

# AN ADDRESS,

TO THE INDEPENDENT ELECTORS OF THE  
HAMPSHIRE NORTH DISTRICT.

By Samuel Taggart.

FELLOW CITIZENS,

I FEEL a degree of delicacy and diffidence in addressing you in this manner. If any apology is necessary, it will be found in the situation in which I have been repeatedly placed by your free and unsolicited suffrages, and in the present alarming crisis of our common country, in which dangers and embarrassments thicken fast around us, and something more fatal to a nation than even the calamities of war, not merely threatens by its appearance at a distance, but even stares us in the face. In such a crisis, I consider the task I now undertake, however irksome it would be to my feelings at another time, as a matter not of liberty but of duty. I make no pretensions to an uncommon share of patriotism. Exclusive professions of that kind do frequently, and many times justly, excite suspicion. But I hope that my age and standing in society will be, in some measure, sufficient to exempt me from the imputation of being actuated by improper motives. I know of no interest that I have to serve but that of my country. I am afraid that this address will prove longer than to be pleasing either to myself or my readers. I shall endeavour, on every point which I may find it necessary to touch, to be as concise as possible. I shall not enter into a consideration of the subject of our foreign relations generally, nor touch them any farther than they are connected with the proceedings of the last session of Congress. The most prominent subjects of that session, and those which have excited the greatest share of public attention, have been the occupation of that part of West Florida which lies between the river Perdido and the Mississippi, by the United States—The dissolution of the Bank of the United States, by suffering the charter to expire by its own limitation—The law passed for the erection of the territory of Orleans into an independent state, and the non-importation law respecting goods, wares and merchandize, the productions of Great Britain or its dependencies. Whatever deference I may be disposed to pay to the decisions of the majority, on all these topics, I was compelled by a sense of duty to act with the minority. A few observations explanatory of the reasons of my conduct on each of these points, as well as of my views on the subject of our foreign relations generally, I beg leave to submit to your consideration.

As the largest portion of my observations will be on the subject of the non-importation, I shall begin with that, and shall probably pretty much invert the order in which the several particulars have been mentioned. I shall make a few observations on the policy of what has been generally known by the name of our restrictive system, which was commenced by the partial

non-importation law of 1806, arrived at its zenith during the embargo, and was continued in a rather milder form during the non-intercourse, and of which the present non-importation system, casting off its former features of ostensible neutrality and impartiality, forms a part.

On the general policy of the restrictive system, I shall make but a few observations. On the discussion of a late question in congress, I mean the subject of the renewal of the charter of the United States' Bank, much has been said upon the very limited powers within which the congress of the United States is restricted in their acts of legislation; and upon the necessity of their confining themselves strictly, not only within the spirit, but within the very letter of the constitution. I shall not spend time to enquire whether a power to give an entire new direction to the industry and energies of an important part of the community—a power to prescribe to the citizens of the United States what particular occupations they shall or shall not pursue, to obtain subsistence and comfort from the honest exertions of their industry, comes within those very narrow limits prescribed by the constitution. Much less will it be necessary to enquire whether a power to restrain or even to annihilate commerce, thereby compelling the numerous class of our citizens, dependent for subsistence on that branch of business, to abandon the ocean, & either seek a living in other employments, for which many of them are incapable, or starve, does not imply a power to prohibit agriculture, or prescribe to the husbandman what particular articles he shall cultivate, or to the manufacturer or mechanic, what particular species of handicraft he shall pursue. This it would seem was no very limited power. But it may be as easily found in some other implied power in the constitution, as the powers necessary to carry our restrictive system into effect, can be implied in the general power vested in congress to regulate commerce. It is, however, its expediency and policy alone which I shall consider. To this, many objections present themselves. In the first place, if we have any enemies whom we ought to consider as such, it is rather hostile to ourselves than to them. Whatever may have been the inconveniences it may have occasioned to foreign nations, it has operated with the greatest severity against our own citizens, and against the resources of our own government. As it respects the latter—those boasted millions, which, at the commencement of this system, were accumulated in the treasury, which were represented of such magnitude, that it was considered as an object of sufficient importance to call for the recommendation of an amendment of the constitution to devise ways and means of disposing of the surplus to advantage, have vanished, and our treasury has been reduced so near to a state of bankruptcy, as to render it necessary to borrow large sums. A loan to considerable amount was authorised by the first session of the eleventh congress, but no money was borrowed under that law. By the law of the second session, a loan of three millions seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars was authorised. Of this sum, 2,750,000 were actually borrowed. By the law of the session lately closed, another loan of 5,000,000 has been authorised. Had it not been for our own commercial restrictions, there cannot be a doubt but the revenue would have been adequate to all the exigencies of government, and a surplus left in the treasury, without

having recourse to loans, notwithstanding all the embarrassments thrown in the way of our commerce by the decrees and orders of foreign powers. A loss still more serious has been experienced by our citizens in consequence of this system. It will not be an extravagant calculation, should it be said that the property of American citizens, which has been sacrificed to an experiment during the continuance of the embargo, non-intercourse, &c. &c. has been more than twice the amount of our national debt. The late law threatens to operate more severely upon our own citizens than any of the former. Under the embargo, our citizens were permitted to bring their vessels and property home; and the operation of the non-intercourse was so long suspended, that the merchant was under no necessity to expose his property to seizure. But the present law takes effect at a time when the spring importations just begin to come in, and when the merchant could in no way evade the risk at least, if not the entire loss of his property.

It is worthy of observation, that the property, at present liable to seizure and confiscation under the present non-intercourse law, had all become *bona fide* American property, before it was possible for the American merchant to know that there was any law to prohibit its importation into this country. Orders for the spring importations are usually sent to Europe in August, September, or October—at least before it could be known in this country that any such thing as a non-intercourse was contemplated. These orders are given to agents and factors to execute, and when executed, the property becomes the property of the American merchant, being either paid for or the payment secured, and is no longer at the risk of the British merchant. This was done before it could be known that there was any prospect of a non-importation taking place. By this law, it is either locked up in a foreign country, where the owner can make no use of it, at the risk of the American merchant, or, on its importation into the United States, is immediately liable to seizure and confiscation. The case of the West India merchants is still harder. In general, these are not men of large capital. Many of them embark with their little all, which they have acquired by many years of persevering industry, on board of a small ship. According to the usual routine of business in the West Indies, these cargoes are trusted out, and the return cargo cannot be obtained until the coming in of the next crop. In March or April, he usually obtains his return cargo, and proceeds for the United States. Before intelligence, of a date posterior to the second of February, arrives from Great Britain to the Islands, although he may have heard of the proclamation, it is impossible for him to know that the law has taken effect. He has intentionally violated no law, and actually violated none of which it was possible he could have obtained the knowledge—and repairs to his native country with the prospect of reaping, in the bosom of his family, the rewards of his toil and danger: but in that country, in which, above all others, he has been taught to expect protection, his all is arrested and confiscated by an act of barefaced robbery and injustice, which could scarcely have been exceeded had it been his lot to have been taken by an Algerine corsair. And wherefore is all this? Will it compel foreign nations to

respect our rights—to rob, plunder, and ruin our own citizens? I believe not.

With respect to the influence of our restrictive system upon foreign nations, we have been in the habit of overrating its importance. We have seemingly considered our commerce as a boon offered to foreign nations, by which they are in a manner the only gainers, and the only sufferers by its loss. This proneness to overrate our importance to the commercial world has been not one of the least of our foibles. Of this, a fair experiment was made during the continuance of the embargo. It was predicted that this strong measure was almost to spread starvation through the world, and bring the nations of Europe, particularly Great Britain, against whom it appears to have been principally levelled, to our feet. An experiment of more than fourteen months taught us our mistake. Whatever partial or temporary inconvenience it might be to other nations, none were so deeply injured as ourselves. Both the number of our ships and the amount of mercantile capital were diminished, and the number of our seamen more reduced, than by all the impressments which have taken place since that was first complained of as a grievance; and many advantageous branches of commerce perhaps irrecoverably lost, by other nations being compelled to explore new sources of supply; or at least many years of commercial prosperity must elapse before they are recovered. The embargo was succeeded by its legitimate offspring, the non-intercourse. This too has had a fair trial; but after the failure of the stronger measure, what success could be expected from one confessedly weaker? Much less is any favourable result to be expected from the operation of the present law, where all the property, that is to be expected will meet confiscation under it, was, at the time in which it was passed, bona fide American.

Indeed, the whole system seems to be a co-operation with foreign nations in our own destruction. European nations injure us by depriving us, in some measure, of the liberty of the seas; by seizing our property on the ocean, or by seizing and confiscating it after it had entered their ports, in direct violation both of the law of nations and the rights of hospitality. This injury falls principally upon our merchants who were prosecuting a lawful commerce; and in order to induce foreign nations to respect our rights, we redouble the blow, by taking a few more steps towards their ruin. It is said that both France and Great Britain, but particularly the latter, is jealous of our growing commercial prosperity, and wish to destroy it. Admitted, and, as if they did not do the work with sufficient rapidity, we lend a helping hand by our restrictive system, which lays the axe to the root; both causes operating together to precipitate the ruin of our commerce, like the hail and the locusts of Egypt, the one destroying what the other had left. But what benefit is to result from all this loss and inconvenience, unless it be to forward the views of a tyrant who is ruining and barbarizing Europe?

But supposing some good consequences might be supposed to result from the continuance of our restrictive system, they will be defeated by its being impracticable to carry it into effect. If Great Britain should not so far relent this hostile attempt which is pointed solely against her, as to

make reprisals, it will be found to be impossible to prevent British goods from coming into our country, on a sea coast and frontier which extend, together, nearly three thousand miles. 100,000 men would not, in that case, be sufficient to prevent it. Perhaps there is no country in the world into which there has been less smuggling than into the United States ; none in which the general character of the merchants has been more fair and honourable. But being once deprived of their accustomed opportunity of importing goods legally into the country, they will be compelled to commence smugglers in their own defence, or if our principal merchants should be found too honourable for such an employment, adventurers will be found in sufficient numbers to supply their place ; and while the government is deprived of its revenue, British goods will find their way into the country, nearly in as great plenty as ever, altho' perhaps at an advanced price, and all laws to prevent smuggling will be evaded.

I shall only add one remark more upon the policy of the restrictive system, and that is one which is derived from experience, which gives us a fair practical test of its correctness, i. e. Let us compare our situation during the two years and four months in which Embargo, Non-intercourse, &c. were the orders of the day, with what it was not only before the commencement of the system of commercial warfare, but also with what it has been since commerce has been again unshackled by our own restrictions. Formerly our revenue was abundant, and our treasury overflowing. During the 10th Congress, it was the almost incessant theme of declamation in Congress hall, that on account of the operation of the British orders and French decrees, we could have no commerce even if the embargo was raised. And this was urged as a reason for continuing it. But as soon as our own restrictions were removed, altho' both the British orders in Council and the Berlin and Milan decrees still continued in force, and notwithstanding the extensive system of robbery committed in French ports, a new spring was given to industry, and, by an inspection of the amount of bonds in the treasury, it will be found that the public revenue which, by the operation of our restrictive system, was thrown into a deep consumption, begins to again look up, and to afford the encouraging prospect of being once more adequate to the exigencies of the nation, and our public coffers begin to be again replenished. The principal part of this revenue, during the last year, has accrued from importations from Great Britain and her dependencies. Can it be good policy again to resort to a system which, if it continues in its present form, cannot fail more effectually to exhaust the treasury than at any period heretofore, while there is the greatest probability that expenditures will increase ?

But the great argument now urged in favour of the non-importation system against Great Britain is that we are bound to do it by our own contract, in order to redeem a pledge given to France by the law of May 1st, 1810. By the 4th section of the law concerning commercial intercourse, passed May 1st, 1810, it is enacted, " That in case, either Great Britain or France shall, before the third day of March next, so revoke or modify her edicts that they shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, which fact the President shall declare by proclamation,



and if the other nation shall not within three months thereafter so revoke and modify her edicts in like manner, then the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eighteenth sections of the law to interdict the commercial intercourse between Great Britain, France and their dependencies, shall, after the expiration of three months from the date of the proclamation aforesaid, be revived and have full force, so far as relates to the dominions, colonies, and dependencies of the nation thus refusing or neglecting to revoke or modify her edicts in the manner aforesaid."

At the time when this act was finally passed, I had left the house and was on my way home. Although I should have voted against it, had I been present, yet, when it was introduced into the house, I, as well as many others, considered it as a matter of very small importance; as rather a gentle come off from, or abandonment of a system of which all had become heartily tired, than as a measure which would probably ever have any practical effect. Experience, and a little more reflection has taught it to be a species of legislation of the most dangerous kind; a legislating the United States into the power of a foreign government, by passing a law which it might require the consent of another nation to repeal. This is to establish a principle which if followed up, amounts to neither more nor less than to legislate away our independence itself. The conduct of the French government, in not revoking the Berlin and Milan decrees, agreeable to the promise contained in Cadore's letter of the 5th of August last, afforded a fair opportunity to escape out of the snare by ridding ourselves of the whole system. This favourable opportunity has not been embraced. We have, by a second act of legislation, more thoroughly entangled ourselves in our own toils, and now have no alternative left but either to quarrel with France, or remain entangled in the net we have spread for ourselves, until his imperial majesty is pleased to release us, or until the measure of our resistance to Great Britain shall come up to whatever capricious meaning he may see fit to impose on what he terms *causing our rights to be respected*.

This act has the appearance of impartiality, and of considering the two nations as on an equal footing at that time. Let us for a moment enquire what has been the conduct of France towards the United States since that period, which lays them under obligations equally binding with a formal contract, to extend to her the arms of friendship, while a hostile front is held up to her enemy. At the time when the law of May 1st, 1810, was passed, the famous Rambouillet decree of March 23d, subjecting to seizure and confiscation all American vessels which had entered either a French port, or those of the dependent nations which she pleases to term allies, at a date posterior to the preceding May, giving it a retrospective operation of ten months, was not known in the United States, and no such measure had been contemplated by the American government. What has been the conduct of France under that infamous and outrageous decree? She has seized and confiscated property to an amount which altho' it cannot be precisely ascertained, is immense, and cannot be estimated at less than thirty millions of dollars. This has been done not only in the

ports of France, but of all the dependent nations under her influence.— The depredations committed in Denmark, Norway, Holland, Sweden, Leghorn, Naples, Hamburgh, Bremen, &c. may be all considered as depredations of France. None of these nations would have entertained a thought of depredating on American commerce, had they not received orders from the palace of St. Cloud. These seizures were made upon pretences hitherto unheard of in the annals of civilized nations, in consequence of a decree not only retrospective in its operations but in direct violation of the faith of treaties, and the law of nations, and without any regard to the rights of hospitality, and was not confined to vessels which had violated either the Berlin or Milan decrees, or any other municipal regulation of France. After American vessels had, in pursuit of a market, voluntarily repaired either to French ports or those of the dependent nations, supposing themselves, for good reasons, to be safe under the laws of the several countries to which they repaired, the property of these unsuspecting merchants was seized and confiscated, and the crews treated with all the rigor of prisoners of war ; being either immured in dungeons, or turned out to starve in a foreign country, without the common privilege of prisoners of war, to whom both the laws of humanity and the usage of nations affords a support, until exchanged or liberated in some other way. The appropriation of almost 80,000 dollars during the late session of congress, in addition to the ordinary funds applicable to the relief of distressed seamen, in order to enable them once more to return to their country, is a standing evidence both of the extent and enormity of these outrages, and of Bonaparte's love to the Americans, and even this sum is far from adequate to reach every case of distress. Many are yet abroad in circumstances of great distress, and unable to return. Numbers have been compelled by dire necessity to engage on board foreign ships of war, and are probably at this moment engaged in committing depredations on American commerce. Such love as this is like that of the wolf, while the unoffending American stands in the place of the lamb. What would have been the feelings manifested both in Congress and this nation, had such outrages been committed by the other belligerent ? Would it have been passed over so tamely as in the present instance ? Would any such palliating milk and water apology have been made, as that it was done under a misconstruction, or misconception of a law of Congress ? I trust not.

In such a state of things, the idea which must naturally strike the mind is, that in such a modification of her edicts as that they would cease to violate our neutral commerce, provision must be made for the restoration of the property seized and confiscated under the Rambouillet decree. But is any such provision made ? No, nor is there the most distant prospect held out that it may be restored, or even become a subject of negotiation hereafter. On the contrary, we are told that the property was seized by way of reprisals and the law of reprisals must govern.

By adverting to the public documents this appears at first to have been the sense of the American executive, and that Gen. Armstrong was not by his instructions, which it has been seen fit to make public, authorized to enter into any arrangement which did not comprise in it a restoration

of the sequestered property. Smith's letter to Armstrong, July 5, 1810, public documents, page 37, "He (the President) instructs you particularly to make the French Government sensible of the deep impression made here, by so signal an aggression on the principles of justice and good faith (as the seizures and confiscations abovementioned) and to demand every reparation of which the case is susceptible. If it be not the purpose of the French government to remove every idea of friendly adjustment with the United States, it would seem impossible but that a reconsideration of this violent proceeding must lead to a redress of it, as a preliminary to a general accommodation of the differences between the two countries." The subject is again introduced in the same letter, page 39. "As has been heretofore stated to you, a satisfactory provision for restoring the property surprised and seized by the order and at the instance of the French government must be combined with a repeal of the French edicts, with a view to a non-intercourse with Great Britain. Such a provision being an indispensable evidence of the just purpose of France towards the United States. And you will moreover be careful in arranging such a provision, for that particular case of spoliations, not to weaken the ground on which a redress of others may be justly pursued. It farther appears to have been the sense of the American government, even at the time when the Berlin and Milan decrees were, by the President's proclamation, declared to be no longer in force, that this revocation was to be combined with a restoration of the property. Smith's letter to Armstrong, Nov. 2, printed documents page 42, "It is to be remarked moreover that in issuing the proclamation it has been presumed that the requisition contained in that letter (viz. the letter of July the 5th) will have been satisfied. This presumption is not only favoured by the natural connexion of the policy and justice of the reversal of that sequestration, but is strengthened by concurrent accounts thro' different channels, that such property as has been sequestered has been actually restored." The same demand is urged, and expectation expressed, in another letter of Nov. 5, documents page 48, in a passage too long to be here inserted.

Thus we see that Gen. Armstrong was limited by express instructions, from acceding to any arrangement which did not comprise in it a provision for the restoration of the sequestered property, and that, even when the proclamation opening an intercourse with France was issued, this appears to have been the sense of the American government. On what possible grounds the American minister could accept of an entirely different arrangement, one which made a sacrifice of thirty millions of property at least, an object of far greater importance than both the Berlin and Milan decrees combined, without such an express violation of his instructions as would exempt the United States from all obligations to ratify the arrangement, it is difficult to conjecture, unless by admitting a supposition so dishonourable that I would not wish to harbor it for a single moment, that he was furnished with a double set of instructions; the one contained in language official, and intended for publication, the other in a language confidential, and not to be trusted to the inspection of the vulgar eye. No adjustment therefore which did not make provision for the restoration of



the sequestered American property, could render the United States pledged to France to revive the non-intercourse against Great Britain, in case she did not withdraw her orders in council. In what particular view of our relations with France the opinion of the executive has been changed, if it has indeed undergone a change, we are not told. However this restoration seems to have been abandoned, as a preliminary, it is still insisted upon as a right. Has any part of this reasonable expectation of the United States been fulfilled on the part of the French government? Or has any encouragement been held out that these immense spoliation may be compensated at some future time? No, nothing of this. Without adverting to other passages in the documents, Gen. Armstrong's question to the duke of Cadore, with the duke's answer, is conclusive. Gen. Armstrong's letter is dated Sept. 7, and is to be found in printed documents, page 133. "Is it his majesty's will that the seizures made in the ports of Spain and other places shall become a subject of present or future negotiation between the two governments, or are the acts already taken by his majesty to be regarded as conclusive against remuneration?" The answer is plain and explicit, contained in a letter from the duke of Cadore to Gen. Armstrong, dated Sept. 12, documents, page 135. "As to the merchandize confiscated, it having been confiscated as a measure of reprisal, the principles of reprisal must be the law in that affair."

The question now is whether the United States, having entered into an arrangement with the distinct understanding that the property seized and confiscated, in such an outrageous and unheard of manner, and to an immense amount, should be restored, or at least made the subject of future negotiation, were bound to make such a great sacrifice as the adoption of the non-importation system, to redeem the pledge given to France in the law of May, 1810 (while she had fulfilled no part of this reasonable expectation) a measure which must be a great sacrifice of revenue by the government, be productive of much individual distress, and may, probably, involve us in a destructive and ruinous war.

With respect to the subject of compensation for spoliation, there is something in the documents publicly communicated, which is either hard to be understood or difficult to reconcile. We are told by Mr. Ruffel, the American charge des affaires, in his letter to the duke of Cadore of Dec. 10, that no official account of his letter of the 5th of August, announcing the revocation of the decrees, left France before Sept. 29, at which time Armstrong's letter of the 7th, and Cadore's answer of the 12th of that month, it would seem, must of course go with it. With this document in their hands, how the American government could presume that the requisition contained in Smith's letter of the 5th of July, in relation to the confiscated property, should have been satisfied, when told the contrary in the most explicit terms, remains to be explained. She here not only delays to make the expected remuneration, but, with the greatest sang froid imaginable, she tells us that she never will.

What else has France done to lay the United States under obligations to make so great a sacrifice? Does she merit it on account of her polite treatment of the American government and people? Or is it because she

has inflicted upon us merited chastisement, then told us we deserved it, and we with meekness receive the chastisement and kiss the rod ? One would be almost tempted to think that this was the case, by comparing the treatment received at that court with the tameness with which we have received it. Cadore's letter of Feb. 14, 1810, about five weeks previous to the outrageous Rambouillet decree, tops the climax of abuse. Printed documents page 111. "His Majesty could place no reliance on the proceedings of the United States, who having no ground of complaint against France, comprised her in their acts of exclusion, and since the month of May, have forbidden the entrance to their ports of French vessels, under the penalty of confiscation. As soon as his majesty was informed of this measure, he considered himself bound to order reprisals on American vessels, not only in his territory but likewise in the countries which are under his influence. In the ports of Holland, of Spain, of Italy and of Naples, American vessels have been seized, because the Americans have seized French vessels. The Americans cannot hesitate as to the part which they are to take ; they ought either to tear to pieces the act of their independence, and to become again, as before the revolution, the subjects of England, or to take such measures as that their commerce and industry should not be tarified by the English, which renders them more dependent than Jamaica, which at least has its assembly of representatives and its privileges. Men without just political views, without honour, without energy, may alledge that payment of the tribute imposed by England may be submitted to, because it is light ; but why will they not perceive that the English will no sooner have obtained the admission of the principle, than they will raise the tariff in such a way, that the burthen at first light, becoming insupportable, it will become necessary to fight for interest, after having refused to fight for honour."

Taking this language, in connexion with the seizure and confiscation which followed, it may be considered as good sound lecturing connected with pretty severe correction. Nothing equals the insolence of such treatment, unless it be the patience and submission with which it is borne. If this treatment paved the way for the removal of difficulties between France and the United States, the method must be confessed to be rather novel. In ordinary cases an Ambassador, after receiving such treatment, would have demanded his passports and withdrawn. But the American policy is pacific and their temper forbearing. In the dispute which took place, however, with Mr. Jackson, I saw no symptoms of extraordinary forbearance.

I have proceeded thus far on the presumption that the Berlin and Milan decrees were, ipso facto, repealed on the 1st of November. I shall now proceed to a more particular examination of that fact. We have the duke of Cadore's promise either absolute or conditional, that the Berlin and Milan decrees were revoked, and would cease to operate on the first of November, couched in language by no means soothing, in a letter to Gen. Armstrong, of the 5th of August, doc. page 127. "Now Congress retrace their steps, and revoke the act of the first of March. The ports of America are open to French commerce, and France is no longer

interdicted to the Americans. In short Congress engages to oppose itself to that one of the belligerent powers, which should refuse to acknowledge the rights of neutrals. In this new state of things, I am authorised to declare to you, that the Berlin and Milan decrees are revoked, and that after the first of November they will cease to have effect. It being understood that, in consequence of this declaration, the English shall revoke their orders in Council, and renounce the new principles of blockade they have wished to establish, or that the United States, conformably to the act you have just communicated, will cause their rights to be respected by the English."

Whether this promised repeal is absolute or conditional, may admit of a dispute. It depends upon one of two contingencies. But if it is to be considered as an absolute promise of a repeal, as it seems to have been viewed both by the American minister and executive, where is the evidence that it has been fulfilled. So far as there was any obligation in the case it was mutual. If France has neglected to fulfil her promise, the U. States are absolved from all obligations to revive the non-intercourse. I intend no reflection upon the president of the United States for issuing his proclamation. Agreeable to the courtesy usually practiced between nations, the declaration of the 5th of August, coming from an accredited source, might be evidence sufficient to him, of the intentions of the French government, on which to issue his proclamation. He had formerly adopted the same principle in his arrangement with Mr. Erskine, in April, 1809. As soon as the news of this arrangement reached Great Britain, it was promptly and publicly disavowed, and, on obtaining the knowledge of that disavowal, a counter proclamation was issued, recalling the first. Had the British government, instead of openly disavowing the arrangement, suffered the orders in council to operate silently, and to entrap the American merchant, would it have been considered by the American government as a repeal of the orders, or would the United States have considered themselves as bound by this part of the engagement? I believe not. So different was the conduct of the British government on this occasion, that the disavowal was not only prompt and open, but vessels which left the United States under the faith of that arrangement, were exempted from the operation of the orders. Is there now sufficient reason, not only for the law to go into operation agreeable to the president's proclamation, but for also reinforcing it with a new act of legislation, when, so long afterwards, we have no evidence of the cessation of the practical effects of the decrees, either in the ports of France or of the other nations of Europe under her controul?

The evidence however which here presents itself to view is not all merely of the negative kind, or a mere want of evidence. We have proof, both positive and official, that even if a mere nominal repeal of the decrees should have taken place at that time, it was but merely nominal, a bare-faced tantalizing of the American government, by pretending to offer a boon with the one hand, and snatching it away with the other, and that such restrictions are still laid on American commerce, by the entire prohibition of certain articles, the exportation of which is of the greatest conse-

quence to the United States, by the imposition of such enormous duties as are tantamount to a prohibition. and by limiting the trade to a few licensed vessels sailing from particular ports which she has been pleased to designate, as to render a nominal repeal of the decrees nugatory. It is not presumed that the president issued his proclamation with the knowledge of these restrictions. They were at that time unknown in the United States. But have we good reason to exclude ourselves by our own restrictions, from a commerce with Great Britain and her dependencies, while, by these new commercial regulations, we are more effectually excluded from all commerce, not only with France but with the continent of Europe, than by the decrees and orders both. I cannot give a better view of the light in which the American government viewed the operation of these restrictions, than by adverting to Mr. Smith's letter to Gen. Turreau, of Dec. 18. "From your letter it appears that the importation into France of cotton and tobacco, is at this time specially prohibited. From the decree of July the 15th it moreover appears that there can be no importation into France, but on terms and conditions utterly inadmissible, and that therefore there can be no importation at all of the following articles, the produce of the United States, viz. fish-oil, dye-wood, salt-fish, cod-fish, hides and peltry. As these enumerated articles constitute the great mass of the exports of the United States to France, the mind is naturally awakened to a survey of the actual condition of the commercial relations between the two countries, and to the consideration, that no practical good, worthy of notice, has resulted to the United States, from the revocation of the Berlin and Milan decrees, combined as it unexpectedly has been, with a change in the commercial system of France, so momentous to the United States. The act of Congress of May last had for its object not merely the recognition of a speculative principle, but the enjoyment of a substantial benefit. The overture therein presented, obviously embraced the idea of commercial advantage. It included a reasonable belief that an abrogation of the Berlin and Milan decrees would leave the ports of France as free for the introduction of the products of the United States, as they were previously to the promulgation of these decrees. The restrictions of the Berlin and Milan decrees, had the effect of restraining the American merchants from sending their vessels to France. The interdictions that have been substituted against the admission of American products will have the same effect of imposing upon them an equal restraint. If then, for the revoked decrees, municipal laws producing the same commercial effect have been substituted, the mode only and not the measure has undergone an alteration. And however true it may be, that the change is lawful in form, it is nevertheless as true, that it is essentially unfriendly, and that it does not at all comport with the ideas inspired by your letter of the 27th ult. in which you were pleased to declare the distinctly pronounced intention of favouring the commercial relations between France and the U. States, in all the objects of traffic, which shall evidently proceed from their agriculture or manufactures. If France, by her own acts, has blocked up her ports against the introduction of the products of the United States, what motive has this government, in a discussion with a third power, to insist on

the privilege of going to France? Whence the inducement to urge the annulment of a blockade of France, when, if annulled, no American cargoes could obtain a market in any of her ports? In such a state of things, a blockade of the coast of France would be to the United States as unimportant as a blockade of the Caspian sea."

Not barely these paragraphs but the whole of Secretary Smith's letter shows in the most clear and convincing manner, that the United States are in the present state of things obligated to take no steps whatsoever against Great Britain, in order to redeem any pledge given to France by the law of May last. Connected with these things we are not unfurnished with evidence that even a nominal repeal of the decrees has not taken place, or at least had not long after the first of November last. We may first notice the official letter of Mr. Russel, the American charge des affaires, in the case of the Orleans packet which arrived at Bordeaux in the month of December; and was immediately sequestered under the Berlin and Milan decrees. This Mr. Russel remarks in his letter to the duke of Cadore of December 10, was the first vessel which had arrived in France after the first of November on which the decrees could operate, and they did operate upon it, & he tells the French government that it will not be pretended that the decrees have been in fact revoked. We have also unofficial information of considerable weight received by three different arrivals from France since the first of November, all which attests that the decrees continued in operation, viz. By the passengers in the ship commodore Rogers, which brought out the new minister, Mons. Serrurier, who left Bayonne about the last of December, and by the Maria Louisa, Capt. Skiddy, which sailed from Bordeaux about the 1st or 2d of January, and by the Osmin, which left Rochelle as late as the middle of that month, all which attest that the decrees were in operation and American vessels subjected to seizure and sequestration.

The two particulars following are without doubt official; although not immediately respecting this country, they are not officially communicated. The first is extracted from a lengthy report of the minister of foreign relations to the emperor in the sitting of the conservative senate, Dec. 10, 1810. "*Sire, as long as England shall persist in her orders in council, your majesty will persist in your decrees. Your majesty will oppose to the blockade of the coasts the continental blockade, and to the pillage on the seas the confiscation of English goods on the continent.*" This minister of foreign relations is the same identical duke of Cadore, who was the organ through whom the repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees was announced on the fifth of August. Here then we have the duke of Cadore versus the duke of Cadore—Cadore on the tenth of December versus Cadore on the fifth of August.

What follows is from another report made by the count Semonville to the conservative senate, in the name of a special committee, on the subject of the annexation of Hamburgh and the other Hanstowns to France.—The report was made Dec. 13, and is extracted from the Hamburgh Correspondenten of the 25th. The extract is as follows. "*From the period of the armed neutrality, England believed that she could give a greater scope to her*



usurpations, without danger and without hindrance. Men looked forward to a period when weighty reprisals should render a return to justice necessary. This time is now come. The decrees of Berlin and Milan are the answer to the orders in council. The British cabinet dictated them to France. Europe receives those decrees as its law book, and this law book will be the palladium of the liberty of the seas. Let England abjure her haughtiness; let her replace neutrals in their rights. Justice has never ceased to demand this of her." Decrees, ceasing to have effect on the first of November, the law book of Europe the thirteenth of December! Strange inconsistency.

But it is said that these decrees respect England alone, and have no reference to the United States. It is granted that both the decrees and orders have a more immediate reference to the opposite belligerent than to the United States, and it is hardly supposable that either of them is actuated merely by a regard to neutrals in calling upon them to interfere. No. France might enact as many decrees as she pleases, and England issue an equal number of orders in council; if they operated on the United States alone, and were no inconvenience to the opposite belligerent, they would not interfere. It is because a system which injures the belligerent, is injurious to neutrals, that the call is made on them to interfere. Let us hear the explanation of our own government on this subject—Mr. Smith to Gen. Terreau, Dec. 16. "*The British edicts may be viewed as having a double relation; first, to the wrong done to the United States; second, to the wrong done to France. And it is in the latter relation only that France has a right to speak.*" *Mutatis mutandis.* The same observations are applicable to the French edicts, as they respect Great Britain. But it seems that now Cadore has declared the decrees revoked, and the president having declared the same by proclamation, England is pledged to withdraw her orders in council and cannot continue them without a manifest breach of faith, and has no right to complain, although the decrees, so far from being revoked, still continue to operate against her with more than Vandal fury. It was probably with a view to bring the United States and Great Britain into collision, by rendering it impracticable in the present state of things for her to withdraw her orders in council, that the late burning system was commenced. It is to be observed that France can operate upon Great Britain with effect only upon land. Her blockade of the British islands was merely nominal, and probably never raised the rate of insurance to Great Britain so much as one per cent. The British orders are no doubt a real annoyance to France. That she should give up her orders in council, merely for France's giving up her nominal blockade, while the French decrees operated with the utmost violence on shore, was hardly to be expected. Accordingly, the promise on the part of Great Britain to withdraw her orders in council, did not rest on such a mere nominal repeal of the decrees, with regard to the United States, as left them in full force against her, but comprised in it a restoration of the commerce of neutrals, to the same state it was in prior to the existence of the decrees. If in the present state of things, therefore, and while what is called the continental system rages with all its virulence, she should be induced to relinquish her orders in council, it must be from considerations entirely distinct from

any nominal repeal of the decrees which may have taken place! I shall only mention one consideration more, which affords, at least, a very strong presumption that no actual repeal of the decrees has taken place, i. e. that the new French minister has made no communication on the subject. Had any such communication been made, it would, without doubt, have been communicated to congress before the close of the session. No such communication was made, and it was the general understanding at Washington, that he had none to make. When his arrival was first announced, it was given out that he was undoubtedly charged with satisfactory explanations, not only on that, but upon every other subject of dispute. Indeed, whatever doubts some might entertain of their sincerity, it was the expectation of all that he would come plentifully furnished with fair promises at least. That he appears to be unfurnished even with that cheap commodity, at a time when such an anxiety was excited on the subject of the decrees, taken in connexion with other evidences, affords conclusive proof that no repeal, at least no efficient practical repeal had taken place.

I shall not, however, pass over in silence some supposed evidences, that the decrees are repealed, in addition to Cadore's letter of August 5. Here our attention is first directed to the letter of Mr. Russell, the American charge de affaires at Paris, to Mr. Pinkney, dated Dec. 1, and to the long communication of Mr. Pinkney to the marquis Wellesley, of Dec. 10.— Mr. Russell observes to Mr. Pinkney, that the decrees of Berlin and Milan had not been executed on any vessel of the United States for an entire month preceding, for the best of all possible reasons, viz. that, during that period, no American vessel had entered a French port, on which the decrees could operate. Mr. Pinkney's letter to lord Wellesley is by some considered as conclusive on the subject. Lord Wellesley had informed Mr. Pinkney by an official note of Dec. 4, that, after the most accurate enquiry, he had not been able to obtain any authentic intelligence of the actual repeal of the French decrees, and requests Mr. Pinkney farther, that if he was in possession of any such information, he would be happy to receive it. Mr. Pinkney's answer is long and diffuse, but instead of stating facts of which it is to be presumed he had none in his possession, he enters on a laborious course of reasoning on Cadore's letter of the fifth of August, which he calls precision itself, and on the information he had received from Mr. Russell, that no case had come to his knowledge on the first of December, on which they had operated since the first of November, but in the whole letter, which occupies almost thirteen printed pages, he is unable to state a single instance, wherein the operation of these decrees has been suspended, in which it was possible for them to operate. I have neither time nor inclination, in this address, to make particular remarks on this singular piece of diplomacy. In general, it has the complexion of the argument of an attorney, labouring hard to influence a jury in favor of his client, by substituting reasoning to supply the place of evidence. With what emotions lord Wellesley read it is uncertain, but I think that of course they must be different from conviction. But whatever shadow of evidence there may be, either in Russell's letter of Dec. 1, or in Pinkney's laboured address, it is all swept away, by Russell's subse-

quent letters of Dec. 10, & 11, in which he states that the Orleans packet was the first American vessel on which the decrees could have operated, and on this they did operate. I do not say that in timing the publication of these letters of Mr. Russell, there was any thing like management; but by comparing the times when they were communicated to congress there is really some appearance of it. Mr. Russell's letters, of Dec. 10 & 11, were communicated to congress Jan. 31. His letter of Dec. 1, was not communicated until Feb. 19. Was this to give it, in the view of superficial observers, the ostensible appearance of being of a subsequent date? or was it because a letter of Dec. 1, did not come to hand until nearly three weeks after one of the 11th?

We are next directed to a communication of the grand judge and minister of justice, the Duke of Massa, to the counsellor of state, president of the council of prizes, and another from the Duke of Gaete minister of finance to the director general of the customs. These letters are both of the same date, viz. Dec. 25, and both to the same effect. At that time it is not pretended that the decrees were actually repealed. But after reciting Cadore's note of the 5th of August, and adverting to the president's proclamation of the 2d of November, it is added—"In consequence of this engagement entered into by the government of the United States, to cause their rights to be respected, his majesty orders that all the causes which may be pending in the council of prizes, of captures of American vessels made after the first of November, and those that may in future be brought before it, shall not be judged according to the principles of the decrees of Berlin and Milan, but that they shall remain suspended, the vessels captured or seized to remain only in a state of sequestration."—i. e. the few vessels which may have arrived subsequent to the first of November, without any reference to former enormous spoliations. Will it be said that while vessels are still held in a state of sequestration, which was to be their situation until the 2d of February the decrees had ceased to operate? I believe not. There seems here to be a clashing between the views and proceedings of the French government, and the law of Congress of May 1, 1810. By that law it was declared necessary for the belligerent first revoking his decrees, to trust the United States three months for the fulfilment of their engagement, or the performance on their part of interdicting intercourse with the other. But Napoleon had said as early as Feb. 14, that he could place no confidence in the Americans. All that was required on the one hand and promised on the other, as a condition of the repeal of the decrees, when that repeal was announced in Cadore's letter of the 5th of August, was resistance to the orders in council, agreeable to the principles of the law of May 1st, which required the credit of three months. That law was fully complied with, when the president issued his proclamation. That proclamation was now in the hands of the French government. Still his majesty cannot trust the Americans. Something farther must be done after the 2d of February. The decrees are only suspended. The property which either had then arrived, Dec. 25, or which might arrive previous to the said 2d of February, although not definitively confiscated, was to be held in a state of sequestration, a state

from which little American property has ever returned. I was in hopes that between this collision of the law of May, 1810, and the disposition of the emperor not to trust the Americans, we might have got fairly rid of the remains of our restrictive system. But it seems this is not the case. So eager does the American government seem, in its wishes to rush into the embraces of the great Napoleon, that the prior claim for a credit of three months is abandoned. We consent to pay down, and even in advance, and to add a work of supererogation, by passing a new law, while that of May, 1810, revived and put in operation by the proclamation of the president, was the only measure on our part which the French government could require, had they even most punctually fulfilled their own engagement.

It is farther suggested, as an evidence that the decrees are revoked, that, since the first of November, vessels, or at least one vessel of the U. States, has actually gone from the U. States to France, and has returned with a cargo. But it is to be observed that prior to the proposal of any arrangement in relation to the repeal of the decrees, a limited number of American vessels, not exceeding 30 or 40, were, by a decree of July 15, 1810, permitted, under special licences, to carry certain articles to France, and bring cargoes in return. These were only to sail from the ports of Newyork and Charleston in the United States. Unless it be under one of these special licences, I believe it will be difficult to prove that a single vessel of the United States has entered the ports of France, been permitted to dispose of her cargo and return. But tho' one vessel should, under favour, have been more fortunate than another, this is but a very slender evidence of the general freedom of commerce. Yet so eager are some to catch at even a shadow of evidence on this head, that, while the detention of a single vessel, by a British cruizer, is an evidence that Great Britain captures all our vessels, the escape of one from the devouring fangs of Napoleon, is to be received as evidence that he has abandoned his whole system of annoyance of American commerce. But let us cast an eye on the situation of our commerce to the continent of Europe generally. Will American vessels, at this moment, be received with cordiality and hospitality, and be permitted to trade on equal terms, not only in the ports of France, but in those of Holland, of Denmark, of Sweden, of Russia, of the Hanfetowns, of Leghorn, Naples, or any of the ports of the kingdom of Italy? The contrary is a well known fact. But the moment the Berlin and Milan decrees are really revoked, all these ports will be open to the flag of the United States. If, in such a state of things, therefore, we are bound by a contract with France to enter into a state of non-intercourse with England, it must be with the obligation of a slave to a master, or of a vassal to his liege lord, and not with any obligation which one independent nation can owe to another.

I have, my fellow citizens, dwelt longer on this topic than I intended, altho' obliged to omit several things I had proposed to notice, and touched others as briefly as possible. I have shown, I think, clearly, that we were under no obligations to adopt the present system by any pledges given to France in the law of May, 1810; it may not be amiss to enquire

briefly what has been the conduct of Great Britain, since the passage of the law of May, 1810, which renders the present hostile attitude towards her necessary. Here it is my wish not to be misunderstood. I have no intention to become, at this time, the apologist of Great Britain, or to palliate the attack on the Chesapeake, the murder of Pierce, so called, the impressment of seamen, the interruptions given to the colonial trade, or any or all the whole list of grievances, which have, for so many years, been topics of complaint, or matters of negotiation. Concerning the comparative magnitude of these grievances, different persons will think differently. But whatever may be the magnitude of the injuries we have received, in all or any of these particulars, they have nothing to do with the present subject. As by the law of May 1, 1810, the two nations were placed on an equal footing, so, in order to test the propriety of the adoption of the present non-importation law, we have only to enquire what has been her conduct towards the United States? What has been the conduct of G. Britain since that period, so extremely hostile, compared with that of France, as to call for this discrimination? Had she made an indiscriminate capture of all American vessels and property, which she either met with on the high seas, or found in her ports, and pled as an apology, that it was because our non intercourse law exposed her vessels to condemnation, it would have been only to imitate what France has done, on a pretence equally unfounded. This she has not done. The American flag has traversed the ocean unmolested, and been received in her ports with hospitality, as well as in those of her allies. Had she done this, and in answer to our claims for the restoration of our property, told us, that the property taken was taken on the principle of reprisals and the law of reprisals must govern in that affair, the feelings of the nation would have been different from what they are when a similar enormity is committed by France. We would, in that case, have heard of nothing so like an apology, as that it was done on a misconception or misconstruction of the law of congress. Well, what else has she done? Has there been of late any increase of the evil of the impressment of seamen? No. For several years past there has been comparatively little complaint on that head, and, I believe, an instance can hardly be found, of one real American seaman, who has not been released on application, and making proof of his being an American citizen. Has the British government through any of their ministers treated the American minister and his government with rudeness? Has Mr. Pinkney been told that the Americans were a nation of poltroons, without energy, without honour, and without courage? By no means. Mr. Pinkney has always been treated with civility at least. What then has she done? She has hitherto delayed to send another minister to replace Mr. Jackson, a man of rank, as it would seem that nothing less than a nobleman at least can be congenial to the republican habits of the government and people of the United States, and she has not as yet withdrawn her orders in council, nor expressed full faith in the promise of France, by the duke of Cadore. But she has promised that as soon as the commerce of neutrals shall be restored to the situation in which it was before the existence of the French decrees, she will meet it by a revocation of her orders



in council. We have a promise from the one and a promise from the other. There is a difference however in the alternatives. The alternative, on which we have the promise from England, rests solely on something to be done by France, and involves in it no condition which may lead to a collision between the United States and that power. But the rescinding of the decrees, although it has been understood as absolutely to take place, on the 1st of November, yet this apparently absolute promise is still hampered with a condition, and made to depend on one or other of these alternatives. "It being understood that the English shall revoke their orders in council and renounce their new principle of blockade which they have wished to establish, or that the United States, conformable to the act you have just communicated, will cause their rights to be respected by England." i. e. go to war, as I presume we will find the phrase interpreted by France. We have therefore a promise from the one, and a promise from the other, both hampered with a condition. In this respect, therefore, the nations still stand on an equal footing.

It is necessary, in the next place, to pass in review the conduct of the United States in their attempts to negotiate with these two powers, for a redress of the wrongs of which we complain. In their overtures to the French government, the United States have practised upon a figure, which may, I believe, be properly termed the art of sinking. At first, no arrangement could be entered into, which did not comprise in it, as a preliminary, the restoration of the sequestered property. By descending one step, the insisting upon the restoration of the property, as a preliminary, was waved, but nothing was to be done without a promise of restoration. In the next place, even the exacting an express promise was waved, but it must be considered as a subject either of present or future negotiation.— But even this ground was abandoned, and it would seem as if government had concluded to rest contented with a naked repeal of the decrees, without any provision for the restoration of the sequestered property. As another step in the scale of depreciation, a repeal is accepted which is confessedly adequate to no repeal at all, being accompanied with such municipal regulations as are equally vexatious with the decrees themselves: and finally, as the lowest round in the ladder of humiliation and submission, the law of May is not only permitted to take effect, but is also reinforced by a new act of legislation, in every view of the subject an act of supererogation, without any evidence of even a nominal repeal. Yet in this state of things we confer all the boon upon France, which she could have expected, had she fulfilled the engagement on her part with the most scrupulous exactness, while not so much as one of what was justly termed the reasonable expectations of the United States was answered.

With respect to concessions required of Great Britain, we do not rest satisfied with demanding all that was contemplated when the law of May, 1810, was passed. A new subject, viz. that of proclamation or paper blockades, is now brought into discussion for the first time in connexion with our restrictive system. I do not mean that these blockades by proclamation have not been heretofore subjects of complaint, or that they may not contain real matters of grievance. They no doubt constitute one item

in the long list of wrongs, about which we have been complaining, remonstrating, and negotiating, for so many years. But never, that I know of, have these blockades been considered as one of the causes either of the embargo or of any other branch of our restrictive system. No one ever thought of a non-intercourse on that account, nor do I recollect that the subject of the blockades was ever so much as once introduced in any debate on the subject, nor were any of our measures considered as retaliatory, or as having any reference to the subject of the blockades. But now their annulment is to be made a *sine qua non*, in our settlement with Great Britain. By some passages in the documents, which I shall not take time to recite, it would seem as if a recal of all these blockades, and an entire renunciation of the principle of declaring a place blockaded by proclamation would be required, and the blockade of Copenhagen, and of the canal of Corfu, as well as others, are mentioned. But the blockade uniformly insisted upon as that which must at all events be revoked to prevent the non-importation from going into effect, is the blockade of 1806, commonly called Fox's blockade.\* As this blockade appears not to have been well understood, and the views of it presented in the documents do not go to explain what it is, as distinguished from any other blockade, I must crave a few moments attention while I attempt an explanation of it, as well as of the light in which it has been formerly viewed by the American government, which may serve as a clue to discover the reason why it is brought into discussion at this time. This I shall do from public documents officially communicated to congress, in the year 1808. The following notification of this blockade was communicated to Mr. Munroe by Mr. Fox in a note dated May 16, 1806. "The undersigned, his majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, has received his majesty's commands to acquaint Mr. Munroe, that the king, taking into consideration the new and extraordinary means resorted to by the enemy for the purpose of distressing the commerce of his subjects, has thought fit to direct that the necessary measures should be taken for the blockade of the coasts, rivers, and ports, from the river Elbe to the port of Brest, both inclusive, and the said coasts, rivers, and ports, are and must be considered as blockaded; but (*observe the exception*) that his majesty is pleased to declare, that such blockade shall not extend to prevent neutral ships and vessels, laden with goods, not being the property of his majesty's enemies, and not contraband of war, from approaching the said coasts, and entering into and sailing from the said rivers and ports (save and except the coasts, rivers, and ports, from Ostend to the river Seine, already in a state of rigorous blockade, and which are declared to be so continued) provided the said ships and vessels, so approaching and entering, shall not have been laden at any port belonging to, or in the possession of any of his majesty's enemies, and that the said

\* The observations on the blockade of 1806, only with some variation in details, have already appeared in the 'Traveller,' and sundry other papers in the United States. As the writer has no wish to shrink from the responsibility of that publication, the remarks on that subject are again republished as a part of this address.

ships and vessels, so sailing from the said rivers and ports, except as aforesaid, shall not be destined to any port belonging to or in the possession of any of his majesty's enemies, nor have previously broken the blockade."

This nominal blockade, (with the exception of that from Ostend to the Seine, which was a strict blockade) did not go to prohibit the direct trade between the U. States and either France, Spain or their allies. It merely prohibited trade from one enemy's port to another. France and Spain were then in alliance, and both the enemies of Great Britain.—Had these countries been both included within this blockading decree, it would not have been lawful for neutrals to trade from France to Spain, and vice versa, or from one port in France to another port in France, i.e. it was not permitted for these countries to carry on their commerce with each other under a neutral flag, which would protect their property from seizure, and condemnation, a privilege for their neutral commerce which the United States have formally relinquished. But, with the exception of those places declared to be in a state of rigorous blockade, it gave no interruption to the direct trade between the U. States, and either France, Spain, or any of their allies. Nor did it interrupt even what was called the Colonial trade, admitting that the Colonial articles had become the bona fide property of citizens of the U. States, and had been entered into and cleared out from an American port, duties having been paid or secured according to law, which was agreeable to an arrangement between the two governments, of the U. States on the one hand, and of Great Britain on the other. Certain it is that, notwithstanding this blockade, a free and beneficial commercial intercourse continued to be maintained between the United States and the countries included within this decree of blockade, until it met with other interruptions. Equally certain it is that Mr. Munroe, who was upon the spot, and who cannot be suspected of a want of vigilance, in attending to the interest of his country, did not consider this blockade in an unfavourable light, or as being any new grievance to the United States.

Copies of three different letters written on the subject soon after the notification of this blockade are now before me, from which I submit the following extracts. They are from him to the then Secretary of State, now President of the United States. The first is dated May 17, 1806, the next day after the date of the notification and the very day in which he received it. "Early this morning, I received from Mr. Fox a note, a copy of which is enclosed, which you will see embraces explicitly, a principal subject depending between our governments, though in rather a singular mode. A similar communication is, I presume, made to the other ministers—though of this I have no information. The note is couched in terms of restraint and professes to extend the blockade, farther than was heretofore done. Nevertheless it takes it off from many ports already blockaded, indeed from all east of Ostend and west of the Seine, except in articles contraband of war and enemies' property, which are seizable without a blockade. And in like form of exception, considering every enemy as one power, it admits the trade of neutrals within the same limits to be free in the productions of enemies' colonies in every but the direct route from the colony to the mother country."

Three days afterwards, viz. on May 20th, he writes as follows:—  
 “From what I could collect I have been strengthened in the opinion which I communicated to you in my last, that Mr. Fox’s note of the 16th was drawn with a view to a principal question with the United States, I mean that of the trade of enemies’ colonies. It embraces, it is true, other objects, particularly the commerce with Prussia, and the North generally, whose ports it opens to neutral powers, under whose flag British manufactures will find a market there. In this particular especially, the commerce promises to be highly satisfactory to the commercial interests of the United States, and it may have been the primary object of the government.”

It appears by his last letter of June 9th, that he had not changed his opinion but had had it rather strengthened by a personal interview with Mr. Fox.—“I concluded from this conversation, as I had done from what had occurred before, that this measure had been taken to prevent the farther seizure and condemnation of our vessels, on the principles in discussion between our governments, and that the acknowledgment had been withheld from a consideration mentioned by Mr. Fox in one of our conferences, that such an acknowledgment would be to give up the point in negotiation.”

Such were the views which Mr. Munroe, who was upon the spot, entertained of this celebrated blockade, at the time it was laid, altho’ it is now considered as a grievance of such magnitude, as alone to afford sufficient cause for the revival of the non-intercourse, should the orders in council be even withdrawn; and we have no evidence that the views of the Government of the United States were, at that time, different from those of Mr. Munroe. Soon after this Mr. Pinkney was joined in commission with Mr. Munroe. The letter of June 9th was, it is believed, the last written before their joint commission. The correspondence between the American Government and Messrs. Munroe and Pinkney, so far as the same has been made public, is now before me, and I do not find in this a single objection made to this blockade, nor does it appear that Messrs. Munroe and Pinkney ever had instructions to make a single remonstrance against it. The following facts make it evident that it was viewed as a measure rather favourable than hostile to the commerce of the U. States; as an abandonment in practice, altho’ without giving up the principle on which a number of late seizures, much complained of, had been made. It will be recollected, that during the year 1805, depredations, to an alarming extent, were committed on American vessels engaged in what was called the colonial trade, grounded on an adoption or rather extension in practice, and more rigorous enforcement, of the principle that a neutral, in time of war, had no claim to the enjoyment of a branch of trade, denied him in time of peace. Many of these vessels were condemned in the British admiralty courts. The celebrated pamphlet entitled *War in Disguise*, which appears to have been written with a view to pave the way for these seizures, is not yet forgotten any more than the adjudications of Sir William Scott. These captures and adjudications were considered as a matter of serious grievance, and the table of the house of representatives was loaded with petitions from almost all our commercial cities. The subject was

long and warmly agitated in congress, and at length the famous partial non-importation law of April 18, 1806, was produced, which was to take effect the 15th of the following November. About the time the knowledge of this law arrived in England, this blockade was notified, the seizures and confiscations having been previously discontinued. This blockade was so far from being considered as a new grievance, that, on the recommendation of the president, an act passed Dec. 19, 1806, farther to suspend the law until the first of July following, at the same time vesting a power provisionally in the president to continue the suspension till the next December. Had there been not only a continuance of the vexations which occasioned the law, but also another grievance superadded in the blockade of 1806, this would not have been done. The truth was, that both the captures and condemnations, previously complained of, were suspended, and under the blockade of 1806 we find no complaint either of captures or of the adjudications of Sir William Scott. The treaty commonly called the Munroe treaty, which was sent back without being even submitted to the senate, was made during the existence of this blockade. Among the objections made to it when it was returned, none is taken from the circumstance of its not providing for the removal of this blockade. It has already been observed that, during all the debates on the embargo, non-intercourse, &c. this blockade was never mentioned as a grievance or as a cause of the adoption of any of these measures. In all the attempts at negotiation, in which offers have been made to repeal our restrictive system with regard to her, what has been demanded in return has been restricted to the orders in council, without making any mention of the blockade of 1806. In the arrangement made with Mr. Erskine, April 1809, no demand was made and no promise given of the withdrawing of this blockade. So late as January 1810, it seems not to have been recollected that this blockade was a grievance. In a letter from Mr. Smith to Mr. Pinkney, Jan. 20, 1810, while the non-intercourse was in force, he is directed to "assure the British government of the cordial disposition of the president to exercise any power with which he may be invested, to put an end to acts of congress which would not have been resorted to but for the orders in council; & the determination to keep them in force against France in case her decrees also should not be repealed." The truth is that this blockade was so far from answering the description of a proper blockade, that it was a mere commercial regulation, relating principally to the colonial trade, placing that subject on a more eligible footing than before, and was so considered by the American government. Now the colonial trade is no more, and if France allows vessels of the United States to enter her ports at all, which is at least doubtful, it is only with articles of the growth or manufacture of the United States, the blockade of 1806, if it even existed in the full extent in which it was first laid, which it does not, is (to borrow an expression from the present secretary of state) of no more consequence to the United States than a blockade of the Caspian Sea. Why, therefore, is this article introduced into discussion now, and made so essential in our demands against Great Britain, that without her compliance in this particular, no accommodation can take place, but the non-intercourse must go



into operation three months after the repeal of the decrees, or rather three months after a repeal was promised to take place, while at first it was considered as rather a favourable than a hostile measure. Can it be merely to prolong a state of irritation between the two countries, and evade an amicable adjustment? I will not suppose it. Another reason is because France wills it, and the American government, to give sufficient proof of their devotion to France, and their readiness to rush into the arms of Napoleon, who has given so many substantial proofs of his love to the Americans, consent, not only to forego a beneficial intercourse, but to impoverish the treasury and run the risk of a war. That the government of the United States was rather pressed into this measure, and did not absolutely volunteer in making this demand, is, I think, pretty plainly implied in Smith's letter to Armstrong of July 5, printed documents, page 38, 39. "If it should be necessary for you to meet the question (i. e. you may evade it if you can, by declining to meet it, unless it becomes necessary.) If it should be necessary for you to meet the question whether the non-intercourse will be renewed against Great Britain, in case she should not comprehend in the repeal of her edicts, her blockades, which are not consistent with the law of nations, you may, should it be found necessary, let it be understood that a repeal of the illegal blockades of a date prior to the Berlin decree, namely, that of May, 1806, will be included in the condition required of Great Britain, that particular blockade having been avowed to be comprehended in, and, of course, identified with, the orders in council. With respect to blockades of a subsequent date, or not against France, you will press the reasonableness of leaving them, together with future blockades not warranted by public law, to be proceeded against by the United States in the manner they may choose to adopt."

What is the plain meaning of this passage? I certainly shall not willingly misconstrue or pervert it, but to me it can admit only the following construction. With respect to the blockade of 1806, you may, if necessary, go so far as to promise without hesitation that the repeal of this will be insisted upon. But we would be exceeding glad to be excused from going any farther. You are therefore to intreat his majesty that you may not be constrained to go any farther, and press the reasonableness of your request with the strongest arguments you can; that, with respect to other blockades, the United States may be permitted to manage their own affairs in their own way. We wish not to be urged any farther.

I may not, perhaps, correctly understand the doctrine of these fictitious, paper, or proclamation blockades. I shall nevertheless hazard an observation or two farther. Much is said about their being contrary to the law of nations. I profess no particular knowledge of writers on that subject. The great maxim of national law, however, between belligerents, is the law of force. Scarcely any nation will refrain from injuring an enemy in that way in which he can do his antagonist the most harm. The question of the blockades, therefore, will not be so much a question of right as of expediency, on which a naval and a land power will invariably take different sides. Let France and Great Britain change situations; let the for-

mer become a naval power, and the latter be driven from the ocean and become all-powerful upon land, and we will see them changing sides on this question. France would, in that case, advocate the system of blockades, and Great Britain would reprobate it; and the neutral, having an extensive commerce, and no means of protecting it on the ocean, will always be the sufferer, let who will be the aggressor.

I do not, however, mean to insinuate that these paper blockades, as they are called, may not, in some instances, have been injurious to the United States, and have been matters of serious grievance, and are proper subjects of remonstrance and negotiation. But to commence and continue a destructive war against ourselves; to prosecute a system which must inevitably ruin our resources and prosperity, and will probably involve us in a war, after draining us of our resources for carrying on that war, because (for I will suppose the orders in council withdrawn) I say, because a foreign nation issues a proclamation declaring the coasts of a particular section of country in a state of blockade, which operates only theoretically, like the blockade of 1806, and has little or no practical effect, is to shew our obsequiousness to one nation, and manifest our spirit, or rather our petulance against another, at too great expense.

I have, I think, shown that there is nothing in the conduct of either France or England which lays us under any obligations to adopt this measure of partial hostility at present. I shall now dismiss this subject with one single observation. Much has been said in attempting to prove that our neglecting or delaying to enforce the non-intercourse against England would be a breach of a solemn contract, a violation of our plighted faith to France in the law of May 1st, 1810. Had she, *ipso facto*, repealed her decrees, and caused all their effects to cease, and had England, at the same time, refused to withdraw her orders in council, whether the entering into such a contract was good policy or not, we would be bound in good faith to fulfill it. But if the law of May, 1810, is to be considered in the light of a contract, a pledge given to the belligerents, it is equally so to France and Great Britain, and a pledge given to the nation revoking her decrees, to revive the non-intercourse with the other, equally was a pledge not to revive it partially against one, without such revocation on the part of the other. If then we adopt the non-intercourse against England, and extend the arms of friendship to France, while she has not, as to any real practical effect, revoked her decrees, it is not only an abandonment of our system of neutrality, by the commission of a hostile act, but it is also a violation of the principles of our own law, and a manifest breach of faith with Great Britain.

Having dwelt so largely on this subject, I shall dismiss the other particulars, which I proposed noticing in this address, with but a very few observations. Respecting the occupation of that part of West Florida, which lies between the river Perdido and the Mississippi, under the proclamation of the president of the United States, I cannot but consider it both as impolitic and unwarrantable at this time. The dispute about the title of this territory is both long and intricate. I shall not meddle with it at present. To me the title of the United States has always appeared to be

problematical at best. That the country west of the Perdido was once included under the general name of Louisiana, is, it is believed, true. So was a great part of what is now the United States. The whole of our western territory, including the Mississippi territory, the states of Tennessee, Kentucky & Ohio, & the territories of Indiana, Illinois, & Michigan, making together, more than half of the territory of the original U. States, was comprised within its limits. For the last 50 years at least, it has been unknown by that name, and has been under a separate government. Certain it is, that, when the United States first set up a claim to that country, as being included within the purchase of Louisiana, both France and Spain protested against it; the latter declaring that it was not contained in the cession made to the former, by the treaty of St. Ildefonso, and the former that she had received no transfer of that territory from the latter, and had conveyed none to the United States. France, at the same time, declaring explicitly, by her minister Talleyrand, not only against the title, but also that on an attempt on the part of the United States to occupy the country by force, she would unquestionably take part with Spain. On these declarations, the urging of the claim was at that time suspended, and the collector's office which was directed to be established on the Mobile, was fixed as far up the river as Fort Stoddard, which was within the original bounds of the United States. And, when afterwards an act was passed during the session of 1805-6, appropriating 2,000,000 dollars to enable the executive to procure not only that but the territory east of the Perdido, including the remainder of West and the whole of East Florida, by purchase, it could not be fairly construed into any thing else than a virtual abandonment of the prior claim. As that attempt to purchase did not succeed, the territory in question has ever since continued in the peaceable possession of Spain. France and Spain, it is to be observed, were then allies. Now, that an intimate connexion is formed between England and Spain, there is but little doubt that France would be willing the country should pass into the hands of the United States, or do any thing which might bring the American government into a collision with either Great Britain or Spain, or both. The conventionalists who raised the insurrection, and invited the United States to take possession of the country, were principally composed of emigrants from the United States. But few if any of the Spaniards had any share in it. The situation in which the country is placed at this moment is a singular one. It is in part occupied by the U. States' troops, who have taken possession of it under the authority of the proclamation of the president, of the 27th of October, 1810. It was with good reason expected that the Spanish governor at Mobile, would surrender that place, on summons, to the United States. This, it is understood, he refuses, and the United States' troops have no authority to use force. No legal provision has been made for its temporary government. It continues in the same situation in which it was occupied by the authority of the president, without any legal interposition of congress. A motion was made to annex it to the territory of Orleans. Another to erect a temporary territorial government, but nothing has been done. The possession of both East and West Florida would be an object of considerable import-

ance to the United States, could it be fairly and honourably acquired, not so much on account of the value of the territory, as of the facility it would afford to other parts, particularly the western parts of Georgia, the Mississippi territory, and even some parts of Tennessee, to reach the ocean by means of navigable rivers which run through it and penetrate far into the country. In this view it is an object of much greater consequence than all the wilds of Louisiana west of the Mississippi. But, in my opinion, the manner in which the possession has been attempted cannot be reprobated in too pointed terms, as it is neither more nor less than an act of hostility against a nation with whom the United States were at peace; and to take advantage of a time when the nation was in distress, and even their national existence threatened, was neither fair nor honourable, had the claim of the United States been even less exceptionable than it is. It is also probable that it will prove a much greater inconvenience to the United States than all its value. Spain has it in her power, by excluding our shipping from South America, to distress our commerce to an amount far greater than all the value of Florida. The coldness uniformly manifested by the government of the United States towards the cause of the Spanish patriots; the state of irritation which has so long continued, and which is like to continue between the United States and Great Britain, who now takes a deep interest in every thing that concerns Spain, combined with this attack upon a Spanish province, will probably produce that exclusion, if it does not involve us in any more serious difficulty.

The erection of the territory of Orleans into an independent state, was met by a twofold objection, one respecting the constitutionality of the measure, the other on its expediency at this time. On the first ground I shall not pretend to decide. The objections on that head were plausible at least, and were not satisfactorily answered. The constitution of the United States was calculated for the territory then known under the name of the United States and its territories. The article in the constitution for the admission of new states into the union, undoubtedly contemplated the erection of these new states within the present acknowledged limits. To extend this territory by the annexing of countries not within the original limits, nor contemplated by the constitution, goes to vary the terms of the original compact, and, when the principle is once admitted, no bounds can be set to its extension. And, it may so happen, that all the original parties to the compact may be thrown completely into the power of new states, erected, not within the original territory, but within that which has been annexed by purchase or some other way. Whether this would not be a direct violation of the constitution, as it respects the original states, is a subject of considerable importance to those states whose political consequence in the union is lessened by every such extension of territory.

But without a particular examination of the constitutional question, I found sufficient reasons to be opposed to the present erection of the territory into an independent state, on the ground of expediency alone. By the ordinance for the regulation of the government of the territories, particularly of those north west of the river Ohio, which passed the old congress, July 13, 1787, and which is still considered as the basis of all the territo-

rial governments, it is ordained, that when any territory contained within the limits therein marked out as proper to become, in due time, a state, shall contain 60,000 inhabitants, said territory shall have a right to form a state constitution, and be admitted into the union, with all the privileges of a free and independent state. It is true congress are not restricted by the ordinance, but may admit a territory into the union as an independent state containing a less number of inhabitants than 60,000. This was to be done in the exercise of a sound discretion. In the exercise of this discretion, that part of the territory north west of the river Ohio, now constituting the state of Ohio, was admitted into the union when it contained a less number of inhabitants than 60,000, the number being about 40, or 45,000, but there was a prospect of a sudden increase of population, not only to 60,000, but far exceeding it, and the population was all free, and so rapid has been this increase, in fact, that the late census gives them a population of 230,000, all free. Whether such a sound discretion has been exercised in the admission of the territory of Orleans into the union, the following circumstances may enable us to form an opinion. A complete return of the census of the territory was not received while congress was in session, but, from a calculation made upon the partial returns which have been made, the whole population, of all sorts, was estimated at not far from 55,000. The population in the city of Orleans was a fraction more than 25,000. Not having the return now before me I cannot state the fractions with exactness. Of this number 8,000, and I believe a small fraction of four or five over, were free whites, a fraction less than 11,000 slaves, and the remainder free people of colour, i. e. such as were not held to personal slavery, but who had no political rights, being incapable of being elected to any office, or of exercising the right of suffrage. As the culture of cotton and sugar form principal branches of the agriculture in the territory, and as these branches require the employment of many slaves, it is not probable that the proportion of slaves is less on the plantations than in the city ; probably it is greater. To allow 20,000 souls for the amount of the free white population of the territory will be a liberal calculation ; and, from the nature of the country, and the vast quantities of swamp incapable of cultivation, a rapid increase of inhabitants is not to be expected. A large majority of this population consists of French inhabitants, equally strangers to our language, our laws, and our constitution, and to the principles of a republican government, and so far as they do know, prejudiced against it, and many of them strongly attached to the grand monarch Napoleon. To these may be added a few Spanish inhabitants, some Americans, and English, Scotch and Dutch Europeans, who were there previous to the cession, and a portion of Americans who have migrated to that country since, but who are a small minority compared with the whole, and there is not the greatest cordiality between them and the original inhabitants. To this motley population, of which probably a considerable proportion are at this moment connected, in affection, with a government from which the United States have more to fear than from all the world besides, is the privilege about to be granted of an equal weight in the senate, and equal influence in the election of a president,



should that ever be to be determined by the legislature, with the state of Newyork, which contains nearly a million of souls. This I could not see to be an exercise of sound discretion at this moment, had there been no existing difficulty with respect to its being a territory without the bounds of the United States, and contemplated neither by the constitution of the United States, nor by the ordinance of the old congress for the government of the territories.

With respect to the dissolution of the bank of the United States, by refusing to renew the charter, which expired with the close of the 11th Congress, by its own limitation, this was a subject on which both houses of Congress were divided nearly equally. Not professing much acquaintance with the principles of banking generally, I shall not go into the subject in detail. I was in favour of the renewal of the charter, because, in my opinion, the public good required it. The two most popular objections against the renewal were, 1st. That a large proportion, nearly three fourths, of the stock was owned by foreigners, and 2dly. That the Constitution of the U. States did not authorise Congress to establish a bank. With respect to the first objection, that a large portion of the stock of the bank was held by foreigners is undoubtedly true in fact. But they had no power over the institution, and were, by the constitution of the bank, rendered incapable of electing, or being elected to the office of directors. All the privilege they enjoyed was that of receiving their semi-annual dividends as they became due. They had become stock holders by fair purchase, and their investing their capital in a foreign institution was an evidence of their belief in its stability. These semi-annual dividends amounted to from four to four and a half per cent half yearly. But when it is considered that this stock was purchased of the government at an advance from 40 to 45 and perhaps some as high as 50 per cent above par, the foreign stock holder did not receive, on an average, more than six per cent upon his capital. There seems also to be something ungenerous in this objection being made by the government, when it is well known that a very considerable portion of this stock was originally the property of the United States, and was by public agents all sold to foreigners at an advanced price. These foreigners undoubtedly purchased on the presumption that the institution would be permanent; for, altho' almost all corporations are limited in their duration, yet it is generally understood that if a corporation does nothing to forfeit their charter, or render themselves unworthy of a renewal, it will be renewed as a matter of course. Nor can it be viewed more dangerous in itself, that foreigners should be proprietors of stock in a bank than stock in the funds. Perhaps there is scarcely a large monied institution in the world, but some of its capital is owned by foreigners. There is scarcely a nation in Europe wherein there are not proprietors of stock in the English funds. Some of these stock-holders are citizens of the U. States, and I believe the capital of the bank of England is not all owned by British subjects. No inconvenience results to the government from this.

With respect to the unconstitutionality of the Bank, much was said upon this subject; but the arguments used upon this head appeared to me to

have but very little weight. There are many things which are every day's practice under the constitution of the U. States, and of the constitutionality or propriety of which no one entertains a doubt, yet, if we search for an express warrant, in so many words in the constitution, to authorise them, we will search in vain. Congress is by the constitution empowered to lay and collect taxes, and to lay and collect imposts and duties, but it says nothing about appointing collectors, establishing custom houses, treasury houses, &c. or about the safe keeping of the revenue. Congress has power to regulate commerce, but nothing is said about registering ships or vessels, building light houses, erecting buoys and beacons, laying embargoes, &c. Congress is to provide for the common defence and general welfare, but the constitution says nothing about casting cannon, manufactories of small arms or erecting military academies, building arsenals, &c.—All these things, and many more, are done under general powers. Indeed, it is scarcely possible to proceed a single step in legislation without them. With the same propriety may a bank be established, for the purpose of facilitating the collection and ensuring the safe keeping of the revenue, and transmitting it to whatever point the expenditure is wanted. On this, and on the authority in congress to emit bills of credit, is the authority to establish a bank clearly founded. Various other things combined with these scruples to prevent a renewal of the charter. Among these may be ranked the intrigues of state banks, who wished to get possession of the deposits heretofore placed in the bank of the United States, and the interference of state legislatures to influence the general government, on what motives I pretend not to say. That the United States had heretofore found very great convenience from the operations of the bank, is self evident. It seemed therefore to be too much, to risk a hazardous experiment upon a groundless scruple. But this is an age of experiment, although a worse time could not possibly have been selected for making it. Had it been made at a time when we were in profound peace with all the world, our commerce flourishing, and our treasury overflowing, it would have been much less hazardous, and attended with fewer inconveniences than now. But, at a time when, on account of the exhausted state of the treasury, it is necessary to have recourse to loans to a large amount, when it is in a fair way to be more and more exhausted by the operation of our own restrictive system, and when trade is under such peculiar embarrassments, and our merchants have suffered so many heavy losses, by the detention and confiscation of their property in foreign countries, the adoption of a measure calculated to increase both private distress and public embarrassment, by throwing such a large capital out of circulation, must be the dictate of something else than sound policy. No doubt the measure will cause much private embarrassment. But the inconveniences to individuals will be the soonest remedied. This capital will not immediately leave the country, and may probably be converted into a banking capital under the authority of the individual states. But in that case, the United States will lose all the aid derived from the institution. In the first place, there is a clear immediate loss of 1,250,000 dollars, which the bank proposed to give for the renewal of the charter, at a time when such a sum would have been

extremely convenient to the government. Deposits of revenue bonds must be made in state banks, of the stability of whose credit it may be difficult to obtain knowledge, and over whose operations the United States have no controul ; and in the case of obtaining loans on a sudden emergency, instead of having an institution under their own peculiar patronage, which was, from motives of interest as well as the obligations of their charter, obliged to make advances to the government, they may have to depend on the ability or caprice of state banks, whose resources or inclination, or both, may be extremely inadequate to the exigencies of the government, or on the still greater caprice of individuals. In a word, I cannot but believe that by abandoning this institution, the government of the United States has deprived itself of one very important mean of its own preservation.

I have, my fellow citizens, endeavoured to lay before you, in as plain and concise a manner as I was able, although at a greater length than I either wished or intended, my views of some prominent measures of the government, and of the state of the nation. On a common occasion, I should have given neither you nor myself the trouble of this publication. But the present crisis is alarming. I hope my fears may be disappointed ; but, to my view, a cloud thickens fast around us, which threatens to burst with an explosion in something worse than war itself with its usual attendant calamities. To be chained to the triumphal car of that tyrant, who is, with such rapid strides, ruining and barbarizing the world to gratify a lawless ambition, I consider as a calamity greater than a war with all Europe. I have ventured to place myself thus before the tribunal of the public : but I stand before a higher tribunal, to which I hope I shall ever consider myself accountable, both for my political, as well as my moral and religious conduct. The facts stated from public documents will be disputed only by ignorance or malice. All I shall say with respect to the opinions and reasonings advanced is, that they have been examined with care and adopted with deliberation ; and all I wish is, that they may be examined with candor, and stand or fall by their own correctness. Should my fears be disappointed, no man would feel more happy in the disappointment than myself. With a grateful sensibility for past tokens of your confidence, which were at first unexpected, and have always been unsolicited on my part—I subscribe,

Your affectionate friend, and

Fellow citizen,

SAMUEL TAGGART.

Colrain, March 21, 1811.