THE

FOUR GOSPELS,

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK

WITH

PRELIMINARY DISSERTATIONS,

AND

NOTES CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY

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PRELIMINARY DISSERTATIONS.

DISSERTATION THE EIGHTH.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE MANNER OF RENDERING SOME WORDS, TO WHICH THERE ARE NOT ANY THAT PERFECTLY CORRESPOND IN MODERN LANGUAGES.

IT was observed in a former Dissertation[1], that there are words in the language of every people, which are not capable of being translated into that of any other people who have not a perfect conformity with them in those customs or sentiments which have given rise to those words. The terms comprehended under this remark, may be distributed into three classes. The first is, of weights, measures, and coins: the second of rites, sects, and festivals: the third of dress, judicatories, and offices.

[1] Diss. II. P. I. § 5.

PART I.

WEIGHTS, MEASURES, AND COINS.

As to the first class, it is evident that there is nothing, wherein nations, especially such as are distant from one another in time and place, more frequently differ, than in the measures and coins, which law or custom has established among them. Under coins I shall here include weights; because it was chiefly by weight that money was anciently distinguished. As commonly, in every country, the people have names only for their own, it is often necessary, in the translation of ancient and foreign books, to adopt their peculiar names, and by mentioning in the margin the equivalent in our own money, measures, and weights, to supply the reader with the proper information. This method has accordingly been, often, though not always, taken by the translators of holy writ. Into the common version of the Old Testament, several Oriental, and other foreign, names, have been admitted, which are explained in the margin. Hence we have *shekel*, *ephah*, *bath*, *homer*, *cor*, and some others. This, however (for what reason I know not), has not been attempted in the New Testament. Instead of it, one or other of

these two methods has been taken: either some name of our own, supposed to be equivalent, or at least not strictly confined, by use, to a precise meaning, is adopted, such as *pound*, *penny*, *farthing*, *bushel*, *firkin*; or (which is the only other method ever used by our translators) some general expression is employed; as, *a piece of money*, *a piece of silver*, *tribute money*, *a measure*, and the like. These are three ways, every one of which has some advantages, and some disadvantages, and is, in some cases, the most eligible, and not in others.

One *Monsieur le Cene*, a French writer, who, in the end of the last century, wrote what he called, a Project for a new Translation of the Bible into French, has recommended a fourth method, which is, to give in the version the exact value expressed in the money, or measures, of the country into whose language the version is made. The anonymous author of an essay, in English, for a new translation, has adopted this idea; or rather, without naming *Le Cene*, has turned into English, and transferred to our use, all those remarks of the Frenchman, which he accounted applicable to the English version. This fourth method, though much approved by some, on account of its supposed perspicuity, is, in my judgment, the worst of them all, nor do I know a single instance wherein I could say that it ought to be adopted [2].

[2] Till I read it lately in Dr. Geddes' Prospectus, I did not know that Le Cene had published a version of the Scriptures. The

§ 2. But, before I enter on the discussion of these methods, it is proper here to premise that, as to measures, the inquiry may well be confined to those called measures of capacity. The smaller length measures have originally, in every country, been borrowed from some of the proportions which take place in the human body. Hence *inch*, *hand-breadth*, *span*, *foot*, *cubit*. The larger measures, *pace*, *furlong*, *mile*, are but multiples of the less. Now, as there is not an exact uniformity of measure in the parts of individuals, it would naturally follow, that different nations would establish, for themselves, standard measures, not much different from those of others, nor yet entirely the same. And this is what, in such measures, has actually happened. When any of them, therefore, is mentioned, we know the measure nearly, but cannot know it accurately, till we are informed of what nation it is the inch, span, foot, cubit, &c. The names have, by use, acquired a latitude and a currency in these

attentive reader will perceive that the criticisms which follow, in relation to him, do not refer to that translation, which I never saw, but solely to his plan. If his version be conformable to his own rules, it is certainly a curiosity of its kind. But that cannot be; otherwise the learned Doctor, though not profuse in its praise, would not, on some points, have spoken so favourably as he has done. Could he have said, for instance, that he is very seldom biassed by party prejudices? If Le Cene was faultless on this article, much may be said to exculpate Beza. Their parties were different, but their error was the same. See Diss. X. P. V. § 13.

different applications. As to superficial measure, we know it is reckoned no otherwise than by the square of the long measure. Whereas, the cubical form, not answering so well in practice to the mensuration of solids, the standards for them have generally been fixed, without any regard to measures of length or surface. It is with these alone therefore that we are here concerned.

§ 3. Now, the best way of determining our choice properly, among the different methods of translating above mentioned, is by attending to the scope of the passages wherein the mention of money and measures is introduced. First, then, it sometimes happens, that accuracy, in regard to the value of these, is of importance to the sense. Secondly, it sometimes happens, that the value of the coin, or the capacity of the measure, is of no consequence to the import of the passage. Thirdly, it happens also, sometimes, that though the real value of the coin, or the capacity of the measure, does not affect the sense of the passage, the comparative value of the different articles mentioned, is of some moment for the better understanding of what is said. Let us consider what methods suit best the several cases now mentioned.

§ 4. First, I observed that accuracy, in regard to the value of the measures or coins mentioned, is sometimes of importance to the sense. When this is the case, and when we have no word exactly

corresponding in import to the original term, that term ought to be retained in the version, and explained in the margin, according to the first method taken notice of. An instance, where the knowledge both of the capacity of the measure and of the value of the coin, are essential to the sense, we have, in that public cry, Χοινιξ σιτου δηναριου [3], which our translators render, *a measure of wheat for a penny*. It is evidently the intention of the writer to inform us of the rate of this necessary article, as a characteristic of the time whereof he is speaking. But our version not only gives no information on this head, but has not even the appearance of giving any, which the word *chænix* would have had, even to those who did not understand it. But to say *a measure*, without saying what measure, is to say just nothing at all. The word *penny*, here, is also exceptionable, being used indefinitely, insomuch that the amount of the declaration is, *a certain quantity of wheat for a certain quantity of money*. This suggests no idea of either dearth or plenty; and can be characteristical of no time, as it holds equally of every time. In this case, the original term, notwithstanding its harshness, ought to be retained in the text, and explained in the margin. Again, it was, doubtless, the intention of the sacred penman, to acquaint us at how low a price our Saviour was sold by his treacherous disciple, when he informs us [4], that the chief priests agreed to give Judas τριακοντα

[3] Rev. vi. 6 [4] Matth. xxvi. 15.

αργυρια. In like manner, when the Evangelist mentioned[5] the indignant observation of Judas, that the ointment, wherewith our Lord's feet were anointed, might have been sold for more than τριακοσιων δηναριων, it was, doubtless, his view to acquaint us with the value of the gift. Once more, when Philip remarked to our Lord, who had proposed to feed the multitude in the desert[6], διακοσιων δηναριων αρτοι, *two hundred pennyworth of bread*, as it runs in the common version, *is not sufficient for them, that every one of them may take a little*, it was the design of the historian to supply us with a kind of criterion for computing the number of the people present. But this could be no criterion, unless we knew the value of the δηναριον.

§ 5. 'But,' say those modern correctors, 'in 'the examples above mentioned, when the know-'ledge of the value of the coin, and the capacity of 'the measure, is of importance to the sense, no 'method can be equal, in point of perspicuity, to 'that recommended by us, whereby both are reduc-'ed to an equivalent, in the moneys and measures of 'the country. Thus, the first passage quoted would 'be rendered, *A measure of wheat, capable of sup-'porting a man for one day*,' for thus Le Cene proposes to translate χοινιξ, '*for seven pence halfpenny*.' 'The second, *The chief priests covenanted with Ju-'das for three pounds fifteen shillings sterling*. The

[5] John, xii. 5. [6] John, vi. 7.

'third, *Why was not this ointment sold for nine* '*pounds seven shillings and sixpence?* And the 'fourth, *Six pounds five shillings would not purchase* '*bread sufficient.*'

The exceptions against this method are many. In the first place, it is a mere comment, and no translation. Considered as a comment, it may be good; but that must be egregiously wrong as a version, which represents an author as speaking of what he knew nothing about, nay, of what had no existence in his time. And such, surely, is the case with our sterling money, which an interpretation of this sort would represent as the current coin of Judea in the time of our Saviour. Nothing ought to be introduced by the translator, from which the English reader may fairly deduce a false conclusion, in regard to the manners and customs of the time. Besides, as the comparative value of their money and measures with ours is not founded on the clearest evidence, is it proper to give a questionable point the sanction, as it were, of inspiration? Add to all this, that no method can be devised, which would, more effectually than this, destroy the native simplicity and energy of the expression. What is expressed in round numbers, in the original, is, with an absurd minuteness, reduced to fractions in the version. Nothing can be more natural than the expression, *Two hundred denarii would not purchase bread enough to afford every one of them a little.* This is spoken like one who makes a shrewd guess from what he sees. Whereas, nothing can be more

unnatural than, in such a case, to descend to fractional parts, and say, *Six pounds five shillings would not purchase.* This is what nobody would have said, that had not previously made the computation. Just so, the round sum of three hundred denarii might very naturally be conjectured, by one present, to be about the value of the ointment. But, for one to go so nearly to work as to say, *Nine pounds seven shillings and sixpence might have been gotten for this liquor*, would directly suggest to the hearers, that he had weighed it, and computed its value at so much a pound. There is this additional absurdity in the last example, that it is said, επανω, *more than:* consequently, it is mentioned, not as the exact account, but as a plausible conjecture, rather under than above the price. But does any body, in conjectures of this kind, acknowledged to be conjectures, descend to fractional parts?

§ 6. Now, if this method would succeed so ill, in the first of the three cases mentioned, it will be found to answer still worse in the other two, where little depends on the knowledge of the value. In the second, I may say, nothing depends on it. Now, there are several passages, wherein coins and measures are mentioned, in which the value of the coin, or the capacity of the measure, is of no conceivable consequence to the import of the passage. In this case, either the second or the third method, above specified, is preferable to the introduction of a foreign term, not used in other places of the version,

and noway necessary to the sense. But let it be observed of the second method, that I am never for using such names of coins and measures as are peculiarly modern, or European, and not applied to the money and measures of ancient and Oriental countries: for such terms always suggest the notion of a coincidence with us, in things wherein there was actually no coincidence.

We read in the common version [7], *Neither do men light a candle and put it under a bushel,* ὑπο τον μοδιον, *but on a candlestick.* Every person must be sensible, that the size of the measure is of no consequence here to the sense: the intention being solely to signify, that a light is brought, not to be covered up, but to be placed where it may be of use in lighting the household. The general term *corn-measure,* perfectly answers the author's purpose in this place; and as nowhere, but in the expression of this very sentiment, does the word μοδιος occur in the Gospels, there is no reason for adopting it. The term *bushel* serves well enough for conveying the import of the sentiment; but as it indirectly suggests an untruth, namely, the ancient use of that measure in Judea, it is evidently improper. For an example in money, our Lord says, when the Pharisees interrogated him about the lawfulness of paying the tribute imposed by their conquerors [8], Επιδειξατε μοι δηναριον, rendered in the common version, *show me a penny,* the sequel evinces that it was of

[7] Matth. v. 15. [8] Luke, xx. 24.

no importance what the value of the money was; the argument is affected solely by the figure and inscription on it. And if, in no other place of the Gospels, the value of that coin had affected the sense more than it does here, it might have been rendered by the general phrase *piece of money*. Now let us see how *Le Cene*'s method does with those two examples. In the first he would say, *Neither do men light a candle to put it under a measure which contains about a pint less than a peck*. Or, according to the manner which he sometimes adopts, *containing such a precise number of eggs* (I do not recollect how many); would not this particularity in fixing the capacity of the measure, but too manifestly convey the insinuation that there would be nothing strange or improper in men's putting a lighted candle under any other measure larger or smaller than that whereof the capacity is, as a matter of principal moment, so nicely ascertained? A strange way this of rendering Scripture perspicuous!

Nor does it answer better in coins than in measures. When our Lord said, Επιδειξατε μοι δηναριον, the very words imply that it was a single piece he wanted to see; and what follows supplies us with the reason. But how does this suit *Le Cene*'s mode of reduction? *Show me sevenpence halfpenny*. Have we any such piece? The very demand must, to an English reader, appear capricious, and the money asked could not be presented otherwise than in different pieces, if not in different kinds. It is added, *Whose image and superscription hath it?* Is this a

question which any man would put, *Whose image and superscription hath sevenpence halfpenny?* 'But there may have been formerly *sevenpence half-penny pieces*, though we have none now.' Be it so. Still, as it is unsuitable to have the head and inscription of a Roman emperor on what must, from the denomination, be understood to be British coin, they ought, for the sake of consistency, and for making the transformation of the money complete, to render the reply to the aforesaid question, *George*'s instead of *Cesar*'s. If this be not translating into English, it is perhaps superior; it is what some moderns call *Englishing*, *making English*, or *doing into English*; for all these expressions are used. Poems done in this manner are sometimes more humbly termed *imitations*.

§ 7. I OBSERVED a third case that occurs in the Gospels with respect to money and measures, which is when the value of the coin, or the capacity of the measure mentioned, does not, but the comparative value of the articles specified, does, affect the sense. Of this kind some of our Lord's parables furnish us with excellent examples. Such is the parable of the pounds [2]. I shall here give as much of it as is necessary for my present purpose, first in the vulgar translation, then in *Le Cene*'s manner. 13. *He called his ten servants, and delivered them ten pounds, and said unto them, Occupy till I come.* 16. *The*

[2] Luke, xix. 13, &c.

first came, saying, Lord, thy pound hath gained ten pounds, and he said unto him, Well, thou good servant: because thou hast been faithful in a very little, have thou authority over ten cities. And the second came, saying, Lord, thy pound hath gained five pounds. And he said likewise to him, Be thou also over five cities. Nothing can be more manifest than that it is of no consequence to the meaning and design of this brief narration, what the value of the pound was, great or little. Let it suffice that it here represents the whole of what we receive from our Creator to be laid out in his service. In the accounts returned by the servants, we see the different improvements which different men make of the gifts of heaven; and in the recompenses bestowed, we have their proportional rewards. But these depend entirely on the numbers mentioned, and are the same, whatever be the value of the money. I shall now, in reducing them to our standard, follow the rates assigned on the margin of the English Bible. Ducats, so often mentioned by *Le Cene*, are no better known to the generality of our people, than talents or *miniæ* are. Whether the rate of conversion I have adopted be just or not, is of no consequence. I shall therefore take it for granted, that it is just. The different opinions of the comparative value of their money and ours, nowise affect the argument. The objections are against the reduction from the one species to the other, not against the rule of reducing.

The foregoing verses so rendered will run thus: *He called his ten servants, and delivered them thirty-*

one pounds five shillings sterling, and said, Occupy till I come. The first came, saying, Lord, thy three pounds two shillings and sixpence, have gained thirty-one pounds five shillings; and he said to him, Well, thou good servant, because thou hast been faithful in a very little, have thou authority over ten cities. And the second came, saying, Lord, thy three pounds two shillings and sixpence, have gained fifteen pounds twelve shillings and sixpence. And he said likewise to him, Be thou also over five cities. In regard to the parable of the talents [10], it is needless, after the specimen now given, to be particular. I shall therefore give only part of one verse thus expressed in the common version. *To one he gave five talents, to another two, and to another one;* which, in *Le Cene*'s manner, would be, *To one he gave nine hundred thirty-seven pounds ten shillings sterling. To another three hundred seventy-five pounds. And to another one hundred eighty-seven pounds ten shillings.* In both examples, what is of real importance, the comparative degrees of improvement and proportional rewards, which in the original, and in the common version, are discovered at a glance, are, if not lost, so much obscured, by the complicated terms employed in the version, that it requires an arithmetical operation to discover them. In the example of the king who called his servants to account [11], this manner is, if possible, still more awkward, by rea-

[10] Matth. xxv. 14. [11] Matth. xviii. 23

son of the largeness of the sums. One of them is represented as owing to the king one million eight hundred seventy-five thousand pounds, and his fellow-servant as indebted to him three pounds two shillings and sixpence. There is some importance in the comparative value of the denarius and the talent, as it appears evidently one purpose of our Lord, in this parable, to show how insignificant the greatest claims we can make on our fellow-creatures are, compared with those which divine justice can make on us. And, though this be strongly marked when the two sums are reduced to one denomination, this advantage does not counterbalance the badness of the expression, so grossly unnatural, unscriptural, and, in every sense, improper. In conveying religious and moral instruction, to embarrass a reader or hearer with fractions and complex numbers, is in a spirit and manner completely the reverse of our Lords.

§ 8. I WILL not further try the patience of my readers with what has been proposed in the same taste, with respect to the measures, both liquid and dry, mentioned in Scripture, in the exhibition of their respective capacities by the number of eggs they could contain. I am afraid I have descended into too many particulars already, and shall therefore only add in general that, in this way, the beautiful and perspicuous simplicity of holy writ, is exchanged for a frivolous minuteness, which descends to the lowest denomination of parts, more in the style of

a penurious money-broker, than in that of a judicious moralist, not to say, a divine teacher. Perspicuity is therefore injured, not promoted, by it, and to those important lessons, an appearance, or rather a disguise, is given, which seems calculated to ruin their effect. The author has never reflected on what I think sufficiently obvious, that when a piece of money is named, the name is understood to denote something more than the weight of the silver or the gold. In the earliest ages, when it was only by weight that the money of the same metal was distinguished, if the weight was the same, or nearly so, the names used in different languages served equally well. It was therefore both natural and proper in the Seventy to render the Hebrew ככר *checher*, in Greek *ταλαντον*, and שקל *shekel*, *διδραχμα*. For the Alexandrian *διδραχμα*, which was double the Attic referred to in the New Testament, was half an ounce. But though such terms might, with propriety, be used promiscuously, when the different denominations of money expressed solely their different weights, as was the case in the earlier ages of the Jewish commonwealth, it is not so now. The name signifies a coin of a particular form and size, stamp, and inscription. The Hebrew *shekel*, the Greek *stater*, and the British *half-crown*, being each about half an ounce of silver, are nearly equivalent. But the names are not synonymous. If one had promised to show you a *stater*, or a *shekel*, would you think he had discharged his promise by producing *half-a-crown*?

§ 9. WORDS therefore which are by use exclusively appropriated to the coins and measures of modern nations, can never be used with propriety in the translation of an ancient author. I have mentioned three ways which a translator may take, and pointed out the different circumstances by which the preference among those methods may, in any instance, be determined. When the sense of the passage does, in any degree, depend on the value of the coin, or the capacity of the measure, the original term ought to be retained, and if needful, explained, in a note. This is the way constantly used in the translation of books where mention is made of foreign coins or measures. What is more common than to find mention made, in such works, of Dutch *guilders*, French *livres*, or Portuguese *moidores?* I acknowledge, at the same time, the inconveniency of loading a version of Scripture with strange and uncouth names. But still this is preferable to expressions, which how smooth soever they be, do, in any respect, misrepresent the author, and mislead the reader. Our ears are accustomed to the foreign names which are found in the common version of the Old Testament, such as *shekel*, *bath*, *ephah*: though, where the same coins and measures are evidently spoken of in the New, our translators have not liked to introduce them, and have sometimes, less properly, employed modern names which do not correspond in meaning.

§ 10. We have, besides, in the New Testament, the names of some Greek and Roman coins and measures not mentioned in the Old. Now, where the words are the same, or, in common use, coincident with those used by the Seventy in translating the Hebrew names above mentioned, I have thought it better to retain the Hebrew words, to which our ears are familiarized, by the translation of the Old, than to adopt new terms for expressing the same things. We ought not surely to make an apparent difference by means of the language, where we have reason to believe, that the things meant were the same. When the word, therefore, in the New Testament, is the name of either measure or coin peculiar to Greeks or Romans, it ought to be retained; but when it is merely the term by which a Hebrew word, occurring in the Old Testament, has sometimes been rendered by the Seventy; the Hebrew name, to which the common version of the Old Testament has accustomed us, ought to be preferred. For this reason, I have, in such cases, employed them in the version of the Gospels. Αργυριον I have rendered *shekel*, when used for money. This was the standard coin of the Jews; and when the Hebrew word for *silver* occurs in a plural signification, as must be the case when joined with a numeral adjective, it is evidently this that is meant. It is commonly in the Septuagint rendered αργυρια, and in one place, in the common translation, *silverlings* [12]. In Hebrew כסף *cheseph* and שקל *shekel*, are often used indiscri-

[12] Isaiah, vii. 23.

minately, and both are sometimes rendered by the same Greek word. Though talent is not a word of Hebrew extraction, the Greek *ταλαντον* is so constantly employed by the Seventy in rendering the Hebrew ככר *checher*, and is so perfectly familiar to us, as the name of an ancient coin of the highest value, that there can be no doubt of the propriety of retaining it. As to the word *pound*, in Greek *μνα*, and in Hebrew מנה *maneh*, as the sense of the only passage wherein it occurs in the Gospel, could hardly, in any degree, be said to depend on the value of the coin mentioned, I have also thought proper to retain the name which had been employed by the English translators. Though *pound* is the name of a particular denomination of our own money, we all know that it admits also of an indefinite application to that of other nations. This is so well understood, that where there is any risk of mistaking, we distinguish our own by the addition of *sterling*. The Greek word and the English are also analogous in this respect, that they are names both of money and of weight. Both also admit some latitude, in the application to the moneys and weights of different countries, whose standards do not entirely coincide.

In regard to some other words, though *penny* is often used indefinitely, the common meaning differs so much from that of *δηναριον* in Scripture, and the plural *pence* is so rarely used with that latitude, that I thought it better to retain the Latin word. I have reserved the word *penny* as a more proper translation of *ασσαριον*, between which and a *penny sterling*,

the difference in value is inconsiderable. This naturally determined me to render κοδραντης *farthing*; for κοδραντης (that is, *quadrans*) is originally a Latin word, as well as δηναριον. They correspond in etymology as well as in value [13]. By this I have avoided a double impropriety into which our translators have fallen. First, by rendering δηναριον *a penny*, and ασσαριον *a farthing*, they make us consider the latter as a fourth part of the former, whereas it was but one-tenth. Again, by rendering ασσαριον and κοδραντης by the same word, they represent those names as synonymous which belong to coins of very different value. In translating λεπτον, I have retained the word *mite*, which is become proverbial for the lowest denomination of money. Disquisitions on little points, more curious than useful, I always endeavour to avoid.

§ 11. As to measures, wherever the knowledge of the capacity was of no use for throwing light on the passage, I have judged it always sufficient to employ some general term, as *measure*, *barrel*, &c. Of this kind is the parable of the unjust steward. The degree of his villany is sufficiently discovered by the numbers. But where it is the express view of the writer to communicate some notion of the size and capacity, as in the account given of the waterpots at the marriage in Cana, or wherever such knowledge is of importance to the sense, those ge-

[13] *Farthing* from the Saxon *feorthling*. that is. the fourth part.

neral words ought not to be used. Such are the reasons for the manner which I have adopted in this work, in regard to money and measures. There is no rule that can be followed which is not attended with some inconveniences. Whether the plan here laid down be attended with the fewest, the judicious and candid reader will judge.

PART II.

RITES, FESTIVALS, AND SECTS.

THE second class of words to which it is not always possible to find in another language equivalent terms, is the names of rites, festivals, and sects, religious, political, or philosophical. Of all words the names of sects come the nearest to the condition of proper names, and are almost always considered as not admitting a translation into the language of those who are unacquainted with the sect. This holds equally of modern, as of ancient, sects. There are no words in other languages answering to the English terms *whig* and *tory*, or to the names of the Italian and German parties called *guelph* and *ghibelin*. It is exactly the same with philosophical sects, as *magian*, *stoic*, *peripatetic*, *epicurean*; and with the religious sects among the Jews, *pharisee*, *sadducee*, *es-*

sene, *karaite*, *rabbinist*. Yet even this rule is not without exception. When the sect has been denominated from some common epithet or appellative thought to be particularly applicable to the party, the translation of the epithet or appellative, serves in other languages as a name to the sect. Thus, those who are called by the Greeks τεσσαρεσκαιδεκατιται, from their celebrating Easter on the fourteenth day of the month, were, by the Romans, called *quartadecimani*, which is a translation of the word into Latin. In like manner, our *quakers* are called in French *trembleurs*. Yet in this their authors are not uniform; they sometimes adopt the English word. In regard to the sects mentioned in the New Testament, I do not know that there has been any difference among translators. The ancient names seem to be adopted by all.

§ 2. As to rites and festivals, which, being nearly related, may be considered together, the case is somewhat different. The original word, when expressive of the principal action in the rite, or in the celebration of the festival, is sometimes translated, and sometimes retained. In these it is proper to follow the usage of the language, even although the distinctions made may originally have been capricious. In several modern languages we have, in what regards Jewish and Christian rites, generally followed the usage of the old Latin version, though the authors of that version have not been entirely uniform in their method. Some words they have trans-

ferred from the original into their language; others they have translated. But it would not always be easy to find their reason for making this difference. Thus the word περιτομη they have translated *circumcisio*, which exactly corresponds in etymology; but the word βαπτισμα they have retained, changing only the letters from Greek to Roman. Yet the latter was just as susceptible of a literal version into Latin as the former. *Immersio*, *tinctio*, answers as exactly in the one case, as *circumcisio* in the other. And if it be said of those words, that they do not rest on classical authority, the same is true also of this. Etymology, and the usage of ecclesiastic authors, are all that can be pleaded.

Now, the use with respect to the names adopted in the Vulgate, has commonly been imitated, or rather implicitly followed, through the western parts of Europe. We have deserted the Greek names where the Latins have deserted them, and have adopted them where the Latins have adopted them. Hence we say *circumcision*, and not *peritomy*; and we do not say *immersion*, but *baptism*. Yet when the language furnishes us with materials for a version so exact and analogical, such a version conveys the sense more perspicuously than a foreign name. For this reason, I should think the word immersion (which, though of Latin origin, is an English noun, regularly formed from the verb *to immerse*), a better English name than *baptism*, were we now at liberty to make a choice. But we are not. The latter term has been introduced, and has obtained the uni-

versal suffrage: and, though to us not so expressive of the action; yet, as it conveys nothing false, or unsuitable to the primitive idea, it has acquired a right by prescription, and is consequently entitled to the preference.

§ 3. I SAID that, in the names of rites or sacred ceremonies, we have commonly followed the Vulgate. In some instances, however, we have not. The great Jewish ceremony, in commemoration of their deliverance from Egypt, is called in the New Testament *πασχα*, the sacred penmen having adopted the term that had been used by the Seventy, which is not a Greek word, but the Hebrew, or rather the Chaldaic, name in Greek letters. The Vulgate has retained *pascha*, transferring it into the Latin character. The words in Greek and Latin have no meaning but as the name of this rite. In English the word has not been transferred, but translated *passover*, answering in our language to the import of the original Hebrew. *Σκηνοπηγια*, *scenopegia*, in the Gospel of John [14], is retained by the Vulgate, and with us translated *the feast of tabernacles*. It would have been still nearer the original Hebrew, and more conformable to the Jewish practice, to have called it *the feast of booths*. But the other appellation has obtained the preference. The Latins have retained the Greek name *azyma*, which we render, properly enough, *unleavened bread*. But the words *jubilee*,

[14] John, vii. 2.

sabbath, *purim*, and some others, run through most languages.

§ 4. THERE is a conveniency in translating, rather than transplanting, the original term, if the word chosen be apposite, as it more clearly conveys the import, than an exotic word, that has no original meaning or etymology in the language. This never appears in a stronger light than when the reason of the name happens to be assigned by the sacred author. I shall give, for instance, that Hebrew appellative, which I but just now observed, that both the Seventy and the Vulgate have retained in their versions, and which the English interpreters have translated. The word is, *pascha*, *passover*. In the explanation which the people are commanded to give of this service to their children, when these shall inquire concerning it, the reason of the name is assigned[15]: *Ye shall say, It is the sacrifice of the Lord's* PASSOVER, *who* PASSED OVER *the houses of the children of Israel in Egypt, when he smote the Egyptians.* Now, this reason appears as clearly in the English version, which is literal, as in the original Hebrew; but it is lost in the version of the Seventy, who render it thus: Ερειτε· Θυσια το ΠΑΣΧΑ τυτο Κυριω, ὡς ΕΣΚΕΠΑΣΕ τυς οικυς των ὑιων Ισραηλ εν Αιγυπτω, ὁτε επαταξε τυς Αιγυπτιυς. Here, as the words πασχα and εσκεπασε have no affinity, it is impossible to discover the reason of the name. The authors of the Vul-

[15] Exodus, xii. 27.

gate, who form the word *phase*, in the Old Testament, more closely after the Hebrew (though they call it *pascha* in the New,) have thought proper, in turning that passage, to drop the name they had adopted, and translate the word *transitus*, that the allusion might not be lost. *Dicetis, victima* TRANSITUS *Domini est, quando* TRANSIVIT *super domos filiorum Israel in Ægypto, percutiens Ægyptios.*

This manner is sometimes necessary, for giving a just notion of the sense. But it is still better when the usual name, in the language of the version, as happens in the English, preserves the analogy, and renders the change unnecessary. In proper names, it is generally impossible to preserve the allusion in a version. In such cases, the natural resource is the margin. The occasion is not so frequent in appellatives, but it occurs sometimes. It is said, by Adam, of the woman [16], soon after her formation, *She shall be called* WOMAN, *because she was formed out of* MAN. Here the affinity of the names, woman and man, is preserved, without doing violence to the language. But, in some versions, the affinity disappears altogether, and, in others, is effected by assigning a name which, if it may be used at all, cannot, with propriety, be given to the sex in general. It is lost in the Septuagint. Αυτη κληθησεται ΓΥΝΗ, οτι εκ του ΑΝΔΡΟΣ αυτης ελημφθη αυτη. Not the shadow of a reason appears in what is here assigned as the reason. The sounds γυνη and ανδρος have no af-

[16] Gen. ii. 23.

finity. The same may be said of *mulier* and *vir* in Castalio's Latin. *Hæc vocabitur* MULIER, *quia sumpta de* VIRO *est.* Other Latin intrepreters have, for the sake of that resemblance in the words, on which the meaning of the expression depends, chosen to sacrifice a little of their latinity. The Vulgate, and Leo de Juda, have, *Hæc vocabitur* VIRAGO, *quia sumpta de* VIRO *est.* Junius, Le Clerc, and Houbigant, use the word *vira*, upon the authority of Festus. Neither of the words is good in this application; but not worse than ανδρις εξ ανδρος, used by Symmachus for the same purpose. Much in the same taste are Luther's *mænnin*, the *homasse* of the Geneva French, and the *huoma* of Diodati's Italian.

PART III.

DRESS, JUDICATORIES, AND OFFICES.

I SHALL now proceed to the third general class of words, not capable of being translated, with exactness, into the language of a people whose customs are not in a great measure conformable to the customs of those amongst whom such words have arisen. This class comprehends names relating to dress, peculiar modes, judicatories, and offices. In regard to *garments*, it is well known, that the usages of the an-

cients, particularly the Orientals, differed considerably from those of modern Europeans. And though I am by no means of opinion, that it is necessary, in a translation, to convey an idea of the exact form of their dress, when nothing in the piece translated appears to depend on that circumstance, I am ever for avoiding that which would positively convey a false notion in this or any other respect. Often, from that which may be thought a trivial deviation from truth, there will result inconveniences, of which one at first is not aware, but which, nevertheless, may produce in the mind of the attentive reader, unacquainted with the original, objections that affect the credibility of the narration. A general name, therefore, like *clothes*, *raiment*, is sufficient, when nothing depends on the form, in like manner as *a piece of money*, *a corn measure*, will answer, when no light, for understanding the scope of the place, can be derived from the value of the one, or the capacity of the other. Where some distinction, however, seems to have been intended in the passage, there is a necessity for using names more definitive. It is not often necessary, for naming the parts of dress, to retain the terms of a dead language. The English translators have never done it, as far as I remember, except in naming that part of the sacerdotal vestments, called the *ephod*, for which it would be impossible to find an apposite term in any European tongue. *Phylacteries*, too, will perhaps be accounted an exception.

§ 2. But, though it is rarely necessary to adopt the ancient or foreign names of garments, it may not be always proper to employ those terms for expressing them, which are appropriated to particular pieces of the modern European habit. The word *coat* answers well enough as a name for the under garment, in Greek χιτων. *Cloak*, by which our translators in the New Testament commonly render ἱματιον, the name for the upper garment, I do not so much approve. My reasons are these: First, *cloak* is not the term that they have used in the Old Testament for that vestment; though we have no reason to believe that there was any change in the Jewish fashions in this particular. It is well known, that the modes, respecting dress, are not, nor ever were, in Asia, as at present they are in Europe, variable and fluctuating. The Orientals are as remarkable for constancy in this particular, as we are for the contrary. Now, though the Hebrew words, answering to ἱματιον, are frequent in the Old Testament, and the Greek word itself in the translation of the Seventy, the word *cloak* has never been admitted by our translators into the version of the Old Testament, except once in Isaiah [17], where it is used only as a simile. Wherever they have thought proper to distinguish the upper garment from that worn close to the body, they have named it the *mantle*. See the places marked in the margin [18]. But these are not all the

[17] Isaiah, lix. 17. [18] Judges, iv. 18. 1 Sam. xxviii. 14. 1 King, xix. 13. 19. 2 Kings, ii. 8. 13, 14. Ezra. ix. 3. 5. Job, i. 20. Job, ii. 12. Psal. cix. 29.

places in which the original word might have been so rendered. Sometimes, indeed, it means garments in general, and in the plural especially, signifies *clothes*. Now, though the difference of a name employed in the version of the Old Testament may be thought too slight a circumstance for founding an argument upon, in regard to the manner of translating the New, I cannot help thinking that, even if the words *mantle* and *cloak* were equally proper, we ought not, by an unnecessary change, without any reason, to give ground to imagine, that there had been, in this article, any alteration in the Jewish customs.

Secondly, I am the more averse to introduce, in the New Testament, a change of the name that had been used in the Old, as it is evident that, in Judea, they placed some share of religion in retaining their ancient garb. They did not think themselves at liberty to depart from the customs of their ancestors in this point. As their law had regulated some particulars in relation to their habit, they looked upon the form as intended for distinguishing them from the heathen, and consequently as sacred [19]: the knots of strings which they were appointed to put upon the four corners or wings, as they called them, did not suit any other form of outer garment, than that to which they had been always accustomed.

Thirdly, the word *mantle* comes nearer a just representation of the loose vesture worn by the He

[19] Numb. xv. 38, 39. Deut. xxii. 12

brews, than *cloak*, or any other term, which refers us to something particular in the make. Whereas their ἱματιον was an oblong piece of cloth, square at the corners, in shape resembling more the *plaid* of a Scotch Highlander, than either the Greek *pallium* or the Roman *toga*. This mantle, it would appear, on ordinary occasions, they threw loosely about them; and, when employed in any sort of work in which it might encumber them, laid aside altogether. To this, doubtless, our Lord refers, in that expression [20], *Let not him who shall be in the field, return home to fetch his mantle.* When setting out on a journey, or entering on any business, compatible with the use of this garment, they tucked it up with a girdle, that it might not incommode them. Hence, the similitude of having their *loins girt*, to express alertness, and habitual preparation for the discharge of duty. I know not why those who have been so inclinable, in some other articles, to give a modern cast to the manners of those ancients, have not modernized them in this also, and transformed *girding their loins*, a very antique phrase, into *buttoning their waistcoats*. This freedom would not be so great, as the reduction of their money and measures above considered. It would not even be greater than giving them *candles* for *lamps*, and making them sit at their meals, instead of reclining on couches. In regard to this last mode, I propose to consider it immediately.

[20] Mark, xiii. 16.

§ 3. Of all their customs they were not so tenacious, as of what regarded the form of their clothes. In things which were not conceived to be connected with religion, and about which neither the law, nor tradition, had made any regulation, they did not hesitate to conform themselves to the manners of those under whose power they had fallen. A remarkable instance of this appears, in their adopting the mode of the Greeks and Romans, in lying on couches at their meals. In the Old Testament times, the practice of sitting on such occasions, appears to have been universal. It is justly remarked by Philo [21], that Joseph "made his brethren sit down according to "their ages; for men were not then accustomed to "lie on beds at entertainments." The words, in the Septuagint [22], are εκαθισαν εναντιον αυτου: in the English translation, *They sat before him;* both literally from the Hebrew. In like manner [23], εκαθισαν δε φαγειν αρτον, *they sat down to eat bread;* and [24], εκαθισεν ὁ λαος φαγειν και πιειν, *the people sat down to eat and drink.* Solomon says [25], *When thou sittest to eat with a ruler,* Εαν καθισης δειπνειν επι τραπεζης δυναςου. But it were endless to enumerate all the examples. Suffice it to observe, that this is as uniformly employed to express the posture at table in the Old Testament, as αναχλινω, or some synony-

[21] Ἐξης δε προσαξαντος κατα τας ἡλικιας καθιζεσθαι, μηπω των ανθρωπων εν ταις συμποτικαις συνουσιαις καταχλιοντι χρωμενων. Lib. de Josepho.

[22] Gen. xliii. 33.

[23] Gen. xxxvii. 25.

[24] Exod. xxxii. 6

[25] Prov. xxiii. 1.

mous term, is employed, for the same purpose, in the New. The Hebrew word is equally unequivocal with the Greek. It is always ישב *jashab*, *to sit*, never שכב *shachab*, or any other word that imports lying down.

Some, indeed, have contended, that this manner of eating was practised among the Jews before the captivity; and in support of this opinion, have produced the passage in Samuel [26], where Saul is spoken of as eating on the bed. But the passage, when examined, makes clearly against the opinion for which it has been quoted. The historian's expression is, *sat upon the bed.* Nor is this, as in the New Testament, the style merely of modern translators; it is that of the original, as well as of all the ancient translations. The Septuagint says εκαθισε, the Vulgate *sedit*. Houbigant is the only translator I know (who, misled, I suppose, by the ordinary style of Latin authors,) has said *decubuit*. The Hebrew word is ישב *jashab*, which never signifies *to lie*. Now, whether a man on a bed takes his repast sitting, after the European manner, with his feet on the floor, or after the Turkish, with his legs across under him, his posture differs totally from that of the ancient Greeks and Romans, who lay at their length.

The words of the Prophet Amos [27] have also been thought to favour the same opinion: *Wo to them that lie upon beds of ivory, and stretch themselves upon their couches, and eat the lambs out of the flock, and*

[26] 1 Sam. xxviii. 23. [27] Amos, vi. 4, &c.

the calves out of the stall, that chant to the sound of the viol, &c. Here the Prophet upbraids the people with their sloth and luxury, specifying a few instances in their manner of living. But nothing is said that implies any other connection among these instances, than that of their being the effects of the same cause, *voluptuousness*. We have no more reason to connect their eating the lambs and the calves with their lying stretched on beds of ivory, than we have to connect with this posture, their chanting to the sound of the viol, and anointing themselves with ointments.

But in the Apocryphal writings, which are posterior in composition to those of the Old Testament and probably posterior to the Macedonian conquests, though prior to the books of the New, we have the first indications of this change of posture. It is said of Judith[28] in the common version, that *her maid laid soft skins on the ground for her over against Holofernes, that she might sit and eat upon them*, εις το εσθιειν καταχλινομενην επ' αυτων, literally, that *she might eat lying upon them*. Again, in Tobit[29], ανεπεσα τυ φαγειν, not *I sat*, but *I lay down to eat*. Other examples might be given which render it probable that this fashion was first introduced into Judæa by the Greeks, before the Jews became acquainted with the Romans. A sure evidence this, that the Jews were not so obstinately tenacious of every national custom, as some have represented them. It is very remarkable

[28] Judith, xii. 15. [29] Tobit, ii. 1.

that, in our Saviour's time, the change was so universal in Judea, that the very common people always conformed to it. The multitudes which our Lord twice fed in the desert, are by all the Evangelists represented as *lying*, not *sitting*, upon the ground. It is strange that our translators have here, by misinterpreting one word, as invariably exhibited them practising a custom which they had abandoned, as they had formerly, by the unwarranted and unnecessary change of a name, given ground to think that there was an alteration in their customs, when there was none.

§ 4. I KNOW it is commonly pleaded in excuse for such deviations from the original, as that whereof I am now speaking, that the posture is a circumstance noway material to the right understanding of the passages wherein it is occasionally mentioned; that besides, to us moderns, there appears in the expressions *lying down to eat*, and *laying themselves at table*, from their repugnancy to our customs, an awkwardness which, so far from contributing to fix our minds on the principal scope of the author, would divert our attention from it. In answer to the first of these objections, I admit that it is sometimes, not always, as will soon be shown, of no consequence to the import of a passage, whether a mere circumstance, which is but occasionally mentioned, and on which the instruction conveyed in the story does not depend, be rightly apprehended or not. The two miracles of the loaves and fishes are to all valuable purposes the

same, whether the people partook of their repast sitting or lying. The like may be said of the greater part of such narratives. For this reason I do not except against a general expression, as, *placed themselves at table*, where a literal version would be attended with the inconvenience of appearing unnatural: but I could never approve, for the sake of elegance or simplicity, a version which, in effect, misrepresents the original; or, in other words, from which one may fairly deduce inferences that are not conformable to fact. Concerning the other exception, I cannot help observing, that it is only because the expression *lying at table* is unusual, that it appears awkward. If the first translators of the Bible into English had thought fit, in this instance, to keep close to the original, the phrases would not now have sounded awkwardly. But it must be owned that no translators enjoy at present equal advantages with those who had, in a manner, the forming of our language, in regard to things sacred. Their versions, by being widely dispersed, would soon give a currency to the terms used in them, which there was then no contrary use to counterbalance. And this is the reason why many things which might have been better rendered then, cannot now so well be altered.

§ 5. BUT to show that even such errors in translating, however trivial they may appear, are sometimes highly injurious to the sense, and render a plain story not only incredible but absurd, I must

entreat the reader's attention to the following passage, as it runs in the common version [30]: *One of the Pharisees desired Jesus that he would eat with him; and he went into the Pharisee's house, and sat down to meat. And behold a woman in the city, which was a sinner, when she knew that Jesus sat at meat in the Pharisee's house, brought an alabaster box of ointment, and stood at his feet behind him weeping, and began to wash his feet with tears, and did wipe them with the hairs of her head, and kissed his feet, and anointed them with the ointment.* Now a reader of any judgment will need to reflect but a moment to discover, that what is here told is impossible. If Jesus and others were in our manner sitting together at table, the woman could not be behind them, when doing what is here recorded. She must in that case, on the contrary, have been under the table. The chairs, on which the guests were seated, would have effectually precluded access from behind. It is said also that she stood, while she bathed his feet with tears, wiped them with the hairs of her head, anointed and kissed them. Another manifest absurdity. On the supposition of their sitting, she must have been at least kneeling, if not lying on the floor. These inconsistencies instantly disappear, when the Evangelist is allowed to speak for himself, who, instead of saying that *Jesus sat down*, says expressly that he *lay down*, ανεκλιθη. And to prevent, if possible, a circumstance being

[30] Luke, vii. 36. 37. 38.

mistaken or overlooked, on which the practicability of the thing depended, he repeats it by a synonymous term in the very next verse. "When she knew that "Jesus lay at table," *αναχειται*. The knowledge of their manner at meals makes every thing in this story level to an ordinary capacity.

§ 6. AT their feasts, matters were commonly ordered thus: Three couches were set in the form of the Greek letter Π, the table was placed in the middle, the lower end whereof was left open, to give access to the servants, for setting and removing the dishes, and serving the guests. The other three sides were inclosed by the couches, whence it got the name of *triclinium*. The middle couch, which lay along the upper end of the table, and was therefore accounted the most honourable place, and that which the Pharisees are said particularly to have affected, was distinguished by the name *πρωτοκλισια*[31]. The person intrusted with the direction of the entertainment was called *αρχιτρικλινος*,[32]. The guests lay with their feet backwards, obliquely, across the couches, which were covered, for their better accommodation, with such sort of cloth, or tapestry, as suited the quality of the entertainer. As it was necessary, for the conveniency of eating, that the couches should be somewhat higher than the table, the guests have probably been raised by them three feet, and upwards, from the floor. When these

[31] Matth. xxiii. 6. [32] John. ii. 8.

particulars are taken into consideration, every circumstance of the story becomes perfectly consistent and intelligible. This also removes the difficulty there is in the account given, by John[33], of the paschal supper, where Jesus being set, as our translators render it, at table, one of his disciples is said, in one verse, to have been leaning on his bosom, and in another, to have been lying on his breast. Though these attitudes are incompatible with our mode of sitting at meals, they were naturally consequent upon theirs. As they lay forwards, in a direction somewhat oblique, feeding themselves with their right hand, and leaning on their left arm; they no sooner intermitted, and reclined a little, than the head of each came close to the breast of him who was next on the left. Now, a circumstance (however frivolous in itself) cannot be deemed of no consequence, which serves to throw light upon the sacred pages, and solve difficulties, otherwise inextricable. This case, though not properly requiring the use of any ancient or foreign name, I could not help considering minutely in this place, on account of its affinity with the other topics of which I had been treating.

§ 7. I SHALL add a few things, on the manner adopted by other translators in rendering what relates to this usage. With regard to the Latin versions, it may naturally be supposed, that the Vulgate would

[33] John, xiii. 23. 25.

be literal, and consequently, in this particular, just. There was no temptation to depart from the letter. It suited their customs at that period, as well as the idiom of their language. And though it did not suit the customs of the times of modern Latin interpreters, they could have no motive, in this article, to desert the manner of the ancient translator, expressed in a phraseology which both Latin and Greek classics had rendered familiar. As to the translations into modern tongues, Luther appears to have been the first who, in his translation into German, has, in this particular, forced the Evangelists into a conformity with modern fashions. The translator into modern Greek has adopted the same method, putting εκαθισε for ανεκλιθη, &c. The French translator, Olivetan, has avoided the false translation of *sitting* for *lying*, and also the apparent awkwardness of a literal version. In the passage from Luke, above quoted, he says, *Il se mit à table;* and speaking of the woman, *Laquelle ayant connu qu'il etoit à table.* In the miraculous increase of the loaves and the fishes in the desert[34], he thus expresses himself: *Il commanda aux troupes de s'arranger par terre.* Diodati has, in the first of these passages, adopted the same method with the French translator, saying, *si mise a tavola;* and *ch'egli era a tavola;* in the other, he has fallen into the error of our common version, and said, *Jesu commandò alle turbe, che si mettessero a sedere in terra.* Most other

[34] Matth. xv. 35.

French versions have taken the same method of eluding the difficulty. But all the late English versions I have seen, follow implicitly the common translation.

§ 8. To come now to offices and judicatories: it must be acknowledged that, in these, it is not always easy to say, as was remarked in a preceding Dissertation [35], whether the resemblances to, or differences from, offices and judicatories of our own, ought to induce us to retain the original term, or to translate it. But whatever be in this, or however the first translators ought to have been determined in their choice between these methods, the matter is not equally open to us in this late age as it was to them. The election made by our predecessors, in this department, has established an use which, except in some particular cases, it would be dangerous in their successors to violate; and which, therefore, unless where perspicuity or energy requires an alteration, ought to be followed. For example, who could deny, that the Greek terms, *αγγελος*, *αποστολος*, *διαβολος*, might not have been as well rendered *messenger*, *missionary*, *slanderer*, as the words *ιερευς*, *υπηρετης*, *αντιδικος*, are rendered *priest*, *minister*, *adversary*. In regard to the import of the words, there does not appear to me to be a closer correspondence in the last mentioned, than in the first. Besides, as the first are themselves no other than

[35] Diss. II. P. I. § 5.

Greek translations of the Hebrew words שטן, שלוח, מלאך, *satan*, *shaluch*, *malach*, which the Seventy have not judged necessary to retain in another language, and in this judgment have been followed by the writers of the New Testament; they have given the example of translating, rather than transferring, these appellatives into other languages; the last name, *satan*, being the only one which is ever retained by them, and that very seldom.

But the true source of the distinction that has been made in this respect by European translators, is not any particular propriety in the different cases, but the example of the old Latin translator. The words which he retained, with such an alteration in the orthography as adapted them to the genius of the tongue, we also retain; and the words which he translated, we translate. Because he said *angelus*, *apostolus*, *diabolus*, which are not properly Latin words, we say *angel*, *apostle*, *devil*, not originally English. Had he, on the contrary, used the terms *nuncius*, *legatus*, *calumniator*, we had probably substituted for them, *messenger*, *missionary*, *slanderer*, or some terms equivalent. For, in those cases wherein the Latin interpreter has not scrupled to translate the Greek by Latin words, neither have we scrupled to render them by English words. I am, however, far from affirming that the interpreters of the Latin church, either in the old Italic, or in the present Vulgate, have acted from caprice in their choice; though I do not always discover reasons of

such weight for the distinctions they have made, as should lead us implicitly to follow them.

There is only one example in titles of this sort, wherein the moderns have taken the freedom to judge differently. The Greek παρακλητος, in John's Gospel, is always retained by the author of the Vulgate, who uses *paracletus*, but has not been followed by later translators. Erasmus has sometimes adopted this word, and sometimes said *consolator*, and is followed in both, by the translator of Zuric. Castalio says *confirmator*, and Beza *advocatus*. Most modern versions into Italian, French, and English, have, in this instance, followed Erasmus, in the import they have given the word, in preference even to Beza. And of these our common version is one, using the word *comforter*. Nay, some French translators from the Vulgate have deserted that version, rendering the word either *consolateur* or *avocat*. In general, I would pay that deference to the example of the ancient interpreters as to prefer their manner, wherever there is not, from perspicuity, energy, or the general scope of the discourse, positive reason to the contrary. Such reason, I think, we have in regard to the title last mentioned [36]. As to the term διαβολος, I have already considered the cases in which it is not proper to render it *devil* [37]. The name αποστολος is so much appropriated in the New Testament, to a particular class of extraor-

[36] See the note on John, xiv. 16.

[37] Diss. VI. Part I. § 2, 3, 4.

dinary ministers, that there are very few cases, and none that I remember in the Gospels, where either perspicuity or energy would require a change of the term.

§ 9. IT is otherwise with the name αγγελος, in regard to which there are several occurrences, where the import of the sentiment is, if not lost, very much obscured, because the word in the version has not the same extent of signification with that in the original. It was observed before [38], that there is this difference between the import of such terms, as they occur in their native tongues, whether Hebrew or Greek, and as modernized in versions, that, in the former, they always retain somewhat of their primitive signification, and beside indicating a particular being or class of beings, they are of the nature of appellatives, and mark a special character, function, or note of distinction in such beings; whereas, when latinized or englished, but not translated into Latin or English, they answer solely the first of those uses, and approach the nature of proper names. Now, where there happens to be a manifest allusion in the original, to the primitive and ordinary acceptation of the word in that language, that allusion must be lost in a translation, where the word is properly not translated, and where there is nothing in the sound that can suggest the allusion. It is particularly unfortunate, if it be in an argument; as the whole will be necessarily involved in darkness.

[38] Diss. VI. Part I. § 1

§ 10. I SHALL illustrate the preceding observations by some remarks on the following passage [39]. 4. *Being made so much better than the angels, as he hath by inheritance obtained a more excellent name than they:* 5. *For unto which of the angels said he at any time, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee? And again, I will be to him a Father, and he shall be to me a Son.* 6. *And again when he bringeth in the first-begotten into the world, he saith, And let all the angels of God worship him.* 7. *And of the angels he saith, Who maketh his angels spirits, and his ministers a flame of fire.* 8. *But unto the Son he saith, Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever.* I cannot help thinking with Grotius, that there is here a comparison of the dignity of the different personages mentioned, from the consideration of what is imported in their respective titles. This is at best but obscurely suggested in the common version. For though the word *son* is expressive of a natural and near relation, the word *angel* in our language is the name of a certain order of beings, and beside that, expresses nothing at all. It is not, like the original appellation, both in Hebrew and in Greek, a name of office. Further, the seventh verse, as it stands with us, *Who maketh his angels spirits, and his ministers a flame of fire*, is unintelligible; and if some mystical sense may be put upon it, this is at best but a matter of conjecture, and appears quite unconnected with the argument. It is well known

[39] Heb. i. 4. &c.

that the word πνευματα rendered *spirits*, signifies also *winds*. That this is the meaning of it here, is evident from the passage [40] whence the quotation is taken. For the Hebrew רוח *ruach*, is of the same extent. And though it be in that place, for the sake of uniformity, rendered the same way as here, nothing can be more manifest, than that the Psalmist is celebrating the wonders of the material creation, all the parts of which execute, in their different ways, the commands of the Creator. Our translators not only render the same Hebrew word *wind* in the third verse, and *spirits* in the fourth, but in this last evidently start aside from the subject. Nothing, on the contrary, can be better connected than the whole passage in the true, which is also the most obvious, interpretation, and may be thus expressed : *Who covereth himself with light as with a mantle, who stretcheth out the heavens like a curtain ; who layeth the beams of his chambers in the waters ; who maketh the clouds his chariot ; who walketh on the wings of the wind ; who maketh winds his messengers, and flaming fire his ministers* [41] *; who hath*

[40] Psal. civ. 4.

[41] Dr. Lowth (De sacra Poesi Hebræorum. Præl. viii.), though he retains the word *angelus*, understands the passage just as I do, making winds the subject, and angels a metaphorical attribute. "Faciens ut venti sint angeli sui, ut ignis ardens sit sibi ministrorum loco." He adds : "Describuntur elementa in exequendis Dei mandatis, prompta et expedita quasi angeli, aut ministri tabernaculo deservientes." Houbigant to the same purpose, "Facit angelos suos, ventos, et ministros suos ignem rutilantem."

laid the foundations of the earth, that it should never be removed. There is an internal probability of the justness of this version, arising from the perspicuous and close connection of the parts, and an improbability in the common version, arising from their obscurity and want of connection; verse 4. *Who maketh his angels spirits, his ministers a flame of fire,* being a digression from the scope of the context, the material world, to the world of spirits.

Now, let us try, in the passage of the Epistle to the Hebrews referred to, how the same translation of the words πνευμα and αγγελος by *wind* and *messenger*, through the whole, will suit the Apostle's reasoning. Speaking of our Lord, he says, *Being as far superior to the heavenly messengers, as the title he hath inherited is more excellent than theirs; For to which of those messengers did God ever say, "Thou art my Son, I have to-day begotten "thee:" And again, "I will be to him a Father, "and he shall be to me a Son:" Again, when he introduceth the first-born into the world, he saith, "Let all God's messengers worship him." Whereas, concerning messengers, he saith, "Who maketh winds his messengers, and flaming fire his ministers:" But to the Son, "Thy throne, O God, endureth for ever."* To me it is plain, first, that the aim of his reasoning is to show the superior excellency of the Messiah, from the superiority of his title of *Son*, given him in a sense peculiar to him (and which, from analogy to the constitution of the universe, should imply of the same nature with the Father),

to that of *messenger*, which does not differ essentially from servant. Now the English word *angel* does not express this. It is a name for those celestial beings, but without suggesting their function. Secondly, that, in proof of the inferiority of the title *messenger*, the writer urges, that it is sometimes given even to things inanimate, such as storms and lightning.

Every reader of reflection admits, that there runs, through the whole passage, a contrast of the things spoken concerning the Messiah, to the things spoken concerning angels, in order to show the supereminence of the former above the latter. The seventh verse, as now rendered, perfectly suits this idea, and completes one side of the contrast. But does it answer this purpose in the common version? Not in the least: for, will any one say, that it derogates from the highest dignity to be called a *spirit*, when it is considered that God himself is so denominated? And as the term, *flaming fire*, when applied to intelligent beings, must be metaphorical, the consideration that, by such metaphors, the energy and omniscience of the Deity are sometimes represented, will, in our estimation, serve rather to enhance than to depress the character. The case is totally different, when *flaming fire*, or lightning, in the literal sense, is made the subject of the proposition, and *God's messengers* the predicate. But it may be asked, Do not the words in the Greek oppose this supposition, inasmuch as τους αγγελους αυτου *his messengers* has the article, and should

therefore be understood as the subject, whereas *πνευματα* having no article must be the predicate; but let it be remarked, that the article is found only in the translation of the Seventy, which is copied by the apostle. In the Hebrew, neither term has the article; the subject therefore must be determined by the scope of the place.

§ 11. I know that it has been objected to this interpretation, that רוח *ruach*, though used in the singular for *wind*, does not occur, in this sense, in the plural, except when joined with the numeral adjective *four*. But from this, though it were true, we can conclude nothing. That the word is found in this meaning, in the plural, is a sufficient ground for interpreting it so, when the connection requires it. Farther, though it were conclusive, it is not true. In Jeremiah [42], we find, in the same passage, both ארבע רוחות *arbang ruchoth*, *four winds*, and כל הרוחות *col haruchoth*, *all the winds*, where it was never doubted, that both expressions were used of *the winds*. As to the insinuation which some have thrown out concerning this explanation, as unfavourable to the doctrine of Christ's divinity, it can be accounted for only from that jealousy, an invariable attendant on the polemic spirit, which still continues too much to infect and dishonour theological inquiries. This jealousy, however, appears so much misplaced here, that the above interpretation is ma-

[42] Jer. xlix. 36.

nifestly more favourable to the common doctrine than the other. I say not this to recommend it to any party, knowing that, in these matters, we ought all to be determined by the impartial principles of sound criticism, and not by our own prepossessions.

§ 12. BUT to return: a second case, wherein it is better to employ the general word *messenger*, is, when it is not clear, from the context, whether the sacred penmen meant a celestial, or a terrestrial, being. In such cases, it is always best to render the term, so as that the version may admit the same latitude of interpretation with the original; and this can be effected only by using the general term. For this reason, in the following expressions, οιτινες ελαβετε τον νομον εις διαταγας αγγελων [43], and διαταγεις δι' αγγελων εν χειρι μεσιτου [44], it would have been better to translate αγγελων *messengers*, as it is not certain whether such extraordinary ministers as Moses and Joshua, and the succeeding Prophets, be meant, or any of the heavenly host. The same may be said of that passage, οφειλει η γυνη εξουσιαν εχειν επι της κεφαλης, δια τους αγγελους [45], it being very doubtful whether the word, in this place, denotes *angels* or *men*.

§ 13. A THIRD case, wherein (I do not say it must, but) it may, properly be rendered *messengers*, is when, though it evidently refers to superior

[43] Acts, vii. 53. [44] Gal. iii. 19. [45] 1 Cor. xi. 10.

beings, it is joined with some word or epithet, which sufficiently marks the reference, as αγγελος Κυριω, *a messenger of the Lord*, οι αγγελοι των ουρανων, *the heavenly messengers*, οι ἁγιοι αγγελοι, *the holy messengers;* for, with the addition of the epithet, the English is just as explicit as the Greek. Not but that such epithets may in some sense be applied to men also; but it is customary with the sacred writers thus to distinguish the inhabitants of heaven. In this case, however, it must be admitted, that either way of translating is good. There is one advantage in sometimes adopting this manner, that it accustoms us to the word *messenger* in this application, and may consequently assist the unlearned in applying it in doubtful cases. In some cases, not doubtful, to add the word *heavenly* in the version, is no interpolation, for the single word αγγελος often includes it. Thus, though the word γλωσσα originally means no more than *tongue*, it is frequently employed to denote an unknown or foreign tongue [45].

§ 14. A FOURTH case, wherein the general term is proper, is when the word is applied to a human being. This rule, however, admits some exceptions, soon to be taken notice of. Our translators have rightly rendered it *messenger*, in the instances which fall under this description noted in the mar-

[45] Diss. XII. P. IV. § 9.

gin [47], wherein they are not only human beings that are meant, but the message is from men.

§ 15. I SAID, that there are some exceptions from this rule. The first is, when not only the message is from God, but when it appears to be the view of the writer to show the dignity of the mission, from the title given to the missionary, as being a title which he has in common with superior natures: in such cases, it is better to preserve in the version the term *angel*, without which the allusion is lost, and by consequence justice is not done to the argument. For this reason the word *angel* ought to be retained in the noted passage of the Gospels concerning John the Baptist [48]: *What went ye to see? A Prophet? Yea, I tell you, and something superior to a Prophet; for this is he concerning whom it is written, "Behold I send mine angel before thee, who "shall prepare thy way."* There is, manifestly, couched here a comparison between the two titles *prophet* and *angel*, with a view to raise the latter. Now, to this end the common English word *messenger* is not adapted, as it does not convey to us the idea of greater dignity than that of a Prophet, or even of so great. My argument here may be thought not quite consistent with what I urged in my first remark on this word. But the two cases are rather opposite than similar. The allusion was there to the ordinary signification of the term; the

[47] Luke, vii. 24. ix. 52. James, ii. 25. [48] Matth. xi. 9, 10.

allusion is here not to the signification, but to the common application of it, to beings of a superior order. The intention was there, comparatively, to depress the character, the intention here is to exalt it.

§ 16. ANOTHER case, in which the word *angel* ought to be retained, though used of man, is when there would arise either obscurity or ambiguity from the construction, if the word *messenger* should be employed. It cannot be doubted, that the angels of the seven churches mentioned in the Apocalypse [49], are human creatures; but the term *messenger* would render the expression ambiguous or rather improper. The messenger of societies (in like manner as of individuals), is one sent by them, not to them. In this, and some other instances, the Greek αγγελος is to be understood as corresponding in extent of signification to the Hebrew מלאך *malach*, which often denotes *a minister*, or servant employed in any charge of importance and dignity, though not a message. It would, therefore, be no deviation from what is included in the Hellenistic sense of the word, if, through the whole of that passage, it were rendered *president*.

§ 17. IN what concerns civil offices, our translators have, very properly, retained some names to which we have none entirely equivalent. Of this

[49] Rev. i. 20. ii. 1. 8. 12. 18. iii. 1. 7. 14.

number is the name *tetrarch*, which admits no explanation but by a periphrasis. *Centurion* and *publican* are of the same kind. The word *legion*, though not a name of office, being the name of a military division, to which we have not any exactly corresponding, may be ranked in the same class. The three words last specified are neither Hebrew nor Greek, but Latin; and as they are the names of things familiar only to the Latins, they are best expressed by those names of Latin derivation employed by our translators. Two of them occur in the Latin form in the New Testament, λεγεων, and κεντυριων, though for the latter word the Greek ἑκατονταρχος is oftener used.

It may be proper here to observe, in regard to such Latin appellatives, that from the connection which has subsisted between all European countries and the Romans, and from the general acquaintance which the Western nations have long had with the ancient Roman usages, history, and literature; their names of offices, &c. are naturalized in most modern languages, particularly in English. This makes the adoption of the Latin name for an office, or any other thing which the Jews had solely from the Romans, peculiarly pertinent. The remark now made holds, especially when the persons spoken of were either Romans, or the servants of Rome. If, therefore, after the Vulgate, we had rendered χιλιαρχος *tribune*, ανθυπατος *proconsul*, and perhaps σπειρα *cohort*, the expression, without losing any thing, in perspicuity, to those of an inferior class; would have

been, to the learned reader, more significant than *chief-captain, deputy, band.*

The word ἡγεμων also, though sometimes a general term, denoting *governor* or *president;* yet, as applied to Pilate, is known to import no more than *procurator.* Properly there was but one *president* in Syria, of which Judea was a part. He who had the superintendency of this part was styled *imperatoris procurator.* For this we have the authority of *Tacitus* the Roman annalist, and of *Philo* the Alexandrian Jew. And though the author of the Vulgate has commonly used the term *præses* for ἡγεμων; yet, in translating Luke [50], he has rendered ἡγεμονευοντος Ποντιυ Πιλατυ της Ιυδαιας, *procurante Pontio Pilato Judæam.* To those who know a little of the language, or even of the history, of ancient Rome, the Latin names, in many cases, are much more definite in their signification, than the words by which they are commonly rendered, and, being already familiar in our language, are not, even to the vulgar, more obscure than names originally English, relating to things wherewith they are little acquainted. For a similar reason, I have also retained the name *prætorium*, which, though a Latin word, has been adopted by the sacred writers, and to which neither common-hall nor judgment-hall entirely answers. That the Evangelists, who wrote in Greek, a more copious language, found themselves compelled to borrow from the Latin, the name of

[50] Luke, iii. 1.

what belonged to the office of a Roman magistrate, is to their translators a sufficient authority for adopting the same method.

§ 18. I SHALL conclude this Dissertation with observing, that there are two judicatories mentioned in the New Testament, one Jewish, the other Grecian, the distinguishing names of which may not, without energy, be preserved in a translation. Though the noun *συνεδριον* is Greek, and susceptible of the general interpretation *council* or senate; yet, as it is commonly in the Gospels and Acts appropriated to that celebrated court of senators or *elders* accustomed to assemble at Jerusalem, and from the Greek name, called *sanhedrim*, which was at once their national senate and supreme judicatory; and, as it appears not, in those books, to have been ever applied to any other particular assembly, though sometimes to such in general as were vested with the highest authority; I have thought it reasonable to retain the word *sanhedrim*, in every case where there could be no doubt that this is the court spoken of. The name has been long naturalized in the language; and, as it is more confined in its application than any common term, it is so much the more definite and energetic. The other is the famous Athenian court called *the Areopagus*, and mentioned in the Acts [51]; which, as it was in several respects peculiar in its constitution, ought to be distinguished in a version,

[51] Acts, xvii. 19.

as it is in the original, by its proper name. To render it *Mars-hill* from etymology, without regard to use, would entirely mislead the unlearned, who could never imagine that the historian spoke of bringing the Apostle before a court, but would suppose that he only informed us that they brought him up to an eminence in the city, from which he discoursed to the people. This is in part effected by the common version; for, though in verse 19, it is said, *They brought Paul to Areopagus*, it is added in verse 22, *Then Paul stood in the midst of Mars-hill, and said.* This leads one to think that these were two names for the same hill. *The Areopagus* with the article is the proper version in both places.

DISSERTATION THE NINTH.

INQUIRY WHETHER CERTAIN NAMES WHICH HAVE BEEN ADOPTED INTO MOST TRANSLATIONS OF SCRIPTURE IN THE WEST, COINCIDE IN MEANING WITH THE ORIGINAL TERMS FROM WHICH THEY ARE DERIVED, AND OF WHICH THEY ARE USED AS THE VERSION.

IT was observed in a former Dissertation [1], as one cause of difficulty in the examination of the Scriptures, that before we begin to study them critically, we have been accustomed to read them in a translation, whence we have acquired a habit of considering several ancient and Oriental terms as equivalent to certain words, in modern use, in our own language, by which they have been commonly rendered. What makes the difficulty the greater is, that when we become acquainted with other versions beside that into our mother-tongue, these, instead of correcting, serve but to confirm the prejudice. For, in these translations, we find the same original words rendered by words which we know to correspond exactly in those tongues, to the terms employed in the English translation. In order to set this observation in the strongest light, it will be necessary to trace the origin of

[1] Diss. II. Part III. § 6.

some terms which have become technical among ecclesiastical writers, pointing out the changes in meaning which they have undergone. When alterations are produced gradually, they escape the notice of the generality of people, and sometimes even of the more discerning. For, a term once universally understood to be equivalent to an original term, whose place it occupies in the translation, will naturally be supposed still equivalent, by those who do not attend to the variations in the meanings of words, which a tract of time often insensibly produces. Sometimes etymology contributes to favour the deception.

How few are there, even among the readers of the original, who entertain a suspicion that the words *mystery*, *blasphemy*, *schism*, *heresy*, do not convey to moderns precisely those ideas which the Greek words (being the same except in termination) μυστηριον, βλασφημια, σχισμα, αἱρεσις, in the New Testament, conveyed to Christians in the times of the Apostles? Yet, that there is not such a correspondence in meaning between them, as is commonly supposed, I intend, in the present Dissertation, to put beyond a doubt. That there is a real difference, in regard to some of those words, is, I think, generally allowed by men of letters; but as all are not agreed in regard to the precise difference between the one and the other, I shall here examine, briefly, the import of the original terms, in the order above mentioned, that we may be qualified to judge how

far they are rightly rendered by the words supposed to correspond to them, and that we may not be misled, by the resemblance of sound, to determine concerning the sameness of signification.

PART I.

OF MYSTERY.

THE Greek word *μυστηριον* occurs frequently in the New Testament, and is uniformly rendered, in the English translation, *mystery*. We all know that by the most current use of the English word *mystery*, (as well as of the Latin ecclesiastic word *mysterium*, and the corresponding terms in modern languages,) is denoted some doctrine to human reason incomprehensible; in other words, such a doctrine as exhibits difficulties, and even apparent contradictions, which we cannot solve or explain. Another use of the word, which, though not so universal at present, is often to be met with in ecclesiastic writers of former ages, and in foreign writers of the present age, is to signify some religious ceremony or rite, especially those now denominated sacraments. In the communion-office of the church of England, the elements, after consecration, are sometimes termed *holy mysteries*. But this use seems not now to be common among protestants, less perhaps in this country

than in any other. Johnson has not so much as mentioned it in his Dictionary. Indeed, in the fourth, and some succeeding, centuries, the word μυστηριον was so much in vogue with the Greek fathers, and *mysterium* or *sacramentum*, as it was often rendered, with the Latin, that it would be impossible to say in what meaning they used the words; nay, whether or not they affixed any meaning to them at all. In every thing that related to religion, there were found *mysteries* and *sacraments*, in doctrines and precepts, in ordinances and petitions: they could even discover numbers of them in the Lord's Prayer. Nay, so late as Father Possevini, this unmeaning application of these terms has prevailed in some places. That Jesuit is cited with approbation by Walton, in the prolegomena to his Polyglot, for saying, "Tot esse Hebraica in Scrip-"tura sacramenta, quot literæ; tot mysteria, quot "puncta; tot arcana, quot apices," a sentence, I acknowledge, as unintelligible to me as Father Simon owns it was to him. But passing this indefinite use, of which we know not what to make, the two significations I have mentioned, are sufficiently known to theologians, and continue, though not equally, still in use with modern writers.

§ 2. When we come to examine the scriptures critically, and make them serve for their own interpreters, which is the surest way of attaining the true knowledge of them, we shall find, if I mistake not, that both these senses are unsupported by the usage

of the inspired penmen. After the most careful examination of all the passages in the New-Testament, in which the Greek word occurs, and after consulting the use made of the term, by the ancient Greek interpreters of the Old, and borrowing aid from the practice of the Hellenist Jews, in the writings called Apocrypha, I can only find two senses, nearly related to each other, which can strictly be called scriptural. The first, and what I may call the leading sense of the word, is *arcanum*, a secret, any thing not disclosed, not published to the world, though perhaps communicated to a select number.

§ 3. Now let it be observed, that this is totally different from the current sense of the English word *mystery*, something incomprehensible. In the former acceptation, a thing was no longer a mystery than whilst it remained unrevealed; in the latter, a thing is equally a mystery after the revelation as before. To the former we apply, properly, the epithet *unknown*, to the latter we may, in a great measure, apply the term *unknowable*. Thus, the proposition that God would call the Gentiles, and receive them into his church, was as intelligible, or, if you like the term better, comprehensible, as that he once had called the descendants of the Patriarchs, or as any plain proposition, or historical fact. Yet, whilst undiscovered, or, at least veiled under figures and types, it remained, in the scriptural idiom, a *mystery*, having been hidden from ages and generations. But, after it had pleased God to reveal this

his gracious purpose to the Apostles, by his Spirit, it was a *mystery* no longer.

The Greek words, αποκαλυψις and μυστηριον, stand in the same relation to each other, that the English words *discovery* and *secret* do. Μυστηριον αποκαλυφθεν is a *secret discovery*, and consequently a secret no longer. The discovery is the extinction of the secret as such. These words accordingly, or words equivalent, as μυστηριον γνωρισθεν, φανερωθεν, are often brought together by the Apostles, to show that what were once the secret purposes and counsels of God, had been imparted to them, to be by them promulgated to all the world. Thus, they invited the grateful attention of all, to what was so distinguished a favour on the part of heaven, and must be of such unspeakable importance to the apostate race of Adam. The terms, communication, revelation, manifestation, plainly show the import of the term μυστηριον, to which they are applied. As this, indeed, seems to be a point now universally acknowledged by the learned, I shall only refer the judicious reader, for further proof of it from the New Testament, to the passages quoted in the margin[2]; in all which, he will plainly perceive, that the Apostle treats of something which had been concealed for ages (and for that reason called μυστηριον), but was then openly revealed; and not of any thing, in its own nature, dark and inconceivable.

[2] Rom. xvi. 25, 26. 1 Cor. ii. 7, 8, 9, 10. Eph. 1. 9. iii. 3, 4, 5, 6. 9. vi. 19. Col. i. 26, 27.

§ 4. IF, in addition to the evidence arising from so many direct and clear passages in the writings of Paul, it should be thought necessary to recur to the usage of the Seventy, we find that, in the Prophet Daniel [3], the word *μυστηριον* occurs not fewer than nine times, answering always to the Chaldaic רזא *raza, res arcana*, and used in relation to Nebuchadnezzar's dream, which was become *a secret*, even to the dreamer himself, as he had forgot it. The word there is uniformly rendered in the common version *secret ;* and it deserves to be remarked that, in those verses, it is found connected with the verbs *γνωριζω, φωτιζω*, and *αποκαλυπτω ;* in a way exactly similar to the usage of the New Testament above observed. It occurs in no other place of that version, but one in Isaiah, of very doubtful import. In the apocryphal writings (which, in matters of criticism on the Hellenistic idiom, are of good authority), the word *μυστηριον* frequently occurs in the same sense, and is used in reference to human secrets, as well as to divine. Nay, the word is not, even in the New Testament, confined to divine secrets. It expresses sometimes those of a different, and even contrary, nature. Thus, the Apostle, speaking of the antichristian spirit, says, *The mystery of iniquity doth already work* [4]. The spirit of antichrist hath begun to operate ; but the operation is latent and unperceived. The Gospel of Christ is a blessing, the spirit of

[3] Dan. ii. 18, 19. 27, 28, 29, 30. 47. iv. 9.

[4] 2 Thess. ii. 7.

antichrist a curse. Both are equally denominated *mystery*, or secret, whilst they remain concealed.

§ 5. I SHALL be much misunderstood, if any one infer, from what has been now advanced, that I mean to signify, that there is nothing in the doctrines of religion which is not, on all sides, perfectly comprehensible to us, or nothing from which difficulties may be raised, that we are not able to give a satisfactory solution of. On the contrary, I am fully convinced, that in all sciences, particularly natural theology, as well as in revelation, there are many truths of this kind, whose evidence such objections are not regarded by a judicious person, as of force sufficient to invalidate. For example, the divine omniscience is a tenet of natural religion. This manifestly implies God's foreknowledge of all future events. Yet, to reconcile the divine prescience with the freedom, and even the contingency, and consequently, with the good or ill desert of human actions, is what I have never yet seen atchieved by any, and indeed despair of seeing. That there are such difficulties also in the doctrines of revelation, it would, in my opinion, be very absurd to deny. But the present inquiry does not affect that matter in the least. This inquiry is critical, and concerns solely the scriptural acceptation of the word *μυστηριον*, which I have shown to relate merely to the secrecy for some time observed with regard to any doctrine, whether mysterious, in the modern acceptation of the word, or not.

§ 6. THE foregoing observations will throw some light on what Paul says of the nature of the office with which he was vested: *Let a man so account of us, as of the ministers of Christ, and stewards of the mysteries of God*[5], οικονομους μυστηριων Θεου, dispensers to mankind of the gracious purposes of heaven, heretofore concealed, and therefore denominated secrets. Nor can any thing be more conformable than this interpretation, both to the instructions given to the Apostles, during our Lord's ministry, and to the commission they received from him. In regard to the former, he tells them, *To you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven;* no secret, relating to this subject, is withheld from you; *but to them it is not given*[6]; that is, not yet given. For these very Apostles, when commissioned to preach, were not only empowered, but commanded, to disclose to all the world[7], the whole mystery of God, his secret counsels in regard to man's salvation. And that they might not imagine that the private informations, received from their Master, had never been intended for the public ear, he gave them this express injunction, *What I tell you in darkness, that speak ye in light. And what ye hear in the ear, that preach ye upon the house-tops.* He assigns the reason, the divine decree; a topic to which he oftener than once recurs. *There is nothing covered that shall not be revealed, and hid that shall not be known*[8]. Again: *There is nothing*

[5] 1 Cor. iv. 1. [6] Matth. xiii. 41.
[7] Matth. xxviii. 19. Mark, xvi. 15. [8] Matth. x. 26, 27.

hid, which shall not be manifested; neither was any thing kept secret, but that it should come abroad[q]. This may serve to explain to us the import of these phrases which occur in the Epistles, as expressing the whole Christian institution, *the mystery of the gospel, the mystery of the faith, the mystery of God, and the mystery of Christ;* mystery, in the singular number, not mysteries, in the plural, which would have been more conformable to the modern import of the word, as relating to the incomprehensibility of the different articles of doctrine. But the whole of the gospel, taken together, is denominated *the mystery*, the grand secret, in reference to the silence or concealment under which it was formerly kept; as, in like manner, it is styled the revelation of Jesus Christ, in reference to the publication afterwards enjoined.

§ 7. I SIGNIFIED, before, that there was another meaning which the term *μυστηριον* sometimes bears in the New Testament. But it is so nearly related to, if not coincident with, the former, that I am doubtful whether I can call it other than a particular application of the same meaning. However, if the thing be understood, it is not material which of the two ways we denominate it. The word is sometimes employed to denote the figurative sense, as distinguished from the literal, which is conveyed under any fable, parable, allegory, symbolical ac-

[q] Mark. iv. 22.

tion, representation, dream, or vision. It is plain that, in this case, the term μυστηριον is used comparatively; for, however clear the meaning intended to be conveyed in the apologue, or parable, may be to the intelligent, it is obscure, compared with the literal sense, which, to the unintelligent, proves a kind of veil. The one is, as it were, open to the senses; the other requires penetration and reflection. Perhaps there was some allusion to this import of the term, when our Lord said to his disciples, *To you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of God; but to them that are without, all these things are done in parables* [10]. The Apostles were let into the secret, and got the spiritual sense of the similitude, whilst the multitude amused themselves with the letter, and searched no further.

In this sense, μυστηριον is used in these words: *The mystery of the seven stars which thou sawest in my right hand, and the seven golden candlesticks. The seven stars are the angels of the seven churches, and the seven candlesticks are the seven churches* [11]. Again, in the same book: *I will tell thee the mystery of the woman, and of the beast that carrieth her*, &c.[12]. There is only one other passage, to which this meaning of the word is adapted, and on which I shall have occasion to remark afterwards [13]. *This is a great mystery, but I speak concerning Christ and the church* [14]. Nor is it any objection to this

[10] Mark, iv. 11. [11] Rev. i. 20. [12] Rev. xvii. 7.
[13] Diss. X. Part III. § 9. [14] Eph. v. 32.

interpretation of the word *mystery* here, that the Apostle alluded not to any fiction, but to an historical fact, the formation of Eve out of the body of Adam her husband. For, though there is no necessity that the story which supplies us with the body of the parable or allegory (if I may so express myself), be literally true; there is, on the other hand, no necessity that it be false. Passages of true history are sometimes allegorized by the sacred penmen. Witness the story of Abraham and his two sons, Isaac by his wife Sarah, and Ishmael by his bond-woman Hagar, of which the Apostle has made an allegory for representing the comparative natures of the Mosaic dispensation and the Christian [15].

§ 8. As to the passage quoted from the Epistle to the Ephesians, let it be observed, that the word *μυστηριον* is there rendered in the Vulgate, *sacramentum*. Although this Latin word was long used very indefinitely, by ecclesiastical writers, it came, at length, with the more judicious, to acquire a meaning more precise and fixed. Firmilian calls Noah's ark the sacrament of the church of Christ [16]. It is manifest, from the illustration he subjoins, that he means the symbol, type, or emblem, of the church; alluding to an expression of the Apostle Peter [17]. This may, on a superficial view, be thought nearly coincident with the second sense of the word *μυστηριον*,

[15] Gal. iv. 22, &c.

[16] Cyp. Epist. 75. in some editions 43.

[17] 1 Pet. iii. 20, 21.

above assigned. But, in fact, it is rather an inversion of it. It is not, in Scripture-language, the type that is called the *mystery*, but the antitype; not the sign, in any figurative speech or action, but the thing signified. It would, therefore, have corresponded better to the import of the Greek word, to say, "The "church of Christ is the sacrament of Noah's ark;" το μυστηριον, the secret antitype, which that vessel, destined for the salvation of the chosen few, from the deluge, was intended to adumbrate. This use, however, not uncommon among the fathers of the third century, has given rise to the definition of a sacrament, as *the visible sign of an invisible grace;* a definition to which some regard has been paid by most parties, Protestant as well as Romish.

§ 9. But to return to μυστηριον: it is plain that the earliest perversion of this word, from its genuine and original sense (a *secret*, or something concealed), was in making it to denote some solemn and sacred ceremony. Nor is it difficult to point out the causes that would naturally bring ecclesiastic writers to employ it in a sense, which has so close an affinity to a common application of the word in profane authors. Among the different ceremonies employed by the heathen, in their idolatrous superstitions, some were public and performed in the open courts, or in those parts of the temples to which all had access; others were more secretly performed in places from which the crowd was carefully excluded. To assist, or even be present at these, a select number only was

admitted, to each of whom a formal and solemn initiation was necessary. These secret rites, on account of this very circumstance, their secrecy, were generally denominated *mysteries*. They were different, according to what was thought agreeable to the different deities, in whose honour they were celebrated. Thus they had the mysteries of Ceres, the mysteries of Proserpine, the mysteries of Bacchus, &c. Now there were some things in the Christian worship, which, though essentially different from all Pagan rites, had as much resemblance, in this circumstance, the exclusion of the multitude, as would give sufficient handle to the heathen to style them the Christian mysteries.

§ 10. PROBABLY the term would be first applied only to what was called in the primitive church, *the eucharist*, which we call *the Lord's supper*; and afterwards extended to *baptism* and other sacred ceremonies. In regard to the first-mentioned ordinance, it cannot be denied, that in the article of concealment, there was a pretty close analogy. Not only were all infidels, both Jews and Gentiles, excluded from witnessing the commemoration of the death of Christ; but even many believers, particularly the catechumens and the penitents; the former, because not yet initiated by baptism into the church; the latter, because not yet restored to the communion of Christians, after having fallen into some scandalous sin. Besides, the secrecy that Christians were often, on account of the persecutions

to which they were exposed, obliged to observe, which made them meet for social worship in the night time, or very early in the morning, would naturally draw on their ceremonies, from the Gentiles, the name of *mysteries*. And it is not unreasonable to think, that a name which had its rise among their enemies, might afterwards be adopted by themselves. The name *Christians*, first used at Antioch, seems, from the manner wherein it is mentioned in the Acts [18], to have been at first given contemptuously to the disciples by infidels, and not assumed by themselves. The common titles by which, for many years after that period, they continued to distinguish those of their own society, as we learn both from the Acts, and from Paul's Epistles, were *the faithful*, or believers, *the disciples*, and *the brethren*. Yet, before the expiration of the apostolic age, they adopted the name *Christian*, and gloried in it. The Apostle Peter uses it in one place [19], the only place in Scripture wherein it is used by one of themselves. Some other words and phrases which became fashionable amongst ecclesiastic writers, might naturally enough be accounted for in the same manner.

§ 11. But how the Greek *μυστηριον* came first to be translated into Latin *sacramentum*, it is not easy to conjecture. None of the classical significations of the Latin word seems to have any affinity to the Greek term. For whether we understand it

[18] Acts, xi. 26. [19] 1 Pet. iv. 16.

simply for a sacred ceremony, *sacramentum* from *sacrare*, as *juramentum* from *jurare*, or for the pledge deposited by the litigants in a process, to ensure obedience to the award of the judge, or for the military oath of fidelity, none of these conveys to us either of the senses of the word μυστηριον explained above. At the same time it is not denied that, in the classical import, the Latin word may admit an allusive application to the more solemn ordinances of religion, as implying, in the participants, a sacred engagement equivalent to an oath. All that I here contend for is, that the Latin word *sacramentum* does not, in any of these senses, convey exactly the meaning of the Greek name μυστηριον, whose place it occupies in the Vulgate. Houbigant, a Romish priest, has, in his Latin translation of the Old Testament, used neither *sacramentum* nor *mysterium*; but where either of these terms had been employed in the Vulgate, he substitutes *secretum*, *arcanum*, or *absconditum*. Erasmus, though he wrote at an earlier period, has only once admitted *sacramentum* into his version of the New Testament, and said, with the Vulgate, *sacramentum septem stellarum*.

Now, it is to this practice, not easily accounted for, in the old Latin translators, that we owe the ecclesiastical term *sacrament*, which, though properly not scriptural, even Protestants have not thought fit to reject: they have only confined it a little in the application, using it solely of the two primary institutions of the Gospel, *baptism* and *the Lord's Supper*;

whereas the Romanists apply it also to five other ceremonies, in all seven. Yet, even this application is not of equal latitude with that wherein it is used in the Vulgate. The sacrament of God's will [20], the sacrament of piety [21], the sacrament of a dream [22], the sacrament of the seven stars [23], and the sacrament of the woman [24], are phrases which sound very strangely in our ears.

§ 12. So much for the introduction of the term *sacrament* into the Christian theology, which (however convenient it may be for expressing some important rites of our religion), has, in none of the places where it occurs in the Vulgate, a reference to any rite or ceremony whatever, but is always the version of the Greek word *μυστηριον*, or the corresponding term in Hebrew or Chaldee. Now the term *μυστηριον*, as has been shown, is always predicated of some doctrine, or of some matter of fact, wherein it is the intention of the writer to denote that the information he gives either was a secret formerly, or is the latent meaning of some type, allegory, figurative description, dream, vision, or fact referred to. No religion abounded more in pompous rites and ordinances than the Jewish, yet they are never, in Scripture, (any more than the ceremonies of the New Testament) denominated either mysteries or sacra-

[20] Eph. i. 9.
[21] 1 Tim. iii. 16.
[22] Dan. ii. 18. 30. 47.
[23] Rev. i. 20.
[24] Rev. xvii. 7.

ments. Indeed with us Protestants, the meanings in present use assigned to these two words, are so totally distinct, the one relating solely to doctrine, the other solely to positive institutions, that it may look a little oddly to bring them together, in the discussion of the same critical question. But to those who are acquainted with Christian antiquity, and foreign use in these matters, or have been accustomed to the Vulgate translation, there will be no occasion for an apology.

§ 13. BEFORE I finish this topic, it is proper to take notice of one passage wherein the word *μυστηριον*, it may be plausibly urged, must have the same sense with that which present use gives to the English word *mystery*, and denotes something which, though revealed, is inexplicable, and, to human faculties, unintelligible. The words are, *Without controversy great is the mystery of godliness: God was manifest in the flesh, justified in the spirit, seen of angels, preached unto the Gentiles, believed on in the world, received up into glory*[25]. I do not here inquire into the justness of this reading, though differing from that of the two most ancient versions, the Syriac and the Vulgate, and some of the oldest manuscripts. The words, as they stand, sufficiently answer my purpose. Admit then that some of the great articles enumerated may be justly called mysteries, in the ecclesiastical and present acceptation of the term; it does not

[25] 1 Tim. iii. 16.

follow that this is the sense of the term here. When a word in a sentence of holy writ is susceptible of two interpretations, so that the sentence, whichsoever of the two ways the word be interpreted, conveys a distinct meaning suitable to the scope of the place; and when one of these interpretations expresses the common import of the word in holy writ, and the other assigns it a meaning which it plainly has not in any other passage of Scripture, the rules of criticism manifestly require that we recur to the common acceptation of the term. Nothing can vindicate us in giving it a singular, or even a very uncommon, signification, but that all the more usual meanings would make the sentence involve some absurdity or nonsense. This is not the case here. The purport of the sentence plainly is, "Great unques-"tionably is the divine secret, of which our religion "brings the discovery; God was manifest in the "flesh, &c."

PART II.

OF BLASPHEMY.

I PROPOSED, in the second place, to offer a few thoughts on the import of the word *βλασφημια*, frequently translated *blasphemy*. I am far from affirming that in the present use of the English word, there is such a departure from the import of the ori-

ginal, as in that remarked in the preceding article, between *μυστηριον*, and *mystery:* at the same time it is proper to observe, that in most cases there is not a perfect coincidence. *Βλασφημια* properly denotes *calumny*, *detraction*, *reproachful* or *abusive language*, against whomsoever it be vented. There does not seem, therefore, to have been any necessity for adopting the Greek word into our language, one or other of the English expressions above mentioned, being, in every case, sufficient for conveying the sense. Here, as in other instances, we have, with other moderns, implicitly followed the Latins, who had in this no more occasion than we, for a phraseology, not originally of their own growth. To have uniformly translated, and not transferred, the words *βλασφημια* and *βλασφημειν*, would have both contributed to perspicuity, and tended to detect the abuse of the terms when wrested from their proper meaning. That *βλασφημια* and its conjugates are in the New Testament very often applied to reproaches not aimed against God, is evident from the passages referred to in the margin [26]; in the much greater part of which the English translators, sensible that they could admit no such application, have not used the words *blaspheme* or *blasphemy*, but *rail*, *revile*, *speak evil*, *&c.* In one of the passages quoted, a reproachful charge brought even against the devil, is

[26] Matth. xii. 31, 32. xxvii. 39. Mark, xv. 29. Luke, xxii. 65. xxiii. 39. Rom. iii. 8. xiv. 16. 1 Cor. iv. 13. x. 30. Eph. iv. 31. 1 Tim. vi. 4. Tit. iii. 2. 1 Pet. iv. 4. 14. Jude, 9, 10. Acts, vi. 11. 13. 2 Pet. ii. 10, 11.

called κρισις βλασφημιας[27], and rendered by them *railing accusation.* That the word in some other places[28] ought to have been rendered in the same general terms, I shall afterwards show. But with respect to the principal point, that the word comprehends all verbal abuse, against whomsoever uttered, God, angel, man, or devil; as it is universally admitted by the learned, it would be losing time to attempt to prove. The passages referred to will be more than sufficient to all who can read them in the original Greek.

§ 2. But it deserves our notice, and it is principally for this reason, that I judged it proper to make some remarks on the word, that even when βλασφημια refers to reproachful speeches against God, and so comes nearer the meaning of our word *blasphemy;* still the primitive notion of this crime has undergone a considerable change in our way of conceiving it. The causes it would not perhaps be difficult to investigate, but the effect is undeniable. In theological disputes nothing is more common, to the great scandal of the Christian name, than the imputation of blasphemy thrown by each side upon the other. The injustice of the charge, on both sides, will be manifest on a little reflection, which it is the more necessary to bestow, as the commonness of the accusation, and the latent, but contagious, motives

[27] Jude, 9.

[28] Acts, xiii. 45. xviii. 6. xxvi. 11. Col. iii. 8. 1 Tim. i. 13. 2 Tim. iii. 2.

of employing it, have gradually perverted our conceptions of the thing.

§ 3. It has been remarked already, that the import of the word *βλασφημια* is *maledicentia*, in the largest acceptation, comprehending all sorts of verbal abuse, imprecation, reviling, and calumny. Now let it be observed, that when such abuse is mentioned as uttered against God, there is properly no change made in the signification of the word; the change is only in the application, that is, in the reference to a different object. The idea conveyed in the explanation now given is always included, against whomsoever the crime be committed. In this manner every term is understood that is applicable to both God and man. Thus the meaning of the word *disobey* is the same, whether we speak of disobeying God or of disobeying man. The same may be said of *believe*, *honour*, *fear*, &c. As therefore the sense of the term is the same, though differently applied, what is essential to constitute the crime of detraction in the one case, is essential also in the other. But it is essential to this crime as commonly understood, when committed by one man against another, that there be in the injurious person the will or disposition to detract from the person abused. Mere mistake in regard to character, especially when the mistake is not conceived by him who entertains it to lessen the character, nay, is supposed, however erroneously, to exalt it, is never construed by any into the crime of defamation. Now, as blasphemy

is, in its essence, the same crime, but immensely aggravated, by being committed against an object infinitely superior to man, what is fundamental to the existence of the crime, will be found in this, as in every other species, which comes under the general name. There can be no blasphemy, therefore, where there is not an impious purpose to derogate from the divine majesty, and to alienate the minds of others from the love and reverence of God.

§ 4. HENCE, we must be sensible of the injustice of so frequently using the odious epithet *blasphemous* in our controversial writings; an evil imputable solely to the malignity of temper, which a habit of such disputation rarely fails to produce. Hence it is, that the Arminian and the Calvinist, the Arian and the Athanasian, the Protestant and the Papist, the Jesuit and the Jansenist, throw and retort on each other the unchristian reproach. Yet it is no more than justice to say, that each of the disputants is so far from intending to diminish, in the opinion of others, the honour of the Almighty, that he is, on the contrary, fully convinced, that his own principles are better adapted to raise it than those of his antagonist, and, for that very reason, he is so strenuous in maintaining them. But to blacken, as much as possible, the designs of an adversary, in order the more effectually to render his opinions hateful, is one of the many common, but detestable resources of theological controvertists. It is to be hoped that the sense, not only of the injustice of

this measure, but of its inefficacy for producing conviction in the mind of a reasonable antagonist, and of the bad impression it tends to make on the impartial and judicious, in regard both to the arguers and to the argument, will at length induce men to adopt more candid methods of managing their disputes; and even, when provoked by the calumnious and angry epithets of an opposer, not to think of retaliating; but to remember, that they will derive more honour from imitating, as is their duty, the conduct of Him who, when he was reviled, reviled not again.

§ 5. But, after observing that this perversion of the word *blasphemy* results, for the most part, from the intemperate heat and violence with which polemic writers manage their religious contests; it is no more than doing justice to theologians and ecclesiastics (though it may look like a digression), to remark, that this evidence of undue acrimony is by no means peculiar to them. So uncontrollable is this propensity in men of violent passions, that even sceptics cannot pretend an entire exemption from it. Some allowances ought doubtless to be made for the rage of bigots, inflamed by contradiction, from the infinite consequence they always ascribe to their own religious dogmas; but when a reasoner, an inquirer into truth, and, consequently, a dispassionate and unprejudiced person (and doubtless such a man Lord Bolingbroke chose to be accounted), falls into the same absurdity, adopts the furious language of fa-

naticism, and rails against those whose theory he combats, calling them *impious blasphemers*, to what allowance can we justly think him entitled? I know of none, except our pity; to which, indeed, a manner, so much beneath the dignity of the philosopher, and unbecoming the patience and self-command implied in cool inquiry, seems to give him a reasonable claim. Since, however, with this defect of discernment, candour, and moderation, philosophers as well as zealots, infidels as well as fanatics, and men of the world as well as priests, are sometimes chargeable, it may not be unreasonable to bestow a few reflections on it.

§ 6. FIRST, to recur to analogy, and the reason of the thing: I believe there are few who have not sometimes had occasion to hear a man warmly, and with the very best intentions, commend another, for an action which in reality merited not praise but blame. Yet no man would call the person who, through simplicity, acted this part, a slanderer; whether the fact he related of his friend were true or false; since he seriously meant to raise esteem of him: for an intention to depreciate, is essential to the idea of slander. To praise injudiciously, is one thing; to slander, is another. The former, perhaps, will do as much hurt to the character, which is the subject of it, as the latter: but the merit of human actions depends entirely on the motive. There is a maliciousness in the calumniator, which no person who reflects, is in danger of confounding

with the unconscious blundering of a man, whose praise detracts from the person whom he means to honour. The blasphemer is no other than the calumniator of Almighty God. To constitute the crime, it is as necessary that this species of calumny be intentional, as that the other be. He must be one, therefore, who, by his impious talk, endeavours to inspire others with the same irreverence towards the Deity, or, perhaps, abhorrence, of him, which he indulges in himself. And though, for the honour of human nature, it is to be hoped, that very few arrive at this enormous guilt, it ought not to be dissembled, that the habitual profanation of the name and attributes of God, by common swearing, is but too manifest an approach towards it. There is not an entire coincidence. The latter of these vices may be considered as resulting solely from the defect of what is good in principle and disposition; the former, from the acquisition of what is evil in the extreme: but there is a close connection between them, and an insensible gradation from the one to the other. To accustom one's self to treat the Sovereign of the universe with irreverent familiarity, is the first step; malignly to arraign his attributes, and revile his providence, is the last.

§ 7. But it may be said, that an inquiry into the proper notion of *βλασφημια*, in the sacred writings, is purely a matter of criticism, concerning the import of a word, whose signification must be ultimately determined by scriptural use. Our reasonings,

therefore, are of no validity, unless they are supported by fact. True: but it ought to be considered, on the other hand, that as the word *βλασφημειν*, when men are the objects, is manifestly used for intentional abuse, the presumption is, that the signification is the same, when God is the object. Nay, according to the rules of criticism, it is evidence sufficient, unless a positive proof could be brought, that the word, in this application, undergoes a change of meaning. In the present instance, however, it is unnecessary to recur to the presumption, as positive testimony can be produced, that both the verb and the noun have the same meaning in these different applications.

§ 8. LET it be observed, then, that sometimes, in the same sentence, the word is applied in common both to divine and to human beings, which are specified as the objects, and construed with it, and sometimes the word, having been applied to one of these, is repeated, in an application to the other; the sacred writers thereby showing, that the evil is the same in kind in both cases, and that the cases are discriminated solely by the dignity of the object. Thus our Lord says (as in the common translation), *All manner of blasphemy, πασα βλασφημια, shall be forgiven unto men: but the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, shall not be forgiven*[29]. The differ-

[29] Matth. xii. 31. See the passage in this translation, and the note upon it.

ence in point of atrociousness is here exceedingly great, the one being represented as unpardonable, and the other as what may be pardoned; but this is exhibited as resulting purely from the infinite disparity of the objects. The application of the same name to the two crimes compared, gives us to understand the immense disproportion there is, in respect of guilt, between the same criminal behaviour, when aimed against our fellow-creatures, and when directed against the Author of our being. As the English word *blasphemy* is not of the same extent of signification with the Greek, and is not properly applied to any abuse vented against man, it would have been better here to have chosen a common term which would have admitted equally an application to either, such as *reproach* or *detraction*. The expression of the Evangelist Mark, in the parallel place [30], is to the same purpose. Again, in the Acts, *We have heard him speak blasphemous words*, ῥηματα βλασφημα, *against Moses, and against God* [31]. Like to this is that passage in the Old Testament, where the false witnesses who were suborned to testify against Naboth say, *Thou didst blaspheme God and the king* [32]. Though the word in the Septuagint is not βλασφημειν, it is a term which, in that version, is sometimes used synonymously, as indeed are all the terms which in the original denote *cursing, reviling, defaming*.

[30] Mark, iii. 28, 29. [31] Acts, vi. 11.

[32] 1 Kings, xxi. 10.

§ 9. FURTHER, with the account given above, of the nature of *blasphemy*, the style of Scripture perfectly agrees. No errors concerning the divine perfections can be grosser than those of polytheists and idolaters, such as the ancient pagans. Errors on this, if on any subject, are surely fundamental. Yet those errors are never in holy writ brought under the denomination of blasphemy: nor are those who maintain them ever styled blasphemers. Nay, among those who are no idolaters, but acknowledge the unity and spirituality of the divine nature (as did all the Jewish sects), it is not sufficient to constitute this crime, that a man's opinions be, in their consequences, derogatory from the divine majesty, if they be not perceived to be so by him who holds them, and broached on purpose to diminish men's veneration of God. The opinions of the Sadducees appear in effect to have detracted from the justice, the goodness, and even the power of the Deity, as their tendency was but too manifestly to diminish in men the fear of God, and consequently to weaken their obligations to obey him. Yet neither our Saviour, nor any of the inspired writers, calls them *blasphemous*, as those opinions did not appear to themselves to detract, nor were advanced with the intention of detracting, from the honour of God. Our Lord only said to the Sadducees, *Ye err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God*[33]. Nay, it does not appear that even their adversaries

[33] Matth. xxii. 19

the Pharisees, though the first who seem to have perverted the word (as shall be remarked afterwards), and though immoderately attached to their own tenets, ever reproached them as blasphemers, on account of their erroneous opinions. Nor is indeed the epithet *blasphemous*, or any synonymous term, ever coupled in Scripture (as is common in modern use) with *doctrines*, *thoughts*, *opinions*. It is never applied but to words and speeches. *A blasphemous opinion*, or *blasphemous doctrine*, are phrases, which (how familiar soever to us) are as unsuitable to the scriptural idiom, as a *railing opinion*, or *slanderous doctrine*, is to ours.

§ 10. BUT to proceed from what is not, to what is, called *blasphemy* in Scripture: the first divine law published against it, *He that blasphemeth the name of the Lord* (or Jehovah, as it is in the Hebrew) *shall be put to death* [34], when considered, along with the incident that occasioned it, suggests a very atrocious offence in words, no less than abuse or imprecations, vented against the Deity. For, in what way soever the crime of the man there mentioned be interpreted, whether as committed against the true God, the God of Israel, or against any of the false gods whom his Egyptian father worshipped, the law in the words now quoted is sufficiently explicit; and the circumstances of the story plainly show that the words which he had used, were dero-

[34] Lev. xxiv. 15, 16.

gatory from the Godhead, and shocking to the hearers.

And, if we add to this, the only other memorable instance, in sacred history, namely, that of Rabshakeh, it will lead us to conclude, that it is solely a malignant attempt, in words, to lessen men's reverence of the true God, and by vilifying his perfections, to prevent their placing confidence in him, which is called in Scripture *blasphemy*, when the word is employed to denote a sin committed directly against God. This was manifestly the attempt of Rabshakeh when he said, *Neither let Hezekiah make you trust in the Lord* (the word is Jehovah), *saying, Jehovah will surely deliver us. Hath any of the gods of the nations delivered his land out of the hand of the king of Assyria? Where are the gods of Hamath and of Arpad? Where are the gods of Sepharvaim, Hena, and Ivah? Have they delivered Samariah out of my hand? Who are they among all the gods of the countries, that have delivered their country out of mine hand, that Jehovah should deliver Jerusalem out of mine hand*[35] ?

§ 11. BLASPHEMY, I acknowledge, like every other species of defamation, may proceed from ignorance combined with rashness and presumption; but it invariably implies (which is not implied in mere error) an expression of contempt or detestation, and a desire of producing the same passions in others.

[35] 2 Kings, xviii. 30. 33, 34. 35.

As this conduct, however, is more heinous in the knowing than in the ignorant, there are degrees of guilt even in blasphemy. God's name is said to be blasphemed among the heathen, through the scandalous conduct of his worshippers. And when Nathan said to David, *By this deed thou hast given occasion to the enemies of Jehovah to blaspheme* [36], his design was evidently to charge on that monarch, a considerable share of the guilt of those blasphemies to which his heinous transgression in the matter of Uriah, would give rise among their idolatrous neighbours: for here, as in other cases, the flagrant iniquity of the servant, rarely fails to bring reproach on the master, and on the service. It is, without doubt, a most flagitious kind of blasphemy whereof those men are guilty who, instead of being brought to repentance by the plagues wherewith God visits them for their sins, are fired with a monstrous kind of revenge against their Maker, which they vent in vain curses and impious reproaches. Thus, in the Apocalypse, we are informed of those who *blasphemed the God of heaven, because of their pains and their sores, and repented not of their deeds* [37].

§ 12. It will perhaps be objected, that even the inspired penmen of the New Testament sometimes use the word with greater latitude than has here been given it. The Jews are said, by the sacred historian, *to have spoken against the things preached by*

[36] 2 Sam. xii. 14. [37] Rev. xvi. 11.

Paul, contradicting and blaspheming[38]. And it is said of others of the same nation, *When they opposed themselves and blasphemed*[39]. Now, as zeal for God and religion was the constant pretext of the Jews for vindicating their opposition to Christianity, it cannot be imagined they would have thrown out any thing like direct blasphemy or reproaches against God. It may, therefore, be plausibly urged, that it must have been (if we may borrow a term from the law) such constructive blasphemy, as when we call fundamental errors in things divine, by that odious name. But the answer is easy. It has been shown already, that the Greek word implies no more than to *revile*, *defame*, or *give abusive language*. As the term is general, and equally applicable, whether God be the object of the abuse, or man, it ought never to be rendered *blaspheme*, unless when the context manifestly restrains it to the former application. There is this advantage, if the case were dubious, in preserving the general term, that if God be meant as the object of their reproaches, still the version is just. In the story of the son of the Israelitish woman, the terms *cursing God*, and *blaspheming him*[40], are used synonymously; and, in regard to Rabshakeh's blasphemy, the phrases, *to reproach the living God* or *Jehovah*, and to blaspheme him[41], are both used in the same way: but, on the other hand, if the writer meant abuse levelled against

[38] Acts, xiii. 45. [39] xviii. 6. [40] Lev. xxiv. 11. 14.
[41] 2 Kings, xix. 4. 16. 22. 23.

men, to render it *blaspheme* is a real mis-translation, inasmuch as, by representing the divine majesty as the object, which the English word *blaspheme* always does, the sense is totally altered.

Our translators have, on other occasions, been so sensible of this that, in none of the places marked in the margin [42], have they used *blaspheme*, or any of its conjugates; but, instead of it, the words *rail*, *revile*, *report slanderously*, *speak evil*, *defame*, though the word in the original is the same; nay, in some places, where Jesus Christ is the object, they translate it in the same manner [43]. There can be no doubt that, in the two passages quoted from the Acts, the Apostles themselves were the objects of the abuse which fiery zeal prompted their countrymen to throw out against the propagators of a doctrine, considered by them as subversive of the religion of their fathers. Both passages are justly rendered by Castalio: the first, *Judæi contradicebant iis quæ a Paulo dicebantur, reclamantes ac convicientes;* the second, *Quumque illi resisterent ac maledicerent.*

§ 13. The same will serve for answer to the objection founded on Paul's saying of himself before his conversion, that he was a *blasphemer* [44]; the

[42] Rom. iii. 8. xiv. 6. 1 Cor. iv. 13. x. 30. Eph. iv. 31. 1 Tim. vi. 4. Tit. iii. 2. 1 Pet. iv. 4. 14. 2 Pet. ii. 10, 11. Jude, 9, 10.

[43] Matth. xxvii. 39. Mark, xv. 29. Luke. xxiii. 39.

[44] 1 Tim. i. 13.

word ought to have been rendered *defamer*. Of this we can make no doubt, when we consider the honourable testimony which this Apostle, after his conversion, did not hesitate to give of his own piety when a Jew, *Brethren*, said he, *I have lived in all good conscience before God* (rather *towards God*, τω Θεω, not ενωπιον τȣ Θεȣ) *until this day* [15]. This expression, therefore, regards what is strictly called *duty to God*. But could he have made this declaration, if his conscience had charged him with blasphemy, of all crimes against God the most heinous? Should it be asked, In what sense could he charge himself with defamation? Whom did he defame? The answer is obvious. Not only the Lord Jesus Christ the head, but the members also of the Christian community, both ministers and disciples. Not that he considered himself as guilty of this crime by implication, for disbelieving that Jesus is the Messiah; for neither Jews nor Pagans are ever represented as either blasphemers or calumniators, merely for their unbelief; but because he was conscious that his zeal had carried him much further, even to exhibit the author of this institution as an impostor and false prophet, and his Apostles as his accomplices, in maliciously imposing upon the nation, and subverting the true religion. That he acted this part, the account given of his proceedings, not to mention this declaration, affords the most ample evidence. We are told that he breathed out threatenings and

[15] Acts, xxiii. 1

slaughter against the disciples[46]; and he says himself that he was exceedingly mad against them, and even compelled them to join in the abuse and reproaches[47], of which he accuses himself as setting the example. And though I doubt not that in this, Paul acted according to his judgment at the time; for he tells us expressly that he thought verily with himself that he *ought* to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus[48]; this ignorance did indeed extenuate his crime, but not excuse it; for it is not he only who invents, but he also who malignantly and rashly, or without examination and sufficient evidence, propagates an evil report against his neighbour, who is justly accounted a defamer.

Nor is the above-mentioned the only place wherein the word has been misinterpreted *blasphemer*. We have another example, in the character which the same Apostle gives of some seducers who were to appear in the church, and of whom he tells us, that they would *have a form of godliness*, but *without the power*[49]. Now, blasphemy is alike incompatible with both; though experience has shown, in all ages, that slander and abuse, vented against men, however inconsistent with the power of godliness, are perfectly compatible with its form. Some other places in the New Testament, in which the word ought to have been translated in its greatest latitude, that is, in the sense of defamation, or reviling in ge-

[46] Acts, ix. 1.
[47] Acts, xxvi. 11.
[48] Acts, xxvi. 9.
[49] 2 Tim. iii. 5.

neral, are marked in the margin [50]. Indeed, as was hinted before, it ought always to be so, unless where the scope of the passage limits it to that impious defamation, whereof the Deity is the object.

§ 14. I KNOW but one other argument that can be drawn from Scripture, in favour of what I call the controversial sense of the word *blasphemy*; that is, as applied to errors which, in their consequences, may be thought to derogate from the perfections or providence of God. In this way the Pharisees, oftner than once, employ the term against our Lord; and, if their authority were to us a sufficient warrant, I should admit this plea to be decisive. But the question of importance to us is, Have we the authority of any of the sacred writers for this application of the word? Did our Lord himself, or any of his Apostles, ever retort this charge upon the Pharisees? Yet it cannot be denied, that the doctrine then in vogue with them gave, in many things, if this had been a legitimate use of the term *blasphemy*, a fair handle for such recrimination. They made void, we are told, the commandment of God, to make room for their tradition [51]; and thus, in effect, set up their own authority, in opposition to that of their Creator. They disparaged the moral duties of the law, in order to exalt positive and ceremonial obser-

[50] Matth. xii. 31. xv. 19. Mark, iii. 28. 29. vii. 22. Luke, xxii. 65. Col. iii. 8. James, ii. 7.

[51] Matth. xv. 6. Mark, vii. 13.

vances [52]. Now, this cannot be done by the teachers of religion, without some misrepresentation of the moral attributes of the Lawgiver, whose character is thereby degraded, in the minds of the people. Yet there is, nowhere, the most distant insinuation given that, on any of these accounts, they were liable to the charge of blasphemy.

But no sooner did Jesus say to the paralytic, *Thy sins are forgiven thee*, than the Scribes laid hold of the expression. *This man blasphemeth*, said they: *Who can forgive sins but God* [53]? Their plea was, it is an invasion of the prerogative of God. Grotius observes justly of this application of the term, *Dicitur hic βλασφημειν, non qui Deo maledicit, sed qui quod Dei est, sibi arrogat.* Such, undoubtedly, was their notion of the matter. But I do not see any warrant they had for thus extending the signification of the word. In the simple and primitive import of the name *blasphemer*, it could not be more perfectly defined in Latin, than by these three words, *qui Deo maledicit*; and, therefore, I cannot agree with the generality of expositors, who seem to think, that if Jesus had not been the Messiah, or authorized of God to declare to men the remission of their sins, the Scribes would have been right in their verdict. On the contrary, if one, unauthorized of Heaven, had said what our Lord is recorded to have said to the paralytic, he would not, in my opinion,

[52] Matth. xxiii. 23. Luke, xi. 42.

[53] Matth. ix. 3. Mark, ii. 7.

have been liable to that accusation : he would have been chargeable with great presumption, I acknowledge ; and if he had been conscious that he had no authority, he would have been guilty of gross impiety ; but every species of impiety is not blasphemy. Let us call things by their proper names. If any of us usurp a privilege that belongs, exclusively, to another man, or, if we pretend to have his authority, when we have it not, our conduct is very criminal ; but nobody would confound this crime with *calumny*. No more can the other be termed *blasphemy*, especially when it results from misapprehension, and is unaccompanied with a malevolent intention, either to depreciate the character, or to defeat the purpose, of the Almighty. The false prophets, who knowingly told lies in the name of God, and pretended a commission from him, which they knew they had not, were liable to death ; but they are nowhere said to blaspheme, that is, to revile, or to defame, their Maker. Much less could it be said of those who told untruths through mistake, and without any design of detracting from God.

This polemic application of the term *blasphemy* must, therefore, have originated in the schools of the rabbies, and appears to have been, in the time of our Lord and his Apostles, in general vogue with the Scribes. Nay, which is exceedingly repugnant to the original import of the name, they even applied it to expressions which did not refer to persons, but to things. Thus, the historian, in relating the

charge brought against Stephen, acquaints us [54], that *they set up false witnesses, which said, This man ceaseth not to speak blasphemous words against this holy place, and the law:* an application of the word, perhaps till then unexampled. But we need not wonder at this liberty, when we consider, that the perversion of the term answered for them a double purpose; first, it afforded them one easy expedient for rendering a person, whom they disliked, odious to the people, amongst whom the very suspicion of blasphemy excited great abhorrence; secondly, it increased their own jurisdiction. Blasphemy was a capital crime, the judgment whereof was in the sanhedrim, of whom the chief priests, and some of the Scribes, always made the principal part. The farther the import of the word was extended, the more cases it brought under their cognizance, and the more persons into their power. Hence it proceeded, that the word *blasphemy*, which originally meant a crime no less than maliciously reviling the Lord of the universe, was at length construed to imply the broaching of any tenet, or the expressing of any sentiment (with whatever view it was done), which did not quadrate with the reigning doctrine. For that doctrine, being presupposed to be the infallible will of God, whatever opposed it was said, by implication, to revile its Author. Such will ever be the case, when the principles of human policy are grafted upon religion.

[54] Acts, vi. 13.

§ 15. When we consider this, and remark, at the same time, with what plainness our Lord condemned, in many particulars, both the maxims, and the practice, of the Pharisees, we cannot be surprised that, on more occasions than one, that vindictive and envious sect traduced him to the people, as a person chargeable with this infernal guilt. Once, indeed, some of them proceeded so far as to *take up stones to stone him*[55]: for that was the punishment which the law had awarded against blasphemers. But he thought proper then to elude their malice, and, by the answer he gave to their unmerited reproach, evidently showed that their application of the term was unscriptural[56]. Those who, on other occasions, watched our Lord to entrap him in his words, seem to have had it principally in view to extract either blasphemy or treason from what he said. By the first, they could expose him to the fury of the populace, or, perhaps, subject him to the Jewish rulers; and, by the second, render him obnoxious to the Roman procurator. What use they made of both articles at last, is known to every body. Nor let it be imagined that, at his trial, the circumstance, apparently slight, of the high priest's rending his clothes, when he pronounced him a blasphemer, an example which must have been quickly followed by the whole sanhedrim, and all within hearing, was not a matter of the utmost consequence, for effecting their malicious pur-

[55] John, x. 31. 33. [56] John. x. 34, 35. 36.

pose. We have reason to believe, that it contributed not a little, in working so wonderful a change in the multitude, and in bringing them to view the man with detestation, to whom so short while before they were almost ready to pay divine honours.

§ 16. But here it may be asked, 'Can we not 'then say, with truth, of any of the false teachers, 'who have arisen in the church, that they vented 'blasphemies?' To affirm that we cannot, would, I acknowledge, be to err in the opposite extreme. Justin Martyr says of Marcion [57], that he taught many to blaspheme the Maker of the world. Now, it is impossible to deny the justice of this charge, if we admit the truth of what Irenæus [58], and others, affirm concerning that bold heresiarch, to wit, that he maintained, that the Author of our being, the God of Israel, who gave the law by Moses, and spoke by the Prophets, is one who perpetrates injuries, and delights in war, is fickle in his opinions, and inconsistent with himself. If this representation of Marcion's doctrine be just, who would not say that he reviled his Creator, and attempted to alienate from him the love and confidence of his creatures? The blasphemy of Rabshakeh was aimed only against the power of God; Marcion's, not so much against his power, as against his wisdom and his goodness. Both equally manifested an intention of subverting the faith and veneration of his worshippers. Now, it is

[57] Apol. 2. [58] Lib. i. c. 29.

only what can be called a direct attack, not such as is made out by implication, upon the perfections of the Lord of the universe, and what clearly displays the intention of lessening men's reverence of him, that is blasphemy, in the meaning (I say not of the rabbies, or of the canonists, but) of the sacred code. In short, such false and injurious language, and only such, as, when applied to men, would be denominated *reviling*, *abusing*, *defaming*, is, when applied to God, *blasphemy*. The same terms in the original tongues are used for both; and it would perhaps have been better, for preventing mistakes, that in modern tongues also, the same terms were employed. Indeed, if we can depend on the justness of the accounts which remain of the oldest sectaries, there were some who went greater lengths in this way than even Marcion.

§ 17. BEFORE I finish this topic, it will naturally occur to inquire, What that is, in particular, which our Lord denominates *blasphemy against the Holy Spirit*[59]? It is foreign from my present purpose, to enter minutely into the discussion of this difficult question. Let it suffice here to observe, that this blasphemy is certainly not of the constructive kind, but direct, manifest, and malignant. First, it is mentioned as comprehended under the same genus with abuse against man, and contradistinguished only by the object. Secondly, it is further explained,

[59] Matth. xii. 31, 32. Mark, iii. 28, 29. Luke, xii. 10.

by being called *speaking against*, in both cases. Ὃς αν ειπη λογον κατα τȣ ὑιȣ τȣ ανθρωπȣ,—Ὃς δ'αν ειπη κατα τȣ πνευματος τȣ ἁγιȣ. The expressions are the same, in effect, in all the Evangelists who mention it, and imply such an opposition as is both intentional and malevolent. This cannot have been the case of all who disbelieved the mission of Jesus, and even decried his miracles; many of whom, we have reason to think, were afterwards converted by the Apostles. But it is not impossible, that it may have been the wretched case of some who, instigated by worldly ambition and avarice, have slandered what they knew to be the cause of God, and, against conviction, reviled his work as the operation of evil spirits.

§ 18. A LATE writer[60], more ingenious than judicious, has, after making some just remarks on this subject, proceeded so far as to maintain that there can be no such crime as *blasphemy*. His argument (by substituting *defamation* for blasphemy, *defame* for blaspheme, and *man* for God) serves equally to prove that there is no such crime as defamation, and stands thus: 'Defamation presupposes malice; where there is malice, there is misapprehension. Now the person who, misapprehending another, defames him, does no more than put the *man*'s name,' (I use the author's phraseology) to his own misapprehensions of him. This is so

[60] Independent Whig. No. 55.

'far from speaking evil of *the man*, that it is not 'speaking of him at all. It is only speaking evil of 'a wild idea, of a creature of the imagination, and 'existing nowhere but there[61].' From this clear manner of reasoning, the following corollary, very comfortable to those whom the world has hitherto misnamed slanderers, may fairly be deduced. If you have a spite against any man, you may freely indulge your malevolence, in saying of him all the evil you can think of. That you cannot be justly charged with defamation, is demonstrable. If all that you say be true, he is not injured by you, and therefore you are no detractor. If the whole or part be false, what is false does not reach him. Your abuse in that case is levelled against an ideal being, a chimera to which you only affix his name (a mere trifle, for a name is but a sound), but with which the man's real character is not concerned. Therefore, when you have said the worst that malice and

[61] That the reader may be satisfied that I do not wrong this author, I shall annex, in his own words, part of his reasoning concerning blasphemy. "As it is a crime that implies malice "against God, I am not able to conceive how any man can "commit it. A man who knows God, cannot speak evil of "him. And a man who knows him not, and reviles him, does "therefore revile him, because he knows him not. He there-"fore puts the name of God to his own misapprehensions of "God. This is so far from speaking evil of the Deity, that "it is not speaking of the Deity at all. It is only speaking "evil of a wild idea, of a creature of the imagination, and exist-"ing nowhere but there."

resentment can suggest, you are not chargeable with defamation, which was the point to be proved. Thus the argument of that volatile author goes further to emancipate men from all the restraints of reason and conscience than, I believe, he himself was aware. He only intended by it, as one would think, to release us from the fear of God; it is equally well calculated for freeing us from all regard to man. Are we from this to form an idea of the liberty, both sacred and civil, of which that author affected to be considered as the patron and friend; and of the deference he professes to entertain for the Scriptures and primitive Christianity? I hope not; for he is far from being at all times consistent with himself. Of the many evidences which might be brought of this charge, one is, that no man is readier than he to throw the imputation of blasphemy on those whose opinions differ from his own [62].

[62] In the dedication of the book to the lower house of convocation, the author advises them to clear themselves from the imputation of maintaining certain ungodly tenets, by exposing the *blasphemies* of those of their own body: in No. 23, we are told that false zeal talks *blasphemy* in the name of the Lord; in No. 24, that persecutors *blasphemously* pretend to be serving God; and in No. 27, that it is a kind of *blasphemy* to attempt to persuade people that God takes pleasure in vexing his creatures. More examples of the commission of this impracticable crime might be produced from that author, if necessary.

PART III

OF SCHISM.

THE next term I proposed to examine critically was σχισμα, *schism*. The Greek word frequently occurs in the New Testament, though it has only once been rendered *schism* by our translators. However, the frequency of the use among theologians has made it a kind of technical term in relation to ecclesiastical matters; and the way it has been bandied, as a term of ignominy, from sect to sect reciprocally, makes it a matter of some consequence to ascertain, if possible, the genuine meaning it bears in holy writ. In order to this, let us, abstracting alike from the uncandid representations of all zealous party-men, have recourse to the oracles of truth, the source of light and direction.

§ 2. As to the proper acceptation of the word σχισμα, when applied to objects merely material, there is no difference of sentiments amongst interpreters. Every one admits that it ought to be rendered *rent*, *breach*, or *separation*. In this sense it occurs in the Gospels, as where our Lord says. *No man putteth a piece of new cloth to an old garment: for that which is put in to fill it up, taketh*

from the garment, and the rent *is made worse*[63]. Χειρον σχισμα γινεται. The same phrase occurs in the parallel passage in Mark[64]. From this sense it is transferred by metaphor to things incorporeal. Thus it is used once and again by the Evangelist John, to signify a difference in opinion expressed in words. Of the contest among the Jews, concerning Jesus, some maintaining that he was, others that he was not, the Messiah; the sacred historian says, Σχισμα ουν εν τω οχλω εγενετο δι' αυτον. *So there was a division among the people because of him*[65]. Here, it is plain, the word is used in a sense perfectly indifferent; for, it was neither in the true opinion supported by one side, nor in the false opinion supported by the other, that the *schism* or division lay, but in the opposition of these two opinions. In this sense of the word, there would have been no *schism*, if they had been all of one opinion, whether it had been the true opinion, or the false. The word is used precisely in the same signification by this Apostle, in two other places of his Gospel marked in the margin[66].

§ 3. But it is not barely to a declared difference in judgment, that even the metaphorical use of the word is confined. As *breach* or *rupture* is the literal import of it in our language; wherever these words may be figuratively applied, the term σχισμα

[63] Matth. ix. 16. [64] Mark, ii. 21.

[65] John, vii. 43. [66] John, ix. 16. x. 19.

seems likewise capable of an application. It invariably presupposes that among those things whereof it is affirmed, there subsisted an union formerly, and as invariably denotes that the union subsists no longer. In this manner the Apostle Paul uses the word, applying it to a particular church or Christian congregation. Thus he adjures the Corinthians by the name of the Lord Jesus, that there be no divisions or schisms among them [67], ἱνα μη η εν ὑμιν σχισματα; and in another place of the same Epistle [68], he tells them, *I hear that there are divisions* or schisms *among you*, ακουω σχισματα εν ὑμιν ὑπαρχειν. In order to obtain a proper idea of what is meant by a breach or schism in this application, we must form a just notion of that which constituted the union whereof the schism was a violation. Now the great and powerful cement which united the souls of Christians, was their mutual love. *Their hearts*, in the emphatical language of holy writ, *were knit together in love* [69]. This had been declared by their Master to be the distinguishing badge of their profession. *By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another* [70]. Their partaking of the same baptism, their professing the same faith, their enjoying the same promises, and their joining in the same religious service, formed a connection merely external and of little significance, unless, agreeably to the Apostle's expression [71], it was root-

[67] 1 Cor. i. 10. [68] 1 Cor. xi. 18. [69] Col. ii. 2.
[70] John, xiii. 35. [71] Eph. iii. 17.

ed and grounded in love. As this, therefore, is the great criterion of the Christian character, and the foundation of the Christian unity, whatever alienates the affections of Christians from one another, is manifestly subversive of both, and may consequently, with the greatest truth and energy, be denominated *schism*. It is not so much what makes an outward distinction or separation (though this also may in a lower degree be so denominated), as what produces an alienation of the heart, which constitutes schism in the sense of the Apostle; for this strikes directly at the vitals of Christianity. Indeed both the evil and the danger of the former, that is, an external separation, is principally to be estimated from its influence upon the latter, that is, in producing an alienation of heart; for it is in the union of affection among Christians, that the spirit, the life, and the power, of religion, are principally placed.

§ 4. It may be said, Does it not rather appear, from the passage first quoted, to denote such a breach of that visible unity in the outward order settled in their assemblies, as results from some jarring in their religious opinions, and by consequence in the expressions they adopted? This, I own, is what the words in immediate connexion, considered by themselves, would naturally suggest. *I beseech you, brethren, that ye all speak the same thing, and that there be no divisions* (schisms) *among you, and that ye be perfectly joined together in the same mind and in the*

same judgment[72]. It cannot be denied that a certain unanimity, or a declared assent to the great articles of the Christian profession, was necessary in every one, in order to his being admitted to, and kept in the communion of, the church. But then it must be allowed, on the other hand, that those articles were at that time, few, simple, and perspicuous. It is one of the many unhappy consequences of the disputes that have arisen in the church, and of the manner in which these have been managed, that such terms of communion have since been multiplied, in every part of the Christian world, and not a little perplexed with metaphysical subtleties, and scholastic quibbles. Whether this evil consequence was, in its nature, avoidable, or, if it was, in what manner it might have been avoided, are questions, though important, foreign to the present purpose. Certain it is, however, that several phrases used by the Apostles, in relation to this subject, such as ὁμοφρονες, το αυτο φρονουντες, and some others, commonly understood to mean unanimous in opinion, denote, more properly, coinciding in affection, concurring in love, desire, hatred, and aversion, agreeably to the common import of the verb φρονειν both in sacred authors and in profane, which is more strictly rendered *to savour*, *to relish*, than *to be of opinion*.

§ 5. FURTHER, let it be observed, that in matters whereby the essentials of the faith are not affect

[72] 1 Cor. i. 10.

ed, much greater indulgence to diversity of opinion was given, in those pure and primitive times, than has been allowed since, when the externals, or the form of religion came to be raised on the ruins of the essentials, or the power, and a supposed correctness of judgment made of greater account than purity of heart. In the apostolic age, which may be styled the reign of charity, their mutual forbearance in regard to such differences, was at once an evidence, and an exercise, of this divine principle. *Him that is weak in the faith*, says our Apostle, *receive ye, but not to doubtful disputations. For one believeth that he may eat all things: another who is weak, eateth herbs. Let not him that eateth, despise him that eateth not; and let not him who eateth not, judge him that eateth*[73]. *One man esteemeth one day above another: another esteemeth every day alike.* As to these disputable points, *let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind*[74], and, as far as he himself is concerned, act according to his persuasion. But he does not permit even him who is in the right, to disturb his brother's peace, by such unimportant inquiries. *Hast thou faith?* says he; the knowledge and conviction of the truth on the point in question? *Have it to thyself before God. Happy is he who condemneth not himself in that thing which he alloweth*[75]. And in another place, *Let us, therefore, as many as be perfect, be thus minded;*

[73] Rom. xiv. 1, 2, 3.

[74] Rom. xiv. 5.

[75] Rom. xiv. 22.

and if in any thing ye be otherwise minded, God shall reveal even this unto you. Nevertheless, whereto we have already attained, let us walk by the same rule, let us mind the same thing[76]. We are to remember, that *as the kingdom of God is not meat and drink*, so neither is it logical acuteness in distinction, or grammatical accuracy of expression; but it is *righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost. For he that in these things serveth Christ, is acceptable to God, and approved of men*[77].

§ 6. Now, if we inquire, by an examination of the context, into the nature of those differences among the Corinthians, to which Paul affixes the name σχισματα, nothing is more certain, than that no cause of difference is suggested, which has any the least relation to the doctrines of religion, or to any opinions that might be formed concerning them. The fault which he stigmatized with that odious appellation, consisted, then, solely in an undue attachment to particular persons, under whom, as chiefs or leaders, the people severally ranked themselves, and thus, without making separate communions, formed distinctions among themselves, to the manifest prejudice of the common bond of charity, classing themselves under different heads. *Now this I say*, adds the Apostle, *that every one of you saith, I am of Paul, and I of Apollos, and I of Cephas, and I of Christ*[78]. It deserves to be remarked, that

[76] Phil. iii. 15. 16. [77] Rom. xiv. 17, 18. [78] 1 Cor. i. 12.

of the differences among the Roman converts, concerning the observance of days, and the distinction of meats, which we should think more material, as they more nearly affect the justness of religious sentiments, and the purity of religious practice, the Apostle makes so little account, that he will not permit them to harass one another with such questions; but enjoins them to allow every one to follow his own judgment; at the same time that he is greatly alarmed at differences among the Corinthians, in which, as they result solely from particular attachments and personal esteem, neither the faith nor the practice of a Christian appears to have an immediate concern. But it was not without reason that he made this distinction. The hurt threatened by the latter was directly against that extensive love commanded by the Christian law; but not less truly, though more indirectly, against the Christian doctrine and manners. By attaching themselves strongly to human, and consequently fallible, teachers and guides, they weakened the tie which bound them to the only divine guide and teacher, the Messiah, and therefore to that also which bound them all one to another.

§ 7. WHAT it was that gave rise to such distinctions in the church of Corinth, we are not informed, nor is it material for us to know. From what follows in the Epistle, it is not improbable, that they might have thought it proper in this manner to range themselves, under those who had been the instru-

ments of their conversion to Christianity, or perhaps, those by whom they had been baptized, or for whom they had contracted a special veneration. It is evident, however, that these petty differences, as we should account them, had already begun to produce consequences unfriendly to the spirit of the Gospel; for it is in this point of view solely that the Apostle considers them, and not as having an immediate bad influence on its doctrine. Thus resuming the subject, he says, *Ye are yet carnal; for whereas there is among you envying and strife and divisions, are ye not carnal, and walk as men? For while one saith, I am of Paul, and another I am of Apollos, are ye not carnal?*[79] Thus it is uncontrovertible, in the first place, that the accusation imports that the Corinthians, by their conduct, had given a wound to charity, and not that they had made any deviation from the faith; and in the second place, that, in the apostolical acceptation of the word, men may be schismatics, or guilty of schism, by such an alienation of affection from their brethren as violates the internal union subsisting in the hearts of Christians, though there be neither error in doctrine, nor separation from communion, and consequently no violation of external unity in ceremonies and worship. Faustus, a Manichean bishop in the fourth century (however remote from truth the leading principles of his party were on more important articles,) entertained sentiments on this subject

[79] 1 Cor. iii. 3, 4.

entirely scriptural. "Schisma," says he, "nisi fallor, est eadem opinantem atque eodem ritu colentem quo cæteri, solo congregationis delectari dissidio." Faust. l. xx. C. iii. ap. August.

§ 8. AFTER so clear a proof of the import of the term, if it should be thought of consequence to allege in confirmation what must be acknowledged to be more indirect, you may consider the only other passage in which the term is used in the New Testament, and applied metaphorically to the human body. In the same Epistle, the Apostle having shown that the different spiritual gifts bestowed on Christians, rendered them mutually subservient, and made all, in their several ways, harmoniously contribute to the good of the Christian community, gives a beautiful illustration of this doctrine from the natural body, the different functions of whose members admirably conduce to the benefit and support of one another, and to the perfection and felicity of the whole. He concludes in these words: *God hath tempered the body together, having given more abundant honour to that part which lacked, that there should be no schism in the body,* ἵνα μὴ ἦ σχίσμα ἐν τῷ σώματι, *but that the members should have the same care one for another: and whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it, or one member be honoured, all the members rejoice with it*[80]. It is obvious that the word *schism* is here employed to

[80] 1 Cor. xii. 24. 25, 26.

signify, not a separation from the body, such as is made by amputation or fracture, but such a defect in utility and congruity, as would destroy what he considers as the mutual sympathy of the members, and their care one of another.

§ 9. As to the distinctions on this subject, which in after-times obtained among theologians, it is proper to remark, that error in doctrine was not supposed essential to the notion of schism; its distinguishing badge was made separation from communion in religious offices, insomuch that the words *schismatic* and *separatist*, have been accounted synonymous. By this, divines commonly discriminate *schism* from *heresy*, the essence of which last is represented as consisting in an erroneous opinion obstinately maintained, concerning some fundamental doctrine of Christianity; and that whether it be accompanied with separation in respect of the ordinances of religion, or not. We have now seen that the former definition does not quadrate with the application of the word in the New Testament, and that *schism*, in scriptural use, is one thing, and *schism*, in ecclesiastical use, another.

PART IV.

OF HERESY.

Let us now inquire, with the same freedom and impartiality, into the scriptural use of the other term. The Greek word αἵρεσις, which properly imports no more than *election*, or *choice*, was commonly employed by the Hellenist Jews, in our Saviour's time, when the people were much divided in their religious sentiments, to denote, in general, any branch of the division, and was nearly equivalent to the English words, *class*, *party*, *sect*. The word was not, in its earliest acceptation, conceived to convey any reproach in it, since it was indifferently used, either of a party approved, or of one disapproved, by the writer. In this way it occurs several times in the Acts of the Apostles, where it is always (one single passage excepted) rendered *sect*. We hear alike of the sect of the Sadducees, αἵρεσις τῶν Σαδδυκαίων [81], and of the sect of the Pharisees, αἵρεσις, τῶν Φαρισαίων[82]. In both places the term is adopted by the historian purely for distinction's sake, without the least appearance of intention to convey either praise, or blame. Nay, on one occasion, Paul, in the defence he made for himself before king Agrippa, where

[81] Acts, v. 17. [82] Acts. xv. 5.

it was manifestly his intention to exalt the party to which he had belonged, and to give their system the preference to every other system of Judaism, both in soundness of doctrine, and purity of morals, expresses himself thus: *My manner of life, from my youth, which was at the first among mine own nation at Jerusalem, know all the Jews, which knew me from the beginning, if they would testify: that after the most straitest sect of our religion,* κατα την ακριβεσατην αιρεσιν της ημετερας θρησκειας, *I lived a Pharisee*[83].

§ 2. THERE is only one passage in that history, wherein there is an appearance that something reproachful is meant to be conveyed under the name αιρεσις. It is in the accusation of Paul, by the orator Tertullus, on the part of the Jews, before the governor Felix; where amongst other things, we have these words: *We have found this man a pestilent fellow, and a mover of sedition among all the Jews throughout the world, and a ringleader of the sect of the Nazarenes,* πρωτοσατην τε της των Ναζωραιων αιρεσεως[84]. I should not, however, have imagined that any part of the obloquy lay in the application of the word last mentioned, if it had not been for the notice which the Apostle takes of it in his answer. *But this I confess unto thee, that after the way which they call heresy,* την λεγουσιν αιρεσιν, *so worship I the God of my fathers*[85].

[83] Acts, xxvi. 4, 5.
[84] Acts, xxiv. 5
[85] Acts, xxiv. 14

§ 3. HERE, by the way, I must remark a great impropriety in the English translation, though in this, I acknowledge, it does but follow the Vulgate. The same word is rendered one way in the charge brought against the prisoner, and another way in his answer for himself. The consequence is that, though nothing can be more apposite than his reply, in this instance, as it stands in the original; yet nothing can appear more foreign than this passage, in the two versions above mentioned. The Apostle seems to defend himself against crimes, of which he is not accused. In both places, therefore, the word ought to have been translated in the same manner, whether *heresy* or *sect*. In my judgment, the last term is the only proper one; for the word *heresy*, in the modern acceptation, never suits the import of the original word, as used in Scripture. But, when one attends to the very critical circumstances of the Apostle at this time, the difficulty in accounting for his having considered it as a reproach to be denominated of a *sect*, disclaimed by the whole nation, instantly vanishes. Let it be remembered, first, that, since the Jews had fallen under the power of the Romans, their ancient national religion had not only received the sanction of the civil powers for the continuance of its establishment in Judea, but had obtained a toleration in other parts of the empire; secondly, that Paul is now pleading before a Roman governor, a Pagan, who could not well be supposed to know much of the Jewish doctrine, worship, or controversies; and that he had been arraign-

ed by the rulers of his own nation, as belonging to a turbulent and upstart sect: for in this way they considered the Christians, whom they reproachfully named Nazarenes. The natural consequence of this charge, with one who understood so little of their affairs as Felix, was to make him look upon the prisoner as an apostate from Judaism, and, therefore, as not entitled to be protected, or even tolerated, on the score of religion. Against a danger of this kind, it was of the utmost importance to our Apostle to defend himself.

§ 4. ACCORDINGLY, when he enters on this part of the charge, how solicitous is he to prove, that his belonging to that *sect*, did not imply any defection from the religion of his ancestors; and thus to prevent any mistaken judgment, on this article of his arraignment, into which a heathen judge must have otherwise unavoidably fallen. His own words will, to the attentive, supersede all argument or illustration: *But this I confess to thee, that after the way which they call a sect, so worship I;* Whom? No new divinity, but, on the contrary, *the God of our fathers:* he adds, in order the more effectually to remove every suspicion of apostacy, *Believing all things which are written in the law and the prophets; and having the same hope towards God, which they themselves also entertain, that there shall be a resurrection of the dead, both of the just and of the unjust*[36]. Nothing could have been more ridiculous,

[36] Acts, xxiv. 14, 15

than for the Apostle seriously to defend his doctrine against the charge of heterodoxy, before an idolater and polytheist, who regarded both him and his accusers as superstitious fools, and consequently, as, in this respect, precisely on a footing; but it was entirely pertinent in him to evince, before a Roman magistrate, that his faith and mode of worship, however much traduced by his enemies, were neither essentially different from, nor any way subversive of, that religion which the senate and people of Rome had solemnly engaged to protect; and that therefore he was not to be treated as an apostate, as his adversaries, by that article of accusation, that he was of the sect of the Nazarenes, showed evidently that they desired he should. Thus the Apostle, with great address, refutes the charge of having revolted from the religious institutions of Moses, and, at the same time, is so far from disclaiming, that he glories in the name of a follower of Christ.

§ 5. THERE is only one other place, in this history, in which the word occurs, namely, where the Jews at Rome (for whom Paul had sent on his arrival), speaking of the Christian society, address him in these words: *But we desire to hear of thee what thou thinkest; for as concerning this sect,* περι μεν γαρ της αιρεσεως ταυτης, *we know that it is everywhere spoken against* [87]. There cannot be a question, here, of the propriety of rendering the word αιρεσις, *sect*, a

[87] Acts, xxviii. 22.

term of a middle nature, not necessarily implying either good or bad. For, as to the disposition wherein those Jews were at this time, it is plain, they did not think themselves qualified to pronounce either for or against it, till they should give Paul, who patronised it, a full hearing. This they were willing to do; and, therefore, only acquainted him, in general, that they found it to be a party that was universally decried. Thus, in the historical part of the New Testament, we find the word αἵρεσις employed to denote *sect* or *party*, indiscriminately, whether good or bad. It has no necessary reference to opinions, true or false. Certain it is, that sects are commonly, not always, caused by difference in opinion, but the term is expressive of the effect only, not of the cause.

§ 6. IN order to prevent mistakes, I shall here further observe, that the word *sect*, among the Jews, was not, in its application, entirely coincident with the same term as applied by Christians to the subdivisions subsisting among themselves. We, if I mistake not, invariably use it of those who form separate communions, and do not associate with one another in religious worship and ceremonies. Thus we call Papists, Lutherans, Calvinists, different sects, not so much on account of their differences in opinion, as because they have established to themselves different fraternities, to which, in what regards public worship, they confine themselves, the several denominations above mentioned having no

intercommunity with one another in sacred matters. High church and low church we call only parties, because they have not formed separate communions. Great and known differences in opinion, when followed by no external breach in the society, are not considered with us as constituting distinct sects, though their differences in opinion may give rise to mutual aversion. Now, in the Jewish sects (if we except the Samaritans), there were no separate communities erected. The same temple, and the same synagogues, were attended alike by Pharisees and by Sadducees. Nay, there were often of both denominations in the Sanhedrim, and even in the priesthood.

Another difference was, that the name of the sect was not applied to all the people who adopted the same opinions, but solely to the men of eminence among them who were considered as the leaders and instructers of the party. The much greater part of the nation, nay, the whole populace, received implicitly the doctrine of the Pharisees, yet Josephus never styles the common people *Pharisees*, but only followers and admirers of the Pharisees. Nay, this distinction appears sufficiently from sacred writ. *The Scribes and Pharisees*, says our Lord [88], *sit in Moses' seat*. This could not have been said so generally, if any thing further had been meant by *Pharisees*, but the teachers and guides of the party. Again,

[88] Matth. xxiii. 2.

when the officers sent by the chief priests to apprehend our Lord, returned without bringing him, and excused themselves by saying, *Never man spake like this man ;* they were asked, *Have any of the rulers, or of the Pharisees, believed on him*[89] *?* Now, in our way of using words, we should be apt to say, that all his adherents were of the Pharisees ; for the Pharisaical was the only popular doctrine. But it was not to the followers, but to the leaders, that the name of the sect was applied. Here, however, we must except the Essenes, who, as they all, of whatever rank originally, entered into a solemn engagement, whereby they confined themselves to a peculiar mode of life, which, in a great measure, secluded them from the rest mankind, were considered almost in the same manner as we do the Benedictines or Dominicans, or any order of monks or friars among the Romanists.

Josephus in the account he has given of the Jewish sects, considers them all as parties who supported different systems of philosophy, and has been not a little censured for this, by some critics. But, as things were understood then, this manner of considering them was not unnatural. Theology, morality, and questions regarding the immortality of the soul, and a future state, were principal branches of their philosophy. " Philosophia," says Cicero[90].

[89] John, vii. 48.

[90] Tuscul. Quæst. lib. I.

" nos primum ad deorum cultum, deinde ad jus ho-
" minum quod situm est in generis humani socie-
" tate, tum ad modestiam, magnitudinemque animi
" erudivit: eademque ab animo tanquam ab oculis,
" caliginem dispulit, ut omnia supera, infera, prima,
" ultima, media, videremus." Besides, as it was only men of eminence qualified to guide and instruct the people, who were dignified with the title, either of Pharisee or of Sadducee, there was nothing so analogous among the Pagans, as their different sects of philosophers, the Stoics, the Academics, and the Epicureans, to whom also the general term αἵρεσις was commonly applied. Epiphanius, a Christian writer of the fourth century, from the same view of things with Josephus, reckons among the αἱρεσεις, sects, or heresies, if you please to call them so, which arose among the Greeks, before the coming of Christ, these classes of philosophers, the Stoics, the Platonists, the Pythagoreans, and the Epicureans. Of this writer it may also be remarked, that in the first part of his work, he evidently uses the word αἵρεσις in all the latitude in which it had been employed by the sacred writers, as signifying sect or party of any kind, and without any note of censure. Otherwise he would never have numbered Judaism, whose origin he derives from the command which God gave to Abraham to circumcise all the males of his family, among the original heresies. Thus, in laying down the plan of his work, he says, Εν τω μεν πρωτω βιβλιω πρωτα τουε αἱρεσεις εικοσιν, αἱ εισιν

ἁιδε. βαρβαρισμος, σκυθισμος, ἑλληνισμος, ιυδαισμος, κ. τ. ἑ. [91]. This only by the way.

§ 7. But, it may be asked, is not the acceptation of the word, in the Epistles, different from what it has been observed to be in the historical books of the New Testament? Is it not, in the former, invariably used in a bad sense, as denoting something wrong, and blameable? That in those, indeed, it always denotes something faulty, or even criminal, I am far from disputing: nevertheless, the acceptation is not materially different from that in which it always occurs in the Acts of the Apostles. In order to remove the apparent inconsistency in what has been now advanced, let it be observed, that the word *sect* has always something relative in it; and therefore, in different applications, though the general import of the term be the same, it will convey a favourable idea, or an unfavourable, according to the particular relation it bears. I explain myself by examples. The word *sect* may be used along with the proper name, purely by way of distinction from another party, of a different name; in which case the word is not understood to convey either praise or blame. Of this we have examples in the phrases above quoted, the sect of the Pharisees, the sect of

[91] This import of the word *heresy* in Epiphanius has not escaped the observation of the author of *Dictionnaire Historique des auteurs Ecclesiastiques*, who says, "Par le mot d' "hérésies, St. Epiphane entend une secte ou une societé d' "hommes qui ont, sur la religion, des sentimens particuliers."

the Sadducees, the sect of the Nazarenes. In this way we may speak of a strict sect, or a lax sect, or even of a good sect, or a bad sect. If any thing reprehensible or commendable be suggested, it is not suggested by the term sect, αἵρεσις, but by the words construed with it. Again, it may be applied to a formed party in a community, considered in reference to the whole. If the community, of which the sect is a part, be of such a nature as not to admit this subdivision, without impairing and corrupting its constitution, to charge them with splitting into sects, or forming parties, is to charge them with corruption, in what is most essential to them as a society. Hence arises all the difference there is in the word, as used in the history, and as used in the Epistles of Peter and Paul; for these are the only Apostles who employ it. In the history, the reference is always of the first kind; in the Epistles, always of the second. In these, the Apostles address themselves only to Christians, and are not speaking of sects without the church, but either reprehending them for, or warning them against, forming sects among themselves, to the prejudice of charity, to the production of much mischief within their community, and of great scandal to the unconverted world without. So Paul's words to the Corinthians were understood by Chrysostom, and other ancient expositors. In both applications, however, the radical import of the word is the same.

§ 8. But even here, it has no necessary reference to doctrine, true or false. Let us attend to the first passage, in which it occurs in the Epistles, and we shall be fully satisfied of the truth of this remark. It follows one quoted in Part Third of this Dissertation. *For there must be also heresies among you*[92], Δει γαρ και αἱρεσεις εν ὑμιν ειναι. Ye must also have sects amongst you. It is plain, that what he reproves under the name σχισματα, in the former verse, is in effect the same with what he here denominates αἱρεσεις. Now, the term σχισμα, I have shown already to have there no relation to any erroneous tenet, but solely to undue regards to some individual teachers, to the prejudice of others, and of the common cause. In another passage of this Epistle, where, speaking of the very same reprehensible conduct, he uses the words strife and factions, ερις και διχοστασιαι[93], words nearly coincident with σχισματα και αἱρεσεις; his whole aim in these reprehensions is well expressed in these words, *that ye might learn in us* (that is, in himself and Apollos, whom he had named, for example's sake), *not to think of men above that which is written*, above what Scripture warrants, *that no one of you be puffed up for one*, make you boast of one, *against another*[94].

§ 9. It may be said, Does not this explanation represent the two words *schism* and *heresy* as synonymous? That there is a great affinity in their significations is manifest; but they are not convertible

[92] 1 Cor. xi. 19 [93] 1 Cor. iii. 3. [94] 1 Cor. iv. 6

terms. I do not find that the word σχισμα is ever applied in holy writ to a formed party, to which the word αιρεσις is commonly applied. I understand them in the Epistles of this Apostle, as expressive of different degrees of the same evil. An undue attachment to one part, and a consequent alienation of affection from another part, of the Christian community, comes under the denomination of σχισμα. When this disposition has proceeded so far as to produce an actual party or faction among them, this effect is termed αιρεσις. And it has been remarked, that even this term was at that time currently applied, when matters had not come to an open rupture and separation, in point of communion. There was no appearance of this, at the time referred to, among the Corinthians. And even in Judaism, the Pharisees and the Sadducees, the two principal sects, nay, the only sects mentioned in the Gospel, and (which is till more extraordinary) more widely different in their religious sentiments than any two Christian sects, still joined together, as was but just now observed, in all the offices of religious service, and had neither different priests and ministers, nor separate places for social worship, the reading of the law, or the observance of the ordinances.

§ 10. It will perhaps be said that, in the use at least which the Apostle Peter has made of this word, it must be understood to include some gross errors, subversive of the very foundations of the faith. The words in the common version are, *But there were*

false prophets also among the people, even as there shall be false teachers among you, who privily shall bring in damnable heresies, even denying the Lord that bought them, and bring upon themselves swift destruction [5]. That the Apostle in this passage foretells that there will arise such αἱρεσεις, sects or factions, as will be artfully and surreptitiously formed by teachers who will entertain such pernicious doctrines, is most certain; but there is not the least appearance that this last character was meant to be implied in the word αἱρεσεις. So far from it, that this character is subjoined as additional information concerning, not the people seduced, or the party, but the seducing teachers; for it is of them only (though one would judge differently from our version) that what is contained in the latter part of the verse is affirmed. The words in the original are, Εν ὑμιν εσονται ψευδοδιδασκαλοι, οἱτινες παρεισαξουσιν αἱρεσεις απωλειας και τον αγορασαντα αυτους δεσποτην αρνουμενοι, επαγοντες ἑαυτοις ταχινην απωλειαν. Observe it is αρνουμενοι and επαγοντες in the masculine gender and nominative case, agreeing with ψευδοδιδασκαλοι, not αρνουμενας and επαγουσας in the feminine gender and accusative case, agreeing with αἱρεσεις. Again, if the word αἱρεσεις did not imply the effect produced, sects, or factions, but the opinions taught, whether true or false, which are often, not always, the secret spring of division, he would probably have expressed himself in this manner, ψευδοδιδασκαλοι οἱτινες

[5] 2 Peter, ii. 1.

διδαξωσι αιρεσεις απωλειας, who will teach damnable, or rather destructive, heresies; for doctrine of every kind, sound and unsound, true and false, is properly said to be taught; but neither here, nor any where else in Scripture, I may safely add, nor in any of the writings of the two first centuries, do we ever find the word αιρεσις construed with διδασκω, κηρυσσω, or any word of like import, or an opinion, true or false, denominated αιρεσις. There are, therefore, two distinct and separate evils in those false teachers of which the Apostle here gives warning. One is, their making division, by forming to themselves sects or parties of adherents; the other is, the destructive principles they will entertain, and doubtless, as they find occasion, disseminate among their votaries.

§ 11. The only other passage in which the word αιρεσις occurs in the New Testament, is where Paul numbers αιρεσεις, *sects*, among the works of the flesh[6], and very properly subjoins them to διχοστασιαι, factions, as the word ought to be rendered, according to the sense in which the Apostle always uses it. Such distinctions and divisions among themselves, he well knew, could not fail to alienate affection and infuse animosity. Hence we may learn to understand the admonition of the Apostle, *A man that is a heretic*, αιρετικον ανθρωπον, *after the first and second admonition reject, knowing that he*

[6] Gal. v. 20.

that is such, is subverted and sinneth, being condemned of himself[97]. It is plain, from the character here given, as well as from the genius of the language, that the word αἱρετικος in this place does not mean a member of an αἱρεσις or sect, who may be unconscious of any fault, and so is not equivalent to our word *sectary*; much less does it answer to the English word *heretic*, which always implies one who entertains opinions in religion not only erroneous, but pernicious; whereas we have shown that the word αἱρεσις, in scriptural use, has no necessary connection with opinion at all. Its immediate connection is with division or dissension, as it is thereby that sects and parties are formed. Αἱρετικος ανθρωπος, must therefore mean one who is the founder of a sect, or at least has the disposition to create αἱρεσεις, or sects, in the community, and may properly be rendered a *factious man*. This version perfectly coincides with the scope of the place, and suits the uniform import of the term αἱρεσις, from which it is derived. The admonition here given to Titus is the same, though differently expressed, with what he had given to the Romans, when he said, *Mark them which cause divisions*, διχοστασιας ποιουντας, make parties or factions, *and avoid them*[98]. As far down indeed as the fifth century, and even lower, error alone, however gross, was not considered as sufficient to warrant the charge of heresy. Malignity, or perverseness of disposition, was held essential to this crime.

[97] Tit. iii. 10, 11 [98] Rom. xvi. 17

Hence the famous adage of Augustine, "Errare "possum, hæreticus esse nolo;" which plainly implies that no error in judgment, on any article, of what importance soever, can make a man a heretic, where there is not pravity of will. To this sentiment even the schoolmen have shown regard in their definitions. "Heresy," say they, "is an opinion "maintained with obstinacy against the doctrine of "the church." But if we examine a little their reasoning on the subject, we shall quickly find the qualifying phrase, *maintained with obstinacy*, to be mere words which add nothing to the sense: for if what they account the church have declared against the opinion, a man's obstinacy is concluded from barely maintaining the opinion, in what way soever he maintain it, or from what motives soever he be actuated. Thus mere mistake is made at length to incur the reproach originally levelled against an aspiring factious temper, which would sacrifice the dearest interests of society to its own ambition.

§ 12. I CANNOT omit taking notice here by the way, that the late Dr. Foster, an eminent English dissenting minister, in a sermon he preached on this subject, has, in my opinion, quite mistaken the import of the term. He had the discernment to discover that the characters annexed would not suit the common acceptation of the word *heretic*; yet he was so far misled by that acceptation, as to think that error in doctrine must be included as part of the description, and therefore defined a *heretic* in

the Apostle's sense, "a person who, to make him-"self considerable, propagates false and pernicious "doctrine, knowing it to be such." Agreeably to this notion, the anonymous English translator renders with his usual freedom ἁμαρτανει, ων αυτοκαταχριτος. *knows in his own conscience that his tenets are false.* To Foster's explanation there are insuperable objections. First, it is not agreeable to the rules of criticism, to assign, without any evidence from use, a meaning to a concrete term which does not suit the sense of the abstract. Αιρεσις is the abstract, αιρετικος the concrete. If αιρεσις could be shown, in one single instance, to mean the profession and propagation of opinions not believed by him who professes and propagates them, I should admit that αιρετικος might denote the professor or propagator of such opinions. But it is not pretended that αιρεσις in any use, scriptural, classical, or ecclesiastical, ever bore that meaning: there is therefore a strong probability against the sense given by that author to the word αιρετικος. Secondly, this word, though it occurs but once in Scripture, is very common in ancient Christian writers; but has never been said, in any one of them, to bear the meaning which the Doctor has here fixed upon it. Thirdly, the apostolical precept, in this way, explained, is of little or no use. Who can know whether a man's belief in the opinions professed by him, be sincere or hypocritical? Titus, you may say, had the gift of discerning spirits, and therefore might know. Was, then, the precept after his lifetime, or, even, after the ceas-

ing of miraculous powers, to be of no service to the church? This I think incredible, especially as there is no other direction in the chapter, or even in the Epistle, which requires a supernatural gift to enable men to follow. To what purpose enjoin us to avoid a heretic, if it be impossible without a miracle to know him? In fine, though I would not say that such a species of hypocrisy as Foster makes essential to the character, has never appeared, I am persuaded it very rarely appears. It is the natural tendency of vanity and ambition to make a man exert himself in gaining proselytes to his own notions, however trifling, and however rashly taken up. But it is not a natural effect of this passion to be zealous in promoting opinions which the promoter does not believe, and to the propagation of which he has no previous inducement from interest. It is sufficient to vindicate the application of the term *αυτοκαταχριτος*, or *self-condemned*, that a factious or turbulent temper, like any other vicious disposition, can never be attended with peace of mind, but, in spite of all the influence of self-deceit, which is not greater in regard to this than in regard to other vices, must, for the mortal wounds it gives to peace and love, often be disquieted by the stings of conscience. In short, the *αιρετικος*, when that term is applied to a person professing Christianity, is the man who, either from pride, or from motives of ambition or interest, is led to violate these important precepts of our Lord, *Υμεις δε μη κληθητε ραββι· εις γαρ εστιν υμων ο διδασκαλος, ο Χριστος· μηδε κληθητε καθηγηται·*

εἷς γαρ ὑμων ἐστιν ὁ καθηγητης, ὁ Χριστος: which I render thus: *But as for you, assume not the title of rabbi; for ye have only one teacher, the Messiah: neither assume the title of leaders, for ye have only one leader, the Messiah* [a].

§ 13. It deserves further to be remarked, that, in the early ages of the church, after the finishing of the canon, the word αἱρετικος was not always limited (as the word *heretic* is in modern use) to those who, under some form or other, profess Christianity. We at present invariably distinguish the *heretic* from the *infidel*. The first is a corrupter of the Christian doctrine, of which he professes to be a believer and a friend; the second a declared unbeliever of that doctrine, and consequently an enemy: whereas, in the times I speak of, the head of a faction in religion, or in ethics (for the term seems not to have been applied at first to the inferior members), the founder, or at least the principal promoter of a sect or party, whether within or without the church; that is, whether of those who called themselves the disciples of Christ, or of those who openly denied him, was indiscriminately termed αἱρετικος.

The not attending to this difference in the ancient application of the word, has given rise to some blunders and apparent contradictions in ecclesiastic history; in consequence of which, the early writers have been unjustly charged with confusion and in-

[a] Matth. xxiii. 8. 10

consistency in their accounts of things; when, in fact, the blunders imputed to them by more modern authors, have arisen solely from an ignorance of their language. We confine their words by an usage of our own, which, though it came gradually to obtain some ages afterwards, did not obtain in their time. Hence Dositheus, Simon Magus, Menander, and some others are commonly ranked among the ancient heretics; though nothing can be more evident, from the accounts given by the most early writers who so denominate them, than that they were denyers of Jesus Christ in every sense, and avowed opposers to the Gospel. Dositheus gave himself out [120], to his countrymen, the Samaritans, for the Messiah promised by Moses. Simon Magus, as we learn from holy writ [121], was baptized; but that, after the rebuke which he received from Peter, instead of repenting, he apostatized, the uniform voice of antiquity puts beyond a question. Origen says expressly [122], "The Simonians by no means acknowledge "Jesus to be the Son of God; on the contrary, they "call Simon the power of God." Accordingly, they were never confounded with the Christians, in the time of persecution, or involved with them in any trouble or danger [123]. Justin Martyr is another evidence of the same thing [124]; as is also Irenæus,

[120] Orig. adv. Cels. lib. I.

[121] Acts, viii. 13.

[122] Ουδαμως τον Ιησουν ομολογουσι υιον Θεου Σιμωνιανοι, αλλα δυναμιν Θεου λεγουσι τον Σιμωνα. Orig. adv. Cels. lib. V.

[123] Orig. adv. Cels. lib. VI.

[124] Apol. 2da. Dialog. cum Tryphone.

in the account which, in his treatise against heresies, he gives [105] of Simon and his disciple Menander. So is likewise Epiphanius. From them all it appears manifestly, that the above-named persons were so far from being, in any sense, followers of Jesus Christ, that they presumed to arrogate to themselves, his distinguishing titles and prerogatives, and might therefore be more justly called Antichrists than Christians. The like may be said of some other ancient sects which, through the same mistake of the import of the word, are commonly ranked among the heresies which arose in the church. Such were the *Ophites*, of whom Origen acquaints us, that they were so far from being Christians, that our Lord was reviled by them as much as by Celsus, and that they never admitted any one into their society, till he had vented curses against Jesus Christ [106].

Mosheim, sensible of the impropriety of classing the declared enemies of Christ among the *heretics*, as the word is now universally applied, and, at the same time, afraid of appearing to contradict the unanimous testimony of the three first centuries, acknowledges that they cannot be suitably ranked with those sectaries who sprang up within the church, and apologizes, merely from the example of some moderns who thought as he did, for his not consi-

[105] Adv. Hæreses, lib. I. cap. xx. xxi.

[106] Οφιανοι καλουμενοι τοσουτον απεδεουσι του ειναι Χριστιανοι, ωστε ουκ ελαττον Κελσου κατηγορειν αυτους του Ιησου. Και μη προτερον προσιεσθαι τινα επι το συνεδριον εαυτων, εαν μη αρατησηται κατα του Ιησου. Adver. Cels. lib. VI.

dering those ancient party-leaders in the same light wherein the early ecclesiastic authors, as he imagines, had considered them. But he has not said any thing to account for so glaring an inaccuracy, not of one or two, but of all the primitive writers who have taken notice of those sects. For even those who deny that they were Christians, call them *heretics* [107].

[107] "Quotquot tribus prioribus sæculis SIMONIS Magi me-
"minerunt, etsi hæreticorum eum familiam ducere jubent,
"per ea tamen quæ de eo referunt, hæreticorum ordine exclu-
"dunt, et inter Christianæ religionis hostes collocant. ORI-
"GENES Simonianos disertissime ex Christianis sectis exturbat,
"eosque non Iesum Christum, sed Simonem colere narrat.
"Cum hoc cæteri omnes, alii claris verbis, alii sententiis,
"quas SIMONI tribuunt, consentiunt: quæ quidem sententiæ
"ejus sunt generis, ut nulli conveniant quam homini CHRISTO
"longissime se præferenti, et divini legati dignitatem sibimet
"ipsi arroganti. Hinc *Simoniani* etiam, quod ORIGENES et
"JUSTINUS MARTYR præter alios testantur, quum Christiani
"quotidianis periculis expositi essent, nullis molestiis et injuriis
"afficiebantur: CHRISTUM enim eos detestari, publice notum
"erat. Sic ego primus, nisi fallor, quum ante viginti annos
"de Simone sentirem, erant, quibus periculosum et nefas vi-
"debatur, tot sanctorum virorum, qui SIMONEM hæreticorum
"omnium patrem fecerunt, fidem in disceptationem vocare,
"tot sæculoram auctoritatem contemnere. Verum sensim plu-
"res hæc sententia patronos, per ipsam evidentiam suam sibi
"acquisivit. Et non ita pridem tantum potuit apud Jos. AU-
"GUSTINUM ORSI, quem summo cum applausu ipsius Pontificis
"Maximi Romæ *Historiam Ecclesiasticam* Italico sermone
"scribere notum est, ut eam approbaret." *Moshemius. De Rebus Christianis ante Constantinum Magnum Commentarii.* Sæculum primum. § lxv. No. 3. The words in the text, to which

Now, I will take upon me to say, that though this, in one single writer, might be the effect of oversight, it is morally impossible that, in so many, it should be accounted for otherwise than by supposing that their sense of the word αἱρετικος did not coincide with ours; and that it was therefore no blunder in them, that they did not employ their words according to an usage which came to be established long after their time. I am indeed surprised, that a man of Mosheim's critical sagacity, as well as profound knowledge of Christian antiquity, did not perceive that this was the only reasonable solution of the matter. But what might sometimes be thought the most obvious truth, is not always the first taken notice of. Now, I cannot help considering the easy manner in which this account removes the difficulty, as no small evidence of the explanation of the word in scriptural use, which has been given above. To observe the gradual alterations which arise in the meanings of words, as it is a point of some nicety, is also of great consequence in criticism; and often proves a powerful means both of fixing the date of genuine writings, and of detecting the supposititious.

the preceding note refers, are, "Toti hæreticorum agmini, "maxime cohorti gnosticæ, omnes veteris ecclesiæ doctores "præponunt SIMONEM MAGUM.—Omnia quæ de SIMONE me- "moriæ ipsi prodiderunt, manifestum faciunt, eum non in "corruptorum religionis Christianæ, id est, hæreticorum, sed "infensissimorum ejus hostium numero ponendum esse, qui et "ipsum CHRISTUM maledictis insectabatur, et progredienti rei "Christianæ quæ poterat, impedimenta objiciebat."

§ 14. I SHALL observe, in passing, that the want of due attention to this circumstance has, in another instance, greatly contributed to several errors, in relation to Christian antiquities, and particularly, to the multiplication of the primitive martyrs, far beyond the limits of probability. The Greek word μαρτυρ, though signifying no more, originally, than *witness*, in which sense it is always used in the New Testament, came, by degrees, in ecclesiastical use, to be considerably restrained in its signification. The phrase οἱ μαρτυρες τϑ Ιησϑ, *the witnesses of Jesus*, was, at first, in the church, applied, by way of eminence, only to the Apostles. The reality of this application, as well as the grounds of it, we learn from the Acts[104]. Afterwards, it was extended to include all those who, for their public testimony to the truth of Christianity, especially when emitted before magistrates and judges, were sufferers in the cause, whether by death or by banishment, or in any other way. Lastly, the name *martyr* (for then the word was adopted into other languages) became appropriated to those who suffered death in consequence of their testimony: the term ὁμολογητης, *confessor*, being, for distinction's sake, assigned to those witnesses who, though they suffered in their persons, liberty, or goods, did not

[104] Acts, i. 8. 22. ii. 32. iii. 15. v. 32. x. 39. xxii. 15. xxvi. 16. The last two passages quoted relate to Paul, who, by being designed of God *a witness of the Lord Jesus to all men*, was understood to be received into the apostleship, and into the society of the twelve

lose their lives in the cause. Now, several later writers, in interpreting the ancients, have been misled by the usage of their own time; and have understood them as speaking of those who died for the name of Jesus, when they spoke only of those who openly attested his miracles and mission, agreeably to the primitive and simple meaning of the word μαρτυρ. Of this Mosheim has justly taken notice in the work above quoted. I have here only observed it, by the way, for the sake of illustration; for, as to the sense wherein the word is used in the New Testament, no doubt seems ever to have arisen [10].

[10] "Ipsa vocabuli *martyr* ambiguitas apud homines imperitos voluntatem gignere potuit fabulas de tragico eorum [apostolorum] exitu cogitandi. *Martyr* Græcorum sermone quemlibet *testem* significat. Sacro verò Christianorum sermone idem nomen eminentiore sensu *testem* CHRISTI sive hominem designat, qui moriendo testari voluit, spem omnem suam in CHRISTO positam esse. Priori sensu apostoli ab ipso CHRISTO μαρτυρες nominantur, et ipsi eodem vocabulo muneris sui naturam explicant. Fieri vero facile potuit, ut indocti homines ad hæc sacri codicis dicta posteriorem vocabuli *Martyr* significationem transferrent, et temere sibi propterea persuaderent, Apostolos inter eos poni debere, quos excellentiori sensu Christiani *Martyres* appellare solebant." Sæc. prim. § xvi. No. Our historian is here, from the ambiguity of the word, accounting only for the alleged martyrdom of all the Apostles except John. But every body who reflects will be sensible, that the same mistake must have contributed to the increase of the number in other instances. For even in apostolical times, others than

§ 15. I SHALL conclude, with adding to the observations on the words *schism* and *heresy*, that how much soever of a schismatical or heretical spirit, in the apostolic sense of the terms, may have contributed to the formation of the different sects into which the Christian world is at present divided; no person who, in the spirit of candour and charity, adheres to that which, to the best of his judgment, is right, though, in this opinion, he should be mistaken, is, in the scriptural sense, either schismatic or heretic; and that he, on the contrary, whatever sect he belong to, is more entitled to these odious appellations, who is most apt to throw the imputation upon others. Both terms, for they denote only different degrees of the same bad quality, always indicate a disposition and practice unfriendly to peace, harmony, and love.

the Apostles, though more rarely, were called *witnesses*. Stephen and Antipas are so denominated in sacred writ. And as both these were put to death for their testimony, this has probably given rise in after-times to the appropriation of the name *witness* or *martyr*, to those who suffered death in the cause.

DISSERTATION THE TENTH.

THE CHIEF THINGS TO BE ATTENDED TO IN TRANSLATING....A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE OPPOSITE METHODS TAKEN BY TRANSLATORS OF HOLY WRIT.

PART I.

THE THINGS TO BE ATTENDED TO IN TRANSLATING.

To translate has been thought, by some, a very easy matter to one who understands tolerably the language from which, and has made some proficiency in the language into which, the translation is to be made. To translate well is, however, in my opinion, a task of more difficulty than is commonly imagined. That we may be the better able to judge in this question, let us consider what a translator, who would do justice to his author, and his subject, has to perform. The first thing, without doubt, which claims his attention, is to give a just representation of the sense of the original. This, it must be acknowledged, is the most essential of all. The second thing is, to convey into his version, as much as possible, in a consistency with the genius of the language which

he writes, the author's spirit and manner, and, if I may so express myself, the very character of his style. The third and last thing is, to take care, that the version have, at least, so far the quality of an original performance, as to appear natural and easy, such as shall give no handle to the critic to charge the translator with applying words improperly, or in a meaning not warranted by use, or combining them in a way which renders the sense obscure, and the construction ungrammatical, or even harsh.

§ 2. Now, to adjust matters so as, in a considerable degree, to attain all these objects, will be found, upon inquiry, not a little arduous, even to men who are well acquainted with the two languages, and have great command of words. In pursuit of one of the ends above mentioned, we are often in danger of losing sight totally of another: nay, on some occasions, it will appear impossible to attain one, without sacrificing both the others. It may happen, that I cannot do justice to the sense, without frequent recourse to circumlocutions; for the words of no language whatever will, at all times, exactly correspond with those of another. Yet, by this method, a writer whose manner is concise, simple, and energetic, is exhibited, in the translation, as employing a style which is at once diffuse, complex, and languid. Again, in endeavouring to exhibit the author's manner, and to confine myself, as nearly as possible, to the same number of words, and the like turn of expression, I may very imperfectly render his sense,

relating obscurely, ambiguously, and even improperly, what is expressed with great propriety and perspicuity in the original. And, in regard to the third object mentioned, it is evident, that when the two languages differ very much in their genius and structure, it must be exceedingly difficult for a translator to render this end perfectly compatible with the other two. It will perhaps be said, that this is of less importance, as it seems solely to regard the quality of the work, as a performance in the translator's language, whereas the other two regard the work only as an exhibition of the original. I admit that this is an object inferior to the other two; I meant it should be understood so, by mentioning it last. Yet even this is by no means so unimportant as some would imagine. That a writing be perspicuous in any language, much depends on the observance of propriety; and the beauty of the work (at least as far as purity is concerned) contributes not a little to its utility. What is well written, or well said, is always more attended to, better understood, and longer remembered, than what is improperly, weakly, or awkwardly, expressed.

§ 3. Now, if translation is in general attended with so much difficulty, what must we think of the chance of success which a translator has, when the subject is of so great importance, that an uncommon degree of attention to all the above mentioned objects, will be exacted of him; and when the difference, in point of idiom, of the language from

which, and of that into which the version is made, is as great, perhaps, as we have any example of. For, in translating the New Testament into English, it is not to the Greek idiom, nor to the Oriental, that we are required to adapt our own, but to a certain combination of both; often, rather, to the Hebrew and Chaldaic idioms, involved in Greek words and syntax. The analogy and prevailing usage in Greek, will, if we be not on our guard, sometimes mislead us. On the contrary, these are sometimes safe and proper guides. But, without a considerable acquaintance with both, it will be impossible to determine, when we ought to be directed by the one, and when by the other.

§ 4. THERE are two extremes in translating, which are commonly taken notice of by those who examine this subject critically; from one extreme, we derive what is called a close and literal, from the other, a loose and free translation. Each has its advocates. But, though the latter kind is most patronised, when the subject is a performance merely human, the general sentiments, as far as I am able to collect them, seem rather to favour the former, when the subject is any part of holy writ. And this difference appears to proceed from a very laudable principle, that we are not entitled to use so much freedom with the dictates of inspiration, as with the works of a fellow-creature. It often happens, however, on such general topics, when no particular version is referred to as an example of excess on one

side, or on the other, that people agree in words, when their opinions differ, and differ in words, when their opinions agree. For, I may consider a translation as close, which another would denominate free, or as free, which another would denominate close. Indeed, I imagine that, in the best sense of the words, a good translation ought to have both these qualities. To avoid all ambiguity, therefore, I shall call one extreme *literal*, as manifesting a greater attention to the letter than to the meaning; the other *loose*, as implying under it, not liberty, but licentiousness. In regard even to literal translations, there may be so many differences in degree, that, without specifying, it is in vain to argue, or to hope to lay down any principles that will prove entirely satisfactory.

PART II.

STRICTURES ON ARIAS MONTANUS.

AMONG the Latin translations of Scripture, therefore, for I shall confine myself to these in this Dissertation, let us select *Arias Montanus* for an example of the literal. His version of both Testaments is very generally known, and commonly printed along with the original, not in separate columns, but, for the

greater benefit of the learner, interlined. This work of Arias, of all that I know, goes the farthest in this way, being precisely on the model of the Jewish translations, not so much of the Septuagint, though the Septuagint certainly exceeds in this respect, as on the model of Aquila, which, from the fragments that still remain of that version, appears to have been servilely literal, a mere *metaphrase*. Arias, therefore, is a fit example of what may be expected in this mode of translating.

§ 2. Now, that we may proceed more methodically in our examination, let us inquire how far every one of the three ends in translating, above mentioned, is answered by this version, or can be answered by a version constructed on the same plan. The first and principal end is to give a just representation of the sense of the original. 'But how,' it may be asked, 'can a translator fail of attaining this end, 'who never wanders from the path marked out to 'him; who does not, like others, turn aside for a 'moment, to pluck flowers by the way, wherewith 'to garnish his performance; who is, on the contra-'ry, always found in his author's track; in short, 'who has it as his sole object, to give you, in the 'words of another language, exactly what his author 'says, and in the order and manner wherein he says 'it, and,' I had almost added (for this, too, is his aim, though not always attainable), 'not one word more 'or less than he says?' However he might fail, in

respect of the other ends mentioned, one would be apt to think, he must certainly succeed in conveying the sentiments of his author. Yet, upon trial, we find that, in no point whatever does the literal translator fail more remarkably, than in this, of exhibiting the sense. Nor will this be found so unaccountable, upon reflection, as, on a superficial view, it may appear. Were the words of the one language exactly correspondent to those of the other, in meaning and extent; were the modes of combining the words in both, entirely similar, and the grammatical or customary arrangement, the same; and were the idioms and phrases resulting thence, perfectly equivalent, such a conclusion might reasonably be deduced: but, when all the material circumstances are nearly the reverse, as is certainly the case of Hebrew, compared with Latin; when the greater part of the words of one, are far from corresponding accurately, either in meaning or in extent, to those of the other; when the construction is dissimilar, and the idioms, resulting from the like combinations of corresponding words, by no means equivalent, there is the greatest probability that an interpreter, of this stamp, will often exhibit to his readers what has no meaning at all, and sometimes a meaning very different from, or perhaps opposite to, that of his author.

§ 3. I SHALL, from the aforesaid translation, briefly illustrate what I have advanced; and that, first, in words, next, in phrases or idioms. I had

occasion, in a former Dissertation [1], to take notice of a pretty numerous class of words which, in no two languages whatever, are found perfectly to correspond, though in those tongues wherein there is a greater affinity, they come nearer to suit each other, than in those tongues wherein the affinity is less. In regard to such, I observed, that the translator's only possible method of rendering them justly, is by attending to the scope of the author, as discovered by the context, and choosing such a term in the language which he writes, as suits best the original term, in the particular situation in which he finds it.

§ 4. But, this is far from being the method of the literal translator. The defenders of this manner, would, if possible, have nothing subjected to the judgment of the interpreter, but have every thing determined by general and mechanical rules. Hence, they insist, above all things, on preserving uniformity, and rendering the same word in the original, wherever it occurs, or, however it is connected, by the same word in the version. And, as much the greater part of the words, not of one tongue only, but of every tongue, are equivocal, and have more significations than one, they have adopted these two rules for determining their choice, among the different meanings of which the term is susceptible. The first is, to adopt the meaning, wherever it is discoverable, to which etymology points, though in

[1] Diss. II. P. I. § 4.

defiance of the meaning suggested, both by the context, and by general use. When this rule does not answer, as when the derivation is uncertain, the second is, to adopt that which, of all the senses of the word, appears to the translator the most common, and to adhere to it inflexibly in every case, whatever absurdity or nonsense it may involve him in. I might mention also a third method, adopted sometimes, but much more rarely than either of the former, which is to combine the different meanings in the version. Thus the Hebrew word כבד answers sometimes to *βαρος weight*, sometimes to *δοξα glory*. Hence probably has arisen the Hellenistic idiom *βαρος δοξης, weight of glory*[2]. The Latin word *salus* means *health*, answering to the Greek *ὑγιεια*; and often *salvation*, answering to *σωτηριον*. The Hebrew word is equally unequivocal with the Greek, yet our translators, from a respect to the Vulgate, have, in one place[3], combined the two meanings into *saving health*, a more awkward expression, because more obscure and indefinite, but which denotes no more than *salvation*. Perhaps, not even the most literal interpreters observe inviolably these rules. But one thing is certain that, in those cases wherein they assume the privilege of dispensing with them, this measure is, in no respect, more necessary than in many of the cases wherein they rigidly observe them. I may add another thing, as equally certain, that, whenever they think proper to supersede those

[2] 2 Cor. iv. 17. [3] Psal. lxvii. 2.

rules, they betray a consciousness of the insufficiency of the fundamental principles of their method, as well as of the necessity there is, that the translator use his best discernment and skill for directing him, first, in the discovery of the meaning of his author, and, secondly, in the proper choice of words for expressing it in his version.

§ 5. I SHALL exemplify the observance of the two rules above mentioned, in the version I proposed to consider. And, first, for that of etymology; the passage in Genesis [4], which is properly rendered in the common translation, *Let the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creature:* Arias renders, *Reptificent aquæ reptile.* It is true, that the word which he barbarously translates *reptificent* (for there is no such Latin word), is in the Hebrew conjugation called *hiphil*, of a verb which in *kal*, that is, in the simple and radical form, signifies *repere, to creep.* Analogically, therefore, the verb in *hiphil* should import, *to cause to creep.* It had been accordingly rendered by Pagninus, a critic of the same stamp, but not such an adept as Arias, *repere faciant.* But in Hebrew, as in all other languages, use, both in altering and in adding, exercises an uncontrollable dominion over all the parts of speech. We have just the same evidence that the original verb in *hiphil*, commonly signifies to produce in abundance, like fishes and reptiles, as we have that in *kal*, it signifies *to creep.*

[4] Gen i. 20.

Now, passing the barbarism *reptificent*, the sense which this version conveys, if it convey any sense, is totally different from the manifest sense of the author. It is the creation, or first production of things, which Moses is relating. Arias, in this instance, (as well as Pagnin,) seems to exhibit things as already produced, and to relate only how they were set in motion. What other meaning can we give to words importing: "Let the waters cause the creeping thing to "creep?" or, if, by a similar barbarism in English we may be allowed to give a more exact representation of the barbarous Latin of Arias: "Let the waters "creepify the creeper?"

Another example of etymological version, in defiance of use and of common sense, we have, in the beginning of the song of Moses[5]. The words rendered in the English translation, *My doctrine shall drop as the rain*, Arias translates, "Stillabit ut plu-"via assumptio mea." The word here rendered *assumptio* has, for its etymon, a verb which commonly signifies *sumo*, *capio*. That sage interpreter, it seems, thought it of more importance to acquaint his reader with this circumstance, than with the obvious meaning of the word itself. And thus, a passage which, in the original, is neither ambiguous nor obscure, is rendered in such a manner as would defy Oedipus to unriddle.

§ 6. As to the second rule mentioned, of adopting that which of all the significations of the word,

[5] Deut. xxxii. 2.

appears to the translator the most common, and to adhere to it inflexibly in every case, however unsuitable it may be to the context, and however much it may mar the sense of the discourse; there is hardly a page, nay a paragraph, nay, a line in Arias, which does not furnish us with an example. Nor does it take place in one only, but in all the parts of speech. First, in nouns [6], *Et hoc verbum quo circumcidit.* The Hebrew word rendered *verbum*, answers both to *verbum*, and to *res;* but as the more common meaning is *verbum*, it must, by this rule, be made always so, in spite of the connection. In this manner he corrects Pagnin, who had rendered the expression, justly and intelligibly, *Hæc est causa quare circumcidit.* In that expression [7], *Filius fructescens Joseph super fontem*, we have both his rules exemplified, the first in the barbarous participle *fructescens*, which has a derivation similar to the Hebrew word; the second in the substantive *filius*, which is no doubt the most common signification of the Hebrew בן *ben*, and in the preposition *super.* In this manner he corrects Pagnin, who had said, not badly, *Ramus crescens Joseph juxta fontem.*

§ 7. And, to shew that he made as little account of the reproach of solecism as of barbarism, he says, as absurdly as unmeaningly, *Pater fuit sedentis tentorium* [8], giving a regimen to a neuter verb.

[6] Joshua. v. 4 [7] Gen. xlix. 22. [8] Gen. iv. 20.

Pagnin had said, *inhabitantis*. That this is conformable to the signification of the Hebrew word in this passage, which the other is not, there can be no question ; but it might fairly bear a question, whether *sedeo* or *inhabito* be the more common meaning of the Hebrew word. The same strange rule he follows in the indeclinable parts of speech, the prepositions in particular, which, being few in Hebrew, and consequently of more extensive signification, he has chosen always to render the same way, thereby darkening the clearest passages, and expressing, in the most absurd manner, the most elegant.

As I would avoid being tedious, I shall produce but two other examples of this, having given one already from Jacob's benediction to his sons, though the whole work abounds with examples. The expression used by Pagnin, in the account of the creation, *Dividat aquas ab aquis*[9], he has thus reformed, *Sit dividens inter aquas ad aquas.* The other is in the account of the murder of Abel[10], *Surrexit Cain ad Hebel*, where Pagnin had used the preposition *contra.* As a specimen of the servile manner in which he traces the arrangement and construction of the original, to the total subversion of all rule and order in the language which he writes, I shall give the following passage in the New Testament, not selected as peculiar, for such are to be found in eve-

[9] Gen. i. 6. [10] Gen. iv. 8.

ry page: *De quidem enim ministerio in sanctos, ex abundanti mihi est scribere vobis* [11].

§ 8. To proceed now, as I proposed, to phrases or combinations of words: I shall, first, produce some examples which convey a mere jargon of words, combined ungrammatically, and, therefore, to those who do not understand the language out of which the translation is made, unintelligibly. Such are the following: *Istæ generationes cœli et terræ, in creari ea, in die facere Deus terram et cœlum* [12].—*Emisit eum Dominus ad colendam terram quod sumptus est inde* [13].—*Major iniquitas mea quam parcere* [14]. But as, in certain cases, this manner of copying a foreign idiom, makes downright nonsense, in other cases, the like combinations of corresponding words, in different languages, though not unmeaning, do not convey the same meaning, nay, sometimes convey meanings the very reverse of one another. Thus, two negatives in Greek and French deny strongly, in Latin and English they affirm. כל לא *col la*, in Hebrew is *none; non omnis*, in Latin, which is a literal version, and *not all*, in English, denote *some*. In like manner, ουκ, construed with ουδεις, in Greek, is still *nobody; non nemo*, in Latin, which is a literal version, is *somebody*. The words και ου μελει σοι περι ουδενος [15], rendered properly in the common version, *and carest for no man*, are translated by Arias, *Et*

[11] 2 Cor. ix. 1. [12] Gen. ii. 4. [13] Gen. iii. 23.
[14] Gen. iv. 13. [15] Mark. xii. 14.

non cura est tibi de nullo; the very opposite of the author's sentiment, which would have been more justly rendered, *Et cura est tibi de nullo;* or, as it is in the Vulgate, *Non curas quenquam.* In this, however, hardly any of the metaphrasts have judged proper to observe a strict uniformity; though, I will venture to say, it would be impossible to assign a good reason why, in some instances, they depart from that method, whilst, in others, they tenaciously adhere to it.

§ 9. It ought, withal, to be observed, that several interpreters who, in translating single words, have not confined themselves to the absurd method above mentioned, could not be persuaded to take the same liberty with idioms and phrases. Thus Arias has but copied the Vulgate in translating, Ὁτι ϗκ αδυνατησει παρα τω Θεω παν ρημα[16], *Quia non erit impossibile apud Deum omne verbum.* In this short sentence there are no fewer than three improprieties, one arising from the mis-translation of a noun, and the other two from mis-translated idioms. Ῥημα, in Hellenistic usage, is equivalent to the Hebrew דבר *daber*, which, as has been observed, signifies not only *verbum*, a word, but *res*, or *negotium*, a thing; which last is the manifest sense of it in the passage quoted: the second is the rendering of ϗ παν, *non omne*, and not, as it ought to have been, *nullum:* the third arises from using the fu-

[16] Luke, i. 37

ture in Latin, in the enunciation of an universal truth. It ought to have been remembered, that the Hebrew has no present tense; one who writes it, is consequently, obliged often to use the other tenses, and especially the future, in enunciating general truths, for which, in all modern languages, as well as in Greek and Latin, we employ the present. In consequence of these blunders, the version, as it lies, is perfectly unmeaning; whereas, no person, that is even but a smatterer in Hebrew, will hesitate to declare, that the sense is completely expressed in English, in these words: *For nothing is impossible with God.*

§ 10. THERE are few of the old versions which have kept entirely clear of this fault. In the ancient Latin translation called the Italic, whereof we have not now a complete copy remaining, there were many more barbarisms than in the present Vulgate. And even Jerom himself acquaints us that, when he set about making a new version, he left several things which he knew to be not properly expressed, for fear of giving offence to the weak, by his numerous and bold alterations. This idiom of *non omne*, for *nihil*, or *nullum*, seems to have been one which, in many places, though not in all, he has corrected. Thus, what, in the old Italic, after the Septuagint, was *Non est omne recens sub sole*[17], he has rendered perspicuously and properly, *Nihil sub sole novum.*

[17] Eccl. i. 9.

A slavish attachment to the letter, in translating, without any regard to the meaning, is originally the offspring of the superstition, not of the church, but of the synagogue, where it would have been more suitable in Christian interpreters, the ministers, not of the letter, but of the spirit, to have allowed it to remain.

§ 11. THAT this is not the way to answer the first and principal end of translating, has, I think, been sufficiently demonstrated. Instead of the sense of the original, it sometimes gives us downright nonsense; frequently a meaning quite different, and not seldom it makes the author say in another language, the reverse of what he said in his own. Can it then be doubted, that this is not the way to attain the second end in translating? Is this a method whereby a translator can convey into his version, as much as possible, in a consistency with the genius of a different language, the author's spirit and manner, and (so to speak) the very character of his style? It is evident, that the first end may be attained, where this is not attained. An author's meaning may be given, but in a different manner; a concise writer may be made to express himself diffusely, or a diffuse writer concisely; the sense of an elegant work may be justly given, though in a homely dress. But it does not hold conversely, that the second end may be attained without the first; for when an author's sense is not given, he is not fairly represented. Can we do justice to his manner, if, when he reasons

consequentially, he be exhibited as talking incoherently; if what he writes perspicuously, be rendered ambiguously or obscurely; if what flows from his pen naturally and easily, in the true idiom and construction of his language, be rendered ruggedly and unnaturally, by the violence perpetually done to the construction of the language, into which it is transmuted, rather than translated? The manner of a tall man, who walks with dignity, would be wretchedly represented by a dwarf who had no other mode of imitation, but to number and trace his footsteps. The immoderate strides and distortions which this ridiculous attempt would oblige the imitator to employ, could never convey to the spectators an idea of easy and graceful motion.

§ 12. THE third end of translating, that of preserving purity and perspicuity in the language into which the version is made, is not so much as aimed at, by any of the literal tribe. Upon the whole, I cannot express my sentiments more justly both of Arias and of Pagnin, than in the words of Houbigant, who [18], in assigning his reasons for not adopting the version of either, says, "Non facerem me-
"am illam versionem Ariæ Montani horridam, infi-
"cetam, obscuram, talem denique qualem compo-
"suisset, si quis homines deterrere ab sacris codici-
"bus legendis voluisset. Non illam Pagnini, quam

[18] Proleg. p. 178.

"Arias, jam malam, fecit imitando ac interpolando "pejorem." In this last remark, which may in part be justified by some of the foregoing examples, he perfectly agrees with Father Simon, who says of Arias's amendments on Pagnin's translation, *Quot correctiones, tot corruptiones.* For there is hardly any thing altered that is not for the worse. Such Latin versions would be quite unintelligible, if it were not for the knowledge we have of the original, and of the common English version, which is as literal as any version ought to be, and sometimes more so. The coincidence of two or three words recalls the whole passage to our memory; but we may venture to pronounce that, to an ancient Roman who knew nothing of the learning or opinions of the East, the greater part of Arias's Bible would appear no better than a jumble of words without meaning.

§ 13. To all the other evil consequences resulting from such versions, we ought to add, that they necessarily lead the unlearned reader into an opinion that the original which is susceptible of them, must be totally indefinite, equivocal, and obscure. Few, without making the experiment, can allow themselves to think, that it is equally possible, by this mode of translation, completely to disfigure, and render unintelligible, what is written with plainness and simplicity, and without any ambiguity, in their mother-tongue. Yet nothing is more certain than that the most perspicuous writing, in any language, may

be totally disguised by this treatment [19]. Were the ancient Greek or Latin classics, in prose or verse,

[19] As it is impossible, without an example, to conceive how monstrous the transformation is, which it occasions, I shall here subjoin a specimen of a few English sentences translated into Latin, in the taste and manner of Arias. "Ego inveni "aliquod pecus in meo frumento, et posui illa in meam libram. "Ego rogavi unum qui stabat per, si ille novit cujus illa "erant. Sed ille vertit unam viam a me, et fecit non ita mul- "tum ut vindicare salvum ad redire mihi ullam responsionem. "Super hoc ego rogavi unum alium qui dixit unam magnam "tabulam abiegnam in replicatione quam ego feci non sub- "stare. Quam unquam ego volui non habere posita illa sur- "sum, habui ego notum ad quem illa pertinebant; nam ego "didici post custodias quod ille fuit unus ego fui multum "aspectus ad." Where these few lines put into the hands of a learned foreigner, who does not understand English, he might sooner learn to read Chinese, than to divine their meaning. Yet a little attention would bring an Englishman who knows Latin, soon to discover that they were intended as a version, if we may call it so, of the following words, which, in the manner of Arias, I give with the version interlined.

Ego inveni aliquod pecus in meo frumento, et posui illa in meam
I found some cattle in my corn, and put them into my
libram. Ego rogavi unum qui stabat per si ille novit cujus
pound. I asked one who stood by if he knew whose
illa erant. Sed ille vertit unam viam a me, et fecit non
they were. But he turned a way from me, and did not
ita multum ut vindicare salvum ad redire mihi ullam responsi-
so much as vouch safe to return me any answer.
onem. Super hoc ego rogavi unum alium qui dixit unam
Upon this I asked another who said a
magnam tabulam abiegnam in replicatione quam ego feci non
great deal in reply which I did not

to be thus rendered into any modern tongue, nobody could bear to read them. Strange indeed, that a

substare. Quam unquam ego volui non habere posita illa
understand. How ever I would not have put them
sursum, habui ego notum ad quem illa pertinebant, nam ego
up, had I known to whom they belonged, for I
didici post custodias quod ille fuit unus ego fui multum aspectus
learned afterwards that he was one I was much beholden
ad.
to.

Should one object that the Latin words here employed do not suit the sense of the corresponding words in the passage translated, it is admitted that they do not; but they are selected in exact conformity to the fundamental rules followed by Arias. Thus *una via* away, *vindicare salvum* vouchsafe, *quam unquam* however, *tabula abiegna* deal, *substare* understand, *post custodias* afterwards, *aspectus* beholden, are all agreeable to the primary rule of etymology, and, in no respect, worse than *reptifico*, where both sense and use require *produco;* or *assumptio* for *doctrina*, to the utter destruction of all meaning, or *non omnis* for *nullus*, which gives a meaning quite different. But by what rule, it may be asked, is *pound* rendered *libra*, in a case wherein it manifestly means *septum?* By the same rule, it is answered, whereby *iashab* is rendered *sedere*, in a case wherein both the sense and the construction required *inhabitare*, and *daber* rendered *verbum*, where it manifestly means *res*, the golden rule of uniformity, by which every term ought always to be rendered the same way, and agreeably to its most common signification, without minding whether it makes sense or nonsense so rendered. [The literal translator follows implicitly the sage direction given by Cajetan, "Non sit vobis "curæ, si sensus non apparet, quia non est vestri officii ex-"ponere sed interpretari: interpretamini sicut jacet, et relin-

treatment should ever have been accounted respectful to the sacred penmen, which, if given to any other writer, would be universally condemned, as no better than dressing him in a fool's coat.

I am not at all surprised that certain great men of the church of Rome, like Cardinal Cajetan, who (though, with foreign assistance, he translated the Psalms) did not understand a word of Hebrew, show themselves great admirers of this method. The more unintelligible the Scriptures are made, the greater is the need of an infallible interpreter, an article of which they never lose sight. But that others, who have not the same motive, and possess a degree of understanding superior to that of a Jewish cabalist, should recommend an expedient, which serves only for debasing and discrediting the dictates of the divine spirit, appears perfectly unaccountable. I shall

" quatis expositoribus curam intelligendi." Præf. Comment. in Psalm.] Now it is certain that *pound* occurs oftner in the sense of *libra* than in that of *septum*. But how do you admit such gross solecisms as *redire responsi[illegible]m* ? I answer, Is this more so than *sedere tentorium* ? or do the prepositions as used here *stabat per* and *aspectus ad*, make the construction more monstrous, than *inter ad* in that sentence *sit dividens inter aquas ad aquas* ? Besides, there is not a word in the above specimen, which, taken severally, is not Latin: so much cannot be said for Arias, whose work is over-run with barbarisms as well as solecisms. Witness his *fructescens* and *reptificent*, in the few examples above produced. And in regard to the total incoherence and want of construction, can any thing in this way exceed *in creari ea*, or *in die facere Deus*, or *ad terram quod sumptus est inde*, or *major iniquitas quam parcere* ?

only add, that versions of this kind are very improperly called translations. The French have a convenient word, *travesty*, by which they denote the metamorphosis of a serious work into mere burlesque by dressing it in such language as renders it ridiculous, makes the noblest thoughts appear contemptible, the richest images beggarly, and the most judicious observations absurd. I would not say, therefore, the Bible *translated*, but the Bible *travestied*, by Arias Montanus. For that can never deserve the name of a translation, which gives you neither the matter nor the manner of the author, but, on the contrary, often exhibits both as the reverse of what they are. Malvenda, a Dominican, is another interpreter of the same tribe with his brother Pagnin, and with Arias, whom he is said greatly to have exceeded in darkness, barbarism, and nonsense. I never saw his version, but have reason to believe, from the accounts given of it, by good judges, that it can answer no valuable purpose.

PART III.

STRICTURES ON THE VULGATE.

I PROCEED now to consider a little the merit of some other Latin translations of holy writ. The first, doubtless, that deserves our attention, in respect both of antiquity, and I may say, of universa-

lity in the Western churches, is the *Vulgate*. The version which is known by this name, at least the greater part of it, is justly ascribed to Jerom, and must therefore be dated from the end of the fourth, or beginning of the fifth century. As its reception in the church was gradual, voluntary, and not in consequence of the command of a superior, and as, for some ages, the old Latin version, called the *Italic*, continued, partly from the influence of custom, partly from respect to antiquity, to be regarded and used by many, there is reason to believe that a part of that version still remains in the Vulgate, and is, in a manner, blended with it. One thing at least is certain that, in several places of the Vulgate, we find those expressions and ways of rendering which that learned father, in his works, strongly condemned, at the same time that, in other parts, we see his emendations regularly followed. Besides, as I hinted before, there were several corrections which, though his judgment approved them, he did not, for fear of shocking the sentiments of the people, think it prudent to adopt. From this it may naturally be inferred, that the manner and style of the Vulgate will not be found equal and uniform. And I believe no person who has examined it with a critical eye, will deny that this is the case.

§ 2. From what remains of the old Italic, it appears to have been much in the taste of almost all the Jewish translations, extremely literal, and consequently, in a great degree, obscure, ambiguous,

and barbarous. To give a Latin translation of the Scriptures, which might at once be more perspicuous, and more just to the original, was the great and laudable design of that eminent light of the Western churches above mentioned. The Old Testament part of the Italic version had been made entirely from the Septuagint (for the Hebrew Scriptures were, for some ages, of no estimation in the church); but Jerom, being well skilled in Hebrew, undertook to translate from the original. This itself has made, in some passages, a considerable difference on the sense. And, as the version of the Seventy has generally the mark of a servile attachment to the letter, there can be no doubt that there must have been, in the Hebrew manuscripts extant at the times when the several parts of that version were made, considerable differences of reading from those in common use at present. And though I think, upon the whole, that the Hebrew Scriptures are much preferable, an acquaintance with the Septuagint is of great importance for several reasons, and particularly for this, that it often assists in suggesting the true reading, in cases where the present Hebrew copies are obscure, or appear to have been vitiated. Jerom, in such cases, judiciously recurred to that translation; and often, when it was more perspicuous than the Hebrew, and the meaning which it contained seemed better adapted to the context, borrowed light from it. Perhaps he would have done still better to have recurred oftener. For, however learned those Jews were, to whose assistance he owed the acquisition

of the language, they were strongly tinctured with the cabalistical prejudices which prevailed, more or less, in all the literati of that nation. Hence they were sometimes led, on very fanciful grounds, to assign to words and phrases, meanings not supported by the obvious sense of the context, nor even by the most ancient versions and paraphrases. In this case, there can be no doubt that these were more to be confided in than his Jewish instructers.

§ 3. No intelligent person will question the fitness of that judicious and learned writer, for the task of translating the Bible into his native language. But that we may not be led too far in transferring to the work, the personal merit of the author, we ought to remember two things, first, that the Vulgate, as we have it at present, is not entirely the work of Jerom; and, secondly, that even in what Jerom translated, he left many things, as he himself acknowledges, which needed correction, but which he did not choose to alter, lest the liberties taken with the old translation should scandalize the vulgar. It is no wonder, then, that great inequalities should be observable in the execution. In many places it is excellent. The sense of the original is conveyed justly and perspicuously; no affectation in the style; on the contrary, the greatest simplicity combined with purity. But this cannot be said with truth of every part of that work.

§ 4. IN the preceding part of this Dissertation [20], I took notice of one passage rendered exactly in the manner of Arias, who found nothing to alter in it, in order to bring it down to his level. Indeed there are many such instances. Thus ουκ αν εσωθη πασα σαρξ is rendered, *Non fieret salva omnis caro* [21]. In some places we find barbarisms and solecisms, to which it would be difficult to discover a temptation, the just expression being both as literal and as obvious as the improper one that has been preferred to it. Of this sort, we may call, *Neque nubent, neque nubentur* [22]. *Nonne vos magis plures estis illis* [23]? *Non capit prophetam perire extra Jerusalem* [24], and *Filius hominis non venit ministrari sed ministrare* [25]. Yet, as to the last example, the same words in another Gospel are rendered without the solecism, *Filius hominis non venit ut ministraretur ei, sed ut ministraret* [26]. Very often we meet with instances of the same original word rendered by the same Latin word, when the sense is manifestly different, and the idiom of the tongue does not admit it. This absurdity extends even to conjunctions. The Greek ὁτι answers frequently to the Latin *quia*, *because*, and not seldom, to *quod*, *that*. Here, however, it is almost uniformly in defiance of grammar and common sense, rendered *quia* or *quoniam*. Thus, *Tunc confitebor illis quia nunquam novi vos* [27], and *Magister scimus quia verax es* [28]. These expressions are

[20] § 9.

[21] Matth. xxiv. 22. [22] Matth. xxii. 30. Mark, xii. 25.
[23] Matth. vi. 26. [24] Luke, xiii. 33. [25] Matth. xx. 28.
[26] Mark, x. 45. [27] Matth. vii. 23. [28] Matth. xxii. 16.

no better Latin, than these which follow are English. *Then will I confess to them, because I never knew you*, and, *Master we know because thou art true:* words which, if they suggest any meaning, it is evidently not the meaning of the author; nor is it a meaning which the original would have ever suggested to one who understands the language.

Nay, sometimes even the favourite rule of uniformity is violated, but not for the sake of keeping to the sense, the sense being rather hurt by the violation. Thus λαος answering to *populus*, and commonly so rendered, is sometimes improperly translated *plebs*. Εποιησε λυτρωσιν τω λαω αυτυ [29], is rendered *Fecit redemptionem plebis suæ*. Sometimes the most unmeaning barbarisms are adopted merely to represent the etymology of the original term. Τον αρτον ημων τον επιυσιον δος ημιν σημερον, is rendered *Panem nostrum supersubstantialem da nobis hodie* [30]. *Panis supersubstantialis* is just as barbarous Latin as *supersubstantial bread* would be English, and equally unintelligible. There is an additional evil resulting from this manner of treating holy writ, that the solecisms, barbarisms, and nonsensical expressions which it gives rise to, prove a fund of materials to the visionary, out of which his imagination frames a thousand mysteries.

§ 5. I WOULD not, however, be understood, by these remarks, as passing a general censure on this

[29] Luke, i. 68. [30] Matth. vi. 11

version, which, though not to be followed implicitly, may, I am convinced, be of great service to the critic. It ought to weigh with us, that even the latest part of this translation was made about fourteen hundred years ago, and is, consequently, many centuries prior to all the Latin translations now current, none of which can claim an earlier date than the revival of letters in the West. I do not use this argument from an immoderate regard to antiquity, or from the notion that age can give a sanction to error. But there are two things, in this circumstance, which ought to recommend the work in question, to the attentive examination of the critic. First that, having been made from manuscripts older than most, perhaps than any, now extant, it serves, in some degree, to supply the place of those manuscripts, and furnish us with the probable means of discovering what the readings were, which Jerom found in the copies which he so carefully collated. Another reason is that, being finished long before those controversies arose which are the foundation of most of the sects now subsisting, we may rest assured that, in regard to these, there will be no bias from party zeal to either side of the question. We cannot say so much for the translations which have been made since the rise of Protestantism, either by Protestants or by Papists. And these are, in my opinion, two not inconsiderable advantages.

§ 6. I TAKE notice of the last the rather, because many Protestants, on account of the declaration of

its authenticity, solemnly pronounced by the council of Trent, cannot avoid considering it as a Popish Bible, calculated for supporting the Roman Catholic cause. Now this is an illiberal conclusion, the offspring of ignorance, which I think it of some consequence to refute. It is no further back than the sixteenth century, since that judgment was given in approbation of this version, the first authoritative declaration made in its favour. Yet the estimation in which it was universally held throughout the Western churches, was, to say the least, not inferior, before that period, to what it is at present. And, we may say with truth that, though no judicious Protestant will think more favourably of this translation, on account of their verdict; neither will he, on this account, think less favourably of it. It was not because this version was peculiarly adapted to the Romish system, that it received the sanction of that synod; but, because it was the only Bible with which the far greater part of the members had, from their infancy, had the least acquaintance. There were but few in that assembly who understood either Greek or Hebrew. They had heard that the Protestants, the new heretics, as they called them, had frequent recourse to the original, and were beginning to make versions from it; a practice of which their own ignorance of the original made them the more jealous. Their fears being thus alarmed, they were exceedingly anxious to interpose their authority, by the declaration above mentioned, for preventing new translations being obtruded on the people. They

knew what the Vulgate contained; and had been early accustomed to explain it in their own way. But they did not know what might be produced from new translations. Therefore, to preoccupy men's minds, and prevent every true son of the church from reading other, especially modern, translations, and from paying any regard to what might be urged from the original, the very indefinite sentence was pronounced in favour of the Vulgate, *vetus et vulgata editio*, that, in all disputes, it should be held for authentic, *ut pro authentica habeatur*.

§ 7. Now, if, instead of this measure, that council had ordered a translation to be made by men nominated by them, in opposition to those published by Protestants, the case would have been very different: for, we may justly say that, amidst such a ferment as was then excited, there should have appeared, in a version so prepared, any thing like impartiality, candour, or discernment, would have been morally impossible. Yet, even such a production would have been entitled to a fair examination from the critic, who ought never to disdain to receive information from an adversary, and to judge impartially of what he offers. As that, however, was not the case, we ought not to consider the version in question as either the better, or the worse, for their verdict. It is but doing justice to say, that it is no way calculated to support Romish errors and corruptions. It had been in current use in the church, for ages before the much greater part of those errors and corrup-

tions was introduced. No doubt the schoolmen had acquired the knack of explaining it in such a way as favoured their own prejudices. But is this any more than what we find the most discordant sects acquire with regard to the original, or even to a translation which they use in common? For my own part, though it were my sole purpose, in recurring to a version, to refute the absurdities and corruptions of Popery, I should not desire other or better arguments than those I am supplied with by that very version, which one of their own councils has declared authentical.

§ 8. I AM not ignorant that a few passages have been produced, wherein the Vulgate and the original convey different meanings, and wherein the meaning of the Vulgate appears to favour the abuses established in that church. Some of these, but neither many, nor of great moment, are, no doubt, corruptions in the text, probably not intentional, but accidental, to which the originals in Hebrew and Greek have been, in like manner, liable, and from which no ancient book extant can be affirmed to be totally exempted. With respect to others of them, they will be found, upon a nearer inspection, as little favourable to Romish superstition, as the common reading in the Hebrew or the Greek. What is justly rendered in our version, *I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise*

his heel [31], is in such a manner translated in the Vulgate, as to afford some colour for the extraordinary honours paid the virgin mother of our Lord. *Inimicitias ponam inter te et mulierem, et semen tuum et semen illius. Ipsa conteret caput tuum, et tu insidiaberis calcaneo ejus.* "She shall bruise thy head." In this way it has been understood by some of their capital painters, who, in their pictures of the Virgin, have represented her treading on a serpent. It is, however certain, that their best critics admit this to be an error, and recur to some ancient manuscripts of the Vulgate which read *ipsum* not *ipsa*.

A still grosser blunder, which seems to give countenance to the worship of relics, is in the passage thus rendered by our interpreters: *By faith Jacob, when he was a dying, blessed both the sons of Joseph; and worshipped, leaning upon the top of his staff* [32]: in the Vulgate thus: *Fide Jacob moriens singulos filiorum Joseph benedixit, et adoravit fastigium virgæ ejus;* "adored the top of his rod;" as the version made from the Vulgate by English Romanists, and published at Rheims, expresses it. But the best judges among Roman Catholics admit, that the Latin text is not entire in this place, and that there has been an accidental omission of the preposition, through the carelessness of transcribers. For they have not now a writer of any name, who infers, from the declaration of authenticity, either the infallibility of the translator or the exactness of the copiers. Houbi-

[31] Gen. iii. 15. [32] Heb. xi. 21.

gant, a priest of the Oratory, has not been restrained by that sentence, from making a new translation of the Old Testament from the Hebrew into Latin, wherein he uses as much freedom with the Vulgate, in correcting what appeared to him faulty in it, as any reasonable Protestant, in this country, would do with the common English translation. Nay, which is more extraordinary, in the execution of this work, he had the countenance of the then reigning pontiff. In his version he has corrected the passage quoted from Genesis, and said, "*Illud*," (not *illa*) "conteret caput tuum." I make no doubt that he would have corrected the other passage also, if he had made a version of the New Testament.

§ 9. I KNOW it has also been urged, that there are some things in the Vulgate, which favour the style and doctrine of Rome, particularly in what regards the sacraments; and that such things are to be found in places where there is no ground to suspect a various reading, nor that the text of the Vulgate has undergone any alteration, either intentional or accidental. Could this point be evinced in a satisfactory manner, it would allow more to Popery, on the score of antiquity, than, in my opinion, she is entitled to. It is true that marriage appears, in one passage, to be called a sacrament. Paul, after recommending the duties of husbands and wives, and enforcing his recommendations by the resemblance which marriage bears to the relation subsisting between Christ and his church, having quoted

these words from Moses, *For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall be joined unto his wife, and they two shall be one flesh;* adds, as it is expressed in the Vulgate, *Sacramentum hoc magnum est, ego autem dico in Christo et in ecclesia*[33]; as expressed in the English translation, *This is a great mystery; but I speak concerning Christ and the church;* that is, as I had occasion to observe in the preceding Dissertation, to which I refer the reader[34], 'This is capable of an important and 'figurative interpretation, I mean as it relates to 'Christ and the church.' Under the Mosaic economy, the relation wherein God stood to Israel, is often represented under the figure of marriage; and it is common with the penmen of the New Testament, to transfer those images, whereby the union between God and his people is illustrated in the Old, to that which subsists between Christ and his church. It is evident that, by the Latin word *sacramentum*, the Greek μυστηριον is frequently rendered in the New Testament; and it is no less evident, not only from the application of the word in that version, but from the general use of it, in ecclesiastical writers, in the primitive ages, that it often denoted no more than an allegorical or figurative meaning, which may be assigned to any narrative or injunction; a meaning more sublime than that which is at first suggested by the words. Thus, the moral conveyed under an apologue or parable was with them the *sacrament*,

[33] Eph. v. 32. [34] Part I. § 7, 8.

that is, the hidden meaning of the apologue or parable. In *ego dicam tibi sacramentum mulieris et bestiæ quæ portat eam* [35], I will tell thee the mystery of the woman, and of the beast which carrieth her; it is indubitable, that μυστηριον, or *sacramentum*, means the hidden meaning of that vision. It is very plain that, in their use, the sense of the word *sacramentum* was totally different from that which it has at present, either among Protestants or among Papists [36]. At the same time, there can be no question, that the misunderstanding of the passage quoted above, from the Epistle to the Ephesians, has given rise to the exaltation of matrimony into a sacrament. Such are the effects of the perversion of words, through the gradual change of customs; a perversion incident to every language, but which no translator can foresee.

No more is their doctrine of merit supported by the following expression: *Talibus hostiis promeretur Deus* [37]; which, though faulty in point of purity, means no more than is expressed in the English translation, in these words: *With such sacrifices God is well pleased.* It is by common use, and not by scholastic quibbles, that the language of the sacred writers ought to be interpreted. Again, the command which so often occurs in the Gospels, *pœnitentiam agite*, seems at first to favour the Popish doctrine of *penance*. In conformity to this idea, the Rhemish translators render it *do penance*. But no-

[35] Rev. xvii. 7. [36] Diss. IX. P. I. [37] Heb. xiii. 16.

thing is more evident, than that this is a perversion of the phrase from its ancient meaning, occasioned by the corruptions which have insensibly crept into the church. That the words, as used by the Latin translator, meant originally as much, at least, as the English word *repent*, cannot admit a question; and thus much is allowed by the critics of that communion. In this manner Maldonate, a learned Jesuit, in his Commentary [38], explains *pœnitentiam agite*, as of the same import with *parate vias Domini, rectas facite semitas ejus:* and both as signifying *Relinquite errores, et sequimini veritatem: discedite a malo, et facite bonum.* He understood no otherwise the *agite pœnitentiam* of the Latin translator, than we understand the μετανοειτε of the Evangelist. Accordingly, the same Greek word is, in one place of that version, rendered *pœnitemini* [39]. But the introduction of the doctrine of auricular confession, of the necessity for obtaining absolution, of submitting to the punishment prescribed by the priest for the sins confessed, which they have come to denominate *pœnitentia*, and their styling the whole of this institution of theirs the *sacrament of penance*, which is of a much later date than that version, has diverted men's minds from attending to the primitive, and only proper, import of the phrase. *Agite pœnitentiam* was not, therefore, originally a mis-translation of the Greek μετανοειτε, though not sufficiently expressive; but the abuse which has gradually taken place in the

[38] On Matth. vii. 15. [39] Mark, i. 15.

Latin church, and the misapplication of the term which it has occasioned, have in a manner justled out the original meaning, and rendered the words, in their present acceptation, totally improper [40].

§ 10. SEVERAL other words and expressions give scope for the like observations. But, after what has been said, it is not necessary to enter further into particulars. The Vulgate may reasonably be pronounced, upon the whole, a good and faithful version. That it is unequal in the style, in respect both of purity and of perspicuity, is very evident; nay, to such a degree, as plainly to evince that it has not all issued from the same pen. Considered in gross, we have reason to think it greatly inferior to Jerom's translation, as finished by himself. I may add, we have reason also to consider the version which Jerom actually made, as greatly inferior to what he could have made, and would have made, if he had thought himself at liberty to follow entirely his own judgment, and had not been much restrained by the prejudices of the people. I have already observed the advantages redounding to the critic from the use of this version, which are in some degree peculiar. I shall only add, that its language, barbarous as it often is, has its use in assisting us to understand, more perfectly, the Latin ecclesiastical writers of the early ages.

[40] For further illustration on this article, see Diss. XI. Part II. § 4.

PART IV.

STRICTURES ON CASTALIO.

HAVING shown, that it is impossible to do justice to an author, or to his subject, by attempting to track him, and always to be found in his footsteps, I shall now animadvert a little on those translators who are in the opposite extreme; whose manner is so loose, rambling, and desultory, that, though they move nearly in the same direction with their author, pointing to the same object, they keep scarcely within sight of his path. Of the former excess, Arias Montanus is a perfect model: the Vulgate is often too much so. Of the latter, the most remarkable example we have in Latin, is Castalio. Yet Castalio's work is no paraphrase, such as we have sometimes seen under the name of *liberal translations:* for in these, there are always interwoven with the thoughts of the author, those of his intepreter, under the notion of their importance, either for illustrating, or for enforcing, the sentiments of the original. The paraphrast does not confine himself to the humble task of the translator, who proposes to exhibit, pure and unmixed, the sentiments of another, clothed, indeed, in a different dress, namely, such as the country, into which he introduces them,

can supply him with. The paraphrast, on the contrary, claims to share with the author in the merit of the work, not in respect of the language merely, for to this every interpreter has a claim, but in respect of what is much more important, the sense: nay, further, if the sentiments of these two happen to jar, no uncommon case, it is easy to conjecture whose will predominate in the paraphrase. But it is not with paraphrasts that I have here to do. A loose manner of translating is sometimes adopted, not for the sake of insinuating, artfully, the translator's opinions, by blending them with the sentiments of the author, but merely for the sake of expressing with elegance, and in an oratorical manner, the sense of the original.

§ 2. THIS was acknowledged to be in a high degree Castalio's object in translating. He had observed, with grief, that great numbers were withheld from reading the Scriptures, that is, the Vulgate, the only version of any account then extant, by the rudeness, as well as the obscurity, of the style. To give the public a Bible more elegantly and perspicuously written, he considered as at least an innocent, if not a laudable, artifice for inducing students, especially those of the younger sort, to read the Scriptures with attention, and to throw aside books full of indecencies, then much in vogue, because recommended by the beauty and ornaments of language. "Cupiebam," says he [41], "extare

[41] Cast. Defens. Translat. &c.

" Latiniorem aliquam, necnon fideliorem, et magis
" perspicuam sacrarum literarum translationem, ex
" qua posset eadem opera pietas cum Latino sermo
" ne disci, ut hac ratione et tempori consuleretur, et
" homines ad legenda sacra pellicerentur." The motive was surely commendable; and the reason whereon it was founded, a general disuse of the Scriptures, on account of the badness of their language, is but too notorious. Cardinal Bembo, a man of some note and literature under the pontificate of Leo X. in whose time the Reformation commenced, is said to have expressed himself strongly on this subject, that he durst not read the Bible, for fear of corrupting his style; an expression which had a very unfavourable aspect, especially in a churchman. Nevertheless, when we consider that, by the Bible he meant the Vulgate, and by his style, his Latinity; this declaration, judged with candour, will not be found to merit all the censure which Brown [42], and others, have bestowed upon it. For, surely no one who understands Latin, will say, that he wishes to form his style in that language on the Vulgate. Nor does any reflection on the language of that translation affect, in the smallest degree, the sacred writers. The character of Moses's style, in particular, is simplicity, seriousness, perspicuity, and purity. The first and second of these qualities are, in general, well exhibited in the Vulgate; the third is sometimes violated, and the fourth often.

[42] Essays on the Characteristics

§ 3. But, to return to Castalio: he was not entirely disappointed in his principal aim. Many Romanists, as well as Protestants, who could not endure the foreign idioms and obscurity of the Vulgate, attracted by the fluency, the perspicuity, and partly, no doubt, by the novelty of Castalio's diction, as employed for conveying *the mind of the Spirit*, were delighted with the performance; whilst the same quality of novelty, along with what looked like affectation in the change, exceedingly disgusted others. One thing is very evident, in regard to this translator, that when his work first made its appearance, nobody seemed to judge of it with coolness and moderation. Almost every person either admired, or abhorred, it. At this distant period, there is a greater probability of judging equitably, than there was when it was first published, and men's passions, from the circumstances of the times, were, on every new topic of discussion, wherein religion was concerned, so liable to be inflamed.

§ 4. If we examine this work by the three great ends of translating, above observed, we shall be qualified to form some judgment of his merit in this department. As to the first and principal end, conveying the true sense of his author, I think he has succeeded, at least, as well as most other translators into Latin, and better than some of those who, with much virulence, traduced his character, and decried his work. He had, indeed, one great advantage, in being an excellent linguist, and knowing more of

the three languages, Hebrew, Greek, and Latin, than most of the critics of his time. But that his immoderate passion for classical elocution, did sometimes lead him to adopt expressions which were feeble, obscure, and improper, is very certain. And it must be owned, notwithstanding his plausible defence, that Beza had reason to affirm, that the words ὁτι επεσκεψατο και εποιησε λυτρωσιν τω λαω αυτυ [43], are but ambiguously and frigidly rendered, *qui populi sui liberationem procuret.* The difference is immense, between the notions of Pagans, concerning the agency of their gods in human affairs and the ideas which Scripture gives us, of the divine efficiency; and, therefore, even Cicero, in a case of this kind, is no authority. The following instance, cited by Houbigant, is an example of obscurity arising from the same cause [44]: *Tu isti populo terræ hæreditatem hercisceris* [45]. *Hercisco* is merely a juridical term which, though it might have been proper, in a treatise on the civil law, or in pleading in a court of judicature, no Roman author, of any name, would have used, in a work intended for the people. But, to no sort of style are technical terms more unsuitable than to that of holy writ. It was the more inexcusable, in this place, where the simple and natural expression was so obvious. *Tu terram—dabis isti populo possidendam.* Whereas, the phrase which Castalio has adopted, would have probably been unintelligible to the much greater part of the

[43] Luke, i. 68. [44] Proleg. [45] Josh. i. 6.

people, even in Rome, at the time when Latin was their mother-tongue.

§ 5. As to the second object of translating, the conveyance of the spirit and manner of the author, in a just exhibition of the character of his style; I hinted before that, in this particular, he failed *entirely*, and, I may even add, *intentionally*. The first characteristical quality of the historic style of holy writ, *simplicity*, he has totally renounced. The simple style is opposed both to the complex, and to the highly ornamented. The complex is, when the diction abounds in periods, or in sentences consisting of several members artfully combined. This is much the manner of Castalio, but far from that of the sacred historians. In a former Dissertation [46], I gave a specimen of this difference, in his manner of rendering the first five verses of Genesis. Now, for the transformation he has made them undergo, he has no excuse, from either necessity or perspicuity. The simple style will suit any tongue, (though the complex will not always,) and is remarkably perspicuous. His affecting so often, without necessity, to give, in the way of narrative, what, in the original, is in the way of dialogue, is another flagrant violation of ancient simplicity.

Nor is simplicity alone hurt by this change. How cold and inanimate, as well as indefinite, is the oblique but classical turn, which Castalio has endea-

[46] Diss. III. § 4.

voured to give to Laban's salutation of Abraham's servant: *Eumque a Jova salvere jussum, hortatur, ne foris maneat:* compared with the direct and vivid address in the Vulgate, literally from the Hebrew: *Dixitque, Ingredere, benedicte Domini: cur foris stas?* Or, as it is in the English translation, *Come in, thou blessed of the Lord: wherefore standest thou without* [47]*?* That he transgresses, in this respect also, by a profusion of ornament, is undeniable. By his accumulated diminutives, both in names and epithets, in the manner of Catullus, intended surely to be ornamental, he has injured the dignity, as well as the simplicity and seriousness, of Solomon's Song.

Another ornament, in the same taste, by which the simplicity of the sacred writers has been greatly hurt in his translation, is the attempt, when the same ideas recur, of expressing them almost always in different words and varied phrases. It is not only essential to the simplicity, but it adds to the majesty, of the inspired penmen, that there never appears, in them, any solicitude about their words. No pursuit of variety, or, indeed, of any thing in point of diction, out of the common road. Very different is the manner of this interpreter. I had occasion to remark before [48], that there were no fewer than seven or eight phrases, employed by Castalio, in different places of the New Testament, for expressing the import of the single verb *μετανοεω*, though used always in the same acceptation. And, as another

[47] Gen. xxiv. 31. [48] Diss. VI. Part III. § 11.

specimen of this inordinate passion, I shall add that, to express διωγμος, he uses, beside the word *persequutio*, the far too general terms, *vexatio*, *afflictio*, *insectatio*, *adversa*, *res adversæ*. Nay, in some instances, his love of variety has carried him so far as to sacrifice, not barely the style of his author, but his sense. What can be a stronger example of it, than his denominating God, *Deus obtrectator*[49], rather than recur, with his author, to any term he had employed before. For the Hebrew קנא *kone*, rendered *jealous* in the English translation, he had used, in one place, *æmulus*, in another, *socii impatiens*, and in a third, *rivalis impatiens*. Though some exception may be made to the two last, the first was as good as the language afforded. Another translator would not have thought there was any occasion for a fourth; but so differently thought our classical interpreter, in matters of this kind, that he preferred a most improper word, which might contribute to give his style the graces of novelty and variety, to an apposite, but more common, term which he had employed before. The word *obtrectator* is never used, as far as I remember, but in a bad sense. It is acknowledged that, when jealousy is ascribed to God, the expression is not strictly proper. He is spoken of after the manner of men. But then the term, by itself, does not imply any thing immoral. We may say of a man properly, in certain cases, that he had reason to be *jealous*; but with no propriety can we

[49] Josh. xxiv. 19.

say, in any case, that a man had reason to be *envious*, that he had reason to be *calumnious*. These epithets are better suited to the diabolical nature, than to the divine. Yet both are included in the word *obtrectator*.

In short, his affectation of the manner of some of the poets and orators, has metamorphosed the authors he interpreted, and stript them of the venerable signatures of antiquity, which so admirably befit them; and which, serving as intrinsic evidence of their authenticity, recommended their writings to the serious and judicious. Whereas, when accoutred in this new fashion, nobody would imagine them to have been Hebrews; and yet (as some critics have justly remarked) it has not been within the compass of Castalio's art, to make them look like Romans.

§ 6. I AM far from thinking that Castalio merited, on this account, the bitter invectives vented against him by Beza, and others, as a wilful corrupter of the word of God. His intention was good; it was to entice all ranks, as much as possible, to the study of the divine oracles. The expedient he used appeared, at least, harmless. It was, in his judgment, at the worst, but like that which Horace observes, was often practised by good-natured teachers:

Ut pueris olim dant crustula blandi
Doctores, elementa velint ut discere prima.

He regarded the thoughts solely as the result of inspiration, the words and idiom as merely circumstantial. "Erant Apostoli," says he [50], "natu He-"bræi: et peregrina, hoc est Græca lingua, scri-"bentes hebraizabant; non quod id juberet spiritus: "neque enim pluris facit spiritus Hebraismos quam "Græcismos." Indeed, if the liberty Castalio has taken with the diction, had extended no further than to reject those Hebraisms which, how perspicuous soever they are in the original, occasion either obscurity or ambiguity, when verbally translated, and to supply their place, by simple expressions, in the Latin idiom, clearly conveying the same sense, no person who is not tinctured with the cabalistical superstition of the rabbinists, could have censured his conduct.

Very often, the freedoms he used with the style of the sacred penmen, aimed no higher. Thus, the expression of the Prophet, which is, literally, in English, *My beloved had a vineyard in a horn of the son of oil;* and which is rendered in the Vulgate, *Vinea facta est dilecto meo in cornu filio olei;* Castalio has translated much better, because intelligibly, *Habebat amicus meus vineam in quodam pingui dorso.* Had he used the more familiar term, *collis*, instead of *dorsum*, it would have been still better. The English translation expresses the sense very properly, *My well beloved hath a vineyard in a very fruitful hill* [51]. But as I have shown, the freedoms ta-

[50] Defens. [51] Isaiah, v. 1.

ken by Castalio went sometimes a great deal further than this, and tended to lessen the respect due to the sacred oracles, by putting them too much on a footing with compositions merely human, and by changing their serious manner, for one comparatively light and trifling, nay, even playful and childish.

§ 7. As to the other two qualities of the historical style of Scripture, perspicuity and purity, he seems in general to have been observant of them. To the latter he is censured chiefly for having sacrificed too much. Yet his attention to this quality has proved a principal means of securing his perspicuity; as it is certain that the excessive attempts of others to preserve in their version the Oriental idiom, have both rendered the plainest passages unintelligible, and given bad Latin for what was good Hebrew or Chaldee. The example last quoted is an evidence of this; and surely none can doubt that it has more perspicuity, as well as propriety, to say in Latin, *ut nemo usque evaderet* with Castalio, than to say, *ut non fieret salva omnis caro* with the Vulgate: and, *Nulla res est quam Deus facere non possit* with the former, than *non erit impossibile apud Deum omne verbum* with the latter. Nevertheless, in a few instances, an immoderate passion for classical phraseology has, as we have seen, betrayed him into obscurities, and even blunders, of which inferior interpreters were in no danger.

§ 8. To illustrate the different effects on the appearance of the sacred penmen, produced by the op-

posite modes of translating, which Arias and Castalio have adopted, I shall employ a similitude of which Castalio himself has given me the hint. In his epistle dedicatory to king Edward, he has these words: *Quod ad latinitatem attinet, est oratio nihil aliud quam rei quædam quasi vestis, et nos sartores sumus.* In conformity to this idea, I should say that those venerable writers the Apostles and Evangelists, appear, in their own country, in a garb plain indeed, and even homely, but grave withal, decent, and well fitted to the wearers. Arias, intending to introduce them to the Latins, has, to make them look as little as possible like other men, and, one would think, to frighten every body from desiring their acquaintance, clothed them in filthy rags, which are indeed of Roman manufacture, but have no other relation to any thing worn in the country, being alike unfit for every purpose of decency and use. For surely that style is most aptly compared to tattered garments, in which the words can, by no rule of syntax in the language, be rendered coherent, or expressive of any sense. Castalio, on the contrary, not satisfied that, when abroad, they should be gravely and properly habited, as they were at home, will have them tricked up in finery and lace, that they may appear like men of fashion, and even make some figure in, what the world calls, good company. But, though I consider both these interpreters as in extremes, I am far from thinking their performances are to be deemed, in any respect, equi-

valent. It is not in my power to discover a good use that can be made of Arias' version, unless to give some assistance to a school-boy in acquiring the elements of the language. Castalio's, with one great fault, has many excellent qualities.

§ 9. In regard to the third object of translating, which is to write so far properly and agreeably in the language into which the translation is made, as may, independently of its exactness, serve to recommend it as a valuable work in that tongue; if Castalio failed here, he has been particularly unlucky, since the latinity and elegance of the work must, by his own acknowledgment, have been more an object to him than to other translators, this being the great means by which he wanted to draw the attention of the youth of that age to the study of the holy Scriptures. But however much his taste may, in this respect, have been adapted to the times wherein he lived, we cannot consider it as perfectly chaste and faultless. Sufficient grounds for this censure may be collected from the remarks already made. The superficial and the shining qualities of style seem often to have had more attractions with him than the solid and the useful.

§ 10. In other respects he appears to have been well qualified for the task of translating. Conversant in the learned languages, possessed of a good understanding, and no inconsiderable share of critical acuteness, candid in his disposition, and not over

confident of his own abilities, or excessively tenacious of his own opinion, he was ever ready to hearken, and, when convinced, to submit, to reason, whether presented by a friend, or by a foe, whether in terms of amity and love, or of reproach and hatred. Of this he gave very ample evidence, in the corrections which he made, on some of the later editions of his Bible.

He was far from pretending, like some interpreters and commentators, to understand every thing. When he was uncertain about the sense, he could do no other than follow the words in translating. This expression of the Apostle Peter [52], Εις τουτο γαρ και νεκροις ευηγγελισθη, ἱνα κριθωσι μεν κατα ανθρωπους σαρκι, ζωσι δε κατα Θεον πνευματι, he translates in this manner, *Nam ideo mortuis quoque nunciatus est, ut et secundum homines carne judicentur et secundum Deum spiritu vivant;* adding this note on the margin: *Hunc locum non intelligo, ideoque ad verbum transtuli.* There are several other such instances. In one place he has on the margin: *Hos duos versus non intelligo, ideoque de mea translatione dubito* [53]. It is worth while to take notice of the manner in which he himself speaks of such passages: "Quod autem alicubi scribo, me aliquem locum non "intelligere: id non ita accipi volo, quasi cætera "plane intelligam: sed ut sciatur, me in aliis aliquid "saltem obscuræ lucis habere, in illis nihil: tum "autem ut meæ translationi in quibusdam hujus-

[52] 1 Pet. iv. 6 [53] Isaiah, xxvii. 6. 7.

" modi locis non nimium confidatur. Neque tamen " ubique quid non intelligam ostendo: esset enim " hoc infinitum [54]."

§ 11. With respect to the changes he made, in adopting classical terms instead of certain words and phrases, which had been long in use amongst ecclesiastic writers, and were supposed to be universally understood, I cannot agree entirely with, either his sentiments, or those of his adversaries. In the first place, I do not think, as he seems once to have thought (though, in this respect, he afterwards altered his conduct, and consequently, we may suppose, his opinion), that no word deserved admission into his version, which had not the sanction of some Pagan classic. For this reason, the words *baptisma*, *angelus*, *ecclesia*, *proselytus*, *synagoga*, *propheta*, *patriarcha*, *mediator*, *dæmoniacus*, *hypocrita*, *benedictus*, and the words *fides* and *fidelis*, when used in the theological sense, he set aside for *lotio*, *genius*, *respublica*, *adventitius*, *collegium*, *vates*, *summus pater*, *sequester*, *furiosus*, *simulator*, *collaudandus*, *fiducia*, *fidens*. Some of the more usual terms, as *angelus*, *baptisma*, *ecclesia*, *synagoga*, were, in later editions, replaced. In regard to some others, considering the plan he had adopted, his choice cannot be much blamed, as they were sufficiently expressive of the sense of the original. A few, indeed, were not so.

[54] Ad lectores admonitio.

Genius is not a version of αγγελος, nor *furiosus* of δαιμονιζομενος. The notions entertained by the heathen of their *genii*, no more corresponded to the ideas of the Hebrews concerning *angels*, than the fancies which our ancestors entertained of elves and fairies, corresponded to the Christian doctrine concerning the heavenly inhabitants. Αγγελος was a literal version made by the Seventy into Greek, of the Hebrew מלאך *malach*, a name of office which, if Castalio after them had literally rendered into Latin, calling it *nuntius*, it would have been as little liable to exception, as his rendering the words βασιλευς and ὑπηρετης, *rex* and *minister*. *Furiosus* is not a just translation of δαιμονιζομενος. The import of the original name, which only suggests the cause, is confined, by the translator's opinion, to the nature of the disorder: *furiosus* means no more than *mad*, whereas δαιμονιζομενος is, repeatedly in Scripture, given as equivalent to δαιμονιον εχων. Nor does the disease of those unhappy persons appear to have been always *madness*. And if, in this, we regard etymology alone, the traditionary fables, about the three infernal goddesses, called *furies*, are no way suited to the ancient popular faith, of either Jews or Pagans, concerning demons. And even though *adventitius* corresponds exactly in etymology with προσηλυτος, the Latin word does not convey the idea which, in the Hellenistic idiom, is conveyed by the Greek. *Simulator* can hardly be objected to, as a version of ὑποκριτης. In some instances, it answers better than *hypocrita*. This name is, in Latin, confined, by

use, to those who lead a life of dissimulation in what regards religion; whereas the Greek term is sometimes employed in the New Testament, in all the latitude in which we commonly use the word *dissembler*, for one who is insincere in a particular instance. But the classical word *collaudandus* does not suit the Greek εὐλογητος as used in holy writ, near so well as does the ecclesiastical epithet *benedictus*. And *summus pater* is too indefinite a version of πατριαρχης.

It is a good rule, in every language, to take the necessary terms in every branch of knowledge or business, from those best acquainted with that branch: because, among them, the extent of the terms, and their respective differences, will be most accurately distinguished. In what, therefore, peculiarly concerned the undisputed tenets, or rites, either of Judaism or of Christianity, it was much more reasonable to adopt the style used by Latin Jews or Christians, in those early ages, before they were corrupted with philosophy, than, with the assistance of but a remote analogy, to transfer terms used by Pagan writers, to the doctrines and ceremonies of a religion with which they were totally unacquainted. I must, therefore, consider the rejection of several terms established by ecclesiastic use, and conveying precisely the idea intended by the sacred penmen, as an indication of an excessive squeamishness in point of Latinity. Such terms, in my judgment, are, in matters of revelation, entitled even to be preferred to classical words. For, though the latter may nearly

suit the idea, they cannot have, to the same degree as the former, the sanction of use in that application.

§ 12. But, let it be observed, on the other hand, that the preference above mentioned, is limited by this express condition, that the ecclesiastic term, in its common acceptation, plainly convey to the reader the same idea which the original word, used by the sacred penmen, was intended to convey to the readers for whom they wrote. To plead, on the contrary, with Father Simon and others, for the preferable adoption of certain theologic words and phrases consecrated by long use, as they are pleased to term it, though admitted to be obscure, ambiguous, or even improper, is to me the greatest absurdity. It is really to make the sacred authors give place to their ancient interpreters: it is to throw away the sense of the former in compliment to the words of the latter. We must surely consider inspiration as a thing of very little consequence, when we sacrifice it knowingly to human errors. This would, in effect, condemn all new translations, whatever occasion there might be for them, for correcting the faults of former versions. But into the truth of this sentiment I shall have occasion to inquire more fully afterwards. Only let it be remembered, that the limitation now mentioned affects two classes of words, first, those by which the original terms were early mis-translated; secondly, those which, though at first they exhibited the true sense of the original,

have come gradually to convey a different meaning. For these, in consequence of a change insensibly introduced in the application, are become now, whatever they were formerly, either improper or ambiguous.

There are some terms in the Vulgate which, in my judgment, were never perfectly adapted to those in the original, in whose place they were substituted. Whether *sacramentum* for *μυστηριον* were originally of this number or not, it is certain that the theological meaning, now constantly affixed to that word, does not suit the sense of the sacred authors, which is fully and intelligibly expressed in Latin, as Castalio and Houbigant have commonly done, by the word *arcanum*. The Vulgate sometimes renders it *mysterium*, which is not much better than *sacramentum*. For *mysterium*, not being Latin, and being variously used as a technical term by theologians, must be vague and obscure. Many other latinized Greek words (as *scandalizo*, *blasphemia*, *hæresis*, *schisma*) are in some measure liable to the same objection. The original terms are none of those, which were observed formerly [55] not to be susceptible of a translation into another language. And in that case to transfer the words, leaving them untranslated, rarely fails either to keep the reader in ignorance, or to lead him into error. For this reason, I am far from condemning, with Boys, Simon, and some others, the modern translators, particularly Castalio,

[55] Diss. II. Part. I. § 5.

for rendering them into proper Latin. I intend, in another Dissertation, to evince that they would not have executed faithfully the office they had undertaken, if they had not done it. The words with which Castalio has commonly supplied us, instead of those above mentioned (*officio*, *maledictum*, or *impia dicta*, *secta*, *dissidium*, or *factio*), are in general as apposite for expressing the sense of the original, as any other words of the same class. And even the Vulgate is not uniform in regard to those words. Αιρεσις is, in several places of that version, rendered *secta*, and σχισμα *scissura* and *dissensio*. But of this I have treated already in the preceding Dissertation.

§ 13. AFTER all the zeal Castalio has shown, and the stretches he has made for preserving classical purity, could it have been imagined that he would have admitted into his version, manifest barbarisms, both words and idioms, of no authority whatever? Yet that he has afforded a few instances of this strange inconsistency, is unquestionable. It would not be easy to assign a satisfactory reason for his rejecting the term *idolum* idol, a classical word, and used by Pagans in the same meaning in which it is used by us. If it be said, that in their use, it was not accompanied with the same kind of sentiment as when used by us; as much may be affirmed with truth of *Deus*, *Numen*, and every word that relates to religion, which could not fail to affect differently the mind of a heathen, from the way in which it af-

fects the mind of a Jew or a Christian. Ought we to have different names for the Pagan deities, Jupiter, Juno, &c. because the mention of them was attended with reverence in Pagans, and with contempt in Christians?

But what shall we say of his supplying *idolum*, by a barbarism of his own, *deaster*, a word of no authority, sacred or profane? It suited the fundamental principles of his undertaking to reject *idololatra*, idolater, because, though analogically formed from a good word, it could plead only ecclesiastic use. But, by what principle, he has introduced such a monster as *deastricola*, that was never heard of before, it would be impossible to say. He could be at no loss for a proper expression. *Idolorum* or *simulacrorum cultor* would have served. He has given but too good reason, by such uncouth sounds as *deaster*, *deastricola*, and *infidens* infidel, to say that his objections lay only against the liberties in language which had been taken by others. Castalio argues against barbarisms as being obscure; surely this argument strikes more against those of his own coining, than against those (if they can be called barbarisms) which are recommended by so long continued, and so extensive, an use. For, though he should not allow the use of theologians to be perfectly good, it is surely, on those subjects, sufficient for removing the objection of obscurity. I do not see any thing, in his work, which has so much the appearance of self-conceit as this. In other respects, I find him modest and unassuming. It has been

also observed, that his idioms are not always pure. *Dominus ad cujus normam*, is not in the Latin idiom. *Norma legis* is proper, not *norma Dei*, or *norma homins*. But this I consider as an oversight, the other as affectation.

§ 14. I SHALL add a few words on the subject of Hebraisms, which Castalio is accused of rejecting altogether. This charge he is so far from denying, that he endeavours to justify his conduct in this particular. Herein, I think, if his adversaries went too far on one side, in preferring the mere form of the expression, to the perspicuous enunciation of the sense; this interpreter went too far on the opposite side, as he made no account of giving to his version the strong signatures which the original bears of the antiquity, the manners, and the character, of the age and nation of the writers. Yet both the credibility of the narrative, and the impression which the sentiments are adapted to make on the readers, are not a little affected by that circumstance. That those are in the worse extreme of the two, who would sacrifice perspicuity and propriety (in other words, the sense itself) to that circumstance, is not indeed to be doubted. The patrons of the literal method do not advert that, by carrying the point too far, the very exhibition of the style and manner of the author, is, with both the other ends of translating, totally annihilated. "Quo pertinent," says Houbigant [56], "istiusmodi interpretationes, quæ ni-

[56] Proleg.

" hil quidquam resonant, nisi adhibes interpretis al
" terum interpretem ?" Again, " Num proprietas
" hæc censenda est, quæ mihi exprimat obscure ac
" inhumane, id quod sacri scriptores dilucide ac
" liberaliter expresserunt ?" The sentiments of this author, in regard to the proper mean between both extremes, as they seem entirely reasonable, and equally applicable to any language (though expressed in reference to Latin versions only), I shall subjoin to the foregoing observations on Castalio : " Utro-
" que in genere tam metrico quam soluto, retinen-
" das esse veteres loquendi formas, nec ab ista li-
" nea unquam discedendum, nisi gravibus de causis,
" quæ quidem nobis esse tres videntur : primo, si
" Hebraismi veteres, cum retinentur, fiunt Latino
" in sermone, vel obscuri vel ambigui ; secundo, si
" eorum significantia minuitur, nisi circuitione qua-
" dam uteris ; tertio, si vergant ad aliam, quam He-
" braica verba, sententiam [57]."

§ 15. I SHALL finish my critique on this translator, with some remarks on a charge brought against him by Beausobre and Lenfant, who affirm [58] that, abstracting from the false elegance of his style, he takes greater liberty (they must certainly mean with the sense) than a faithful interpreter ought to take. Of this his version of the following passage [59] is given as an example. Τθ επιςρεψαι απο σκοτθς ει-

[57] Ibidem.

[58] Preface Generale, P. II. des Versions du N. T.

[59] Acts. xxvi. 18.

φως, και της εξουσιας του Σατανα επι τον Θεον, του λαβειν αυτους αφεσιν ἁμαρτιων, και κληρον εν τοις ἡγιασμενοις, πιστει τη εις εμε; which is thus translated by Castalio: "Ut ex tenebris in lucem, et ex Sata-"næ potestate ad Deum se convertant, et ita pecca-"torum veniam, et eandem cum iis sortem conse-"quantur, qui fide mihi habenda sancti facti fuerint:" and by Beza, whom they here oppose to him: "Et "convertas eos a tenebris ad lucem, et a potestate Sa-"tanæ ad Deum, ut remissionem peccatorum et sor-"tem inter sanctificatos accipiant per fidem quæ est "in me." In my opinion there is a real ambiguity in the original, which if Castalio be blameable for fixing, in one way, Beza is not less blameable for fixing it, in another. The words πιστει τη εις εμε, may be construed with the verb λαβειν at some distance, or with the participle ἡγιασμενοις, immediately preceding. In the common way of reckoning, if one of these methods were to be styled a stretch, or a liberty, it would be Beza's, and not Castalio's; both because the latter keeps closer to the arrangement of the original, and because the Apostle, not having used the adjective ἁγιοις but the participle ἡγιασμενοις, gives some ground to regard the following words as its regimen. Accordingly, Beza has considered the version of Erasmus, which is to the same purpose with Castalio's, and with which the Tigurine version also agrees; "ut accipiant remissionem peccatorum, et "sortem inter eos qui sanctificati sunt, per fidem "quæ est erga me;" as exhibiting a sense quite different from his own; at the same time, he freely ac-

knowledges, that the original is susceptible of either meaning. "Τη πιζει. Potest quidem hoc referri "ad participium ἡγιασμενοις, quemadmodum refert "Erasmus." In this instance, Beza, though not remarkable for moderation, has judged more equitably than the French translators above mentioned, who had no reason to affirm, dogmatically, that the words ought to be joined in the one way, and not in the other; or to conclude that Castalio affected to give the words this turn, in order to exclude the idea of *absolute election.* Did the English translators, for this purpose, render the passage after Erasmus and Castalio, not after Beza, *That they may receive forgiveness of sins, and inheritance among them which are sanctified by faith that is in me?* Nobody, I dare say, will suspect it.

I cannot help thinking those critics unlucky in their choice of an example: for had there been more to say, in opposition to this version of the passage, than has yet been urged, it would still have been hard to treat that as a liberty peculiar to Castalio, in which he was evidently not the first, and in which he has had the concurrence of more translators, than can be produced on the other side. For my part, as I acknowledge that such transpositions are not unfrequent in holy writ, my opinion is, that the connection and scope of the place ought chiefly to determine us in doubtful cases. In the present case, it appears to me to yield the clearest sense, and to be every way the most eligible, to join the words πιστει τη εις εμε, neither to ἡγιασμενοις, nor to λαβειν;

but to the foregoing verb επιστρεψαι; for when the regimen is thrown to the end of the sentence, it is better to join it to the first verb, with which it can be suitably construed, than to an intermediate verb, explicative of the former. Nothing can give a more plain, or a more apposite, meaning, than the words under examination, thus construed; *To bring them by the faith that is in me* (that is, by my doctrine, the faith, ἡ πιστις being often used by the sacred writers for the object of faith, or *thing believed*), *from darkness to light*, &c.

§ 16. Thus, I have endeavoured to examine, with impartiality, Castalio's character as a translator, without assuming the province of either the accuser or the apologist. I have neither exaggerated, nor extenuated, either his faults or his virtues, and can pronounce truly, upon the whole, that though there are none (Arias and Pagnin excepted), whose general manner of translating is more to be disapproved; I know not any by which a student may be more assisted in attaining the true sense of many places, very obscure in most translations, than by Castalio's.

PART V.

STRICTURES ON BEZA.

BEZA, the celebrated Geneva translator of the New Testament, cannot be accused of having gone to either of the extremes in which we find Arias and Castalio. In general, he is neither servilely literal, barbarous, and unintelligible, with the former; nor does he appear ashamed of the unadorned simplicity of the original, with the latter. It was, therefore, at first, my intention not to criticise his version, no more than to inquire into the manner of all the Latin translators of sacred writ, but barely to point out the most egregious faults in the plan of translating sometimes adopted, specifying, in the way of example and illustration, those versions only, wherein such faults were most conspicuous. On more mature reflection, I have judged it proper to bestow a few thoughts on Beza, as his translation has, in a great measure, been made the standard of most of the translations of the reformed churches (I do not include the Lutheran) into modern tongues. He has, perhaps, had less influence on the English translators, than on those of other countries; but he has not been entirely without influence, even on them.

And, though he writes with a good deal of purity and clearness, without florid and ostentatious ornaments; there are some faults, which it is of great moment to avoid, and with which he is, upon the whole, more chargeable, than any other translator of the New Testament I know.

§ 2. His version of the New Testament is nearly in the same taste with that of the Old, by Junius and Tremellius, but better executed. These two translations are commonly bound together, to complete the version of holy writ. Junius and Tremellius have been accused of obtruding upon the sacred text, a number of pronouns, *ille*, *hic*, and *iste*, for which the original gives no warrant. Their excuse was, that the Latin has not articles, as the Hebrew, and that there is no other way of supplying the articles, but by pronouns. But it may, with reason, be questioned, whether it were not better, except in a few cases, to leave them unsupplied, than to substitute what may darken the expression, and even render it more indefinite, nay, what may sometimes alter the sense. At the same time, I acknowledge that there are cases in which this method is entirely proper. In the edition of an emphatic epithet, the article is fitly supplied by the pronoun. Thus the words, Επεσε Βαβυλων ἡ πολις ἡ μεγαλη[60], are justly translated by Beza, *Cecidit Babylon urbs illa magna:* and the expression used by Nathan to David,

[60] Rev. xiv. 8.

Thou art the man[61], is properly rendered by Junius, *Tu vir ille es.* The necessity of recurring to the pronoun, in these instances, has been perceived also by the old translator and Castalio.

Nor are these the only cases wherein the Greek or Hebrew article may, not only in Latin, but even in English, which has articles, be rendered properly by the pronoun. For example, a particular species is distinguished from others of the same genus, by some attributive conjoined with it; but when the occasion of mentioning that species soon recurs, the attributive is sufficiently supplied by the article; and, in such instances, it often happens, that the article is best supplied, in another language, by the pronoun. In the question put to our Lord, *Τι αγαθον ποιησω, ἱνα εχω ζωην αιωνιον*[62], a species of life to which the question relates, is distinguished from all others, by the epithet *αιωνιον*. The article would contribute nothing here to the distinction. But when, in the answer[63], the same subject is referred to, the epithet is dropped, and the article is prefixed to *ζωην*, which ascertains the meaning with equal perspicuity. *Ει δε θελεις εισελθειν εις την ζωην.* I have seen no Latin translation, no not Beza's, which renders it, *Si vis in vitam illam ingredi;* and yet it is evident, that such is, in this passage, the force of the article. The English idiom rarely permits us to give articles to abstract nouns. For this reason, it would not be a just expression of the sense to say, *If thou wouldst*

[61] 2 Sam. xii. 7. [62] Matth. xix. 16. [63] 17.

enter into the life, to wit, *eternal life*, the life inquired about. Our only way of marking the reference to the question, is by saying, *If thou wouldst enter into that life.* As, in French, the article is, on the contrary, added to all abstract nouns, the pronoun is equally necessary with them as with us, for making the distinction. There is, besides, something like an impropriety in saying to the living, *If thou wouldst enter into life.*

But there are, unquestionably, cases in which the Genevese interpreters employ the pronoun unnecessarily, awkwardly, and even improperly. *In that day shall the deaf hear the words of the book*[64], say the English translators. *Audient die illa surdi isti verba literarum*, say Junius and his associate. Any person who understands Latin, on hearing the verse read by itself, will suppose that there must have been mention of some deaf persons in the foregoing verses, to which the pronoun *isti*, in this verse, has a reference. But, on inquiry, he will find there is no such thing; and that it is deaf persons in general of whom the Prophet speaks. The introduction of the pronoun, therefore, serves only to mislead. *Matthæus ille publicanus*[65], in Beza's version, evidently suggests, that Matthew was a man famous as a publican, before he became an Apostle. Though our language has articles, the Geneva England interpreters have here copied Beza so servilely as to say, *Matthew that publican.* This manner, in some

[64] Isaiah, xxix. 18. [65] Matth. x. 3.

places, not only appears awkward, but injures the simplicity of the style. Junius says, in his account of the creation, *Dixit Deus, Esto lux, et fuit lux; viditque Deus lucem hanc esse bonam: et distinctionem fecit Deus inter hanc lucem et tenebras*[66]. Here, I think, the pronoun is not only unnecessary and affected, but suggests something ridiculous, as if that light only had been distinguished from darkness. However, as *lux* is first mentioned, without an attendant, the pronoun which attends it, when mentioned afterwards, does not make the expression so indefinite and obscure as in the former example. But, when Beza makes the Evangelist say[67], *Jonas genuit Jechoniam in transportatione illa Babylonica; post autem transportationem illam Babylonicam, Jechonias genuit Salathielem;* what more is expressed, in relation to the period, than if he had said simply, *in transportatione Babylonica, et post transportationem Babylonicam?* The addition of this epithet makes the noun sufficiently definite, without any pronoun. Nay, does not the pronoun, thus superadded, suggest one of two things; either that the transportation, here referred to, had been mentioned in the preceding words, or that the historian meant to distinguish, out of several transportations, one more noted than the rest? Now, neither of these was the case: no mention had been made before, of the Babylonian transportation; and there were not more Babylonian transportations, or more trans-

[66] Gen. i. 3, 4. [67] Matth. i. 11, 12.

portations any whither, than one which the Jewish nation had undergone. With this fault Erasmus also is chargeable, but much seldomer. Greek, as well as Hebrew, has an article, and so have modern languages. But, in translating out of these into Latin, nobody, I believe, has ever, either before or since, thought of making the pronoun supply the article, except in a few special instances, such as those above excepted. In such instances, I acknowledge, there is an evident propriety.

§ 3. BEZA, with natural talents considerably above the middle rate, had a good deal of learning, and understood well both Greek and Latin; but he neither knew Hebrew (though he had the assistance of some who knew it), nor does he seem to have been much conversant in the translation of the Seventy. Hence it has happened, that his critical acuteness is not always so well directed as it might have been. The significations of words and idioms are often determined by him from classical authority, which might, with greater ease and more precision, have been ascertained by the usage of the sacred writers, and their ancient interpreters. As to words which do not occur in other Greek writers, or but rarely, or in a sense manifestly different from what they bear in Scripture, Beza's chief aid was etymology. This has occasioned his frequent recourse, without necessity, to circumlocution, to the prejudice always of the diction, and sometimes of the sense. Examples of this we have in his manner of rendering

σπλαγχνιζομαι [68], κληρονομεω [69], πληροφορεω [70], συκοφαντεω [71], χειροτονεω [72], and several others. On the last of these, I shall soon have occasion to make some remarks. For the other four, I shall only refer to my notes on those passages in the Gospels, where they occur as marked in the margin. It is, no doubt, to this attempt at tracing the origin of the words in his version, that he alludes in that expression, *Verborum proprietatem studiose sum sectatus* [73]. This, however, has been shown not to be always the surest method of attaining the signification wanted [74].

§ 4. But of all the faults with which Beza is chargeable as a translator, the greatest is, undoubtedly, that he was too violent a party-man to possess that impartiality, without which it is impossible to succeed as an interpreter of holy writ. It requires but a very little of a critical eye to discern in him a constant effort to accommodate the style of the sacred writers to that of his sect. Nay, what he has done in this way, is done so openly, I might have said avowedly, that it is astonishing it has not more discredited his work.

In this particular, as in the application of the pronouns above mentioned, Junius and Tremellius have

[68] Matth. ix. 36. [69] Matth. v. 5. [70] Luke, i. 1.
[71] Luke, xix. 8 [72] Acts, xiv. 23.
[73] Epist. ad Elis. Reg. Angel. [74] Diss. IV. § 15. &c.

also justly fallen under the animadversion of all impartial judges. What is thus well expressed in the English translation, *They gave the sense, and caused them to understand the reading*[75], is rendered, by these interpreters, *Exponendo sensum dabant intelligentiam* PER SCRIPTURAM IPSAM. The three last words are an evident interpolation. There is no ellipsis in the sentence: they are noway necessary; for the sense is complete without them. But with them it is most unwarrantably limited to express the private opinion of the translators. I am as zealously attached as any man, to the doctrine that Scripture will ever be found its own best interpreter; an opinion which I have considered in a former Dissertation[76], and which is sufficiently supported by the principles of sound criticism, and common sense. But no person can detest more strongly a method of defending even a true opinion, so unjustifiable as that of foisting it into the sacred Scriptures. If any thing can serve to render a just sentiment questionable, it is the detection of such gross unfairness, in the expedients employed for promoting it. Yet this has been copied into the Geneva French version, after it had received the corrections of Bertram, by whom it has been made to say, *Ils en donnoient l'intelligence, la faisant entendre par l'ecriture meme.* It is but just to observe, that neither Olivetan the translator, nor Calvin, who afterwards revised his work, had

[75] Neh. viii. 8. [76] Diss. II. Part II.

dicovered any warrant for the last clause in the original, or had admitted it into the version.

The insertion of this comment has here this additional bad consequence, that it misleads the reader in regard to the exposition meant by the sacred penman. Who would not conclude, from the version of Junius, that Ezra, or some of the Levites who attended, after reading a portion of Scripture, pronounced an explanatory discourse (such as in some Christian societies is called a lecture) on the passage. Whereas the whole import appears to be that, as the people, after the captivity, did not perfectly understand the ancient Hebrew, in which the law was written, this judicious teacher found it expedient, by himself or others, to interpret what was read, one paragraph after another, into that dialect of Chaldee which was current among them; a practice long after continued in the synagogue, and not improbably, as learned men have thought, that which gave rise to the *targums* or paraphrases, in that tongue, extant to this day.

I do not remember a passage wherein Beza has gone quite so far, as Junius and Tremellius have presumed to do in this instance; but that he has shown throughout the whole work, a manifest partiality to the theology then prevalent in Geneva, is beyond a doubt. I shall select a few examples out of a much greater number, which might be brought.

§ 5. The first shall be from that celebrated discourse of our Lord's, commonly called his sermon

on the mount, wherein these words, ηκουσατε ὅτι ἐρρεθη τοις αρχαιοις[77], are always rendered, *Audistis dictum fuisse* a *veteribus;* in contradiction to all the versions which had preceded, Oriental and Occidental, and in opposition to the uniform idiom of the sacred writers. [See the note on that passage in this version.] Beza does not hesitate in his annotations to assign his reason, which is drawn not from any principle of criticism, not from a different reading in any ancient manuscripts, of which he had several, but professedly from the fitness of this version for supporting his own doctrine. "Præstat τοις αρ-" χαιοις explicare quasi scriptum sit ὑπο των αρχα-" ιων (*ut sic notentur synagogæ doctores*, jampridem " sic docentes, qui solebant patrum et majorum no-" mina suis falsis interpretationibus prætexere) quam " ad auditores referre." But this correction of the ancient version was every way unsuitable, and the expedient weak. It was essential to the Pharisaical notion of traditions, to consider them as precepts which God himself had given to their fathers verbally, and which were therefore called the *oral* law, in contradistinction to the *written* law, or the Scriptures. Consequently Beza's representation of their presumption is far short of the truth. He ought to have said, *Qui solebant* (not *patrum et majorum nomina*, but) *Dei nomen* (for the fact is indubitable) *suis falsis interpretationibus prætexere.* And let it be observed, that our Lord does not here give any

[77] Matth. v. 21. 27. 33.

sanction to their distinction of the law, into *oral*, and *written*. He does not once say, *It was said to the ancients*, but uniformly, *Ye have heard that it was said*. He speaks not of what God did, but of what they pretended that he did.

His words, therefore, and the doctrine of the Pharisees, are alike misrepresented by this bold interpreter; and that for the sake of an advantage, merely imaginary, against an adverse sect. The one nterpretation is not more favourable to the Socinians than the other. But, if it had been otherwise, no person will consider that as a good reason for misrepresenting, unless he is more solicitous of accommodating Scripture to his sentiments, than of accommodating his sentiments to Scripture. The former has indeed been but too common with interpreters, though with few so much, and so barefacedly, as with Beza. I am sorry to add that, in the instance we have been considering, Beza has been followed by most of the Protestant translators of his day, Italian, French, and English.

§ 6. THE following is another example of the strong inclination which this translator had, even in the smallest matters, to make his version conformable to his own prepossessions. He renders these words, *συν γυναιξι* [78], though, without either article or pronoun, *cum uxoribus*, as though the expression had been *συν ταις γυναιξιν αυτων*. In this manner he excuses himself in the notes: "Conveniebat aposto-

[78] Acts, i. 14.

" lorum etiam uxores confirmari, quas vel peregri-
" nationis illorum comites esse opportebat, vel eo-
" rum absentiam domi patienter expectare." Very well : and because Theodore Beza judges it to have been convenient that the Apostles wives, for their own confirmation, should be there, he takes the liberty to make the sacred historian say that they were there, when, in fact, he does not so much as insinuate that there were any wives among them. The use of the Greek word γυνη is entirely similar to that of the French word *femme*. Nobody that understands French would translate *avec les femmes* with the *wives*, but with the *women*, whereas the proper translation of *avec leurs femmes* is, *with their wives*.

It is impossible for one who knows the state of things, at the time when that version was made, not to perceive the design of this misinterpretation. The Protestant ministers, amongst whom marriage was common, were exposed to much obloquy among the Romanists, through the absurd prejudices of the latter, in favour of celibacy. It was, therefore, deemed of great consequence to the party, to represent the Apostles as married men. But, could one imagine that this consideration would have weight enough to lead a man of Beza's abilities and character into such a flagrant, though not very material mistranslation ? A translator ought surely to express the full meaning of his author, as far as the language which he writes is capable of expressing it. But here there is an evident restriction of his au

thor's meaning. The remark of the canon of Ely is unanswerable: "Qui mulieres dicit, uxores etiam "sub eadem appellatione comprehendere potest. "At qui uxores nominat, solas illas nominat.—Igi "tur quo generalior eo tutior erit, et Græcis con "venientior interpretatio." Besides, there may have been, for aught we know, no wives in the company, in which case Beza's words include a direct falsehood. And this falsehood he boldly puts into the mouth of the sacred penman. We know that Peter had once a wife, as we learn from the Gospel, that his wife's mother was cured by Jesus of a fever [79]. But whether she was living at the time referred to in the Acts, or whether any more of the Apostles were married, or whether their wives were disciples, we know not. Now this falsification, though in a little matter, is strongly characteristical of that interpreter. I am glad to add, that in this he has been deserted by all the Protestant translators I know.

A similar instance the very next chapter presents us with [80]. The words, *ουκ εγκαταλειψεις την ψυχην μου εις ᾅδου*, he translates, *Non derelinques cadaver meum in sepulcro*, not only rendering ᾅδης *sepulcrum*, according to an opinion which, though shown above [81], to be ill-founded, is pretty common; but ψυχη *cadaver*, carcase, wherein, I believe, he is singular. His motive is still of the same kind. The

[79] Matth. viii. 14, 15.

[80] Acts, ii. 27.

[81] Diss. VI. Part II. § 4, &c

common version, though unexceptionable, might be thought to support the Popish limbo. "Quod autem annotavi ex vetere versione *animam meam* natum esse errorem, ac propterea me maluisse aliud nomen usurpare, non temere feci, cum hunc præcipue locum a Papistis torqueri ad suum limbum constituendum videamus, et veteres etiam inde descensum illum animæ Christi ad inferos excogitarint [82]."

This specimen from Beza, it may be thought, should have been overlooked, because, though inserted in the first, it was corrected in the subsequent, editions of his version. This, I confess, was my own opinion, till I observed, that in the annotations of those very editions, he vindicates his first translation of the words, and acknowledges that he had altered it, not from the conviction of an error, but to gratify those who, without reason, were, through ignorance of the Latin idiom, dissatisfied with the manner in which he had first rendered it. "In priore nostra editione," says he [83], "recte interpretatus eram, NON DERELINQUES CADAVER, &c. quod tamen nunc mutavi, ut iis obsequar, qui conquesti sunt me a Græcis verbis discessisse, et nomine *cadaveris* (inscitia certe potius Latini sermonis quam recto ullo judicio) offenduntur."

To Beza's reason for rejecting the common version, Castalio retorts, very justly, that if the possibility of wresting a passage in support of error, were

[82] Bezæ Resp. ad Cast. [83] Bezæ Annotationes, ed. 1598.

held a good reason for translating it otherwise, Beza's own version of the passage in question, would be more exceptionable than what he had pretended to correct. "Deinde non minus ex ejus translatione "possit error nasci, et quidem longe perniciosior. "Cum enim animam Christi vertat in cadaver, pe- "riculum est ne quis animam Christi putet nihil "fuisse nisi cadaver[84]." And even this opinion, which denies that Jesus Christ had a human soul, has not been unexampled. It was maintained by Beryllus, bishop of Bostra in Arabia, in the third century. But, on this strange principle of Beza's, where is the version of any part of Scripture in which we could safely acquiesce?

§ 7. A THIRD example of the same undue bias (for I reckon not the last, because corrected, whatever was the motive) we have in his version of these words, Χειροτονησαντες δε αυτοις πρεσβυτερους[85], which he renders *Quumque ipsi per suffragia creassent presbyteros.* The word χειροτονησαντες, he translates from etymology, a manner which, as was observed before, he sometimes uses. Χειροτονειν literally signifies, *to stretch out the hand.* From the use of this manner, in popular elections, it came to denote *to elect*, and thence, again, *to nominate*, or appoint any how. Now Beza, that his intention might not escape us, tells us in the note, "Est notanda vis hujus "verbi, ut Paulum ac Barnabam sciamus nil privato

[84] Cast. Defen. adversarii Errores. [85] Acts, xiv. 23.

" arbitrio gessisse, nec ullam in ecclesia exercuisse " tyrannidem: nil denique tale fecisse quale hodie " Romanus papa et ipsius asseclæ, quos ordinarios " vocant." Now, though no man is more an enemy to ecclesiastic tyranny than I am, I would not employ against it weapons borrowed from falsehood and sophistry. I cannot help, therefore, declaring, that the version which the Vulgate has given of that passage, *Et quum constituissent illis presbyteros*, fully expresses the sense of the Greek, and, consequently, that the words *per suffragia*, are a mere interpolation, for the sake of answering a particular purpose. It was observed before [86], that use, where it can be discovered, must determine the signification, in preference to etymology. And here we are at no loss to affirm that χειροτονεω, whatever were its origin, is not confined to electing, or constituting, by a plurality of voices.

But, whatever be in this, in the instance before us, the χειροτονησαντες, or electors, were no more than Paul and Barnabas; and it could not, with any propriety, be said of two, that they elected by a majority of votes; since there can be no doubt that they must have both agreed in the appointment: and if it had been the disciples, and not the two Apostles who had given their suffrages, it would have been of the disciples, and of them only, not of the Apostles, that the term χειροτονησαντες could have been used, which the construction of the sentence

[86] Diss. IV. §. 15. &c.

manifestly shows that it is not. The sense of the word here given by Beza, is therefore totally unexampled; for, according to him, it must signify not *to elect*, but *to constitute those whom others have elected.* For, if this be not what he means by *per suffragia creassent*, applied to no more than two, it will not be easy to divine his meaning, or to discover in what manner it answered the purpose expressed in his note. And if this be what he means, he has given a sense to the word, for which I have not seen an authority from any author, sacred or profane. The common import of the word is no more than to constitute, ordain, or appoint any how, by election, or otherwise, by one, two, or more. When it is by election, it is solely from the scope of the passage that we must collect it. In the only other place [87] where it occurs in the New Testament, it no doubt relates to a proper election. But it is from the words immediately connected, *χειροτονηθεις ὑπο των εκκλησιων*, we learn, that this is the sense there, as it is from the words immediately connected that we learn, with equal certainty, that it relates here to an appointment made by two persons only.

The word occurs once in composition with the preposition *προ. Αλλα μαρτυσι τοις προκεχειροτονημενοις ὑπο τυ Θευ* [88], rendered by Beza himself, *sed testibus quos ipse prius designaverat.* Here there can be no question that it refers to a destination, of which God alone is the author, and in which, therefore, there could be no suffrages. For even Beza

[87] 2 Cor. viii. 19 [88] Acts. x. 41

will not be hardy enough to pretend, that such is the force of this verb, as to show, that God did nothing but by common consent, and only destined those whom others had elected. That the word χειροτονεω was commonly used in all the latitude here assigned to it, Dr. Hammond has, from Philo, Josephus, and Pagan writers of undoubted authority, given the amplest evidence in his Commentary.

But, so great was the authority of Beza with the Protestant translators, who favoured the model of Geneva, that his exposition of this passage, however singular, was generally adopted. Diodati says, still more explicitly, *E dopo ch' ebbero loro ordinati* PER VOTI COMMUNI, *degli antiani.* The French, *Et apres que* PAR L'AVIS DES ASSEMBLEES, *ils eurent etabli des anciens.* The English Geneva Bible, *And when they had ordained them elders* BY ELECTION. The words in these versions, distinguished by the character, are those which, after Beza's example, are interpolated. In the English translation, these words are discarded. Our translators did not concur in sentiments with the Genevese, at least, in this article.

§ 8. AGAIN, that he might avoid every expression which appeared to favour the doctrine of universal redemption, the words of the Apostle, concerning God, Ὃς παντας ανθρωπους θελει σωθηναι[89], literally rendered in the Vulgate, *Qui omnes homines*

[89] 1 Tim. ii. 4.

vult salvos fieri, he translates, *Qui quosvis homines vult servari*[90]. A little after, in the same chapter[91], Ὁ δους ἑαυτον αντιλυτρον ὑπερ παντων, in the Vulgate *Qui dedit redemptionem semetipsum pro omnibus*. Beza makes *Qui sese ipse dedit redemptionis pretium pro quibusvis*. Once more, in another place of this Epistle, Ὁς ἐστι σωτηρ παντων ανθρωπων, μαλιστα πιστων[92], in the Vulgate, *Qui est salvator omnium hominum, maxime fidelium;* Beza renders, *Qui est conservator omnium hominum, maxime vero fidelium*. Let it be observed, that this is the only place, in his version, where σωτηρ is rendered *conservator*, preserver: in every other passage but one, where he uses a periphrasis, the word is *servator*, answering to *salvator*, in the Vulgate, *saviour*. If it had not been for the annexed clause, μαλιστα πιστων, Beza, I suppose,

[90] In the same manner he renders these words [Tit. ii. 11.], Επεφανη γαρ ἡ χαρις του Θεου ἡ σωτηριος πασιν ανθρωποις, "Illuxit "enim gratia illa Dei salutifera *quibusvis* [not *omnibus*] ho- "minibus." No modern translation that I am acquainted with follows Beza in his interpretation of this verse. The Geneva French says, *Car la grace de Dieu salutaire a tous hommes, est clairement apparue*. The Geneva English, *For that grace of God that bringeth salvation unto all men, hath appeared*. The translators of the version in common use, have considered πασιν ανθρωποις as governed by επεφανη, and not by σωτηριος, rendering it, *For the grace of God that bringeth salvation hath appeared to all men*. Of this version the original is evidently capable. Diodati has done still better in retaining the ambiguity. *Percioche e apparita la gratia di Dio salutare a tutti gli huomini*.

[91] 1 Tim. ii. 6. [92] 1 Tim. iv. 10.

would have retained the word *servator*, and had recourse to the expedient he had used repeatedly for eluding the difficulty, by saying, *Servator quorumvis hominum*. But he perceived, that παντων ανθρωπων must be here taken in the most comprehensive sense, being contradistinguished to πιςων. I do not mean, by these remarks, to affirm, whether or not the word *conservator* be equivalent to the import of the original term, as used in this place. It is enough for my purpose that, as this difference of meaning does not necessarily result, either from the words in immediate connection, or from the purport of the Epistle, no person is entitled to alter the expression, in order to accommodate it to his own opinions.

An exact counterpart to this is the manner in which an anonymous English translator has rendered these words of our Lord, Το περι πολλων εκχυνομενον εις αφεσιν αμαρτιων [93], *which is shed for mankind, for the remission of sins;* defending himself in a note, by observing, that "πολλοι is frequently "used for ALL." Admit it were. The common acceptation of the word is doubtless *many*, and not *all*. And if no good reason for departing from the common meaning can be alleged, either from the words in construction, or from the scope of the passage, it ought to remain unchanged: otherwise, all dependence on translations, except for the theological system of the translator, is destroyed. Of the conduct of both translators, in these instances, though act-

[93] Matth. xxvi. 28.

ing in support of opposite opinions, the error is the same. And the plea which vindicates this writer, will equally vindicate Beza, and the plea which vindicates Beza, will equally vindicate this writer. The analogy of the faith, that is, the conformity to his particular system, is the genuine plea of each.

The safest and the fairest way for a translator is, in every disputable point, to make no distinction where the divine Spirit has not distinguished. To apply to this the words used by Boys, in a similar case, "Cur "enim cautiores simus, magisque religiosi quam "Spiritus Sanctus? Si Spiritus Sanctus non dubita-"vit dicere παντας et σωτηρ, cur nos vereamur di-"cere *omnes* et *servator*?" In the same manner would I expostulate with certain divines amongst ourselves, who, I have observed, in quoting the preceding passages of Scripture, never say, *would have all men to be saved*, and, *the Saviour of all men*, but invariably, *all sorts of men*; charitably intending, by this prudent correction, to secure the unwary from being seduced, by the latitudinarian expressions of the Apostle. If this be not being *wise above what is written*, I know not what is. In the first and second passages quoted, I know no translator who has chosen to imitate Beza; in the third, he is followed by the Geneva French only, who says *Le conservateur de tous hommes*. But it is proper to add, that it was not so in that version, till it had undergone a second or third revisal: for the corrections have not been all for the better.

§ 9. FURTHER, the words χαρακτηρ της ὑποστασεως αυτου [24], rendered in the Vulgate, *figura substantiæ ejus*, he has translated, *character personæ illius*. My only objection here is, to his rendering ὑποστασις *persona*. However much this may suit the scholastic style, which began to be introduced into theology in the fourth century, it by no means suits the idiom of a period so early as that in which the books of the New Testament were written. It is of real consequence to scriptural criticism, not to confound the language of the sacred penmen with that of the writers of the fourth, or any subsequent, century. The change in style was gradual, but, in process of time, became very considerable. There was scarcely a new constroversy started, which did not prove the source of new terms and phrases, as well as of new or unusual applications of the old. The word ὑποστασις occurs four times in the New Testament, but in no other place is it rendered *person*. It occurs often in the Septuagint, but it is never the version of a Hebrew word which can be rendered *person*. Jerom, though he lived when the Sabellian and Arian controversies were fresh in the minds of men, did not discover any reason to induce him to change the word *substantia*, which he found in the former version, called the Italic. I take notice of this, principally (for I acknowledge that the expression is obscure, either way rendered) on ac-

[24] Heb. i. 3.

count of the manner wherein Beza defends his version. "Quominus *substantiam* interpretarer, eo sum "adductus, quod videam plerosque ὑποστασιν hoc "loco pro ουσια esse interpretatos, perinde ac si "inter essentiam et substantiam nihil interesset— "Deinde hoc etiam commodi habet ista interpretatio "quod hypostases adversus Sabellium aperte distin-"guit, et το ὁμοουσιον confirmat adversus Arianos." Here we have a man who, in effect, acknowledges that he would not have translated some things in the way he has done, if it were not that he could thereby strike a severer blow against some adverse sect, or ward off a blow, which an adversary might aim against him. Of these great objects he never loses sight. Accordingly, the controvertist predominates throughout his whole version, as well as commentary; the translator is, in him, but a subordinate character; insomuch that he may justly be called what Jerom calls Aquila, *contentiosus interpres*.

I own, indeed, that my ideas on this subject are so much the reverse of Beza's, that I think a translator is bound to abstract from, and as far as possible, forget, all sects and systems, together with all the polemic jargon which they have been the occasion of introducing. His aim ought to be invariably to give the untainted sentiments of the author, and to express himself in such a manner as men would do, or (which is the same thing) as those men actually did, amongst whom such disputes had never been agitated. In this last example, Beza is

followed by the French and the English translators, but not by the Italian.

§ 10. AGAIN, in the same Epistle it is said, Ὁ δε δικαιος εκ πιςεως ζησεται· και εαν ὑποςειληται, ουκ ευδοκει ἡ ψυχη μου εν αυτω [95]. In the Vulgate, rightly, *Justus autem meus ex fide vivet: quod si subtraxerit se, non placebit animæ meæ.* In Beza's version, *Justus autem ex fide vivet; at si* QUIS *se subduxerit, non est gratum animo meo.* Here we have two errors. First, the word *quis* is, to the manifest injury of the meaning, foisted into the text. Yet there can be no pretence of necessity, as there is no ellipsis in the sentence. By the syntactic order, ὁ δικαιος is understood as the nominative to ὑποςειληται; the power of the personal pronoun being, in Greek and Latin, sufficiently expressed by the inflexion of the verb. Secondly, the consequent displeasure of God is transferred from the person to the action; *non est gratum;* as though εν αυτω could be explained otherwise than as referring to δικαιος. This perversion of the sense is, in my judgment, so gross, as fully to vindicate from undue severity, the censure pronounced by bishop Pearson [96]. *Illa verba a Theodoro Beza haud bona fide sunt translata.* But this is one of the many passages in which this interpreter has judged that the sacred penmen, having expressed themselves incautiously, and given

[95] Heb. x. 38. [96] See his Præfatio Paræneticа, prefixed to Grabe's Septuagint.

a handle to the patrons of erroneous tenets, stood in need of him more as a corrector than as a translator. In this manner Beza supports the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints, having been followed, in the first of these errors, by the French and English translators, but not in the second; and not by the Italian translator in either, though as much a Calvinist as any of them. In the old English Bibles, the expression was, *If he withdraw himself.*

§ 11. In order to evade, as much as possible, the appearance of regard, in the dispensation of grace, to the disposition of the receiver, the words of the Apostle, Τον προτερον οντα βλασφημον και διωκτην, και ὑβριςην· αλλ' ηλεηθην, ὁτι αγνοων εποιησα εν απιςια[97], he renders *Qui prius eram blasphemus et persecutor, et injuriis alios afficiens: sed misericordia sum donatus. Nam ignorans id faciebam: nempe fidei expers.* Here I observe, first, that he divides the sentence into two, making a full stop at ηλεηθην, and thus disjoins a clause which, in Greek, is intimately connected, and had always been so understood, as appears from all the ancient versions and commentaries: and, secondly, that he introduces this sentence with *nam*, as if, in Greek, it had been γαρ, instead of *quia*, the proper version of ὁτι. Both are causal conjunctions; but as the former is generally employed in uniting different sentences, and the latter in uniting the different members of the

[97] 1 Tim. i. 13

same sentence, the union occasioned by the former is looser and more indefinite than that produced by the latter. The one expresses a connection with the general scope of what was said, the other with the particular clause immediately preceding. This second sentence, as Beza exhibits it, may be explained as an extenuation suggested by the Apostle, after confessing so black a crime. As if he had said: "For I would not have acted thus, but I knew not "what I was doing, as I was then an unbeliever." It is evident that the words of the original are not susceptible of this interpretation. Beza has not been followed in this, either by Diodati, or by the English translators. The Geneva French, and the Geneva English, have both imitated his manner.

§ 12. I SHALL produce but one other instance. The words of the beloved disciple, Πας ὁ γεγεννημενος εκ τυ Θευ, ἁμαρτιαν υ ποιει [98]; rendered in the Vulgate, *Omnis qui natus est ex Deo, peccatum non facit*, Beza translates, *Quisquis natus est ex Deo, peccato non dat operam;* by this last phrase, endeavouring to elude the support which the original appears to give to the doctrine of the sinless perfection of the saints in the present life. That this was his view, is evident from what he had urged in defence of the phrase, in his annotations on the fourth verse, to which he has subjoined these words: "Ita- "que non homines sed monstra hominum (such was

[98] 1 John, iii. 9

" his polemic style) sunt Pelagiani, Cathari, Cœles-
" tiani, Donatistæ, Anabaptistæ, Libertini, qui ex
" hoc loco perfectionem illam somniant, a qua ab-
" sunt ipsi omnium hominum longissime." His only argument, worthy of notice, is the seeming inconsistency of this verse, with what the Apostle had advanced a little before, Εαν ειπωμεν ὁτι ἁμαρτιαν ϗκ εχομεν, ἑαυτϗς πλανωμεν [99], *If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.* But he has not considered that, if one of those human monsters (as he meekly calls them) should render this verse, *If we say that we have never sinned* (which is not a greater stretch than he has made in rendering the other), the reconciliation of the two passages is equally well effected as by his method. But as, in fact, neither of these expedients can be vindicated, the only fair way is, to exhibit both verses in as general terms as the inspired penman has left them in; and thus to put, as nearly as possible, the readers of the translation on the same footing on which the sacred writers have put the readers of the original.

There is still another reason which seems to have influenced Beza in rendering ἁμαρτιαν ποιει *peccato dat operam*, which is kindly to favour sinners, not exorbitantly profligate, so far as to dispel all fear about their admission into the kingdom of heaven. This construction may be thought uncharitable. I own I should have thought so myself, if he had not explicitly shown his principles, on this subject, in

[99] 1 John, i. 8.

other places. That expression, in the sermon on the mount, Αποχωρειτε απ' εμυ οι εργαζομενοι την ανομιαν [100], he renders, *Abscedite a me qui operam datis iniquitati.* And though he is singular in using this phrase, I should not, even from it, have concluded so harshly of his motive, if his explanation in the note had not put it beyoud doubt. Οι εργαζομενοι την ανομιαν, "id est, OMNIBUS sceleribus et flagitiis "addicti homines—qui velut artem peccandi exer- "cent, sicut Latini medicinam, argentariam facere "dicunt." Thus, if he wound the sense in the version, he kills it outright in the commentary. In another edition, wherein he renders the text simply *facitis iniquitatem*, he says, still more expressly, "Dicuntur ergo *facere iniquitatem*, et a Christo "rejiciuntur hoc in loco, non qui *uno et altero* sce- "lere sunt contaminati, sed qui hanc velut artem "faciunt, ut sceleste agendo vitam tolerent, et Dei "nomine abutantur ad quæstum, quo cupiditatibus "suis satisfaciant." Castalio, after quoting these words, says [101], very justly, and even moderately, "Hæc sunt ejus [Bezæ] verba, quibus mihi vide- "tur (si modo de habitu loquitur, sicut antithesis "ostendere videtur) nimis latam salutis viam fa- "cere: quasi Christus non rejiciat sceleratos, sed "duntaxat sceleratissimos. Enimvero longe aliter "loquuntur sacræ literæ."

Not only Scripture in general, he might have said, but that discourse in particular, on which Beza

[100] Matth. vii. 23. [101] Cas. Defens. Adversarii Errores.

was then commenting, speaks a very different language: *Except your righteousness*, says Jesus[102], *shall exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven.* It would have better suited Beza's system of Christian morality, to have said, *Except your unrighteousness shall exceed the unrighteousness of publicans and harlots, ye shall in no case be excluded from the kingdom of heaven.* But as our Lord's declaration was the reverse, it is worth while to observe in what manner this champion of Geneva eludes its force, and reconciles it to his own licentious maxims. Hear his note upon the place: "Justitiæ "nomine intellige sinceram tum doctrinam tum vi- "tam, cum verbo Dei videlicet, quod est justitiæ "vera norma, congruentem. Sed, de doctrina potis- "simum hic agi liquet ex sequenti reprehensione "falsarum legis interpretationum." And on the last clause of the sentence, *nequaquam ingressuros in regnum cœlorum*, he says, "Id est, indignos fore "qui in ecclesia doceatis. Nec enim de quorumvis "piorum officio, sed de solis doctoribus agit: et "nomine regni cœlorum, ut alibi sæpe, non trium- "phantem (ut vulgo loquuntur), sed adhuc mili- "tantem, et ministerio pastorum egentem ecclesiam "intelligit."

According to this learned commentator, then, *your righteousness* here means, chiefly or solely, *your orthodoxy:* I say, *chiefly* or *solely:* for, observe

[102] Matth. v. 20.

his artful climax, in speaking of teachers and teaching. When first he obtrudes the word *doctrine*, in explanation of the word *righteousness*, he puts it only on the level with a good life; it is "tum doc- "trinam tum vitam." When mentioned the second time, a good life is dropt, because as he affirms, "de doctrina potissimum hic agi liquet." When the subject is again resumed, in explaining the latter part of the sentence, every thing which relates to life and practice is excluded from a share in what is said; for after this gradual preparation of his readers, they are plainly told, "de solis doctoribus "hic agit." Now, every body knows, that Beza meant, by orthodoxy, or sound doctrine, an exact conformity to the Genevese standard. The import of our Lord's declaration, then, according to this bold expositor, amounts to no more than this, 'If 'ye be not completely orthodox, ye shall not be 'teachers in the church.' In this way of expounding Scripture, what purposes may it not be made to serve? For my part, I have seen nothing in any commentator or casuist, which bears a stronger resemblance to that mode of subverting, under pretence of explaining, the divine law, which was adopted by the Scribes, and so severely reprehended by our Lord. In the passage taken from John's Epistle, I do not find that Beza has had any imitators. In the version of the like phrase in the Gospel, he has been followed by the Geneva French, which says, *Vous qui faites le metier d'iniquite.*

§ 13. I MIGHT collect many more passages, but I suppose that those which have been given, will sufficiently verify what has been advanced concerning this translator's partiality. Any one who critically examines his translation, will see how much he strains in every page, especially in Paul's Epistles, to find a place for the favourite terms and phrases of his party. A French projector, Monsieur Le Cene (whose project for a new translation was, in what regards one article, considered already), seems, though of a party in many things opposite to Beza's, to have entertained certain loose notions of translating, which in general coincide with his; but, by reason of their different parties, would have produced, in the application, contrary effects. As a contrast to Beza's corrections of the unguarded style (as he certainly thought it) of the sacred penmen, I shall give a few of Le Cene's corrections, which he proposed, with the same pious purpose of securing the unlearned reader against seduction [103]. The words of the Apostle, rendered by Beza, *Qui credit in eum qui justificat impium* [104], Le Cene thus translates into French: *Qui croit en celui qui justifie* CELUI QUI AVOIT ETE *un impie.* The expression rendered by Beza, *Quem autem vult indurat* [105], Le Cene thinks ought to be corrected; and though he does not in so many words say how, it is plain, from the tenor of his remark, that he would have it *permittit ut seipsum induret.* He adds, "It behoveth also to re-

[103] Proj. &c. ch. xiv.

[104] Rom. iv. 5.

[105] Rom. ix. 18.

" form (I use his own style, *Il faudroit aussi refor-*
" *mer*) what the Vulgate and Genevese versions (he
" might have added, Moses and Paul) represent
" God as saying to Pharaoh, *In hoc ipsum excitavi*
" *te, ut ostendam in te virtutem meam*[106];" but does not mention the reformation necessary.

I cannot help observing here by the way that, though Castalio was, in regard to the subject of the chapter from which some of the foregoing quotations are taken, of sentiments, as appears from his notes, opposite to Beza's, and coincident with Le Cene's, he has translated the whole with the utmost fairness. Nor has he employed any of those glossing arts recommended by Le Cene, and so much practised by Beza, when encountering a passage that appeared favourable to an adversary. Merely from his translation, we should not discover that his opinions of the divine decrees, and the freedom of human actions, differed from Beza's. If both interpreters, however, have sometimes failed in their representations of the sacred authors, the difference between them lies in this: the liberties which Castalio has taken, are almost solely in what regards their style and manner; the freedoms used by Beza affect their sentiments and doctrine.

But to return to Le Cene, of whom I shall give but one other specimen; the words rendered by Beza, *Quia iterum dixit Esaias, excœcavit oculos eorum, et obduravit cor eorum; ne videant oculis, et*

[106] Rom. ix. 17. Exod. ix. 16.

sint intelligentes corde, et sese convertant, et sanem eos [107]; he proposes in this manner to express in French: *Ce qui avoit fait dire a Isaie; ils ont aveugles leurs yeux et endurci leur cœur, pour ne pas voir de leurs yeux, et pour n'entendre point du cœur, et de peur de se convertir, et d'etre gueris.* "They "have blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart," &c. instead of, "He hath blinded," &c. Surely, the difference between these interpretations, regards more the sense than the expression. In the latter instances, we have the Arminian using the same weapons against the Calvinist, which, in the former, we saw the Calvinist employ against the Arminian; a conduct alike unjustifiable in both.

§ 14. THESE examples may suffice to show that, if translators shall think themselves entitled, with Beza and Le Cene, and the anonymous English translator above quoted, to use such liberties with the original, in order to make it speak their own sentiments, or the sentiments of the party to which they have attached themselves, we shall soon have as many Bibles as we have sects, each adapted to support a different system of doctrine and morality; a Calvinistic Bible, and an Arminian, an Antinomian Bible, a Pelagian, and I know not how many more. Hitherto, notwithstanding our disputes, we have recurred to a common standard; and this circumstance, however lightly it may be thought of,

[107] John, xii. 39, 40.

has not been without its utility, especially in countries where the Christian principle of toleration is understood and practised. It has abated the violence of all sides, inspiring men with candour and moderation in judging of one another, and of the importance of the tenets which discriminate them. The reverse would take place, if every faction had a standard of its own, so prepared, as to be clearly decisive in supporting all its favourite dogmas, and in condemning those of every other faction. It may be said, that the original would still be a sort of common standard, whose authority would be acknowledged by them all. It no doubt would: but when we consider how small a proportion of the people, of any party, are qualified to read the original, and how much it would be the business of the leading partizans, in every sect, to preoccupy the minds of the people, in regard to the fidelity of their own version, and the partiality of every other; we cannot imagine that the possession of a standard, to which hardly one in a thousand could have recourse, would have a sensible effect upon the party. Of so much consequence it is, in a translator, to banish all party-considerations, to forget, as far as possible, that he is connected with any party; and to be ever on his guard, lest the spirit of the sect absorb the spirit of the Christian, and he appear to be more the follower of some human teacher, a Calvin, an Arminius, a Socinus, a Pelagius, an Arius, or an Athanasius, than of our only divine and rightful teacher, Christ.

§ 15. SOME allowance is no doubt to be made for the influence of polemic theology, the epidemic disease of those times wherein most of the versions, which I have been examining, were composed. The imaginations of men were heated, and their spirits embittered with continual wranglings, not easily avoidable in their circumstances: and those who were daily accustomed to strain every expression of the sacred writers, in their debates one with another, were surely not the fittest for examining them with that temper and coolness, which are necessary in persons who would approve themselves unbiassed translators. Besides, criticism, especially sacred criticism, was then but in its infancy. Many improvements, through the united labours of the learned in different parts of Europe, have since accrued to that science. Much of our scholastic controversy on abstruse and undeterminable questions, well characterised by the Apostle, *strifes of words, which minister not to godly edifying*[108], is now happily laid aside. It may be hoped, that some of the blunders into which the rage of disputation has formerly betrayed interpreters, may, with proper care, be avoided; and that the dotage about questions, which gender contention (questions than which nothing can be more hollow or unsound[109]), being over, some will dare to speak, and others bear to hear, the things which become sound doctrine, the doctrine according to godliness.

[108] 1 Tim. vi. 3, &c. [109] See an excellent sermon on this subject, by my learned colleague, Dr. Gerard, vol. II. p. 129.

DISSERTATION THE ELEVENTH.

OF THE REGARD WHICH, IN TRANSLATING SCRIPTURE INTO ENGLISH, IS DUE TO THE PRACTICE OF FORMER TRANSLATORS, PARTICULARLY OF THE AUTHORS OF THE LATIN VULGATE, AND OF THE COMMON ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

PART I.

THE REGARD DUE TO THE VULGATE.

IN the former Dissertation [1], I took occasion to consider what are the chief things to be attended to by every translator, but more especially a translator of holy writ. They appeared to be the three following; first, to give a just and clear representation of the sense of his original; secondly, to convey into his version as much of his author's spirit and manner as the genius of the language, in which he writes, will admit; thirdly, as far as may be, in a consistency with the two other ends, to express himself with purity in the language of the version. If these be

[1] X. Part I.

the principal objects, as, in my opinion, they are; they will supply us with a good rule for determining the precise degree of regard which is due to former translators of reputation, whose works may have had influence sufficient to give a currency to the terms and phrases they have adopted. When the terms and phrases employed by former interpreters are well adapted for conveying the sense of the author, when they are also suited to his manner, and do no violence to the idiom of the language of the translation, they are justly preferred to other words equally expressive and proper, but which, not having been used by former interpreters of name, are not current in that application. This, in my opinion, is the furthest we can go, without making greater account of translations than of the original, and showing more respect to the words and idioms of fallible men, than to the instructions given by the unerring Spirit of God.

§ 2. If, in respect of any of the three ends above mentioned, former translators, on the most impartial examination, appear to have failed, shall we either copy or imitate their errors? When the question is thus put in plain terms, I do not know any critic that is hardy enough to answer in the affirmative. But we no sooner descend to particulars, than we find that those very persons who gave us reason to believe that they agree with us in the general principles, so totally differ in the application, as to show themselves disposed to sacrifice all those pri-

mary objects in translating, to the phraseology of a favourite translator. Even Father Simon could admit that *it would be wrong to imitate the faults of Saint Jerom, and to pay greater deference to his authority than to the truth*[2]. How far the verdicts he has pronounced on particular passages in the several versions criticised by him, are consistent with this judgment, shall be shown in the sequel.

§ 3. BUT, before I proceed farther, it may not be amiss to make some remarks on what appears to have been Simon's great scope and design in the Critical History; for, in the examination of certain points strenuously maintained by him, I shall chiefly be employed in this Dissertation. His opinions in what regards biblical criticism, have long had great influence on the judgment of the learned, both Popish and Protestant. His profound erudition in Oriental matters, joined with uncommon penetration, and, I may add, strong appearances of moderation, have procured him, on this subject, a kind of superiority, which is hardly disputed by any. Indeed, if I had not read the answers made to those who attacked his work, which are subjoined to his Critical History, and commonly, if I mistake not, thought to be his, though bearing different names, I should not have spoken so dubiously of his title to the vir-

[2] En effet, il [Pagnin] auroit eu tort d'imiter les fautes de St. Jerôme, et de deferer plus à l'autorité de ce pere, qu' à la verité. Hist. Crit. du Vieux Testament. liv. ii. ch. xx.

tue of moderation. But throughout these tracts, I acknowledge, there reigns much of the illiberal spirit of the controvertist. None of the little arts, however foreign to the subject in debate, by which contempt and odium are thrown upon an adversary, are omitted. And, we may say with truth, that by assuming too high an ascendant over Le Clerc and his other antagonists, he has degraded himself below them, farther, I believe, than by any other method, he could have so easily effected.

§ 4. In regard to Simon's principal work, which I have so often had occasion to mention, *the Critical History of the Old and New Testaments*, its merit is so well known and established in the learned world, as to render it superfluous now to attempt its character. I shall only animadvert a little on what appear to me, after repeated perusals, to be the chief objects of the author, and on his manner of pursuing these objects. It will scarcely admit a doubt, that his primary scope, throughout the whole performance, is to represent Scripture as, in every thing of moment, either unintelligible or ambiguous. His view in this is sufficiently glaring; it is to convince his readers that, without the aid of tradition, whereof the church is both the depositary and the interpreter, no one article of Christianity can, with evidence sufficient to satisfy a rational inquirer, be deduced from Scripture. A second aim, but in subordination to the former, is to bring his readers to such an acquiescence in the Latin Vulgate, which

he calls the translation of the church, as to consider the deviations from it in modern versions, from whatever cause they spring, attention to the meaning, or to the letter, of the original, as erroneous and indefensible.

The manner in which the first of these aims has been pursued by him, I took occasion to consider in a former Dissertation [3], to which I must refer my reader; I intend now to inquire a little into the methods by which he supports this secondary aim, the faithfulness of the Vulgate, and, if not its absolute perfection, its superiority, at least to every other attempt that has been made, in the Western churches, towards translating the Bible. This inquiry naturally falls in with the first part of my subject in the present Dissertation, in which I hope to show, to the satisfaction of the reader, that he might, with equal plausibility, have maintained the superiority of that version over every translation which ever shall, or can, be made of holy writ.

§ 5. From the view which I have given of his design with respect to the Vulgate, one would naturally expect, that he must rate very highly the verdict of the council of Trent, in favour of that version, that he must derive its excellence, as others of his order have done, from immediate inspiration, and conclude it to be infallible. Had this been his method of proceeding, his book would have excited

[3] Diss. III. § 1—17.

little attention from the beginning, except from those whose minds were pre-engaged on the same side by bigotry or interest, and would probably, long ere now, have been forgotten. What person of common sense in these days ever thinks of the ravings of Harduin the Jesuit, who, in opposition to antiquity and all the world, maintained, that the Aposties and Evangelists wrote in Latin, that the Vulgate was the original, and the Greek New Testament a version, and that consequently the latter ought to be corrected by the former, not the former by the latter, with many other absurdities [4], to which Michaelis has done too much honour, in attempting to refute them in his lectures?

But Simon's method was, in fact, the reverse. The sentence of the council, as was hinted formerly, he has explained in such a manner as to denote no more than would be readily admitted by every mo-

[4] Such as, that, except Cicero's works, Pliny's Natural History, the Georgics, Horace's Epistles, and a few others, all the ancient classics Greek and Latin are the forgeries of monks in the 13th century. Virgil's Eneid is not excepted. This, according to him, was a fable invented for exhibiting the triumph of the church over the synagogue. Troy was Jerusalem, in a similar manner, reduced to ashes after a siege. Eneas carrying his gods into Italy, represented St. Peter travelling to Rome to preach the gospel to the Romans, and there lay the foundations of the hierarchy. I heartily join in Boileau's sentiment, (for of him it is told, if I remember right) "I should like much to have conversed with friar Virgil, and friar Livy, and friar Horace; for we see no such friars now."

derate and judicious Protestant. The inspiration of the translator he disclaims, and consequently the infallibility of the version. He ascribes no superiority to it above the original. This superiority was but too plainly implied in the indecent comparison which Cardinal Ximenes made of the Vulgate as printed in his edition (the Complutensian) between the Hebrew and the Septuagint, to our Lord crucified between two thieves, making the Hebrew represent the hardened thief, and the Greek the penitent. Simon, on the contrary, shows no disposition to detract from the merit either of the original, or of any ancient version; though not inclinable to allow more to the editions and transcripts we are at present possessed of, than the principles of sound criticism appear to warrant. He admits that we have yet no perfect version of holy writ, and does not deny that a better may be made than any extant[5]. In short, nothing can be more equitable than the general maxims he establishes. It is by this method that he insensibly gains upon his readers, insinuates himself into their good graces, and brings them, before they are aware, to repose an implicit confidence in his discernment, and to admit, without examining, the equity of his particular decisions. Now all these decisions are made artfully to conduct them to one point, which he is the surer to carry, as he never openly proposes it, namely, to consider the Vulgate as the standard, by a conformity to which, the value of every other version ought to be estimated.

[5] Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. III. ch. i.

§ 6. In consequence of this settled purpose, not declared in words, but, without difficulty, discovered by an attentive reader, he finds every other version which he examines, either too literal or too loose, in rendering almost every passage which he specifies, according as it is more or less so, than that which he has tacitly made to serve as the common measure for them all. And though it is manifest, that even the most literal are not more blameably literal in any place than the Vulgate is in other places; or even the most loose translations more wide of the sense than in some instances that version may be shown to be; he has always the address, to bring his readers (at least on their first reading his book) to believe with him, that the excess, of whatever kind it be, is in the other versions, and not in the Vulgate. In order to this he is often obliged to argue from contrary topics, and at one time to defend a mode of interpreting which he condemns at another. And though this inevitably involves him in contradictions, these, on a single, or even a second or third perusal, are apt to be overlooked by a reader who is not uncommonly attentive. The inconsistencies elude the reader's notice the more readily, as they are not brought under his view at once, but must be gathered from parts of the work not immediately connexed; and, as the individual passages in question are always different, though the manner in which they are translated, and on which the criticism turns, is the same. Add to this, that our critic's mode of arguing is the more spe-

cious and unsuspected, because it is remarkably simple and dispassionate. It will be necessary, therefore, though it may be accounted a bold and even invidious undertaking, to re-examine a few of the passages examined by Father Simon, that we may, if possible, discover whether there be reason for the charge of partiality and inconsistency, which has been just now brought against him.

§ 7. In his examination of Erasmus's version of the New Testament, he has the following observation: "Where we have in the Greek τȣ ὁρισθεντος "υἱȣ Θεȣ εν δυναμει[6], the ancient Latin interpreter "has very well and literally rendered it, *qui præ-* "*destinatus est filius Dei in virtute*, which was "also the version used in the Western churches "before Saint Jerom, who has made no change on "this place. I do not inquire whether that inter- "preter has read προορισθεντος as some believe: "for *prædestinatus* signifies no more here than *des-* "*tinatus*: and one might put in the translation *præ-* "*destinatus*, who read ὁρισθεντος, as we read at pre- "sent in all the Greek copies; and there is nothing "here that concerns what theologians commonly call "*predestination*. Erasmus, however, has forsaken "the ancient version, and said, *qui declaratus fuit fi-* "*lius Dei cum potentia*. It is true, that many learned "Greek fathers have explained the Greek participle "ὁρισθεντος by δειχθεντος, αποφανθεντος; that is,

[6] Rom. i. 4.

" *demonstrated* or *declared;* but an explanation is " not a translation. One may remark, in a note, " that that is the sense which Saint Chrysostom has " given the passage, without changing the ancient " version, as it very well expresses the energy of " the Greek word, which signifies rather *destina-* " *tus* and *definitus* than *declaratus*[7]." Thus far " Simon.

Admit that the Vulgate is here literal, since this critic is pleased to call it so; it is at the same time obscure, if not unmeaning. What the import of

[7] Où il y a dans le Grec, τὸ ὁρισθέντος υἱὸ Θεὸ ἐν δυνάμει, l'ancien interprete Latin a fort bien traduit à la lettre, *qui prædestinatus est filius Dei in virtute;* et c'est même la version qui étoit en usage dans les eglises d'Occident avant Saint Jerome, qui n'y a rien changé en cet endroit. Je n'examine point si cet interprete a lû προορισθέντος, comme quelques uns le croyent: car *prædestinatus* ne signifie en ce lieu-là que *destinatus;* et ainsi l'on a pû traduire *prædestinatus* en lisant ὁρισθέντος, comme on lit presentement dans tous les exemplaires Grecs, et il ne s'agit nullement de ce que les theologiens appellent ordinairement *predestination.* Erasme cependant s'est éloigné de cette ancienne version, ayant traduit *qui declaratus fuit filius Dei cum potentia.* Il est vrai que plusieurs doctes peres Grecs ont expliqué le verbe Grec ὁρισθέντος par δειχθέντος, ἀποφανθέντος c'est-à-dire demontré ou declaré: mais une explication n'est pas une traduction. L'on peut marquer dans une note que c'est là le sens que Saint Chrysostome a donné à ce passage, sans changer pour cela la version ancienne, qui exprime très-bien la force du mot Grec qui signifie plûtôt *destinatus, definitus* que *declaratus.* Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxii

the word *predestinated* may be when, as he says, it has no relation to what divines call *predestination*, and consequently cannot be synonymous with *predetermined*, *foreordained*, he has not been so kind as to tell us, and it will not be in every body's power to guess. For my part, I do not comprehend that curious aphorism as here applied, *An explanation is not a translation.* Translation is undoubtedly one species, and that both the simplest and the most important species, of explanation: and when a word is found in one language, which exactly hits the sense of a word in another language as used in a particular passage, though it should not reach the meaning in other places, it is certainly both the proper translation, and the best explanation, of the word in that passage.

And, for the truth of this sentiment, I am happy to have it in my power to add, that I have the concurrence of Mr. Simon himself most explicitly declared. Speaking of a Spanish translation of the Old Testament by a Portuguese Jew, which is very literal, as all Jewish translations are, he says [8], "This grammatical rigour does not often suit the "sense. We must distinguish between a dictionary

[8] Cette rigeur de grammaire ne s'accorde pas souvent avec le sens. Il faut mettre de la difference entre un dictionaire et une traduction. Dans le premier on explique les mots selon leur signification propre, au-lieu que dans l'autre il est quelquefois necessaire de detourner les mots de leur significations propres et primitives, pour les ajuster aux autres mots avec lesquels ils sont joints. Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. xix.

"and a translation. In the former, one explains "the words according to their proper signification, "whereas, in the latter, it is sometimes necessary "to divert them from their proper and primitive "signification, in order to adjust them to the other "words with which they are connected." In another place[o], "He *(Pagnin)* has imagined that, in "order to make a faithful translation of Scripture, "it was necessary to follow the letter exactly, and "according to the rigour of grammar; a practice "quite opposite to that pretended exactness, be-"cause it rarely happens that two languages agree "in their idioms; and thus, so far from expressing "his original in the same purity wherein it is writ-"ten, he disfigures it, and spoils it of all its orna-"ments." In the former of these quotations, the author shows that the literal method is totally unfit for conveying an author's sense, and therefore ill suited for answering the first great end in translating; and in the latter, that it is no better adapted either for doing justice to an author's manner, or for producing a work which can be useful or agreeable, and therefore equally unfit for all the primary pur-

[o] Il s'est imaginé que pour faire une traduction fidelle de l'Ecriture, il etoit necessaire de suivre la lettre exactement et selon la rigeur de la grammaire; ce qui est tout-a-fait opposé à cette prétendue exactitude, parce qu'il est rare que deux langues se rencontrent dans leurs façons de parler: et ainsi, bien loin d'exprimer son original dans la même pureté qu'il est ecrit, il le défigure, et le depouille de tous ses ornemens. Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. xx.

poses of translating. Had it been this author's declared intention to refute his own criticism on the passage quoted from Erasmus, he could have said nothing stronger or more pertinent.

I shall just add to his manner of reasoning on this subject, a particular example, which may serve as a counterpart to the remark on Erasmus above quoted. Speaking of the translators of Port Royal, he says [10], "They have followed the grammatical sense of the "Greek text in translating John, xvi. 13. *Il vous* "*fera entrer dans toutes les verites*, as if this other "sense, which is in the Vulgate, and which they "have put into their note, *il vous enseignera toute* "*verite*, did not answer exactly to the Greek. But "John Boys has not thought the new translators "worthy of approbation for changing *docebit*, which "is in our Latin edition, into another word. *Vetus*, "says this learned Protestant, *docebit*, *non male*, *nam* "*et ὁ διδασκων suo modo ὁδηγει*, *et ὁ ὁδηγων suo modo* "*διδασκει.*" Yet let it be observed, that here it is the new interpreters, and not the Vulgate, who very well express the energy of the Greek word, and that without either deserting the meaning or darkening it, as the Vulgate, in the former case, has not scrupled

[10] Ils ont suivi le sens grammatical du texte Grec en traduisant, *il vous fera entrer*, &c. comme si cet autre sens qui est dans la Vulgate, et qu'ils ont mit dans leur note, *il vous enseignera*, &c. ne repondoit pas exactement au Grec. Mais Jean Boys n'a pû approuver les nouveaux traducteurs, qui ont changé *docebit*, qui est dans nôtre edition Latine en un autre mot. *Vetus*, &c. Hist. Crit. de Versions du N. T. ch. xxxvi.

to do. Here he has given, indeed, the most ample scope for retorting upon the Vulgate, in his own words, that ὁδηγει may indeed be explained by *docebit*, "but an explanation is not a translation."

§ 8. BUT this is not all. Our critic objects also to the freedom which Erasmus has taken in translating the Greek preposition εν in the forecited passage by the Latin *cum*. "Besides," says he [11], "although "the Greek particle εν signifies, in the style of the "writers of the New Testament, which is conformable to that of the Seventy, *in* and *cum*, it had been "better to translate, as it is in the Vulgate, *in virtute*, "or *in potentia*, and to write on the margin that *in* "signifies also *cum*, because there is but one single "preposition which answers to them both in the Hebrew or Chaldaic language, with which the Greek "of the New Testament often agrees, especially in "this sort of prepositions."

Now it is very remarkable, that there is nothing which he treats as more contemptible and even absurd in Arias Montanus, than this very attempt at

[11] De plus, bien que la particule Grecque εν signifie dans le stile des ecrivains du Nouveau Testament qui est conforme à celui des Septante, *in* et *cum*, il eût été mieux de traduire, comme il y a dans la Vulgate *in virtute* ou *in potentia*, et de mettre à la marge que *in* signifie aussi *cum;* parce qu'il n'y a qu'une seule preposition qui réponde à ces deux-la dans la langue Ebraïque ou Caldaïque, a laquelle le Grec du N. T. est souvent conforme, sur-tout dans ces sortes de prepositions. N. T. l. II. c. xxii.

uniformity, in translating the Hebrew prepositions and other particles. " Can one," says he [12], " give " the title of a very exact interpreter, to a translator, " who almost everywhere confounds the sense of his " text? In effect, all his erudition consists in trans- " lating the Hebrew words literally, according to " their most ordinary signification, without minding " whether it agree, or not, with the context where he " employs it. When the Hebrew words are equivo- " cal, one ought, methinks, to have some regard to " that signification which suits them in the places " where they are found; and it is ridiculous to as-

[12] Peut on donner la qualité d'interprete très-exact à un traducteur qui renverse presque partout le sens de son texte? En effet, toute son erudition consiste à traduire les mots Hebreux à la lettre, selon leur signification la plus ordinaire, sans prendre garde si elle convient ou non, aux endroits ou il l'employ. Quand les mots Hebreux sont equivoques, on doit, ce semble, avoir egard a la signification qui leur est propre selon les lieux ou ils se trouvent, et il est ridicule de mettre indifferement toute sorte de signification, soit qu'elle convienne, ou qu'elle ne convienne pas. Ce defaut est cependant repandu dans toute la version d' Arias Montanus, qui a fait paroitre en cela très-peu de jugement. Il a traduit, par example, presque en tous les endroits la preposition Ebraique *al* par la preposition Latine *super*: et cependant on sait, que cette preposition signifie dans l'Ebreu tantôt *super*, tantôt *juxta*, et quelquefois *cum*. Il a fait la même chose à l'egard de la lettre *Lamed*, laquelle repond au *pour* des François, ou elle est une marque du datif. C'est ainsi qu'au chapitre premier de la Genese, verset sixieme, ou Pagnin avoit traduit assez nettement *Dividat aquas ab aquis*, il a traduit sans aucun sens *Dividat aquas ad aquas*. Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. xx.

" sign them indifferently every sort of signification " suitable or unsuitable. Yet this fault abounds in " every part of the version of Arias Montanus, who " has herein displayed very little judgment. He has, " for example, translated, in almost every passage, " the Hebrew preposition *al* by the Latin *super;* " whereas it is well known that this preposition sig- " nifies in Hebrew, sometimes *super*, sometimes " *juxta*, sometimes *cum*. He has done the same in " regard to the letter *Lamed*, which answers to the " French *pour*, where it is a mark of the dative. " Thus the words of Genesis, which Pagnin had " rendered clearly enough, *Dividat aquas ab aquis*, " he has translated, without any meaning, *Dividat* " *aquas ad aquas*."

Here in two parallel cases, for the question is the same in both, whether the sense or the letter merit most the attention of the translator, or more particularly, whether or not the prepositions of the original ought uniformly to be translated in the same way, without regard to the sense, our learned critic has pronounced two sentences perfectly opposite to each other. This opposition is the more flagrant, as Arias had actually taken the method which Simon insists that Erasmus ought to have taken. He followed the letter in the text, and gave the meaning, by way of comment, on the margin. The second decision, however, we may reasonably conclude, is the decision of his judgment, as neither of the interpreters compared, Pagnin nor Arias, is a favourite with

him; whereas the first is the decision merely of his affection, as Erasmus was opposed to the Vulgate.

§ 9. In further confirmation of the judgment I have just now given, it may be observed that in every case wherein the Vulgate is not concerned, his verdict is uniform in preferring the sense to the letter. "There is," says he [13], "in this last revisal of "the version of Geneva, *Alors on commenca d'appel-* "*ler du nom de l'Eternel*, which yields an obscure "and even absurd meaning. It is indeed true that "Aquila has translated word for word after the "same manner; but he has followed literally the "grammatical sense. Now, with the aid of a very "slight acquaintance with Hebrew, one might know "that this phrase *appeller du nom* signifies to invoke "the name, especially when the discourse is of "God." In like manner, when the Vulgate is concerned in the question, and happens to follow the sense in an instance wherein the version compared with it prefers the letter, we may be certain that our author's decision is then for the sense. "The Se-

[13] Il y a dans cette derniere revision [de la version de Geneve] *Allors on commença d'appeller du nom de l'Eternel.* Ce qui fait un sens obscur, et même impertinent. Il est bien vrai qu' Aquila a traduit mot pour mot de la même maniere: mais il a suivi à la lettre le sens grammatical, et pour peu qu'on ait lû d'Ebreu, on sait que cette façon de parler *appeller du nom* signifie *invoquer le nom* de quelqu'un, principalement quand il est parlé de Dieu. Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. xxiv.

" venty," he tells us [14], " have rendered Επικατα-
" ρατος συ απο παντων των κτηνων, where we have
" in the Vulgate, *maledictus es inter omnia anima-*
" *tia:* the Greek word απο, used by the Septua-
" gint in this place, is unsuitable and nonsensical."
Such is the sentence which our author invariably pronounces on this truly senseless mode of translating.

But still it is with a secret exception of all the instances wherein this senseless mode of translating has been adopted by the Vulgate. For this adoption has instantly converted it into the only proper method, and the version which the plain sense of the passage indicates, must then be consigned to the margin; for *an explanation is not a translation.*

§ 10. To the preceding remarks, I shall subjoin two more of Father Simon on the version of Erasmus, in which he cannot indeed accuse that learned interpreter of departing further either from the letter, or from the sense, than the Vulgate itself, but merely of leaving the Vulgate, and rendering the Greek word differently. Simon has in this cause a powerful ally, John Bois, canon of Ely, a man whom, not without reason, he extols for his learning and

[14] Les Septante ont traduit Επικαταρατος συ απο παντων των κτηνων, où il y a dans la Vulgate, *Maledictus es inter omnia animantia:* le mot Grec απο, dont les Septante se sont servis en cet endroit n'y convient point, et ne fait aucun sens. Hist Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. v.

critical sagacity; and one who had, besides, such an attachment to the Vulgate as exactly tallied with his own. For Bois, in every instance wherein the Vulgate is literal, finds a freer method loose, profane, and intolerable: and when the Vulgate follows more the sense than the letter, which is not unfrequently the case, no person can be more decisive than he, that the literal method is servile, barbarous, unmeaning, and such as befits only a school-boy.

But to return to Simon: "Erasmus," says he [15], "rendered not very appositely *obscurant* what in the "Vulgate was *exterminant*, and in the Greek αφα- "νιζωσι. John Bois, who has defended in this place "the Latin interpreter, by the authority of Saint "Chrysostom, who explains the verb αφανιζωσι by "διαφθειρωσι, *they corrupt*, maintains that we ought "to give this meaning to the Latin verb *exterminant*. "He condemns the new interpreters who have trans- "lated otherwise, under pretence that this word is "not good Latin. *Parum fortasse eleganter*," says he, "*verbum* αφανιζωσι *sic reddidit, sed apposite ut*

[15] Il n'étoit pas à propos qu'Erasme traduisit *obscurant*, où il y a dans la Vulgate *exterminant*, et dans le Grec αφανιζωσι (Mat. vi. 16.) Jean Bois qui a defendu en cet endroit l'interprete Latin par l'autorité de Saint Chrysostome, lequel explique le verbe αφανιζωσι par διαφθειρωσι, *corrompent*, pretend qu'on doit donner ce sens au verbe Latin *exterminant*. Il condamne les nouveaux interpretes qui ont traduit autrement sous pretexte que ce mot n'est pas assez Latin. Si cette expression, dit-il, n'a rien d'elegant, au moins elle est très-propre. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxii.

"*qui maxime.*" But how is the authority of Chrysostom concerned in the question? Chrysostom, indeed, affirms that αφανιζωσι is in this place equivalent to διαφθειρωσι, but says nothing at all of *exterminant*, the only word about which we are in doubt.

For my part, I believe I shall not be singular in thinking, that it is far from being apposite in the present application. "John Bois," he says, "main-"tains that we ought to give the same meaning with "διαφθειρωσι to the Latin verb." But is it in the power of John Bois, or of Richard Simon, or of both, to give what sense they please to a Latin verb? On this hypothesis, indeed, they may translate in any way, and defend any translation which they choose to patronize. But if, in Latin, as in all other languages, propriety must be determined by use, the word *exterminant* is in this place, I say not inelegant, but improper. It is not chargeable with inelegance, because used by good writers, but is charged with impropriety, because unauthorized in this acceptation. And even, if it should not be quite unexampled, it must be admitted to be obscure and indefinite, on account of the uncommonness of the application.

§ 11. THE other example follows[16]: "Erasmus' "desertion of the ancient edition has often arisen

[16] Cet éloignement vient souvent de ce qu'il [Erasme] a crû que l'ancienne edition n'est pas assez Latine. Par example

"from the belief that the Latin was not pure enough. "For example, instead of saying *noluit consolari*, "he has said *noluit consolationem admittere*. Yet "*consolari* occurs in the passive in some ancient au- "thors. Besides, this great exactness about the "propriety of the Latin words in a version of the "Scriptures is not always seasonable. The inter- "preter's principal care should be to express well "the sense of the original." True. But to express the sense well, and to give it in proper words, are, in my apprehension, very nearly, if not entirely, coincident. I admit, indeed (if that be the author's meaning), that it would not be seasonable to recur to circumlocution, or to affected and far-fetched expressions, and avoid such as are simple and perspicuous, because not used by the most elegant writers. But this is not the case here. The expression which Erasmus has adopted, is sufficiently plain and simple; and, though *consolari* may sometimes be found in a passive signification, there can be no doubt that the active meaning is far the more common. Now, to avoid even the slightest ambiguity in the version, where there is nothing ambiguous in

(dans Mat. ii. 18.) au lieu de *noluit consolari*, il a mis *noluit consolationem admittere*. On trouve cependant *consolari* au passif, dans d'anciens auteurs; outre que cette grande exactitude pour la proprieté des mots Latins, dans une version de l'Ecriture, n'est pas toûjours de saison. L'on doit principalement prendre garde à bien exprimer le sens de l'original. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxii.

the original, would be a sufficient reason with any man but an Arias or an Aquila, for a greater deviation from the form of the expression, than this can reasonably be accounted.

§ 12. This critical historian is indeed so sensible of the futility of the greater part of his remarks on the version of Erasmus, that he, in a manner, apologizes for it. "This sort of alterations," says he [17], "so frequent in Erasmus's version, is generally of "no importance; but it would have been more ju- "dicious to alter nothing in the ancient interpreter "of the church, but what it was absolutely neces- "sary to correct, in order to render him more ex- "act: and perhaps it would have been better to put "the corrections in the margin in form of remarks." This is a topic to which he is perpetually recurring. It was not unsuitable for one who thought as Father Simon seems sometimes to have done, to use this plea as an argument against making new translations of the Bible into Latin: but it is not at all pertinent to obtrude it upon the readers (as he often does), in the examination of the versions actually made. The question, in regard to these, is, or ought to be, solely

[17] Ces sortes de changemens qui sont frequents dans la version d'Erasme, sont la pluspart de nulle importance; mais il étoit plus judicieux de ne changer dans l'ancien interprete de l'eglise, que ce qu'il étoit il absolument necessaire de corriger, pour le rendre plus exact: et peut-etre même étoit il mieux de mettre les corrections à la marge, en forme de remarque Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxii.

concerning the justness of the version. Nor is it easy to conceive another motive for confounding topics so different, but to excite such prejudices in the readers, as may preclude a candid examination.

As to his critique upon the translation made by Erasmus, it appears to me, I own, exceedingly trifling. I believe every impartial reader will be disposed to conclude as much from the examples above produced. And I cannot help adding, in regard to the whole of his criticisms on that version, with the exception of a very few, that they are either injudicious, the changes made by the interpreter being for the better; or frivolous, the changes being, at least, not for the worse. I admit a few exceptions. Thus, the *cui servio* of the Vulgate, is preferable to the *quem colo* of Erasmus, as a version of ὡ λατρευω [18], and better suited to the scope of the passage. Λειτουργουντων δε αυτων [20], could not have been more justly rendered than by the Vulgate, *ministrantibus autem illis.* The expression adopted by Erasmus, *Cum autem illi sacrificarent*, is like one of Beza's stretches, though on a different side. Simon's censure of this passage deserves to be recorded as an evidence of his impartiality, in his theological capacity at least, however much we may think him sometimes biassed as a critic. "Erasmus," says he [20],

[18] Rom. i. 9. [19] Acts, xiii. 2.

[20] Il a limité au sacrifice ou à l'action publique que les Grecs appellent *liturgie*, et les Latins *messe*, ce qu'on doit entendre

" has limited to the sacrifice, or the public action " which the Greeks call *liturgy*, and the Latins " *mass*, that which, in this place, ought to be un- " derstood of the ministry and functions in general, " of the first ministers of the church. He had, " therefore, no reason to reform the version of the " ancient interpreter, who expresses, agreeably both " to the letter and to the sense, the Greek verb " λειτυργειν."

Among the Romish translators into modern languages, Erasmus, in this particular, soon had his imitators. *Corbin*, in his French version, rendered that passage, *Eux celebrans le saint sacrifice de la messe.* After him, Father *Veron*, *Les Apotres celebroient la messe au Seigneur.* " The reason," says Simon [2], " which Veron offers for translating it in " this manner, is because the Calvinists had often " asked him in what passage of Scripture it was " mentioned that the Apostles ever said mass." This plea of Veron is not unlike the mode of reasoning in his own defence, of which I had occasion formerly

en ce lieu-là generalement du ministere et des fonctions des premiers ministres de l'eglise. Il n'a donc pas eu raison de reformer la version de l'ancien interprete qui exprime très-bien à la lettre, et selon le sens, le verbe Grec λειτυργειν. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxiii.

[2] La raison qu'il apporte de sa traduction en cet endroit, est que les Calvinistes lui avoient souvent demandé en quel lieu de l'Ecriture il étoit marqué que les apôtres eussent dit la messe. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxxi.

to produce some examples from Beza [22]. That father, that he might not again be at a loss for an answer to such troublesome querists as he had found in those disciples of Calvin, was resolved that, whether the mass had a place in the original or not, or even in the Vulgate, it should stand forth conspicuous in his translation, so that no person could mistake it. The reader will not be surprised to learn, that he was a controvertist by profession, as appears from his addition in the title of his book, "Docteur en "Theologie, Predicateur et Lecteur du Roi pour "les Controverses, Depute par Nosseigneurs du "Clerge, pour ecrire sur icelles." And to show of what consequence he thought these particulars were to qualify him as a translator, he observes in the preface [23], that "the quality of holy writ well deserves, "on several important accounts, that its translators "should be doctors in theology, and especially well "versed in controversies." Simon's observation on this sentiment, merits our utmost attention: "It is "true," says he [24], "that it were to be wished "that those who meddle with translating the Bible, "were learned in theology; but it should be ano-"ther sort of theology than the controversial; for

[22] Diss. X. Part V. § 5, 6. 9,

[23] La qualité de l'Ecriture sainte merite bien aussi pour divers chefs que ses traducteurs soient docteurs en theologie, et bien verséz specialement aux controverses. Ibid.

[24] Il est vrai qu'il seroit à desirer que ceux qui se mêlent de traduire la bible fussent scavans dans la theologie: mais ce

"it frequently happens, that controvertists discover "in the Bible things not in it, and that they limit "the significations of the words by their own "ideas."

§ 13. BUT, to return to the detection I have attempted of Simon's partiality as a critic, and of the contradictory arguments in which he is often involved by it; we should think him sometimes as much attached to the letter, and even to the arrangement of the words in the original, as any devotee of the synagogue; and at other times disposed to allow great freedoms in both respects. When we examine into the reason of this inconsistency, we always find that the former is a prelude to the defence of the Vulgate in general, or of some obscure and barbarous expression in that version: the latter is often, but not always, in vindication of something in the Vulgate, expressed more freely than perhaps was expedient, or, at least, necessary; for there are great inequalities in that translation. I say, in this case, *often*, but not *always;* because, as was hinted before, when there is no scope for party-attachment, his own good sense determines him to prefer those who keep close to the meaning, before those who keep close to the letter.

doit être une autre theologie que celle qui regarde la controverse; car il arrive souvent que les controversistes voyent dans la bible des choses qui n'y sont point, et qu'ils en limitent quelquefois les mots selon leurs idées. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxxi.

"It flows," says he [25], "from want of respect "for the writings of the Apostles, to transpose the "order of their words, under pretence that this trans- "position forms a clearer and more natural sense. "This may properly be remarked, but it is not al- "lowable to make such a change in the text." Again [26]: "People of sense will prefer the barba- "rism of the ancient Latin edition to the politeness "of Erasmus, because it is no fault, in an interpre- "ter of Scripture, to follow closely his original, and "to exhibit even its transpositions of words. If the "interpreter of the church does not employ Latin "terms sufficiently pure, it is because he is deter- "mined to render faithfully the words of his original. "It is easy to remedy, by short notes, such pretend- "ed faults."

The preceding observations and reasoning he has himself answered in another place, in a way that is

[25] Ce n'est pas aussi avoir assez de respect pour les ecrits des apôtres, que de transposer l'ordre des mots sous pretexte que cette transposition forme un sens plus net et plus naturel. Il est bon de le remarquer; mais il n'est pas permis de faire ce changement dans le texte. Hist. Crit. des Com^rs du N. T. ch. lx.

[26] Les gens de bon sens prefereront la barbarie de l'ancienne edition Latine à la politesse d'Erasme, parceque ce n'est pas un defaut dans un interprete de l'Ecriture de suivre fidelement son original, et d'en representer jusqu-aux hyperbates. Si l'interprete de l'eglise ne s'explique pas en des terms Latins assez purs, c'est qu'il s'est attaché a rendre fidelement les mots de son original. Il est aisé de remedier à ces pretendus defauts par des petites notes.

quite satisfactory. "A translator of Scripture," says he [27], "ought to take care not to attach him-"self entirely to the order of the words in the origi-"nal; otherwise, it will be impossible for him to "avoid falling into ambiguities; because the lan-"guages do not accord with each other in every "thing." Again [28]: "A translator ought not sim-"ply to count the words; but he ought, besides, to "examine in what manner they may be joined toge-"ther, so as to form a good meaning; otherwise his "translation will be puerile and ridiculous." In another place he is still more indulgent [29]: "One "ought, doubtless, to consider the difference of the

[27] Un traducteur de l'Ecriture doit prendre garde à ne s'attacher pas entierement à l'ordre des mots qui est dans l'original; autrement il sera impossible qu'il ne tombe dans des equivoques, parce que les langues ne se rapportent pas en tout les unes aux autres. Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. III. ch. ii.

[28] Un traducteur ne doit pas compter simplement les mots; mais il doit de-plus examiner, de quelle maniere on les peut joindre ensemble pour former un bon sens; autrement sa traduction sera puerile et ridicule. Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. xx.

[29] On doit à la verité considerer la difference de langues, nos manieres et nos expressions ne s'accordant point avec celles des anciens peuples d'Orient. Sur ce pied-là je conviens, avec le P. Amelote, qu'il n'a pas été necessaire qu'il employât la conjonction *et* dans tous les endroits ou elle se trouve dans le Nouveau Testament, parce que cette repetition nous choque, aussi bien que ces autres particules, *voila*, *donc*, *or*, *parce que*. Je suis même persuadé qu'il en a pû substituer d'autres en leur place. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxxiii.

"languages: our manners and our expressions do "not suit those of the ancient Orientals. For this "reason, I agree with Father Amelote, that it was "not necessary that he should employ the conjunc- "tion *and* in all the places where it is found in the "New Testament, because this repetition shocks "us; as do also these other particles, *behold*, *now*, "*then*, *because*. I am convinced that Amelote did "right in substituting others in their stead."

If it should be asked, Why does not Simon enjoin rather, in those places, to trace the letter, at all hazards, in the text, and recur to the margin, his never-failing resource on other occasions, for what regards the meaning? I know no pertinent answer that can be given, unless that, in the places just now quoted, he is not engaged in defending the obscurities, and even the nonsense, of the Vulgate, against the plain sense of other versions.

§ 14. To those above cited, I shall add but a few other specimens. "It is," says he[30], "much more "proper, in a translation of the sacred books into "the vulgar tongue, to attach one's self, as much "as possible, to the letter, than to give meanings too "free in quitting it." Again[31]: "This respect

[30] Il est bien plus à propos dans une traduction des livres sacrés en langue vulgaire, de s'attacher à la lettre autant qu'il est possible, que de donner des sens trop libres en la quittant. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxxv.

[31] On doit avoir ce respect pour les livres sacrés qui ne peuvent être traduits trop à la lettre, pourveu qu'on se fasse entendre. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxiv.

" is due to the sacred books, which cannot be too " literally interpreted, provided they be made intel- " ligible." This sentiment appears moderate, on a general view; yet, when applied to particular cases, it will not be found to be that author's sentiment. And, what may be thought more extraordinary, this rule of his will be found to require, when judged by his own criticisms, both too much, and too little.

First, it requires too much; because it implies that we are never to forsake the letter, unless when, by adhering to it, the expression might be rendered unintelligible. Yet, in a quotation lately given from that author, he admits, that the particles *and*, *behold*, *now*, *then*, *because*, may be either omitted or changed, and that not on account of their hurting the sense, which they rarely do, but expressly, because the frequent recurrence of such words shocks us, that is, offends, our ears. An additional evidence of the same thing is, the exception he takes to Munster's translation, which he declares to be too literal, and consequently rude, though, at the same time, he acknowledges it to be sufficiently intelligible [32]. The sacred books, then, may be too literally interpreted, though they be made intelligible. Assertions more manifestly contradictory it is impossible to conceive.

[32] Quoique sa version soit assez intelligible, elle a neanmoins quelque chose de rude, parce qu'elle suit trop la lettre du texte Ebreu. Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. xxi.

Secondly, the rule he has given us requires too little; because it evidently implies that the letter ought to be deserted, when to do so is necessary for expressing the sense perspicuously. Now, if that had been uniformly our critic's opinion, we should never have had so many recommendations of the margin for correcting the ambiguities, false meanings, and no meanings, which a rigorous adherence to the letter had brought into the text of the Vulgate, and which he will not permit to be changed in other versions.

§ 15. I HAVE already given it as my opinion, that Father Simon's sentiments on this subject, when unbiassed by any special purpose, were rational and liberal. I have given some evidences of this, and intend here to add a few more. Speaking of the Greek version of the Old Testament, by Aquila the Jew, he says [33], "One cannot excuse this interpreter's "vicious affectation (which St. Jerom has named "*κακοζηλια*, or *ridiculous zeal*), in translating every "word of his text entirely by the letter, and in so "rigid a manner, as to render his version altogether "barbarous." Again [34]: "The Seventy, who trans-

[33] On ne peut pas excuser cet interprete d'une affectation vicieuse (que St. Jerome a nommé *κακοζηλιαν*, ou *zele ridicule*) d'autant qu'il a traduit chaque mot de son texte entierement à la lettre, et d'une maniere si rigoureuse, que cela a rendu sa version tout-a-fait barbare. Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. II.

[34] Les Septante qui traduisent souvent l'Ebreu trop à la lettre, et quelquefois même sans prendre garde au sens. ne

" late the Hebrew often too literally, and sometimes " even without attending to the sense, do not always " exactly hit the meaning; and they render them- " selves obscure, by an excessive attachment to the " letter." Of Arias' translation he says [35]: " It is " true, that this version may be useful to those who " are learning Hebrew, because it renders the Hebrew " word for word, according to the grammatical sense; " but I do not think that one ought therefore to give " Arias Montanus the character of *a most faithful* " *interpreter;* on the contrary, one will do him " much more justice, in naming him *a most trifling* " *interpreter.*"

Agreeably to this more enlarged, and, indeed, more accurate way of thinking, the critic did not hesitate to pronounce this expression of Munster: *Fructificate et augescite, et implete aquas in fretis,* much inferior to that of the Vulgate, *Crescite et multiplicamini, et implete aquas maris* [36]. I am of the same opinion as to the passages compared, though I have no partiality to the Vulgate. Yet, by Simon's

font pas toujours un choix exact du veritable sens, et ils se rendent obscurs, pour s'attacher trôp à la lettre. Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. xiii.

[35] Il est vrai que cette version peut être utile à ceux qui veulent apprendre la langue Ebraïque, parce qu'elle rend l'Hebreu mot pour mot, et selon le sens grammatical: mais je ne crois pas qu'on doive donner pour cela a Arias Montanus la qualité de *fidissimus interpres:* au contraire, on lui fera beaucoup plus de justice, en le nommant *ineptissimus interpres* Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. xx.

[36] Gen. i. 22. Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. xxi.

rule, above quoted, Munster's version here ought to be preferred. It is equally intelligible, and more literal. Nor is the word *fructificate* more exceptionable in point of Latinity, than many words in the Vulgate which he strenuously defends; accusing those who object to them, of an excess of delicacy, but ill suited to the subject. His friend, the canon of Ely, if it had been a term of the ancient interpreter, would have told us boldly, and in my opinion, with better reason than when he so expressed himself, *Parum fortasse eleganter verbum* פרו pheru, *sic reddidit; sed apposite, ut qui maxime.* The same fault, of being too literal, and sometimes tracing etymologies, he finds in Beza. "What has often deceived Beza," says he [37], "and the other "translators of Geneva, is their thinking to render "the Greek more literally, by attaching themselves "to express etymologies. They have not considered that it is proper only for school-boys to translate in this manner." To these let me add the testimony of his apologist, Hieronymus Le Camus [38]:

[37] Ce qui a souvent trompé Beze et les autres traducteurs de Geneve, c'est qu'ils ont crû rendre les mots Grecs plus à la lettre, s'ils s'attachoient à exprimer jusqu'aux etymologies. Ils n'ont pas consideré qu'il n'y a que des ecoliers qui soient capables de traduire de cette maniere. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxxvi.

[38] Quando verba Ebraica ita reddunt, ut verbum de verbo exprimant, minus Græcè loquuntur; et hoc Simonius vocavit κακοζηλιαν, seu pravam affectationem Judæis interpretibus fa-

" When they render the Hebrew, word for word, " they do not speak pure Greek. This Simon calls " κακοζηλια, or a vicious affectation familiar to Jew- " ish interpreters, and occurring sometimes in the " Septuagint. Thus, when they turn some prepo- " sitions from Hebrew into Greek, they retain the " Hebrew idiom; for example, in Hebrew, the com- " parative is expressed by the preposition *min*, which " the Seventy, and Aquila, often render απο, *from*; " in which case, this κακοζηλια darkens the sense." Was there none of this κακοζηλια then, in using the preposition *in* (where the idiom of the Latin, and the sense of the expression, required *cum*), in the phrase *in virtute* of the Vulgate [29]?

§ 16. But it is certain that, whatever were his general sentiments on the subject, he no sooner descended to particular instances, than he patronized the free, or the literal, manner, just as the one, or the other, had been followed by the Vulgate. If he had said, in so many words, that the example of the ancient interpreter was a sufficient reason, the ques-

miliarem, quæ etiam interdum in septuaginta interpretibus occurrit. Sic dum quasdam prepositiones ex Ebræo faciunt Græcas, retinent dictionem Ebraicam: exempli causâ, sermo Ebraicus comparativum exprimit per *min* quod 70 cum Aquila haud infrequenter reddunt απο *ab*. Tunc ista κακοζηλια sensum efficit obscurum. Hier. le Cam. De Responsione Vossii, edit. Edinb. 1685, p. 50.

[29] Rom. i. 4. See § 7. of this Dissertation.

tion would have been more simple. But, whatever weight this sentiment might have had with Romanists, to whom that version serves as a standard, it could not surely have had influence enough on Protestants, to make them sacrifice what they judged to be the sense of the unerring Spirit, in deference to the discovered mistakes of a fallible translator. It was, therefore, of importance to Father Simon, for the conviction of his Protestant readers, to show, from the authentic principles of criticism, that, in every thing material, the old translator had judged better than any of the later interpreters: and, in prosecution of this momentous point, I have given a specimen of his wonderful versatility in arguing. That I may not be misunderstood, I must at the same time add, that he does not carry his partiality so far, as to refuse acknowledging, in the Vulgate, a few slips of no consequence, and no wise affecting the sense. To have acted otherwise, would have been too inartificial in that critic, as it would have exposed the great object of his treatise too much. Some concessions it was necessary that he should employ, as an expedient for gaining the acquiescence of his readers in points incomparably more important.

§ 17. I SHALL now finish what I have to remark upon his criticisms, with some reflections on those words which, in consequence of the frequency of their occurrence, both in the Vulgate, and in ancient ecclesiastical writers, he considers as consecrated,

and as therefore entitled to be preferred to other words, which are equally significant, but have not had the same advantage of antiquity, and theological use. I readily admit the title claimed in behalf of such words, when they convey exactly the idea denoted by the original terms, and are neither obscure nor ambiguous: nay, I do not object even to their ambiguity, when the same ambiguity is in the original term. And this is, in my opinion, the utmost which ought to be either demanded on one side, or yielded on the other. If, on account of the usage of any former interpreter, I admit words which convey not the same idea with the original, or which convey it darkly, or which convey also other ideas that may be mistaken for the true, or confounded with it; I make a sacrifice of the truths of the Spirit, that I may pay a vain compliment to antiquity, in adopting its phraseology, even when it may mislead. That the words themselves be equally plain and pertinent with any other words which might occur, appears to me so reasonable a limitation to the preference granted in favour of those used in any former version, that, if the bare stating of the matter, as is done above, be not sufficient; I do not know any topic by which I could convince persons who are of a different opinion. But, perhaps, it will answer better to descend to particulars. It is only thus a person can be assured of making himself thoroughly understood.

§ 18. SIMON, speaking of the Lutheran and Port

Royal versions, says [40], "Neither of them retains "almost any thing of that venerable and quite divine "appearance which Scripture has in the original lan- "guages. One does not find, in these versions, that "simplicity of style which is diffused through the "writings of the Apostles and Evangelists. This "appears from the first words of the translation of "Mons, where we read, *La genealogie de Jesus "Christ:* in effect, the two Latin words, *liber gene- "rationis*, answering to two others in the Greek, "signify *genealogy*. But an interpreter, who chooses "to preserve that simple air which the sacred books "have in the original tongues, will rather translate, "simply, *the book of the generation*. He will remark, "at the same time, on the margin, that in the style "of the Bible, one calls βιβλος γενεσεως, what the "Greeks name γενεαλογια, *genealogy;* that the

[40] Les uns et les autres ne retiennent presque rien de cet air venerable et tout divin que l'Ecriture a dans les langues originales. On n'y trouve point cette simplicité de stile qui est repandue dans les ecrits des Evangelistes et des Apôtres.—Cela paroit dès les premiers mots de la traduction de Mons, où nous lisons, *la genealogie de Jesus Christ:* et en effet ces deux mots Latins, *liber generationis*, qui repondent à deux autres qui sont dans le Grec, signifient *genealogie*. Mais un interprete qui voudra conserver cet air simple que les livres sacrés ont dans les langues originales, aimera mieux traduire simplement *le livre de la generation*. Il remarquera en même tems à la marge, que dans le stile de la bible on appelle βιβλος γενεσεως ce que les Grecs nomment γενεαλογια, *genealogie;* que les Apôtres ont pris cette expression de la version Grecque des Septante, qui ont ainsi interpreté le *sepher-toldoth* des Ebreux. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxxv.

"Apostles have adopted this expression from the "Greek version of the Seventy, who have thus ex- "pressed the *sepher-toldoth* of the Hebrews."

Now it may be observed, that Simon himself speaks of it as unquestionable, that *genealogie* expresses the meaning. But he objects, that it is not so simple an expression as *le livre de la generation*. If he had called it too learned a term for ushering in so plain a narrative as the Gospel, I should have thought the objection plausible. But when he speaks of simplicity, I am afraid that he has some meaning to that word which I am not acquainted with. I should never imagine, that of different ways of expressing the same idea, supposing the expressions in other respects equal, that should be accounted the least simple, which is in the fewest words. Or, if the phrase, *le livre de la generation*, do not derive its superior simplicity from its being more complex; does it derive that quality from its being more obscure than *la genealogie?* I have been accustomed to consider plainness, rather than obscurity, as characteristic of simplicity. And, indeed, the chief fault I find in the former of these expressions, is its obscurity. The word *livre* is here used in a sense which it never has in French; as much may be said of the word *generation:* and consequently the phrase does not convey intelligibly the idea of the writer, or, indeed, any idea whatever. Our author's answer to this is: 'Give the sense on the margin;' that is, in other words, give the etymology of the phrase in

the text, and the translation in the margin. Is not this the very method taken by Arias Montanus, whom our critic has, nevertheless, treated very contemptuously? Is not this hunting after etymological significations, the very thing he condemns so strongly in Beza, and some other modern interpreters? And where is the difference, whether the expression to be explained, be a phrase or a compound word: for a compound word is no other than a contracted phrase? Γενεαλογια is but two words, γενεας λογος, contracted into one. This our author admits to be a just (and, I add, a literal) version of *sepher toldoth*. Now, if the Evangelist had employed this, instead of βιβλος γενεσεως, Simon would have had the same reason for insisting that it ought to be rendered, in the text, *la parole de la generation*, and that the meaning should be explained in the margin.

Sometimes, indeed, this way of interpreting, by tracing the etymology, is proper, because sometimes it conveys the sense with sufficient perspicuity, and with as much brevity as the language admits: but this is not the case always. Every body will allow, that φιληδονοι could not be more justly rendered than *lovers of pleasure*, or φιλοθεοι, than *lovers of God*. But συκοφανται is much better translated *false accusers*, than *informers concerning figs*; φιλοσοφοι, *philosophers*, than *lovers of wisdom*. The apostolical admonition[41], Βλεπετε μη τις υμας εξαι ὁ

[41] Col. ii. 8.

συλαγωγων δια της φιλοσοφιας, is certainly better rendered, *Beware lest any man seduce you through philosophy*, than, Beware lest any man carry you off a prey, through the love of wisdom; which, though it traces the letter, does not give the sense. Yet, in these cases, the terms may be pertinently explained in the margin, as well as in that mentioned by the critic. Now, to qualify one for the office of interpreter, it is requisite that he be capable of giving the received use of the phrases, as well as of the compound words, and of the compound words, as well as of the simple words.

There are cases in which I have acknowledged, that recourse to the margin is necessary; but such cases are totally different from the present, as will appear to the satisfaction of any one who has attended to what has been said [42], on that subject. But the method, so often recommended by Simon, is, in my apprehension, the most bungling imaginable. It is unnaturally to disjoin two essential parts of the translator's business, the interpretation of words, and the interpretation of idioms, or phrases, allotting the text, or body of the book, for the one, and reserving the margin for the other. In consequence of which, the text will be often no better than a collection of riddles, or what is worse, a jargon of unmeaning words; whilst that which alone deserves the name of interpretation, will be found in the margin. This naturally suggests a query, Whether

[42] Diss. II. Part I. § 5. Diss. VIII. throughout.

the text might not as well be dispensed with altogether; as it would only serve to interrupt a reader's progress, distract his attention, and divide his thoughts? To this let me add another query, Whether there be any thing in the translations of Aquila, Malvenda, Arias Montanus, Pagnin, and Beza (for they all incur this stigma from our author, when they translate more literally than the Vulgate,) which better deserves the denomination of a school-boy's version, than that which the author, in this place, so strongly patronizes?

§ 19. I OBSERVED, that compound words are nearly on the same footing with such phrases as *βιβλος γενεσεως*. This holds more manifestly in Hebrew, where the nouns which are said, by their grammarians, to be *in statu constructo*, are, in effect, compound terms. To combine them the more easily, a change is, in certain cases, made on the letters of the word which we should call the governing word; and when there is no change in the letters, there is often, by the Masoretic reading, a change in the vowel-points to facilitate the pronunciation of them as one word. In this way, *sepher-toldoth* is as truly one compound word in Hebrew, as *γενεαλογια* is in Greek, and of the same signification. There is a similar idiom in the French language, for supplying names, by what may be termed, indifferently, phrases, or compound nouns. Such are, *gens d'armes*, *jet d'eau*, *aide de camp*. We should think a translator had much of the *κακοζηλια*,

the vicious affectation so oft above mentioned, who should render them into English, *people of arms*, *cast of water*, *help of field*. Another evidence that this may justly be regarded as a kind of composition in Hebrew, is that, when there is occasion for the affix pronouns, though their connection be in strictness with the first of the two terms, they are annexed to the second, which would be utterly repugnant to their syntax, if both were not considered as making but one word, and, consequently, as not admitting the insertion of a pronoun between them. Thus, what is rendered [43], *his idols of silver*, and *his idols of gold;* if the two nouns in each phrase were not conceived as combined into one compound term, ought to be translated, *idols of his silver*, and *idols of his gold*, ואת אלילי זהבו את אלילי כספו, which is not according to the genius of that language, for the affix pronouns are never transposed.

But when the words are considered in this (which I think is the true) light, as one compound name, there is the same reason for rendering them as our interpreters have done, that there would be to render ἡ φιλανθρωπια αυτου, *his love to men*, and not *love to his men*. In the same manner, שם קדשי *shem kodshi*, is *my holy name*, הר קדשי *har kodshi*, *my holy mountain*, and שמן קדשי *shemen kodshi*, *my holy oil*. These, if we should follow the letter in translating them, or, which is the same thing, trace the form of the composition, must be, *the name of*

[43] Isaiah, ii. 20.

my holiness, the mountain of my holiness, and the oil of my holiness. In translating אלהי צדקי[44] *elohe tsidki*, rendered, in the common version, *O God of my righteousness*, I see no occasion, with Dr. Taylor, to make a stretch to find a meaning to the word answering to *righteousness;* the word, agreeably to the Hebrew idiom above exemplified, has there manifestly the force of an epithet, and the expression implies no more than *my righteous God.* In this way עם קדשך[45] *gham kodshecha* (which is exactly similar), translated in the English Bible, after Tremellius, and much in the manner of Arias, *the people of thy holiness*, is rendered in the Vulgate, and by Houbigant, *populum sanctum tuum, thy holy people*, and to the same purpose by Castalio and the translator of Zuric. This very thing, therefore, that the Seventy did not render *sepher-toldoth*, γενεαλογια, to which it literally, and in signification, answers, but βιβλος γενεσεως, is an example of that κακοζηλια, of which Jerom justly accuses them, and which Simon never fails to censure with severity, in every translation where he finds it, except the Vulgate. As this phrase, however, in consequence of its introduction by these interpreters, obtained a currency among the Hellenist Jews, and was quite intelligible to them, being in the national idiom, it was proper in the Evangelist, or his translator, to adopt it. The case was totally different with those for whom the Latin version was made, whose idiom the words *liber*

[44] Psalm iv. 1. [45] Isaiah, lxiii. 18.

generationis, did not suit, and to whose ears they conveyed only unmeaning sounds.

§ 20. I HAVE never seen Mr. Simon's French translation of the New Testament from the Vulgate, but I have an English version of his version, by William Webster, curate of St. Dunstan's in the West. The English translator professes, in his dedication, to have translated literally from the French. Yet Matthew's Gospel begins in this manner: *The genealogy of Jesus Christ.* If Mr. Webster has taken the freedom to alter Simon's phrase, he has acted very strangely, as it is hardly in the power of imagination to conceive a good reason for turning that work (which is itself but a translation of a translation) into English; unless to show, as nearly as possible, that eminent critic's manner of applying his own rules, and to let us into his notions of the proper method of translating holy writ. And if, on the other hand, Simon has actually rendered it in French, *La genealogie*, it is no less strange that, without assigning a reason for his change of opinion, or so much as mentioning, in the preface, or in a note, that he had changed it, he should employ an expression which he had, in a work of high reputation, censured with so much severity in another [46].

[46] I have, since these Dissertations were finished, been fortunate enough to procure a copy of Simon's French translation of the New Testament; from which I find that his Eng-

§ 21. Now if, from what has been said, it be evident, that his own principles, explicitly declared in numberless parts of his book, as well as right reason, condemn the servile method of tracing etymologies in words or phrases (for there is no material difference in the cases), to the manifest injury of perspicuity, and, consequently, of the sense; I know no tolerable plea which can be advanced in favour of such phrases, unless that to which he often recurs in other cases, *consecration by long use.* "Why," he asks [47], speaking of the Port Royal translation, "have "they banished from this version many words which

lish translator has not misrepresented him. Without any apology either in the preface or in the notes, he adopts the very expression which he had in so decisive a manner condemned in the Gentlemen of Port Royal. Nay, so little does he value the rule which he had so often prescribed to others, to give a literal version in the text, and the meaning in the margin, that in most cases, as in the present, he reverses it; he gives the meaning in the text, and the literal version in the margin. I think that, in so doing, he judges much better; but, if further experience produced this alteration in his sentiments, it is strange that he seems never to have reflected that he owed to the public some account of so glaring an inconsistency in his conduct; and to those translators whose judgment he had treated with so little ceremony, an acknowledgment of his error. Simon's translation is, upon the whole, a good one, but it will not bear to be examined by his own rules and maxims.

[47] Pourquoi a-t-on banni plusieurs mots qu'un long usage a autorizés, et qui ont été, pour ainsi dire, canonisés dans les eglises d'Occident? Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxxv.

"long use has authorised, and which have been, so "to speak, canonized in the Western churches?" He does not, indeed, plead this in defence of the words *liber generationis*, though, in my opinion, the most plausible argument he had to offer. But, as it is a principal topic with him, to which he often finds it necessary to recur, it will require a more particular examination.

§ 22. "WHERE we have, in the Greek," says he [48], "εναγγελιζονται, and in the Vulgate *evange-* "*lizantur*, Erasmus has translated, "*Lætum evan-* "*gelii accipiunt nuntium.* He explains, by several "words, what might have been rendered by one "only, which is not, indeed, Latin, but, as the "learned John Bois remarks, it is ancient, and is, "besides, as current as several other words which "ecclesiastic use has rendered familiar. He adds, "in the same place, that he is not shocked with "this expression in our Vulgate, *qui non fuerit* "*scandalizatus*, because he is for allowing the Gos- "pel to speak after its own manner. Erasmus has "translated, *Quisquis non fuerit offensus*, which is "better Latin." In regard to the last expression, he has a similar remark in his critique on the version

[48] Ou il y a dans le Grec (Mat. xi. 5.) εναγγελιζονται, et dans la Vulgate *evangelizantur*, Erasme a traduit *lætum Evangelii accipiunt nuntium*. Il explique par plusieurs mots ce qu'il pouvoit rendre par un seul, qui n'est pas à la verité Latin,

of Mons. "These words," says he[49], "*Si ocu-* "*lus tuus dexter scandalizat te*, the Gentlemen of "Port Royal have translated, *Si votre œil droit vous* "*est un sujet de scandale et de chute.* They say "that the word *scandale*, by itself, conveys com- "monly another idea, denoting that which shocks "us, not that which makes us fall. But St. Jerom, "whom they pretend to imitate, was not so deli- "cate. We should not, however, have found fault "with their explaining the word *scandale*, scandal, "by the word *chute*, fall: but this explanation ought "to have been in the margin, rather than in the text "of the version."

§ 23. As to what regards the proper version of

mais, comme le docte Jean Bois a remarqué, il est ancien, et il est aussi bien de mise que plusieurs autres mots auxquels l'usage de l'eglise a donné cours. Il ajoute au même endroit, qu'il n'est point choqué de cette expression qui est dans nôtre Vulgate, *qui non fuerit scandalizatus*, parce qu'il souffre volontiers que l'Evangile parle à sa maniere. Erasme a traduit, *quisquis non fuerit offensus;* ce qui est plus Latin. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxii.

[49] Ces paroles (Mat. v. 29.), *Si oculus tuus dexter scandalizat te*, Messieurs de Port Royale ont traduit par celles-ci, *Si votre œil droit vous est un sujet de scandale et de chute.* Ils disent que le mot de *scandale* tout seul donne d'ordinaire une autre idée, et qu'ils se prend pour ce qui nous fait choque, et non pas pour ce qui nous fait tomber. Mais St. Jerôme qu'ils pretendent imiter, n'a point eu cette delicatesse. On ne trouve pas neanmoins mauvais qu'ils ayent expliqué le mot de *scandale* par celui de *chute:* mais cette explication devoit plûtôt être à la marge, que dans le texte de la version. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxxv.

the words *ευαγγελιζω* and *ευαγγελιον*, I have explained myself fully in some former dissertations [50], and shall only add here a few things suggested by the remarks above quoted. First, then, Mr. Simon condemns it much in a translator, to explain, by several words, what might have been rendered by one only. I condemn it no less than he. But, by the examples produced, one would conclude that he had meant, not *what might have been*, but *what could not have been*, rendered by one only; for *evangelizantur* is not a version of *ευαγγελιζονται*, nor *scandalizatus fuerit* of *σκανδαλισθη*. This is merely to give the Greek words something of a Latin form, and so evade translating them altogether. A version composed on this plan, if, without absurdity, we could call it a version, would be completely barbarous and unintelligible. There are a very few cases wherein it is necessary to retain the original term. These I have described already [51]. But neither of the words now mentioned falls under the description. And common sense is enough to satisfy us, that when a word cannot be translated intelligibly by one word only, the interpreter ought to employ more. *Verba ponderanda sunt*, says Houbigant [52], *non numeranda —Neque enim fieri potest, ut duarum linguarum paria semper verba paribus respondeant.*

Secondly, That a word is familiar to us, is no evidence that we understand it, though this circum-

[51] Diss. V. Part II. Diss. VI. Part V.

[51] Diss. VIII. passim. [52] Proleg. Cap. V. Art. III.

stance, its familiarity, often prevents our discovering that we do not understand it.

Thirdly, Ecclesiastical use is no security that the word, though it be understood, conveys to us the same idea which the original term did to those to whom the gospels were first promulgated. In a former Dissertation [53], the fullest evidence has been given that, in regard to several words, the meaning which has been long established by ecclesiastic use, is very different from that which they have in the writings of the New Testament.

Fourthly, That to render the plain Greek words σκανδαλιζω and ευαγγελιζω into Latin, by the words *scandalizo* and *evangelizo*, which are not Latin words, is so far from allowing the Gospel to speak after its own manner (as Bois calls it), that it is, on the contrary, giving it a manner of speaking the most different from its own that can be imagined. This I intend soon to evince, even from Simon himself, though, in the passage above referred to, he seems to have adopted the sentiment of the English critic.

Lastly, The argument implied in the remark, that Jerom had not so much delicacy as the translators of Port Royal, because he did not scruple to employ the word *scandalizo*, though not Latin, in his Latin version, admits a twofold answer. The first is, Jerom did wrong in so doing. Simon acknowledges that he was neither infallible nor inspired; he acknowledges, further, that he might, and, in a few

[53] Diss. IX.

instances, did, mistake, and is, by consequence, not implicitly to be followed. "It would be wrong," says the critic, in a passage formerly quoted, "to "imitate the faults of St. Jerom, and to pay greater "deference to his authority than to the truth." The second answer is, that the cases are not parallel. *Scandalum* was not a Latin word; consequently, to those who understood no Greek, it was obscure, or, if you will, unintelligible. This is the worst that could be said. Jerom, or whoever first introduced it into the Latin version, had it in his power to assign it, in a note, what sense he pleased. But *scandale* was a French word before the translators of Mons had a being; and it was not in their power to divert it from the meaning which general use had given it long before. Now, as they justly observe, in their own vindication, the import of the French word did not coincide with that of the original; they were, therefore, by all the rules of interpretation, obliged to adopt another. Jerom, by adopting the word *scandalum*, darkened the meaning; they, by using the word *scandale*, would have given a false meaning. Their only fault, in my opinion, was their admitting an improper word into their version, even though coupled with another which expresses the sense.

§ 24. But, as our author frequently recurs to this topic, the consecration of such words by long use, it will be proper to consider it more narrowly. Some have gone further, on this article, than our au-

thor is willing to justify. "Sutor," says he [54], "pretended, that it was not more allowable to make "new translations of the Bible, than to change the "style of Cicero into another. *Nonne injuriam "faceret Tullio, qui ejus stylum immutare vellet?* "But, by the leave of this Parisian theologist," says Simon, "there is a great difference between reforming "the style of a book, and making a version of that "book. One may make a translation of the New "Testament from the Greek, or from the Latin, "without making any change on that Greek or that "Latin." The justness of this sentiment is self-evident; and it is a necessary consequence from it, that if the words and phrases in the version convey the same ideas and thoughts to the readers, which those of the original convey, it is a just translation, whatever conformity or disconformity in sound and etymology there may be between its words and phrases, and the words and phrases of the original, or of other translations.

Of this Simon appears, on several occasions, to be perfectly sensible, insomuch that he has, on this

[54] Sutor pretendoit qu'il n'etoit pas plus permis de faire de nouvelles traductions de la Bible, que de changer le stile de Ciceron en un autre. *Nonne injuriam faceret Tullio qui ejus stylum immutare vellet?* Mais n'en déplaise à ce theologien de Paris, il y a bien de la difference entre reformer le stile d'un livre, et faire une version de ce même livre. On peut faire une traduction de Nouveau Testament sur le Grec, ou sur le Latin, sans toucher à ce Grec, ni à ce Latin. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxi.

very article, taken up the defence of Castalio against Beza, who had attacked, with much acrimony, the innovations of the former, in point of language. "It "is not, as Beza very well said," (I quote Beza here as quoted by Simon [55]), "so much my opinion as "that of the ablest ecclesiastic writers, who, when "they discourse with the greatest elegance con- "cerning sacred things, make no alteration on the "passages of Scripture which they quote." Though this verdict of Beza is introduced with manifest approbation, *dit-il fort bien*, and though, in confirmation of it, he adds, that both Beza and Castalio have taken, in this respect, unpardonable liberties, yet it is very soon followed by such a censure as, in my opinion, invalidates the whole. "There is, nevertheless," says he [56], "some ex-

[55] Ce n'est pas, dit il fort bien, tant mon sentiment, que celui des plus habiles ecrivains ecclesiastiques, lesquels, quand même ils parlent avec le plus de politesse des choses sacreés, ne changent rien dans les passages de l'Ecriture qu'ils citent. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxiv.

[56] Il y a neanmoins de l'exaggeration dans ce reproche. Car il n'est ici question que de la version des livres sacrés, et non pas de l'original: et ainsi l'on ne peut pas objecter à Castalio, comme fait Beze, d'avoir changé les paroles du Saint Esprit, ou, comme il parle, *divinam illam Spiritûs Sancti eloquentiam*. Il est certain que le Saint Esprit, pour me servir des termes des ministres de Geneve, n'a point parlé Latin. C'est pourquoi Castalio a pû mettre dans sa traduction Latine *lotio* et *genii* au lieu de *baptisma* et *angeli*, sans rien changer pour cela dans les expressions du Saint Esprit. Hist Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxiv.

"aggeration in this reproach. For the question here "is about the version of the sacred books, and not "about the original; so that one cannot object to "Castalio, as Beza does, his having changed the "words of the Holy Spirit, or, as he expresses it, "*divinam illam Spiritus Sancti eloquentiam*. It "is certain, to adopt the style of the ministers of "Geneva, that the Holy Spirit did not speak La- "tin. Wherefore, Castalio might well put, in his "Latin translation, *lotio* and *genii*, instead of *bap-* "*tisma* and *angeli*, without changing aught in the "expressions of the Holy Spirit." The moderation and justness of his sentiments here, do not well accord, either with the high claims which, in favour of ecclesiastic terms, he makes to consecration, canonization, &c. or with the accusations brought, on this very article, against Erasmus and others.

Wherein does the expression of Theodore Beza, in calling those ancient words and phrases of the Vulgate, *divinam illam Spiritus Sancti eloquentiam*, differ, in import, from that given by John Bois, who says, in reference to them, *Libenter audio Scripturam suo quidem modo, suoque velut idiomate loquentem?* May it not be replied, just as pertinently to Bois as to Beza: "The question here, is about the "version of the sacred books, and not about the "original. It is certain, that as the Holy Spirit did "not speak Latin, the Scriptures were not written "in that language." Their phrases and idioms, therefore, are not concerned in the dispute; for, if those expressions, concerning which we are now in-

quiring, be not the language of the Holy Spirit, as Simon himself maintains that they are not; neither are they the language of the Scriptures. Thus, the same sentiment, with an inconsiderable difference in the expression, is quoted by our author, with high approbation from the canon of Ely, as worthy of being turned into a general rule [57], and with no little censure from the minister of Geneva.

§ 25. I HAVE often had occasion to speak of the obscurity of such terms, and I have shown [58] the impropriety of several of them, as conveying ideas very different from those conveyed by the words of the original, rightly understood: and though this alone would be a sufficient reason for setting them aside, sufficient, I mean, to any person who makes more account of obtaining the mind of the Spirit, than of acquiring the dialect of uninspired interpreters; the very reason for which the use of them is so strenuously urged by Simon and others, appears to me a very weighty reason against employing them. They are, say these critics, consecrated words; that is, in plain language, they are, by the use of ecclesiastic writers, become a sort of technical terms in theology. This is really the fact. Accordingly, those words hardly enter into common use at all. They are appropriated as terms of art, which have

[57] Cette reflexion doit servir de regle pour une infinité d'endroits du Nouveau Testament, ou les nouveaux traducteurs ont affecté de s'eloigner de l'ancienne edition Latine. Ibid. ch. xxii.

[58] Diss. IX. throughout.

no relation to the ordinary commerce of life. Now, nothing can be more repugnant to the character of the diction employed by the sacred writers; there being, in their language, nothing to which we can apply the words scholastic or technical. On the contrary, the inspired penmen always adopted such terms as were, on the most common occurrences, in familiar use with their readers. When the Evangelist tells us, in Greek [59], that the angel said to the shepherds, Ευαγγελιζομαι ὑμιν, he represents him as speaking in as plain terms to all who understood Greek, as one who says in English, *I bring you good news*, speaks to those who understand English. But will it be said that the Latin interpreter spoke as plainly to every reader of Latin, when he said *Evangelizo vobis?* Or does that deserve to be called a version, which conveys neither the matter, nor the manner, of the author? Not the matter, because an unintelligible word conveys no meaning; not the manner, because what the author said simply and familiarly, the translator says scholastically and pedantically. Of this, however, I do not accuse Jerom. The phrase in question was, doubtless, one of those which he did not think it prudent to meddle with.

§ 26. Nor will their method of obviating all difficulties, by means of the margin, ever satisfy a reasonable person. Is it proper, in translating an author, to make a piece of patchwork of the version, by trans-

[59] Luke ii. 10.

lating one word, and mis-translating, or leaving untranslated, another, with perpetual references to the margin, for correcting the blunders intentionally committed in the text? And if former translators have, from superstition, from excessive deference to their predecessors, from fear of giving offence, or from any other motive, been induced to adopt so absurd a method, shall we think ourselves obliged to imitate them? Some seem strangely to imagine, that to have, in the translation, as many as possible of the articulate sounds, the letters and syllables of the original, is to be very literal, and, consequently, very close. If any choose to call this literal, I should think it idle to dispute with him about the word; but I could not help observing that, in this way, a version may be very literal, and perfectly foreign from the purpose. Nobody will question that the English word *pharmacy* is immediately derived from the Greek φαρμακεια, of which it retains almost all the letters. Ought we, for that reason, to render the Greek word φαρμακεια, *pharmacy*, in the catalogue the apostle has given us of the works of the flesh [60]? Must we render παροξυσμος [61] *paroxysm*, and παραδοξα [62] *paradoxes? Idiot* is, by this rule, a literal version of the Greek ιδιωτης. But an interpreter would be thought not much above that character, who should render it so, in several places of Scripture [63]. Yet if this be not exhibiting what

[60] Gal. v. 19, 20, 21. [61] Acts, xv. 39. [62] Luke, v. 26.
[63] Acts, iv. 13. 1 Cor. xiv. 16. 23, 24. 2 Cor. xi. 6.

Beza denominates *divinam illam Spiritus sancti eloquentiam:* or what Bois, with no better reason, calls *Scripturam suo quidem modo, suoque velut idiomate loquentem*, it will not be easy to assign an intelligible meaning to these phrases.

But, if such be the proper exhibition of the eloquence of the Spirit, and of the idiom of Scripture, it will naturally occur to ask, Why have we so little, even in the Vulgate, of this divine eloquence? Why do we so seldom hear the Scripture, even there, speak in its own way, and in its native idiom? It would have been easy to mutilate all, or most of the Greek words, forming them in the same manner as *evangelizatus* and *scandalizatus* are formed, and so to turn the whole into a gibberish, that would have been neither Greek nor Latin, though it might have had something of the articulation of the one language, and of the structure of the other. But it is an abuse of speech, to call a jargon of words, wherein we have nothing but a resemblance in sound, without sense, the eloquence of the Holy Spirit, or the idiom of the Scriptures.

It is sometimes made the pretence for retaining the original word, that it has different significations, and, therefore, an interpreter, by preferring one of these, is in danger of hurting the sense. Thus, the Rhemish translators, who render *αλλον παρακλητον δωσει ὑμιν*[64], *He will give you another paraclete*, subjoin this note: "*Paraclete*, by interpretation, is

[64] John, xiv. 16.

" either a comforter, or an advocate; and, therefore, " to translate it by any one of them only, is, perhaps, " to abridge the sense of this place :" to which Fulke, who publishes their New Testament along with the then common version, answers very pertinently, in the note immediately following : " If you will not " translate any words that have diverse significations, " you must leave five hundred more untranslated " than you have done." But there is not even this poor pretence for all the consecrated barbarisms. The verb *ευαγγελιζομαι* never occurs in the Gospels in any sense but one, a sense easily expressed in the language of every people.

§ 27. It may be replied, 'If you will not admit with Beza, that this mode of writing is the eloquence of the Spirit, or with Bois, that it is the idiom of Scripture, you must at least allow, with Melancthon, that it is the language and style of the church: *Nos loquamur cum ecclesia. Ne pudeat nos materni sermonis. Ecclesia est mater nostra. Sic autem loquitur ecclesia.*' This comes indeed nearer the point in hand. The language of the Latin church is, in many things, founded in the style introduced by the ancient interpreters. But it ought to be remembered, that even the Latin church herself does not present those interpreters to us as infallible, or affirm that their language is irreprehensible. And if she herself has been any how induced to adopt a style that is not well calculated for conveying the mind of the Lord; nay, which in many

things darkens, and in some misrepresents it, shall we make less account of communicating clearly the truths revealed by the Spirit, than of perpetuating a phraseology which contributes to the advancement of ignorance, and of an implicit deference, in spiritual matters, to human authority? On the contrary, if the church has, in process of time, contracted somewhat of a Babylonish dialect, and thereby lost a great deal of her primitive simplicity, purity, and plainness of manner; her language cannot be too soon cleared of the unnatural mixture, and we cannot too soon restore her native idiom. To act thus is so far from being imputable to the love of novelty, that it results from that veneration of antiquity which leads men to ask for the old paths, and makes the votaries of the true religion desirous to return to the undisguised sentiments, manner, and style of holy writ, which are evidently more ancient than the oldest of those canonized corruptions. This is not to relinquish, it is to return to the true idiom of Scripture: with as little propriety is such a truly primitive manner charged with the want of simplicity. A technical or learned style is of all styles the least entitled to be called *simple*: for it is the least fitted for conveying instruction to the simple, to *babes* in knowledge, the character by which those to whom the Gospel was first published, were particularly distinguished [65]. Whereas the tendency of a scholastic phraseology, is, on the contrary, to hide divine

[65] Matth. xi. 25. Luke, x. 21.

things from babes and simple persons, and to reveal them only to sages and scholars. Never, therefore, was controvertist more unlucky in his choice of arguments than our opponents, on this article, are, in urging the plea of simplicity, and that of Scripture idiom, topics manifestly subversive of their cause.

§ 28. THE impropriety of changing, on any pretext, the consecrated terms, and the impropriety of giving to the people, within the pale of the Roman church, any translation of Scripture into their mother-tongue, unless from the Vulgate, are topics to which Father Simon frequently recurs. And, it must be acknowledged that, on his hypothesis, which puts the authority of tradition on the same foot with that of Scripture, and makes the church the depositary and interpreter of both, there appears a suitableness in his doctrine. He admits, however, that the translation she has adopted, is not entirely exempted from errors, though free from such as affect the articles of faith, or rules of practice. This propriety of translating only from the Vulgate, he maintains from this single consideration, its being that which is read for Scripture daily in their churches.

NOW this argument is of no weight with Protestants, and appears not to be entitled to much weight even with Roman Catholics. If there be no impropriety in their being supplied with an exact version of what is read in their churches; neither is there any impropriety in their being supplied with an exact version of what was written by the inspired penmen,

for the instruction of the first Christians. This appears as reasonable, and as laudable, an object of curiosity, even to Romanists, as the other. Nay, I should think this, even on Simon's own principles, defensible. The sacred penmen were infallible, so was not the ancient interpreter. He will reply, 'But 'ye have not the very hand-writings of the Apostles 'and Evangelists. There are different readings in 'different Greek copies. Ye are not, therefore, 'absolutely certain of the conformity of your Greek 'in every thing, any more than we are of our Latin, 'to those original writings.' This we admit, but still insist that there is a difference. The Latin has been equally exposed with the Greek to the blunders of transcribers. And as, in some things, different Greek copies read differently, we receive that version, with other ancient translations, to assist us, in doubtful cases, to discover the true reading. But the Vulgate, with every other version, labours under this additional disadvantage that, along with the errors arising from the blunders of copiers, it has those also arising from the mistakes of the interpreter.

§ 29. But, in fact, the secret reason both for preserving the consecrated terms, and for translating only from the Vulgate, is no other than to avoid, as much as possible, whatever might suggest to the people, that the Spirit says one thing and the Church another. It is not according to the true principles of ecclesiastical policy, that such differences should

be exposed to the vulgar. This the true sons of the church have discovered long ago. "Gardiner," says bishop Burnet[66], "had a singular conceit. "He fancied there were many words in the New "Testament of such majesty that they were not to "be translated, but must stand in the English Bi- "ble as they were in the Latin. A hundred of these "he put into a writing, which was read in convoca- "tion. His design in this was visible, that if a tran- "slation must be made, it should be so daubed all "through with Latin words, that the people should "not understand it much the better for its being in "English. A taste of this the reader may have by "the first twenty of them; *ecclesia*, *pœnitentia*, *pon- "tifex*, *ancilla*, *contritus*, *olocausta*, *justitia*, *jus- "tificatio*, *idiota*, *elementa*, *baptizare*, *martyr*, "*adorare*, *sandalium*, *simplex*, *tetrarcha*, *sacra- "mentum*, *simulacrum*, *gloria*. The design he had "of keeping some of these, particularly the last save "one, is plain enough, that the people might not "discover that visible opposition which was between "the Scriptures and the Roman church, in the "matter of images. This could not be better palli- "ated, than by disguising these places with words "that the people understood not." Thus far the bishop.

§ 30. It would not be easy to conjecture why Gardiner, that zealous opposer of the reformation,

[66] History of the Reformation in England, book iii. year 1542.

selected some of the words above mentioned as proper to be retained, unless by their number and frequent recurrence, to give an uncouth and exotic appearance to the whole translation. In regard to others of them, as the bishop justly remarks, the reason is obvious. And it is to be regretted that that historian has not inserted in his valuable work the whole catalogue. Nothing could serve better to expose the latent but genuine purpose of the consecrated terms. Not that any judicious person can be at a loss to discover it; but the more numerous the examples are, the evidence is the stronger. The meaning of common words is learnt solely from common usage, but the import of canonized words can be got only from canonical usage. We all know what an *image* is, it being a word in familiar use; we therefore find no difficulty in discovering what we are forbidden to worship, by the command which forbids the worship of images. Whereas, had the word *simulacrum*, quite unused before, been substituted for image, it would have, doubtless, acquired a currency on theological subjects; but, being confined to these, would have been no better than a technical term in theology, for the meaning of which, recourse must be had to men of the profession. Nor would it have required of the casuist any metaphysical acuteness in distinguishing, to satisfy those whom he taught to worship *images*, that they were in no danger of adoring a *simulacrum*.

§ 31. To prevent mistakes, it may not be improper to observe, that the word *simulacrum* in the

Vulgate itself is no more a term of art than *similitudo* or *imago* are; for they are all words in familiar use in Latin; but *simulacrum* is not in familiar use in English, though *similitude* and *image* are, which are both formed from Latin words of the same signification. It is not, therefore, their affinity, or even identity in respect of sound, but their difference in respect of use, which stamps nearly related words, or what we call convertible terms, with these different characters, in different languages. Thus ευαγγελιζω and σκανδαλιζω are common, not technical, terms, in the Greek New Testament: but *evangelizo* and *scandalizo* in the Vulgate are the reverse, technical, not common. Now it is for this reason, I say, that to adopt, without necessity, such terms in a language to which they do not belong, and in which consequently they are unknown, or known merely as professional terms, is to form a style the very reverse of what I should call the eloquence of the Holy Spirit, and the proper idiom of the Scriptures. For a greater contrast to the plain and familiar idiom of Scripture, and the eloquence of the Spirit, addressed entirely to the people, than a style that is justly denominated dark, learned, and technical, it is impossible to conceive.

Let it be observed, therefore, that it is the use, not the etymology, to which, in translating, we ought to have respect, either in adopting, or in rejecting, an expression. A word is neither the better, nor the worse, for its being of Greek, or Latin origin. But our first care ought to be, that it con-

vey the same meaning with the original term; the second, that it convey it as nearly as possible in the same manner, that is, with the same plainness, simplicity, and perspicuity. If this can be done, with equal advantage, by terms which have obtained the sanction of ecclesiastic use, such terms ought to be preferred. For this reason I prefer *just* to virtuous, *redeemer* to ransomer, *saviour* to deliverer. But if the same meaning be not conveyed by them, or not conveyed in the same manner, they ought to be rejected. Otherwise, the real dictates of the Spirit, and the unadulterated idiom of Scripture, are sacrificed to the shadowy resemblance, in sound, and etymology, of technical words, and scholastic phrases.

§ 32. Such, upon the whole, are my sentiments of the regard which, in translating holy writ into modern languages, is due to the practice of former translators, especially of the authors of the Latin Vulgate. And such, in particular, is my notion of those words which, by some critics, are called *consecrated*, and, which, in general, in respect of the sense, will not be found the most eligible; nay, by the use of which, there is greater hazard of deserting that plainness, and that simplicity, which are the best characteristics of the Scripture style, than by any other means I know.

PART II.

THE REGARD DUE TO THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

HAVING been so particular in the discussion of the first part of this inquiry, namely, the regard which, in translating the Scriptures, is due to the manner wherein the words and phrases have been rendered by the authors of the Vulgate, it will not be necessary to enter so minutely into the second part, concerning the regard which an English translator owes to the expressions adopted in the common translation. The reasons for adopting, or for rejecting, many of them are so nearly the same in both cases, that, to avoid prolixity by unnecessary repetitions, I shall confine myself to a few observations, to which the special circumstances affecting the common English version, naturally give rise.

§ 2. THAT translation, we all know, was made at a time when the study of the original languages, which had been long neglected, was just revived in Europe. To this the invention of printing first, and the reformation soon afterwards, had greatly contributed. As it grew to be a received doctrine among Protestants, that the word of God, contained in the Scriptures, is the sole infallible rule which he has

given us of faith and manners; the ineffable importance of the study of Scripture was perceived more and more, every day. New translations were made, first into Latin, the common language of the learned, and afterwards into most European tongues. The study of languages naturally introduces the study of criticism, I mean that branch of criticism which has language for its object; and which is, in effect, no other than the utmost improvement of the grammatical art. But this, it must be acknowledged, was not then arrived at that perfection which, in consequence of the labours of many learned and ingenious men, of different parties and professions, it has reached since. What greatly retarded the progress of this study, in the first age of the reformation, was the incessant disputes about article of doctrine, ecclesiastical polity, and ceremonies, in which the reformers were engaged, both with the Romanists, and among themselves. This led them insensibly to recur to the weapons which had been employed against them, and of which they had at first spoken very contemptuously, the metaphysical and unintelligible subtleties of school-divinity.

This recourse was productive of two bad consequences. First, it diverted them from the critical study of the sacred languages, the surest human means for discovering the mind of the Spirit: secondly, it infused into the heads of the disputants, prepossessions in favour of such particular words and phrases as are adapted to the dialect and system of the parties to which they severally attached them-

selves; and in prejudice of those words and phrases which seem more suitable to the style and sentiments of their adversaries. There is, perhaps, but too good reason for adding an evil consequence produced also upon the heart, in kindling wrath, and quenching charity. It was when matters were in this situation, that several of the first translations were made. Men's minds were then too much heated with their polemic exercises, to be capable of that impartial, candid, and dispassionate examination, which is so necessary in those who would approve themselves faithful interpreters of the oracles of God. Of an undue bias on the judgment in translating, in consequence of such perpetual wranglings, I have given some specimens in the former Dissertation [67].

§ 3. In regard to the common translation, though not entirely exempted from the influence of party and example, as I formerly had occasion to show [68], it is, upon the whole, one of the best of those composed so soon after the Reformation. I may say justly that, if it had not been for an immoderate attachment, in its authors, to the Genevese translators, Junius, Tremellius, and Beza, it had been still better than it is; for the greatest faults with which it is chargeable, are derived from this source. But since that time, it must be owned, things are greatly altered in the church. The rage of disputation on

[67] Part V. § 4, &c

[68] Diss. X. p. V. § 4, &c.

points rather curious than edifying, or, as the Apostle calls it [69], the dotage about questions and strifes of words, has, at least, among men of talents and erudition, in a great measure, subsided. The reign of scholastic sophistry and altercation is pretty well over. Now, when to this reflection we add a proper attention to the great acquisitions in literature which have of late been made, in respect, not only, of languages, but also, of antiquities and criticism, it cannot be thought derogatory from the merit and abilities of those worthy men who formerly bestowed their time and labour on that important work, to suppose that many mistakes, which were then inevitable, we are now in a condition to correct.

To effect this, is the first, and ought, doubtless, to be the principal, motive for attempting another version. Whatever is discovered to be the sense of the Spirit, speaking in the Scriptures, ought to be regarded by us, as of the greatest consequence: nor will any judicious person, who has not been accustomed to consider religion in a political light, as a mere engine of state, deny that where the truth appears, in any instance, to have been either misrepresented, or but obscurely represented, in a former version, the fault ought, in an attempt like the present, as far as possible, to be corrected. To say the contrary, is to make the honourable distinction of being instruments in promoting the knowledge of God, of less moment, than paying a vain compliment to

[69] 1 Tim. vi. 4.

former translators, or, perhaps, showing an immoderate deference to popular humour, which is always attached to customary phrases, whether they convey the true meaning, or a false meaning, or any meaning at all. This, therefore, is unquestionably a good ground for varying from those who preceded us.

§ 4. IT deserves further to be remarked that, from the changes incident to all languages, it sometimes happens that words, which expressed the true sense at the time when a translation was made, come afterwards to express a different sense; in consequence whereof, though those terms were once a proper version of the words in the original, they are not so after such an alteration, having acquired a meaning different from that which they had formerly. In this case, it cannot be doubted that, in a new translation, such terms ought to be changed. I hinted before [70], that I look upon this as having been the case with some of the expressions employed in the Vulgate. They conveyed the meaning at the time that version was made, but do not so now. I shall instance only in two. The phrase *pœnitentiam agite* was, in Jerom's time, nearly equivalent in signification to the Greek *μετανοειτε*. It is not so at present. In consequence of the usages which have crept in, and obtained an establishment in the churches subject to Rome, it no longer conveys the same

[70] Part. III. § 9.

idea; for having become merely an ecclesiastic term, its acceptation is regulated only by ecclesiastic use. Now, in that use, it exactly corresponds to the English words *do penance;* by which, indeed, the Rhemish translators, who translate from the Vulgate, have rendered it in their New Testament. Now, as no person of common sense, who understands the language, will pretend, that to enjoin us to *do penance*, and to enjoin us to *reform*, or *repent*, is to enjoin the same thing; both Erasmus and Beza were excusable, notwithstanding the censure pronounced by Bois and Simon, in deserting the Vulgate in this place, and employing the unambiguous term *resipiscite*, in preference to a phrase, now at least become so equivocal as *pœnitentiam agite*. We may warrantably say more, and affirm, that they would not have acted the part of faithful translators, if they had done otherwise.

It was, to appearance, the uniform object of the priest of the Oratory (I know not what may have biassed the canon of Ely) to put honour upon the church, by which he meant the church of Rome; to respect, above all things, and at all hazards, her dogmas, her usages, her ceremonies, her very words and phrases. The object of Christian interpreters is, above all things, and at all hazards, to convey, as perspicuously as they can, the truths of the Spirit. If the former ought to be the principal object of the translators of holy writ, Simon was undoubtedly in the right; if the latter, he was undoubtedly in the wrong. The other expression in the Vulgate,

which may not improbably have been proper at the time when that translation was made, though not at present, is *sacramentum* for *μυστηριον*, in the second scriptural sense which I observed to be sometimes given to the Greek word[71]. But, in consequence of the alterations which have since taken place in ecclesiastical use, the Latin term has acquired a meaning totally different, and is therefore now no suitable expression of the sense.

§ 5. Now, what has been observed of the Latin words above mentioned, has already happened to several words employed in the common English translation. Though this may appear, at first, extraordinary, as it is not yet two centuries since that version was made; it is, nevertheless, unquestionable. The number of changes whereby a living language is affected in particular periods, is not always in proportion to the extent of time. It depends on the stage of advancement, in which the language happens to be, during the period, more than on the length of the period. The English tongue, and the French too, if I mistake not, have undergone a much greater change than the Italian, in the last three hundred years; and perhaps as great as the Greek underwent, from the time of Homer to that of Plutarch, which was more than four times as long. It is not merely the number of writings in any language, but it is rather their merit and eminence, which confers stability on its words, phrases and idioms.

[71] Diss. IX. Part I. § 7.

Certain it is that there is a considerable change in our own since the time mentioned; a change in respect of the construction as well as of the significations of the words. In some cases, we combine the words differently from the way in which they were combined at the time above referred to: we have acquired many words which were not used then, and many then in use are now either obsolete, or used in a different sense. These changes I shall here briefly exemplify. As habit is apt to mislead us, and we are little disposed to suspect that the meaning of a word or phrase, to which we are familiarised, was not always the meaning; to give some examples of such alteration, may prevent us from rashly accusing former translators, for improprieties wherewith they are not chargeable; and to specify alterations on our own language, may serve to remove the doubts of those who imagine there is an improbability in what I have formerly maintained, concerning the variations which several words, in ancient languages, have undergone in different periods. Now, this is a point of so great moment to the literary critic and antiquary, that it is impossible thoroughly to understand, or accurately to interpret, ancient authors, without paying due regard to it. Through want of this regard, many things in ecclesiastic history have been much misunderstood, and grossly misrepresented. Unluckily, on this subject, powerful secular motives interfering, have seduced men to contribute to the general deception, and to explain ancient names by usages and opinions comparatively

modern. But this by the way; I proceed to the examples.

§ 6. I INTEND to consider, first, the instances affected by the last of the circumstances above mentioned, namely, those wherein the signification is changed, though the term itself remains. Of such I shall now produce some examples; first, in nouns. The word *conversation*, which means no more at present, than *familiar discourse* of two or more persons, did, at the time when the Bible was translated, denote *behaviour* in the largest acceptation. The Latin word *conversatio*, which is that generally used in the Vulgate, answering to the Greek *αναστροφη*, has commonly this meaning. But the English word has never, as far as I have observed, this acceptation, in the present use, except in the law phrase, *criminal conversation*. And I have reason to believe that, in the New Testament, it is universally mistaken by the unlearned, as signifying no more than familiar talk or discourse. Hence it has also happened, that hypocrites and fanatics have thought themselves authorised, by the words of Scripture, in placing almost the whole of practical religion in this alone. Yet, I do not remember that the word occurs, so much as once, in Scripture, in this sense. What we call *conversation* must, indeed, be considered as included, because it is a very important part of behaviour; but it is not to be understood as particularly specified. In one passage, it is expressly distinguished from familiar discourse or conversation, in

the modern import of the word. *Τυπος γινυ των πιςων εν λογω, εν αναςροφη*, rendered in the common version, "Be an example of the believers *in word, in conversation*[72]." That these words *λογω* and *αναςροφη*, are not synonymous, the repeating of the preposition sufficiently shows. Though, therefore, not improperly rendered at that time, when the English term was used in a greater latitude of signification, they ought, manifestly, to be rendered now, *in conversation, in behaviour*; the first answering to *λογος*, the second to *αναςροφη*.

Another instance of such a variation we have in the word *thief*, which, in the language of Scripture, is confounded with *robber*, and probably was so also, in common language at that time, but is now invariably distinguished. They are always carefully distinguished in the original, the former being *κλεπτης*, the latter *ληςης*. The two criminals who were crucified with our Lord, are always called, by the two Evangelists, who specify their crime, *ληςαι*[73], never *κλεπται*. Yet our translators have always rendered it *thieves*, never *robbers*. This is the more remarkable, as what we now call *theft*, was not a capital crime among the Jews. Yet the penitent malefactor confessed upon the cross, that he and his companion suffered *justly*, receiving *the due reward of their deeds*[74]. He probably would not have expressed himself in this manner, if their condemna-

[72] 1 Tim. iv. 12. [73] Matth. xxvii. 38. 44. Mark, xv. 27.

[74] Luke, xxiii. 41.

tion had not been warranted by the law of Moses. And though, doubtless, the English word, at that time, was used with greater latitude than it is at present; yet, as they had rendered the same original term λῃστης, when applied to Barabbas, *robber*[75], they ought to have given the same interpretation of the word, as applied to the two malefactors, who, on the same occasion, were accused of the same crime. In like manner, in the parable of the compassionate Samaritan, the words rendered, *fell among thieves*[76], are, λῃσαις περιεπεσεν. Hardly would any person now confound the character there represented, with that of thieves.

Again, the expression, *the uppermost rooms*[77], does not suggest to men of this age, the idea of the chief places at table, but that of the apartments of the highest story. *The good man of the house*[78], though sufficiently intelligible, is become too homely (not to say ludicrous) a phrase for the master of the family. The word *lust*[79] is used, in the common translation, in an extent which it has not now; so also is *usury*[80]. *Worship*[81], for honour, or civil respect paid to men, does not suit the present idiom. The words *lewd* and *lewdness*[82], in the New Tes-

[75] John, xviii. 40. [76] Luke, x. 30.

[77] Matth. xxiii. 6. [78] Matth. xx. 11. [79] Rom. vii. 7.

[80] Matth. xxv. 27. Luke, xix. 23. [81] Luke, xiv. 10.

[82] See an excellent illustration of the remark, in regard to these two words, in the Disquisitions concerning the Antiquities of the Christian Church, p. 4. note.

tament, convey a meaning totally different from that in which they are now constantly used. The word *pitiful*, with us, never means, as it does in Scripture [83], in conformity to etymology, compassionate, merciful; but paltry, contemptible. In the following words, also, there is a deviation, though not so considerable, from the ancient import. *Meat* [84] and food are not now synonymous terms, neither are *cunning* [85] and skilful, *honest* [86] and decent, or becoming, *more* [87] and greater, *quick* [88] and living, *faithless* [89] and incredulous, *coasts* [90] and territories, or borders not confining with the sea.

The like variations have happened in verbs. *To prevent* [91] is hardly ever now used, in prose, for to go before; *to faint* [92], for to grow faint, to fail in strength; *to ensue* [93], for to pursue; *to provoke* [94], for to excite to what is proper and commendable; *to entreat* [95], for to treat; and *to learn*, for to teach [96]. Even adverbs and particles have shared the general fate. *Yea* and *nay* [97], though still words in the language, are not the expressions of affirmation and negation as formerly; *instantly* [98] we never use for earnestly, nor *hitherto* [99] for thus far. Yet this was,

[83] James, v. 11.
[84] Matth. iii. 4.
[85] Exod. xxxviii. 23.
[86] 2 Cor. viii. 21.
[87] Acts, xix. 32.
[88] Acts, x. 42.
[89] John, xx. 27.
[90] Matth. ii. 16.
[91] 1 Thess. iv. 15.
[92] Matth. xv. 32. Luke, xviii. 1.
[93] 1 Pet. iii. 11.
[94] Heb. x. 24.
[95] Luke, xx. 11.
[96] Psalm xxv. 4. Common Prayer.
[97] Matth. v. 37.
[98] Luke, vii. 4.
[99] Job, xxxviii. 11.

no doubt, its original meaning, and is more conformable to etymology than the present meaning; *hither* being an adverb of place and not of time. More instances might be given, if necessary.

Now, to employ words which, though still remaining in the language, have not the sanction of present use for the sense assigned to them, cannot fail to render the passages where they occur, almost always obscure, and sometimes ambiguous. But, as every thing which may either mislead the reader, or darken the meaning, ought carefully to be avoided by the interpreter, no example, however respectable, will, in such things, authorize our imitation. An alteration here implies nothing to the disadvantage of preceding translators, unless it can be supposed to detract from them, that they did not foresee the changes which, in after-times, would come upon the language. They employed the words according to the usage which prevailed in their time. The same reason, which made them adopt those words then, to wit, regard to perspicuity by conforming to present use, would, if they were now alive, and revising their own work, induce them to substitute others in their place.

§ 7. ANOTHER case in which a translator ought not implicitly to follow his predecessors, is in the use of words now become obsolete. There is little or no scope for this rule, when the subject is a version into a dead language like the Latin, which, except in the instances of some ecclesiastic terms, such

as those above taken notice of, is not liable to be affected by the changes to which a living tongue is continually exposed. The very notion of a dead language refers us to a period which is past, whose usages are now over, and may therefore be considered as unchangeable. But, in living languages, wherein use gradually varies, the greatest attention ought to be given to what obtains at present, on which both propriety and perspicuity must depend. Now, with respect to our common version, some words are disused only in a particular signification, others are become obsolete in every meaning. The former ought to be avoided, in such acceptations only as are not now favoured by use. The reason is obvious; because it is only in such cases that they suggest a false meaning. The latter ought to be avoided in every case wherein they do not clearly suggest the meaning. I admit that there are certain cases in which even an obsolete word may clearly suggest the meaning. For, first, the sense of an unusual or unknown word may be so ascertained by the words in connection, as to leave no doubt concerning its meaning; secondly, the frequent occurrence of some words in the common translation, and in the English liturgy, must hinder us from considering them, though not in common use, as unintelligible to persons acquainted with those books. The danger, therefore, from using words now obsolete, but frequently occurring in the English translation, is not near so great, as the danger arising from employing words not obsolete, in an obsolete mean-

ing, or a meaning which they formerly had, but have not at present. For these rarely fail to mislead.

Further, a distinction ought to be made in obsolete words, between those which, in Scripture, occur frequently, and whose meaning is generally known, and those which occur but rarely, and may, therefore, be more readily misunderstood. The use of old words, when generally understood, has, in such a book as the Bible, some advantages over newer terms, however apposite. A version of holy writ ought, no doubt, above all things, to be simple and perspicuous; but still it ought to appear, as it really is, the exhibition of a work of a remote age and distant country. When, therefore, the terms of a former version are, by reason of their frequent occurrence there, universally understood, though no longer current with us, either in conversation or in writing, I should account them preferable to familiar terms. Their antiquity renders them venerable. It adds even an air of credibility to the narrative, when we consider it as relating to the actions, customs, and opinions of a people very ancient, and, in all the respects now mentioned, very different from us. There may, therefore, be an excess in the familiarity of the style, though, whilst we are just to the original, there can be no excess in simplicity and perspicuity. It is for this reason, that I have retained sometimes, as emphatical, the interjections *lo!* and *behold!* which, though antiquated, are well understood; also that the obsolete word *host* is, in perference to *army*, employed in such

phrases as *the host of heaven*, *the Lord of hosts*; and that the terms *tribulation*, *damsel*, *publican*, and a few others, are considered as of more dignity than *trouble*, *girl*, *toll-gatherer*; and therefore worthy to be retained. For the like reason, the term of salutation *hail*, though now totally disused, except in poetry, has generally, in the sacred writings, a much better effect than any modern form which we could put in its place. To these we may add words which (though not properly obsolete) are hardly ever used, except when the subject, in some way or other, concerns religion. Of this kind are the words *sin*, *godly*, *righteous*, and some others, with their derivatives. Such terms, as they are neither obscure nor ambiguous, are entitled to be preferred to more familiar words. And if the plea for consecrated words extended no further, I should cheerfully subscribe to it. I cannot agree with Dr. Heylin, who declares explicitly[100] against the last mentioned term, though, by his own explanation, it, in many cases, conveys more exactly the sense of the original, than the word *just* which he prefers to it. The practice of translators into other languages, where they are confined by the genius of their language, is of no weight with us. The French have two words, *pouvoir* and *puissance*; the English word *power* answers to both. But, because we must make one term serve for both theirs, will they, in complaisance to us, think they are obliged to confine themselves to one? And, as

[100] Theol. Lect. vol. i. p. 7.

to those over-delicate ears, to which, he says, cant and fanaticism have tarnished and debased the words *righteous* and *righteousness;* were this consideration to influence us, in the choice of words, we should soon find that this would not be the only sacrifice it would be necessary to make. It is but too much the character of the age to nauseate whatever, in the intercourse of society, has any thing of a religious or moral appearance, a disposition which will never be satisfied, till every thing serious and devout be banished, not from the precincts of conversation only, but from the language.

But to return: when words totally unsupported by present use, occur in Scripture but rarely, they are accompanied with a degree of obscurity which renders them unfit for a book intended for the instruction of all men, the meanest not excepted. Of this class are the words *leasing*, for lies; *ravin*, for prey; *bruit*, for rumour; *marvel* for wonder; *worth* for be; *wot*, and *wist*, for know and knew; *to bewray*, for to expose; *to eschew*, for to avoid; *to skill*, for to be knowing in, or dexterous at; *to wax*, for to become; *to lease*, for to lose; and *to lack*, for to need or be wanting. Terms such as some of these, like old vessels, are, I may say, so buried in rust, as to render it difficult to discover their use. When words become not entirely obsolete, but fall into low or ludicrous use, it is then also proper to lay them aside. Thus *folk*, for people; *trow*, for think; *seethe*, for boil; *sod* and *sodden*, for boiled; *score*, for twenty; *twain*, for two;

clean and *sore*, when used adverbially, for entirely and very much; *all to*, *albeit*, and *howbeit*, may easily be given up. To these we may add the words that differ so little from those which have still a currency, that it would appear like affectation to prefer them to terms equally proper and more obvious. Of this kind are *mo*, for more; *strait* and *straitly*, for strict and strictly; *aliant*, for alien; *dureth*, for endureth; *camp*, for encamp; *minish*, for diminish; *an hungred*, for hungry; *garner*, for granary; *trump*, for trumpet; *sith*, for since; *fet*, for fetched; *ensample*, for example; *mids*, for midst. I shall only add, that when old words are of low origin, harsh sound, or difficult pronunciation; or when they appear too much like learned words; familiar terms, if equally apposite, are more eligible. For this reason, the nouns *backslidings*, *shamefacedness*, *jeopardy*, and *concupiscence*, may well be dispensed with.

Upon the whole, there is still some danger in retaining words which are become obsolete, though they continue to be intelligible. Words hardly sooner contract the appearance of antiquity, by being abandoned by good use, than they are picked up as lawful prize by writers in burlesque, who, by means of them, often add much poignancy to their writings. This prostitution, when frequent, produces an association in the minds of readers, the reverse of that which originally accompanied them. Hence it is that, though nothing is better suited to the seriousness and importance of the subject of holy writ, than

solemnity of style; nothing is, at the same time, more hazardous, as no species of diction borders on the ludicrous oftener, than the solemn. Let it suffice, therefore, if, without venturing far from the style of conversation, in quest of a more dignified elocution, we can unite gravity with simplicity and purity, which commonly secure perspicuity. With these qualities there can be no material defect in the expression. The sprightly, the animated, the nervous, would not, in such a work, be beauties, but blemishes. They would look too much like meretricious ornaments, when compared with the artless, the free, yet unassuming, manner of the sacred writers.

§ 8. BUT, if it be of consequence to avoid antiquated words, it is not less so to avoid antiquated phrases, and an antiquated construction. No writing in our language, as far as I know, is less chargeable with idiomatical phrases, vulgarisms, or any peculiarities of expression, than the common translation of the Bible; and to this it is, in a great measure, imputable, that the diction remains still so perspicuous, and that it is universally accounted superior to that of any other English book of the same period. But, though remarkably pure, in respect of style, we cannot suppose that no idiomatical phrases should have escaped the translators, especially when we consider the frequency of such phrases in the writings of their contemporaries. Yet, in all the four Gospels, I recollect only two or three which come under that denomination. These are, *The*

goodman of the house, *They laughed him to scorn*, and *They cast the same in his teeth*; expressions for which the interpreters had not the apology that may be pleaded in defence of some idioms in the Old Testament history, that they are literal translations from the original [101]. That the English construction has undergone several alterations since the establishment of the Protestant religion in England, it would be easy to evince. Some verbs often then used impersonally, and some reciprocally, are hardly ever so used at present. *It pitieth them* [102], would never be said now. *It repented him* [103], may possibly be found in modern language, but never *he repented himself* [104]. There is a difference also in the use of the prepositions. *In* [105] was then sometimes used for *upon*, and *unto* instead of *for* [106]. *Of* was frequently used before the cause or the instrument, where we now invariably use *by* [107]; *of* was also employed, in certain cases, where present use requires *off* or *from* [108]. Like differences might be observed in the pronouns. One thing is certain, that the old usages in construction, oftner occasioned ambiguity than the present, which is an additional reason for preferring the latter.

[101] Matth. xx. 11. οικοδεσποτῃ. ix. 24. κατεγελων αυτου. xxvii. 44. Το αυτο ονειδιζον αυτω.

[102] Psal. cii. 14. Common Prayer.

[103] Genesis, vi. 6.

[104] Matth. xxvii. 3.

[105] Matth. vi. 10.

[106] John, xv. 7.

[107] Matth. i. 18.

[108] Matth. vii. 16.

§ 9. FINALLY, in regard to what may be called *technical*, or, in Simon's phrase, *consecrated* terms, our translators, though not entirely free from such, have been comparatively sparing of them. In this they have acted judiciously. A technical style is a learned style. That of the Scriptures, especially of the historical part, is the reverse; it is plain and familiar. If we except a few terms, such as *angel*, *apostle*, *baptism*, *heresy*, *mystery*, which, after the example of other Western churches, the English have adopted from the Vulgate; and for adopting some of which, as has been observed, good reasons might be offered; the instances are but few wherein the common name has been rejected, in preference to a learned and peculiar term.

Nay, some learned terms, which have been admitted into the liturgy, at least into the rubric, the interpreters have not thought proper to introduce into the Scriptures. Thus, the words, *the nativity*, for Christ's birth, *advent*, for his coming, *epiphany*, for his manifestation to the Magians by the star, do very well in the titles of the several divisions in the Book of Common Prayer, being there a sort of proper names for denoting the whole circumstantiated event, or rather the times destined for the celebration of the festivals, and are convenient, as they save circumlocution; but would by no means suit the simple and familiar phraseology of the sacred historians, who never affect uncommon, and especially learned words. Thus, in the titles of the books of Moses, the Greek names of the Septuagint, *Genesis*,

Exodus, *Leviticus*, *Deuteronomy*, are not unfitly preserved in modern translations, and are become the proper names of the books. But where the Greek word *genesis*, which signifies generation, occurs in that ancient version of the book so named, it would have been very improper to transfer it into a modern translation, and to say, for example, "This is the "*genesis* of the heavens and the earth [109]." In like manner, *Exodus*, which signifies departure, answers very well as a proper name of the second book, which begins with an account of the departure of the Israelites out of Egypt; but it would be downright pedantry to introduce the term *exodus*, *exody*, or *exod* (for in all these shapes some have affected to usher it into the language), into the body of the history.

I remember but one passage in the New Testament, in which our translators have preferred a scholastic to the vulgar name, where both signified the same thing; so that there was no plea from necessity. The expression alluded to is, "To whom he "showed himself alive after his *passion* [110]." Passion, in ordinary speech, means solely a fit of anger, or any violent commotion of the mind. It is only in theological or learned use that it means the sufferings of Christ. The Evangelist wrote to the people in their own dialect. Besides, as he wrote for the conviction of infidels, as well as for the instruction of believers, it is not natural to suppose

[109] Gen. ii. 4. [110] Acts, i. 3.

that he would use words or phrases, in a particular acceptation, which could be known only to the latter. His expression, *μετα το παθειν αυτον*, which is literally, *after his sufferings*, is plain and unambiguous, and might have been said of any man who had undergone the like fate. Such is constantly the way of the sacred writers; nor is any thing, in language, more repugnant to their manner, than the use of what is called consecrated words. I admit, at the same time, that *post passionem suam*, in the Vulgate, is unexceptionable, because it suits the common acceptation of the word *passio* in the Latin language. Just so, the expression *accipiens calicem*, in the Vulgate [111], is natural and proper. *Calix* is a common name for cup, and is so used in several places of that version: whereas, *taking the chalice*, as the Rhemish translators render it, presents us with a technical term not strictly proper, inasmuch as it suggests the previous consecration of the vessel to a special purpose, by certain ceremonies, an idea not suggested by either the Greek *ποτηριον*, or the Latin *calix*. I do not mean, however, to controvert the propriety of adopting an unfamiliar word, when necessary for expressing what is of an unfamiliar, or, perhaps, singular nature. Thus, to denote the change produced on our Saviour's body, when on the mount with the three disciples, Peter, and the two sons of Zebedee, a more apposite word than *transfigured* could not have been found. The Eng-

[111] Matth. xxvi. 27.

lish word *transformed*, which comes nearest, and is more familiar than the other, would have expressed too much.

§ 10. To conclude, the reasons which appear sufficient to justify a change of the words and expressions of even the most respectable predecessors in the business of translating, are, when there is ground to think, that the meaning of the author can be either more exactly, or more perspicuously, rendered; and when his manner, that is, when the essential qualities of his style, not the sound or the etymology of his words, can be more adequately represented. For, to one or other of these, all the above cases will be found reducible.

DISSERTATION THE TWELFTH.

AN ACCOUNT OF WHAT IS ATTEMPTED IN THE TRANSLATION OF THE GOSPELS, AND IN THE NOTES HERE OFFERED TO THE PUBLIC.

THE things which will be treated in this Dissertation may, for the sake of order, be classed under the five following heads; the first comprehends all that concerns the essential qualities of the version; the second, what relates to the readings (where there is a diversity of reading in the original) which are here preferred; the third contains a few remarks on the particular dialect of our language employed in this version; the fourth, what regards the outward form in which it is exhibited; and the fifth, some account of the notes with which it is accompanied.

PART I.

THE ESSENTIAL QUALITIES OF THE VERSION.

THE three principal objects to be attended to, by every translator, were explained in a former Dissertation [1]. It is, perhaps, unnecessary to say, that to

[1] Diss. X. Part I.

them I have endeavoured to give a constant attention. It is not, however, to be dissembled, that even those principal objects themselves sometimes interfere. And, though an order, in respect of importance, when they are compared together, has been also laid down, which will, in many cases, determine the preference; it will not always determine it. I may find a word, for example, which hits the sense of the author precisely, but which, not being in familiar use, is obscure. Though, therefore, in itself, a just expression of the sentiment, it may not clearly convey the sentiment to many readers, because they are unacquainted with it. It is, therefore, but ill fitted to represent the plain and familiar manner of the sacred writers, or, indeed, to answer the great end of translation, to convey distinctly, to the reader, the meaning of the original. Yet there may be a hazard, on the other hand, that a term more perspicuous, but less apposite, may convey somewhat of a different meaning, an error more to be avoided than the other. Recourse to circumlocution is sometimes necessary; for the terms of no two languages can be always made to correspond; but frequent recourse to this mode of rendering, effaces the native simplicity found in the original, and, in some measure, disfigures the work. Though, therefore, in general, an obscure, is preferable to an unfaithful, translation, there is a degree of precision, in the correspondence of the terms, which an interpreter ought to dispense with, rather than involve his version in such darkness, as will render it useless to the gene-

rality of readers. This shows sufficiently, that no rule will universally answer the translator's purpose; but that he must often carefully balance the degrees of perspicuity on one hand, against those of precision on the other, and determine, from the circumstances of the case, concerning their comparative importan I acknowledge that, in several instances, the counterpoise may be so equal, that the most judicious interpreters may be divided in opinion; nay, the same interpreter may hesitate long in forming a decision, or even account it a matter of indifference to which side he inclines.

§ 2. I SHALL only say, in general, that, however much a word may be adapted to express the sense, it is a strong objection against the use of it, that it is too fine a word, too learned, or too modern. For, though in the import of the term, there should be a suitableness to the principal idea intended to be conveyed, there is an unsuitableness in the associated or secondary ideas, which never fail to accompany such terms. These tend to fix on the Evangelists the imputation of affecting elegance, depth in literature or science, or, at least, a modish and flowery phraseology, than which nothing can be more repugnant to the genuine character of their style, a style eminently natural, simple, and familiar. The sentiment of *Jaques le Fevre d'Estaples*[2],

[2] An old French commentator, who published a version of the Gospels into Latin in 1523; his words are: "Ce que plu-"sieurs estiment elegance, est inelegance et parole fardée de-"vant Dieu."

which shows, at once, his good taste and knowledge of the subject, is here entirely apposite: "What "many think elegance is, in God's account, inele- "gance, and painted words."

§ 3. On the other hand, a bad effect is also produced by words, which are too low and vulgar. The danger here is not, indeed, so great, provided there be nothing ludicrous in the expression, which is sometimes the case with terms of this denomination. When things themselves are of a kind which gives few occasions of introducing the mention of them into the conversation of the higher ranks, and still fewer of naming them in books, their names are considered as partaking in the meanness of the use, and of the things signified. But this sort of vulgarity seems not to have been regarded by the inspired authors. When there was a just occasion to speak of the thing, they appear never to have been ashamed to employ the name by which it was commonly distinguished. They did not recur, as modern delicacy prompts us to do, to periphrasis, unusual, or figurative expressions, but always adopted such terms as most readily suggested themselves. There is nothing more indelicate, than an unseasonable display of delicacy; for which reason, the naked simplicity wherewith the sacred penmen express themselves on particular subjects, has much more modesty in it than the artificial, but transparent, disguises

which, on like occasions, would be employed by modern writers [3].

A certain correctness of taste, as well as acuteness of discernment, taught a late ingenious author [4] to remark this wonderful union of plainness and chastity in the language of the Bible, which a composer of these days, in any European tongue, would in vain attempt to imitate. Yet, it is manifest, that it is not to justness of taste, but to purity of mind in the sacred authors, that this happy singularity in their writings ought to be ascribed. This, however, is an evidence that they did not consider it as

[3] I can scarely give a better illustration of this remark than in the correction proposed by Dr. Delany, of the phrase *him that pisseth against the wall*, which occurs sometimes in the Old Testament, and which, he thinks, should be changed into *him that watereth against the wall*. I am surprised that a correction like this should have the approbation of so excellent a writer as the bishop of Waterford. (See the preface to his Version of the Minor Prophets.) To me the latter expression is much more exceptionable than the former. The former may be compared to the simplicity of a savage who goes naked without appearing to know it, or ever thinking of clothes: the other is like the awkward and unsuccessful attempt of an European, to hide the nakedness of which, by the very attempt, he shews himself to be both conscious and ashamed. The same offensive idea is suggested by the word which Delany proposes, as is conveyed by the common term; but it is suggested in so affected a manner, as necessarily fixes a reader's attention upon it, and shows it to have been particularly thought of by the writer. Can any critic seriously think that more is necessary, in this case, than to say, *Every male?*

[4] Rousseau.

mean or unbecoming, to call low or common things by their common names. But there are other sorts of vulgarisms in language, with which they are never chargeable, the use of such terms as we call cant words, which belong peculiarly to particular professions, or classes of men, and contemptuous or ludicrous expressions, such as are always accompanied with ideas of low mirth and ridicule.

§ 4. Of both the extremes in language above mentioned, I shall give examples from an anonymous English translator in 1729, whose version, upon the whole, is the most exceptionable of all I am acquainted with, in any language; and yet it is but doing justice to the author to add that, in rendering some passages, he has been more fortunate than much better translators. For brevity's sake, I shall here only mention the words I think censurable, referring to the margin for the places. Of learned words the following are a specimen: *verbose* [5], *loquaciousness* [6], *advent* [7], *chasm* [8], *grumes* [9], *steril* [10], *phenomena* [11], *consolated* [12], *investigate* [13], *innate* [14], *saliva* [15]; concerning which, and some others of the same kind, his critical examiner, Mr. Twell, says justly, that they are unintelligible to the ignorant, and offensive to the knowing. His fine

[5] Matth. vi. 7. [6] Ibid. [7] xxiv. 27.
[8] Luke, xvi. 26. [9] xxii. 44. [10] i. 17. [11] xii. 56.
[12] Acts, xv. 32. [13] xvii. 22.
[14] Eph. iv. 18. [15] John, ix. 6.

words and fashionable phrases, which, on account of their affinity, I shall throw together, the following may serve to exemplify: *detachment*[16], *foot-guards*[17], *brigue*[18], *chicanery*[19]. *Zacharias*, we are told[20], *vented his divine enthusiasm;* that is, when translated into common speech, *prophesied.* A later translator, or rather paraphrast, is not much happier in his expression, *he was seized with a divine afflatus*, here spoken of as a disease. *Zaccheus*, for chief of the publicans, is made *collector-general of the customs*[21]. *Simon Magus*, in his hands, becomes *the plenipotentiary of God*[22]. Jesus Christ is titled *guarantee of the alliance*[23], and the Lord of hosts, *the Lord of the celestial militia*[24]. And, to avoid the flatness of plain prose, he sometimes gives a poetical turn to the expression. *Before the cock crow*, becomes in his hands, *Before the cock proclaims the day*[25].

The foppery of these last expressions is, if possible, more insufferable than the pedantry of the first. They are, besides, so far from conveying the sense of the author, that they all, less or more, misrepresent it. As to low and ludicrous terms, there is sometimes a greater coincidence in these with quaint and modish words, than one at first would imagine. It would not be easy to assign a motive for rendering *οικοδεσποτης yeoman*[26], but it is still worse to trans-

[16] Matth. ii. 16. [17] xxvii. 27. [18] 1 Thess. v. 13.
[19] 1 Tim. vi. 4. [20] Luke, i. 67. [21] xix. 2.
[22] Acts, viii. 10. [23] Heb. vii. 22. [24] James, v. 4.
[25] Luke, xxii. 34. [26] Matth. xiii. 27.

late ὅσοι τὴν θαλασσαν ἐργαζονται *supercargoes* [27], ἁρπαξιν *raparees* [28], which he explains in the margin to mean *kidnappers*, and μεθυοντων *sots* [29]. I am surprised he has not found a place for *sharpers*, *gamblers*, and *swindlers*, fit company, in every sense, for his sots and raparees. Γλωσσοκομον is distended into a *bank* [30], and κλεπτης dwindles into a *pilferer* [31] : τὴν χαραν τȣ κυριȣ σȣ is degraded into *thy master's diversions* [32], and αἰνος is swoln into a *consort of praise* [33]. The laudable and successful importunity of the two blind men who, notwithstanding the checks they received from the multitude, persisted in their application to Jesus for relief, is contemptuously denoted *bawling out* [34]. When we are told that our Lord *silenced*, ἐφιμωσε, the *Sadducees*, this author acquaints us that he *dumbfounded them* [35]. In short, what by magnifying, what by diminishing, what by distorting and disfiguring, he has, in many places, burlesqued the original. For answering this bad purpose, the extremes of cant and bombast are equally well adapted. The excess, in the instances now given, is so manifest, as entirely to supersede both argument and illustration.

§ 5. But, in regard to the use of what may be called learned words, it must be owned, after all,

[27] Rev. xviii. 17. [28] 1 Cor. v. 10. [29] Matth. xxiv. 49.
[30] John, xii. 6. [31] Ibid. [32] Matth. xxv. 21.
[33] xxi. 16. [34] xx. 31. [35] xxii. 34.

that it is not easy, in every case, to fix the boundaries. We sometimes find classed under that denomination, all the words of Greek and Latin etymology, which are not current among the inferior orders of the people. Yet I acknowledge that, if we were rigidly to exclude all such terms, we should be too often obliged, either to adopt circumlocution, or to express the sentiment weakly and improperly. There are other disadvantages, to be remarked afterwards, which might result from the exclusion of every term that may be comprehended in the definition above given. The common translation, if we except the consecrated terms, as some call them, which are not many, is universally admitted to be written in a style that is not only natural, but easily understood by the people: yet, in the common translation, there are many words which can hardly be supposed ever to have been quite familiar among the lower ranks. There is, however, one advantage possessed by that version, over every other book composed at that period, which is, that from the universality of its use, and (we may now add) its long continuance, it must have greatly contributed to give a currency to those words which are frequently employed in it. Now, it would be absurd, in an interpreter of this age, to expect a similar effect from any private version. A new translation, even though it were authorised by the public, would not have the same advantage at present, when our language is in a more advanced stage.

§ 6. I SHOULD not be surprised, that a reader not accustomed narrowly to attend to these matters, were disposed, at first hearing, to question the fact, that there are many words in the vulgar translation which were not in common use at the time among the lower orders. But I am persuaded that a little reflection must soon convince him of it. Abstracted from those terms which have been transferred from the original languages, because there were no corresponding names in our tongue, such as *phylactery*, *tetrarch*, *synagogue*, *proselyte*, *centurion*, *quaternion*, *legion*, there are many in the English Bible, which cannot be considered as having been, at that time, level to the meanest capacities. They are scarcely so yet, notwithstanding all the advantage which their occurring in that translation has given them. Of such words I shall give a pretty large specimen in the margin [36]. Nor can it be said

[36] *First, of nouns:* scribe, disciple, parable, epistle, infidel, matrix, lunatic, exile, exorcist, suppliant, residue, genealogy, appetite, audience, pollution, perdition, partition, potentate, progenitor, liberality, occurrent, immutability, pre-eminence, remission, diversity, fragment, abjects, frontier, tradition, importunity, concupiscence, redemption, intercession, superscription, inquisition, insurrection, communion, instructer, mediator, exactor, intercessor, benefactor, malefactor, prognosticator, ambassador, ambassage, ambushment, meditation, ministration, administration, abomination, consummation, convocation, constellation, consolation, consultation, acceptation, communication, disputation, cogitation, estimation, operation, divination, vocation, desolation, tribulation, regeneration, propitiation, jus-

of those there specified, that more familiar terms could not have been found equally expressive. For, though this may be true of some of them, it is not true of them all. *Calling* is equivalent to vocation, *comfort* to consolation, *destruction* to perdition, *forgiveness* to remission, *defilement* to pollution, *almighty* to omnipotent, *enlightened* to illuminated, *watchful* to vigilant, *delightful* to delectable, *unchangeable* to immutable, *heavenly* to celestial, and *earthly* to terrestrial. Nay, the first six in the marginal list might have been not badly supplied by the more homely terms, *writer*, *scholar*, *comparison*, *letter*, *unbeliever*, *womb*. Yet, I would not be understood, by this remark, as intending to throw any blame upon the translators, for the choice they have sometimes made of words which, though not obscure, were not the most familiar that it was possible to find. There are several reasons, to be given immediately, which may justly determine the translator, on some occasions, to desert the common rule of adopting always the most obvious words. At the same time there

tification, sanctification, salutation, interpretation, supplication, exaction, unction. *Second, of adjectives:* barbed, circumspect, conversant, extinct, vigilant, inordinate, delectable, tributary, impotent, magnifical, immutable, innumerable, celestial, incorruptible, terrestrial, omnipotent. *Third, of verbs and participles:* laud, distil, remit, adjure, implead, estimate, ascend, descend, frustrate, disannul, reverse, meditate, premeditate, predestinate, consort, amerce, transferred, transfigured, illuminated, consecrated, translated, incensed, mollified.

are certain excesses in this way, whereof I have also given examples, into which a judicious interpreter will never be in danger of falling. The reasons which ought, on the other hand, to determine a translator, not to confine himself to the words which are current in the familiar tattle of the lower ranks in society, are as follows:

§ 7. First, in all compositions not in the form of dialogue, even the simplest, there is some superiority, in the style, to the language of conversation, among the common people; and even the common people themselves understand many words, which, far from having any currency among them, never enter into their ordinary talk. This is particularly the case with those of them who have had any sort of education, were it but the lowest. One ought, therefore, to consider accurately the degree of the uncommonness of the term, before it be rejected: as it may not be easy to supply its place with one more familiar, and equally apposite. Unnecessary circumlocutions are cumbersome, and ought always to be avoided. They are unfriendly alike to simplicity and to energy, and sometimes even to propriety and perspicuity.

§ 8. Secondly, there are cases wherein some things may be done, nay, ought to be done, by a translator, for the sake of variety. I acknowledge that this is a subordinate consideration, and that variety is never to be purchased at the expense of

either perspicuity, or simplicity. But even the sacred historians, though eminently simple and perspicuous, do not always confine themselves to the same words in expressing the same thoughts. Not that there appears in their manner any aim at varying the expression; but, it is well known that, without such an aim, the same subject, even in conversation, is hardly ever twice spoken of precisely in the same words. To a certain degree this is a consequence of that quality I have had occasion oftner than once to observe in them, a freedom from all solicitude about their language. Whereas an unvarying recourse to the same words for expressing the same thoughts, would, in fact, require one to be solicitous about uniformity, and uncommonly attentive to it. But in the use of the terms of principal consequence, in which the association between the words and the ideas is much stronger, they are pretty uniform in recurring to the same words, though they are not so in matters of little moment. Yet in these the variety is no greater than is perfectly natural in men whose thoughts are engrossed by their subject, and who never search about in quest of words. Now it is only in consequence of some attention to language in a translator, that he is capable of doing justice to this inattention, if I may so denominate it, of his author.

§ 9. THIRDLY, it was remarked before[37], that though there is a sameness of idiom in the writers

[37] Diss. I. Part II.

of the New Testament, particularly the Evangelists, there is a diversity in their styles. Hence it arises, that different terms are sometimes employed, by the different historians, in relating the same fact. But, as this circumstance has not much engaged the attention of interpreters, it often happens that, in the translations of the Gospels, (for this is not peculiar to any one translation,) there appears in the version, a greater coincidence in the style of the Evangelists, than is found in the original. Now there are very good reasons to determine us to avoid, as much as possible, a sameness which is not authorized by the original. There are cases, I own, in which it is unavoidable. It often happens that two or more words, in the language of the author, are synonymous, and may therefore be used indiscriminately, for expressing the same thing, when it is impossible to find more than one, in the language of the translator, which can be used with propriety. When our Lord fed the five thousand men in the desert, the order he gave to the people immediately before, was, as expressed by Matthew [38], *αναχλιθηναι επι τους χορτους*; as expressed by Mark [39], *αναχλιναι επι τω χλωρω χορτω*; as expressed by Luke [40], *κατακλινατε αυτους*; and, as expressed by John [41], *ποιησατε αναπεσειν*. Here every one of the Evangelists conveys the same order in a different phrase, all of them, however, both naturally and simply.

[38] Matth. xiv. 19. Luke, ix. 14.

[39] Mark, vi. 39.

[41] John, vi. 10.

This variety it would be impossible to imitate in English, without recurring to unnatural and affected expressions. The three last Evangelists use different verbs to express the posture, namely *αναπλινω*, *καταπλινω*, and *αναπιπτω*. And even in the first, the expression is, I may say, equally varied, as one of the two who use that verb, employs the passive voice, the other the active. Now, in the common translation, the phrase *to sit down*, signifying the posture, is the same in them all. I do not here animadvert on the impropriety of this version. I took occasion formerly [42], to observe that those Greek words denote always *to lie*, and not *to sit*. My intention at present is only to show that the simplicity of the sacred writers does not entirely exclude variety. Even the three terms above mentioned, are not all that occur in the Gospels for expressing the posture then used at table. *Ανακειμαι*, and *κατακειμαι*, are also employed. It would be in vain to attempt, in modern tongues, which are comparatively scanty, to equal the copiousness of Greek; but, as far as the language which we use will permit, we ought not to overlook even these little variations.

§ 10. THE Evangelists have been thought, by many, so much to coincide in their narratives, as to give scope for suspecting that some of those, who wrote more lately, copied those who wrote before them. Though it must be owned that there is often

[42] Diss. VIII. Part III. § 3, &c.

a coincidence, both in matter and in expression, it will not be found so great in the original, nor so frequent as, perhaps, in all translations ancient and modern. Many translators have considered it as a matter of no moment, provided the sense be justly rendered, whether the differences in the manner were attended to or not. Nay, in certain cases, wherein it would have been easy to attain, in the version, all the variety of the original, some interpreters seem studiously to have avoided it. Perhaps they did not judge it convenient to make the appearance of a difference between the sacred writers in words, when there was none in meaning. In this, however, I think they judged wrong. An agreement in the sense, is all that ought to be desired in them; more especially, as they wrote in a language different from that spoken by the persons whose history they relate. When this is the case, the most tenacious memory will not account for a perfect identity of expression in the witnesses. Their testimony is given in Greek. The language spoken by those whose story they relate, was a dialect of Chaldee. They were themselves, therefore (at least three of them), the translators of the speeches and conversations recorded in their histories. The utmost that is expected from different translators, is a coincidence in sense; a perfect coincidence in words, in a work of such extent as the Gospel, is, without previous concert, impossible. Consequently, an appearance of difference, arising solely from the use of different expressions, is of much less prejudice to the credibility of their nar-

ration, than the appearance of concert or copying would have been.

When, therefore, the language of the interpreter of the Gospels will admit an imitation of such diversities in the style, it ought not to be overlooked. If possible, their narratives should be neither more, nor less, coincident, in the version, than they are, in the original. And to this end, namely, that the phraseology may nearly differ as much in English as it does in Greek, I have, on some occasions, chosen not the very best word which might have been found, satisfying myself with this, that there is nothing in the word I have employed, unsuitable, dark, or ambiguous. But, as was signified before, it is not possible so to diversify the style of a version, as to make it always correspond, in this respect, to the original. Nor ought a correspondence of this kind ever to be attempted, at the expense of either perspicuity or propriety. I shall only add, that a little elevation of style may naturally be expected in quotations from the Prophets and the Psalms, and in the short canticles which we have in the two first chapters of Luke; for in these, though not written in verse, the expression is poetical.

§ 11. FOURTHLY, Not only the differences in the styles of the different Evangelists, ought not to pass entirely unnoticed; but the same thing may be affirmed of the changes sometimes found in the terms used by the same Evangelist. Here, again, I must observe, that it were in vain to attempt an exact cor-

respondence in this respect. There is a superior richness in the language of the sacred writers, which even their style, though simple and unaffected (for they never step out of their way in quest of ornament), cannot entirely conceal. They use considerable variety of terms for expressing those ordinary exertions for which our modern tongues hardly admit any variety. I have given one specimen of this, in the words whereby they express the posture then used at meals. I shall here add some other examples. The following words occur in the New Testament, λεγω, επω, φημι, φασκω, φραζω, ρεω, ειρω, ερεω, all answering to the English verb *say*. Of these we may affirm, with truth, that it is but rarely that any of them admits a different rendering in our language. The words κοινοω, μολυνω, μιαινω, σπιλοω, ρυπoω, correspond to the English verb *defile*, by which they are commonly rendered. So also do the words βρωσκω, εσθιω, τρωγω, φαγω, to the English verb *eat*. The greater part of the words subjoined are, in the common translation, rendered always, and the rest occasionally, by the English verb *see*; ειδω, απειδω, οπτομαι, οπτανω, βλεπω, εμβλεπω, ὁραω, καθοραω, θεαομαι, θεωρεω, ἰσορεω. Yet, in none of the lists aforementioned, are the words perfectly synonymous, nor can they be said to be always used promiscuously by the inspired penmen. They are, consequently, of use, not only for diversifying the style, but for giving it also a degree of precision which poorer languages cannot supply.

The same thing may be exemplified in the nouns, though not, perhaps, in the same degree as in the verbs. Αρς, αρνιον, αμνος, are used by the Evangelists, the first by Luke, the other two by John; and are all rendered, in the common translation, *lamb*: δικτυον, αμφιβληςρον, σαγηνη, in the Gospels, are all translated *net*. And, though the latter might have been varied in the version, the others could not with propriety. Sometimes we are obliged to render different words which occur pretty often, but are not entirely synonymous, by the same English word, for want of distinct terms adapted to each meaning. Thus, the words παιδια and τεκνα are, if I mistake not, uniformly rendered *children*; though the former word particularly respects the age and size, the latter solely the relation. The first answers to the Latin *pueruli*, the second to *liberi*. The English word *children* is well adapted to the former, though sometimes but awkwardly employed to denote the latter. Yet, for want of another term to express the offspring, without limiting it to either sex, we find it necessary to use the English word in this application. The word ὁ πλησιον, used by the Evangelists Matthew, Mark, and Luke, γειτων by Luke and John, and περιοικος only by Luke, are all rendered *neighbour*. And though they are evidently not of the same signification, it would be difficult, in our language, to express the sense of any of them in one word, which would answer so well as this. Yet, that they are not synonymous, every one who understands Greek must, on reflection, be sensible. For if, instead of πλησιον, in the commandment,

Αγαπησεις τον πλησιον σθ ὡς σεαυτον, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, we should substitute either *γειτονα*, or *περιοικον*, we should totally alter the precept; for these terms would comprehend none but those who live within what is strictly called the neighbourhood. The translation, indeed, into English ought to be the same; and, to say the truth, it would be a more exact version of that precept, than it is of the precept, as we actually find it in the Gospel. For, let it be observed, that the word *neighbour* is one of those which, for want of more apposite terms, we are obliged to admit, in Scripture, in a meaning not perfectly warranted by common use.

I shall add but one other example. The word *φιλος*, used by Matthew, Luke, and John, and *ἑταιρος*, used only by Matthew, are both rendered *friend;* yet, in their genuine signification, there is but little affinity between them. The former always implies affection and regard, the latter does not. The latter, not the former, was employed as a civil compellation to strangers and indifferent persons. It is that which is given, in the parable of the labourers in the vineyard [43], to the envious and dissatisfied labourer; in the parable of the marriage feast [44] to the guest who had not the wedding garment; and it was given by our Lord to the traitor Judas [45], when he came to deliver him up to his enemies. I do not say that *ἑταιρε* is not rightly translated *friend* in these instances; for common use permits us to employ

[43] Matth. xx. 13. [44] xxii. 12. [45] xxvi. 50.

the word in this latitude. But it is to be regretted, that we have not a word better adapted to such cases, but are obliged to prostitute a name so respectable as that of *friend*. Besides, it is manifest that, for this prostitution, we cannot plead the example of the Evangelists. I make this remark the more willingly, as I have heard some unlearned readers express their surprize that our Lord should have paid so much deference to the insincere modes of civility established by the corrupt customs of the world, as to denominate a man *friend*, whom he knew to harbour the basest and the most hostile intentions. But defects of this kind are not peculiar to our language. They are, on the contrary, to be found in every tongue. All the Latin translations render the word, in the passages above mentioned, *amice*: and all the versions into modern tongues, with which I am acquainted, except one, act in the same manner. The exception meant is the Geneva French, which says not *mon ami*, as others, but *compagnon*, in all the three places mentioned. This is more literal, for ἑταιρος is, strictly, *socius*, or *sodalis*, not *amicus*. But it may be questioned, whether such a compellation suits the idiom of that tongue, as it appears to have been adopted by no other French interpreter.

§ 12. I SHALL now give, from the first of the lists of verbs above mentioned, an instance or two of the uniformity commonly observed in the use of this variety, a uniformity which sufficiently evinces.

that the terms were not conceived by the writers to be perfectly synonymous. Our Lord says, in his sermon on the mount [46], Ηκουσατε ὁτι ΕΡΡΕΘΗ τοις αρχαιοις· Ου φονευσεις—Εγω δε ΛΕΓΩ ὑμιν, ὁτι—ὁς αν ΕΙΠΗ τω αδελφω αυτου, Ραχα:—In the common translation, *Ye have heard that it was* SAID *by them of old time, Thou shalt not kill—But I* SAY *unto you, that—whosoever shall* SAY *to his brother, Raca*—In the English, the verb *say* occurs thrice in this short passage; in the Greek, there are three different verbs employed. Yet so little does there appear, in the author, a disposition to change, for the sake of changing, that wherever the case is perfectly similar to that wherein any of the three verbs above mentioned is used in this quotation, the word will be found to be the same throughout the whole discourse. Thus, through the whole of this discourse, what our Lord authoritatively gives in charge, as from himself, is signified by the same phrase, εγω λεγω ὑμιν; whatever is mentioned as standing on the foot of oral tradition, is expressed by ερρεθη; part of the verb ρεω; and what is mentioned as neither precept nor maxim of any kind, but as what may pass incidentally in conversation, is denoted by the verb επω. Another example of the different application of such words, we have, in our Lord's conversation with the chief priests and elders, in relation to the authority by which he acted [47]. Οι δε διελογιζοντο παρ' ἑαυτοις, ΛΕΓΟΝΤΕΣ, Εαν ΕΙΠΩΜΕΝ,

[46] Matth. v. 21, 22. [47] Matth. xxi. 25. 27.

εξ ϑρανϑ, ΕΡΕΙ ῾ημιν· Διατι ϑν ϑκ επιϛευσατε αυτω; A little after, ΕΦΗ αυτοις και αυτος. In the common translation, *And they reasoned with themselves*, SAYING, *If we shall* SAY *from heaven, he will* SAY *unto us, Why did ye not then believe him?* Afterwards, *And he* SAID *unto them.* Here the same repetition in the version is contrasted with a still greater variety in the original; for we have no fewer than four different words in the Greek, rendered into our language, by repeating the same English verb four times. The sense of επω is the same in both passages; the word λεγω is used here more indefinitely than in the former; the verb ειρω approaches in meaning to the word *retort*, and seems to preclude reply.

On comparing, we must perceive, that there is not only an awkwardness in the repetitions which modern languages sometimes render necessary, but even a feebleness in the enunciation of the sentiment. This consideration, when attended to, will be found to warrant our taking the greater liberty in diversifying the expression wherever our language permits it. For if we are often obliged to repeat the same, where the original employs different words; and if we also retain the same words, where the original retains the same, though our own tongue would allow a change, the style of the version must be a bad representation of that of the original. It will have all the defects of both languages, and none of the riches of either. I have, therefore, taken the liberty to vary the expression a little, where the ge-

nius of our tongue, in a consistency with simplicity, propriety, and perspicuity, permitted it; as it was only thus I could compensate for the restraints I was obliged to submit to, in cases wherein the sacred penmen had taken a freer range.

§ 13. CONCERNING the diversity of styles in the different Evangelists, which I cannot help considering as entitled to more attention than translators seem to have given it, I shall beg leave to make a few more observations. Of the words which I have mentioned as nearly synonymous, or at least as rendered, by most interpreters, in the same manner, some, though common in some of the Gospels, do not occur in others; yet, in no version that I know, is this always to be discovered. The verb ρεω, *I say*, is used by Matthew often, by Mark once, but never by either Luke or John. The synonyme ειρω is used by all except John, and ερεω by all except Mark. Αναχλινω, *I lay down*, occurs in all the Gospels except John's; καταχειμαι, *I lie down*, in all except Matthew's. Every one of the Evangelists has also many words to be found in none of the rest; and that not only when peculiar things are mentioned by him, but when the same things, the same actions, the same circumstances, which are taken notice of by other Evangelists, are related. These, it is, sometimes, impossible to translate justly in different words. Luke, sometimes, in addressing God, uses the word δεσποτης, which is not in any of the other Evangelists, and can hardly be rendered otherwise than *Lord*,

the term whereby κυριος, which occurs in them all, is commonly translated. Luke is also peculiar in giving Jesus Christ the title επιςατης, which cannot well be rendered otherwise than *master*, the common rendering of διδασκαλος, though, as Grotius observes, the words are not perfectly equivalent. Matthew has, in one passage, applied to our Lord a title not used by any other, καθηγητης, which our translators have also rendered *master*, and have thereby impaired the sense. In like manner the multiplicity of inflections in the tenses, moods, and voices of their verbs, supplies them with a variety of expressions which serve to diversify their style in a manner not to be imitated in modern tongues, and less perhaps in English, which has very few inflections, than in any other. Add to the aforesaid advantages, in respect of variety, which the writers of the New Testament derived from their language, the derivatives and compounds with which that copious tongue so remarkably abounds.

Now, I do not know any stronger indications of a native difference of style than those above mentioned, and in part exemplified. And, as this difference conveys some evidence of the authenticity of the writings, it ought not to be always disregarded by translators, merely because it is not possible always to preserve it in their versions. It is then in effect preserved, when they give such a turn to the expression, as renders the difference of phraseology nearly equal upon the whole. This, however, ought never to be attempted, when either the sense may be ever

so little altered by it, or the simplicity and perspicuity of the sentence may be injured. What has been now observed will account for my employing words sometimes, which, though not unusual or obscure, are not the most obvious, and for giving such a turn to the expression, as renders it less literal than it might otherwise have been.

§ 14. I HAVE avoided, as much as possible, the use of circumlocution: yet there are certain cases where we cannot avoid it entirely, and do justice to our author. I do not mean barely, when there is not a single word in the language of the translation which conveys the sense of the original term; but when there is something, either in the application, or in the argument, that cannot be fully exhibited without the aid of some additional terms. It has been often observed that, in no two languages, do the words so perfectly correspond, that the same terms in one will always express the sense of the same terms in the other. There is a difference of extent in meaning which hinders them from suiting exactly, even when they coincide in the general import. The epithet *αχρειος*, as applied in the Gospel of Luke [48], is so far from suiting the sense of the English word *unprofitable*, by which it is rendered in the common translation, that if we were to give a definition of an unprofitable servant, we should hardly think of another than the reverse of the character given in that

[48] Luke xvii. 10.

passage, but should say, 'he is one who does not 'that to his master which is his duty to do.' From the context, however, no person can be at a loss to see, that the import of the word is, "We have con- "ferred no favour, we have only fulfilled the terms "which we were bound to perform." I know that because the sentiment is not expressed with the brevity of the original, many would call this a comment, or rather a paraphrase, and not a version. It is expressed, I acknowledge, by a periphrasis; but periphrasis and paraphrase are not synonymous terms. The former is in every translation sometimes necessary, in order to transmit the genuine thought and reasoning of the author; it is only when more than this is attempted, and when other sentiments are introduced or suggested, for the sake of illustrating an author's thoughts, or enforcing his arguments, that men employ paraphrase. It is not denied, that periphrasis in translating, ought to be avoided, if possible; but it is not always possible to avoid it, and periphrasis is preferable to single words, which either convey no meaning, or convey a meaning different from the author's.

The word *βαπτισμα*, in the question put by our Lord, Το *βαπτισμα Ιωαννυ ποθεν ην* [49]; does not answer to the word *baptism*, as used by us; nor does *αναστασις*, in the account given of the Sadducees [50], correspond entirely to the English word *resurrection*: the word *επαγγελια* is, for the most part, ren-

[49] Matth. xxi. 25. [50] Matth. xxii. 23.

dered *promise*, and means neither more nor less. In a few cases, however, it does not signify the promise itself, but the thing promised. Now the English word is never so applied. Hence the obscurity, not to say impropriety, of that expression, *I send the promise of my Father upon you*[51], which, if it can be said to suggest any thing to an English reader, suggests awkwardly, *I give you a promise on the part of my Father*. Yet this is not the sense. What is here meant is the fulfilment of a promise formerly given them by his Father, and is therefore properly rendered, *I send you that which my Father hath promised*. Though not attending to this difference, our translators have thrown great darkness on some passages in the Epistle to the Hebrews. *These all* (says the writer, speaking of Abraham, Sarah, and others) *died in the faith, not having received the promises*, μη λαβοντες τας επαγγελιας[52]. Yet this way interpreted, the assertion is contradictory, not only to the patriarchal history, but to what is said expressly of Abraham in the same chapter[53]. The words, therefore, ought to have been rendered, *not having received the promised inheritance;* for it is the land of Canaan promised to Abraham and his posterity, to which the writer particularly refers, giving as an evidence that they had not received it, their acknowledging themselves to be *strangers and sojourners in the land;* not *on the earth*, as it is,

[51] Luke, xxiv. 49. See all these passages in this Translation, and the notes upon them. [52] Heb. xi. 13. [53] viii. &c.

particularly in this place, very improperly translated.

§ 15. AGAIN, suppose, which is not uncommon, that the original word has two different, but related senses, and that the author had an allusion to both. Suppose also that in the language of the interpreter there is a term adapted to each of those senses, but not any one word that will suit both. In such cases perspicuity requires somewhat of periphrasis. If we abruptly change the word in the same sentence, or in the same argument, there will appear an incoherence in the version, where there appears a close connection in the original; and if we retain the same term, there will be both obscurity and impropriety in the version. I shall explain my meaning by examples, the only way of making such criticisms understood.

In one place in Matthew[54], the verb τιμαω is employed, as usual, to express the duty which children owe to their parents. *To honour* is that commonly used in English. Yet this word is not equivalent in import to the Greek verb, much less to the Hebrew כבד *chabad*, translated τιμαω by the Seventy in the place quoted by the Evangelist. This is one of the causes of the obscurity and apparent inconsequence of that passage in the Gospel. I have, therefore, rendered the word, where it occurs the second time in the argument used by our Lord, *ho-*

[54] Matth. xv. 4, 5.

nour by his assistance; for the original implies no less.

The Apostle Paul, writing to the Romans (for it is not necessary here to confine myself to the Gospels), says [55], as it is expressed in the common version, *But they have not all obeyed the Gospel; for Esaias saith, Lord, who hath believed our report? So then, faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God.* What the Apostle introduces here with *So then*, as a direct conclusion from the words of the Prophet, cannot fail to appear remote to an English reader, and to require some intermediate ideas to make out the connection. The incoherency disappears entirely, when we recur to the original, where the words are: Αλλ' ου παντες ὑπηκουσαν τω ευαγγελιω. Ησαιας γαρ λεγει, Κυριε, τις επιστευσε τη ακοη ἡμων; Αρα ἡ πιστις εξ ακοης, ἡ δε ακοη δια ρηματος Θεου. Nothing can be more clearly consequential, than the argument as expressed here. Isaiah had said, complaining of the people, Τις επιστευσε τη ακοη ἡμων; from which the Apostle infers, that it commonly holds ΠΙΣΤΙΣ εξ ΑΚΟΗΣ, otherwise there had been no scope for complaint. But, by the change of the term in English, from *report* to *hearing*, however nearly the ideas are related, the expression is remarkably obscured. It must be owned, that we have no word, in English, of equal extent, in signification, with the Greek ακοη, which denotes both the *report*, or the thing heard, and the sensa-

[55] Rom. x. 16, 17.

tion of hearing; though, in regard to the sense of seeing, the English word *sight* is of equal latitude; for it denotes both the thing seen, and the perception received by the eye[56]. But, when such a difference as this happens, between the import of their words and ours, one does more justice to the original, and interprets more strictly, by giving the sentence such a turn as will preserve the verbal allusion, than by such a change of the terms as our translators have adopted, to the no small injury of perspicuity. The passage may, therefore, properly be rendered thus: *For Isaiah saith, "Lord, who be-"lieveth what he heareth us preach?" So then, belief cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God preached.* Nor is the addition of the participle *preached*, to be considered as a supply, from conjecture, of what is not expressed in the original; for, in fact, the word αχοη here implies it. Diodati has not badly translated it *preaching*. *Signore, chi a creduto alla nostra predicatione? La fede adunque e dalla predicatione.* This is better than the English version, as it preserves clearly the connection of the two verses. It is, nevertheless, of importance, not to suppress the other signification of αχοη, to wit, *hearing*, as, by means of it, the connection is rendered clearer, both with the preceding words, *How shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard*[57]*?* and with the following, *But, I*

[56] See an excellent illustration of this in Dr. Beattie's Essay on Truth, Part II. Ch. II. Sect. I.

[57] Rom. x. 14.

say, Have they not heard [58]*?* I shall only add, that where the coincidence in the sense is very clear, the grammatical relation between the words is of less importance. There is, in this passage, a verbal connection, not only between the words *ακουω* and *ακοη*, but also between *πιστευω* and *πιστις*. But the English word *faith*, being fully equivalent to the Greek word *πιστις*, and its connection with believing being evident, it is not of great moment to preserve in English the affinity in sound. As such resemblances, however, always in some degree assist attention, and are a sort of evidence, it is rather better to retain them, where, without hurting the sense, it can be done. For this reason, I prefer the word *belief*, here, to the word faith.

I shall give but one other example, which, though not requiring the aid of circumlocution, is of a nature somewhat similar to the former. A verb, or an epithet, in the original, is sometimes construed with a noun, used figuratively, and is also construed, because use permits the application, with that which is represented by the figure; whereas, in the translator's language, the term by which the verb or epithet is commonly rendered, is not equally susceptible of both applications. In such cases, it is better, when the thing is practicable, to change the word for one which, though less common, suits both. The following passage will illustrate my meaning [59]. *Περιεχει εν τη γραφη· "Ιδου τιθημι εν Σιων λιθον ακρογωνιαιον,*

[58] Ver. 18. [59] 1 Pet. ii. 6, 7.

" εκλεκτον, εντιμον· και ὁ πιςευων επ' αυτω, ȣ μη " καταισχυνθη." Ὑμιν ȣν ἡ τιμη τοις πιςευȣσιν· " απειθȣσι δε, λιθον ὁν απεδοκιμασαν ὁι οικοδομȣν- " τες, ὁτος εγενηθη εις κεφαλην γωνιας: which our translators render thus: *It is contained in the Scripture,* " *Behold, I lay in Sion a chief corner-stone, elect,* " *precious, and he that believeth on him shall not be* " *confounded.*" *Unto you, therefore, which believe, he is precious: but unto them which be disobedient, the stone which the builders disallowed, the same is made the head of the corner.* Here the type and the antitype are so blended, as to hurt, alike, both perspicuity and propriety. To speak of *believing in a stone, an elect stone,* and to apply the pronoun *him* to a stone, sound very oddly in our language; but πιςευω επι, in the Hellenistic idiom, and εκλεκτος, admit an application either to persons or to things. The apostle said επ' αυτω, because λιθος is of the masculine gender: for the like reason, he would have said επ' αυτη, had he used πετρα instead of λιθος. Would our translators, in that case, have rendered it, *He who believeth on her?* Now, the English verb, *to trust,* and the participle *selected,* are susceptible of both applications. Let the passage, then, be rendered thus: *It is said in Scripture,* " *Be-* " *hold, I lay in Sion a chief corner-stone, selected* " *and precious: whosoever trusteth to it shall not be* " *ashamed.*" *There is honour, therefore, to you who trust; but to the mistrustful, the stone which the builders rejected, is made the head of the corner.* I may remark, in passing, that ἡ τιμη is here evidently

opposed to ἡ αισχυνη, the import of which is included in the verb καταισχυνθη; instead of *shame* ye shall have *honour;* but by no rule, that I know, can it be translated, *he is precious.* Απειθσι, though often justly rendered *disobedient*, rather signifies, here, *mistrustful, incredulous*, being contrasted to πιςευσι. All the above examples are calculated to show, that it is as impossible for a translator, if he preserve that uniformity in translating so much insisted on by some, to convey perspicuously, or even intelligibly, the meaning of the author, and to give a just representation of his manner, as it is to retain any regard to purity in the language which he writes: and that, therefore, this absurd κακοζηλια subverts, alike, all the principal ends which he ought to have in view.

§ 16. It was admitted, that it is necessary to employ more words than one in the version, when the original term requires more for conveying the sense into the language of the translator. Nobody doubts the propriety of rendering προσωπολημπτης, *respecter of persons*, φιλαργυρια, *love of money*, or αποσυναγωγος, *expelled the synagogue;* and it is hardly possible to give the meaning in another language, without the aid of some such periphrasis. Yet even this rule, however general it may appear, does not hold invariably. There are cases wherein it is better to leave part of the meaning unexpressed, than, by employing circumlocution, not only to desert simplicity, but to suggest something foreign to the intention of

the author. That this will sometimes be the consequence of an over-scrupulous solicitude to comprehend every thing that may be implied in the original term, will be evident on reflection. Zaccheus, the publican, said to our Lord [60], *Ει τινος τι εσυκοφαντησα, αποδιδωμι τετραπλεν*, which our translators have rendered, *If I have taken any thing from any man by false accusation, I restore him four-fold.* In this they have followed Beza, and Leo de Juda, who say, *Si quid cuipiam per calumniam eripui, reddo quadruplum.* Admitting the justness of the note subjoined by the latter, in regard to the artifices of the publicans, I approve much more the version of the word in the Vulgate and Erasmus, *Si quid aliquem defraudavi*, or in Castalio, to the same purpose, *Si quem ulla re fraudavi*, "If in aught I have "wronged any man;" than those anxious attempts, by tracing little circumstances, to reach the full import of the original. My objection to such attempts, is not so much because they render the expression unnecessarily complex, but because something foreign to the intention of the author, rarely fails to be suggested by them. However paradoxical it may at first appear, it is certainly true, that to express a thing in one word, and to express it in several, makes sometimes a difference, not only in the style, but in the meaning. I need not go further, for an example, than the words on which I am remarking. For a man, in the station of Zaccheus, who was probably not liable to the charge of being injurious in any other way than that to which his bu-

[60] Luke, xix. 8.

siness exposed him, nothing could be more natural, or more apposite, than the expression which the Evangelist represents him as having used, *ει τινος τι εσυκοφαντησα.* On the contrary, it would not have been natural in him to say, *ει τι εκλεψα*, or *ει τι εσυλησα*, because his manner of life, and his circumstances, set him above the suspicion of the crimes of theft and robbery. Such things, therefore, are not supposed to enter the person's mind. But when we substitute a circumlocution, that is, a definition, for the name of a crime, other kindred crimes are necessarily conceived to be in view; because it is always by the aid of the genus, and the difference, somehow signified, that the species is defined. Now, in a case like the present, wherein the purpose of restitution is explicitly declared, to introduce mention of the genus, with the limitation denoted by the specific difference, is an implicit declaration, that the promise of reparation shall not be understood to extend to any other species of injuries. Had our language been that spoken in Judea, and had this humble publican, when he made his penitent declaration to his Lord, said in English, *I will restore four-fold, if in aught I have wronged any man;* can we imagine, that he would have clogged his pious purpose, with the reserve which the additional words, *by false accusation*, manifestly imply? Who sees not that, in this manner introduced, they are such a restriction of the promise, as is equivalent to the retracting of it in part, and saying, 'Let it be observed, that as to 'any other sort of wrong I may have committed, I

'promise nothing?' But when the thing is expressed in one word, as in the Greek, no such effect is produced. Much, therefore, of the meaning, depends on the form of the expression, as well as on the import of the words.

§ 17. BUT this is not the only bad consequence which results from the excessive solicitude of interpreters, to comprehend in their translation, by the aid of periphrasis, every thing supposed to be included in the original term. A single word is sometimes used, with energy and perspicuity, as a trope. But if we substitute a definition for the single word, we destroy the trope, and often render the sentence nonsensical. To say, *The meek shall inherit the earth*[61], is to employ the word *inherit* in a figurative sense, which can hardly be misunderstood by any body, as denoting the facility with which they shall obtain possession, and the stability of the possession obtained. But, if we employ circumlocution, and say, in the manner of some interpreters, *The meek shall succeed to the earth by hereditary right;* by so explicit, and so formal, a limitation of the manner, we exclude the trope, and affirm what is palpably inapplicable, and therefore ridiculous; for, *to obtain by hereditary right*, is to succeed, in right of consanguinity, to the former possessor, now deceased. In such cases, if the translator's language cannot convey the trope, in one word, with sufficient clear-

[61] Matth. v. 5.

ness, a plain and proper term is much preferable to such attempts at expressing, in several words, a figure, whose whole effect results from its simplicity and conciseness.

§ 18. It is proper also to observe, that the idiom of one language will admit, in a consistency with elegance and energy, redundancies in expression, which have a very different effect, translated into another language. A few examples of this occur in the New Testament. *Υποποδιον των ποδων αυτου*[62], is adequately rendered, in the common translation, *his footstool*, but is literally *footstool of his feet.* It is the version given by the Seventy of the Hebrew phrase רגליו הדם, in which there is no pleonasm. Our translators have imitated them in rendering *ποιμην των προβατων shepherd of the sheep* [63], for here the redundancy is only in the version. The words *ανηρ* and *ανθρωπος*, are often by Greek authors, especially the Attic, construed with other substantives which, by a peculiar idiom, are used adjectively [64]. Matthew joins *ανθρωπος* with *εμπορος* [65], with *οικοδεσποτης* [66], with *βασιλευς* [67]; and John prefixes it to *αμαρτωλος* [68]. Luke, in similar cases, employs *ανηρ*,

[62] Matth. v. 35. [63] John, x. 2.

[64] This idiom is not peculiarly Greek. In Genesis, xiii. 8. *We are brethren*, is, in Hebrew, אנשים אחים אנחנו, in the Septuagint, *ανθρωποι αδελφοι ημεις εσμεν*, *We are men brethren.* Other examples might be produced.

[65] Matth. xiii. 45. [66] Matth. xiii. 52.

[67] Matth. xviii. 23. [68] John. ix. 16.

joining it to αμαρτωλος[69], προφητης[70], φονευς[71]. In some instances our translators have very properly dropt the redundant term; in others, for I know not what reason, they have retained it. Thus dropping it, they say *a prophet*, *a murderer*, and *a certain king*. On another occasion, in order to include both words, they say a *merchant-man*. But use, whose decisions are very arbitrary, has long appropriated this name to *a trading ship*. They say also *a man that is a householder*, *a man that is a sinner*[72], and, in one place, not badly, *a sinful man*[73]. In these, however, we must acknowledge, there is no deviation from the meaning. Such superfluous words as some of those now mentioned, enfeeble the expression, but without altering or darkening the sense.

But there is one case wherein this use of the noun, ανηρ, has, in the common version, occasioned a small deviation from the meaning. The words ανδρες αδελφοι frequently occur in the Acts, and are always rendered by our translators, *Men and brethren*, as if the phrase were ανδρες και αδελφοι, thereby making them two distinct appellations. This I once thought peculiar to English translators, but have since found that the same method is in one place adopted by Luther, in his German translation, who

[69] Luke, v. 8. xix. 7.
[70] Luke, xxiv. 19.
[71] Acts, iii. 14.
[72] Luke, xix. 7. John, ix. 16
[73] Luke, v. 8.
[74] Acts i. 16.

says, **Ihr manner und bruder**[74]. Some foreign versions have scrupulously preserved the pleonastic form; one says *hommes freres*, another *huomini fratelli;* which are equally awkward in French and Italian, as *men brethren* would be in English; but into none of the versions in these languages which I have seen, is the conjunction inserted. Our interpreters must have proceeded on the supposition, that the Apostles, by such compellations, divided their hearers into two classes, one of whom they barely denominated *men*, the other they more affectionately saluted *brethren*. But that there is no foundation for this conceit is manifest; first, in that case, by the syntactic order, the copulative *και* must have been inserted between the titles. Yet, though *ανδρες αδελφοι* occurs in the Acts no fewer than thirteen times, no example of *ανδρες και αδελφοι* is to be found. Secondly, it is, as was signified above, entirely in the Greek idiom. *Ανδρες στρατιωται soldiers*, *ανδρες δικαστai judges*, in like manner as *ανδρες Αθηναιοι Athenians*, are warranted by the examples of Demosthenes, and the best writers in Greece. Thirdly, there is the same reason to introduce the copulative in the other examples above quoted, and to render *ανθρωπος εμπορος a man and a merchant*, *ανηρ αμαρτωλος, a man and a sinner*, and so of the rest, as *ανδρες αδελφοι men and brethren.* It may be thought that in the address *Ανδρες αδελφοι και πατερες*, as no conjunction is needed in the version but what is ex-

[74] Acts, i. 16.

pressed in the original, the word *men* ought to be preserved. But the use above examined sufficiently shows that, in all such cases, the word *ανδρες* is to be considered not as a separate title, but as an idiomatic supplement to *αδελφοι και πατερες*. the only titles given, and that therefore in translations into modern tongues, it ought to be dropt as an expletive which does not suit their idiom. The above criticism will also serve as one of the many evidences, that what is vulgarly called the most literal translation, is not always the most close.

§ 19. It may be proper also to observe, that the import of diminutives is not always to be determined by the general rules laid down by grammarians. *Βιβλιον* is only in form a diminutive of *βιβλος*, *οικια* of *οικος*, *δαιμονιον* of *δαιμων*; the same may be said of *εριφιον* as used in the Gospel. It cannot be understood as expressing littleness; for what is called *εριφια* in the only place where the word occurs [75], is *εριφοι* in the verse immediately preceding. The like may be said of *ονταριον* and *ονος*. And the application in that passage shows sufficiently, that it is not an expression of affection or tenderness. *Πινακιδιον* in Luke [76], denotes a thing differing rather in kind and use, than in dimensions from *πιναξ*, as used by the same Evangelist [77]. Some diminutives are intended to mark a distinction only in age or in size, as *δυ-*

[75] Matth. xxv. 33. [76] Luke, i. 63.

[77] Luke, xi. 39.

γατριον, βιβλαριδιον, οψαριον, ιχθυδιον, κλινιδιον, πλοιαριον, παιδιον, παιδαριον; and may be rendered into English by the aid of the epithet *little*, as *little daughter*, *little book*, *little fish*, or by a single word adapted to the meaning in the passage where it occurs, as *couch*, *boat*, *child*, *boy*, *infant*. Τεκνιον appears, on the contrary, more expressive of affection, than of size; τεκνια is therefore better rendered *dear children*, than *little children*, which, when addressed to grown persons, sounds very oddly. Sometimes the diminutive expresses contempt. In this way the word γυναικαρια is used by Paul [78], and is not badly translated *silly women*. But, in many cases, it must be acknowledged that the difference which a diminutive makes, though real, is of too delicate a nature to be transfused into a version. For when a translator, because the language which he writes, does not afford a term exactly equivalent, makes a stretch for a word; that word often farther exceeds the import of the original, than the common term would have fallen below it. For example, in the check which our Lord at first gave to the application of the Syrophenician woman, I consider the diminutive κυναρια as more emphatical in that place than κυνες; yet I think it is incomparably better rendered in the common version *dogs*, than in that of the anonymous translator *puppies*.

Nay, in the few cases (for they are but few) in which our language has provided us with diminu-

[78] 2 Tim. iii. 6.

tives, it is not always proper to render the Greek diminutive by the English. Αρνιον, for example, is in Greek the diminutive of αρς, so is *lambkin* of *lamb* in English, which is the only proper version of αρς. To translate αρνιον *lambkin*, must therefore be entirely agreeable to the laws of literal interpretation. Yet, who that understands English, would hesitate to affirm that a translator who should so render the word, wherever it occurs in the New Testament, would betray a great defect both of taste and of judgment? This is one of the many evidences we have that, without knowing somewhat of the sentiments and manners of a people, with which the genius of their language is intimately connected, we may, in translating their works, exhibit an uncouth representation of the dead letter, but are not qualified for transfusing into the version, the sense and spirit of their writings. The Greek abounds in diminutives of every kind, though used but sparingly in the Gospels; nay, even in the diminutives of diminutives. They are admitted into all kinds of composition, both prosaic and poetical, the most solemn as well as the most ludicrous. It is quite otherwise with us. We have but few of that denomination, and those few are hardly ever admitted into grave discussions. They are in a manner confined to pastoral poetry and romance, or at best to performances whose end is amusement rather than instruction. It is only in these that such words as *lordling*, *baby*, *manikin*, could be tolerated. Αρνιον, in Greek, is a word of sufficient dignity, which *lambkin* in English is not. This term shows

rather a playful than a serious disposition in the person who uses it. I have been the more particular here in order to show that, if we would translate with propriety, more knowledge is requisite than can be furnished by lexicons and grammars. So much for what, in translating, concerns the justness of expression necessary for promoting the author's intention, and conveying his sentiments.

§ 20. NEXT to the justness, the perspicuity of what is said will be universally admitted to be, of all the qualities of style, the most essential. Some indeed seem to think that this is peculiarly the author's province, and no farther the translator's, than he has the warrant of his original. Such was the opinion of Le Clerc, a man of considerable name in literature. "Quamvis Latina lingua," says he [79], "perspicuitate "multo magis quam Hebraica gaudeat, imo vero "obscuritatem, quantum potest, vitare soleat: ubi "Hebraica obscura sunt, translationem nostram ob- "scuriorem esse non diffitemur. Sed ut ea de- "mum effigies laudatur, non quæ vultum formosum "spectandum, sed qualis est revera, spectantium "oculis offert; sic translatio, ubi archetypus sermo "clarus est, clara; ubi obscurus obscura esse de- "bet." This judgment he qualifies with the following words: "Obscura autem hic vocamus, non "quæ Hebraicæ linguæ nesciis obscura sunt, sic "enim pleræque loquutiones scripturæ obscuræ

[79] Proleg. in Pent. Diss. II. § 4.

" essent, sed quæ a linguæ non imperitis hodie non " satis intelliguntur. Contra vero clara esse dicimus, " non ea tantum quæ omnibus, etiam imperitis aperta " sunt, sed quæ linguæ peritioribus nullum negotium " facessunt." But even with this qualification the sentiment does not appear defensible. It makes the standard of perspicuity what it is impossible for any person exactly to know, namely, the degree of knowledge in the original attained (not by the translator, but) by the learned in general in the Oriental languages at the time. " Obscura vocamus quæ a linguæ non imperitis *hodie*, non satis intelliguntur." In consequence of which the Scriptures ought to be translated more perspicuously at one time than at another, because the original is better understood at one time than at another. That in fact they will be so, when in the hands of a translator of superior capacity and knowledge, cannot be questioned. But, by this critic's rule, if I understand him right, the interpreter ought not to avail himself of greater abilities, if he have greater abilities; but, however clear the sentiments are to him, he ought to render them obscurely, if the original appear obscure to the critics of the age. In this case, it would be of little consequence, whether the translator were profoundly skilled in the languages or not. The only thing of importance would be, that he were well versed in the interpretations and comments of others. This is so absurd, that I cannot allow myself to think that it was the fixed opinion of that critic, or the rule by which he

conducted himself in translating; yet it is hardly possible to put another construction upon his words.

§ 21. HOUBIGANT, without minding the qualification above quoted, severely censures the general position, that the obscurities of an author ought to be rendered obscurely. "Obscurus," says he[80], "est "non semel Horatius; num igitur laudanda ea erit "Horatii Gallica interpretatio, quæ Horatium faciet "Gallico sermone, ubi clarus est, clare, ubi obscu- "rus, obscure loquentem?" I must, however, say so much for Le Clerc, as to acknowledge, that the cases compared by Houbigant, are not parallel. Greater freedom may reasonably be used with profane authors than with the sacred. If the general tenour and connection be preserved in the thoughts of a Greek or Latin poet, and if the diction be harmonious and elegant, a few mistakes about the import of words, by which the scope of the whole is little affected, will be thought, even by the most fastidious critics, a more pardonable fault than such obscurity as interrupts a reader, and makes it difficult for him to divine the sense. But it is otherwise with a book of so great authority as the Scriptures. It is better that, in them, the reader should sometimes be at a loss about the sentiment, than that he should have a false sentiment imposed upon him for a dictate of the Spirit of God. I approve much more what follows in Houbigant: "Humani ingenii est,

[80] Proleg. Cap. V. Art. III.

" non linguæ cujuscunque obscuritas, divini sermo-
" nis dos perpetua, ut dignitas, ita etiam perspicui-
" tas. Ut quanquam obscura nunc esset Hebraica
" lingua, tamen dubitandum non esset, quæ sacri
" autores scripserunt, perspicue scripsisse: nobis
" igitur esse maxime elaborandum, ut quæ nunc no-
" bis obscura esse videantur, ad pristinam nativam-
" que perspicuitatem, quoad fieri potest, revocemus;
" non autem nos nobis contentos esse debere, si
" quæ prima specie obscura erant, obscure conver-
" terimus." I have already given my reasons [81] for thinking that the historical style of the Scriptures, in consequence of its greater simplicity, is naturally more perspicuous than that of most other writings. But it is impossible that their sense should appear, even to men of profound erudition, with the same facility and clearness, as it did to the countrymen and contemporaries of the inspired writers, men familiarized to their idiom, and well acquainted with all the customs and manners to which there are, in those writings, incidental allusions. If then, to adopt Le Clerc's similitude, we prefer likeness to the original before beauty, we must endeavour to make our translation as perspicuous to our readers, as we have reason to think the writings of Moses were, not to modern linguists, but to the ancient Israelites, and the writings of the Evangelists to the Hellenist Jews. This is the only way, in my judgment, in which,

[81] Diss. III.

consistently with common sense, we can say that a resemblance, in perspicuity, is preserved in the translation.

§ 22. But, it may be asked, Is there then no case whatever, wherein it may be pardonable, or even proper, to be, in some degree, obscure? I acknowledge that there are such cases, though they occur but seldom in the historical books. First, it is pardonable to be obscure, or even ambiguous, when it is necessary for avoiding a greater evil. I consider it as a greater evil in a translator, to assign a meaning merely from conjecture, for which he is conscious he has little or no foundation. In such cases, the method taken by Castalio, is the only unexceptionable method, to give a literal translation of the words, and acknowledge our ignorance of the meaning. For the same reason, there will be a propriety in retaining even some ambiguities in the version. But this method ought to be taken, only when the interpreter, using his best judgment, thinks there is ground to doubt which of the two senses, suggested by the words, is the meaning of the author. If the language of the version be susceptible of the same ambiguity which he finds in the original, it ought to be preserved; but if the language be not susceptible of it, which often happens, the translator should insert the meaning he prefers in the text, and take notice of the other in the notes, or on the margin.

I shall give some examples of both. The Evan-

gelist John says [82], Ην το φως το αληθινον ὁ φωτιζει παντα ανθρωπον ερχομενον εις τον κοσμον. Here we have an ambiguity in the word ερχομενον, which may be either the nominative neuter, agreeing with φως, or the accusative masculine, agreeing with ανθρωπον. Our translators have preferred the latter meaning, and said, *That was the true light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world.* It was hardly possible to preserve the native simplicity of the expression, and retain the ambiguity in English. I have, therefore, as I preferred the former meaning, rendered the verse, *The true light was he, who coming into the world, enlighteneth every man*, and mentioned the other sense in the note, assigning the reasons which determined my choice.

Another Evangelist represents our Lord as saying [83], Λεγω ὑμιν, ὁτι ὑμεις ὁι ακολουθησαντες μοι, εν τη παλιγγενεσια, ὁταν καθισῃ ὁ ὑιος τυ ανθρωπυ επι θρονυ δοξης αυτυ καθισεσθε και ὑμεις επι δωδεκα θρονυς κρινοντες τας δωδεκα φυλας τυ Ισραηλ. Here the clause εν τη παλιγγενεσια, may be construed, either with the preceding words, or with the following. In the former of these ways our translators have understood them, and have, therefore, rendered the verse, *I say unto you, that ye which have followed me in the regeneration; when the Son of man shall sit in the throne of his glory, ye also shall sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel.* I think, on the contrary, that the words ought to be

[82] John, i. 9. [83] Matth. xix. 28.

understood in the latter way, and have, therefore, translated them in this manner: *I say unto you, that at the renovation, when the Son of man shall be seated on his glorious throne, ye my followers, sitting also upon twelve thrones, shall judge the twelve tribes of Israel.* For this choice I have assigned my reasons in the note on the passage.

§ 23. But it sometimes happens, that the preference of one of the meanings of an equivocal word or phrase, cannot be determined with probability sufficient to satisfy a candid critic. In this case, when the version can be rendered equally susceptible of the different meanings, candour itself requires, that the interpreter give it this turn. By so doing, he puts the unlearned reader on the same footing on which the learned reader is put by the author. It does not often happen that this is possible, but it happens sometimes. The word *αιων* may denote, either the world, in the largest acceptation, or the age, state, or dispensation of things, answering nearly to the Latin *seculum*. There are some passages in the New Testament, on which probable arguments may be advanced in favour of each interpretation. Nay, some have plausibly contended, that in the prophetic style, there is no impropriety in admitting both senses. Now, by rendering *αιων*, in those doubtful cases, *state*, the same latitude is given the sentiment in English, which the words have in the

original. See the note on this passage in Matthew [84], *ουκ αφεθησεται αυτω, ουτε εν τω νυν αιωνι, ουτε εν τω μελλοντι*, which I have rendered, *will never be pardoned, either in the present state, or in the future.*

§ 24. THERE are, moreover, a few instances, in which it cannot be doubted that there is an intentional obscurity. In these it is plain, that the same degree of darkness which is found in the original ought, as far as possible, to be preserved in the version. Predictions are rarely intended to be perfectly understood till after their fulfilment, and are intended to be then understood by means of their fulfilment. When our Lord said to his disciples, in his last consolatory discourse [85], *Within a little while ye shall not see me, a little while after ye shall see me, because I go to the Father*, we learn, from what follows, that they did not understand him. Yet, though he perceived they were puzzled, he did not think proper to clear up the matter; but, that his words might make the deeper impression upon their minds, he mentioned some additional circumstances, the triumph of the world, the sorrow of the disciples at first, and joy afterwards. He knew that his death and resurrection, which were soon to follow, would totally dissipate all doubts about his meaning. It must be injudicious, therefore, to render the verse in such a manner as to leave no room, to persons in their circumstances, for doubt and perplexity. Yet in one version it is thus translated: "In a very lit-

[84] Matth. xii. 32. [85] John, xvi. 16.

" tle time you will not see me—in a very little time " you will see me again—for I am going to the Fa- " ther, shortly to return." The last clause, *shortly to return*, for which there is no warrant in the original, removes the difficulty at once, and consequently, makes the disciples appear, in the subsequent verses, in a very strange light, as being at a loss to understand what is expressed in the clearest manner. It holds, therefore, true in general that, in translating prophecy, we ought to avoid giving the version either more or less light than is found in the original. The anonymous translator often errs in this way. Thus, in the prophecy on mount Olivet, where our Lord says [86], *These things must happen, but the end is not yet*, the last clause, οπω εςι το τελος, he renders, *the end of the Jewish age is not yet.* There is nothing answering to the words *of the Jewish age* in the Gospel. It is not certain that the word τελος here relates to the same event which is called συντελεία τυ αιωνος a little before [87]. At any rate, there is no mention of *Jews*, or *Jewish*, in the whole prophecy. Nay, if it were absolutely certain, that the meaning is what this interpreter has expressed, it would be wrong to render it so, because we have reason to conclude, that it was not without design that our Lord, on that occasion, employed more general terms.

[86] Matth. xxiv. 6. [87] Ver. 3.

§ 25. In some cases, it is particularly unsuitable to be more explicit than the sacred authors, how certain soever we be that we express the meaning. A little reflection must satisfy every reasonable person, that events, depending on the agency of men, cannot, with propriety, be revealed, so as to be perfectly intelligible to those on whose agency they depend. For, if we suppose that the things predicted, are such as they would not knowingly be the instruments of executing, either it will be in their power to defeat the intention of the prophecy, or they must be over-ruled in their actions by some blind fatality, and consequently cannot be free agents in accomplishing the prediction. Neither of these suits the methods of Providence. God does not force the wills of his creatures; but he makes both their errors and their vices conduce to effect his wise and gracious purposes. This conduct of Providence was never more eminently displayed, than in what related to the death and sufferings of the Son of God. The predictions of the ancient prophets are so apposite, and so clearly explained by the events, that we are at no loss to apply them; nay, we find some difficulty in conceiving how they could fail of being understood by those who were the instruments of their accomplishment. Yet, that they were misunderstood by them, we have the best authority to affirm: *I wot*, says Peter [88] to the people of Jerusalem, who had, with clamour, demanded of Pilate the crucifixion of Jesus, *that, through ignorance, ye did it, as did also*

[88] Acts, iii. 17, 18.

your rulers; but those things which God before had shewed, by the mouth of all his Prophets, that Christ should suffer, he hath so fulfilled. The predictions in the Gospel are conveyed in the same idiom, and under the like figurative expressions, as are those of the Old Testament. And, though many of the events foretold, which are now accomplished, have put the meaning of such prophecies beyond all question, we ought not, in translating them, to add any light borrowed, merely, from the accomplishment. By so doing, we may even materially injure the history, and render those mistakes incredible, which, on a more exact representation of things, as they must have appeared at the time, were entirely natural.

§ 26. THE commentator's business ought never to be confounded with the translator's. It is the duty of the latter to give every thing to his readers, as much as possible, with the same advantages, neither more nor fewer, with which the sacred author gave it to his contemporaries. There were some things which our Saviour said, as well as some things that he did, to his disciples, which it was not intended that they should understand then, but which, if taken notice of then, and remembered, they would understand afterwards. *These things*, said our Lord[89], *I have spoken to you in figures; the time cometh when I shall no longer speak to you in figures; but instruct you plainly concerning the Father.* It was,

[89] John. xvi. 25.

therefore, not intended that every thing in the Gospel should be announced, at first, with plainness. It is, withal, certain, that the veil of figurative language, thrown over some things, was employed to shade them, only for a time, and, in the end, to conduce to their evidence and greater lustre. *For there* was *no secret that* was *not to be discovered; nor* was *aught concealed which was not to be divulged*[90]. Now, justice is not done to this wise conduct of the Spirit, unless things be represented, in this respect also, as nearly as possible, in his own manner. And those translators who have not attended to this, have sometimes, by throwing more light than was proper on particular expressions, involved the whole passage in greater darkness, and made it harder to account for the facts recorded.

§ 27. At the same time, let it be remembered, that the case of prophecy is in a great measure peculiar; and we have reason to think, that there is hardly any other case in which we are in danger of exceeding in perspicuity. Even in those places of the Gospel, about the meaning of which expositors are divided, there is ground to believe, that there is no intended obscurity in the original; but that the difficulty arises merely from an allusion to some custom, or an application of some term, at that time familiar, but at present, not easily discovered. Where the translator is in the dark, his version ought not to

[90] Mark, iv. 22.

be decisive. But where he has rational grounds for forming a judgment, what he judges to be the sense, he ought to express with clearness.

§ 28. I HAVE oftener than once had occasion to observe, that wherever propriety, perspicuity, and the idiom of the tongue employed, permit an interpreter to be *close*, the more he is so, the better. But what it is to be *literal*, I have never yet seen defined by any critic or grammarian, or even, by any advocate for the literal manner of translating. A resemblance in sound, by the frequent use of derivatives from the words of the original, cannot, where there is no coincidence in the sense, confer on a translator, even the slight praise of being literal. Who would honour with this denomination one who, in translating Scripture, should render συμφωνια *symphony*, ὑπερβολη *hyperbole*, παροξυσμος *paroxysm*, φαρμακεια *pharmacy*, συκοφαντειν *to play the sycophant*, παραδοξα *paradoxes*, ιδιωτης *idiot?* Yet some of the consecrated words have no better title to this distinction.

I once met with a criticism, I do not remember where, on a passage in the Epistle of James [91], in which God is called the *Father of lights*, παρ' ὡ ουκ ενι παραλλαγη, η τροπης αποσκιασμα. The critic profoundly supposes, that the sacred penman, though writing to the Christian converts, of the dispersed Jews, amongst whom there certainly were not many

[91] James, i. 17.

noble, or rich, or learned, addressed them in the language of astronomy; and therefore renders παραλλαγη *parallax*, and τροπη *tropic*. If this be to translate very literally, it is also to translate very absurdly. And surely the plea is not stronger, that is urged in favour of those interpreters who, without regard to usage in their own language, scrupulously exhibit, in their versions, the etymologies of their author's words, especially compound words. Such, if they would preserve consistency, ought to translate ευηθης *well-bred*, ραδιωργια *easy work*, σπερμολογος *seed-gatherer*, πανυργος *all-working*, γλωσσοκομον *tongue-case*, and παμπολυς *all-many*. The similar attempts of some, at analysing phrases, or idiomatical expressions, in their version, which are but a looser sort of composition, fall under the same denomination. Both the above methods, though differing greatly from each other, are occasionally patronized as literal, by the same persons. There is a third particular, which is considered as, perhaps, more essential to this mode of interpreting, than either of the former, and which consists in tracing, as nearly as possible, in the version, the construction and arrangement of the original. This, if not carried to excess, is less exceptionable than either of the former.

§ 29. BUT, it deserves our notice, that translators attempting, in this way, to keep closely to the letter, have sometimes failed, through their attending more to words and particles, considered separately,

than to the combination and construction of the whole sentence. Thus, the words of our Lord [92], Πας γαρ ὁ αιτων λαμβανει, και ὁ ζητων ἑυρισκει, as rendered in the common translation, *For every one that asketh receiveth; and he that seeketh, findeth;* err in this very way. Ὁ ζητων ἑυρισκει, taken by itself as a separate sentence, cannot be better rendered than *he that seeketh, findeth.* But in this passage it is only a clause of a sentence. The words πας γαρ, wherewith the sentence begins, relate equally to both clauses. The version here given, *For whosoever asketh, obtaineth; whosoever seeketh, findeth,* is, in fact, therefore, more close to the letter, as well as to the sense: for, by the syntactic order, the second clause evidently is πας ὁ ζητων ἑυρισκει. The Vulgate is both literal and just, *Omnis enim qui petit, accipit; et qui quærit, invenit.* Here *omnis*, like πας, belongs to both members. Had our translators, in the same manner, said, *Every one that asketh, receiveth; and that seeketh, findeth;* leaving out the pronoun *he*, they would have done justice both to the form and to the sense. But they have chosen rather to follow Beza, who says, *Quisquis enim petit, accipit; et qui quærit, invenit;* where, though the second member is the same as in the Vulgate, the expression in the Gospel is in effect differently translated, as *quisquis* cannot, like *omnis*, be supplied before *qui.* I acknowledge that there is not a material difference in meaning. Only the second clause in

[92] Matth. vii. 8. See the note on that verse.

Beza is expressed more weakly, and appears not to affirm so universally as the first clause. The clause, as expressed in Greek, has no such appearance.

§ 30. FOR a similar reason, the words οπου ὁ σκωληξ αυτων ου τελευτα, και το πυρ ου σβεννυται [93], are, in my opinion, more strictly rendered, *where their worm dieth not, and their fire is not quenched*, than as in the common version, *the fire is not quenched*. The manner in which the clauses are here connected, rendered the repetition of the pronoun in the second clause unnecessary, because in Greek it is in such cases understood as repeated. Whereas in English, when *the fire* is said, the pronoun cannot be understood. It is excluded by the article, which is never by us joined with the possessive pronoun. Could we, with propriety, imitate the Greek manner entirely, making the personal pronoun supply the possessive, and saying, *where the worm of them dieth not, and the fire is not quenched*, the pronoun might be understood in English as well as in Greek. But such an idiom with us would be harsh and unnatural. It gives an additional probability to this explanation, that, in the passage in the Old Testament referred to [94], it is expressly *their fire*, as well as *their worm*. In Hebrew the affixes are never left to be supplied. This remark regards only the exhibition of the con-

[93] Mark, ix. 44. 46. 48. [94] Isaiah, lxvi. 24.

struction, for the sense is not affected by the difference.

§ 31. THE words of John, Ὁ ποιων την δικαιοσυνην δικαιος εστι, καθως εκεινος δικαιος εστι[95], are, in my judgment, more literally rendered, *He that doth righteousness is righteous, even as God is righteous*, than as it stands in the English translation, *even as he is righteous*. The English pronoun *he* does not correspond to the Greek εκεινος so situated. In English, the sentence appears, to most readers, a mere identical proposition: in Greek it has no such appearance, εκεινος plainly referring us to a remote antecedent. As no pronoun, in our language, will here answer the purpose, the only proper recourse is to the noun whose place it occupies[96]. The intention of the three examples just now given, is to show that, when the construction of the sentence is taken into the account, that is often found a more literal (if by this be meant *closer*) translation, which, to a superficial view, appears less so.

§ 32. I SHALL here take notice of another case in which we may translate literally, nay, justly, and perspicuously, and yet fail greatly, in respect of energy. This arises from not attending to the minute, but often important, differences in structure, between the language of the original, and that of the

[95] 1 John, iii. 7. [96] Luke, ix. 34.

version. Of many such differences between Greek and English, I shall mention at present only one. We find it necessary to introduce some of the personal pronouns almost as often as we introduce a verb. Not only does our idiom require this, but our want of inflections constrains us to take this method for conveying the meaning. In the ancient languages this is quite unnecessary, as the inflection of the verb, in almost every case, virtually expresses the pronoun. There are certain cases, nevertheless, wherein the pronoun is also employed in those languages. But, in those cases, it has, for the most part, an emphasis which the corresponding pronoun with us, because equally necessary in every case, is not fitted for expressing. Thus our Lord says to his disciples [97], Ουχ ὑμεις με εξελεξασθε, αλλ' εγω εξελεξαμην ὑμας, which is rendered in the common version, *Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you.* This version is at once literal, just, and perspicuous; yet it has not the energy of the original. The stress laid on ὑμεις and εγω, which are here contrasted with manifest intention, because the words are otherwise superfluous, is but feebly, if at all, represented by the pronouns *ye* and *I*, which are, in English, necessary attendants on the verbs. Our translators could not have rendered differently, had the words been Ου με εξελεξασθε, αλλ' εξελεξαμην ὑμας. Yet every reader of taste will perceive that this expression is not nearly so emphatical. I might

[97] John, xv. 16.

add that such a reader will be sensible, that even so slight a circumstance as beginning the sentence with the negative particle, adds to the emphasis, and that ὑμεις ου would not have been so expressive as ουχ ὑμεις. To do justice, therefore, to the energy, as well as to the sense of the original, it is necessary, in modern languages, to give the sentence a different turn. The Port Royal, and after them Simon, and other French translators, have done this successfully by rendering it, *Ce n'est pas vous qui m'avez choisi, mais c'est moi qui vous ai choisi.* The like turn has been given by some very properly to the words in English, *It was not you who chose me, but it was I who chose you.*

I recollect one instance in the Old Testament, wherein our translators have taken this method. Joseph, after he had discovered himself to his brethren, observing that the remembrance of their guilt overwhelmed them with terror and confusion; in order to compose their spirits, says to them [98], *It was not you that sent me hither, but God.* The expression in the Greek translation is perfectly similar to that above quoted from the Gospel. Ουχ ὑμεις με απεςαλκατε ὡδε, αλλ' η ὁ Θεος. In the original Hebrew it is not less so: לא אתם שלחתם האלהים כי הנה אתי. I do not say, however, that the pronoun, when mentioned, is, in every case, emphatical, or that, in every case, it would be proper to deviate from the more simple manner of translating.

[98] Gen. xlv. 8.

§ 33. THUS much shall suffice for what regards those leading rules in translating, which may be judged necessary for securing propriety, perspicuity, and energy; and, as far as possible, in a consistency with these, for doing justice to the particular manner of the author translated; and for bestowing on the whole, that simple kind of decoration, which is suited to its character. This finishes the first part of this Dissertation relating to the matter or principal qualities to be attended to in translating.

PART II.

THE READINGS OF THE ORIGINAL HERE FOLLOWED.

I SHALL now subjoin a few remarks on the readings, where there is, in the original, a diversity of reading, which are here preferred.

Were it in our power to recur to the autographies of the sacred penmen, that is, to the manuscripts written by themselves, or by those whom they employed, to whom they dictated, and whose work they supervised, there could be no question that we ought to recur to them, as the only infallible standards of divine truth. But those identical writings, it is acknowledged on all hands, are nowhere now to be found. What we have, in their stead, are the copies of copies (through how many successions, it

is impossible to say), which were originally taken from those autographies. Now, though Christians are generally agreed in ascribing infallibility to the sacred penmen, no Christian society, or individual, that I know, has ever yet ascribed infallibility to the copiers of the New Testament. Indeed, some Christians appear absurd enough to admit thus much in favour of those who have transcribed the Old Testament; about which they seem to imagine, that Providence has been more solicitous than about the New. For, in regard to the New Testament, nothing of this kind has ever been advanced. Now, what has been said of the transcribers of the New Testament may, with equal certainty, be affirmed of the editors and printers. It is, nevertheless, true, that, since the invention of printing, we have greater security than formerly, against that incorrectness which multiplies the diversities of reading; inasmuch as now, a whole printed edition, consisting of many thousand copies, is not exposed to so many errors, as a single written copy was before. But this invention is comparatively modern. Besides, the effect it had, in point of correctness, was only to check the progress, or, more properly, to prevent the increase of the evil, by giving little scope for new variations. But it could have no retrospective effect in rectifying those already produced.

§ 2. It behoved the first editors of the New Testament in print, to employ the manuscripts of which they were possessed, with all their imperfections.

And who will pretend that Cardinal Ximenes, Erasmus, Robert Stephens, and the other early publishers of the New Testament, to whom the republic of letters is indeed much indebted, were under an infallible direction in the choice of manuscripts, or in the choice of readings in those passages wherein their copies differed from one another? That they were not all under infallible guidance, we have ocular demonstration, as, by comparing them, we see that, in many instances, they differ among themselves. And if only one was infallibly directed, which of them, shall we say, was favoured with this honourable distinction? But, in fact, though there are many well-meaning persons, who appear dissatisfied with the bare mention of various readings of the sacred text, and much more with the adoption of any reading to which they have not been accustomed, there is none who has yet ventured to ascribe infallibility, or inspiration, to any succession of copyists, editors, or printers. Yet, without this, to what purpose complain? Is it possible to dissemble a circumstance clear as day, that different copies read some things differently? a circumstance of which every person who, with but a moderate share of knowledge, will take the trouble to reflect, must be convinced that it was inevitable? Or, if it were possible to dissemble it, ought this truth to be dissembled? If, in any instance wherein the copies differ, there appear, upon inquiry, sufficient reason to believe, that the reading of one copy, or number of copies, is the dictate of inspiration, and that the reading

of the rest, though the same with that of the printed edition most in use, is not; will the cause of truth be better served by dissimulation, in adhering to a maxim of policy, merely human, or by conveying, in simplicity, to the best of our power, the genuine sense of the Spirit? The former method savours too much of those pious frauds which, though excellent props to superstition, in ignorant and barbarous ages, ought never to be employed in the service of true religion. Their assistance she never needs, and disdains to use. Let us then conclude that, as the sacred writings have been immensely multiplied, by the copies which have been taken from the original manuscripts, and by the transcripts successively made from the copies; the intrusion of mistakes into the manuscripts, and thence into printed editions, was, without a chain of miracles, absolutely unavoidable.

§ 3. It may be thought that the transmission, through so many ages, merely by transcribing, in order to supply the place of those copies which, from time to time, have been destroyed or lost, must have, long before now, greatly corrupted the text, and involved the whole in uncertainty. Yet, in fact, the danger here is not near so great as, at first, it would appear. The multiplication of the copies, the very circumstance which occasions the increase of the evil, has, in a great measure, as it began very early, brought its own remedy along with it, namely, the opportunity it affords, of collating those which have

been made from different ancient exemplars. For, let it be observed, that different transcribers from a correct standard, rarely fall into the same errors. If, therefore, which is highly probable, as almost all those writings were originally intended for the use of multitudes, several copies were made directly from the writings of the sacred penmen, those transcripts, when the common archytype was lost, would serve, when collated, to correct one another: and, in like manner, the copies taken from one would serve to correct the copies taken from another. There are several considerations, arising from external circumstances, from which, among the different readings of different manuscripts, the preference may, with probability, be determined; such are the comparative antiquity, number, and apparent accuracy of the copies themselves. There are considerations, also, arising from internal qualities in the readings compared; such as, conformity to the grammatical construction, to the common idiom of the language, to the special idiom of the Hellenists, to the manner of the writer, and to the scope of the context. Need I subjoin the judgments that may be formed, by a small change in the pointing, or even in dividing the words? for, in these things, the critic is entitled to some latitude, as, in the most ancient manuscripts, there were neither points nor accents, and hardly a division of the words.

Next to the aid of manuscripts, is that of the Greek commentators, who give us, in their com-

mentaries, the text, as they found it at the time; and, next to this, we have that of ancient translations. I do not mean the aid they give for discovering the import of the original terms; for, in this respect, modern versions may be equally profitable; but, their leading to the discovery of a different reading in the manuscripts from which they were made. In this way, modern versions are of no use to the critic, the world being still in possession of their originals. Next to ancient translations, though very far from being of equal weight, are the quotations made by the Fathers, and early ecclesiastical writers. Of the degrees of regard due, respectively, to the several assistances above named, it would be superfluous here to discourse, after what has been written by Walton, Mill, Wetstein, Simon, Michaelis, Kennicott, and many others. As we can ascribe to no manuscript, edition, or translation, absolute perfection; we ought to follow none of them implicitly. As little ought we to reject the aid of any. On these principles I have proceeded in this version. Even the English translators have not scrupled, in a few instances, to prefer a manuscript reading to that of the printed editions, and the reading of the Vulgate to that of the Greek. Of the former, I remember two examples[99] in the Gospels, wherein our translators have adopted a reading different from the reading of the common Greek, and also different

[99] Matth. x. 10. John, xviii. 20.

from that of the Vulgate; and not a few [100], wherein they have preferred the latter to the former, some times, in my opinion, rashly. The passages are mentioned in the margin; the reader may compare them at his leisure, and consult the notes relating to them, subjoined to this translation.

§ 4. BENGELIUS, though he consulted manuscripts, declares, that he has followed none in the edition he has given of the New Testament, unless where they supported the reading of some one, at least, of the printed editions. "This," says Bowyer [101], "is the greatest deference that was ever paid to the press." But, with all due respect to the judgment of that worthy and learned printer, I do not think it evidence of a deference to the press, but of an extravagant deference to the first editors of the sacred books in print. The Scriptures of the New Testament had been conveyed, by manuscript, for about fourteen hundred years before the art of printing existed. As it has never been pretended that the first printers, or the first publishers, were inspired, or ought to be put on the footing of Prophets, we conclude, that if their editions contain things not warranted by the manuscripts or ancient versions then extant, such things must be erroneous, or, at least, apocryphal. And, if every thing they

[100] Matth. xii. 14. xxv. 39. xxvi. 15. Mark, vi. 56. Luke, i. 35. ii. 22. xi. 13. John, xvi. 2. xviii. 1. 15.

[101] Pref. to his Critical Conjectures.

contain may be found in some manuscripts or versions of an older date, though not in all, our giving such a preference to the readings copied into the printed editions, can proceed from nothing but a blind deference to the judgment of those editors, as always selecting the best. Whether they merited this distinction, the judicious and impartial will judge. But no reasonable person can hesitate a moment to pronounce, that if, of all the readings they had met with, they had selected the worst, the press would have conveyed them down to us with equal fidelity. We may then have a prejudice in favour of the printed editions, because we are accustomed to them, but have no valid reason for preferring them to manuscripts, unless it arise from a well-founded preference of the first editors of the New Testament to all other scriptural critics, as men who had the best means of knowing what was preferable in the manuscripts, and who were the most capable of making a proper choice. But hardly will either be admitted by those who are acquainted with the state of this species of literature, at that time, and since.

§ 5. THOUGH not the first published, the first prepared for publication, was the Complutensian Polyglot, by Cardinal Ximenes, a Spaniard. The sentence, formerly quoted from him, relating to the place he had assigned the Vulgate in his edition, between the Hebrew and the Greek, and his indecent comparison of its appearance there, to our Lord crucified between the two malefactors, do not serve

to raise our opinion either of his judgment, or of his impartiality. He boasted of the use he had made of the Vatican, and other manuscripts of great antiquity, as to which Wetstein is not singular in expressing doubts of his veracity.

Erasmus is considered as the second editor. His New Testament was published, but not printed, before the Complutensian. He made use of some manuscripts of Bazil, and others, which he had collected in different parts; but he was so little scrupulous, in regard to the text, that what was illegible in the only Greek copy, he seems to have had, of the Apocalypse, he supplied, by translating back into Greek from the Vulgate. He published several editions of this work, the two or three last of which he brought to a greater conformity to the Complutensian printed at Alcala, than his three first were.

The third editor of note, (for I pass over those who did little other than republish either Ximenes or Erasmus,) was Robert Stephens. He allowed himself, in a great measure, to be directed by the two former editors; but not without using, on several occasions, the readings which he found in some of the best manuscripts he had collected. Many of the later editions of the New Testament are formed from some of his.

Beza, indeed, who was himself possessed of some valuable manuscripts, and was supplied, by Henry Stephens, with the various readings which had been collected by his father, sometimes introduced them into the text. But his choice was directed by no

principle of criticism. His great rule of preference, (as might be expected from the manner in which he conducted his translation,) was conformity to his own theological system. This led him to introduce variations, sometimes on the authority of a single manuscript of little or no account, sometimes without even that, insomuch that several of his alterations must be considered as conjectural. Yet his edition has been much followed by Protestants. Curcellæus [102] complains of him for having, by his own acknowledgment, suppressed many readings he was possessed of. Simon takes notice of the same thing [103]. And, it must be owned, that Beza's conduct, in other particulars, gives ground to suspect, that his impartiality, in a matter of this kind, was not to be relied on.

The only other editor I know, who has had recourse to guessing, for the improvement of his text, is the English translator in 1729, often before mentioned. He has, along with his version, republished the Greek text, corrected, as he pretends, from authentic manuscripts. It does not, however, appear, that he has been guided by critical principles in judging of manuscripts, or of the preference due to particular readings. His chief rule seems to have been their conformity to his own notions, which has led him to employ a boldness in correcting altogether unwarrantable.

[102] Pref. to his edition of the N. T. Nescio quo consilio, plurimas quas præ manibus habebat, publico inviderit.

[103] Hist. Crit. du N. T. lib. ii. cap. 29.

§ 6. WHAT follows may serve as evidence of this. Dr. Mill was so much pleased with a correction proposed by Bentley [104], as to say, "Mihi tantopere placet hæc lectio, ut absque unanimi codicum in altera ista lectione consensu, genuinam eam intrepide pronunciarem:" to which our editor gives this brief and contemptuous reply,—"As if there was any manuscript so old as COMMON SENSE." The greatest regard is doubtless due to *common sense;* but, where the subject is matter of fact, the proper province of common sense lies in comparing and judging the proofs brought before it, not in supplying from invention any deficiency in these. Common sense, or rather *Reason* is the judge in the trial. Manuscripts, versions, quotations, &c. are the testimonies. It would be a bad scheme in civil matters to supercede the examination of witnesses, on pretence that the sagacity of the judge rendered it unnecessary. Yet it might be pretended, that his penetration is such, that he can discover, at a glance, the truth, or the falsity, of the charge, from the bare physiognomy of the parties. But can you imagine, that people would think their lives, liberties, and properties, secure in a country, where this were the method of trial? Or will this method, think you, be found to answer better in critical, than in judicial matters? If, under the name of COMMON SENSE, we substitute the critic's fancy, in the room of testimony and all external evidence; we shall find, that we have established a test of cri-

[104] The passage, on which the correction was proposed, is Gal. iv. 25.

ticism which is infinitely various, not in different sects only, but in different individuals. The common sense of the aforesaid English editor, and the common sense of Beza (yet neither of them was destitute of this quality), would, I am afraid, have not very often coincided.

§ 7. SHALL we then set aside reason, or common sense, in such inquiries? On the contrary, no step can properly be taken without it. The judge is necessary in the trial, so are the witnesses: but there will be an end of all fairness, and an introduction to the most arbitrary proceedings, if the former be made to supply the place of both. In cases of this kind, we ought always to remember that the question, wherever any doubt arises, is a question of fact, not a question of right, or of abstract truth. It is, 'What was said;' not 'What should have been 'said;' or 'What we ourselves would have said,' had we been in the author's place. This is what we never mistake in the explanation of any pagan writer, or of any modern, but are very apt to mistake in the explanation of the Bible. If a Christian of judgment and knowledge were translating the Alcoran, there would be no risk of his confounding things so manifestly distinct. The reason is, such a translator's concern would only be to give the meaning of his author, without either inquiring or minding, whether it were agreeable, or contrary, to his own sentiments.

Whereas, it is a thousand to one that the Christian, of whatever denomination he be, has previously to his entering on the interpretation, gotten a set of opinions concerning those points about which Scripture is conversant. As these opinions have acquired a certain firmness through habit, and as a believer in Christianity cannot, consistently, maintain tenets which he sees to be repugnant to the doctrines contained in Scripture, he will find it easier, (unless possessed of an uncommon share of candour and discernment) to bring, by his ingenuity, (especially when aided by conjectural emendations) the dictates of revelation to a conformity to his opinions, than to bring his opinions to a conformity to the dictates of revelation. This tendency is the real cause of so much straining as is sometimes to be found in the manner of criticising holy writ; straining, let me add, to a degree which we never see exemplified, in interpreting any classical author. In the latter we are, comparatively, little interested, and are therefore ready to admit, on many occasions, that such are the sentiments expressed in his writings, though very different from our sentiments. But as Christians will not admit this with regard to the Bible, they have often no other resource, but either to wrest its words, or to change their own opinions. Which of these ways will be oftener taken, it is not difficult to say.

§ 8. I HAVE often wished (if such a person could be found) that an infidel of sufficient learning, pe-

netration, coolness, and candour, would, merely for the sake of illustrating, what must be allowed, even by him, to be curious pieces of ancient literature, undertake the translation of the sacred books. Such a man would have no bias upon his mind to induce him to wrest the words, in order to make them speak his own sentiments. And, if he had the genuine spirit of the philospher, historian, or antiquary, he would be solicitous to exhibit the manners, opinions, customs, and reasonings, of those early ages, fairly, as he found them, without adding any thing of his own, either to exalt, or to depress, the original. I should not think it impossible to find so much fairness in a Christian who, having resided long in India, and understood their sacred language, should undertake to translate to us the Scriptures of the Bramins; but such impartiality in an infidel living in a Christian country, would be, I fear, a chimerical expectation.

There is, however, I acknowledge, a considerable difference in the cases. We view with different eyes the opinions of remote ages and distant nations, from those wherewith we contemplate the sentiments of the times in which, and the people amongst whom, we live. The observation of our Lord [105] holds invariably, *He who is not for us, is against us; and he who gathereth not with us, scattereth.* We find no examples of neutrality in this cause. Whoever is not a friend is an enemy: and, for this reason, with-

[105] Matth. xii. 30.

out any violation of charity, we may conclude that the interpretation of Scripture is safer in the hands of the bigoted sectary, than in those of the opinionative infidel, whose understanding is blinded by the most inflexible and the most unjust of all passions, an inveterate contempt. Hatred, when alone, may be prevailed on to inquire, and, in consequence of inquiry, may be surmounted; but when hatred is accompanied with contempt, it spurns inquiry as ridiculous.

§ 9. BUT, it may be said, though this may be justly applied to the confirmed infidel, it is not applicable to the sceptic who, because, on both sides of the question, he finds difficulties which he is not able to surmount, is perplexed with doubts in relation to it. I am sensible of the difference, and readily admit that what I said of the infidel, does not apply to the last mentioned character. At the same time I must observe, that those just now described, appear to be a very small number, and are not the people whom the world at present commonly calls *sceptics*. This, on the contrary, like the term free-thinker, is become merely a softer and more fashionable name for *infidel;* for, on all those points wherein the sceptics of the age differ from Christians, they will be found, to the full, as dogmatical as the most tenacious of their adversaries [106]. Such, at least, is

[106] The only exception which has appeared in this age (if we can account one an exception who has done so much to un-

the manner of those who, in modern Europe, affect to be considered as philosophical sceptics.

§ 10. But, to return to the consideration of the first printed editions, from which it may be thought I have digressed too far: what has been said sufficiently shows that they are not entitled to more credit than is due to the manuscripts from which they were compiled. Nobody ascribes inspiration, or any

dermine in others a belief, with which at times he seems himself to have been strongly impressed) is that eminent but anomalous genius, Rousseau. He had the sensibility to feel strongly, if I may so express myself, the force of the internal evidence of our religion, resulting from the character, the life, and the death, of its Author, the purity and the sublimity of his instructions; he had the sagacity to discern, and the candour to acknowledge, that the methods employed by infidels in accounting for these things are frivolous, and, to every rational inquirer, unsatisfactory. At the same time, through the unhappy influence of philosophical prejudices, insensible of the force of the external evidence of prophecy and miracles, he did not scruple to treat every plea of this kind as absurd, employing against the same religion, even the poorest cavils that are any where to be found in the writings of infidels. Nay, for this purpose, he mustered up a world of objections, without ever discovering that he mistook the subject of dispute, and confounded the doctrine of particular sects or denominations of Christians, with the doctrine of Christ. The articles against which his artillery is generally pointed, are the comments of later ages, and not the pure dictates of holy writ. See the character of this extraordinary man (whom I here consider only as a sceptic) as delineated by the masterly pen of Dr. Beattie, Essay on Truth, Part III. chap. 2.

supernatural direction, to the first editors. And as to advantages merely natural, they where not on an equal footing with the critics of after-times. The most valuable manuscripts, far from being then generally known, remained scattered throughout the world. A few might fall under the notice of one curious inquirer, another few under that of another. But there had not been any number of them yet collated, and consequently their various readings had not been collected and published. Nay, that the judgment of those editors, concerning the antiquity and correctness of the manuscripts which they used, cannot be implicitly relied on, may warrantably be concluded from this circumstance, that this species of criticism was but in its infancy, and that even learned men had not then, as now, the necessary means of qualifying themselves, for judging of the antiquity, and correctness, of manuscripts. Besides, those publishers themselves were not unanimous. Nor were the alterations made by those of them who were posterior in time, always for the better. "I am "amazed," says Michaelis [107], very justly, "when I "hear some vindicate our common readings, as if "the editors had been inspired by the Holy Ghost."

Is it possible, then, to assign a satisfactory reason for the determination of Bengelius, not to admit any reading which had not the support of some former printed edition? "Ne syllabam quidem, etiamsi mille

[107] Introduc. Lect. sect. 34.

" MSS. mille critici juberent, antehac [in editioni-
" bus] non receptam, adducar ut recipiam [108]." He has not indeed confined himself, in his choice of readings, to any one edition, but has excluded entirely from his text, those readings which, however well supported, no preceding editor had adopted. This rule which he laid down to himself, is manifestly indefensible, inasmuch as the authority of the printed editions must ultimately rest on that of the manuscripts from which they are taken. Whereas it can give no additional value to the manuscripts, that some of the first publishers have thought fit to prefer them, perhaps injudiciously, to others; or, to speak more properly, have thought fit to copy them as the best they had. Their merit depends entirely on the evidences we have of their own antiquity, accuracy, &c. For none, surely, will be hardy enough to say, that errors, by being printed, will be converted into truths.

§ 11. THE only cause which I can assign, for the resolution taken by Bengelius, though of no weight in the scales of criticism and philosophy, may merit some regard, viewed in a prudential and political light. The printed copies are in every bodies hands; the manuscripts are known to very few: and though the easy multiplication of the copies, by the press, will not be considered, by any person who reflects, as adding any authority to the manuscripts from

[108] Prodromus.

which they were taken; it has, nevertheless, the same effect on the generality of mankind, as if it did. Custom, the duration, and the extent, of their reception, are powerful supports, with the majority of readers. The reason, therefore, which has influenced that learned editor is, at bottom, I suppose, the same that influenced Jerom, when revising the old Latin version, not to correct every thing which he was sensible stood in need of correction, that he might not, by the number and boldness of his alterations, scandalize the people. But this is a motive of a kind totally different from those which arise from critical considerations, and ought not to be confounded with them.

§ 12. I DO not mean to say, that this is a motive to which no regard should be shown. There are two cases in which, in my opinion, it ought to determine the preference; first, when the arguments in favour of one reading, appear exactly balanced by those in favour of another; secondly, when the difference in reading, cannot be said to affect either the sense, or the perspicuity, of the sentence. In the former case, when no better rule of decision can be discovered, it is but reasonable, that custom should be allowed to decide. In the latter, as we ought to avoid, especially in a version, introducing alterations of no significance, it might be justly accounted trifling, to take notice of such differences. In other cases, we ought to be determined by the rules of criticism; that is, in other words, by the evidence impartially examined. As to which, I shall

only add, that though much regard is due to the number of manuscripts, editions, versions, &c. yet, in ascertaining the preference, we ought not to be determined solely by the circumstance of number. The testimony of a few credible witnesses, outweighs that of many who are of doubtful character. Besides, there are generally internal marks of credibility or incredibility, in the thing testified, which ought always to have some influence on the decision.

§ 13. At the same time, I cannot help disapproving the admission of any correction (where the expression, as it stands in the text, is not downright nonsense) merely on conjecture: for, were such a method of correcting to be generally adopted, no bounds could be set to the freedom which would be used with sacred writ. We should very soon see it a perfect Babel in language, as various in its style, in different editions, as are the dialects of our different sects and parties. This is an extreme which, if it should prevail, would be of much more pernicious consequence than the other extreme, of adhering implicitly and inflexibly, with or without reason, to whatever we find in the common edition. We know the worst of this error already; and we can say, with assurance, that though the common editions are not perfect, there is no mistake in them of such a nature, as materially to affect, either the doctrines to be believed, or the duties to be practised, by a Christian. The worst consequences which the blunders of transcribers have occasioned,

are their hurting sometimes the perspicuity, sometimes the credibility, of holy writ, affording a handle to the objections of infidels, and thereby weakening the evidences of religion. But, as to the extreme of correcting on mere conjecture, its tendency is manifestly to throw every thing loose, and to leave all at the mercy of system-builders, and framers of hypotheses: for who shall give law to the licentiousness of guessing?

It is not enough to answer, that the classics have sometimes been corrected on conjecture. The cases are not parallel. A freedom may be taken with the latter with approbation, which cannot, with propriety, be taken with the former [109]. Houbigant, though

[109] Part I. § 21. Since these Dissertations were written, I have seen Dr. Geddes' PROSPECTUS, wherein, among many things which I entirely approve, I observed the following words (p. 55.) which appear to stand in direct contradiction to the opinion given above: "When the corruptions of the "text cannot be removed, either by the collation of manu- "scripts, or the aid of versions, internal analogy, or external "testimony, the last resourse is conjectural criticism." In opposition to this doctrine, he produces a popular objection, which he examines and answers. And, in this answer, he goes still further, affirming that there are cases in which the text may be restored by *mere critical conjecture*. I have attentively considered his answer, and am led by it to regret that, through the imperfection of all languages, ancient and modern, it often happens that writers agree in sentiments who differ in words, and agree in words who differ in sentiments. Though that author and I have, on this head, expressed ourselves very

a critic of eminence in Oriental literature, and a good translator, has, in my judgment, taken most unjus-

differently, I am apt to conclude, from the explanation he has given, the instances he has produced, and the canons he has laid down, that the difference between us is mostly, if not entirely, verbal. It lies chiefly in the sense affixed to the word *conjecture*. He has applied it to cases to which I should not think it applicable. When any passage contains in itself such indications, as are always accounted sufficient evidence of a particular alteration it has undergone, I never call the discovery of that alteration conjecture.

Now this is precisely the case in some of the instances given by Dr. Geddes. When, in one edition of the English Bible, we read *to ad daffliction to my bonds*, how do we reason from it? We perceive at once that *ad* is not English, neither is *daffliction*. Hence we conclude, with perfect assurance, that this is not the true reading, or the reading intended by the translators. A very little attention shows us that if, without altering the order of the letters, we take the *d* from the beginning of *daffliction*, and annex it to *ad* immediately preceding (which is the smallest alteration possible, as not a single letter intervenes) the expression is just in itself, and the meaning is suited to the context. As it stands, it is nonsense. No evidence can be more convincing. We may venture to say, that if there were fifty other editions of the English Bible at hand, no reasonable person would think of consulting any of them, for further satisfaction. Now I submit it to this critic himself, whether to say of any thing, "It is a matter of the ut-"most certainty," and to say, "It is a mere conjecture," be not considered as rather opposite in signification than coincident. There are some other of the learned Gentleman's examples, in which there is hardly more scope for conjecture than in that now examined: such as that wherein *terited* (which is no word) is used for *retired* (a word remarkably similar),

tifiable liberties in his conjectural emendations, and has been but too much followed by critics, commen-

and that wherein *well* (which in that place has no meaning) is used for *dwell.* In all such cases we are determined, by the internal evidence resulting from the similarity of the letters, from the scope of the place, and from the construction of the words. In a few of the cases put, there is, I own, something of conjecture; but the correction is not merely conjectural. Of this kind is that, *versed in the politer of learning*, where *parts* or *branches*, or some word of like signification, must be supplied. If it be asked, What then ought to be denominated a matter of mere conjecture? I answer, The reader will find an example of this in § 14. to which I refer him. We have but too many examples in some late critical productions of great name, wherein the authors, without any warrant from manuscripts or versions, and without any reason from the scope of the place, or the import of the passage, are perpetually proposing emendations on the text, and that by transposing, changing, adding, or dismissing, not only words but clauses, when the passage does not, as it stands, perfectly suit their notions.

That the text has sometimes been interpolated, and otherwise corrupted by transcribers and interpreters, cannot be questioned. Of this it is doubtless the critic's business to clear it as much as possible. But we ought ever to remember that the greater part of those corruptions were originally no other than conjectural corrections. And if we go to work in the same way, with such freedom of guessing as has sometimes been employed, it is ten to one that we ourselves corrupt the text instead of mending it, and that we serve only to furnish more work for future critics. I observe in the Monthly Review [August 1786] of Reed's late edition of Shakespeare, in a note on the expression *knowledge illinhabited*, which has given great plague to the critics, the following remark, "At all

tators, or paraphrasts, amongst ourselves. I am far from thinking that, in some of his guesses, he may not be right; it is, however, much more probable that, in the greater part of them, he is wrong.

A mere conjecture may be mentioned in a note; but if, without the authority of copies, translations, or ancient ecclesiastical writers, it may be admitted into the text, there is an end of all reliance on the Scriptures as the dictates of the divine Spirit. Manuscripts, ancient translations, the readings of the most early commentators, are, like the witnesses in a judicial process, direct evidence in this matter. The reasonings of conjecturers are but like the speeches of the pleaders. To receive, on the credit of a sagacious conjecture, a reading not absolutely necessary to the construction, and quite unsupported by positive evidence, appears not less incongruous,

" events we beg leave to enter our protest against putting *inhibit* " into the text. How many plausible conjectures, which their " ill-advised predecessors," former publishers, " had advanced " into the body of the page, have the late editors, in conse- " quence of their more extensive researches, been obliged to de- " grade to their proper place, the margin? Can they then be " too scrupulous in admitting their own corrections?" Upon the whole, from the way wherein Dr. Geddes qualifies his sentiments, I am convinced, that the difference between him and me on this article is more in the words than in the thought. His verdict in regard to every one of the particular cases, supposed by him, is unexceptionable: but his manner of expressing the general position is, in my opinion, unguarded, and consequently may mislead.

than it would be, in a trial, to return a verdict, founded on the pleading of a plausible speaker, not only without proof, but in direct opposition to it. For, let it be observed, that the copies, ancient versions, and quotations, which are conformable to the common reading, are positive evidence in its favour, and therefore against the conjecture. And even, if the readings of the passage be various, there is, though less, still some weight in their evidence against a reading merely conjectural, and consequently, destitute of external support, and different from them all. It must, however, be acknowledged, that the variety itself, if it affect some of the oldest manuscripts and translations, is a presumption that the place has been early corrupted in transcribing.

§ 14. I CANNOT avoid, here, taking notice of a correction, merely conjectural, proposed by the late Dr. Kennicott, a man to whose pious and useful labours, the learned in general, and the students of the divine oracles in particular, are under the greatest obligations. The correction he proposes [110], is on these words, תא רשעם קברו ואת עשיר במתיו ויתן. E. T. *And he made his grave with the wicked, and with the rich in his death* [111]. This ingenious critic supposes, that the words קברו and במתיו have, by some means or other, changed places. He would have them, therefore, transposed, or rather restored, each to its proper place, in consequence of

[110] Diss. II. chap. IV. 2d period. [111] Isa. liii. 9.

which, the import will be (I give it in his own words), *And he was taken up with wicked men in his death; and with a rich man was his sepulchre.* He adds: "Since the preceding parts of the pro-" phecy speak so indisputably of the sufferings and " death of the Messiah, these words seem evidently " meant, as descriptive of the Messiah's being put " to death in company with wicked men, and making " his grave, or sepulchre (not with rich men, but) " with one rich man."

Now, let it be observed, that of all the vast number of manuscripts which that gentleman had collated, not one was found to favour this arrangement; that neither the Septuagint, nor any other old translation, is conformable to it; that no ancient author, known to us, in any language, quotes the words, so arranged, either from the original, or from any version; and, consequently, that we cannot consider the conjecture otherwise, than as opposed by such a cloud of witnesses as, in inquiries of this kind, must be accounted strong positive evidence. Had the words, as they are read in Scripture, been ungrammatical, so as to yield no meaning that we could discover, and had the transposition of the two words added both sense and grammar to the sentence, and that in perfect consistency with the scope of the context, I should have readily admitted, that the criticism stood on a firmer foundation than mere conjecture, and that the external proofs, from testimony, might be counterbalanced by the intrinsic evidence arising from the subject. But this is not pretended here.

To be associated with the rich in death, is equally grammatical, and equally intelligible, as to be associated with the wicked; the like may be said in regard to burial. Where, then, is the occasion for a change? The only answer that can be given, is certainly a very bad one. The occasion is, that the words may be adjusted to an event which, in our opinion, is the fulfilment of the prophecy.

But, if such liberties may be taken with the Prophets, there will be no difficulty in obtaining, from them, proofs in support of any interpretation. The learned Doctor takes notice, that the preceding part of this chapter speaks indisputably of the sufferings and death of the Messiah. I am as much convinced as any man, that the subject of the prophecy is as he represents it; but, to say that it is indisputably so, seems to insinuate that it is universally admitted. Now this is far from being the fact. It is disputed by the whole Jewish nation, and is allowed by some Christian expositors, to be only, in a secondary sense, prophetical of Christ. Suppose a Christian, after the passage shall have been, in the Christian Bibles, new modelled in the way proposed, to urge it on a Jew, as an argument from prophecy, that Jesus, the son of Mary, is the person in whom the prediction was fulfilled, and therefore the Messiah; inasmuch as the words exactly represent what, in so signal a manner, happened to him.—He suffered with malefactors, and was buried in a rich man's sepulchre; would not the other have reason to retort, 'Ye Christians have a wonderful dexterity in

'managing the argument from prophecy; ye, first, 'by changing and transposing the Prophet's words, 'accommodating them to your purpose, make him 'say, what we have direct evidence that he never 'said; and then ye have the confidence to argue, this 'must infallibly be the event intended by the Pro-'phet, it so exactly answers the description. Ye 'yourselves make the prophecy resemble the event 'which ye would have to be predicted by it, and 'then ye reason, from the resemblance, that this is 'the completion of the prophecy.'

Let us judge equitably of men of all denominations. Should we discover that the Masorets had made so free with the declaration of any Prophet, in order to adapt it to what they take to be the accomplishment; would we hesitate a moment to call the words, so metamorphosed, a corruption of the sacred text? In an enlightened age, to recur to such expedients, will be always found to hurt true religion, instead of promoting it. The detection of them, in a few instances, brings a suspicion on the cause they were intended to serve, and would go far to discredit the argument from prophecy altogether. I cannot conclude this remark, without adding, that this is almost the only instance wherein I differ in critical sentiments from that excellent author; from whose labours, I acknowledge with gratitude, I have reaped much pleasure and instruction.

§ 15. To conclude what relates to various readings; those variations, which do not affect either

the sense or the connection, I take no notice of; because the much greater part of them would occasion no difference in translating; and even of the few of these which might admit some difference, the difference is more in words than in meaning. Again, such variations as even alter the sense, but are not tolerably supported, by either external, or internal, evidence, especially when the common reading has nothing in it apparently irrational, or unsuitable to the context, I have not judged necessary to mention. Those, on the contrary, which not only, in some degree, affect the sense, but, from their own intrinsic evidence, or from the respectable support of manuscripts and versions, have divided the critics about their authenticity, I have taken care to specify. When the evidence, in their favour, appeared to me clearly to preponderate, I have admitted them into the text, and assigned my reason in the notes. Wherever the matter seemed dubious, I have preferred the common reading, and suggested, in the notes, what may be advanced in favour of the other. When the difference lay in the rejection of a clause commonly received, though the probability were against its admission, yet, if the sentence or clause were remarkable, and if it neither conveyed a sentiment unsuitable to the general scope, nor brought obscurity on the context, I have judged it better to retain it, than to shock many readers by the dismission of what they have been accustomed to read in their Bible. At the same time, to distinguish such clauses, as of doubtful authority, I in-

close them in crotchets. Of this the doxology, as it is called, in the Lord's prayer, is an example. In other cases, I have not scrupled to omit what did not appear sufficiently supported.

PART III.

THE DIALECT EMPLOYED.

As to what concerns the language of this version, I have not much to add to the explanations I have given of my sentiments on this article, in the latter part of the preceding Dissertation, and the first part of the present. When the common translation was made, and (which is still earlier) when the English liturgy was composed, the reigning dialect was not entirely the same with that which prevails at present. Now, as the dialect which then obtained does, very rarely, even to the readers of this age, either injure the sense, or affect the perspicuity; I have judged it proper, in a great measure, to retain it. The differences are neither great, nor numerous. The third person singular of the present of the verb, terminates in the syllable *eth*, in the old dialect, not the letter *s*, as in that now current. The participles are very rarely contracted; nor is there ever any elision of

the vowels. Indeed, these elisions, though not entirely laid aside, are becoming much less frequent now, than they were about the beginning of the last century. The difference is, in itself, inconsiderable: yet, as all ranks and denominations of Christians are, from the use of, either the Bible, or the Book of Common Prayer, or both, habituated to this dialect; and as it has contracted a dignity, favourable to seriousness, from its appropriation to sacred purposes; it is, I think, in a version of any part of holy writ, entitled to be preferred to the modern dialect.

§ 2. THE gayer part of mankind will, doubtless, think that there is more vivacity in our common speech; as by retrenching a few unnecessary vowels, the expression is shortened, and the sentiment conveyed with greater quickness. But vivacity is not the character of the language of the sacred penmen. Gravity here, or even solemnity, if not carried to excess, is much more suitable. "I bid this man," says the centurion, in the anonymous translation [112], "Go, and he's gone; another, Come, and he's here; "and to my servant, Do this, and it is done." And in the parallel place in Luke [113], "Lord, don't give "yourself the trouble of coming; I don't deserve "you should honour my house with your pre- "sence." There are, I believe, not a few who would prefer this manner to that of the common version, as being much smarter, as well as more gen-

[112] Matth. viii. 9. [113] Luke, vii. 6.

teel. Surely, if that interpreter had given the smallest attention to uniformity, he would never have rendered αμην αμην λεγω ὑμιν, as he sometimes does, by the antiquated phrase, *Verily, verily I say unto you.* It would have been but of a piece with many passages of his version, to employ the more modish, and more gentlemanlike asseveration, "Upon my "honour." With those who can relish things sacred in this dress, or rather disguise, I should think it in vain to dispute.

§ 3. ANOTHER criterion of that solemn dialect, is the recourse, when an individual is addressed, to the singular number of the second personal pronoun *thou* and *thee*, and, consequently, to the second person singular of the verb, which being, in common language, supplied by the plural is, in a manner, obsolete. This also is, from scriptural use, and the constant use of it in worship, in the British dominions, both by those of the establishment, and by dissenters, universally intelligible, and now considered as the proper dialect of religion. Immediately after the Reformation, the like mode, in using the pronoun, was adopted by all Protestant translators into French, Italian, and German, as well as into English. But as, in Roman Catholic countries, those translations were of no authority; and as the Scriptures are read in their churches, and their devotions and ceremonies performed, in a language not understood by the people; the customs of dissenters, as all Protestants are in those countries, could not introduce, into the

language of religion, so great a singularity of idiom. And as there was nothing to recommend this manner to the people, whilst there were several things to prejudice them against it, we do not find that it has been employed by any late Popish translators into French.

What tended to prejudice them against it, is, first, the general disuse of it in the ordinary intercourse of men; and, secondly, the consideration that the few exceptions from this disuse, in common life, instead of showing respect or reverence, suggests always either pity or contempt; no person being ever addressed in this way but one greatly inferior, or a child. This being the case, and they not having, like us, a solemn, to counterbalance the familiar, use; the practice of Protestants would rather increase, than diminish, their dislike of it. For these reasons, the use of the singular pronoun, in adoration, has the same effect, nearly, on them, which the contrary use of the plural has on us. To a French Catholic, *Tu es notre Dieu, et nous te benirons*, and to an English Protestant, *You are our God, and we will bless you*, equally betray an indecent familiarity [114]. By reason of this difference in the pre-

[114] The way in which *Saci*, who appears to have been a pious worthy man, translates from the Vulgate the Lord's Prayer, rendered literally from French into English, is a striking example of the difference of manner: "Our Father who "are in heaven, let your name be sanctified, let your reign "arrive, let your will be done," &c. Yet the earlier

vailing usages, it must be acknowledged, that French Romanists have a plausible pretext for using the plural. We have, however, a real advantage in our manner, especially in worship. Theirs, it is true, in consequence of the prevalent use, has nothing in it disrespectful or indecent; but this is merely a negative commendation; ours, on account of the peculiarity of its appropriation in religious subjects, is eminently serious and affecting. It has, besides, more precision. In worship, it is a more explicit declaration of the unity of the Godhead; and even when, in holy writ, addressed to a creature, it serves to remove at least one ambiguous circumstance, consequent on modern use, which does not rightly distinguish what is said to one, from what is said to

Popish translators chose to use the singular number as well as the reformed. It had been the universal practice of the ancients, Greeks, Romans, and Orientals. It was used in the English translation of Rheims, though composed by Papists in opposition to the Protestant version then commonly received. In the later versions of French Protestants, this use of the singular number of the second person is given up entirely, except in addresses to God; the formularies read in their meetings, having, in this particular, established among them a different usage. Beausobre and Lenfant [see *Preface Generale sur le Nouveau Testament*] strenuously maintain the propriety of their not using the singular of the second personal pronoun except in worship. I admit their arguments to be conclusive with respect to French; but, for the reasons above mentioned, they are inconclusive applied to English. Yet in this some English translators have followed the French manner, but not uniformly.

many. And though the scope of the place often shows the distinction, it does not always.

§ 4. A FEW other particulars of the ancient dialect I have also retained, especially in those instances wherein, without hurting perspicuity, they appeared to give greater precision: but those, on the contrary, which might, in some instances, darken the expression, or render it equivocal, I have rejected altogether. For I consider no quality of elocution as more essential than perspicuity, and nothing more conducive to this, than as much uniformity and precision in the application of words, as the language will admit. For this reason, though I have retained *whether* for which of two, *whoso* for whoever, and a few others, little used at present; I have not employed *which*, as in the old dialect, for who, or whom, *his* or *her* for its, *that* for that which, or what. For these, though they do not often occasion ambiguity, sometimes occasion it: and there is no way of preventing doubt in every case, but by observing uniformity, when practicable, in all cases. In such an expression, for example, as that of the Apostle Peter[115], *Being born again by the word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever;* if the relative *which* were applied, indiscriminately, to persons or to things, it might be questioned, whether what is affirmed, be affirmed of the word of God, or of

[115] 1 Pet. i. 23.

God himself. But if, according to present use, it be confined to things, there is no question at all.

§ 5. ANOTHER point, in which the scriptural differs from the modern dialect, is in the manner sometimes used in expressing the future. In all predictions, prophecies, or authoritative declarations, the auxiliary *shall* is used, where, in common language, it would now be *will*. This method, as adding weight to what is said, I always adopt, unless when it is liable to be equivocally interpreted, and seems to represent moral agents as acting through necessity, or by compulsion. In the graver sorts of poetry, the same use is made of the auxiliary *shall*. As to the prepositions, I observed, in the preceding Dissertation [116], that the present use gives them more precision, and so occasions fewer ambiguities, than the use which prevailed formerly. I have, therefore, given it the preference. There is one case, however, wherein I always observe the old method. *Called of God*, *chosen of God*, and other the like phrases, are, for an obvious reason, more agreeable to Christian ears, than if we were to prefix to the name of God the preposition *by*. The pronouns *mine* and *thine*, I have also sometimes, after the ancient manner, in order to avoid a disagreeable hiatus, substituted for *my* and *thy*.

§ 6. To the foregoing remarks on the subject of dialect, I shall subjoin a few things on the manner

[116] Part II.

of rendering proper names. Upon the revival of letters in the West, Pagnin first, and after him some other translators, through an affectation of accuracy in things of no moment, so justly censured by Jerom, seem to have considered it as a vast improvement, to convey, as nearly as possible, in the letters of another language, the very sounds of the Hebrew and Syriac names which occur in Scripture. Hence the names of some of the most eminent personages in the Old Testament, were, by this new dialect, so much metamorphosed, that those who were accustomed to the ancient translation, could not, at first hearing, recognize the persons with whose history they had been long acquainted. The *Heva* of the Vulgate was transformed into *Chauva*, the *Isaia* into *Jesahiahu*, the *Jeremia* into *Irmeiahu*, the *Ezechiel* into *Jechezechel*, and similar changes were made on many others. In this Pagnin soon had, if not followers, at least imitators. The trifling innovations made by him, after his manner, have served as an example to others to innovate also after theirs. Junius and Tremellius, though they say, with Pagnin, *Chauva*, do not adopt his *Jesahiahu*, *Irmeiahu*, and *Jechezechel;* but they give us what is no better of their own, *Jischahja*, *Jirmeja*, and *Jechezekel.* Munster's deviations are less considerable, and Castalio went no further (except in transforming the name of God into *Javo*), than to give a Latin termination to the names formerly used, that he might thereby render them declinable.

§ 7. A DEVIATION purely of this last kind, as it served to prevent ambiguities, otherwise inevitable, in the Latin, where there was no ambiguity in the original, did, in my opinion, admit a good apology. For, what was expressed in Hebrew, by the aid of the *status constructus*, as their grammarians call it, or by prepositions, was expressed with equal clearness, in Latin, by means of declension: whereas, by making the names indeclinable, in this language, that advantage had been lost, in regard to many names; and ambiguities, of which there was not a trace in the original, introduced into the translation. The declension of proper names was not, however, equally essential to perspicuity in Greek as in Latin. Their want of cases, the Greeks could supply by the cases of the article, which the idiom of their tongue permitted them to prefix. But the Latins had no article. It was, therefore, very injudicious in the first Latin translators to imitate the Seventy in this particular; the more so, as it had been the common practice of Latin authors, to decline the foreign names they adopted, in order the more effectually to fit them for use in their tongue. Thus they said, *Hannibal Hannibalis*, *Juba Jubæ*, and *Hanno Hannonis*. The inconveniencies of the other manner appear from many equivocal passages in the Vulgate, which, whithout some previous knowledge of the subject, it would be difficult to understand [117].

[117] Several instances occur in the prophetical benediction which Moses gave to the twelve tribes, immediately before his

Castalio, in like manner, introduced into his version patronymics formed on the Grecian model, as *Jacobida* and *Davidides*, in which, as he has not been followed, we may conclude that he is generally condemned; and, in my opinion, not undeservedly, because the departure from the Hebrew idiom, in this instance, is both unnecessary and affected.

§ 8. BUT, though it be excusable to alter the names in common use, so far as to make them admit inflections in languages which use inflections, since this alteration answers a necessary purpose; to alter them, for the sake of bringing them nearer the ancient orthography, or for the sake of assisting us to produce a sound in pronouncing them, that may resemble the sound of the ancient names, is no better than arrant pedantry. The use of proper names is, as that of appellatives, to serve as signs, for recalling to the mind what is signified by them. When this purpose is attained, their end is answered. Now, as it is use alone which can convert a sound

death, Deut. xxxiiii. In verse 4. *Legem præcipit nobis Moyscs, hæreditatem multitudinis Jacob.* To one unacquainted with Scripture, it would not be obvious that *Moyses* here is in the nominative, and *Jacob* in the genitive. Hardly could it be suspected, that in the following verses, 8. *Levi quoque ait;* 12. *Et Benjamin ait* (and so of the rest), the names are in the dative. The form of the expression in Latin could not fail to lead an ordinary reader to understand them as in the nominative. Yet nothing can be more unequivocal than the words in Hebrew.

into a sign, a word that has been long used (whether a proper name or an appellative) as the sign of person or thing, genus, species, or individual, must be preferable to a new invented, and therefore unauthorized sound. If there is generally in proper names a greater resemblance to the original words than in appellatives, this difference nowise affects the argument. Appellatives are the signs of species and genera, with the more considerable part of which the people are acquainted in all civilized countries. Common things have consequently names in all languages; and the names in one language have often no affinity to those in another. Proper names are the signs of individuals, known originally only in the neighbourhood of the place of their existence, whence the name is transferred with the knowledge of the individual into other languages.

But the introduction of the name is not because of any peculiar propriety in the sound for signifying what is meant by it; but merely because, when the language we write does not supply a suitable term, this is the easiest and most natural expedient. It is in this way also we often provide appellatives, when the thing spoken of, which sometimes happens, has no name in our native idiom. But when an individual thing is of a nature to be universally known, and to have a name in every language, as the sun, the moon, and the earth, we never, in translating from an ancient tongue, think of adopting the name we find there, but always give our own. Yet the things now mentioned are as really individuals, as are Peter,

James, and John. And when, in the case of appellatives, we have been obliged at first to recur for a name, to the language whence we drew our knowledge of the thing, we never think afterwards of reforming the term, because not so closely formed on the original, as it might have been. It has, by its currency, produced that association which confers on it the power of a sign, and this is all that the original term itself ever had, or could have. Who would think of reforming flail into *flagel*, messenger into *messager*, and nurse into *nourrice*, that they may be nearer, the first to the Latin, or perhaps the German, and the second and third to the French originals?

§ 9. BESIDES, in translating Hebrew names, the attempt was the more vain, as little or nothing was known about their pronunciation. The manner of pronouncing the consonants is judged of very differently by the critics; and as to the vowels, who has not heard what contests they have occasioned among the learned? But what rendered this attempt, at giving the exact pronunciation, completely ridiculous, is, that it was made in Latin, a dead language, of whose pronunciation also we have no standard, and in the speaking or reading of which, every different nation follows a different rule. Harmony among themselves, therefore, was not to be expected in men who had taken this whim. Accordingly, when they once began to innovate, every one innovated after his own fashion, and had a list of

names peculiar to himself. This, with reasonable people, has sufficiently exposed the folly of the conceit.

§ 10. Now, though our translators have not made the violent stretches made by Pagnin and others, for the sake of adjusting the names to the original sounds, and have not distressed our organs of speech with a collision of letters hardly utterable; there is one article on which I do not think them entirely without blame. The names of the same persons, and in effect the same names, are sometimes rendered differently by them in the New Testament, from what they had been rendered in the Old; and that, on account of a very inconsiderable difference in the spelling, or perhaps only in the termination in Hebrew and in Greek. By this the sense has been injured to ordinary readers, who are more generally ignorant than we are apt to imagine, of the persons in the Old Testament, meant by the names in the New. Now this is a species of *κακοζηλια*, from which the authors of the Vulgate were free.

The old Italic had been made from the Greek of the Seventy. The names by consequence were more accommodated to the Greek orthography than to the Hebrew. But as that was a matter of no consequence, when Jerom undertook to translate from the Hebrew, he did not think it expedient to make any changes in the proper names to which the people had been habituated from their infancy. He knew that this might have led some readers into mis-

takes, and, as appearing awkward and affected, would be disagreeable to others: at the same time there was no conceivable advantage from it to compensate these inconveniencies. For, to tell the Latin reader more exactly how the Hebrew proper names sounded (if that could have been done,) was of no more significance to him, than to acquaint him with the sound of their appellatives. He therefore judged rightly, in preserving in the old Testament, though he translated from the Hebrew, the names to which the people were accustomed, as Elias, and Eliseus, and Esdras, and Nebuchodonosor, which were formed immediately from the Greek. By this means there was an uniformity in the manner of translating both Testaments. The prophets, and other eminent ancients, were not distinguished by one name in one part of the sacred text, and by another in the other. Whereas the attempt at tracing servilely the letter in each part, has given us two sets of names for the same persons, of which the inconveniencies are glaring, but the advantages invisible.

§ 11. IT may be thought indeed a matter of little consequence, and that the names, if not the same, do at least so closely resemble, that they can hardly be mistaken for the names of different persons. But I have had occasion to discover that many of the unlearned, though neither ignorant nor deficient in understanding, know not that *Elias*, so often mentioned in the New Testament, is the Elijah of the Old, that *Eliseus* is Elisha, that *Osee* is Hosea, and

that the *Jesus*, mentioned once in the Acts [118], and once in the Epistle to the Hebrews [119], is Joshua. Had the names been totally different in the original, there might have been some reason for adopting this method. The old Oriental names are often of use for pointing out the founders of nations, families, and tribes, and the more recent Greek names serve to connect those early notices with the later accounts of Greek and Roman historians. If they had, therefore, in the translation of the Old Testament, given, as in the original, the name *Mizraim* to Egypt, *Aram* to Syria, and *Javan* to Greece, much might have been urged in defence of this manner. But when all the difference in the words results from an insignificant alteration in the spelling, in order to accommodate the Hebrew name to Grecian ears; to consider them on that account as different names, and translate them differently, does not appear susceptible of a rational apology.

What should we think of a translator of Polybius, for example, who should always call Carthage *Karchedon*, and Hannibal *Annibas*, because the words of his author are Καρχηδων and Αννιβας, or, to come nearer home, should, in translating into English from the French, call London *Londres*, and the Hague *La Haye*. It can be ascribed solely to the almost irresistible influence of example, that our translators, who were eminent for their discernment as well as their learning, have been drawn into this frivolous

[118] Acts, vii. 45. [119] Heb. iv. 8.

innovation. At the same time their want of uniformity, in using this method, seems to betray a consciousness of some impropriety in it, and that it tended unnecessarily to darken what in itself is perfectly clear. Accordingly, they have not thought it advisable to exhibit the names in the most frequent use, differently in different parts of Scripture, or even differently from the names by which the persons are known in profane history. Thus he whom they have called Moses in the New Testament, is not in the Old Testament made *Mosheh*, nor Solomon *Shelomeh;* nor is Artaxerxes rendered *Artachshasta*, nor Cyrus *Choresh*, agreeably to the Hebrew orthography, though the names of the two last mentioned, are not derived to us from the New Testament, but from pagan historians.

§ 12. Not that I think it of any moment whether the names be derived from the Greek, or from the Hebrew, or from any other language. The matters of consequence here are only these two. First, to take the name in the most current use, whether it be formed from the Hebrew, from the Greek, or from the Latin; secondly, to use the same name in both Testaments, when the difference made on it, in the two languages, is merely such a change in the spelling and termination, as commonly takes place in transplanting a word from one tongue into another. Nothing can be more vain than the attempt to bring us, in pronouncing names, to a stronger resemblance to the original sounds. Were this, as it is not, an

object deserving the attention of an interpreter, it were easy to show that the methods employed for this purpose have often had the contrary effect. We have in this mostly followed German and Dutch linguists.

Admitting that they came near the truth, according to their rule of pronouncing, which is the utmost they can ask, the powers of the same nominal letters are different in the different languages spoken at present in Europe; and we, by following their spelling, even when they were in the right, have departed farther from the original sound than we were before. The consonant *j*, sounds in German like our *y* in the word *year*, *sch* with them sounds like our *sh*; like the French *ch*, and like the Italian *se*, when it immediately precedes *i* or *e*; whereas *sch* with us has generally the same sound with *sk*, and the consonant *j* the same with *g* before *i* or *e*. Besides, the letters which with us have different sounds in different situations, we have reason to believe, were sounded uniformly in ancient languages, or, at least, did not undergo alterations correspondent to ours. Thus the brook called *Kidron*, in the common version in the Old Testament, is, for the sake, I suppose, of a closer conformity to the Greek, called *Cedron* in the New. Yet the *c* in our language in this situation, is sounded exactly as the *s*, a sound which we have good ground to think that the corresponding letter in Hebrew, Greek, and Latin never had.

§ 13. THE rules, therefore, which I have followed in expressing proper names, are these: First, when the name of the same person or thing is, in the common translation, both in the Old Testament and in the New, expressed in the same manner, whether it be derived from the Hebrew, or from the Greek, I uniformly employ it, because in that case it has always the sanction of good use. Thus *Moses* and *Aaron*, *David* and *Solomon*, *Jerusalem* and *Jericho*, *Bethlehem* and *Jordan*, and many others, remain in the places of which they have had immemorial possession; though of these *Moses* and *Solomon* are directly from the Greek, the rest from the Hebrew. Secondly, when the name of the same person or thing is expressed, in the common translation, differently in the Old Testament and in the New (the difference being such as results from adapting words of one language to the articulation of another,) I have, except in a very few cases, preferred the word used in the Old Testament. This does not proceed from the desire of coming nearer the pronunciation of the Hebrew root: for that is a matter of no consequence; but from the desire of preventing, as far as possible, all mistakes in regard to the persons or things spoken of. It is from the Old Testament, that we have commonly what is known of the individuals mentioned in it, and referred to in the New. By naming them differently, there is a danger lest the person or thing alluded to be mistaken.

For this reason, I say, *Elijah*, not Elias; *Elisha*, not Eliseus; *Isaiah*, not Esaias; *Kidron*, not Ce-

dron. For this reason, also, in the catalogues of our Lord's progenitors, both in Matthew and in Luke, I have given the names, as they are spelt in the common version of the Old Testament. From this rule I admit some exceptions. In a few instances, the thing mentioned is better known, either by what is said of it in the New Testament, or by the information we derive from Pagan authors, than by what we find in the Old. In this case, the name, in the New Testament, has a greater currency than that used in the Old, and consequently, according to my notion of what ought to regulate our choice, is entitled to the preference. For this reason, I say *Sarepta* and *Sidon*, not Zarephath and Zidon; as the former names are rendered, by classical use, as well as that of the New Testament, more familiar than the latter. Thirdly, when the same name is given by the sacred writers, in their own language, to different persons, which the English translators have rendered differently in the different applications, I have judged it reasonable to adopt this distinction, made by our old interpreters, as conducing to perspicuity. The name of Jacob's fourth son is the same with that of two of the Apostles. But as the first rule obliges me to give the Old Testament name *Judah* to the Patriarch, I have reserved the term *Judas*, as used in the New, for the two Apostles. This also suits universal and present use: for we never call the Patriarch Judas, nor any of the Apostles Judah. The proper name of our Lord is the same with that of *Joshua*, who is, in the Septuagint, always called

Ιησους, and is twice so named in the New Testament. Every body must be sensible of the expediency of confining the Old Testament name to the captain of the host of Israel, and the other to the Messiah. There can be no doubt, that the name of Aaron's sister, and that of our Lord's mother, were originally the same. The former is called, in the Septuagint, Μαριαμ, the name also given to the latter by the Evangelist Luke. The other Evangelists commonly say Μαρια. But as use, with us, has appropriated *Miriam* to the first, and *Mary* to the second, it could answer no valuable purpose to confound them. The name of the father of the twelve tribes is, in the Oriental dialects, the same with that of one of the sons of Zebedee, and that of the son of Alpheus. A small distinction is, indeed, made by the Evangelists, who add a Greek termination to the Hebrew name, when they apply it to the Apostles, which, when they apply it to the Patriarch, they never do. If our translators had copied as minutely, in this instance, as they have done in some others, the Patriarch, they would indeed have named *Jacob*, and each of the two Apostles *Jacobus*. However, as in naming the two last, they have thought fit to substitute *James*, which use also has confirmed, I have preserved this distinction.

§ 14. UPON the whole, in all that concerns proper names, I have conformed to the judicious rule of king James the first, more strictly, I suppose,

than those translators to whom it was recommended: "The names of the Prophets, and the holy writers, "with the other names in the text, are to be retain- "ed, as near as may be, according as they are vul- "garly used."

PART IV.

THE OUTWARD FORM OF THE VERSION.

I AM now to offer a few things on the form in which this translation is exhibited. It is well known, that the division of the books of holy writ, into chapters and verses, does not proceed from the inspired writers, but is a contrivance of a much later date. Even the punctuation, for distinguishing the sentences from one another, and dividing every sentence into its constituent members and clauses, though a more ancient invention, was, for many ages, except by grammarians and rhetoricians, hardly ever used in transcribing; insomuch, that whatever depends merely on the division of sentences, on points, aspirations, and accents, cannot be said to rest ultimately, as the words themselves do, upon the authority of the sacred penmen. These particulars give free scope for the sagacity of criticism, and unrestrained exercise to the talent of investigating; in-

asmuch as in none of these points is there any ground for the plea of inspiration.

§ 2. As to the division into chapters and verses, we know that the present is not that which obtained in primitive ages, and that even the earliest division is not derived from the Apostles, but from some of their first commentators, who, for the conveniency of readers, contrived this method. The division into chapters, that now universally prevails in Europe, derived its origin from cardinal Caro, who lived in the twelfth century: the subdivision into verses is of no older date than the middle of the sixteenth century, and was the invention of Robert Stevens. That there are many advantages which result from so minute a partition of the sacred oracles, cannot be denied. The facility with which any place, in consequence of this method, is pointed out by the writer, and found by the reader, the easy recourse it gives, in consulting commentators, to the passage whereof the explanation is wanted, the aid it has afforded to the compilers of concordances, which are of considerable assistance in the study of Scripture; these, and many other accommodations, have accrued from this contrivance.

§ 3. IT is not, however, without its inconveniences. This manner of mincing a connected work into short sentences, detached from one another, not barely in appearance, by their being ranked under separate numbers, and by the breaks in the lines, but in effect, by the influence which the text, thus

parcelled out, has insensibly had on copiers and translators, both in pointing, and in translating, is not well suited to the species of composition which obtains in all the sacred books, except the Psalms, and the Book of Proverbs. To the epistolary and argumentative style it is extremely ill adapted, as has been well evinced by Mr. Locke [120]; neither does it suit the historical. There are inconveniencies which would result from this way of dividing, even if executed in the best manner possible: but, though I am unwilling to detract from the merit of an expedient which has been productive of some good consequences, I cannot help observing that the inventors have been far too hasty in conducting the execution.

The subject is sometimes interrupted by the division into chapters. Of this I might produce many examples, but, for brevity's sake, shall mention only a few. The last verse of the fifteenth chapter of Matthew is much more closely connected with what follows in the sixteenth, than with what precedes. In like manner, the last verse of the nineteenth chapter, *Many shall be first that are last, and last that are first*, ought not to be disjoined, (I say not, from the subsequent chapter, but even) from the subsequent paragraph, which contains the parable of the labourers hired to work in the vineyard, brought merely in illustration of that sentiment, and beginning and ending with it. The first verse of the

[120] *Essay for the understanding of St. Paul's Epistles*, prefixed to his paraphrase and notes on some of the Epistles.

fifth chapter of Mark is much more properly joined to the concluding paragraph of the fourth chapter, as it shows the completeness of the miracle there related, than to what follows in the fifth. The like may be remarked of the first verse of the ninth chapter. Of the division into verses, it may be observed, that it often occasions an unnatural separation of the members of the same sentence [121]; nay, sometimes, which is worse, the same verse comprehends a part of two different sentences.

That this division should often have a bad effect upon translators is inevitable. First, by attending narrowly to the verses, an interpreter runs the risk of overlooking the right, and adopting a wrong, division of the sentences. Of this I shall give one remarkable example from the Gospel of John [122]. Our Lord says, in one of his discourses, *Εγω ειμι ὁ ποιμην ὁ καλος· και γινωσκω τα εμα, και γινωσκομαι ὑπο των εμων, καθως γινωσκει με ὁ πατηρ, καγω γινωσκω τον πατερα· και την ψυχην μυ τιθημι ὑπερ των προβατων.* When the sentence is thus pointed, as it manifestly ought to be, and exhibited unbroken by the division into verses, no person can doubt that the following version is equally close to the letter and to the sense. *I am the good Shepherd; I both know my own, and am known by them, even as the Father knoweth me, and I know the Father; and I lay*

[121] In Matth. xi. 2. we have a verse without a verb, and ending with a comma.

[122] John, x. 14, 15.

down my life for the sheep. But its being divided into two sentences, and put into separate verses, has occasioned the disjointed and improper version given in the common translation. 14. *I am the good Shepherd and know my sheep; and am known of mine.* 15. *As the Father knoweth me, even so know I the Father: and I lay down my life for the sheep.* In this artificial distribution (which seems to have originated from Beza; for he acknowledges that before him, the fifteenth verse included only the last member, *and I lay down*, &c.) the second sentence is an abrupt, and totally unconnected, interruption of what is affirmed in the preceding words, and in the following. Whereas, taking the words as they stand naturally, it is an illustration by similitude quite in our Lord's manner, of what he had affirmed in the foregoing words. But, though the translator should not be misled in this manner, a desire of preserving, in every verse of his translation, all that is found in the corresponding verse of his original, that he may adjust the one to the other, and give verse for verse, may oblige him to give the words a more unnatural arrangement, in his own language, than he would have thought of doing, if there had been no such division into verses, and he had been left to regulate himself solely by the sense.

§ 4. INFLUENCED by these considerations, I have determined, neither entirely to reject the common division, nor to adopt it in the manner which is usually done. To reject it entirely, would be to

give up one of the greatest conveniences we have in the use of any version, for every purpose of occasional consultation, and examination, as well as for comparing it with the original, and with other versions. Nor is it enough that a more commodious division than the present may be devised, which shall answer all the useful purposes of the common version, without its inconveniencies. Still there are some advantages which a new division could not have, at least, for many centuries. The common division, such as it is, has prevailed universally, and does prevail, not in this kingdom only, but throughout all Christendom. Concordances in different languages, commentaries, versions, paraphrases; all theological works, critical, polemical, devotional, practical, in their order of commenting on Scripture, and in all their references to Scripture, regulate themselves by it. If we would not then have a new version rendered in a great measure useless, to those who read the old, or even the original, in the form wherein it is now invariably printed, or who have recourse to any of the helps above mentioned, we are constrained to adopt, in some shape or other, the old division.

§ 5. FOR these reasons, I have judged it necessary to retain it; but, at the same time, in order to avoid the disadvantages attending it, I have followed the method taken by some other editors, and confined it to the margin. This answers sufficiently all the purposes of reference and comparison, with-

out tending so directly to interrupt the reader, and divert him from perceiving the natural connection of the things treated. I have also adopted such a new division into sections and paragraphs, as appeared to me better suited than the former, both to the subject of these histories, and to the manner of treating it. Nothing, surely, can be more incongruous, than to cut down a coherent narrative into shreds, and give it the appearance of a collection of aphorisms. This, therefore, I have carefully avoided. The sections are, one with another, nearly equal to two chapters; a few of them more, but many less. In making this division, I have been determined, partly by the sense, and partly by the size. In every section I have included such a portion of Scripture as seemed proper to be read at one time, by those who regularly devote a part of every day to this truly Christian exercise. To make all the portions of equal length, or nearly so, was utterly incompatible with a proper regard to the sense. I have avoided breaking off in the middle of a distinct story, parable, conversation, or even discourse, delivered in continuance.

The length of three of the longest sections in this work, was occasioned by the resolution, not to disjoin the parts of one continued discourse. The sections I allude to are, *the sermon on the mount*, and *the prophecy on Olivet*, as recorded by Matthew, together with our Lord's *valedictory consolations* to his disciples, as related by John. The first occupies three ordinary chapters, the second two long ones,

and the third four short chapters. But, though I have avoided making a separation, where the scope of the place requires unity, I could not, in a consistency with any regard to size, allot a separate section to every separate incident, parable, conversation, or miracle. When these, therefore, are briefly related, insomuch that two or more of them can be included in a section of moderate length, I have separated them only by paragraphs. The length of the paragraph is determined merely by the sense. Accordingly, some of them contain no more than a verse of the common division, and others little less than a chapter. One parable makes one paragraph. When an explanation is given separately, the explanation makes another. When it follows immediately, and is expressed very briefly, both are included in one. Likewise one miracle makes one paragraph; but when the narrative is interrupted, and another miracle intervenes, as happens in the story of the daughter of Jairus, more paragraphs are requisite. When the transition, in respect of the sense, seems to require a distinction more strongly marked, it has been judged expedient to leave a blank line, and begin the next paragraph with a word in capitals.

§ 6. IT was not thought necessary to number the paragraphs, as this way is now, unless in particular cases, and for special purposes, rather unusual; and as all the use of reference and quotation may be sufficiently answered by the old division on the margin. In the larger distribution into sections, I have, ac-

cording to the most general custom, both numbered and titled them. But as to this method of dividing, I will not pretend that it is not, in a good measure, arbitrary, and that it might not, with equal propriety, have been conducted otherwise. As it was necessary to comprehend distinct things in the same section, there was no clear rule by which one could, in all cases, be directed where to make the separation. It was indeed evident that, wherever it could occasion an unseasonable interruption in narration, dialogue, or argument, it was improper: and that this was all that could be ascertained with precision. The titles of the sections I have made as brief as possible, that they may be the more easily remembered; and have, for this purpose, employed words, as we find some employed in the rubric of the common prayer, which have not been admitted into the text. To these I have added, in the same taste, the contents of the section, avoiding minuteness, and giving only such hints of the principal matters, as may assist the reader to recall them to his remembrance, and may enable him, at first glance, to discover whether a passage he is looking for, be in the section, or not. I have endeavoured to avoid the fault of those who make the contents of the chapters supply, in some degree, a commentary, limiting the sense of Scripture by their own ideas. Those who have not dared to make so free with the text, have thought themselves entitled to make free with these abridgments of their own framing. To insert thus without hesitation into the contents prefixed to

the several chapters, and thereby insinuate, under the shelter of inspiration, doubtful meanings which favour their own prepossessions, I cannot help considering as one way of handling the word of God deceitfully. I have, therefore, avoided throwing any thing into those summaries, which could be called explanatory, and have, besides, thought it better to assign them a separate place in this work, where the reader may consult them, when he chuses, than to intermix them with the truths we have directly from the sacred writers.

§ 7. Most translators have found it necessary to supply some words, for the sake of perspicuity, and for accommodating the expression to the idiom of the language into which the version is made, who, at the same time, to avoid even the appearance of assuming an undue authority to themselves, have visibly distinguished the words supplied, from the rest of the sentence. Thus the English translators, after Beza and others, always put the words in Italics by which an ellipsis in the original, that does not suit our idiom, is filled up. Though I approve their motives in using this method, as they are strong indications of fairness and attention to accuracy; I cannot help thinking that, in the execution, they have sometimes carried it to excess. In consequence of the structure of the original languages, several things are distinctly, though implicitly, expressed, which have no explicit signs in the sentence. The personal pronouns, for example, both in power and in

number, are as clearly, though virtually, expressed in their tongue, by the verb alone, as they are in ours, by a separate sign. Thus, *amo*, in Latin, is not less full and expressive than *I love* in English, or *amavistis* than *ye have loved.* And it would be exceedingly improper to say that in the former language there is an ellipsis of the pronoun, since the verb actually expresses it. For *amo* can be said of none but the first person singular, and *amavistis* of none but the second person plural. The like holds in other instances. The adjective sometimes includes the power of the substantive. *Bonus* is a good man, *bona* a good woman, and *bonum* a good thing. Yet to mark an ellipsis arising from such a want as that of a word corresponding to *man*, *woman*, and *thing*, in the above expressions, the Italic character has sometimes been introduced, by our translators.

§ 8. I REMEMBER that, when I first observed this distinction of character in the English Bible, being then a school-boy, I asked my elder brother, who had been at college, the reason of the difference. He told me that the words in Italics were words to which there was nothing in the original that corresponded. This made me take greater notice of the difference afterwards, and often attempt to read, passing over those words entirely. As this sometimes succeeded, without any appearance of deficiency in the sentence, I could not be satisfied with the propriety of some of the insertions. These words particularly attracted

my attention [123]: *Two* women *shall be grinding at the mill*, where the word *women* is in Italics. I could not conceive where the occasion was for inserting this word. Could it be more improper to say barely, *two shall be grinding at the mill*, than to say, as in the former verse, *two shall be in the field*, without limiting it to either sex? And since the Evangelist expressed both in the same manner, was any person entitled to make a difference? On having recourse again for information, I was answered that the Evangelist had not expressed them both in the same manner; that, on the contrary, the first, as written by him, could be understood only of men, the second only of women; as all the words susceptible of gender were in the fortieth verse in the masculine, and in the forty-first in the feminine. I understood the answer, having, before that time, learnt as much Latin as sufficiently showed me the effect produced, by the gender, on the sense. What then appeared to me unaccountable in the translators was, first, their putting the word *women* in Italics, since, though it had not a particular word corresponding to it, it was clearly comprehended in the other words of the passage; and, secondly, their not adding *men* in the fortieth verse, because, by these two successive verses, the one in the masculine, the other in the feminine gender, it appeared the manifest intention of the author to ac-

[123] Matth. xxiv. 40, 41.

quaint us, that both sexes would be involved in the calamities of the times spoken of.

This is but one instance of many which might be given to show how little dependance we can have on those marks; and that if the unlearned were to judge of the perspicuity of the original (as I once did) from the additions which it seems by the common version to have required, their judgment would be both unfavourable, and erroneous. The original has, in many cases, a perspicuity, as well as energy, which the ablest interpreters find it difficult to convey into their versions. The Evangelist John says of our Lord [124], εις τα ιδια ηλθε, και οι ιδιοι αυτον ου παρελαβον. I have expressed the sentiment, but not so forcibly, in this manner: *He came to his own land, and his own people did not receive him* [125]. On the principles on which the English translation is conducted, the words *land* and *people* ought to be visibly distinguished, as having no corresponding names in the original. That the old interpreters would have judged so, we may fairly conclude from their not admitting them, or any thing equivalent, into their version. Yet, that their version is, on this account, less explicit than the original, cannot be doubted by those that understand Greek, who must

[124] John, i. 11.

[225] The verse was so rendered in the former edition. In this I have preferred, *He came to his own home, and his own family did not receive him.* By the same rule the words *home* and *family* should be distinguished here, as *land* and *people* in the other case.

be sensible that, by the bare change of gender in the pronoun, the purport of those names is conveyed with the greatest clearness. See the note on that passage in the Gospel.

§ 9. OUR translators have not, however, observed uniformly their manner of distinguishing by the aid of Italics. Indeed, if they had, their work must have made a very motley appearance. On many occasions, the Hebrew or Greek name requires more than one word in our language to express a meaning which it often bears, and which alone suits the context. There was no reason, in rendering γλωσσα [126] to put *unknown* in Italics, before the word *tongue*, a strange or unknown tongue being one very common signification of the word, in the best authors. Πνευματα [127] is very properly rendered *spiritual gifts;* it means no less, in the Apostle Paul's language; but there was no propriety in distinguishing the word *gifts* by the Italic letter: for πνευματα, a substantive, can in no instance, be rendered barely by the adjective *spiritual.* Sometimes, the word in Italics is a mere intruder, to which there is not any thing in the import of the original, any more than in the expression, either explicitly, or implicitly, corresponding; the sense, which in effect it alters, being both clear and complete without it. For an example of this, I shall recur to a passage on

[126] 1 Cor. xiv. 2. [127] 1 Cor. xiv. 12.

which I had occasion formerly to remark [128], "The "just shall live by faith; but if *any man* draw "back"—where *any man* is foisted into the text, in violation of the rules of interpreting, which compel us to admit the third personal pronoun *he*, as clearly, though virtually, expressed by the verb. I do not remember such another instance, in the English translation, though I had occasion to observe something still more flagrant, in the version of the Old Testament by Junius and Tremellius [129].

§ 10. It must be acknowledged, however, that the insertion of a word, or of a few words, is sometimes necessary, or at least convenient, for giving a sufficiency of light to a sentence. For let it be observed, that this is not attempting to give more perspicuity to the sacred writings, in the translation, than was given them, by the inspired penmen, in the original. The contemporaries, particularly Hellenist Jews, readers of the original, had many advantages which, with all our assistances, we cannot attain. Incidental allusions to rites, customs, facts, at that time, recent and well known, now little known, and known only to a few, render some such expedient extremely proper. There are many things which it would have been superfluous in them to mention, which it may, nevertheless, be necessary for us to suggest. The use of this expedient has accordingly never been considered as beyond the legitimate pro-

[128] Diss. X. Part V. § 10. [129] Diss. X. Part V. § 4.

vince of the translator. It is a liberty, indeed, which ought to be taken with discretion, and never, but when the truth of what is supplied, and its appositeness, are both unquestionable. When I recur to this method, which is but seldom, I distinguish the words inserted by inclosing them in crotchets, having reserved the Italic character for a purpose now to be explained.

§ 11. In such a work as the Gospel, which, though of the nature of history, is a history rather of teaching than of acting, and, in respect of the room occupied, consists in the relation of what was said more than of what was done; I thought it of consequence to distinguish the narrative part which comes directly from the Evangelist, from the interlocutory part (if I may use the expression), or whatever was spoken either by our Lord himself, or by any of the persons introduced into the work. To the former I have assigned the Italic, to the latter the Roman character. Though the latter branch in this distribution much exceeds in quantity the other, it is but a very inconsiderable part of that branch which is furnished by all the speakers in the history, Jesus alone excepted. Pretty long discourses, which run through whole successive chapters, are recorded as delivered by him, without any interruption.

§ 12. Now, my reasons for adopting this method are the two following: First, I was inclinable to ren-

der it evident to every reader, at a single glance, how small a share of the whole the sacred penmen took upon themselves. It is little, very little, which they say, as from themselves, except what is necessary for connecting the parts, and for acquainting us with the most important facts. Another reason for my taking this method was, because, in a few instances, a reader, through not adverting closely, (and what reader is always secure against such inadvertency ?) may not sufficiently distinguish what is said by the historian, from what is spoken by our Lord himself, or even by any of the other speakers, in a conversation reported of them. But it may be objected, 'May not this method sometimes, in dubious 'cases, confine the interpretation in such a way as 'to affect the sense?' I acknowledge that this is possible; but it does not at present occur to my recollection, that there are cases in these histories, wherein any material change would be produced upon the sense, in whichsoever of the two ways the words were understood. In most cases it is evident, with a small degree of attention, what are the words of the Evangelist the relater, and what are the words of the persons whose conversations he relates.

§ 13. THE principal use of the distinction here made is to quicken attention, or rather to supply a too common deficiency, which most readers are apt at intervals to experience, in attending. And even, at the worst, it does not limit the sense of the original in one instance, out of twenty wherein it is

limited by the pointing, which is now universally admitted by critics to have been in later times superadded. Indeed, there can be no translation of any kind (for in translating there is always a choice of one out of several meanings, of which a word is susceptible) without such limitations of the sense. Yet the advantages of pointing and translating are too considerable to be given up, on account of an inconvenience more apparent than real.

§ 14. ALL that is necessary in an interpreter, when the case is doubtful, is to remark in the notes the different ways in which the passage may be understood, after having placed in the text that which appears to him the most probable. In like manner, in the case under consideration, wherever there is the least scope for doubting, whether the words be those of the Evangelist, or those of any of the speakers introduced into the history, I assign to the passage in this version, the character which, to the best of my judgment, suits it, giving in the notes the reasons of my preference, together with what may be urged for viewing it differently. It is, in effect, the same rule which I follow in the case of various readings, and of words clearly susceptible of different interpretations; also, when an alteration in the pointing would yield a different sense.

§ 15. IT is proper to add a few things on the use I have made of the margin. And first of the side-margin. One use has been already mentioned, to

wit, for marking the chapters and verses of the common division. Beside these, and a little further from the text, I have noted, in the outer margin, the parallel places in the other Gospels, the passages of the Old Testament quoted or alluded to, and also the places in Scripture, and those in the apocryphal writings, where the same sentiment occurs, or the like incident is related. In this manner, I have endeavoured to avoid the opposite extremes into which editors have fallen, either of crowding the margin with references to places whose only resemblance was in the use of a similar phrase or identical expression, or of overlooking those passages wherein there is a material coincidence in the thought. To prevent, as much as possible, the confusion arising from too many references, and figures in the margin, and, at the same time, to omit nothing useful, I have, at the beginning of every paragraph, referred first to the parallel places, when there are such places, in the other Gospels. As generally the resemblance or coincidence affects more than one verse, nay, sometimes, runs through the whole of a paragraph; I have made the reference to the first verse of the corresponding passage serve for a reference to the whole; and, in order to distinguish such a reference from that to a single verse or sentence, I have marked the former by a point at the upper corner of the figure, the latter by a point at the lower corner, as is usual at the end of a sentence. I have adopted the same method in references to the Old Testament, to mark the difference between

those where only one verse is quoted or alluded to, and those wherein the allusion is to two or more in succession.—These are the only purposes to which I have appropriated the side-margin.

To give there a literal version of the peculiarities of idiom, whether Hebraisms or Grecisms, of the original, and all the possible ways in which the words may otherwise be rendered, has never appeared to me an object deserving a tenth part of the attention and time, which it requires from a translator. To the learned such information is of no significancy. To those who are just beginning the study of the language, it may indeed give a little assistance. To those who understand only the language of the translation, it is, in my judgment, rather prejudicial than useful, suggesting doubts which readers of this stamp are not qualified for solving, and which often a little knowledge in philology would entirely dissipate. All that is requisite is, where there is a real ambiguity in the text, to consider it in the notes. As therefore the only valuable purpose that such marginal information can answer, is to beginners in the study of the sacred languages, and as that purpose so little coincides with the design of a translation of the Scriptures into the vulgar tongue, I could not discover the smallest propriety in giving it a place in this work.

§ 16. THE foot-margin I have reserved for different purposes; first, for the explanation of such appellatives, as do not admit a proper translation in-

to our language, and as, by consequence, render it necessary for the translator to retain the original term. This I did not consider as a proper subject for the notes, which are reserved chiefly for what requires criticism and argument: whereas all the explanations requisite in the margin, are commonly such as do not admit a question among the learned. Brief explanations, such as those here meant, may be justly considered as essential to every translation into which there is a necessity of introducing foreign words. The terms which require such explanations, to wit, the names of peculiar offices, sects, festivals, ceremonies, coins, measures, and the like, were considered formerly[130]. Of certain terms, however, which come under some of these denominations, I have not judged it necessary to give any marginal explanation. The reason is, as they frequently occur in the sacred books, what is mentioned there concerning them sufficiently explains the import of the words. The distinction of *Pharisee* and *Sadducee*, we learn chiefly from the Gospel itself; and in the Old Testament, we are made acquainted with the *sabbath*, *circumcision*, and *passover*.

Those things which stand most in need of a marginal explanation, are offices, coins, measures, and such peculiarities in dress as their phylacteries and tufts or tassels at the corners of their mantles. In like manner their division of time, even when it does not occasion the introduction of exotic terms,

[130] Diss. VIII.

is apt to mislead the unlearned, as it differs widely from the division which obtains with us. Thus we should not readily take the third hour of the day to mean nine o'clock in the morning, or the sixth hour to mean noon. Further, when to Hebrew or Syriac expressions an explanation is subjoined in the text, as is done to the words, *Talitha cumi*, *Immanuel*, *Ephphatha*, and to our Lord's exclamation on the cross, there is no occasion for the aid of the margin. When no explanation is given in the text, as in the case of the word *Hosanna*, I have supplied it on the margin. Of the etymological signification of proper names, I have given an account, only when there is in the text an allusion to their etymology, in which case to know the primitive import of the term is necessary, for understanding the allusion.

§ 17. THERE is only one other use to which I have applied the foot-margin. The Greek word κυριος was employed by the Seventy, not only for rendering the Hebrew word *adon*, that is, *lord* or *master*, but also to supply the word JEHOVAH, which was used by the Jews as the proper name of God, but which a species of superstition that, by degrees, came generally to prevail among them, hindered them from transplanting into the Greek language. As the name *Jehovah*, therefore, was peculiarly appropriated to God; and, as the Hebrew *adon*, and the Greek *kyrios*, like the Latin *dominus*, and the English *lord*, are merely appellatives, and used promiscuously of God, angels, and men, I thought it

not improper, when a passage in the New Testament is quoted or introduced from the Old, wherein the word rendered in Greek *kyrios*, is in Hebrew, *Jehovah*, to mark this name in the margin. At the same time let it be observed, that I have made no difference in the text of the version, inasmuch as no difference is made on the text of the Evangelists my original, but have used the Common English name *Lord* in addressing God, where they have employed the common Greek name *kyrios*.

PART V.

THE NOTES.

I SHALL now conclude with laying a few things before the reader, for opening more fully my design in the notes subjoined to this version. I have in the title denominated them critical and explanatory: *explanatory*, to point out the principal intention of them, which is to throw light upon the text, where it seems needful for the discovery of the direct and grammatical meaning; *critical*, to denote the means principally employed for this purpose, to wit, the rules of criticism on manuscripts and versions, in what concerns language, style, and idiom. I have called them *notes* rather than annotations, to sug-

gest that, as much as possible, I have studied brevity, and avoided expatiating on any topic. For this reason, when the import of the text is so evident as to need no illustration, I have purposely avoided diverting the reader's attention, by an unnecessary display of quotations from ancient authors, sacred or profane. As I would withhold nothing of real utility, I recur to classical authority, when it appears necessary, but not when a recourse to it might be charged with ostentation. A commentary was not intended, and therefore, any thing like a continued explanation of the text is not to be expected. The criticisms and remarks here offered are properly *scholia*, or glosses on passages of doubtful, or difficult, interpretation; and not comments. The author is to be considered as, merely, a *scholiast*, not a commentator. Thus much may suffice, as to the general design. In regard to some things, it will be proper to be more particular.

§ 2. FROM the short account of my plan here given, it may naturally and justly be inferred, that I have shunned entirely the discussion of abstract theological questions, which have afforded inexhaustible matter of contention, not in the schools only, but in the church, and have been the principal subject of many commentaries of great name. To avoid controversy of every kind is, I acknowledge, not to be attempted by one who, in his remarks on Scripture, often finds himself obliged to support controverted interpretations of passages, concerning the

sense of which there are various opinions. But questions of this kind, though sometimes related to, are hardly ever coincident with, the speculative points of polemic theology. The latter are but deduced, and for the most part indirectly, from the former. Even controvertists have sometimes the candour (though a class of men not remarkable for candour) to admit the justness of a grammatical interpretation which appears to favour an antagonist; no doubt believing, that the deduction, made by him from the text, may be eluded otherwise than by a different version.—But my reasons, for keeping as clear as possible of all scholastic disputes, are the following:

§ 3. First, if, in such a work as this, a man were disposed to admit them, it is impossible to say how far they would, or should, carry him. The different questions which have been agitated, have all, as parts of the same system, some connection, natural or artificial, among themselves. The explanation and defence of one draws in, almost necessarily, the explanation and defence of another on which it depends. Besides, those conversant in systematic divinity, scarcely read a verse in the Gospel, which they do not imagine capable of being employed plausibly, or which, perhaps, they have not seen or heard employed, either in defending, or in attacking some of their dogmas. Whichsoever of these be the case, the staunch polemic finds himself equally obliged, for what he reckons the cause of

truth, to discuss the controversy. I know no way so proper for escaping such endless embarrassments, as to make it a rule to admit no questions but those which serve to evince either the authentic reading, or the just rendering, of the text.

§ 4. My second reason is, I have not known any interpreter, who has meddled with controversy, whose translation is not very sensibly injured by it. Disputation is a species of combat; the desire of victory is natural to combatants, and is commonly, the further they engage, found to become the more ardent. The fairness and impartiality of a professed disputant, who being, at the same time, a translator, has, in the latter capacity, the moulding of the arguments to which, in the former, he must recur, will not be deemed, in the office of translating, greatly to be depended on. A man, however honest in his intentions, ought not to trust himself in such a case. Under so powerful a temptation, it is often impossible to preserve the judgment unbiassed, though the will should remain uncorrupted. And I am strongly inclined to think that, if Beza had not accompanied his translation with his controversial commentary, he would not have been capable of such flagrant wresting of the words, and perversion of the sense, of his author, as he is sometimes justly chargeable with. But, in rendering a passage in the version, to be presently converted into an argument in the annotations, it was not easy for a translator of so great ardour, to refrain from giving it

the turn that would best suit the purpose, of which, as annotator, he never lost sight, and for which, both version, and commentary, seem to have been undertaken, the defence of the theology of his party.

§ 5. My third reason for declining all such disputes is, because the much greater part of them, even those which are treated by the disputants, on both sides, as very important, have long appeared to me, in no other light, than that of the foolish questions which the Apostle warns Titus to avoid [131], as unprofitable and vain; or of the profane babblings and oppositions of science, falsely so called, against which he repeatedly cautioned Timothy [132]. If we may judge of them by their effects, as of the tree by its fruits, we shall certainly be led to this conclusion. For, from the marks which the Apostle has given of the *logomachies*, or strifes of words, then beginning to prevail, we have the utmost reason to conclude, that a great proportion of our scholastic disputes come under the same denomination. What character has he given of the vain janglings of his day, which is wanting in those of ours? Do not the latter gender contention as successfully as ever the former did? Cannot we say, with as much truth of these, as Paul did of those, *whereof cometh envy, strife, revilings, evil surmisings, perverse disputings of men of corrupt minds?* Do our babblings, any more than theirs, minister godly edifying? Do they

[131] Tit. iii. 9. [132] 1 Tim. i. 4. vi. 20. 2 Tim. ii. 23.

not, on the contrary, with equal speed, when they are encouraged, increase unto more ungodliness? Have our polemic divines, by their abstruse researches and metaphysical refinements, contributed to the advancement of charity, love to God, and love to man? Yet this is, in religion, the great end of all; for charity is the end of the commandment, and the bond of perfectness. These questions I leave with every considerate reader. The proper answers will, with the aid of a little experience and reflection, be so quickly suggested to him, that he will need no prompter.

§ 6. LASTLY, Though I am far from putting all questions in theology on a level, the province of the translator, and that of the controvertist are so distinct, and the talents requisite in the one, so different from those requisite in the other, that it appears much better to keep them separate. I have, therefore, in this work, confined myself entirely to the former.

§ 7. FURTHER, I do not attempt, in the notes, to remove every kind of textuary difficulty in the books here translated; such, for example, as arise from apparent contradictions in the accounts of the different Evangelists, or from the supposed contradiction of contemporary authors, or such as are merely chronological or geographical. Not that I consider these, like the dogmas of the controvertist, as without the sphere of a critic on the sacred text; not

that I make it, as in the former case, a rule to exclude them, if any thing new and satisfactory should occur to me to offer: but because, on most questions of this nature, all the methods of solution, known to me, are either trite or unsatisfactory. Much has been written for solving the difficulty arising from the different accounts given of our Lord's genealogy by Matthew and Luke; and different hypotheses have been framed for this purpose. Though I do not pretend to have reached certainty on this question, I incline most to the opinion of those who make the one account the pedigree of Joseph, the other that of Mary. But having nothing to advance which has not been already said over and over by others, and the evidence not being such as to put the matter beyond doubt; I see no occasion for a note, barely to tell my opinion, which is entitled to no regard from the reader, unless so far as it is supported by evidence.

For similar reasons, I have avoided entering upon the examination of the difficulties occasioned by the different accounts given of our Lord's resurrection, and his appearances to his disciples after it. On some of these points there is a danger lest an interpreter be too hasty in deciding. A judgment rashly formed may give his mind such a bias as shall affect his translation, and lead him to make stretches in support of his opinion, which the laws of criticism do not warrant. I acknowledge, on the other hand, that there are instances wherein a small variation, very defensible in the pointing, or in rendering a

particular expression, may totally remove a difficulty or apparent contradiction. In such a case, it would be both uncandid and injudicious, not to give that, of all the interpretations whereof the words are susceptible, which is attended with the least difficulty; and, if the interpretation be uncommon, to assign the reasons in the notes. But, to do violence to the rules of construction, and distort the words, for the sake of producing the solution of a difficulty, is, in effect, to substitute our own conjectures for the word of God, and thus to put off human conceit for celestial verity. It is far better to leave the matter as we found it. In solving difficulties to which we find ourselves unequal, future expositors may be more successful.

§ 8. ONE great fault, far too common with scriptural critics, is, that they would be thought to know every thing: and they are but too prone to think so concerning themselves. This tends to retard (instead of accelerating) their progress in true knowledge. Men are unwilling to part with what they fancy they have gotten a sure hold of, or to be easily stript of what has cost them time and painful study to acquire. Custom soon supplies the place of argument; and what at first may have appeared to be reason, settles into prejudice. It is necessary, in our present state, that habit should have influence even on our opinions. But it is particularly fortunate when the habit, in matters of judgment, extends not barely to the conclusions, but to the premises;

not to the opinions only, but to the reasons on which we have founded them. When this is the case, we experience all the advantages derived from an habitual association, without much danger of bigotry or blind attachment. Now it is well known, that opinions hastily formed, preclude all the advantage which may afterwards redound from better information. The truth of this remark is, even in the ordinary affairs of life, too well seen and felt, in its unhappy consequences, every day.

§ 9. AGAIN, I have, in these notes, avoided meddling with questions relating to the order in which the different miracles were performed, and the discourses spoken, and also settling the doubts which have been raised concerning the identity or diversity of some of the facts and speeches recorded by the different Evangelists. I have shunned, in like manner, all inquiry about the time occupied by our Lord's ministry, and about several other historical questions which have been much canvassed. I do not say that such inquiries are useless. A connection with the evidence of other points, which may be of great importance, may confer on some of them a consequence, much beyond, what, at first, we should be apt to imagine. But, in general, I do not hesitate to affirm that, though I have occasionally attended to such inquiries, I have not been able to discover that their consequence is so great as some seem to make it. They are still, upon the whole, rather curious than useful. Besides, on the greater part of

them, little is to be expected beyond uncertainty and doubt.

Some people have so strong a propensity to form fixed opinions on every subject to which they turn their thoughts, that their mind will brook no delay. They cannot bear to doubt or hesitate. Suspense in judging, is to them more insufferable, than the manifest hazard of judging wrong: and, therefore, when they have not sufficient evidence, they will form an opinion from what they have, be it ever so little; or even from their own conjectures, without any evidence at all. Now, to believe without proper evidence, and to doubt when we have evidence sufficient, are equally the effects, not of the strength, but of the weakness, of the understanding. In questions, therefore, which have appeared to me either unimportant, or of very dubious solution, I have thought it better to be silent, than to amuse the reader with those remarks in which I have myself found no satisfaction. In a very few cases, however, I have, in some measure, departed from this rule; and, in order to prevent the reader from being misled in a matter of consequence, by explanations more specious than solid, have even attempted to refute those solutions given by others which appeared to pervert the sense, though I had nothing satisfactory of my own to substitute in their place[133]. Having said thus much of the purposes for which the notes are not, it is proper now, to mention those for which they are, intended.

[133] See the note on Mark, x. 30.

§ 10. FIRST, then, as was hinted before, such different readings as affect the sense, and are tolerably supported by manuscripts, versions, or their own intrinsic evidence, insomuch, that the judgments of the learned are divided concerning them, are commonly given in the notes: their evidence briefly stated, and the reason assigned for the reading adopted in the translation. In this I carefully avoid all minuteness, having no intention to usurp the province, or supersede the labours, of those who have, with so much laudable care and diligence, collected those variations, and thereby facilitated the work of other critics. Indeed, as the variations are comparatively few, which are entitled to a place here; and as, in those few, I do not enter into particulars, but only give what appears the result of the evidence on both sides, I cannot be said, in any respect, to interfere with the departments of such critics as Mill and Wetstein. The little which occurs here ought, on the contrary, to serve as a spur to the learned reader, to the more assiduous study of this important branch of sacred literature. In like manner, variations of consequence, affecting the sense, in versions of such venerable antiquity as the Syriac and the Vulgate, though not accompanied with correspondent readings in any Greek copies, are not often passed over unobserved. In all dubious cases, I give my reason for the reading preferred in this translation, whether it be the common reading or not; and, after mentioning the other,

with what may be urged in its favour, leave the reader to his choice.

§ 11. THE other, and the principal end of these notes, is to assign the reasons for the way wherein the words or sentences of the original are rendered in this translation. As it would have been improper, because unnecessary, to give a reason for the manner wherein every word, or even sentence, is translated, I shall here mention the particular cases in which it has been judged expedient to offer something in the notes in vindication of the version. The first is, when the rendering given to the words does not coincide in meaning with that of the common version. Where the difference is manifestly and only in expression, to make remarks must generally appear superfluous; the matter ought to be left to the taste and discernment of the reader. To attempt a defence of every alteration of this kind, would both extend the notes to an unmeasurable length, and render them, for the most part, very insignificant.

But, secondly, there are a few instances wherein all the difference in the version may, in fact, be merely verbal, though not manifestly so; and therefore as, to the generality of readers, they will at first appear to affect the sense, it may be of consequence to take notice of them. The difference between sound and sense, the words and the meaning, though clearly founded in the nature of things, is not always so obvious as we should imagine. That, in language, the connection between the sign and the thing signi-

fied is merely artificial, cannot admit a question. Yet, the tendency of the mind, when much habituated to particular sounds, as the signs of certain conceptions, is to put both on the footing of things naturally connected. In consequence of this, a difference only in expression may appear to alter the sentiment, or, at least, very much to enervate and obscure it. For this reason, in a few cases, wherein the change made on the place is, in effect, merely verbal, I have, to obviate mistakes, and to show that, in alterations even of this kind, I have been determined by reasons which appear to me weighty, attempted a brief illustration in the notes.

Thirdly, in certain cases, wherein there is no difference between the common translation and the present, either in thought or in expression, but wherein both differ from that of other respectable interpreters, or wherein the common version has been combated by learned critics, I have assigned my reasons for concurring with the English translators, and for not being determined by such criticisms, though ingenious, and though supported by writers of character. This is the more necessary, as there has been, of late, both abroad and at home, a profusion of criticisms on the sacred text; and many new versions have been attempted, especially in France and England. As these must be supposed to have had some influence on critical readers, it would have been improper to overlook entirely their remarks. Such, therefore, as seem to be of moment, and have come to my knowledge, or occurred to my

memory, I have occasionally taken notice of. This I have done, with a view sometimes to confirm their reasoning, sometimes to confute it, or, at least, to show that it is not so decisive as a sanguine philologist (for even philologists are sometimes sanguine in deciding) is apt to imagine. In this article, the learned reader will find many omissions, arising partly from forgetfulness, and partly from the different judgments which are inevitably formed, by different persons, concerning the importance of particular criticisms. When the decision of any point may be said to depend, in whole or in part, on what has been discussed in the Preliminary Dissertations, I always, to avoid repetitions, refer to the paragraph or paragraphs of the Dissertation, where such a discussion is to be found.

§ 12. ANOTHER purpose for which I have sometimes employed the notes, is the explanation of a name or word which, though from scriptural use it be familiar to our ears, has little currency in conversation, because rarely or never applied to any common subject. Of this kind are the words *parable*, *publican*, *scribe*, of which I have attempted an explanation in the notes: add to these all the terms which, though current in conversation, have something peculiar in their scriptural application. I have generally avoided employing words in meanings which they never bear in ordinary use. As it is from the prevailing use that words, as signs, may be said to originate, and by it that their import is as-

certained, such peculiarities rarely fail to create some obscurity. There are, nevertheless, instances in all languages, in which, on certain subjects (for religion is not singular in this), common terms have something peculiar in their application. In such cases, we cannot avoid the peculiarity of meaning, without having recourse to circumlocution, or such other expedients as would injure the simplicity of the expression, and give the appearance of affectation to the language. When, therefore, I have thought it necessary to employ such words, I have endeavoured to ascertain the scriptural acceptation in the notes; or, if the explanation has been anticipated in these Dissertations, I have referred to the place. Of such peculiarities, which are far from being numerous in this version, the following will serve as examples.

The first shall be the word *lawyer*, which I have, after the old translators, retained as the version of *νομικος*; not that it entirely answers in the Gospel to the English use, but because it has what I may call an analogical propriety, and bears nearly the same relation to their word *νομος*, that the word *lawyer* bears to our word *law*. The deviation from common use is, at most, not greater than that of the words *patron* and *client*, in the translation of any Roman historian. Some, indeed, have chosen to render *νομικος scribe*, and others, for the same reason, to render *γραμματευς lawyer*, because in one instance, a person called *νομικος* in one Gospel [134],

[134] Matth. xxii. 35.

is named in another [135] γραμματευς. But this argument is not conclusive. *Jonathan, David's uncle,* we are told [136], *was a counsellor, a wise man, and a scribe.* Can we infer from this, that these are synonymous words? The contrary, I think, may be concluded with much greater reason. If then, Jonathan had been called by one historian barely a *counsellor,* and by another barely a *scribe,* it would not have been just to infer that *counsellor* and *scribe,* though both, in this instance, applicable to the same person, are words of the same import. Yet the argument is no better in the present case. That there is, however, an affinity in their significations can hardly be doubted, as both belonged to the literary profession, which was not very extensive among the Jews. But that they are not entirely coincident, may be inferred from a passage in Luke [137], where we are informed that our Lord, after severely censuring the practices of the Scribes γραμματεις, and Pharisees, is addressed in this manner by one of the νομικοι, who happened to be present, *Master, thus saying, thou reproachest us also.* That the reproach extended to them he infers from the thing said, *thus saying,* but there had been no occasion for inference, if they had been addressed by their common appellation, and if *scribe* and *lawyer* had meant the same thing. Neither, in that case, could he have said *us also,* that is, *us* as well as those whom thou hast

[135] Mark, xii. 28. [136] 1 Chron. xxvii. 32.
[137] Luke, xi. 45.

named, the Scribes and Pharisees. Our Lord's reply makes it, if possible, still more evident, that though what he had said, did indeed comprehend them, the title which he had used, did not necessarily imply so much. *Wo unto* YOU ALSO, *ye lawyers*, KAI ΥΜΙΝ τοις νομικοις και [138], which could not have been so expressed, if the denunciation immediately preceding, had been addressed to them by name. Others think νομικος equivalent to νομοδιδασκαλος, rendering both *Doctor of the law*. But as we have not sufficient evidence that there is in these a perfect coincidence in meaning, and as they are differently rendered in the Syriac version, it is better to preserve the distinction which the original makes, at least in the names.

Another example of a small deviation from familiar language, is in the word *sinner*, ἁμαρτωλος, which, in common use, is applicable to every rational being not morally perfect, but frequently in Scripture denotes a person of a profligate life. Now as the frequency of this application, and the nature of the occurrences, remove all doubt as to the meaning, it may be considered as one of those Hebrew idioms, which it is proper in a translator to preserve. Neither *desert* nor *wilderness* exactly corresponds to ερημος in the New Testament [139]; but they are near enough to answer the purpose better than a periphrasis. The like may be said of *neighbour*, which, in familiar language, is never used with so great lati-

[138] Luke, xi. 46. [139] Mark, i. 3. N.

tude as in holy writ. And in general, when words in scriptural use are accompanied with perspicuity, they ought to be preferred to words in greater currency, which are not used in the common translation; and that even though the import of these more familiar words should be sufficiently apposite. It is for this reason alone, that in relation to human characters, we should reckon it more suitable to the language of the Spirit, to say *righteous* than virtuous, *just* than honest.

§ 13. THE only other use I have made of the notes, and that but seldom, is to remark passingly what may serve either to illustrate the character of the style of those writings, or to display the spirit which everywhere animates them: for in these we discover the intrinsic evidences they carry of a divine original. This has induced me, sometimes, to take notice also of the moral lessons to which some things naturally lead the attention of the serious reader. There is not, on this ground, the same hazard, as on the speculative questions of school-divinity, of rousing even among Christians, a whole host of opponents, or stirring up unedifying and undeterminable disputes. Practical observations, though too little minded, are hardly ever controverted. Besides, they are not of that kind of questions which genders strife, but are most evidently of that which ministers godly edifying. On this article, some will think that I have been too sparing. But, in my judgment, it is only in very particular cases, that the in-

troduction of such hints is pertinent, in a scholiast. When the scope of the text is manifestly practical, it is enough that we attend to the sacred authors. To enforce what they say, by obtruding on the reader, remarks to the same purpose, might appear a superfluous, or even officious, interruption. The effect is fully as bad when the observation, however good in itself, appears far-fetched: for the best things do not answer out of place. Perhaps the least exceptionable account that can be given of such remarks as are at once pertinent, and efficacious, is, that they arise naturally, though not obviously, out of the subject.

§ 14. To conclude; as I do not think it the best way of giving an impartial hearing to the sacred authors, to interrupt the reading of them every moment, for the sake of consulting either the glosses, or the annotations, of expositors, I have avoided offering any temptation to this practice, having placed the notes at the end. When a portion of Scripture, such as one of the sections of this version, is intended to be read, it is better to read it to an end without interruption. The scope of the whole is in this way more clearly perceived, as well as the connection of the parts. Whereas, when the reader finds the text and the notes on the same page, and under his eye at once, the latter tend, too evidently, to awake his curiosity, and, before he has proceeded in the former far enough to have a distinct view of the scope of the passage, to call off his attention; but when they are

separated, as in this work, it may be supposed, that a reader will finish at least a paragraph, before he turn over to a distant part of the book. This method gives this advantage even to the notes, if judicious, that as the argument there used, in favour of a particular reading, or of a particular rendering, of a sentence, is often drawn from the scope and connection of the place, he will be better qualified to judge of the justness of the criticism. It ought always to be remembered that an acquaintance with the text is the principal object. Recourse to the notes may be had only occasionally, as a man, when he meets with some difficulty, and is at a loss how to determine, recurs to the judgment of a friend. For the same reason I have also avoided inserting any marks in the text referring to them. The reference is sufficiently ascertained in the notes themselves, by the common marks of chapter and verse.

THE END OF THE PRELIMINARY DISSERTATIONS