


THE
MONTHLY REVIEW;
LITERARY JOURNAL,
ENLARGED.



From JANUARY to APRIL, *inclusive*,

M, DCC, XCVI.

With an APPENDIX.

“ *Exploring Systems, but enflaw'd by none,*

“ *Examine with the torch of Truth alone.*”

Anon. Advice to a Critic.

“ *Expatriate free — — — — —.*”

POPE.

VOLUME XIX.



LONDON:

Printed for R. GRIFFITHS;

AND SOLD BY T. BECKET, IN FALL MALL,

M DCC XCVI.

out with a view to their appearance in a picture, but to their uses, and the enjoyment of them in real life, and their conformity to those purposes is that which constitutes their true beauty; with this view, gravel walks, and neat mown lawns, and in some situations straight alleys, fountains, terraces, and, for aught I know, parterres and cut hedges, are in perfect good taste, and infinitely more conformable to the principles which form the basis of our pleasure in these instances, than the docks and thistles, and litter and disorder, that may make a much better figure in a picture."

Were it within the limits of our province to speak of authors independently of their works, we should say of Mr. R., notwithstanding the objections which we have found it requisite to make to different passages in his book, that we think no one who has rural alterations to make, on a large scale, should neglect to consult a man who to a good taste has added the advantages of so much experience: for, although a transient view of the place might not enable him to lay down such a plan as could be implicitly followed in every part, it is highly probable that he would point out many practical ideas which persons of less experience in the examination of places might overlook.

ART. II. *Church and State: being an Enquiry into the Origin, Nature, and Extent of Ecclesiastical and Civil Authority, with Reference to the British Constitution.* By Francis Plowden, L. C. D. 4to. pp. 620. 11. 1s. Boards. Robinsons. 1795.

IN some of the former publications of this author, we had to lament that we found him dogmatical; enforcing opinions by the weight only of assertion; more intent on upholding a favourite party in politics by abusing its opponents, than by proving that it was radically right, and that its opponents were radically wrong; mistaking vehemence for reason; and finally triumphing in his own mind over adversaries, whose force appeared to us to be still unbroken:—but, in the work now before us, he displays a very different conduct: he lays down his propositions in a manner which shews that he does not expect that they will be admitted merely because he has advanced them; he trusts only to the force of the arguments which he brings to establish them; and where he is most convincing he is also most modest. In a word, this 'Enquiry' does great honour to him, as a lawyer, a reasoner, and a man. We do not mean that he is unanswerably right in every part of this performance. It is not indeed to be expected that, in a work of such length, he should be every where so fortified, as that some weak parts should not occur: but we must in justice say that they are very few in number; and that in general the ground on which he stands

stands is so advantageous, and he makes so much of its natural strength, that he may be fairly said to be inexpugnable.

From this collective character of the whole, we will now descend to a particular account of the contents of the book, which may be considered as a continuation of the author's "*Jura Anglorum*." The object which Dr. P. had in view, when he resolved to write a sequel to that publication, is to be collected from his preface, which we therefore extract :

“ In the following work I have largely committed myself upon the most delicate subjects of discussion. I have endeavoured to speak as freely of all opinions, as the earnest investigation of truth requires. If any reader then should feel sore at what I have said, I previously entreat him to lay the unintended cause of offence to the account of that freedom of thought, by which each claims the right of maintaining his own opinions. I lie not open to the imputation of provoking the discussion of matters, that may appear to some pregnant with irritation, scandal and danger. For at a time, when I thought a serious attack was aimed at our Constitution, I stood forward in her defence by displaying, according to my slender means, the real and true grounds of her excellencies ; this brought forth my *Jura Anglorum*. Under a strong desire to displease none but the enemies of the Constitution, and too vain a conviction, that I had avoided all reasonable grounds of offence, I was somewhat surprized to receive from a quarter the least suspected, a publication under the following title : “ A Letter to Francis Plowden, Esq. Conveyancer of the Middle Temple on his work, entitled *Jura Anglorum*, by a Roman Catholic Clergyman.

“ *Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis tempus eget.*”

“ The author appears to have written under an enthusiasm of sincerity and zeal, which has produced a conviction upon my mind, that I have not sufficiently developed the subjects I undertook to explain in my former work. And there needs no other proof of the importance of those subjects, than the holy indignation, with which my Reverend Correspondent prosecutes my supposed deviations from truth in treating of them. Had his reflections and censures been personal, I should have passed them over unnoticed. But when I am arraigned for having “ enhanced the cause I undertook to defend by making essential sacrifices of my own and others’ unalienable rights ;” for having “ attempted to establish in man a right to choose his own religion :” for having broached “ principles repugnant to holy writ and destructive both of one religion and the other :” for having ceased to be “ a man of principle and honour by acquiescing in the consequences and effects of the revolution of 1688 :” for having “ acted inconsistently with the character of a Catholic, 1st, in having approved the principles of the revolution—2dly, in making the canon law dependent upon the temporal legislature—3dly, in attributing to the rulers of the realm powers over the church and its property :” and for having “ struck a deadly blow to the vitals of that church, which I once loved and revered ;” it will perhaps be allowed by my readers, that further elucidation

elucidation was wanting to these subjects, which are highly important to the well-being of the British Constitution.

'I affect not to write controversy. After I had attempted to submit to my countrymen a fair exposition of the British Constitution, I found, that I had been deficient in developing some material parts of it. I shall therefore seek no further apology for offering to them these ulterior disquisitions into the fundamental principles and mutual relations of Church and State.'

The work is divided into three books, the first of which contains 9 chapters, the second 7, and the third 6. The author expressly disclaims the idea of writing a theological essay, having no inclination to break into the province of divines: keeping in mind the adage *tractent fabrilia fabri*, he thinks it would not be proper for him, a mere layman, to treat of matters which more particularly belong to those who have made divinity their peculiar study. He lays claim, however, to indulgence, if, while he is discussing topics which are of a complex or mixed kind, he should give 'into matter of a theological nature.' In this case, he says, he does it only incidentally, and because it is impossible absolutely to avoid it.

Entering now on his task, Dr. P. observes that the church is possessed of two very distinct powers, the one *spiritual* and the other *temporal*; that the former, being derived from Christ himself, when he commissioned his Apostles to "go and teach all nations," is independent of the civil power, and uncontrollable by man: but that the temporal power of the church, having no pretensions like the former to divine origin, but being derived solely from man, is as liable to be regulated or resumed by the state, as any that is possessed by a lay corporation, or body of lay subjects. On this principle, he vindicated in his "*Jura Anglorum*" the decree of the Constituent Assembly of France, by which the estates of the French church were declared to belong to the nation. The expedience or propriety of that decree is not the subject of discussion: our author labours only to prove that the state had a *right* to pass such a decree. He remarks that the commission to preach the gospel, and what is called by divines the *power of the keys*, were not bestowed on the church by the state; and that therefore the state can have no right to regulate, limit, or abridge, much less to extinguish them: but that houses, lands, privileges, tithes, and a corporate existence in the state, being enjoyed by the clergy only as the *gifts of the public*, all these are subject to regulation, or even resumption, at the will of the legislature; to whom, he justly maintains, belongs the *altum dominium* over every *temporal* concern of every branch of the community. Thus does our author establish two powers exercised within the bounds of the

same society, but at the same time completely independent of each other—a power *purely spiritual* in the church, over which the state can have no controul—and a power *purely temporal* in the state, to which the church is as much subject as any individual in the nation. Whatever is commanded by the power purely spiritual, being confined to what relates solely to God, and to what rests clearly on his divine word, he considers as binding on the consciences of men; who, owing obedience to God more than to man, should disregard the laws of the latter whenever they exceed the limits of their peculiar sphere, or purely temporal concerns;—and whatever is enjoined by the state, being strictly of a temporal nature, he contends ought not to be resisted under a pretence that the persons affected by it are the depositories of spiritual power.

Having laid down these general principles, he proceeds to answer the charges brought against him by his reverend antagonist, who thus opened his attack on our author—“The first of your principles which appears to me blameable, is the pretended right you attempt to establish in man to choose his own religion.” We refer our readers to our No. for July 1794, in which we reviewed the letter here quoted, and which called forth this answer. In that letter, it was maintained in substance, that man was not at liberty to make choice of what religion he pleased; that on the contrary he was bounden by his duty to his Creator to seek for that religion which was most conformable to the divine word, and to adopt it when found; so that to make choice of any other in preference to it would be not only not a right in man, but a direct violation of the duty which the creature owed to the Creator. Dr. P. in reply says that nothing was ever farther from his thoughts or intentions, than to establish a general right in man to choose what religion he pleases.—He then goes on as follows:

‘It is evident from the tenor and context of my whole book, that the *right, freedom, liberty, or choice*, which I attribute to each individual of adopting a particular mode or system of religion, is retained by the individual, as against the community, which can neither direct, bind, nor controul his conscience; but not as against God, to whom alone he is accountable for the religion he professes.’

‘Having so pointedly and unequivocally expressed my sentiments upon the *indispensable obligations* of man to act as God shall require of him in the adoption of his religion, I cannot admit myself open to the imputation of having asserted that as against God, “Man has a right to choose what religion he pleases.” For it is self-evident, that man cannot possess a right to choose, against the indispensable mandate and requisition of him whom he is bounden to obey.’

Dr. P. then proves that his adversary differs less from him on this very head than he seems to imagine, as the following passage,

passage, written by the latter, (and which we insert for the purpose of shewing that Catholic divines differ not on this subject from the church of England,) will pointedly make appear. In our church ritual, we find the words "whose service is perfect freedom." The Catholic divine thus contrives to reconcile, with this perfect freedom, the proposition that man has not a right to choose whatever religion he pleases :

"As my Reverend Correspondent assures me, that my assertion runs "counter to the tenets of the Catholic belief, and therefore that it ought not to pass unamended in a Catholic writer;" I entreat my readers to judge whether he do not in other words maintain precisely the same doctrine himself, p. 18. "I readily grant that religion is free in the sense above mentioned, because it pleased the Divine Wisdom in making known the revelations of Christianity, so to temper the certainty of its revelations with the darkness and impenetrability of the revealed articles themselves, as to leave it within the free and uncontrouled power of the human mind to assent to such articles or not. If we were compelled by an irresistible evidence discovered in the revealed objects themselves to give our assent to them, as we often are in natural things, there would be no freedom, and consequently no merit in an act of faith, &c. Now the combination of these and other circumstances leaves it, I say, free to the mind of man, to agree or not to the revealed articles of the Christian religion. Religion therefore, in the sense I have explained, is unquestionably free."

Having proved that the state has no right to dictate to any man what faith he shall profess, nor to punish him for not embracing that which is adopted by the state,—religion being purely of a spiritual nature, a communication only between God and man, and consequently not within the jurisdiction of the temporal power,—Dr. P. proceeds next to consider 'the general source of authority,' which he traces up to God himself. As he is writing for a Christian nation, he says he does not think it necessary to prove the existence of a SUPREME BEING: he assumes it in common with his Christian readers. He assumes also that man is formed of an immaterial soul, and of a body; and on this he builds his system that there must be two kinds of authority, which he calls spiritual and temporal: it being impossible that matter should act on spirit, he subjects only the body to the controul of the temporal power, and the soul to that of the spiritual. Thus man for his worldly concerns is subject to the civil authority of society; for his heavenly or religious interests, exclusively to God. The author labours, and in our opinion with great success, to ascertain the limits which separate the civil from the spiritual power, which he considers as absolutely independent of each other. This leads him to speak of the Christian church, and to examine in what consists the power which she may exercise independently.

pendently of the state, and in what respects she is as liable to human controul as any political establishment in the community: the foundation of both powers, the spiritual power of the church and the temporal power of the state, he maintains to be equally divine, the Almighty being the founder both of religion and society. Obedience to these two powers, each in its respective sphere, he declares to be a duty imposed on man by his Maker.

* These two powers or authorities, though in themselves widely different from each other, proceed originally and fundamentally from one and the same source, *God*: man therefore is equally bounden and obliged to obey them both. The institution of *temporal or civil* authority is an effect of the general dispensation of God's providence in creating mankind, which never has been, and probably never will be altered from the creation of man until the consummation of the world. The institution of that *spiritual or ecclesiastical* authority, to which Christians are obliged to submit, was the special grace and favour dispensed to us by the mercy and bounty of our Redeemer, when he came upon earth to establish the law of grace upon the abolition of the less perfect system of the Jewish legislation.

Each of these powers he considers separately; and first *the temporal*.—When the author says that the temporal power is derived from God, our readers must not so far mistake him as to suppose that he wants to establish the divine right of kings; what he means to prove is that the *sovereign civil authority* of any state, whether republican or monarchical, or mixed, being necessary to the subsistence of order and government in society, must have sprung from God, when he ordained that man should live in society; for, without order and government, society could not subsist. He then insists that on account of its divine origin it ought to be submitted to by man: for, says Dr. P., ‘as authority, which is a right to command, and submission, which is an obligation to obey, are correlatives, it must be admitted that when God instituted authority, he enjoined submission to it.’ The different modifications of this authority, or the various modes of exercising it, he justly observes, make no difference in the essence of the thing, nor weaken in the smallest degree the obligation imposed on man to submit to it. God became indeed the immediate legislator and governor of the Jewish nation, and established what is called a theocracy.

* This, says our author, ‘was a special favour conferred upon his chosen people, which he extended not to others. All the rest of mankind were therefore left to their free liberty to form themselves into whatever communities or societies they chose, and to delegate the sovereignty of *human or temporal* power and authority to whomsoever and in whatsoever manner they should find it reasonable and agreeable.

Hence

Hence has arisen the endless variety of forms and modes of government, through the succession of all ages to the present time.'

In Chap. 5. the author touches on various topics connected with the exercise of supreme civil authority,—the deposit of sovereign power in one or more,—and absolute monarchy. He points out in what consists the conscientious obligation of civil obedience, the super-excellence of the British constitution, and he shews that absolute monarchy has a dangerous tendency to a dissolution of government, and that passive obedience and non-resistance are not applicable to our king. He says that 'in whom the sovereignty resides, in him the legislative power exists; legislation being a direct emanation of the sovereignty, the action of the sovereign power.'—Speaking on this subject, he advances doctrines which, though perhaps strictly true, will sound harsh to an English ear; particularly those that relate to absolute monarchy.

'To whomsoever the community freely delegates the right of legislating, in him her or them it reposes the sovereign authority. The legislative power then is unexceptionably binding upon the whole community, because it is the collective free sense of the majority, which binds the whole. There cannot exist any government, unless the sovereign power be deposited by the community in some person or persons, who can exercise it over the rest: for although by the providential ordinance of God, the principal or original right of sovereignty be vested in the community at large, yet the actual formation of government is the act of their depositing this sovereignty in the legislative body. When they deposit it unconditionally in one individual, it establishes a pure absolute monarchy, by many called despotism, or absolute mastership. This form of government, which to us Englishmen appears a state of servitude, is as lawful a form of government as that of our own, in which we deposit the sovereignty in a king, lords, and commons: for it is as fully competent for a community to entrust the sovereignty to the uncontrolled discretion of one man as to many. Such absolute monarch has the same right and title to his authority or power, as has the parliament of Great Britain, viz. the free gift or disposal of the sovereign power or authority by the community. In such a monarch the full legislative power is as complete as in our parliament, and is equally binding upon the community, who by the general ordinance of God are as conscientiously bounden to obey the decrees and edicts of their king, as Englishmen are the acts of their parliament. The Emperor of China has neither more nor less power over the consciences of his subjects, than the parliament of Great Britain. The same duty of conscience is imposed upon the Chinese and the Briton to obey the laws of the country, in which they reside: and this by the ordinance of God's providence, which unexceptionably and equally affects all mankind. This providence operates by the light and law of nature upon every human individual, and cannot be dispensed with, but by a special and supernatural interposition of the superintending Deity itself. Besides this, in order

to effectuate the means of preserving and improving the ends of society, we find, that our blessed Redeemer made peace one of the leading precepts and ordinances of Christianity, and peace cannot be kept but by the submission of the minority to the will of the majority, which is expressed by the laws of each community.'

Dr. P. must here be understood to mean that men are bounden in conscience to submit to absolute monarchy, only as long as they consent that such a monarchy shall exist: they confessedly have the *power* to change their governments whenever they have the *will*; and their *right* to exercise such power, and to follow such a will, he by no means denies; on the contrary he admits it, and asserts it in direct terms. He quotes the expression of Cardinal Bellarmine, *Singula species regiminis sunt de jure gentium*, and then adds the following clear and strong declaration:

'Each nation has the right to choose its own government: all forms of government, and all modes of legislation answer the general design of God's providence in preserving, as he originally instituted, the social state of mankind. Although all societies or communities enjoy equal freedom or liberty of choosing, modelling and changing their form of government; it does not follow that they all use this liberty with equal discretion, wisdom and efficacy: there is as much variety or difference in the use of this political freedom or liberty, as there is in the free use of the physical faculties of man: God's providence has a general superintendance over all human events; yet it is certain, that the particular designs of that providence are in the continuance of the present system of nature accomplished by the operations of secondary causes.'

In Chap. 6. he treats of 'the nature of human or temporal laws,' and contends that, it being once admitted that none but the sovereign power can have legislative authority, the conclusion is obvious that no other *human, civil, or temporal* power within a community can controul the sovereign power of that community; and on this principle he refuses to subscribe to the position of his adversary—

"Every law is unjust, essentially null, and no ways binding the consciences of men, which in its own nature may not be, and which at least in its primary intent is not actually, directed to the good of the community."

This pretended rule of divines or schoolmen he considers as the strongest provocation of the subject to disobedience, in as much as it erects every individual into a judge of what act of the legislature, or will of the majority of the community, may be binding, or entitled to conscientious obedience. He admits, however, that, when the legislature enacts any thing contrary to the law of God and reason, or enjoins what is *malum in se*, it exceeds the bounds of its authority. We are of opinion that

it is clearly deducible from this admission, that disobedience to such acts or injunctions is not only not a crime but a duty, even though the majority of the community should acquiesce in and support them. Divines may possibly carry their principles too far, or, though possibly not too far, still may too much encourage contests with the legislature, and expose the tranquillity of the state, when they say that a law is null which in its own nature, or at least in its primary intent, is not actually directed to the good of the community. At the same time we must confess that, if such a law might not conscientiously be resisted, a conscientious legislature ought to feel it to be a duty to repeal it. Our author maintains that laws, which have no reference to the general good of society, are nevertheless binding on the subject; and he instances the act for providing for the first Duke of Richmond and his race, descended illegitimately from Charles II. He might have added also the act for providing for the illegitimate offspring of the same monarch by the Duchesses of Cleveland, out of certain duties on wines. His words are—

‘ When a provision was made for the payment of one shilling per chaldron upon all coals exported from Newcastle to the port of London, for the illegitimate issue of the unlawful pleasures of King Charles the Second, it was clear and certainly known, that the law had no reference to the general benefit of the society, for it was an encouragement given to the vices of the great; and it was increasing the difficulty of procuring a very necessary commodity of life: but will any Theologian pretend to assert, that the law, by which this duty was secured to the illegitimate issue of the king, is not equally binding, as any other law of the State: or that a man might conscientiously refuse the payment of this duty, and be conscientiously obliged to pay all other duties imposed by the State?’

On this head we must agree with our author. Parliament had certainly a *right* to make such a provision, though it ought not to have exercised it; it comes, therefore, under that rule of law, *fieri non debuit, factum valet*; and we will go so far as to say that parliament could not *now* with justice repeal even that act, which it could not have passed without a desertion of its duty to the public. Various intermarriages have since been formed on the grounds of this parliamentary provision, which it would be now an act of cruelty and injustice to distinguish from private property.

Chap. 7. is on the rights and duties of human legislators concerning civil establishments of religion. Dr. P. admits in the utmost latitude the right of the community to give a civil establishment, not indeed to any religion which it pleases, but to that which the majority of the people may conscientiously think to be the best, though it should in reality be erroneous. Obedience to the laws by which religious establishments are formed

formed by the State; he considers as a duty binding on individuals; though he admits it to be a qualified obedience. This is certainly a delicate subject, and the author displays much dexterity in treating it. He says—

‘The sole quality that renders a law obligatory, is its validity: and this, as I have before observed, depends upon the nature of the thing enacted. If it be in its nature indifferent and capable of being observed by all the members of the State, all subjects are bound to obey the law, whatever may have been the motives or intentions of the legislators in passing it: if it be contrary to or inconsistent with the law of nature and the word of God, no subject can lawfully obey it; because such a law cannot be valid. Within the scope of lawful or indifferent actions *civil or temporal* legislators are bound to frame such laws, as in their judgment and discretion they shall think tend to advance the unity peace and welfare of the community, which is the whole extent of their trust and mission. But the observers of the law are in no manner committed in the conscientious discharge of duty by the legislators. However sinful unjust or mischievous their views motives and reasons may have been for passing the law, the subjects are conscientiously bound to obey it, provided it contradict not the law of nature and the revealed word of God.’

Here it must be observed that a wide door is opened to litigation about what is or is not contrary to the law of nature or revelation; and conscience, as far as obedience is a duty binding on it is liable to be made the sport of human passions. The civil establishment of a religion, he observes, is no proof of its orthodoxy even in the opinion of the legislature by which it is endowed. Thus he instances the cases of the church of England established by legislative authority to the south of Tweed, Presbyterianism in Scotland, and the Roman Catholic religion in Canada; each of which is placed under restrictions and disabilities where it is not the establishment. Hence he concludes that submission to the laws for the support of an established religion cannot be construed into an assent to the doctrine which it teaches. As a proof that man is bound to obey the laws which are framed for maintaining the civil existence of religion in a state, he quotes the example of Christ himself; and as we wish to give his meaning fairly, on this nice topic, we will use his own words:

‘In order to explain this the more fully, we must view in three distinct lights those actions of men which a human legislature may controul: the *first* is the mere physical action abstracted from any mental application to render it moral or immoral; the *second* is the physical action so influenced by the moral intention, that its essential nature consists in this inseparable connection of the intention with the action: as for example, the administering poison to another, sacrificing to and adoring an idol; or by omission in neglecting to perform any explicitly enjoined duty. The *third* is the performance of certain actions,

which though indifferent in themselves, are enjoined with a vicious or sinful intention in the legislature, and may as well as any other physical action be converted by the *malus animus* of the agent into an immoral action: but which at the same time may, and indeed ought to be performed by the subject externally, without his mental approbation or application of it to the intention of him that enjoined it. Let us consider how our blessed Redeemer acted for our example in such instances when upon earth. Judea was in his time subject to the power of the Roman Emperor: an idolatrous worship was established throughout the empire. The Emperor himself was looked upon as the *pontifex maximus*, or high priest: and the actual application of a part of the taxes was made to support an idolatrous and false religion. All positive laws of the empire, that required or enjoined the second sort of actions, such as to offer sacrifice to idols, or renounce Christianity, were null and void: but such actions of the third class, which enjoined the payment of money, a part of which was applicable to the support of their idolatrous priests and temples, were obeyed and complied with by our Lord, who paid the tribute for himself and St. Peter without inquiring into the particular appropriation of it. This, like every other action of our Divine Master, was for our instruction and example: and it emphatically teaches every Christian the same obligation of paying taxes tythes or such like impositions when imposed by the *civil* power, whether they be applied wholly to mere civil purposes, or partly to the support and maintenance of the ministers of the religion, which receives the civil sanction of the state; and it is immaterial whether such religion be true or false, Christian or Heathenish. So, as I shall say more fully hereafter, tythes are not paid because the parson is entitled to them by the revealed law of Christianity, but because they are secured to him by the *civil* law of the State.

It is evident from this quotation that our author unequivocally denies the existence of any *divine* right on the part of the clergy to tithes or temporal possessions; and that he maintains that they become intitled to them only through the will of the *civil* power. When the legislator attempts to force obedience to laws which are incompatible with the law of God, the author says that in that case he exceeds his just authority, and that he cannot validly enjoin and enforce conformity with a religion which the individual may in his conscience believe to be erroneous. Dr. P. goes perhaps a little too far, when he says that a legislator cannot validly pass laws which enact penalties and punishments for exercising a religion, which the subject may in his conscience believe to be true. We think that, conformably to the principles before laid down by him, the *validity* of such laws ought not to be questioned, though they must certainly be considered as violating justice and equity: but that, on the contrary, individuals ought to submit to the penalties; thus obeying God on the one hand by adhering with unshaken firmness to the dictates of their conscience; and obeying

obeying man, on the other, by paying the penalties consequent on their refusal to do what they might deem forbidden by the command of the Almighty.

[To be continued in the next Review.]

ART. III. *Travels in Europe, Africa, and Asia, made between the Years 1770 and 1779.* Vol. IV. Containing Travels in the Empire of Japan, and in the Islands of Java and Ceylon, together with the Voyage home. By Charles Peter Thunberg, M. D. Knight of the Order of Vasa, &c. &c. 8vo. 6s. Boards. Rivingtons. 1795.

WE have already given our idea of this author as a traveller*, which is in no respect altered by the additional volume now before us. The same fidelity and accuracy in particular observations, the same total absence of enlarged and philosophical views, and of all that constitutes *amenity* in narration, are displayed in this as in the preceding volumes. As adding a mass of fact to the stock of curious and useful information, these travels possess considerable value; and the novelty of objects collected from such distant and different parts of the globe cannot but prove in some measure entertaining, whatever be the mode of describing them.

The additional matter relative to Japan respects the government, religion, diet, sports and games, arts and sciences, laws and police, medicine, agriculture, natural history, and commerce. Most of these important articles are slightly treated, as may be supposed from the small compass allotted to them. The lists of secular and ecclesiastical emperors, or *Kubos* and *Dairis*, continued from Kœmpfer's time to the year 1776, are what the author values himself much on procuring, and may be useful to historians. In the accounts of government and police, there is too much admiration of the order and regularity which are the obvious features in the external view of this country, without considering the rigid despotism by which they are obtained; the idea of 'innumerable inhabitants without strife, discord, discontent and distress,' is scarcely compatible with a most severe system of laws, except on the supposition that this severity stifles all outward appearances of what cannot but exist within. The mode of publishing laws, however, deserves commendation. 'They are promulgated not only once or twice from the pulpit, according to the custom in Christian churches, but likewise in every town and village they are posted up for public inspection and daily

* See M. R. for February 1794, for our account of the three preceding volumes.