Body*, is as remote from the Nature of our Ideas, as how any *Body* should produce any Thought in the *Mind*. That it is so, if Experience did not convince us, the Consideration of the Things themselves, would never be able in the least to discover to us, there appearing no necessary Dependence one on the other.

In some of our Ideas there are certain Relations, Habitudes, and Connections, so visibly included in the Nature of the Ideas themselves, that we cannot conceive them separable from them by any Power whatsoever: In these only

we are capable of certain and universal Knowledge. Thus the Idea of a *right-lin'd Triangle*, necessarily carries with it an *Equality of it's Angles to two right ones*. Nor can we conceive this Relation, this Connection of these two Ideas, to be possibly mutable, or to depend on any arbitrary Power, which of Choice made it thus, or could make it otherwise. But the Coherence and Continuity of the Parts of Matter; the Production of Sensation in us, of *Colours* and *Sounds*, &c. by Impulse and Motion, being such wherein we can discover no natural Connexion with any Ideas we have, we cannot but ascribe them to the arbitrary Will and good Pleasure of the wise Architect. I need not, I think, here mention the Resurrection of the dead, the future state of this Globe of Earth, and such other Things, which are by every one acknowledged to depend wholly on the determination of a free Agent.

The Things that we observe constantly to proceed regularly, we may conclude to act by a Law set them; but yet by a Law that we know not; whereby, tho' Causes work steadily, and Effects constantly flow from them; yet their Connexions and Dependencies being not discoverable in our Ideas, we can have but an experimental Knowledge of them. Several Effects come every Day within the Notice of our *Senses*, of which we have so far *sensitive* Knowledge. From all which it is easy to perceive, what a Darkness we are involved in, how little it is of Being, and the Things that are, that we are capable to know. But the Causes, Manner, and Certainty of their Production, we must for the

the foregoing Reasons be content to be ignorant of. In these we can go no farther than particular *Experience* informs us of Matter of Fact, and by *Analogy*, guess what Effects the like Bodies are upon other Tryals like to produce. But as to the perfect Knowledge of *natural Bodies* (not to mention *spiritual* Beings) we are, I think, that I from being capable of any such Thing, so far conclude it lost Labour to seek after it.

The *third*, Where we have adequate Ideas, and where there is a certain and discoverable Connection between them, yet we are often ignorant, for *Want of tracing those Ideas we have*, or may have; and finding out those intermediate Ideas which may shew us what Habitude of Agreement or Disagreement they may have one with another; and thus many are ignorant of *mathematical* Truths, for want of Application in enquiring, examining, and, by due Ways, comparing those Ideas. That which has most contributed to hinder the due tracing of our Ideas, and finding out their Relations, and Agreements or Disagreements one with another, has been, I suppose, the ill Use of Words. It is impossible that Men should ever truly seek, or certainly discover the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas themselves, whilst their Thoughts are employed only about Sounds of doubtful and uncertain Significations. Mathematicians abstracting their Thoughts from Names, and accustoming themselves to set before their Minds the Ideas themselves that they would consider, and not Sounds instead of them, have avoided thereby a great Part of that Perplexity, Obscurity, and Confusion, which have so much hin-

dered

dered Mens Progreſs in other Parts of Knowledge.

Hitherto we have examined the *Extent* of our Knowledge, in Reſpect of the ſeveral Sorts of Beings that are. There is another *Extent of it, in Reſpect of Univerſality*, which will alſo deſerve to be conſidered; and in this Regard our Knowledge follows the Nature of our Ideas. If the Ideas are abſtract, whoſe Agreement or Diſagreement we perceive, our Knowledge is univerſal. For what is known of ſuch general Ideas, will be true of every particular Thing in which that *Eſſence*, that is, that *abſtract* Idea, is to be found: And what is once known of ſuch Ideas, will be perpetually, and for ever true. So that as to all general Knowledge, we muſt ſearch and find it only in our own Minds: And it is only the examining of our own Ideas, that furniſhes us with that. Truths belonging to Eſſences of Things (that is, to *abſtract* Ideas) are *eternal*, and are to be found out by the Contemplation only of thoſe Eſſences; as the Exiſtence of Things is to be known only from Experience. But I ſhall ſay more of this in the following Chapters, where I ſhall ſpeak of *general* and *real* Knowledge.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Reality of our Knowledge.

I Doubt not but my Reader by this Time, may be apt to think that I have been all this

While

While only building a *Castle* in the Air; and be ready to object, though it should be true, that all Knowledge lies only in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our own Ideas, as the Visions of an *Enthusiast*, and the Reasonings of a *sober* Man will be equally certain: It is no Matter how Things are, so a Man observe but the Agreement of his own Imaginations, and talk conformably, it is all Truth, all Certainty. Such Castles in the Air, will be as strong Holds of Truth, as the Demonstrations of *Euclid*. That an *Harpy* is not a *Centaur*, is by this Way as certain Knowledge, and as much Truth, as that a Square is not a Circle. But of what Use is all this fine Knowledge of Mens own Imaginations, to a Man that enquires after the Reality of Things? It matters not what Mens fancies are, it is the Knowledge of Things that is only to be prized: It is this alone gives a Value to our Reasonings, and Preference to one Man's Knowledge over another's, that it is of Things as they really are, and not of Dreams and Fancies.

To which *I answer*, That if our Knowledge of our Ideas should terminate in them, and reach no farther, where there is something farther intended, our most serious Thoughts would be of little more Use than the *Reveries* of a crazy Brain; and the Truths built thereon of no more Weight than the Discourses of a Man asleep. But I hope, before I have done, to make it evident, that this Way of Certainty by the Knowledge of our own Ideas, goes a little farther than bare Imagination: And that all the Certainty of general Truths a Man has, lies in nothing else but this Knowledge of our Ideas.

'Tis

'Tis evident that the Mind knows not Things immediately, but by the Intervention of the Ideas it has of them. Our Knowledge therefore is *real*, only ſo far as there is a Conformity between our Ideas, and the Reality of Things. But how ſhall we know when our Ideas agree with Things themſelves? I anſwer, there are *two Sorts* of Ideas that we may be aſſured agree with Things: Theſe are,

Firſt, *Simple* Ideas; which ſince the Mind can by no Means make to itſelf, muſt be the Effect of Things operating upon the Mind in a natural Way; and producing therein thoſe Perceptions, which by the Will of our Maker, they are ordained and adapted to. Hence it follows, that ſimple Ideas are not Fictions of our Fancies, but the natural and regular Productions of Things without us, really operating upon us; which carry with them all the Conformity our State requires, which is to repreſent Things under thoſe Appearances they are fitted to produce in us. Thus the Idea of *Whiteneſs*, as it is in the Mind, exactly anſwers that Power which is in any Body to produce it there. And this Conformity between our *ſimple* Ideas, and the Exiſtence of Things is ſufficient for real Knowledge.

Secondly, All our *complex Ideas*, except thoſe of *Subſtances*, being *Archetypes* of the Mind's own making, and not referred to the Exiſtence of Things as to their Originals, cannot want any Conformity neceſſary to real Knowledge. For that which is not deſigned to repreſent any

Thing

Thing but itſelf, can never be capable of a wrong Repreſentation: Here the Ideas themſelves are conſidered as *Archetypes*, and Things no otherwiſe regarded, than as they are conformable to them. Thus the *Mathematician* conſiders the Truth and Properties belonging to a *Rectangle* or *Circle*, only as they are Ideas in his own Mind, which poſſibly he never found outwardly exiſting Mathematically, that is, preciſely true; yet his Knowledge is not only certain, but real; becauſe real Things are no farther concerned nor intended to be meant by any ſuch Propoſitions, than as Things really agree to thoſe *Archetypes* in his Mind. It is true of the Idea of a *Triangle, that its three Angles are equal to two right Ones*; it is true alſo of a *Triangle* where ever it *exiſts*; what is true of thoſe Figures, that have barely an ideal Exiſtence in his Mind, will hold true of them alſo, when they come to have a real Exiſtence in Matter.

Hence it follows, that moral Knowledge is as capable of *real Certainty* as *Mathematicks*. For *Certainty* being nothing but the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of our Ideas, and Demonſtration nothing but the Perception of ſuch Agreement by the Intervention of other Ideas; our *moral Ideas* as well as *Mathematical*, being *Archetypes* themſelves, and ſo adequate or compleat Ideas, all the Agreement or Diſagreement we ſhall find in them, will produce *real* Knowledge as well as in *Mathematical Figures*. That which is requiſite to make our Knowledge *certain*, is the Clearneſs of our Ideas; and that which is required to make it *real*, is, that they anſwer their *Archetypes*. I preſume, upon Examination,

mination, it will be found to be general Propositions, and Notions in which Existence is not at all concerned. All the Discourses of the Mathematicians, about the squaring of a Circle, conic Sections, or any other Part of Mathematics, concern not the Existence of any of those Figures; but their Demonstrations, which depend on their Ideas, are the same, whether there be any Square or Circle existing in the World, or no. In the same Manner, the Truth and Certainty of moral Discourses abstracted from the Lives of Men, and the Existence of those Virtues in the World, whereof they treat; nor are *Tully*'s Offices less true, because there is not any one in the World that exactly practises his Rules, and lives up to the Pattern of that virtuous Man, which he has given us, and which no where existed, when he wrote, but in his Imagination.

But it will here be said, That if *moral* Knowledge be placed in the Contemplation of our own *moral* Ideas; and those, as other Modes, be of our own making, what strange Notions will there be of *Justice* and *Temperance*? What Confusion of *Virtues* and *Vices*, if every Man may make what Ideas of them he pleases? *I answer*, No Confusion nor Disorder in the Things themselves, nor the Reasonings about them, no more than in Mathematics, there would be a Change in the Properties of Figures and their Relations one to another, if a Man should make a *Triangle* with four Corners, or a *Trapezium* with four right Angles; that is, in plain *English*, change the Names of the Figures, and call that by one Name, which commonly Mathematicians called by another. The Change of Name will

will indeed at first disturb him, who knows not what Idea it stands for: But as soon as the Figure is drawn, the Consequences and Demonstration are plain and clear. Just the same is it in *moral* Knowledge: Let a Man have the Idea of taking from others, without their Consent, what they are justly possessed of, and call this *Justice* if he pleases; he that takes the Name here, without the Idea put to it, will be mistaken by joining another Idea of his own to that Name; but strip the Idea of that Name, or take it such as it is in the Speaker's Mind; and the same Thing will agree to it, as if you called it *Injustice*. Indeed, wrong Names in moral Discourses, occasion usually more Disorder, because they are not so easily rectified as in Mathematics, where the Figure once drawn and seen, makes the Name useless and of no Force. For what Need of a Sign, when the Thing signified is present and in View?

One Thing we are to take Notice of, That where God, or any other Law-maker, has defined any *moral Names*, there they have made the Essence of that *Species* to which that Name belongs: And there it is not safe to apply, or use them otherwise. But in other Cases it is bare Impropriety of Speech, to apply them contrary to the common Usage of the Country they are used in.

Thirdly, But the complex Ideas which we refer to *Archetypes* without us, may differ from them, and so our Knowledge about them may come short of being real: And such are our *Ideas* of *Substances*. These must be taken from some-

ſomething, that does exiſt, or has exiſted, and not be made up of Ideas arbitrarily put together, without any real Pattern. Herein therefore is founded the Reality of our Knowledge of *Subſtances*, that all our complex *Ideas* of them muſt be ſuch, and ſuch only, as are made up of ſuch ſimple ones, as have been diſcovered to co-exiſt in Nature. But in our Ideas of other mixed Modes, as of *Sacrilege*, or *Perjury*, &c. they are as real and true Ideas before, as after the Exiſtence of any ſuch mixed Mode. And our Ideas being thus true, tho' not perhaps very exact Copies, are the whole of our *real* Knowledge of Subſtances. Whatever Ideas we have, the Agreement we find they have with others will be Knowledge. If thoſe Ideas be abſtract, it will be *general* Knowledge: But to make it *real* concerning *Subſtances*, the Ideas muſt be taken from the real Exiſtence of Things. Wherever therefore we perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement of our Ideas, there is *certain Knowledge*: And wherever we are ſure thoſe Ideas agree with the Reality of Things, there is *certain, real Knowledge*. So neceſſary is it to quit the common Notion of Species and Eſſences, if we will truly look into the Nature of Things, and examine them, by what our Faculties can diſcover in them as they exiſt, and not by groundleſs Fancies, that have been taken up about them.

I have mentioned this here, becauſe I think we cannot be too cautious that *Words* and *Species*, in the ordinary Notions which we have been uſed to of them, impoſe not upon us. For I am apt to think, therein lies one great Obſtacle

to

to our clear and diſtinct Knowledge, eſpecially in Reference to Subſtances; and from thence has roſe a great Part of the Difficulties about Truth and Certainty. Would we accuſtom ourſelves to ſeparate our Contemplations and Reaſonings from Words, we might, in a great Meaſure, remedy this Inconvenience within our own Thoughts. But yet it would ſtill diſturb us in our Diſcourſe with others, as long as we retained the Opinion, that Species and their Eſſences were any Thing elſe but our abſtract Ideas, (ſuch as they are) with Names annexed to them, to be the Signs of them.

C H A P. V.

Of Truths in general.

WHAT is TRUTH, was an Enquiry many Ages ſince; and it being that which all Mankind either do, or pretend to ſearch after, it cannot but be worth our while carefully to examine wherein it conſiſts; and ſo acquaint ourſelves with the Nature of it, as to obſerve how the Mind diſtinguiſhes it from Falſhood.

Truth in the proper Import of the Word, ſignifies the joining or ſeparating of Signs, as the Things ſignified by them, do agree or diſagree one with another. The joining or ſeparating of Signs, is what we call *Propoſitions*; ſo that *Truth* properly belongs only to *Propoſitions*; whereof there are *two* Sorts, *mental* and *verbal*, as there

are

are *two* Sorts of Signs commonly made Use of, *viz.* *Ideas* and *Words*.

'Tis difficult to treat of *mental* Propositions without *verbal:* Because in speaking of *mental*, we must make Use of *Words*, and then they become *verbal*. Again, Men commonly in their Thoughts and Reasonings, use *Words* instead of *Ideas*; especially if the Subject of their Meditations contains in it *complex Ideas*. Which is a great Evidence of the Imperfection and Uncertainty of our Ideas of that Kind, and may, if attentively made Use of, serve for a Mark to shew us, what are those Things, we have clear and perfect established Ideas of, and what not. If we have Occasion to form *mental* Propositions about *white*, *black*, *Circle*, &c. we can, and often do, frame in our Minds the Ideas themselves, without reflecting on the *Names*. But when we would consider, or make Propositions about the more *complex Ideas*, as of a *Man*, *Vitriol*, *Fortitude*, *Glory*, &c. we usually put the *Names* for the *Ideas*; because the *Ideas* these *Names* stand for, being for the most Part confused, imperfect, and undetermined; we reflect on the *Names* themselves, as being more clear, certain and distinct, and readier to occur to our Thoughts than pure *Ideas:* And so we make Use of these *Words* instead of the *Ideas* themselves, even when we would meditate and reason within ourselves, and make tacit *mental Propositions*. In Substances, as has been already noted, this is occasioned by the Imperfection of our Ideas; we making the Name stand for the real Essence, of which we have no Idea at all. In Modes, it is occasioned by the great Number of

of ſimple Ideas, that go to the making them up. For many of them being compounded, the Name occurs much eaſier than the complex Idea itſelf, which requires Time and Attention to be recollected, and exactly repreſented to the Mind, even in thoſe Men who have formerly been at the Pains to do it; and is utterly impoſſible to be done by thoſe, who though they have ready in their Memory the greateſt Part of the common Words of their Language, yet perhaps, never troubled themſelves in all their Lives, to conſider what preciſe Ideas the moſt of them ſtood for. Some confuſed or obſcure Notions have ſerved their Turns; and many who talk very much of Religion and Conſcience, of Church and Faith, of Power and Right, of Obſtructions and Humours, Melancholy and Choler, would, perhaps, have little left in their Thoughts and Meditations, if one ſhould deſire them to think only of the Things themſelves, and lay by thoſe Words, with which they ſo often confound others, and not ſeldom themſelves alſo.

We muſt then obſerve two Sorts of *Propoſitions*, that we are capable of making. *Firſt, Mental Propoſitions*, wherein the Ideas in our Underſtandings are without the Uſe of Words put together, or ſeparated by the Mind, perceiving or judging of their Agreement or Diſagreement. *Secondly, verbal Propoſitions*, which are Words, the Signs of our Ideas put together, or ſeparated in Affirmative or Negative Sentences. By which Way of affirming or denying, theſe Signs made by Sounds, are, as it were, put together or ſeparated one from another. So that

that *Proposition* consists in joining or separating Signs: And *Truth* consists in putting together or separating these Signs according as the Things they stand for, agree or disagree. So that it will be altogether as true a Proposition, to say *all Centaurs are Animals*, as that *all Men are Animals*; and the Certainty of one, as great as the other. For in both the Propositions, the Words are put together according to the Agreement of the Ideas in our Minds: And the Agreement of the Idea of *Animal* with that of *Centaur*, is as clear and visible to the Mind as the Agreement of the Idea of *Animal* with that of *Man*; and so these Propositions are equally true, equally certain. But of what Use is all such Truth to us? What has been already said, to distinguish real Truth from imaginary Knowledge, will be sufficient to distinguish real Truth from chimerical.

Truth as well as Knowledge may well come under the Distinction of *verbal* and *real*; That being only *verbal Truth*, wherein Terms are joined according to the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas they stand for, without regarding whether our Ideas are such as really have, or are capable of having an Existence in Nature. But then it is they contain *real Truth*, when these Signs are joined, as our Ideas agree; and when our Ideas are such as we know, are capable of having an Existence in Nature; which in *Substances* we cannot know, but by knowing that such have existed. *Truth*, is the marking down in Words the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, as it is. *Falshood*, is the marking down in Words the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas,

Ideas, otherwiſe than it is; and ſo far as theſe Ideas thus marked by Sounds, agree to their *Archetypes*, ſo far only is the *Truth real.* The Knowledge of this *Truth* conſiſts in knowing what Ideas the Words ſtand for, and the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of thoſe Ideas, according as it is marked by thoſe Words.

Beſides *Truth* taken in the ſtrict Senſe beforementioned, there are other Sorts of *Truths*: As, *Firſt, Moral Truth*, which is ſpeaking of Things according to the Perſuaſion of our own Minds, though the Propoſition we ſpeak of, agree not to the Reality of Things. *Secondly, Metaphyſical Truth*, which is nothing but the real Exiſtence of Things conformable to the Ideas to which we have annexed their Names.

Theſe Conſiderations of *Truth* either having been before taken Notice of, or not being much to our preſent Purpoſe, it may ſuffice here only to have mentioned them.

CHAP. VI.

Of Univerſal Propoſitions, their Truth and Certainty.

THOUGH the examining and judging of Ideas by themſelves, their Names being quite laid aſide, be the beſt and ſureſt way to clear and diſtinct Knowledge; yet through the prevailing Cuſtom of uſing *Sounds* for *Ideas*, as it

is even when Men think and reason within their own Breasts, makes the Consideration of *Words*, and *Propositions* so necessary a Part of the Treatise of Knowledge, that it is very hard to speak intelligibly of the one, without explaining the other. And since *general Truths*, which with Reason are most sought after, can never be well made known, and are seldom apprehended, but as conceived and expressed by Words; it is not out of our Way in the Examination of our own Knowledge, to enquire into the *Truth* and *Certainty* of *universal Propositions*. But it must be observed, that Certainty is twofold, Certainty of *Truth*, and Certainty of *Knowledge*.

Certainty of *Truth* is, when Words are so put together in *Propositions*, as exactly to express the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas they stand for, as really it is. Certainty of *Knowledge*, is to perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas as expressed in any *Proposition*. This we usually call *knowing*, or being certain of the Truth of any *Proposition*.

Now because we cannot be certain of the Truth of any *general Proposition*, unless we know the precise Bounds and Extent of the *Species*, its Terms stand for; it is necessary we should know the Essence of each *Species*, which is that which constitutes and bounds it. This in all *simple Ideas* and *Modes* is not hard to do; for in these the *real* and *nominal* Essence being the same, there can be no doubt how far the *Species* extends, or what Things are comprehended under each Term: Which it is evident are all that have an exact Conformity with the Idea it stands

ſtands for, and no other. But in *Subſtances* wherein a *real* Eſſence, diſtinct from the *nominal*, is ſuppoſed to conſtitute, and bound the *Species*, the Extent of the general Word is very uncertain; becauſe not knowing this real Eſſence, we cannot know what is, or is not of that *Species*, and conſequently what may, or may not with Certainty be affirmed of it. For Man, or Gold, taken in this Senſe, and uſed for Species of Things, conſtituted by real Eſſences, different from the complex Idea in the Mind of the Speaker, ſtand for we know not what, and the Extent of theſe Species, with ſuch Boundaries, are ſo unknown and undetermined, that it is impoſſible with any Certainty, to affirm, that all Men are rational, or that all Gold is yellow. But where the nominal Eſſence is kept to, as the Boundary of each Species, and Men extend the Application of any general Term no farther than to the particular Things, in which the complex Idea it ſtands for is to be found, there they are in no Danger to miſtake the Bounds of each Species, nor can be in Doubt, on this Account, whether any Propoſitions be true, or no. I have choſen to explain this Uncertainty of Propoſitions in this ſcholaſtic way, and have made Uſe of the Terms of *Eſſences* and *Species*, on Purpoſe to ſhew the Abſurdity and Inconvenience there is to think of them, as of any other Sort of Realities, than barely abſtract Ideas with Names to them.

Hence we may ſee that the Names of Subſtances, when made to ſtand for *Species*, ſuppoſed to be conſtituted by *real Eſſences*, which we know not, are not capable of conveying Cer-

tainty to the Underſtanding. Of the *Truth* of *general Propoſitions* made up of ſuch Terms, we cannot be ſure. For how can we be ſure that this or that Quality is in *Gold*, for Inſtance, when we know not what is, or is not *Gold*; that is, what has, or has not the *real Eſſence* of *Gold*, whereof we have no Idea at all. On the other Side, the Names of Subſtances when made Uſe of for the *complex Ideas* Men have in their Minds, tho' they carry a clear and determinate Signification with them, yet will not ſerve us to make any univerſal *Propoſitions*, of whoſe Truth we can be certain: Becauſe the *ſimple Ideas*, out of which the *complex* are combined, carry not with them any diſcoverable Connection or Repugnancy, but with a very few other Ideas. For Inſtance, *All Gold is fixed*, is a Propoſition we cannot be certain of, how univerſally ſoever it be believed: For if we take the Term *Gold* to ſtand for a *real Eſſence*, it is evident we know not what particular Subſtances are of that *Species*, and ſo cannot, with Certainty affirm, any Thing univerſally of *Gold*. But if we make the Term *Gold* ſtand for a *Species*, determined by its *nominal Eſſence*, be its *complex Idea* what it will; for Inſtance, a Body *yellow*, *fuſible*, *mallcable*, and *very heavy*; no Quality can with Certainty be affirmed or denied univerſally of it, but what has a diſcoverable Connection, or Inconſiſtency with that *nominal Eſſence*: *Fixedneſs*, for Inſtance, having no neceſſary Connection that we can diſcover with any *ſimple Idea* that make the *complex* one, or with the whole Combination together; it is impoſſible that we ſhould certainly know the Truth of this Propoſition, *All Gold is fixed*.

But

But is not this an universal certain Proposition, *All Gold is malleable?* I answer, it is so, if *Malleableness* be a Part of the *complex Idea*, the Word *Gold* stands for: But then there is nothing affirmed of *Gold*, but that, that Sound stands for an Idea in which *Malleableness* is contained. And such a Sort of Truth and Certainty it is, to say a *Centaur is four-footed*. But if *Malleableness* makes not a Part of the specific Essence the Name *Gold* stands for, it is plain, *all Gold is malleable*, is not a certain Proposition. Because, let the complex Idea of Gold, be made up of which soever of its other Qualities you please, Malleablereſs will not appear to depend on that complex Idea, nor follow from any simple one contained in it. I imagine amongst all the secondary Qualities of Substances, and the Powers relating to them, there cannot any two be named, whose necessary Co-existence or Repugnance to co-exist can be certainly known, unless in those of the same Sense, which necessarily exclude one another. Thus by the Colour we cannot certainly know what *Smell*, *Taste*, &c. any Body is of. 'Tis no Wonder then that Certainty is to be found but in a very few general Propositions concerning Substances: Our Knowledge of their Qualities and Properties goes very seldom farther than our Senses reach, or inform us. Inquisitive and observing Men may, by Strength of Judgment, penetrate farther; and on Probabilities taken from wary Observations, and Hints well laid together, often guess right at what Experience has not yet discovered to them: But this is but *guessing* still; it amounts only to *Opinion*; and has not that

Certainty which is requiſite to *Knowledge*, which muſt continue, unleſs we had ſuch Ideas of Subſtances, as to know what real Conſtitutions produce thoſe ſenſible Qualities we find in them, and how thoſe Qualities neceſſarily flowed from them.

To conclude: General Propoſitions of what kind ſoever, are then only capable of Certainty, when the Terms uſed in them, ſtand for ſuch Ideas whoſe Agreement or Diſagreement, as there expreſſed is capable to be diſcovered by us. And we are then certain of their Truth or Falſhood, when we perceive the Ideas they ſtand for, to agree or not agree, according as they are affirmed or denied one of another; whence we may take Notice, that general Certainty is never to be found but in our *Ideas*. Whenever we go to ſeek it elſewhere in Experiment or Obſervations without us, our Knowledge goes not beyond Particulars. It is the Contemplation of our own abſtract Ideas, that alone is able to afford us general Knowledge.

CHAP. VII.

Of Maxims.

THERE are a Sort of Propoſitions, which under the Names of *Maxims* and *Axioms*, have paſſed for Principles of Science: And becauſe they are ſelf-evident, have been ſuppoſed *innate*. It may be worth While to enquire into

into the Reaſon of their Evidence, and examine how far they influence our other Knowledge.

Knowledge being but the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas, where that Agreement or Diſagreement is perceived immediately, without the Intervention or Help of any other Ideas, there our *Knowledge* is *ſelf-evident*: This will appear to be ſo to any one, who will but conſider any of thoſe Propoſitions, which, without any Proof, he aſſents to at firſt Sight; for in all of them he will find, that the Reaſon of his Aſſent, is from that Agreement or Diſagreement, which the Mind, by an immediate comparing them, finds in thoſe Ideas anſwering the Affirmation or Negation in the Propoſition. This Self-Evidence is viſible not only in *Maxims*, but in an infinite Number of other Propoſitions. For,

In Reſpect of *Identity* and *Diverſity*, we may have as many Self-evident Propoſitions as we have diſtinct *Ideas*. 'Tis the firſt Act of the Mind, to know every one of its Ideas by itſelf, and diſtinguiſh it from others. Every one finds in himſelf, that he knows the Ideas he has; that he knows alſo when any one is in his Underſtanding, and what it is; and that when more than one are there, he knows them diſtinctly and unconfuſedly, one from another; ſo that all Affirmations, or Negations, concerning them, are made without any Poſſibility of Doubt or Uncertainty; and muſt neceſſarily be aſſented to as ſoon as underſtood; that is, as ſoon as we have in our Minds the Ideas clear and diſtinct, which the Terms in the Propoſition ſtand for.

Thus a *Circle is a Circle, Blue is not Red,* are as self-evident Propositions, as those general ones, *what is, is*; and *'tis impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be.* Nor can the Consideration of these *Axioms* add any Thing to the Evidence, or Certainty of our Knowledge of them.

As to the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas of *Co-existence,* the Mind has an immediate Perception of this, but in very few of them; and therefore, in this Sort we have very little *intuitive* Knowledge; tho' in some few Propositions we have. *Two Bodies cannot be in the same Place,* I think is a self-evident Proposition. The Idea of filling a Place equal to the Contents of its Superficies being annexed to our Idea of Body.

As to the Relations of *Modes,* Mathematicians have framed many Axioms concerning that one Relation of Equality; as *Equals taken from Equals, the Remainder will be equal,* &c. which however received for Axioms, yet I think have not a clearer Self-evidence than these, that *one and one are equal to two:* That if from the five Fingers of one Hand you take two, and from the five Fingers of the other Hand two, the remaining Numbers will be equal. These and a thousand other such Propositions may be found in Numbers, which carry with them an equal, if not greater Clearness than those Mathematical Axioms.

As to *real Existence,* since that has no Connection with any other of our *Ideas,* but that of ourselves, and of a *first Being*; we have not so much

much as a Demonſtrative, much leſs a Self-evident Knowledge, concerning the *real Exiſtence* of other Beings.

In the next Place, let us conſider what Influence theſe Maxims have upon the other Parts of our Knowledge. The Rules eſtabliſhed in the Schools, That all Reaſonings are *ex præcognitis & præconceſſis*, ſeem to lay the Foundation of all other Knowledge in theſe Maxims, and to ſuppoſe them to be *præcognita*; whereby I think are meant two Things: *Firſt*, That theſe Axioms are thoſe Truths that are firſt known to the Mind: *Secondly*, That upon them the other Parts of our Knowledge depend.

Firſt, That theſe Axioms are not the Truths firſt known to the Mind, is evident from Experience: For who knows not, that a *Child perceives that a Stranger is not its Mother*, long before he knows, *that it is impoſſible for the ſame Thing to be, and not to be?* And how many Truths are there about Numbers, which the Mind is perfectly acquainted with, and fully convinced of, before it ever thought on theſe general Maxims? Of this the Reaſon is plain; for that which makes the Mind aſſent to ſuch Propoſitions, being nothing but the Perception it has of the Agreement or Diſagreement of its *Ideas*, according as it finds them affirmed or denied in Words one of another; and every *Idea* being known to be what it is; and every two diſtinct *Ideas* not to be the ſame, it muſt neceſſarily follow, that ſuch ſelf-evident Truths muſt be firſt known, which conſiſt of *Ideas*, that are firſt in the Mind; and the *Ideas* firſt in the

Mind, it is evident, are thoſe of particular Things; from whence, by ſlow Degrees, the Underſtanding proceeds to ſome few general ones, which being taken from the ordinary and familiar Objects of Senſe, are ſettled in the Mind, with general Names to them. Thus particular *Ideas* are firſt received and diſtinguiſhed, and ſo Knowledge got about them; and next to them the leſs general or ſpecifick, which are next to particular ones.

For *abſtract Ideas* are not ſo obvious or eaſy to *Children*, or the yet unexerciſed Mind as particular ones. If they ſeem ſo to grown *Men*, 'tis only becauſe by conſtant and familiar Uſe they are made ſo. It is true, the Mind, in this imperfect State, has need of ſuch Ideas, and makes all the Haſte to them it can, for the Conveniency of Communication and Enlargement of Knowledge; to both which it is naturally very much inclined. But yet one has reaſon to ſuſpect ſuch Ideas are Marks of our Imperfection; at leaſt this is enough to ſhew, that the moſt abſtract and general Ideas are not thoſe that the Mind is firſt and moſt eaſily acquainted with, nor ſuch as its earlieſt Knowledge is converſant about.

Secondly, From what has been ſaid, it plainly follows, that theſe magnified *Maxims* are not the Principles and Foundations of all our other Knowledge: For if there be a great many other Truths as ſelf-evident as they, and a great many that we know before them, it is impoſſible that they ſhould be the Principles, from which we deduce all other Truths. Thus, that *one*

and

and two are equal to three, is as evident, and easier known than that the *whole is equal to all its Parts*. Nor after the Knowledge of this Maxim, do we know that *one and two are equal to three*, better, or more certainly than we did before. For if there be any Odds in these *Ideas*, the *Ideas* of whole and *Parts* are more obscure, or at least more difficult to be settled in the Mind, than those of *one, two and three*. And indeed, I think, I may ask these Men, who will needs have all Knowledge besides those general Principles themselves, to depend on general, innate, and self-evident Principles, what Principle is requisite to prove, that *one* and *one* are *two*, that *two* and *two* are *four*, that *three* times *two* are *six*? Which being known without any Proof, do evince, that either all Knowledge does not depend on certain *præcognita*, or general Maxims, called Principles, or else such as these, (*that one and one are two, that two and two are four*, &c.) and a great Part of Numeration will be so. To which if we add all the self-evident Propositions that may be made about all our distinct *Ideas*; Principles will be almost infinite, at least innumerable, which Men arrive to the Knowledge of, at different Ages; and a great many of those innate Principles, they never come to know all their Lives. But whether they come in view earlier or later, they are all known by their native Evidence, and receive no Light, nor are capable of any Proof one from another; much less the more particular from the more general; or the more simple from the more compounded: The more simple and less abstract, being the most familiar, and easier and earlier apprehended.

These

These *general Maxims* then, are only of Use in Disputes, to stop the Mouths of Wranglers; but not of much Use to the Discovery of unknown Truths; or to help the Mind forwards in its Search after Knowledge. Several general Maxims are no more than bare verbal Propositions; and teach us nothing but the Respect and Import of Names, one to another; as, *The Whole is equal to all its Parts:* What real Truth does it teach us more, than what the Signification of the Word *Totum*, or *Whole*, does of itself import?

They are not of Use to help Men forward in the Advancement of Sciences, or new Discoveries of yet unknown Truths. Mr. *Newton*, in his never enough to be admired Book, has demonstrated several Propositions, which are so many new Truths, before unknown to the World, and are farther Advances in Mathematical Knowledge: But for the Discovery of these, it was not the general Maxims, *what is, is*; or, *the whole is bigger than a Part*, or the like, that helped him. These were not the Clues that led him into the Discovery of the Truth and Certainty of those Propositions. Nor was it by them that he got the Knowledge of those Demonstrations; but by finding out intermediate Ideas, that shewed the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas, as expressed in the Propositions he demonstrated. This is the great Exercise and Improvement of human Understanding in the enlarging of Knowledge, and advancing the Sciences; wherein they are far enough from receiving any Help from the Contempla-

templation of these, or the like magnified Maxims.

But yet, *Mathematicians* do not without Reason place this, and some other Axioms, amongst their *Maxims*; that their Scholars having, in the Entrance, perfectly acquainted their Thoughts with these Propositions, made in such general Terms, may have them ready to apply to all particular Cases: Not that if they be equally weighed, they are more clear and evident, than the particular Instances they are brought to confirm; but that being more familiar to the Mind, the very naming them is enough to satisfy the Understanding. But this, I say, is more from our Custom of using them, than the different Evidence of the Things.

So that, if rightly considered, I think we may say, that where our *Ideas* are clear and distinct, there is little, or no Use at all of these *Maxims*, to prove the Agreement or Disagreement of any of them. He that cannot discern the Truth, or Falshood of such Propositions, without the Help of these and the like Maxims, will not be helped by these Maxims to do it. He that needs any Proof to make him certain, and give his Assent to this Proposition, that *two are equal to two*, or that *white is not black*, will also have need of a Proof to make him admit that, *what is, is*: or, *that it is impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be.*

And as these *Maxims* are of little Use, where we have clear and distinct *Ideas*; so they are of dangerous Use where our *Ideas* are confused; and

and where we use Words that are not annexed to clear and distinct *Ideas*, but to such as are of a loose and wandering Signification, sometimes standing for one, and sometimes for another *Idea*; from which follows Mistake and Error, which these Maxims (brought as Proofs to establish Propositions wherein the Terms stand for confused and uncertain *Ideas*) do by their Authority confirm and rivet.

CHAP. VIII.

Of trifling Propositions.

WHETHER the Maxims treated of in the foregoing Chapter, be of that Use to real Knowledge as is generally supposed, I leave to be considered. This, I think, may confidently be affirmed, that there are universal Propositions, which though they be certainly true, yet they add no Light to our Understandings, bring no Increase to our Knowledge: Such are,

First, All *purely identical Propositions*. These, at first Sight, appear to contain no Instruction in them: For when we affirm the same Term of itself, it shews us nothing but what we must certainly know before, whether such a Proposition be either made by, or proposed to us.

Secondly, Another Sort of trifling Propositions is, when a *Part of the complex* Idea *is predicated of the Name of the whole*; a Part of the Defini-

Definition, of the Word defined, as, *Lead is a Metal, Man an Animal.* These carry no Information at all, to those who know the complex *Ideas*, the Names *Lead* and *Man* stand for: Indeed to a Man that knows the Signification of the Word *Metal*, and not of the Word *Lead*, it is a shorter Way to explain the Signification of the Word *Lead*, by saying it is a *Metal*, which at once expresses several of its simple Ideas, than to enumerate them one by one, telling him it is a Body very *heavy*, *fusible*, and *malleable*.

Alike trifling it is, to predicate any other Part of the Definition of the Term defined, or to affirm any one of the simple Ideas of a complex one, by the Name of the whole complex Idea: As *all Gold is fusible*; for Fusibility being one of the simple Ideas that goes to the making up the complex one, the Sound *Gold* stands for; what can it be but playing with Sounds, to affirm that of the Name *Gold*, which is comprehended in its received Signification? It would be thought little better than ridiculous, to affirm gravely, as a Truth of Moment, that *Gold is yellow*; and I see not how it is any Jot more material to say, *it is fusible*, unless that Quality be left out of the complex Idea, of which the sound *Gold* is the Mark in ordinary Speech, What Instruction can it carry, to tell one that which he is supposed to know before? For I am supposed to know the Signification of the Word another uses to me, or else he must explain it.

The general Propositions that are made about Substances, if they are certain, are for the most

Part

Part but *trifling*; and if they are instructive, are uncertain, and such as we can have no Knowledge of their real Truth, how much soever constant Observation and Analogy may assist our Judgments in *guessing*. Hence it comes to pass, that one may often meet with very clear and coherent Discourses, that yet amount to nothing. For Names of substantial Beings, as well as others, having settled Significations affixed to them, may with great Truth be joined negatively and affirmatively in Propositions, as their Definitions make them fit to be so joined; and Propositions consisting of such Terms, may with the same Clearness be deduced one from another, as those that convey the most real Truths, and all this without any Knowledge of the Nature or Reality of Things existing without us. Thus he that has learned the following Words, with their ordinary Acceptations annexed to them, *viz. Substance, Man, Animal, Form, Soul, Vegetative, Sensitive, Rational*, may make several undoubted Propositions about the Soul, without any Knowledge at all of what the Soul really is. And of this Sort a Man may find an infinite Number of Propositions, Reasonings and Conclusions in Books of *Metaphysicks, School-Divinity*, and some Part of *natural Philosophy*; and after all, know as little of *God, Spirits*, or *Bodies*, as he did before he set out.

Thirdly, The worst Sort of *trifling is to use Words loosely and uncertainly*, which sets us yet farther from the Certainty of Knowledge we hope to attain to by them, or find in them. That which occasions this, is, That Men may find it convenient to shelter their Ignorance or Obsti-

Obſtinacy, under the Obſcurity and Perplexedneſs of their Terms; to which, perhaps, Inadvertency and ill Cuſtom do in many Men much contribute.

To conclude, barely *verbal Propoſitions* may be known by theſe following Marks.

Firſt, All Propoſitions, wherein two abſtract Terms are affirmed one of another, are barely about the Signification of Sounds. For ſince no abſtract Idea can be the ſame with any other, but itſelf; when its abſtract Name is affirmed of any other Term, it can ſignify no more than this, that it may or ought to be called by that Name; or that theſe two Names ſignify the ſame Idea. Thus ſhould any one ſay, that *Parſimony is Frugality*, that *Gratitude is Juſtice*; that this or that Action is or is not *Temperance*; however ſpecious theſe and the like Propoſitions may at firſt Sight ſeem, yet when we come to preſs them, and examine nicely what they contain, we ſhall find, that it all amounts to nothing, but the Signification of thoſe Terms.

Secondly, All Propoſitions, wherein a Part of the complex Idea, which any Term ſtands for, is affirmed of that Term, are only *verbal*: *v. g.* to ſay, *that Gold is a Metal*, or *heavy*. And thus all Propoſitions wherein more comprehenſive Terms called *Genera*, are affirmed of ſubordinate, or leſs comprehenſive, called *Species* or *Individuals*, are barely *verbal*. When by theſe two Rules we examine the Propoſitions that make up the Diſcourſes we ordinarily meet with, both in and out of Books; we ſhall perhaps find, that

that a greater Part of them, than is usually suspected, are merely about the Signification of Words, and contain nothing in them but the Use and Application of these Signs.

This, I think, I may lay down for an infallible Rule, that wherever the distinct Idea any Word stands for, is not known and considered, and something not contained in the Idea, is not affirmed, or denied of it, there our Thoughts stick wholly in Sounds, and are able to attain no real Truth or Falshood. This, perhaps, if well heeded, might save us a great deal of useless Amusement and Dispute; and very much shorten our Trouble and wandering in the Search of real and true Knowledge.

CHAP. IX.

Of our Knowledge of Existence.

HItherto we have only considered the *Essences* of Things, which being only *abstract* Ideas, and thereby removed in our Thoughts from particular Existence, (that being the proper Operation of the Mind, in Abstraction, to consider an Idea under no other Existence, but what it has in the Understanding) give us no Knowledge of real *Existence* at all. We proceed now to enquire concerning our *Knowledge of the Existence* of Things, and how we came by it.

I say then, that we have the Knowledge of our *own Existence*, by *Intuition*; of the *Existence*

ence of God, by *Demonstration*; and of *other Things*, by *Sensation*. As for our own *Existence*, we perceive it so plainly, that it neither needs, nor is capable of any Proof. *I think*; *I reason*; *I feel Pleasure and Pain*: Can any of these be more evident to me than my *own Existence*? If I doubt of all other Things, that very *Doubt* makes me perceive my *own Existence*, and will not suffer me to doubt of that. If I know I doubt, I have as certain a Perception of the *Thing* doubting, as of that *Thought* which I call *Doubt*. Experience then convinces us that we have an *intuitive Knowledge of our own Existence*; and an internal infallible Perception that we are. In every Act of Sensation, Reasoning or Thinking, we are conscious to ourselves of our own Being, and in this Matter come not short of the highest Degree of *Certainty*.

CHAP. X.

Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a God.

THOUGH *God* has given us no *innate Ideas* of himself; though he has stamped no original Characters on our Minds, wherein we may read his Being; yet having furnished us with those Faculties our Minds are endowed with, he hath not *left himself without a Witness*, since we have Sense, Perception, and Reason, and cannot want a clear Proof of him, as long as we carry ourselves about us: Nor can we justly complain of our Ignorance in this great Point, since he has so plentifully provided us with

with Means to discover, and know him, so far as is necessary to the End of our Being, and the great Concernment of our Happiness. But though, this be the most obvious Truth that Reason discovers, and though its Evidence be, if I mistake not, equal to Mathematical Certainty; yet it requires Thought and Attention: And the Mind must apply itself to a regular Deduction of it, from some Part of our *intuitive* Knowledge, or else we shall be as ignorant of this as of other Propositions which are in themselves capable of clear Demonstration. To shew therefore, that we are capable of knowing, that is, *being certain*, that *there is a God*, and how we may come by this Certainty, I think we need go no farther than ourselves, and that undoubted Knowledge we have of our own *Existence*.

I think it is beyond Question, that *Man has a clear Perception of his own Being:* He knows certainly that he exists, and that he is something. In the next Place, Man knows by an *intuitive* Certainty, that *bare Nothing can no more produce any real Being, than it can be equal to two right Angles*. If therefore we know there is some real Being, it is an evident Demonstration, that *from Eternity there has been Something*; since what was not from Eternity, had a Beginning; and what had a Beginning must be produced by something else. Next it is evident, *that what has its Being from another, must also have all that which is in, and belongs to its Being from another too:* All the Powers it has, must be owing to, and received from the same Source. This eternal Source then of all Being must be

also

alſo the Source and Original of all Power; and ſo this *Eternal Being* muſt be alſo the *moſt powerful.*

Again, Man finds in himſelf *Perception* and *Knowledge:* We are certain then, that there is not ly ſome Being, but ſome knowing, intelligent Being in the World. There was a Time then, when there was no knowing Being, and when Knowledge began to be; or elſe there has been a knowing Being from Eternity. If it be ſaid, there was a Time when that eternal Being had no Knowledge; I reply, that then it is impoſſible there ſhould ever have been any Knowledge: It being as impoſſible that Things wholly void of Knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any Perception, ſhould produce a knowing Being, as it is that a Triangle ſhould make itſelf three Angles, bigger than two right ones.

Thus from the Conſideration of ourſelves, and what we infallibly find in our own Conſtitutions, our Reaſon leads us to the Knowledge of this certain and evident Truth, that *there is an eternal, moſt powerful, and knowing Being,* which, whether any one will pleaſe to call God, it matters not. The Thing is evident, and from this Idea duly conſidered, will eaſily be deduced all thoſe other *Attributes* we ought to aſcribe to this *eternal Being.*

From what has been ſaid, it is plain to me we have a more certain Knowledge of the Exiſtence of a *God,* than of any Thing our Senſes have not immediately diſcovered to us. Nay I preſume I may ſay, that we more certainly know that

that there is a *God*, than that there is any Thing else without us. When I say, we know, I *mean*, there is such a Knowledge within our Reach, which we cannot miss, if we will but apply our Minds to that, as we do to several other Enquiries. For the *invisible Things of God are clearly seen from the Creation of the World, being understood by the Things that are made, even his eternal Power and God head.*

It being then unavoidable for all rational Creatures to conclude, that *Something has existed from Eternity*; let us next see what *Kind of Thing* that must be. There are but two Sorts of Beings in the World, that Man knows or conceives: *First*, Such as are purely material, without Sense or Perception, as the Clippings of our Beards, and Parings of our Nails. *Secondly*, Sensible perceiving Beings; such as we find ourselves to be. These two Sorts we shall hereafter call *cogitative* and *incogitative* Beings: Which to our present Purpose are better than *material* and *immaterial*.

If then there must be something *eternal*, it is very obvious to Reason, that it must necessarily be a *cogitative* Being; because it is as impossible to conceive that ever bare *incogitative* Matter should produce a *thinking* intelligent Being, as that Nothing should of itself produce Matter. Let us suppose any Parcel of Matter *eternal*, we shall find it in itself unable to produce any Thing. Let us suppose its Parts firmly at rest together: If there were no other Being in the World, must it not eternally remain so, a dead unactive Lump? Is it possible to conceive it can

add

add Motion to itſelf, or produce any Thing? *Matter* then by its own Strength cannot produce in itſelf, ſo much as *Motion*. The Motion it has muſt alſo be from Eternity, or elſe added to Matter by ſome other Being, more powerful than Matter: Matter, as is evident, having not Power to produce Motion in itſelf. But let us ſuppoſe Motion eternal too, yet Matter, *incogitative* Matter and Motion could never produce *Thought*: *Knowledge* will ſtill be as far beyond the *Power* of *Motion* and *Matter* to produce, as Matter is beyond the Power of Nothing to produce. And I appeal to every one's own Thoughts, whether he cannot as eaſily conceive Matter produced by *nothing*, as Thought to be produced by pure Matter, when before there was no ſuch Thing as Thought, or an intelligent Being exiſting. Divide *Matter* into as minute Parts, as you will, vary the Figure and Motion of it, as much as you pleaſe, it will operate no otherwiſe upon other Bodies of proportionable Bulk, than it did before this Diviſion. The minuteſt Particles of Matter, knock, impel, and reſiſt one another, juſt as the greater do, and that is all they can do, ſo that if we will ſuppoſe *nothing eternal*, *Matter can never begin to be*. If we ſuppoſe *bare Matter* without Motion, *eternal Motion can never begin to be*. If we ſuppoſe only Matter and Motion eternal, *Thought can never begin to be*: For it is impoſſible to conceive, that Matter either with or without Motion, could have originally in and from itſelf, Senſe, Perception, and Knowledge, as is evident from hence, that then Senſe, Perception and Knowledge, muſt be a Property eternally inſeparable from Matter

and

and every Particle of it. Since therefore whatsoever is the first eternal Being, must necessarily be *cogitative*; and whatsoever is *first* of all Things, must necessarily contain in it, and actually have, at least, all the Perfections that can ever after exist, it necessarily follows, that the *first eternal Being cannot be Matter*.

If therefore it be evident that something necessarily must exist from Eternity, it is also evident that, that *something must necessarily be a cogitative Being*. For it is as impossible that *incogitative Matter* should produce a *cogitative Being*, as that Nothing, or the Negation of all Being, should produce a positive Being or Matter.

This Discovery of the necessary Existence of an eternal Mind, does sufficiently lead us into the Knowledge of *God*. For it will hence follow, that all other knowing Beings, that have a Beginning, must depend on him, and have no other Ways of Knowledge or Extent of Power, than what he gives them: And therefore if he made those, he made also the less excellent Pieces of this Universe, all *inanimate Bodies*, whereby his *Omniscience*, *Power*, and *Providence* will be established, and from thence all his other Attributes necessarily follow.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Of our Knowledge of the Existence of other Things.

THE Knowledge of our own Being we have by *Intuition:* The Existence of a *God*, *Reason* clearly makes known to us, as has been shewn: The *Knowledge of the Existence* of any other Thing, we can have only by Sensation; for there being no necessary Connection of *real Existence* with any *Idea* a Man hath in his Memory; nor of any other Existence, but that of *God*, with the Existence of any particular Man; no particular Man can know the Existence of any other Being, but only, when by actually operating upon him, it makes itself be perceived by him. The having the *Idea* of any Thing in our Mind, no more proves the Existence of that Thing, than the Picture of a Man evidences his Being in the World, or the Visions of a Dream, make thereby a true History. It is therefore the actual receiving of *Ideas* from without that gives us Notice of the Existence of other Things, and makes us know that something doth exist at that time without us, which causes that *Idea* in us, tho' perhaps we neither know nor consider how it does it; for it takes not from the *Certainty* of our Senses, and the *Ideas* we received by them, that we know not the Manner wherein they are produced: This *Notice* we have by our *Senses* of the existing of Things without us, tho' it be not altogether so certain as our *Intuitive* Knowledge, or the De-

ductions of our *Reason*, employed about the clear *abstract Ideas* of our Minds, which is *Demonstration*, deserves the name of Knowledge, if we persuade ourselves that our Faculties act and inform us right, concerning the Existence of those Objects that affect them: It cannot pass for an ill-grounded Confidence. But besides the Assurance we have from our *Senses* themselves, that they do not err in the Information they give us of the Existence of Things without us, we have other concurrent Reasons: As, *First*, It is plain those Perceptions are produced in us, by exterior Causes affecting our Senses, because those that want the *Organs* of any *Sense*, never can have the *Ideas* belonging to that Sense produced in their Minds. This is too evident to be doubted, and therefore we cannot but be assured, that they come in by the Organs of that Sense, and no other Way.

Secondly, Because we find sometimes that we cannot avoid the having those *Ideas* produced in our Minds; when my Eyes are shut, I can at pleasure recall to my Mind the *Ideas* of *Light* or the *Sun* which former Sensations had lodged in my Memory; but if I turn my Eyes towards the *Sun*, I cannot avoid the *Ideas* which the *Light* or the *Sun* then produces in me: Which shews a manifest Difference between those *Ideas* laid up in the Memory, and such as force themselves upon us, and we cannot avoid having. And therefore it must needs be some *exterior* Cause, whose Efficacy I cannot resist, that produces those *Ideas* in my Mind, whether I will or no.

Besides,

Besides, there is no Body who doth not perceive the Difference in himself, between actually looking upon the *Sun*, and contemplating the *Idea* he has of it in his Memory; and therefore he hath certain Knowledge, that they are not both Memory or Fancy; but that actual Seeing has a Cause without.

Thirdly, Add to this, that many *Ideas* are produced in us with Pain, which we afterwards remember without the least Offence. Thus the Pain of *Heat* or *Cold*, when the *Idea* of it is received in our Minds, gives us no Disturbance; which when felt was very troublesome; and we remember the Pain of *Hunger*, *Thirst*, *Head-ach*, &c. without any Pain at all; which would either never disturb us, or else constantly do it, as often as we thought of it, were there nothing more but *Ideas* floating in our Minds, and Appearances entertaining our Fancies, without the real Existence of things affecting us from abroad. The same may be said of Pleasure, accompanying several actual Sensations: and though mathematical Demonstration depends not upon Sense, yet the examining them by Diagrams, gives credit to the Evidence of our Sight, and seems to give it a Certainty approaching to that of Demonstration itself.

Fourthly, Our *Senses* in many Cases bear Witness to the Truth of each others Report, concerning the Existence of sensible Things without us: He that doubts when he sees a *Fire*, whether it be *Real*, may if he pleases feel it too; and by the exquisite Pain, he will be convinced

that it is not a bare *Idea* or *Phantom*. Whence it is evident, that they are not barely the Sport and Play of our Imagination, when I find that the Characters which I made on Paper, at the Pleasure of my own Thoughts, do not obey them; nor yet cease to be, whenever I shall fancy it, but continue to affect my Senses constantly and regularly, according to the Figures I made them. To which, if we will add, that the sight of those shall, from another man, draw such sounds as I before-hand designed they shall stand for, there will be little reason left to doubt that those Words I write do really exist without me, when they cause a long Series of regular Sounds to affect my Ears, which could not to be the Effect of my Imagination, nor could my Memory retain them in that Order.

If, after all this, any one will be so *sceptical*, as to distrust his Senses, and to question the Existence of all Things, or our Knowledge of any Thing; let him consider that the Certainty of Things existing in *rerum natura*, when we have the Testimony of our Senses for it, is not only as great as our Frame can attain to, but as our Condition needs. From our *Faculties* being not suited to the full Extent of Being, nor a clear comprehensive Knowledge of all Things, but to the Preservation of us, in whom they are, and accommodated to the Use of Life; they serve our Purpose well enough, if they will but give us certain Notice of those Things, that are convenient or inconvenient to us. For he that sees a *Candle* burning, and has experimented the Force of the Flame, by putting his Finger in it, will little doubt, that this is something existing

isting without him, which does him harm and puts him to pain, which is Assurance enough; when no man requires greater Certainty to govern his Actions by, than what is as certain as his Actions themselves: So that this Evidence is as great as we can desire, being as certain to us as our Pleasure or Pain, that is, *Happiness* or *Misery*, beyond which we have no Concernment either of Knowing or Being. Such an Assurance of the Existence of Things without us, is sufficient to direct us in the attaining the Good, and avoiding the Evil, which is caused by them, which is the important concernment we have of being made acquainted with them.

In fine, when our Senses do actually convey into our Understandings any *Idea*, we are assured that there is something at that Time *really existing* without us. But this Knowledge extends only as far as the present Testimony of our Senses, employed about particular Objects, that do then affect them, and no farther. My seeing a *Man* a Minute since, is no certain Argument of his present Existence.

As when our Senses are actually employed about any Object, we know that it does exist; so by our Memory we may be assured, that heretofore Things that affected our *Senses*, *have existed*: And thus we have the Knowledge of the past Existence of several Things; whereof our *Senses* have informed us, our Memories still retain the *Ideas*: And of this we are past all Doubt, so long as we remember well.

As to the Existence of Spirits, our having *Ideas* of them, does not make us know, that any such Things do exist without us; or that there are any *finite Spirits*; or any other spiritual Beings but the eternal God. We have Ground from *Revelation*, and several other Reasons, to believe with Assurance, that there are such Creatures: But our Senses not being able to discover them, we want the Means of knowing their particular Existence; for we can no more know that there are *finite Spirits* really existing, by the *Idea* we have of such Beings, than by the *Ideas* any one has of *Fairies* or *Centaurs*, he can come to know that Things answering those *Ideas*, do really exist.

And therefore concerning the Existence of finite Spirits, as well as several other Things, we must content ourselves with the Evidence of Faith; but universal certain Propositions concerning this Matter, are beyond our Reach. For however true it may be, *v. g.* that all the intelligent Spirits that God ever created, do still exist; yet it can never make a Part of our certain Knowledge. These, and the like Propositions we may assent to, as highly probable, but are not, I fear, in a State capable of knowing. We are not then to put others upon demonstrating, nor ourselves upon Search of universal Certainty in all those Matters wherein we are not capable of any other Knowledge, but what our Senses give us in this or that particular.

Hence

Hence we may gather, that there are *two Sorts* of Propositions, *one* concerning the Existence of any Thing answerable to such an *Idea* as that of an *Elephant*, *Phœnix*, *Motion* or *Angel*, *viz.* Whether such a Thing does any where exist: And this Knowledge is only of *Particulars*, and not to be had of any Thing without us, but only of *God*, any other Way than by our *Senses*.

Another Sort of Proposition is, wherein is expressed the Agreement or Disagreement of our *abstract Ideas*, and their Dependence on one another. And these may be *universal* and certain: So having the *Idea* of *God* and *myself*, of *Fear* and *Obedience*, I cannot but be sure that *God is to be feared and obeyed by me*; and this Proposition will be certain concerning *Man* in general, if I have made an *abstract Idea* of such a *Species*, whereof I am one Particular. But such a Proposition, how certain soever, proves not to me the Existence of Men in the World; but will be true of all such Creatures, whenever they do exist: Which *Certainty* of such general Propositions, depends on the Agreement or Disagreement discoverable in those *abstract Ideas*. In the former Case, our Knowledge is the Consequence of the *Existence of Things*, producing *Ideas* in our Minds by our Senses: In the latter, the Consequences of the *Ideas* that are in our *Minds*, and producing these general Propositions, many whereof are called *eternæ veritates*; and all of them indeed are so, not from being written all, or any of them in the Minds of all Men, or that they were any of

them Propositions in any one's Mind, till he having got the *abstract Ideas*, joined or separated them by Affirmation or Negation: But wheresoever we can suppose such a Creature as *Man* is, endowed with such Faculties, and thereby furnished with such *Ideas* as we have, we must conclude, he must needs, when he applies his Thoughts to the Consideration of his *Ideas*, know the Truth of certain Propositions, that will arise from the Agreement or Disagreement he will perceive in his own *Ideas*. Such Propositions being once made about *abstract Ideas* so as to be true, are called *eternal Truths*, as they will, whenever they can be supposed to be made again, at any Time past, or to come, by a Mind having those Ideas, always be true. For Names being supposed to stand perpetually for the same *Ideas*; and the same *Ideas* having immutably the same Habitudes one to another; Propositions concerning any *abstract Ideas* that are once true, must needs be *eternal Verities*.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Improvement of our Knowledge.

IT being the received Opinion amongst Men of Letters, that *Maxims are the Foundation of all Knowledge*, and that Sciences are each of them built upon *Præcognita*, from whence the Understanding was to take its Rise, and by which it was to conduct itself in its Inquiries in the Matter belonging to that *Science*, the beaten Road of the Schools has been to lay down

down in the beginning one or more general Propositions, called *Principles*, as Foundations whereon to build the Knowledge that was to be had of that Subject.

That which gave Occasion to this Way of Proceeding, was, I suppose, the good Success it seemed to have in *Mathematicks*, which of all other Sciences, have the greatest Certainty, Clearness, and Evidence in them. But if we consider it, we shall find that the great *Advancement* and Certainty of *real Knowledge* Men arrived to in these *Sciences*, was not owing to the Influence of these Principles, but to the clear, distinct, and compleat *Ideas* their Thoughts were employed about; and the Relation of *Equality* and *Excess*, so clear between some of them, that they had an *intuitive Knowledge*; and by that a Way to discover it in others; and this without the Help of those *Maxims*. For I ask, Is it not possible for a Lad to know that his whole Body is bigger than his little Finger, but by Virtue of this Axiom, *The whole is bigger than the Part*; nor be assured of it, till he has learned that *Maxim?* Let any one consider from what has been elsewhere said, which is known first and clearest by most People, the *particular* Instance, or the *general* Rule; and which it is that gives Life and Birth to the other. These *general Rules* are but the comparing our more general and *abstract Ideas*, which Ideas are made by the Mind, and have Names given them, for the easier Dispatch in its Reasonings: But Knowledge began in the Mind, and was founded on *Particulars*, tho' afterwards perhaps no Notice be taken thereof: It being natural for the Mind,

to lay up those general Notions, and make the proper Use of them, which is to disburthen the Memory of the cumbersome Load of Particulars.

The Way to *improve in Knowledge*, is not to receive Principles, with an implicit Faith, and without Examination, which would be apt to mislead Men, instead of guiding them into Truth; but to get and fix in our Minds *clear* and *complete* Ideas, as far as they are to be had, and annex to them *proper* and *constant* Names: And thus barely by considering our Ideas, and comparing them together, observing their Agreement or Disagreement, their Habitudes and Relations, we shall get more true and clear Knowledge by the Conduct of this one *Rule*, than by taking up *Principles*, and thereby putting our Minds into the Disposal of others.

We must therefore, if we will proceed as *Reason* advises, adopt our Methods of Enquiry to the Nature of the Ideas we examine, and the Truth we search after. *General* and *certain Truths*, are only founded in the Habitudes and Relations of *abstract* Ideas. Therefore a sagacious methodical Application of our Thoughts for the finding out these Relations, is the only Way to discover all that can with Truth and Certainty be put into general Propositions. By what Steps we are to proceed in these, is to be learned in the Schools of the *Mathematicians*, who from very plain and easy Beginnings, by gentle Degrees, and a continued Chain of Reasonings, proceed to the Discovery and Demonstration of *Truths*, that appear at first Sight beyond

beyond human Capacity. This I think I may ſay that if other Ideas, that are *real* as well as *nominal* Eſſences of their *Species*, were purſued in the Way familiar to *Mathematicians*, they would carry our Thoughts farther, and with greater Evidence and Clearneſs, than poſſibly we are apt to imagine. This gave me the Confidence to advance that Conjecture, which I ſuggeſt, *Chapter* the Third, viz. that *Morality is capable of Demonſtration*, as well as *Mathematicks*: For *moral* Ideas being real Eſſences, that have a diſcoverable Connection and Agreement one with another, ſo far as we can find their Habitudes and Relations, ſo far we ſhall be poſſeſſed of *real* and *general* Truths.

In our Knowledge of *Subſtances*, we are to proceed after a quite different Method: The bare Contemplation of their *abſtract* Ideas (which are but *nominal* Eſſences) will carry us but a very little Way, in the Search of Truth and Certainty. Here Experience muſt teach us what Reaſon cannot; and it is by trying alone, that we can certainly know, what other Qualities co-exiſt with thoſe of our *complex* Idea; (for Inſtance) whether that *yellow*, *heavy*, *fuſible* Body, I call *Gold*, be *malleable* or no: Which Experience (however it prove in that particular Body we examine) makes us not certain that it is ſo in all, or any other *yellow*, *heavy*, *fuſible* Bodies, but that which we have tried; becauſe it is no Conſequence one Way or the other from our *complex* Idea: The Neceſſity or Inconſiſtence of *Malleability*, hath no viſible Connection with the Combination of that *Colour*, *Weight*, and *Fuſibility* in any Body. What I have here ſaid of

of the *nominal* Essence of *Gold*, supposed to consist of a Body of such a determinate *Colour*, *Weight*, and *Fusibility*, will hold true, if other Qualities be added to it. Our Reasonings from those Ideas, will carry us but a little Way in the certain Discovery of the other *Properties*, in those Masses of Matter wherein all those are to be found. As far as our Experience reaches, we may have certain Knowledge, and no farther.

I deny not, but a Man accustomed to rational and regular Experiments, shall be able to see farther into the Nature of Bodies, and their unknown Properties, than one that is a Stranger to them. But this is but *Judgment* and *Opinion*, not *Knowledge* and *Certainty*. This makes me suspect that *natural Philosophy* is not capable of being made a *Science*: From Experiments and historical Observations we may draw Advantages of Ease and Health, and thereby increase our Stock of Conveniencies for this Life: But beyond this, I fear our *Talents* reach not; nor are our Faculties as I guess, able to advance.

From whence it is obvious to conclude, that our Faculties are not fitted to penetrate the *real Essences* of Bodies, but yet plainly to discover to us the *Being* of a *God*, and the *Knowledge* of *ourselves*; enough to give us a clear Discovery of our *Duty*, and great Concernment; it will become us as rational Creatures, to employ our Faculties, about what they are most adapted to, and follow the Direction of Nature, where it seems to point us out the

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Way. For it is rational to conclude, that our proper Employment lies in those Enquiries, and that Sort of Knowledge which is most suited to our natural Capacities, and carries in it our greatest Interest, that is *the Condition of our eternal State:* And therefore it is, I think, that *Morality* is the proper Science and Business of *Mankind* in general (who are both concerned and fitted to search out their *summum bonum*) as several *Arts* conversant about the several Parts of Nature, are the Lot and private Talent of particular Men, for the common Use of human Life, and their own particular Subsistence in this World.

The Ways to enlarge our Knowledge, as far as we are capable, seem to me to be *these two:* The *First* is to get and settle in our Minds, as far as we can, clear, distinct, and constant Ideas of those Things we would consider and know. For it being evident that our Knowledge cannot exceed our Ideas; where they are either imperfect, confused, or obscure, we cannot expect to have certain, perfect or clear Knowledge. The *other* is the Art of finding out the intermediate Ideas, which may shew us the Agreement or Repugnancy of other Ideas, which cannot be immediately compared.

That these *two* (and not the relying on *Maxims*, and drawing Consequences from some general Propositions) are the right Method of improving our Knowledge, in the Ideas of other *Modes*, besides those of Quantity, the Consideration of *mathematical* Knowledge will easily inform us. Where *First*, We shall find that he that

that has not clear and perfect Ideas of those *Angles* or *Figures*, of which he desires to know any Thing, is utterly thereby incapable of any Knowledge about them. Suppose a Man not to have an exact Idea of a *right Angle*, *Scalenum* or *Trapezium*, and it is clear, that he will in vain seek any Demonstration about them. And *farther* it is evident, that it was not the Influence of *Maxims* or *Principles*, that has led the Masters of the *Sciences* into those wonderful Discoveries they have made. Let a Man of good Parts know all the *Maxims* of *Mathematicks* ever so well, and contemplate their Extent and Consequences as much as he pleases, he will by their Assistance, I suppose, scarce ever come to know, that the Square of the *Hypotenuse, in a right angled Triangle, is equal to the Squares of the two other Sides.* This and other *mathematical* Truths have been discovered by the Thoughts, otherwise applied. The Mind has other Objects, other Views before it, far different from those *Maxims* which Men well enough acquainted with those received *Axioms* but ignorant of their Method, who first made these Demonstrations, can never sufficiently admire. And who knows what Methods, to enlarge our Knowledge in other Parts of Science, may hereafter be invented, answering that of Algebra in Mathematics, which so readily finds out Ideas of Quantities to measure others by, whose Equality or Proportion we could otherwise very hardly, or perhaps never come to know?

CHAP.

C H A P. XIII.

Some farther Considerations concerning Knowledge.

OUR *Knowledge*, as in other Things, so in this, has a great Conformity with our *Sight*, that it is neither wholly *necessary*, nor wholly *voluntary*. Men that have Senses cannot chuse but receive some Ideas by them; and if they have Memory, they cannot but retain some of them; and if they have any distinguishing Faculty, cannot but perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of some of them, one with another. As he that has Eyes, if he will open them by Day, cannot but see some Objects, and perceive a Difference in them; yet he may chuse whether he will turn his Eyes towards an Object, curiously survey it, and observe accurately all that is visible in it. But what he does see, he cannot see otherwise than he does: It depends not on his *Will*, to see that *black*, which appears *yellow*, nor to persuade himself, that what actually *scalds* him, feels *cold*. Just thus it is with our *Understanding*: All that is voluntary in our Knowledge is the employing or with-holding any of our Faculties from this or that Sort of *Objects*; and a more or less accurate Survey of them: But they being employed, our *Will* hath no Power to determine the Knowledge of the Mind, one Way or another. That is done only by the *Objects* themselves, as far as they are clearly discovered. And therefore, as far as Mens Senses are conversant

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about external Objects, the Mind cannot but receive those Ideas which are presented by them, and be informed of the Existence of Things without; and so far as Mens Thoughts converse with their own determined Ideas, they cannot but, in some Measure, observe the Agreement and Disagreement that is to be found amongst some of them, which is so far *Knowledge*: And if they have Names for those Ideas which they have thus considered, they must needs be assured of the Truth of those Propositions, which express that Agreement or Disagreement they perceive in them, and be undoubtedly convinced of those Truths. For what a Man sees, he cannot but see, and what he perceives, he cannot but know that he perceives.

Thus he that has got the Ideas of *Numbers*, and hath taken the Pains to compare *one*, *two* and *three* to *six*, cannot chuse but know that they are equal. He that hath got the Idea of a Triangle, and found the Ways to measure its Angles, and their Magnitudes, is certain that its three Angles are equal to two right ones: And can as little doubt of that, as of this Truth, that *it is impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be.*

He also that hath the Idea of an intelligent, but weak and frail *Being*, made by, and depending on another, who is *eternal*, *omnipotent*, perfectly *wise* and *good*, will as certainly know that *Man* is to honour, fear, and obey *God*, as that the Sun shines when he sees it. For if he hath but the Ideas of two such Beings in his Mind,

and

and will turn his Thoughts that Way, and consider them, he will as certainly find, that the inferior, finite, and dependent, is under an Obligation to obey the supreme and infinite, as he is certain to find, that *three*, *four*, and *seven* are less than *fifteen*, if he will consider and compute those Numbers; nor can he be surer in a clear Morning that the Sun is risen, if he will but open his Eyes, and turn them that Way. But yet these Truths be they ever so certain, ever so clear, he may be ignorant of either or both of them, who will not take the Pains to employ his Faculties as he should, to inform himself about them.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Judgment.

THE *understanding Faculties* being given to Man, not barely for Speculation, but also for the Conduct of his Life; a Man would be at a great Loss if he had nothing to direct him but what has the Certainty of true Knowledge. For that being very short and scanty, as we have seen, he would be often utterly in the dark, and, in most of the Actions of his Life, perfectly at a Stand, had he nothing to guide him, in the Absence of clear and certain Knowledge. He that will not *eat* till he has Demonstration that it will nourish him; nor *stir* till he is infallibly assured of Success in his Business, will have little else to do but *sit still and perish*.

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Therefore as God hath set some Things in broad *Day-light*; as he has given us some certain Knowledge, tho' limited to a few Things, in Comparison, (probably as a Taste of what *intellectual* Creatures are capable of, to excite in us a Desire and Endeavour after a better State) so in the greatest Part of our Concernment, he has afforded us only the *Twilight*, as I may so say, of *Probability*, suitable to that State of *Mediocrity* and *Probationship*, he has been pleased to place us in here; wherein, to check our over-confidence and Presumption, we might, by every Day's Experience, be made sensible of our short-sightedness, and Liableness to Error; the Sense whereof might be a constant Admonition to us, to spend the Days of this our Pilgrimage with Industry and Care, in the Search, and following of that Way, which might lead us to a State of greater Perfection. It being highly rational to think, even where Revelation is silent in the Case, that as Men employ those Talents God has given them here, they shall accordingly receive their Rewards at the close of the Day, when their Sun shall set, and Night shall put an End to their Labours.

The Faculty which *God* has given *Man* to enlighten him, next to certain Knowledge is *Judgment*, whereby the Mind takes its Ideas to agree or disagree; or, which is the same, any Proposition to be true or false, without perceiving a demonstrative Evidence in the Proofs. The Mind exercises this Judgment, sometimes out of *Necessity*, where demonstrative Proofs, and certain Knowledge are not to be had; and some-

ſometimes out of *Lazineſs*, Unſkilfulneſs, or Haſte, even where they are to be had. Men often ſtay not warily to examine the Agreement or Diſagreement of two Ideas, which they are deſirous or concerned to know; but either incapable of ſuch Attention as is requiſite in a long Train of Gradations, or impatient of Delay, lightly caſt their Eyes on, or wholly paſs by the Proofs; and ſo, without making out the Demonſtration, determine of the Agreement or Diſagreement of two Ideas, as it were by a View of them as they are at a Diſtance, and take it to be the one or the other, as ſeems moſt likely to them upon ſuch a looſe Survey.

This Faculty of the Mind when it is exerciſed immediately about Things, is called *Judgment*; when about Truths delivered in Words, is moſt commonly called *Aſſent* or *Diſſent*: Which being the moſt uſual Way wherein the Mind has occaſion to employ this Faculty, I ſhall, under theſe Terms, treat of it as leaſt liable in our Language to Equivocation.

Thus the Mind has *two Faculties* converſant about Truth and Falſhood; *Firſt*, *Knowledge*, whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly ſatisfied of the Agreement or Diſagreement of any Ideas. *Secondly*, *Judgment*, which is the putting *Ideas* together, or ſeparating them from one another in the Mind, when their certain Agreement or Diſagreement is not *perceived*, but preſumed to be ſo, before it certainly appears. And if it ſo unites or ſeparates them, as in Reality Things are, it is *right Judgment*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XV.

Of Probability.

AS *Demonſtration* is the ſhewing the Agreement or Diſagreement of two Ideas, by the Intervention of one or more Proofs, which have a conſtant, immutable, and viſible Connexion one with another; ſo *Probability* is nothing but the Appearance of the Agreement or Diſagreement of two Ideas, by the Intervention of Proofs, whoſe Connection is not conſtant, and immutable; or is not perceived to be ſo; but is, or appears for the moſt Part to be ſo, and is enough to induce the Mind to judge the Propoſition to be *true* or *falſe*, rather than the contrary.

Of *Probability* there are Degrees from the Neighbourhood of *Certainty* and *Demonſtration*, quite down to *Improbability* and *Unlikelineſs*, even to the Confines of *Impoſſibility*: And alſo Degrees of *Aſſent* from certain Knowledge and what is next it, *full Aſſurance* and *Confidence*, quite down to *Conjecture*, *Doubt*, *Diſtruſt*, and *Diſbelief*.

That Propoſition then is *probable*, for which there are Arguments or Proofs to make it paſs, or be received for *true*. The Entertainment the Mind gives to this Sort of Propoſitions, is called *Belief*, *Aſſent* or *Opinion*, which is the admitting or receiving any Propoſition for true, upon

upon Arguments, or Proofs that are found to perſuade us to receive it as true, without certain Knowledge that it is ſo. And herein lies the Difference between *Probability* and *Certainty*, *Faith* and *Knowledge*, that in all the Parts of Knowledge, there is Intuition; each immediate Idea, each Step has its viſible and certain Connexion; in Belief not ſo. That which makes me believe, is ſomething extraneous to the Thing I believe; ſomething not evidently joined in both Sides to, and ſo not manifeſtly ſhewing the Agreement or Diſagreement of thoſe Ideas that are under Conſideration.

Probability then, being to ſupply the Defect of our Knowledge, is always converſant about Propoſitions, whereof we have no *Certainty*, but only ſome *Inducements* to receive them for true. The *Grounds* of it are *theſe two* following.

Firſt, The *Conformity* of any Thing with our own Knowledge, Experience, or Obſervation.

Secondly, The *Teſtimony* of others, vouching their Obſervation and Experience; in the *Teſtimony* of others, is to be conſidered; *Firſt*; the Number; *Secondly*, the Integrity; *Thirdly*, the Skill of the Witneſſes; *Fourthly*, the Deſign of the Author, if it be a Teſtimony cited out of a Book; *Fifthly*, the Conſiſtency of the Parts and Circumſtances of the Relation; *Sixthly*, contrary Teſtimonies.

Probability wanting that intuitive Evidence which infallibly determines the Underſtanding, and

and produces certain Knowledge, the Mind, if it would proceed rationally, ought to examine all the Grounds of *Probability*, and ſee how they make more or leſs, for or againſt any Propoſition, before it aſſents to, or diſſents from it, and upon a due balancing the whole, reject or receive it, with a more or leſs firm Aſſent, proportionably to the Preponderancy of the greater Grounds of Probability on one Side or the other. For Example:

If I myſelf ſee a Man walk on the Ice, it is paſt *Probability*, it is *Knowledge*: But if another tells me he ſaw a Man in *England*, in the midſt of a ſharp Winter, walk upon Water hardened with Cold; this has ſo great Conformity with what is uſually obſerved to happen, that I am diſpoſed, by the Nature of the Thing itſelf, to aſſent to it, unleſs ſome manifeſt Suſpicion attend the Relation of that Matter of Fact. But if the ſame Thing be told to one born between the Tropics, who never ſaw nor heard of any ſuch Thing before, there the whole Probability relies on Teſtimony: And as the Relators are more in Number, and of more Credit, and have no Intereſt to ſpeak contrary to the Truth, ſo that Matter of Fact is like to find more or leſs Belief.

Upon theſe Grounds depends the *Probability* of any Propoſition: And as the Conformity of our Knowledge, as the Certainty of Obſervations, as the Frequency and Conſtancy of Experience, and the Number and Credibility of Teſtimonies, do more or leſs agree or diſagree with it, ſo is any Propoſition in itſelf, more or

leſs

leſs probable. There is another, I confeſs, which though by itſelf it be no true Ground of *Probability*, yet is often made uſe of for one, by which Men moſt commonly regulate their Aſſent, and upon which they pin their Faith more than any Thing elſe, and that is *the Opinions of others*: Though there cannot be a more dangerous Thing to rely on, nor more likely to miſlead one, ſince there is much more Falſhood and Error among Men, than Truth and Knowledge. And if the Opinions and Perſuaſions of others, whom we know and think well of, be a Ground of Aſſent, Men have Reaſon to be Heathens in *Japan*, Mahometants in *Turkey*, Papiſts in *Spain*, Proteſtants in *England*, and Lutherans in *Sweden*. But of this wrong Ground of Aſſent, I ſhall have Occaſion to ſpeak more at large in another Place.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the Degrees of Aſſent.

THE *Grounds* of *Probability* laid down in the foregoing *Chapter*, as they are the Foundations on which our *Aſſent* is built, ſo are they alſo the Meaſure whereby its ſeveral *Degrees* are (or ought to be) regulated. Only we are to take Notice, that no Grounds of Probability operate any farther on the Mind, which ſearches after Truth, and endeavours to judge right, than they appear, at leaſt in the firſt Judgment, or Search that the Mind makes. It is indeed in many Caſes impoſſible, and in moſt very

very hard, even for thoſe who have admirable Memories, to retain all the Proofs, which upon a due Examination, made them embrace that Side of the Queſtion. It ſuffices that they have once with Care and Fairneſs, ſifted the Matter as far as they could; and having once found on which Side the *Probability* appeared to them, they lay up the Concluſion in their Memories, as a *Truth* they have diſcovered; and for the future remain ſatisfied with the Teſtimony of their Memories, that this is the Opinion, that by the Proofs they have once ſeen of it, deſerves ſuch a *Degree* of their *Aſſent* as they afford it.

This is all that the greateſt Part of Men are capable of doing, in regulating their Opinions and Judgments, ſo that it is unavoidable but that the Memory muſt be depended on in this Caſe, and that Men be perſuaded of ſeveral *Opinions*, whereof the Proofs are not actually in their Thoughts, nay, which perhaps they are not able actually to recall, from the great Number of intermediate Ideas, that were neceſſary in the Deduction. Without this the greateſt Part of Men, muſt be either *Scepticks*, or change every Moment, when any one offers them Arguments, which for want of Memory, they are not preſently able to anſwer.

It muſt be owned that Mens relying too much on their paſt Determinations, is often the Cauſe of great *Obſtinacy* in Error and Miſtake. But the Fault is not, that they rely on their Memories for what they have before well conſidered, but becauſe they made their Concluſions before they

they had been well examined. May we not find a great Number (not to ſay the greateſt Part) of Men, that think they have formed right Judgments of ſeveral Matters, and that for no other Reaſon, but becauſe they never thought otherwiſe? That imagine themſelves to have judged right, only becauſe they never queſtioned, never examined their own Opinions? Which is indeed to think they judged right, becauſe they never judged at all: And yet theſe, of all Men, hold their Opinions with the greateſt Stiffneſs; thoſe being generally the moſt fierce and firm in their Tenets, who have leaſt examined them. What we once know, we are certain is ſo; and we may be ſecure that there are no latent Proofs undiſcovered, which may overturn our Knowledge, or bring it in Doubt. But in Matters of Probability, it is not in every Caſe we can be ſure that we have all the Particulars before us, that any Way concern the Queſtion; and that there is no Evidence behind, and yet unſeen, which may caſt the Probability on the other Side, and out-weigh all that at preſent ſeems to preponderate with us. Who almoſt is there that hath the Leiſure, Patience, and Means to collect together, all the Proofs concerning moſt of the Opinions he has, ſo as ſafely to conclude that he has a clear and full View, and that there is no more to be offered for his further Information? And yet we are forced to determine ourſelves on one Side or other: The Conduct of our Lives, and the Management of our great Concerns, will not bear Delay. For thoſe depend for the moſt Part on the Determination of our Judgment in Points wherein we are not capable of certain Know-

ledge, and wherein it is neceſſary for us to embrace one Side or the other.

Since therefore, it is unavoidable to the greateſt Part of Men, if not all, to have ſeveral Opinions, without certain and indubitable Proofs of their Truths; and it carries too great an Imputation of Ignorance, Lightneſs, or Folly, for Men to quit and renounce their former Tenets preſently upon the Offer of an Argument which they cannot immediately anſwer, and ſhew the Inſufficiency of; it would methinks become all Men to maintain Peace, and the common Offices of Humanity and Friendſhip, in the Diverſity of Opinions, ſince we cannot reaſonably expect, that any one ſhould readily and obſequiouſly quit his own Opinion, and embrace ours, with a blind Reſignation to an Authority which the Underſtanding of Man acknowledges not. For however it may often miſtake, it can own no other Guide but Reaſon, nor blindly ſubmit to the Will and Dictates of another. Thoſe who have fairly and truly examined, and are thereby got paſt Doubt in all the Doctrines they profeſs, and govern themſelves by, would have a juſter Pretence to require others to follow them: But theſe are ſo few in Number, and find ſo little Reaſon to be magiſterial in their Opinions, that nothing inſolent and imperious is to be expected from them: And there is Reaſon to think, that if Men were better inſtructed themſelves, they would be leſs impoſing on others.

But to return to the Grounds of Aſſent, and the ſeveral Degrees of it, we are to take Notice,

tice, that the Propositions we receive upon Inducements of *Probability*, are of *two Sorts*: *First*, concerning some particular Existence, or Matter of *Fact*, which falling under our Observation, is capable of *human Testimony*. *Secondly*, concerning Things, which being beyond the Discovery of our *Senses*, are not capable of human Testimony.

Concerning the first of these, *viz. Particular Matter of Fact.*

First, Where any particular Thing consonant to the constant Observation of ourselves and others in the like Case, comes attested with the concurrent Reports of all that mention it, we receive it as easily, and build as firmly upon it, as if it were certain Knowledge: And we reason and act thereupon with as little Doubt, as if it were perfect *Demonstration*. Thus, if all *Englishmen* who have occasion to mention it, should report, that it *froze* in *England* last Winter, or the like, I think a Man would as little doubt of it, as that *seven and four are eleven*.

The *First*, and *highest* Degree of *Probability* then is, when the general Consent of all Men, in all Ages, as far as can be known, concurs with a Man's own constant Experience in the like Cases, to confirm the Truth of any particular Matter of Fact, attested by fair Witnesses: Such are the stated *Constitutions* and *Properties* of Bodies, and the regular Proceedings of *Causes* and *Effects* in the ordinary Course of *Nature*; this we call an *Argument* from the Nature of Things themselves. For what we

and others always obſerve to be after the ſame Manner, we conclude with Reaſon, to be the Effects of ſteady and regular *Cauſes*, tho' they come not within the Reach of our Knowledge. As that Fire warmed a Man, or made *Lead fluid*; that *Iron* ſunk in Water, ſwam in Quickſilver. A Relation affirming any ſuch Thing to have been, or a Predication that it will happen again in the ſame Manner, is very true. Theſe Probabilities riſe ſo near to Certainty, that they govern our Thoughts as abſolutely, and influence all our Actions as fully, as the moſt evident Demonſtration; and in what concerns us, we make little or no Difference between them and certain Knowledge. Our *Belief* thus grounded, riſes to *Aſſurance*.

Secondly, The next Degree of *Probability* is, when by my own Experience, and the Agreement of all others that mention it, a *Thing* is found to be for the moſt Part ſo; and that the particular Inſtance of it is atteſted by many and undoubted *Witneſſes*. Thus *Hiſtory* giving us ſuch an Account of Men in all Ages, and my own Experience confirming it, that moſt Men prefer their own private Advantage to the Publick. If all Hiſtorians that writ of *Tiberius*, ſay that he did ſo, it is extremely probable: And in this Caſe, our *Aſſent* riſes to a Degree which we may call *Confidence*.

Thirdly, In Matters happening indifferently, as that, a *Bird* ſhould fly this or that Way: When any particular Matter of Fact comes atteſted by the concurrent Teſtimony of unſuſpected *Witneſſes*, there our *Aſſent* is alſo unavoidable.

voidable. Thus that there is in *Italy* ſuch a City as *Rome*; that about one thouſand and ſeven Years ago, there lived ſuch a Man in it as *Julius Cæſar*, &c. A Man can as little doubt of this, and the like, as he does of the Being and Actions of his own Acquaintance, whereof he himſelf is a Witneſs.

Probability, on theſe Grounds, carries ſo much Evidence with it, that it leaves us as little Liberty to believe or diſbelieve, as Demonſtration does, whether we will know or be ignorant. But the Difficulty is, when Teſtimonies contradict common Experience, and the Reports of Witneſſes claſh with the ordinary Courſe of Nature, or with one another. Here Diligence, Attention, and Exactneſs are required to form a *right Judgment*, and to proportion the *Aſſent* to the Evidence and *Probability* of the Thing, which riſes and falls, according as the two Foundations of Credibility favour, or contradict it. Theſe are liable to ſuch Variety of contrary Obſervations, Circumſtances, Reports, Tempers, Deſigns, Overſights, *&c.* of Reporters, that it is impoſſible to reduce to preciſe Rules, the various Degrees wherein Men give their *Aſſent*. This in general may be ſaid, That as the *Proofs* upon due Examination, ſhall to any one appear in a greater or leſs Degree, to preponderate on either Side, ſo they are fitted to produce in the Mind ſuch different Entertainments, as are called *Belief*, *Conjecture*, *Gueſs*, *Doubt*, *Wavering*, *Diſtruſt*, *Diſbelief*, &c.

It is a *Rule* generally approved, that any Teſtimony, the farther off it is removed from the

Original Truth, the less Force it has: And in *traditional* Truths, each Remove weakens the Force of the *Proof*. There is a *Rule* quite contrary to this, advanced by some Men, who look on *Opinions* to gain Force by growing *older*. Upon this Ground, Propositions evidently false or doubtful in their first Beginning, come by an inverted *Rule* of *Probability*, to pass for *authentick* Truths; and those which deserved little Credit from the Mouths of their first Relators, are thought to grow *venerable* by Age, and are urged as undeniable.

I would not be thought by this Remark to lessen the Credit and Use of History: It is all the Light we have in many Cases; and we receive from it a great Part of the useful Truths we have, with a convincing Evidence. I think nothing more valuable than the Records of Antiquity: I wish we had more of them, and more uncorrupted. But certain it is, that no *Probability can rise above its first Original*. What has no other Evidence than the single Testimony of *one Witness*, must stand or fall by his *only* Testimony, tho' afterwards cited by Hundreds of others; and is so far from receiving any Strength thereby, that it becomes the weaker. Because Passion, Interest, Inadvertency, Mistake of his Meaning, and a thousand odd Reasons, which capricious Mens Minds are acted by, may make one Man quote another's Words or Meaning wrong. This is certain, that what in one Age was affirmed upon slight Grounds, can never after come to be more valid in future Ages by being often repeated. But the farther still it is from the Original, the less valid it is, and has always

always less Force in the Mouth or Writing of him that last made Use of it, than in his from whom he received of it.

The Probabilities we have hitherto mentioned, are only such as concern Matter of Fact, and such Things as are capable of Observation and Testimony. There remains that other Sort, concerning which Men entertain Opinions with Variety of Assent, though the Things be such, that falling not under the Reach of our Senses, they are not capable of Testimony. Such are,

First, The Existence, Nature, and Operations of *finite*, *immaterial* Beings without us, as *Spirits*, *Angels*, &c. or the Existence of *material* Beings, such as for their Smallness or Remoteness, our *Senses* cannot take Notice of: As whether there be any *Plants*, *Animals*, &c. in the *Planets*, and other Mansions of the vast Universe.

Secondly, Concerning the Manner of Operations in most Parts of the Works of *Nature*; wherein tho' we see the sensible *Effects*, yet their Causes are unknown, and we perceive not the Ways, and Manner how they are produced. We see *Animals* are generated, nourished, and move; the *Loadstone* draws *Iron*, &c. but the Causes that operate, and the Manner they are produced in, we can only guess, and probably conjecture. In these Matters, *Analogy* is the only Help we have; and it is from that alone we draw all our Grounds of *Probability*. Thus observing, that the bare rubbing of two Bodies iolently upon one another, produces *Heat* and

very often *Fire*; we have reason to think that what we call *Heat* and *Fire*, consists, in a certain violent Agitation of the imperceptible minute Parts of the burning Matter. The Difference is exceeding great between some Men, and some Animals; but if we will compare the Understanding and Abilities of some Men, and some Brutes, we shall find so little Difference, that it will be hard to say, that that of the Man is either clearer or larger. Observing, I say, such gradual and gentle Descents downwards in those Parts of the Creation that are beneath Man, the Rule of Analogy may make it probable, that it is so also in Things above us and our Observation; and that there are several Ranks of intelligent Beings, excelling us in several Degrees of Perfection, ascending upwards towards the infinite Perfection of the Creator, by gentle Steps and Differences, that are every one at no great Distance from the next to it. This Sort of *Probability*, which is the best Conduct of rational Experiments, and the Rise of Hypothesis, has also its Use and Influence; and a wary Reasoning from *Analogy*, leads us often into the Discovery of *Truths*, and useful *Productions*, which would otherwise lie concealed.

Tho' the common Experience, and the ordinary Course of Things, have a mighty Influence on the Minds of Men, to make them give or refuse Credit to any Thing proposed to their Belief; yet there is one Case wherein the strangeness of the Fact lessens not the *Assent* to a fair Testimony given of it. For where such supernatural *Events* are suitable to Ends aimed at by him,

him, who has the Power to change the Course of Nature; *there under such Circumstances* they may be the fitter to procure Belief, by how much the more they are beyond, or contrary to ordinary Observation. This is the proper Case of *Miracles*, which well attested, do not only find Credit themselves, but give it also to other *Truths*, which need such Confirmation.

There are Propositions that challenge the highest Degree of our *Assent* upon bare Testimony, whether the Thing proposed agree or disagree with common Experience, and the ordinary Course of Things or no: The Reason whereof is, because the Testimony is of such *an one* as cannot deceive nor be deceived; and that is *God* himself. This carries with it Certainty beyond Doubt, Evidence beyond Exception. This is called by a peculiar Name, *Revelation*, and our *Assent* to it, *Faith*; which has as much Certainty in it, as our Knowledge itself; and we may as well doubt of our own *Being*, as we can, whether any *Revelation* from *God* be *true*. So that *Faith* is a settled and sure Principle of *Assent* and *Assurance*, and leaves no Manner of Room for Doubt or Hesitation; only we must be sure, that it be a divine *Revelation*, and that we understand it right; else we shall expose ourselves to all the Extravagancy of *Enthusiasm*, and all the Error of wrong Principles if we have *Faith* and *Assurance*, in what is not *divine Revelation*. And therefore, in those Cases our Assent can be rationally no higher than the Evidence of its being a Revelation, and that this is the Meaning of the Expressions it is delivered in. If the Evidence of its being a Revelation,

or that this is its true Sense, be only on probable Proofs, our Assent can reach no higher than an Assurance or Diffidence, arising from the more or less apparent Probability of the Proofs.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Reason.

THE Word *Reason* in the *English* Language has different Significations. Sometimes it is taken for *true* and *clear Principles*; sometimes for *clear* and *fair Deductions* from those Principles: Sometimes for the *Cause*, and particularly for the *final Cause*; but the Consideration I shall have of it here, is as it stands for a *Faculty*, whereby *Man* is supposed to be distinguished from *Beasts*; and wherein it is evident he much surpasses them.

If general Knowledge, as has been shewn, consists in a Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our own Ideas, and the Knowledge of the Existence of all Things without us, (except only of a God, whose Existence every Man may certainly know and demonstrate to himself from his own Existence) be had only by our Senses: What Room then is there for the Exercise of any other Faculty, but outward Sense, and inward Perception? What need is there of Reason? Very much; both for the Enlargement of our Knowledge, and regulating our Assent: For it hath to do both in Knowledge and Opinion, and is necessary and assisting

ing to all our other intellectual Faculties; and indeed, contains *two* of them, *viz. First, Sagacity*, whereby it finds intermediate *Ideas. Secondly, Illation*, whereby it so orders and disposes of them, as to discover what Connexion there is in each Link of the Chain, whereby the Extremes are held together, and thereby, as it were to draw into View the Truth sought for; which is what we call *Illation* or *Inference*: And consists in nothing but the Perception of the Connexion there is between the Ideas, in each Step of the Deduction, whereby the Mind comes to see, either the certain Agreement or Disagreement of any two Ideas, as in *Demonstration*, in which it arrives at Knowledge: Or their probable Connexion, on which it gives or withholds its *Assent*, as in *Opinion*.

Sense and *Intuition* reach but a little Way: The greatest Part of our Knowledge depends upon Deductions and intermediate Ideas. In those Cases where we must take Propositions for true, without being certain of their being so, we have need to find out, examine, and compare the Grounds of their *Probability*: In both Cases, the Faculty which finds out the Means, and rightly applies them to discover Certainty in the one, and Probability in the other, is that which we call *Reason*. For as Reason perceives the necessary and indubitable Connection of all the Ideas or Proofs one to another, in each Step of any Demonstration that produces Knowledge: So it likewise perceives the probable Connexion of all the Ideas or Proofs one to another, in every Step of a Discourse to which it will think Assent due. This is the lowest Degree of that which

can

can be truly called *Reason*. For where the Mind does not perceive this probable Connexion; where it does not discern whether there be any such Connexion or no, there Mens Opinions are not the Product of Judgment, or the Consequence of Reason, but the Effects of Chance and Hazard of a Mind floating at all Adventures, without Choice, and without Direction.

So that in Reason we may consider these *four* Degrees; *First*, The discovering and finding out of Proofs. *Secondly*, The regular and methodical Disposition of them, and laying them in such Order as their Connexion may be plainly perceived. *Thirdly*, The perceiving their Connexion. *Fourthly*, The making a right Conclusion. These several Degrees may be observed in any Mathematical Demonstration: It being one Thing to perceive the Connexion of each Part, as the Demonstration is made by another; another to perceive the Dependence of the Conclusion on all the Parts; a third to make out a Demonstration clearly and properly one's self; and something different from all these, to have first found out those intermediate Ideas or Proofs by which it is made.

There is one Thing more which I shall desire to be considered concerning *Reason*, and that is, whether *Syllogism*, as is generally thought, be the proper Instrument of it; and the most useful Way of exercising this Faculty. The Causes I have to doubt of it, are these,

First, Because *Syllogism* serves our *Reason* but in one only of the forementioned Parts of it, and

and that is to ſhew the Connexion of the Proofs of any one Inſtance, and no more: But in this it is of no great Uſe, ſince the Mind can perceive ſuch Connexion, where it really is, as eaſy, nay, perhaps better without it. We may obſerve that there are many Men that reaſon exceeding clear and rightly, who know not how to make a *Syllogiſm*: And I believe ſcarce any one makes *Syllogiſms* in reaſoning within himſelf. Indeed, ſometimes they may ſerve to diſcover a Fallacy, hid in a *Rhetorical* Flouriſh; or by ſtripping an Abſurdity of the Cover of Wit and good Language, ſhew it in its naked Deformity. But the Weakneſs or Fallacy of ſuch a looſe Diſcourſe, it ſhews, by the artificial Form it is put into, only to thoſe who have thoroughly ſtudied *Mode* and *Figure*, and have ſo examined the many Ways, that three Propoſitions may be put together, as to know which of them does certainly conclude right, and which not, and upon what Grounds it is that they do ſo. All who have ſo far conſidered *Syllogiſm*, as to ſee the Reaſon why, in three Propoſitions laid together in one Form, the Concluſion will be certainly right, but in another, not certainly ſo, I grant are certain of the Concluſions they draw from the Premiſſes in the allowed Modes and Figures. But they who have not ſo far looked into thoſe Forms, are not ſure, by Virtue of *Syllogiſm*, that the Concluſion certainly follows from the Premiſſes; they only take it to be ſo by an implicit Faith in their Teachers, and a Confidence in thoſe Forms of Argumentation; but this is ſtill but believing, not being certain. The Mind is not taught to reaſon by theſe *Rules*; it has a native Faculty to perceive the

the Coherence or Incoherence of its Ideas, and can range them right, without any ſuch perplexing *Repetitions*.

And to ſhew the Weakneſs of an Argument, there needs no more but to ſtrip it of the ſuperfluous Ideas which blended and confounded with thoſe on which the Inference depends, ſeem to ſhew a Connexion where there is none, or at leaſt do hinder the Diſcovery of the Want of it, and then to lay the naked Ideas on which the Force of the Argumentation depends in their due Order; in which Poſition the Mind taking a View of them, ſees what Connexion they have, and ſo is able to judge of the Inference without any Need of Syllogiſm at all.

Secondly, Becauſe Syllogiſms are not leſs liable to Fallacies than the plainer Ways of Argumentation: And for this I appeal to common Obſervation, which has always found theſe artificial Methods of reaſoning more adapted to catch and entangle the Mind, than to inſtruct and inform the Underſtanding. And if it be certain that Fallacy can be couched in Syllogiſms, as it cannot be denied, it muſt be ſomething elſe, and not Syllogiſm that muſt diſcover them. But if Men ſkilled in and uſed to Syllogiſms, find them aſſiſting to their Reaſon in the Diſcovery of Truth, I think they ought to make uſe of them. All that I aim at is, that they ſhould not aſcribe more to theſe Forms than belongs to them; and think that Men have no Uſe, or not ſo full a Uſe of their reaſoning Faculty without them.

But

But however it be in Knowledge, I think it is of far less, or no Use at all in *Probabilities:* For the *Assent* there being to be determined by the Preponderancy, after a due weighing of all the Proofs on both Sides, nothing is so unfit to assist the Mind in that, as *Syllogism*; which running away with one assumed *Probability*, pursues that till it has led the Mind quite out of Sight of the Thing under Consideration.

But let it help us (as perhaps may be said) *in convincing Men of their Errors or Mistakes*; yet still it fails our Reason in that Part, which if not its highest Perfection, is yet certainly its hardest Task; and that which we most need its help in, and that is, *The finding out of Proofs, and making new Discoveries.* The Rules of Syllogism serve not to furnish the Mind with those intermediate Ideas that may shew the Connection of remote ones. This Way of Reasoning discovers no new Proofs, but is the Art of marshalling and ranging the old ones we have already. The forty-seventh Proposition of the first Book of Euclid, is very true; but the Discovery of it, I think, not owing to any Rules of common Logic. A Man knows first, and then he is able to prove *syllogistically*; so that *Syllogism* comes after Knowledge; and then a Man has little or no Need of it. But it is chiefly by the finding out those Ideas that shew the Connection of distant ones, that our Stock of Knowledge is encreased, and that useful Arts and Sciences are advanced.

Reason

Reaſon, though it penetrates into the Depths of the Sea and Earth, elevates our Thoughts as high as the Stars, and leads us through the vaſt Spaces, and large Rooms of this mighty Fabric, yet it comes far ſhort of the real Extent of even corporeal Being; and there are many Inſtances wherein it fails us: As,

Firſt, It perfectly fails us where our Ideas fail. It neither does, nor can extend itſelf farther than they do. And therefore wherever we have no Ideas, our Reaſoning ſtops, and we are at an End of our Reckoning: And if at any Time we reaſon about Words, which do not ſtand for any Ideas, it is only about thoſe Sounds, and nothing elſe.

Secondly, It is often at a Loſs, becauſe of the Obſcurity, Confuſion, or Imperfection, of the Ideas it is employed about. Thus having no perfect Idea of the leaſt Extenſion of *Matter*, nor of *Infinity*, we are at a Loſs about the Diviſibility of *Matter*; but having perfect, clear, and diſtinct Ideas of Number, our Reaſon meets with none of thoſe inextricable Difficulties in Numbers, nor finds itſelf involved in any Contradictions about them.

Thirdly, Our *Reaſon* is often at a Stand, becauſe it perceives not thoſe Ideas which would ſerve to ſhew the certain or probable Agreement or Diſagreement of any other two Ideas: And in this ſome Mens Faculties far out-go others. Till Algebra, that great Inſtrument and Inſtance of human Sagacity, was diſcovered, Men, with Amazement, looked on ſeveral of the

the Demonſtrations of antient Mathematicians, and could ſcarce forbear to think the finding ſeveral of thoſe Proofs to be ſomething more than human.

Fourthly, Our *Reaſon* is often engaged in Abſurdities and Difficulties, by proceeding upon falſe Principles, which being followed, lead Men into Contradictions to themſelves, and Inconſiſtency in their own Thoughts.

Fifthly, As obſcure and imperfect Ideas often involve our Reaſon, ſo upon the ſame Ground, do dubious Words, and uncertain Signs, often in Diſcourſes and Arguing when not cautiouſly attended to puzzle Mens *Reaſon*, and bring them to a Nonplus: But theſe two latter are our Fault, and not the Fault of Reaſon. But yet the Conſequences of them are nevertheleſs obvious; and the Perplexities of Errors they fill Mens Minds with, are every where obſervable.

Some of the Ideas that are in the Mind, are ſo there, that they can be by themſelves immediately compared one with another: And in theſe the Mind is able to perceive, that they agree, or diſagree, as clearly as that it has them. Thus the Mind perceives, that an Arch of a Circle is leſs than the whole Circle, as clearly as it does the Idea of a Circle: And this therefore, as has been ſaid, I call *intuitive Knowledge*, which is certain, beyond all Doubt, and needs no Probation, nor can have any; this being the higheſt of all human Certainty. In this conſiſts the Evidence of all thoſe Maxims which no Body has any Doubt about, but every Man (does not, as

as is ſaid, only aſſent to, but) knows to be true, as ſoon as ever they are propoſed to his Underſtanding. In the Diſcovery of, and Aſſent to theſe Truths, there is no Uſe of the diſcurſive Faculty, no Need of Reaſoning, but they are known by a ſuperior, and higher Degree of Evidence. And ſuch, if I may gueſs at Things unknown, I am apt to think, that Angels have now, and the Spirits of juſt Men made perfect, ſhall have in a future State, of Thouſands of Things, which now either wholly eſcape our Apprehenſions, or which, our ſhort-ſighted Reaſon having got ſome faint Glimpſe of, we, in the dark, grope after.

But though we have here and there a little of this clear Light, ſome Sparks of bright Knowledge; yet the greateſt Part of our Ideas are ſuch, that we cannot diſcern their Agreement or Diſagreement, by an immediate comparing them. And in all theſe we have Need of Reaſoning, and muſt, by Diſcourſe and Inference, make our Diſcoveries. Now, of theſe there are two Sorts, which I ſhall take the Liberty to mention here again:

Firſt, Thoſe whoſe Agreement or Diſagreement, though it cannot be ſeen by an immediate putting them together, yet may be examined by the Intervention of other Ideas, which can be compared with them. In this Caſe, when the Agreement or Diſagreement of the intermediate Idea, on both Sides with thoſe which we would compare, is plainly diſcerned, there it amounts to Demonſtration, whereby Knowledge is produced, which though it be certain,

tain, yet it is not ſo eaſy, nor altogether ſo clear, as intuitive Knowledge; becauſe in that there is barely one ſimple Intuition, wherein there is no Room for any the leaſt Miſtake or Doubt; the Truth is ſeen all perfectly at once. In Demonſtration, it is true, there is Intuition too, but not altogether at once; for there muſt be a Remembrance of the Intuition of the Agreement of the Medium, or intermediate Idea, with that we compared it with before, when we compare it with the other; and where there are many Mediums, there the Danger of the Miſtake is the greater. For each Agreement or Diſagreement of the Ideas muſt be obſerved and ſeen in each Step of the whole Train, and retained in the Memory, juſt as it is, and the Mind muſt be ſure that no Part of what is neceſſary to make up the Demonſtration, is omitted or overlooked. This makes ſome Demonſtrations long and perplexed, and too hard for thoſe who have not Strength of Parts diſtinctly to perceive, and exactly carry ſo many Particulars orderly in their Heads. And even thoſe, who are able to maſter ſuch intricate Speculations, are fain ſometimes to go over them again, and there is Need of more than one Review before they can arrive at Certainty. But yet where the Mind clearly retains the Intuition it had of the Agreement of any Idea with another, and that with a third, and that with a fourth, *&c.* there the Agreement of the firſt and fourth is a Demonſtration, and produces certain Knowledge, which may be called *rational Knowledge*, as the other is *intuitive*.

Secondly,

Secondly, There are other Ideas, whose Agreement or Disagreement can no otherwise be judged of, but by the Intervention of others, which have not a certain Agreement with the Extremes, but an usual or likely one: And in these it is, that the Judgment is properly exercised, which is the acquiescing of the Mind, that any Ideas do agree, by comparing them with such probable Mediums. This, though it never amounts to Knowledge, no, not to that which is the lowest Degree of it; yet sometimes the intermediate Ideas tye the Extremes so firmly together, and the Probability is so clear and strong, that Assent as necessarily follows it, as Knowledge does Demonstration. The great Excellency and Use of the Judgment is to observe right, and take a true Estimate of the Force and Weight of each Probability; and then casting them up all right together, chuse that Side which has the over-balance.

Intuitive Knowledge is the Perception of the certain Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas, immediately compared together.

Rational Knowledge is the Perception of the certain Agreement or Disagreement of any two Ideas, by the Intervention of one or more other Ideas.

Judgment is the thinking or taking two Ideas to agree or disagree by the Intervention of one or more Ideas, whose certain Agreement or Disagreement with them it does not perceive, but hath observed to be frequent and usual.

Tho'

Tho' the deducing one Proposition from another be a great Part of *Reason*, and that which it is usually employed about; yet the principal Act of Ratiocination is the finding the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas one with another, by the Intervention of a third. As a Man, by a Yard, finds two Houses to be of the same Length, which could not be brought together to measure their Equality by *Juxta-position*. Words have their Consequences as the Signs of such Ideas; and Things agree, or disagree, as really they are; but we observe it only by our Ideas.

In Reasoning, Men ordinarily use *Four Sorts* of *Arguments*.

The *First*, is to alledge the Opinions of Men, whose Parts, Learning, Eminency, Power, or some other Cause, has gained a Name, and settled their Reputation in the common Esteem, with some Kind of Authority. This may be called *Argumentum ad Verecundiam*.

Secondly, Another Way that Men ordinarily use to drive others, and force them to submit their Judgments, and receive the Opinion in Debate, is to require the Adversary to admit what they alledge as a Proof, or to assign a better. This I call *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam*.

A *Third* Way, is to press a Man with Consequences drawn from his own Principles or Concessions This is already known under the Name of *Argumentum ad hominem*.

Fourthly,

Fourthly, The using of Proofs drawn from any of the Foundations of Knowledge or Probability. This I call *Argumentum ad Judicium*. This alone of all the Four, brings true Instruction with it, and advances us in our Way to Knowledge. For *First*, It argues not another Man's Opinion to be right, because I, out of Respect, or any other Consideration but that of Conviction, will not contradict him. *Secondly*, It proves not another Man to be in the right Way, nor that I ought to take the same with him, because I know not a better. *Thirdly*, Nor does it follow, that another Man is in the right Way, because he has shewn me that I am in the wrong. I may be modest, and therefore not oppose another Man's Persuasion; I may be ignorant, and not be able to produce a better; I may be in an Error, and another may shew me that I am so. This may dispose me perhaps for the Reception of Truth, but helps me not to it; that must come from *Proofs* and *Arguments*, and Light arising from the Nature of Things themselves; not from my Shame-facedness, Ignorance, or Error.

By what has been said of *Reason*, we may be able to make some guess at the Distinction of Things, into those that are according to, above, and contrary to *Reason*. *According to Reason*, are such Propositions, whose Truth we can discover, by examining and tracing those Ideas we have from *Sensation* and *Reflection*, and by natural Deduction find to be true or probable. *Above Reason*, are such Propositions, whose *Truth* or *Probability* we cannot by *Reason* derive from those

thoſe Principles. *Contrary to Reaſon*, are ſuch Propoſitions as are inconſiſtent with, or irreconcileable to, our clear and diſtinct *Ideas*. Thus the *Exiſtence of one God*, is according to *Reaſon:* The *Exiſtence of more than one God*, contrary to *Reaſon:* The *Reſurrection of the Body* after Death, above *Reaſon*. *Above Reaſon*, may be alſo taken in a double Senſe, *viz. Above Probability*, or *Certainty* In that large Senſe alſo, *contrary to Reaſon*, is, I ſuppoſe, ſometimes taken.

There is another Uſe of the Word *Reaſon*, wherein it is oppoſed to *Faith*; which, though authoriſed by common Uſe, yet is in itſelf a very improper Way of Speaking: For *Faith* is nothing but a firm *Aſſent* of the Mind; which if it be regulated as is our Duty, cannot be afforded to any Thing but upon good *Reaſon*, and ſo cannot be oppoſite to it. He that believes without having any Reaſon for believing, may be in Love with his own Fancies; but neither ſeeks *Truth* as he ought, nor pays the Obedience due to his Maker, who wou d have him uſe thoſe diſcerning Faculties, he has given him, to keep him out of Miſtake and Error. He that does not this to the beſt of his Power, however he ſometimes lights on Truth, is in the Right but by Chance; and I know not whether the Luckineſs of the Accident will excuſe the Irregularity of his Proceeding. This at leaſt is certain, that he muſt be accountable for whatever Miſtakes he runs into; whereas he that makes Uſe of the Light and Faculties God has given him, and ſeeks ſincerely to diſcover Truth by thoſe Helps and Abilities he has, may

have

have this Satisfaction in doing his Duty as a rational Creature, that though he ſhould miſs Truth, he will not miſs the Reward of it: For he governs his Aſſent right, and places it as he ſhould, who in any Caſe or Matter whatſoever, believes or diſbelieves according as *Reaſon* directs him. He that does otherwiſe, tranſgreſſes againſt his own Light, and miſuſes thoſe Faculties which were given him to no other End, but to ſearch and follow the clearer Evidence, and greater Probability. But ſince *Reaſon* and *Faith* are by ſome Men oppoſed, we will ſo conſider them in the following *Chapter*.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Faith and Reaſon, and their diſtinct Provinces.

FROM what has been juſt related, it is evident, 1. That we are of Neceſſity ignorant, and want Knowledge of all Sorts, where we want Ideas. 2. That we are ignorant, and want rational Knowledge, where we want Proofs. 3. That we want general Knowledge and Certainty, as far as we want clear and determined ſpecific Ideas. 4. That we want Probability to direct our Aſſent in Matters where we have neither Knowledge of our own, nor Teſtimony of other Men to ground our Reaſon upon.

From theſe Things thus premiſed, I think we may come to lay down the Meaſures and Boundaries between Faith and Reaſon: The Want whereof may poſſibly have been the Cauſe,

Cause, if not of great Disorders, yet at least of great Disputes, and perhaps Mistakes in the World: For till it be resolved how far we are to be guided by Reason, and how far by Faith, we shall in vain dispute, and endeavour to convince one another in Matters of Religion.

I find every Sect, as far as Reason will help them, make use of it gladly; and where it fails them, they cry out, *It is Matter of Faith, and above Reason.* And I do not see how they can argue with any one, or ever convince a Gainsayer, who makes Use of the same Plea, without setting down strict Boundaries between Faith and Reason, which ought to be the first Point established in all Questions, where Faith has any Thing to do.

Reason, as opposed to *Faith*, I take to be the Discovery of the *Certainty* or *Probability* of such Propositions or Truths which the Mind arrives at by Deductions made from such *Ideas*, which it has got by the Use of its natural Faculties, *viz.* by *Sensation* or *Reflection*.

Faith, on the other Side, is the Assent to any Proposition, not thus made out by the Deductions of Reason, but upon the Credit of the Proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary Way of Communication. This Way of discovering Truths to Men, we call *Revelation*.

First, That *no Man inspired by* God, *can by any Revelation communicate to others, any new* simple Idea, which they had not before from

Sensation or *Reflection*: For whatsoever Impressions he himself may have from the immediate Hand of God, this Revelation, if it be of new simple Ideas, cannot be conveyed to another, either by Words, or any other Signs, for Words, by their immediate Operation on us, cause no other Ideas but of their natural Sounds; and as *Signs* of latent Ideas they can only recal to our Thoughts those Ideas, which to us they have been wont to be Signs of; but cannot introduce any new, and formerly unknown simple Ideas. The same holds good in all other *Signs*, which cannot signify to us Things of which we never before had any Idea.

Thus whatever Things were discovered to St. Paul when he was taken up into the third Heaven, whatever new Ideas his Mind there received, all the Description he could give to others of that Place, was only this, that there are such Things *as Eye hath not seen, nor Ear heard, nor hath it entered into the Heart of Man to conceive.* The great Creator has limited the human Species of this lower World to five Senses, it cannot be supposed as an Impossibility that others of his Creatures else where Inhabitants, may be endowed with an additional Sense, of whose Perception we cannot have any Conception; as for our simple Ideas we must depend for them wholly upon our natural Faculties, and can by no Means receive them from *traditional Revelation*; I say *traditional*, in Distinction to *original Revelation*. By the *one*, I mean that Impression which is made immediately by God on the Mind of any Man, to which we cannot set any Bounds. And by the *other*, those Impressions deliver-

delivered over to others in Words, and the ordinary Ways of conveying our Conceptions one to another.

Secondly, I ſay, that *the ſame Truths may be diſcovered by Revelation, which are diſcoverable to us by Reaſon*; but in ſuch there is little Occaſion for or Uſe of *Revelation*; God having furniſhed us with natural Means to arrive at the Knowledge of them: And Truths diſcovered by our natural Faculties, are more certain, than when conveyed to us by *traditional Revelation*. For the Knowledge we have, that this *Revelation* came at firſt from God, can never be ſo ſure as the Knowledge we have from the clear and diſtinct Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of our own Ideas. This alſo holds in Matters of Fact, knowable by our Senſes: As the *Hiſtory* of the *Deluge* is conveyed to us by Writings, which had their Original from *Revelation*; and yet no Body, I think, will ſay he has as certain and clear Knowledge of the *Flood*, as *Noah* that ſaw it, or that he himſelf would have had, had he then been alive and ſeen it. For he has no greater Aſſurance, than that of his *Senſes*, that it is written in the Book ſuppoſed to have been written by *Moſes* when inſpired. But he has not ſo great an Aſſurance that *Moſes* wrote that Book, as if he had ſeen *Moſes* write it; ſo that the Aſſurance of its being a *Revelation*, is ſtill leſs than the Aſſurance of his *Senſes*.

Revelation cannot be admitted againſt the clear Evidence of *Reaſon*. For ſince no Evidence of our Faculties, by which we receive ſuch a *Revelation*, can exceed, if equal the

Certainty of our *intuitive* Knowledge; we can never receive for a Truth any Thing that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct Knowledge. Thus the Ideas of *one Body* and *one Place*, do so clearly agree, that we can never assent to a Proposition that affirms *the same Body to be in two distinct Places at once*; however, it should pretend to the Authority of a divine Revelation: Since the Evidence, *First*, That we deceive not ourselves in ascribing it to *God*: *Secondly*, That we understand it right, can never be so great as the Evidence of our own *intuitive* Knowledge, whereby we discern it impossible for *the same Body to be in two Places at once*.

In Propositions therefore, contrary to our distinct and clear Ideas, it will be in vain to urge them as Matters of Faith. For Faith can never convince us of any Thing that contradicts our Knowledge. Because, though Faith be founded upon the Testimony of *God*, who cannot lie, yet we cannot have an Assurance of the Truth of its being a *divine Revelation*, greater than our own Knowledge. For if the Mind of Man can never have a clearer Evidence of any Thing to be a *divine Revelation*, than it has of the Principles of its own Reason; it can never have a Ground to quit the clear Evidence of its Reason, to give Place to a Proposition, whose *Revelation* has not a greater Evidence than those Principles have.

In all Things therefore where we have clear Evidence from our Ideas, and the Principles of Knowledge just mentioned, *Reason* is the proper Judge; and *Revelation* cannot in such Cases invalidate

validate its Decrees; nor can we be obliged, where we have the clear and evident Sentence of Reason, to quit it for the contrary Opinion, under a Pretence that it is *Matter of Faith*, which can have no Authority against the plain and clear Dictates of *Reason*. But,

Thirdly, There being many Things of which we have but imperfect Notions, or none at all; and other Things, of whose past, present, or further Existence, by the natural Use of our Faculties, we can have no Knowledge at all: These being beyond the *Discovery of our Faculties, and above Reason*, when revealed become the *proper Matter of Faith*. Thus, that Part of the Angels rebelled against *God*, and thereby lost their first happy State; that the Bodies of Men shall rise and live again, and the like, are purely Matters of Faith, with which Reason has directly nothing to do.

But since God in giving us the Light of Reason has not thereby debarred himself from affording us, when he thinks fit, the Light of Revelation in any of those Matters, wherein our natural Faculties are able to give a probable Determination; *Revelation*, where God has been pleased to give it, must carry it against the probable Conjectures of Reason, because the Mind, not being certain of the Truth of that it does not evidently know, but only yielding to the Probability that appears in it, is bound to give up its Assent to such a Testimony; which, it is satisfied, comes from one who cannot err, and will not deceive. But yet it still belongs to *Reason*, to judge of the Truth of its being a Reve-

lation, and of the Signification of the Words wherein it is delivered. Indeed, if any Thing ſhall be thought Revelation, which is contrary to the plain Principles of Reaſon, and the evident Knowledge the Mind has of its own clear and diſtinct Ideas, there Reaſon muſt be hearkened to, as to a Matter within its Province. Since a Man can never have ſo certain a Knowledge, that a Propoſition, which contradicts the clear Principles and Evidence of his own Knowledge, was divinely revealed, or that he underſtands the Words rightly, wherein it is delivered, as he has, that the contrary is true; and ſo is bound to conſider and judge of it as a Matter of Reaſon, and not implicitly believe, as a Matter of Faith, without Examination.

Firſt then, Whatever Propoſition is revealed, of whoſe Truth our Mind, by its natural Faculties and Notions cannot judge, that is purely Matter of Faith and above Reaſon.

Secondly, All Propoſitions, whereof the Mind by its natural Faculties, can come to determine and judge from natural acquired Ideas, are *Matter of Reaſon*; but with this Difference; that in thoſe concerning which it has but an uncertain Evidence, and ſo is perſuaded of their Truth only upon probable Grounds, which ſtill admit a Poſſibility of the contrary to be true, without doing Violence to the certain Evidence of its own Knowledge, and overturning the Principles of all Reaſon, in ſuch probable Propoſitions; I ſay, an *evident Revelation ought to determine our Aſſent*, even againſt *Probability*. For where the Principles of Reaſon have not evidenced a Propoſition

position to be certainly true or false, there clear Revelation, as another Principle of Truth, and Ground of Assent, may determine; and so it may be *Matter* of *Faith*, and be also above Reason, because Reason, in that particular Matter, being able to reach no higher than Probability, *Faith* gave the Determination where *Reason* came short; and *Revelation* discovered on which Side the Truth lay.

Thus far the Dominion of Faith reaches; and that without any Violence to *Reason*, which is not injured or disturbed, but assisted and improved by new Discoveries of Truth, coming from the *eternal Fountain* of all Knowledge. Whatever *God* hath revealed is certainly true; no Doubt can be made of it. This is the proper Object of *Faith*: But whether it be a divine Revelation or no, *Reason* must judge; which can never permit the Mind to reject a greater Evidence, to embrace what is less evident, nor prefer less Certainty to the greater. There can be no Evidence, that any traditional *Revelation* is of divine Original, in the Words we receive it, and the Sense we understand it, so clear and so certain, as that of the Principles of *Reason*: And therefore, *Nothing that is contrary to the clear and self-evident Dictates of* Reason, *has a Right to be urged or assented to, as a Matter of Faith, wherein* Reason *has not any thing to do.* Whatsoever is divine *Revelation*, ought to overrule all our Opinions, Prejudices and Interests, and hath a Right to be received with a full *Assent*. Such a Submission as this, of our *Reason* to *Faith*, takes not away the Land-marks of Knowledge: This shakes not the Foundation of Reason, but

leaves us that Use of our Faculties, for which they were given us.

If the Provinces of *Faith* and *Reason* are not kept distinct by these Boundaries, there will, in Matters of Religion, be no Room for Reason at all; and those extravagant Opinions and Ceremonies, that are to be found in the several Religions of the World, will not deserve to be blamed. For, to this crying up of Faith, in Opposition to Reason, we may, I think, in good Measure, ascribe those Absurdities that fill almost all the Religions which possess and divide Mankind. For Men having been principled with an Opinion, that they must not consult Reason in the Things of Religion, however apparently contradictory to common Sense, and the very Principles of all their Knowledge, have let loose their Fancies, and natural Superstition; and have been, by them, led into so strange Opinions, and extravagant Practices in Religion, that a considerate Man cannot but stand amazed at their Follies, and judge them so far from being acceptable to the great and wise God, that he cannot avoid thinking them ridiculous, and offensive to a sober good Man. So that, in Effect, Religion, which should most distinguish us from Beasts, and ought most peculiarly to elevate us, as rational Creatures, above Brutes, is that wherein Men often appear most irrational, and more senseless than Beasts themselves. *Credo, quia impossibile est: I believe, because it is impossible*, might, in a good Man, pass for a Sally of Zeal; but would prove a very ill Rule for Men to chuse their Opinions, or Religion by.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Enthusiasm.

HE that would seriously set about the Search of Truth, ought in the first Place to prepare his Mind with a Love of it. For he that loves it not, will not take much Pains to acquire it, nor be much concerned when he loses it. There is no one who does not profess himself a Lover of Truth, and that would not take it amiss to be thought otherwise. And yet notwithstanding one may truly say, there are very few Lovers of Truth for Truth's Sake, even amongst those who persuade themselves that they are so. How a Man may know whether he be so in earnest, is worthy Enquiry: And I think there is this one unerring Mark of it, *viz.* The not entertaining any Proposition with greater Assurance than the Proofs it is built upon will warrant. Whoever goes beyond this Measure of Assent, 'tis plain receives not Truth in the Love of it: For the Evidence that any Proposition is true (except such as are self-evident) lying only in the Proofs a Man has of it, whatever Degrees of Assent he affords it, beyond the Degrees of that Evidence, 'tis plain all the Assurances that exceed this is owing to some other Affection, and not to the Love of Truth. Whatever Credit we give to any Proposition more than it receives from the Principles and Proofs it supports itself upon, is owing to our Inclinations that Way, and is so far a Deviation from the Love of Truth as

ſuch: Which as it can receive no Evidence from our Paſſions or Intereſts, ſo it ſhould receive no Tincture from them.

The aſſuming an Authority of Dictating to others, and a Forwardneſs to preſcribe to their Opinions, is a conſtant Concomitant of this Bias and Corruption of our Judgments. For how can it be otherwiſe, but that he ſhould be ready to impoſe on another's Belief, who has already impoſed on his own? Who can reaſonably expect Arguments and Conviction from him, in Dealing with others, whoſe Underſtanding is not accuſtomed to them in his Dealing with himſelf? Who does Violence to his own Faculties, tyrannizes over his own Mind, and uſurps the Prerogative that belongs to Truth alone, which is to command Aſſent by only its own Authority, *i. e.* by and in Proportion to that Evidence which it carries with it.

Upon this Occaſion I ſhall conſider a third Ground of Aſſent, which with ſome Men has the ſame Authority as either *Faith* or *Reaſon*, I mean, *Enthuſiaſm*; which laying aſide *Reaſon*, would ſet up Revelation without it. Whereby in Effect it takes away both Reaſon and Revelation, and ſubſtitutes in the Room of it, the ungrounded Fancies of a Man's own Brain, and aſſumes them for a Foundation both of Opinion and Conduct.

Reaſon is natural Revelation, whereby the eternal Father of Light, and Fountain of all Knowledge, communicates to Mankind that Portion of Truth which he has laid within the Reach

Reach of their natural Faculties. Revelation is natural Reason enlarged by a new Set of Discoveries communicated by God immediately, which Reason vouches the Truth of, by the Testimony and Proofs it gives, that they come from God. So that he that takes away Reason, to make Way for Revelation, puts out the Light of both, and does much the same, as if he would persuade a Man to put out his Eyes, the better to receive the Light of an invisible Star by a Telescope.

Immediate Revelation being a much easier Way for Men to establish their Opinions, and regulate their Conduct, than the tedious Labour of strict Reasoning, it is no Wonder that some have been very apt to pretend to it; especially in such of their Actions and Opinions as they cannot account for by the ordinary Methods of Knowledge and Principles of Reason. Hence we see that in all Ages, Men in whom Melancholy has mixed with Devotion, or whose Conceit of themselves has raised them into an Opinion of a greater Familiarity with God than is allowed others, have often flattered themselves with a Persuasion of an immediate Intercourse with the Almighty, and frequent Communications from the Divine Spirit. Their Minds being thus prepared, whatever Opinion however so groundless comes to settle strongly upon their Fancies, is an Illumination from the Spirit of God; and whatsoever odd Action they find in themselves a strong Inclination to do, that Impulse is concluded to be a Call or Direction from Heaven, and must be obeyed. This I take to be properly *Enthusiasm*, which though rising from the

the Conceit of a warm or overweening Brain, works, where it once gets Footing, more powerfully on the Persuasions and Actions of Men, than either Reason or Revelation, or both together; Men being most forwardly obedient to the Impulses they receive from themselves. Strong Conceit, like a new Principle, carries all easily with it; when got above common Sense, and free from all Restraint of Reason, and Check of Reflection, it is heightened into a divine Authority, in Concurrence with our own Temper and Inclination.

When Men are once got into this Way of immediate Revelation, of Illumination without Search, and of Certainty without Proof, 'tis a hard Matter to get them out of it. Reason is lost upon them, they are above it: They see the *Light* infused into their Understandings, and cannot be mistaken; 'tis clear and visible there, like the Light of bright Sun-shine; shews itself, and needs no other Proof, but its own Evidence: They feel the Hand of God moving them within, and the Impulses of the Spirit, and cannot be mistaken in what they feel. Thus they support themselves, and are sure Reason hath nothing to do with what they see and feel in themselves; what they have a sensible Experience of, admits no Doubt, and needs no other Evidence. This Light from Heaven is strong, clear, and pure; carries its own Demonstration with it; and we may as rationally take a Glow-worm to assist us to discover the Sun, as to examine the celestial Ray by our dim Candle, Reason.

This

This is the Way of talking of these Men; they are sure *because* they are sure: And their Persuasions are right, only because they are strong in them. For when what they say is stripped of the Metaphor of seeing and feeling, this is all it amounts to; and yet these Similies so impose on them, that they serve them for Certainty in themselves, and Demonstration to others.

But to examine a little soberly this internal Light, and this Feeling on which they build so much. These Men have, they say, clear Light, and they see; They have an awakened Sense, and they feel: This cannot, they are sure, be disputed them. But here let me ask: Is this seeing the Perception of the Truth of the Proposition, or of this, that it is a Revelation from God? Is this Feeling a Perception of an Inclination to do something, or of the Spirit of God moving that Inclination? These are two very different Perceptions, and must be carefully distinguished. I may perceive the Truth of a Proposition, and yet not perceive that it is an immediate Revelation from God. Nay I may perceive I came not by it in a natural Way, without perceiving that it is a Revelation from God. Because there are Spirits, which without being divinely commissioned, may excite those Ideas in me, and make their Connection perceived. So that the Knowledge of any Proposition coming into my Mind I know not how, is not a Perception that it is from God. But however it be called Light and Seeing; I suppose it is at most but Belief and Assurance. For where a Pro-

a Propoſition is known to be true, Revelation is needleſs. If therefore it be a Propoſition which they are perſuaded, but do not know to be true, it is not ſeeing but believing. What I ſee, I know to be ſo by the Evidence of the Thing itſelf: What I believe, I take to be ſo upon the Teſtimony of another: But this Teſtimony I muſt know to be given, or elſe what Ground have I of believing? I muſt ſee that it is God that reveals this to me, or elſe I ſee nothing. The Queſtion then here is, how do I know that God is the Revealer of this to me; that this Impreſſion is made upon my Mind by his holy Spirit, and that therefore I ought to obey it? If I know not this, how great ſoever my Aſſurance is, it is groundleſs: Whatever Light I pretend to, it is but *Enthuſiaſm*. For whether the Propoſition ſuppoſed to be revealed, be in itſelf evidently true, or viſibly probable, or by the natural Ways of Knowledge uncertain, the Propoſition that muſt be well-grounded, and manifeſted to be true, is this, that God is the Revealer of it, and that what I take to be a Revelation, is certainly put into my Mind by him, and is not an Iluſion, dropped in by ſome other Spirit, or raiſed by my own Fancy. For if I miſtake not, theſe Men receive it for true, becauſe they preſume God revealed it. Is it not then incumbent upon them, to examine upon what Grounds they preſume it to be a Revelation from God? Or elſe all their Confidence is mere Preſumption; and this Light they are ſo dazzled with, is nothing but an *ignis fatuus*, that leads them continually round in this Circle. It is a Revelation, becauſe they firmly believe it; and they believe it, becauſe it is a Revelation.

In

In all that is of divine Revelation, there is Need of no other Proof, but that it is from God: For he can neither deceive nor be deceived. But how ſhall it be known that any Propoſition in our Minds is a Truth revealed to us by God? Here it is that *Enthuſiaſm* fails of the Evidence it pretends to. For Men thus poſſeſſed boaſt of a Light, whereby they ſay they are brought into the Knowledge of this or that Truth. But if they know it to be a Truth, they muſt know it to be ſo, either by its own Self Evidence, or by the rational Proofs that make it out to be ſo. If they know it to be a Truth either of theſe two Ways, they in vain ſuppoſe it to be a Revelation. For thus all Truths of what Kind ſoever, that Men uninſpired are enlightened with, come into their Minds. If they ſay they know it to be true, becauſe it is a Revelation from God, the Reaſon is good: But then it will be demanded, how they know it to be a Revelation from God. If they ſay by the Light it brings with it, I beſeech them to conſider, whether this be any more, than that it is a Revelation becauſe they ſtrongly believe it to be true. For all the Light they ſpeak of, is but a ſtrong Perſuaſion of their own Minds that it is a Truth, which is a very unſafe Ground to proceed on, either in our Tenets or Actions.

This cannot be otherwiſe, whilſt Firmneſs of Perſuaſion is made the Cauſe of believing, and Confidence of being in the right, is made an Argument of Truth. St. Paul himſelf believed he did well, and that he had a Call to it when he perſecuted the Chriſtians, whom he confident-

ly

ly thought in the wrong: But yet it was he, and not they, who were mistaken. Good Men are Men still, liable to Mistakes, and are sometimes warmly engaged in Errors, which they take for divine Truths, shining in their Minds with the clearest Light.

True Light in the Mind is nothing else but the *Evidence* of the Truth of any Proposition; And if it be not self-evident, all the Light it can have is from Clearness of those Proofs upon which it is received. To talk of any other Light in the Understanding, is to put ourselves in the Dark, or in the Power of the Prince of Darkness, and by our own Consent, to give ourselves up to Delusion, to believe a Lye: For if Strength of Persuasion be the Light which must guide us, I ask how shall any one distinguish between the Delusions of *Satan*, and the Inspirations of the Holy Ghost? He therefore that will not give up himself to Delusion and Error, must bring this Guide of his *Light within* to the Tryal. God when he makes the Prophet, does not unmake the Man. He leaves his Faculties in their natural State, to enable him to judge of his Inspirations, whether they be of divine Original or no. If he would have us assent to the Truth of any Proposition, he either evidences that Truth by the usual Methods of natural Reason, or else makes it known to be a Truth which he would have us assent to by his Authority; and convinces us that it is from him, by some Marks, which Reason cannot be mistaken in. Reason must be our last Judge and Guide in every Thing. I do not mean that we must consult Reason, and examine whether a Pro-

Propoſition revealed from God can be made out by natural Principles, and if it cannot, that then we may reject it: But conſult it we muſt, and by it examine, whether it be a Revelation from God or no; and if Reaſon finds it to be revealed from God, Reaſon then declares for it, as much as for any other Truth, and makes it one of her Dictates. Every Conceit that thoroughly warms our Fancies muſt paſs for an Inſpiration, if there be nothing but the Strength of our Perſuaſions whereby to judge of them: If Reaſon muſt not examine their Truth by ſomething extrinſical to the Perſuaſions themſelves, Inſpirations and Deluſions, Truth and Falſhood, will have the ſame Meaſure, and will not be poſſible to be diſtinguiſhed.

If this internal Light, or any Propoſition which under that Title we take for inſpired, be conformable to the Principles of Reaſon, or to the Word of God, which is atteſted Revelation, Reaſon warrants it, and we may ſafely receive it for true, and be guided by it in our Belief and Actions: If it receives no Teſtimony nor Evidence from either of theſe Rules, we cannot take it for a Revelation, or ſo much as for true, till we have ſome other Mark that it is a Revelation, beſides our believing that it is ſo. Thus we ſee the holy Men of God, who had Revelations from God, had ſomething elſe beſides that internal Light of Aſſurance in their own Minds, to teſtify to them that it was from God. They had outward Signs to convince them of the Author of thoſe Revelations. And when they were to convince others, they had a Power given them to juſtify the Truth of their Com-

Commiſſion from Heaven; and by viſible Signs to aſſert the divine Authority of the Meſſage they were ſent with. *Moſes* ſaw the Buſh burn without being conſumed, and heard a Voice out of it. God by another Miracle of his Rod turned into a Serpent, aſſured him likewiſe of a Power to teſtify his Miſſion by the ſame Miracle repeated before them, to whom he was ſent. This, and the like Inſtances to be found among the Prophets of old, are enough to ſhew, that they thought not an inward Seeing or Perſuaſion of their own Minds a ſufficient Evidence without any other Proof, that it was from God, though the *Scripture* does not every where mention their demanding or having ſuch Proofs.

I do not deny that God can, or doth ſometimes enlighten Mens Minds in the apprehending of certain Truths, or excite them to good Actions by the immediate Influence and Aſſiſtance of the Holy Spirit, without any extraordinary Signs accompanying it. But in ſuch Caſes too we have Reaſon and the Scriptures, unerring Rules to know whether it be from God or no. Where the Truth embraced is conſonant to the Revelation in the written Word of God; or the Action conformable to the Dictates of right Reaſon, or Holy Writ, we run no Riſque in entertaining it as ſuch; becauſe tho' perhaps it be not an immediate Revelation from God, extraordinarily operating on our Minds, yet we are ſure it is warranted by that Revelation which he has given us of Truth. Where Reaſon or Scripture is expreſs for any Opinion or Action, we may receive it as of divine Authority: But 'tis not the Strength of our own Perſuaſions

which

which can by itſelf give it that Stamp. The Bent of our own Minds may favour it as much as we pleaſe; that may ſhew it to be a Fondling of our own, but will by no Means prove it to be an *Offspring* of Heaven, and of divine Original.

CHAP. XX.

Of wrong Aſſent or Error.

KNOWLEDGE being to be had only of viſible certain Truth, *Error* is not a Fault of our Knowledge, but a Miſtake of our Judgment, in giving *Aſſent* to that which is not true.

But if *Aſſent* be grounded on Likelihood, if the proper Object and Motive of our *Aſſent* be Probability, and that Probability conſiſts in what is laid down in the foregoing Chapters, it will be demanded, how Men come to give their *Aſſent* contrary to Probability. For there is nothing more common than Contrariety of Opinions; nothing more obvious, than that one Man wholly diſbelieves what another only doubts of, and a third ſtedfaſtly believes, and firmly adheres to. The Reaſons whereof, though they may be very various, yet, I ſuppoſe, may all be reduced to theſe four; Firſt, *Want of Proofs.* Secondly, *Want of Ability to uſe them.* Thirdly, *Want of Will to uſe them.* Fourthly, *Wrong Meaſures of Probability.*

Firſt,

First, Want of Proofs; by which I do not mean only the Want of those Proofs which are not to be had, but also of those Proofs which are in Being, or might be procured. The greatest Part of Mankind want the Conveniencies and Opportunities of making Experiments and Observations themselves, or of collecting the Testimonies of others, being enslaved to the Necessity of their mean Condition, whose Lives are worn out only in the Provisions for Living. These Men are by the Constitution of human Affairs, unavoidably given over to invincible Ignorance of those Proofs on which others build, and which are necessary to establish those Opinions. For having much to do to get the Means of living, they are not in a Condition to look after those of learned and laborious Enquiries.

It is true, that God has furnished Men with Faculties sufficient to direct them in the Way they should take, if they will but seriously employ them that Way, when their ordinary Vocations allow them Leisure. No Man is so wholly taken up with the Attendance on the Means of living, as to have no spare Time at all to think on his *Soul*, and inform himself in Matters of Religion, were Men as intent on these as they are on Things of far less Importance. There are none so enslaved to the Necessities of Life, who might not find many Vacancies that might be well managed to this Knowledge.

Secondly,

Secondly, Want of *Ability* to use them. There are many who cannot carry a Train of Consequences in their Heads, nor weigh exactly the Force of contrary Proofs and Testimonies. These cannot discern that Side on which the strongest Proofs lie; nor follow that which in itself is the most probable Opinion. It is certain, that there is a wide Difference in Mens Understandings, Apprehensions and Reasonings, to a very great Latitude, so that one may, without doing Injury to Mankind, affirm, that there is a greater Distance between some Men and others in this Respect, than between some Men and some Beasts: But how this comes about is a Speculation, though of great Consequence, yet not necessary to our present Purpose.

Thirdly, For Want of Will to use them. Some, tho' they have Opportunities and Leisure enough, and want neither Parts nor Learning, nor other Helps, are yet never the better for them, and never come to the Knowledge of several Truths that lie within their Reach; either upon Account of their hot Pursuit of Pleasure, constant Drudgery in Business, Laziness and Carelessness in general, or a particular Aversion for Books and Study: And some out of Fear that an impartial Inquiry would not favour those Opinions, which best suit their Prejudices, Lives, Designs, Interests, *&c.* as many Men forbear to cast up their Accounts, who have Reason to fear that their Affairs are in no very good Posture.

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How Men, whose plentiful Fortunes allow them Leisure to improve their Understandings, can satisfy themselves with a lazy Ignorance, I cannot tell: But methinks they have a low Opinion of their Souls, who lay out all their Incomes in Provisions for the Body, and employ none of it to procure the Means and Helps of Knowledge. I will not here mention how unreasonable this is for Men that never think of a future State, and their Concernment in it, which no rational Man can avoid to do sometimes: Nor shall I take Notice what a Shame it is to the greatest Contemners of Knowledge, to be found ignorant in Things they are concerned to know. But this at least, is worth the Consideration of those who call themselves Gentlemen; that however they may think Credit, Respect, and Authority the Concomitants of their Birth and Fortune: Yet they will find all these still carried away from them by Men of lower Condition who surpass them in Knowledge. They who are blind, will always be led by those that see, or else fall into the Ditch: And he is certainly the most subjected, the most enslaved, who is so in his Understanding. In the foregoing Instances, some of the Causes have been shewn of wrong Assent, and how it comes to pass, that probable Doctrines are not always received with an Assent proportionable to the Reasons which are to be had for their Probability: But hitherto we have considered only such Probabilities, whose Proofs do exist, but do not appear to him that embraces the Error.

Fourthly,

Fourthly, There remains yet the last Sort, who, even where the real Probabilities appear, and are plainly laid before them, do not admit of the Conviction, nor yield unto manifest Reasons, but do either ἐπέχειν, suspend their Assent, or give it to the less probable Opinion. And to this Danger are those exposed, who have taken up wrong Measures of Probability, which are,

First, *Propositions that are not in themselves certain and evident, but doubtful and false, taken for Principles.* Propositions looked on as Principles, have so great an Influence upon our Opinions, that it is usually by them we judge of Truth; and what is inconsistent with them, is so far from passing for probable with us, that it will not be allowed possible. The Reverence borne to these Principles is so great, that the Testimony, not only of other Men, but the Evidence of our own Senses are often rejected, when they offer to vouch any Thing contrary to these established Rules. The great Obstinacy that is to be found in Men, firmly believing quite contrary Opinions, tho' many Times equally absurd in the various Religions of Mankind, are as evident a Proof, as they are an unavoidable Consequence of this Way of Reasoning from received traditional Principles: So that Men will disbelieve their own Eyes, renounce the Evidence of their Senses, and give their own Experience the Lye, rather than admit of any Thing disagreeing with these sacred Tenets.

Secondly,

Secondly, *Received Hypotheses.* The Difference between these and the former, is, that those who proceed by these, will admit of Matter of Fact, and agree with Dissenters in that; but differ in assigning of Reasons, and explaining the Manner of Operation. These are not at that open Defiance with their *Senses* as the former: They can endure to hearken to their Information a little more patiently; but will by no Means admit of their Reports in the Explanation of Things; nor be prevailed on by *Probabilities* which would convince them, that Things are not brought about just after the same Manner that they have decreed within themselves that they are. There is nothing more familiar than this. The Instances of Men contending for different Opinions, which they all derive from the infallible Truth of the Scripture, are an undeniable Proof of it. All that call themselves Christians, allow the Text that says, μετανοεῖτε, to carry in it the Obligation of a very weighty Duty. But how erroneous and different must their Opinions and Practices be, who understanding no other Language but the French, take for their Guide the following Translation of the Greek, *repentez vous*, repent ye: While others follow that of *faitiez penitence*, do Penance.

Thirdly, *Predominant Passions or Inclinations:* Let ever so much *Probability* preponderate on one Side of a *covetous* Man's Reasoning, and *Money*, on the other, it is easy to foresee which will prevail. Tho' Men cannot always openly refute, or resist the Force of manifest *Probabilities* that make against them, yet yield they not to the Argument. Not but that it is the Nature of the

the Underſtanding, conſtantly to cloſe with the more probable Side: But yet a Man hath Power to ſuſpend and reſtrain its Enquiries, and not permit a full and ſatisfactory Examination. Until that be done, there will be always theſe *two Ways* left for evading the moſt *apparent Probabilities*.

Firſt, That the Arguments being brought in Words, there may be *Fallacy* latent in them; and the Conſequences being perhaps many in Train, may be ſome of them incoherent. There are few Diſcourſes ſo ſhort and clear, to which Men may not with Satisfaction enough to themſelves raiſe this Doubt, and from whoſe Conviction they may not without Reproach of Diſingenuity or Unreaſonableneſs ſet themſelves free.

Secondly, Manifeſt *Probabilities* may be evaded upon this Suggeſtion, that *I know not yet all that may be ſaid on the contrary Side*: And therefore, tho' a Man be beaten, it is not neceſſary he ſhould yield, not knowing what Forces there are in Reſerve behind. This is a Refuge againſt Conviction, ſo open and ſo wide, that it is hard to determine, when a Man is quite out of the Verge of it.

As Knowledge is no more arbitrary than Perception; ſo, I think, *Aſſent* is no more in our Power than Knowledge. When the Agreement of any two Ideas appears to our Minds, whether immediately, or by the Aſſiſtance of Reaſon, I can no more refuſe to perceive, no more avoid knowing it, than I can avoid ſeeing thoſe

Objects which I turn my Eyes to, and look on in Day light: And what, upon full Examination, I find the most probable, I cannot deny my Assent to. But though we cannot hinder our Knowledge, where the Agreement is once perceived; nor our Assent, where the Probability manifestly appears upon due Consideration of all the Measures of it; yet we can hinder both Knowledge and Assent, by stopping our Enquiry, and not employing our Faculties in the Search of any Truth. If it were not so, Ignorance, Error, or Infidelity, could not in any Case be a Fault; but where Men will act otherwise, and not submit to this Indolence, the greater Probability, I think, in that Case, will determine the Assent; and a Man can no more avoid assenting, or taking it to be true, where he perceives the greater Probability, than he can avoid knowing it to be true, where he perceives the Agreement or Disagreement of any two Ideas. If this be so, the Foundation of Error will lie in wrong Measures of Probability; as the Foundation of Vice in wrong Measures of good.

Fourthly, *Authority*, or the *giving up our Assent to the common received Opinions*, either of our Friends or Party, Neighbourhood or Country. How many Men have no other Ground for their Tenets, than the supposed Honesty or Learning, or Number of these of the same Profession? As if honest or learned Men could not err; or Truth were to be established by the Vote of the Multitude. Yet this with most Men serves the Turn. All Men are liable to Error, and most Men are in many Points by *Passion* or *Interest* under Temptation to it. This is

is certain, that there is not an Opinion ſo abſurd, which a Man may not receive upon this Ground; there is no Error to be named, which has not had its Profeſſors. And a Man ſhall never want crooked Paths to walk in, if he thinks that he is in the right Way, wherever he has the Footſteps of others to follow. But, notwithſtanding the great Noiſe made in the World about Errors ard Opinions, I muſt do Mankind that right as to ſay, there are not *ſo many Men in Errors and wrong Opinions, as is commonly ſuppoſed:* Not that I think they embrace the Truth, but indeed, becauſe concerning thoſe Doctrines they keep ſuch a Stir about, they have *no Thought, no Opinion at all.* For if any one ſhould a little catechize the greateſt Part of the *Partiſans* of moſt of the Sects in the World, he would not find, concerning thoſe Matters they are ſo zealous for, that they have any Opinions of their own: Much leſs would he have Reaſon to think that they took them upon the Examination of Arguments and Appearance of Probability. They are reſolved to ſtick to a Party, that Education or Intereſt has engaged them in: And there, like the common Soldiers of an Army, ſhew their Courage and Warmth, as their Leaders direct, without ever examining, or ſo much as knowing the Cauſe they contend for. If a Man's Life ſhews that he has no ſerious Regard for Religion; for what Reaſon ſhould we think, that he beats his Head about the Opinions of his Church, and troubles himſelf to examine the Grounds of this or that Doctrine? It is enough for him to obey his Leaders, to have his Hand and his Tongue ready for the Support of the common Cauſe, and thereby approve him-

ſelf to thoſe who can give him Credit, Preferment or Protection in that Society. Thus Men become Profeſſors of, and Combatants for thoſe Opinions, they were never convinced of, nor Proſelytes to; no, nor ever had ſo much as floating in their Heads; and though one cannot ſay there are fewer improbable or erroneous Opinions in the World than there are, yet this is certain, there are fewer that actually aſſent to them, and miſtake them for Truths, than is imagined.

CHAP. XXI.

Of the Diviſion of the Sciences.

ALL that can fall within the Compaſs of human Underſtanding, being either, *Firſt*, The Nature of Things, their Relations, and their Manner of Operation: Or, *Secondly*, That which Man himſelf ought to do as a rational and voluntary Agent for the Attainment of any End, eſpecially *Happineſs:* Or, *Thirdly*, The Ways and Means whereby the Knowledge of both of theſe are attained and communicated: I think *Science* may be properly divided into theſe *three Sorts*.

Firſt, The Knowledge of Things, their Conſtitutions, Properties, and Operations, whether material or immaterial: This, in a little more enlarged Senſe of the Word, I call Φυσικὴ or *Natural Philoſophy*. The End of this is bare *Speculative Truth*, and whatſoever can afford the Mind

Mind of Man any ſuch, falls under this Branch: Whether it be God himſelf, *Angels*, *Spirits*, *Bodies*, or any of their Affections, as *Number*, *Figure*, &c.

Secondly, πρακτικὴ, the Skill of right-applying our own Powers and Actions for the Attainment of Things good and uſeful. The moſt conſiderable under this Head, is *Ethicks*, which is the ſeeking out thoſe Rules and Meaſures of human Actions which lead to *Happineſs*, and the Means to practiſe them. The End of this is not bare *Speculation*, and the Knowledge of Truth; but *right*, and a Conduct ſuitable thereto.

Thirdly, The third Branch may be called σημειωτικὴ, or the *Doctrine of Signs*, the moſt uſual whereof being Words, it is aptly enough termed alſo λογικὴ, *Logic*; the Buſineſs whereof is to conſider the Nature of Signs the Mind makes Uſe of for the Underſtanding of Things, or conveying its Knowledge to others. For ſince the Things the Mind contemplates are none of them, beſides itſelf, preſent to the Underſtanding, it is neceſſary that ſomething elſe, as a Sign or Repreſentation of the Thing it conſiders, ſhould be preſent to it; and theſe are Ideas. And becauſe the Scene of Ideas that makes one Man's Thoughts, cannot be laid open to the immediate View of another, nor laid up any where but in the Memory, a no very ſure Repoſitory; therefore, to communicate our Thoughts to one another, as well as record them for our own Uſe, Signs of our Ideas are alſo neceſſary. Thoſe which Men have found moſt convenient, and therefore generally make

Uſe

Use of, are *articulate Sounds* The Consideration then of Ideas and Words, as the great Instruments of Knowledge, makes no despicable Part of their Contemplation, who would take a View of human Knowledge, in the whole Extent of it. And perhaps if they were distinctly weighed, and duly considered, they would afford us another Sort of *Logic* and *Criticism*, than what we have been hitherto acquainted with.

This seems to me the *first and most general, as well as natural Division* of the Objects of our Understanding. For a Man can employ his Thoughts about nothing, but either the Contemplation of Things themselves for the Discovery of Truth, or about the Things in his own Power, which are his *Actions* for the Attainment of his own Ends; or the *Signs* the Mind makes Use of, both in the one and the other, and the right ordering of them for its clearer Information. All which *three*, viz. *Things*, as they are in themselves, knowable: *Actions*, as they depend on us in Order to Happiness, and the right Use of *Signs*, in Order to Knowledge, being *Toto Cœlo* different, they seemed to me to be the three great Provinces of the *intellectual* World wholly separate, and distinct one from another.

F I N I S.