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JOHN W. PICKET, A. M.

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INDEX.

LITERARY NOTICES.

most in the philosophy of language, the ancients failed most in its history. They are rarely to be relied-on as etymologists, whilst the moderns, who have enjoyed so much better opportunities of cultivating this branch of the science, have obtained in it, a decided superiority. They have discovered, that most of those auxiliary words, which are employed in aiding the construction of nouns and verbs, were once nouns and verbs themselves; and that those which appear now void of signification, were formerly significant.

It seems to follow from what has been said, that in order to study Grammar as a science, a general survey of the mental faculties should be premised or presumed. These will lead us in our future numbers to a detailed consideration of the parts of speech, both in regard to their separate properties, and also to their syntax or union.

PHILOSOPHICAL EDUCATION.

BY REV. WILLIAM H. M'GUFFEY.

No man can teach, who is destitute of *mind*. No child can be taught, who is without the ordinary faculties of the mind. Nor can the mind of the instructor be made to operate upon the mind of the pupil without an intelligent employment of the means, necessary to mutual intercourse.

It is plain, then, that mind is the *agent* in the business of education, and the *instrument*, and the *object*. It is the mind that *operates;* it is the instrument with which the teacher puts in requisition the means of instruction, and it is the object upon which the instructor expends his skill.

It must be obvious then, that, in order to complete success, the teacher must understand the powers and susceptibilities of that agent, the mind, which is constantly and necessarily employed in every attempt to give instruction. If this is not the case, all his doings must be at random.

No one would be thought likely to succeed in business, who did not understand nor regard the character and abilities of the agents whom he employed. They might be honest, but they would be misdirected, or left to pursue their way without instructions of any kind.

Such is too much the case in every profession; but more lamentably true of the profession of teaching.

But it is even more important, that the teacher should understand the properties of the mind, as an instrument, than

that he should know its powers as an agent. An artist may not be fully aware of his own powers, and yet if he has "the use of his tools," he may employ them to some good purpose, in obtaining desirable results. But if he is unacquainted with the use and construction, and temper of the implements necessary to be employed, he cannot fail to be unsuccessful.

Suppose a man to be unacquainted with the corporeal faculties, so far as not to know to what organ the several sensations of sight, hearing, touch, taste and smell, are respectively referable; he would be in great danger of falling into ridiculous, if not dangerous mistakes. He would, to be sure, be susceptible of all the variety of sensations experienced by other men. But let him attempt the *voluntary* exercise of his organs; and his want of knowledge would become painfully conspicuous. Or let him undertake to instruct a child in the use of its organs of sense, and (if as ignorant as we have supposed) he would be found holding his watch to the *tongue* of the child in order that it might *hear* the sound which it made; or he might be seen applying a colored object to the *ear* that the learner might be amused with its brilliancy.

Similar mistakes must ensue in case of equal ignorance as to our mental powers and moral susceptibilities; not when they are left to their instinctive tendencies—but just so soon as their possessor undertakes to give them a voluntary or philosophical direction, and this he must do in every attempt at rational instruction.

But can an instance of such extreme ignorance of our mental character be presumed to exist amongst those of adult years, and the least pretensions to education? Would that a prompt and decisive answer could be given in the negative. Should you ask a dozen of intelligent individuals, taken at random from the ranks of professional teachers, the difference between *memory* and *imagination*, for example, or between *reason* and *judgment*, would you be likely to receive a prompt and intelligent answer? Might we not rather expect (and that too without the least disrespect to either the talent or industry of the persons thus interrogated) that they would at once confess, that they had never given any attention to the differences between these very distinct mental operations.

Now, in education, the different powers of the teacher's mind have different functions to perform, which can no more be transferred from one, to the other, than the function of sight can be performed by the organ of hearing. What chance for success, then, can there be, except what may accrue from mere accident?

The danger is now greatly enhanced from the fact, that instruction by rule or by rote is no longer tolerated. Once it

was enough, that the schoolmaster kept in the track that custom, or his predecessors had marked out for him. No one enquired further than whether the "*master*" went the accustomed round; and if the answer was in the affirmative, all was well. But of late, philosophy has touched the schoolmaster with her wand—innovation on old customs is the order of the day. Philosophical systems and shreds of systems are found on almost every page of every newspaper, and in the preface of every school book. New plans are introduced, and experiments are tried in school houses from the log cabin to the University. And it is all right. Let no one check it, if he could. Only let us all use our best efforts to bring correct *principles* into use, since we have with *one* consent agreed to be governed by principle, and not any longer by rule. Necessity, then, for us as teachers, to study our own minds as the instruments which we use, arises in a great measure from the impulse given to the *science* of education.

But it is mainly, as the *object* upon which education operates, that a knowledge of the mind becomes important to the instructor. No two minds are alike. This enhances the difficulty. For, how shall he distinguish between minds that are different, who knows not what are the general properties or peculiar faculties of the human intellect? The statuary may know his own powers; he may be acquainted with the nature and use of the implements which his art employs, but still he will not be successful in the execution of his task, unless he can distinguish between the freestone and the marble that may come under his chisel. The man wholly ignorant of mind, may strengthen the passions while he is aiming to cultivate the understanding; and will be likely to produce results the very reverse of what he intends. Indeed, if such a one is ever successful as an instructor, it must be by mere accident.

These views cannot be better confirmed than by an extract from the work of that judicious writer, and most laborious compiler on Mental Science, Thomas C. Upham, of Boudoin College.

"It is well known," he remarks, "that children and youth adopt almost implicitly the manner and opinion of those under whom they happen in Providence to be placed, or with whom they much associate, whether they be parents, instructors or others.

"Let it, therefore, be remembered, that passions, both good and evil, may then rise up and gain strength which it will afterwards be found difficult to subdue. Intellectual operations may, at that time, be guided and invigorated, which, if then neglected, can never be called forth to any effective purpose in after life.

"Associations and habits of various kinds may then be formed which will defy all subsequent attempts at removal, and will follow the subjects of them down to the grave. In a word, the soul may be trained in no small degree, either to truth or falsehood, virtue or vice, to activity or sluggishness, to glory or infamy.

"When we take these things into view, and when we further recollect the frequency of characteristic if not original differences in intellectual power and inclination, no one certainly can be considered properly qualified for the great undertaking of a teacher of youth, who has not formed a systematic and philosophic acquaintance with the principles of the mind." Ment. Phil. p. 25.

The writer of this article would not have it understood, that the knowledge of mind, requisite to success in teaching, can be acquired only from *books*. Indeed, it cannot be acquired from *books alone*, however extensive may be our reading. If our acquaintance with the philosophy of mind must be confined (but why need it be?) to any one source of information, let books be neglected rather than men.

The *living* subject is a *better* study in mental as well as in material physiology than *dried specimens*, however well selected or perfectly preserved. There are in the ranks of professional teachers, many who have never read a single work on Systematic Metaphysics, who nevertheless have, from observation and experience alone, acquired a more profound, and what is better, a much more practical acquaintance with the human powers and susceptibilities, than falls to the share of any mere book learned pretender to philosophy. Nothing more is wanting to a great majority of those already engaged in the business of instruction, than that they should have their attention turned to this matter in order that their success might be complete. They have the talent. They have the intelligence. They have the industry. They can command the *attention* of their pupils—a task harder to perform than to command the attention of the largest audiences; they can and do communicate to the minds of their pupils their own mental movements. What then do they need but to make their profession a *science* as well as an *art*. Let no one in our ranks despair. The most eminent men in all the liberal professions in our country have found their way through the "school house" to their present elevation. And if they can rise from such beginnings to the highest eminence in other professions, why may they not rise still more easily to the highest rank in their profession as teachers—an eminence it will not be disputed, still greater than the same rank in most other professions? "The man," said an intelligent citizen of this city

very recently, "who has reached the head of his profession as an instructor of youth, must be admitted to occupy higher ground that the most distinguished member of the other professions. What merely professional man in our land, would not envy the more than desirable reputation of the veteran instructor of youth, who has grown gray in the service of the most valuable part of his fellow citizens, the youth of his country? Who, in old age is so likely always to be distinguished by the members of his profession as the aged teacher? Who can meet his fellow citizens of all ranks in society, on grounds that preclude debate and contention, except it be the aged and eminent instructor of youth? In politics, party spirit prevents this. In literature rivalry will prevent. In religion, sectarian views always have prevented it, and it is to be feared, always will. It is only in education, that the foul fiend of discord has not found, and may we not hope, *can* find no entrance.

TEACHERS, PARENTS AND COMMON SCHOOLS.

BY THE EDITOR.

The expression, that education forms the man, has become a maxim. Its operation commence swith our existence. Every thing, whether proper or improper, which passes, strikes with amazing force, the mind and heart, and leaves a strong impression. Hence the necessity of excluding the young from seeing or hearing any thing which may tend to injure moral purity, or weaken the growing strength of their understandings and affections. Since impressions and habits formed in the vestibule of life, adhere strongly in after years; since future character and conduct are shaped by the actual condition of the mind; since too, both mind and heart are formed by the nature of the discipline to which they are subjected in early years; it becomes a duty, superior to all other considerations, of those who have given life to human beings, to watch them with an eye that never tires; to see that those who have the charge of their intellectual and moral instruction, are adequate to the task, and that, *they themselves*, fail not in the performance of the high duties which by becoming parents, they have imposed upon themselves, and that they aid those whom they delegate to act in their place, to train them up as dutiful children and good members of society, respecting the laws of their country, and obeying the laws of God.

over every such instance of success, with a feeling akin to that which angels experience, when a sinner has repented; and in the excess of his joy he hardly thinks for the time of those other valiant youths who have needed little more of his attention than to be shewn the way. But such youths never fail to receive the admiration of strangers, and therefore they are always more than duly applauded and excited by applause. Premiums, if premiums are distributed, belong exclusively to them; the race is here always to the swift, the victory to the strong. But those unaspiring, disheartened youths—what is their reward, who from a kind of natural lameness have been unable to run; from natural imbecility have been unfit to contend; what flattering smiles of notice or of approbation fall to their share? None—from ignorant or unthinking spectators. Who then shall cheer them, or intellectually befriend them unless their teacher? and I know, I do but justice to the feelings of my professional brethren generally, when I say that to a teacher such youths are often dearer than almost all his school besides, if he has succeeded in curing in any degree their mental defect, or *they* have showed any disposition to be cured: in such case they are regarded by him as sons restored; as those who were *dead* and are alive again, who were *lost* and now are alive.

SCHOOL ETHICS.

BY THE REV. WILLIAM H. M'GUFFEY.

Much has been said, of late, on the subject of *moral* education. This may be taken as one of the "signs of the times." Hitherto, the object of instruction has been too exclusively the improvement of the understanding, to the neglect of the better qualities of the heart.

This reform will be likely to meet with but little opposition in theory, on the part of either parents or teachers; or even of the community at large. But in practice, it is to be feared, it may have to encounter that opposition which is arrayed against every species of innovation without regard to the difference between improvements and those changes which are not improvements.

Teachers may be reluctant to introduce an exercise, that will require them to reduce to a scientific form, that knowledge which has so long been familiar to them, in the character of practical

precepts. Their perfect understanding of moral rules, and their high sense of moral obligation, will make them unwilling to put the first to the test of speculation, or analysis; and make them impatient of that questioning of the second, which must always arise in the free discussion of the class-room. Their reasonings will not always be as clear as their convictions; and the consequent failure to impress the minds of their pupils as deeply as their own, with the solemn sanctions of moral law, cannot fail to produce at first, a hesitancy, as to the propriety of a course which seems to be promotive only of scepticism.

But a little perseverance will show, that this is only a deceptive appearance. Practice will soon enable them to succeed in finding adequate expressions for all their ideas; convincing arguments in defence of their doctrines, and a sufficient antidote for that lurking scepticism, which their incipient attempts had not originated, but only developed in the minds of their pupils.

Parents too, through inadvertence, may be found practically to oppose the study of "school ethics," on the ground that it will interfere with that which to them may appear a more important acquisition.

They will probably be found expressing some dissatisfaction with the teacher who employs a part of the day in instructing the boys in such questions as involve the characteristic difference between the faculties of brutes and the mind of man. They might, in some instances, prefer that their sons should devote more time in studying the relations of numbers; and less in the study of those relations that exist between them and their schoolfellows, and out of which grow a great variety of most important duties, strikingly analogous to those which are, at once, most obligatory and most important in civil society.

But the instructer, who shall, even for a short time, judiciously persevere in imparting to his pupils a knowledge of the *principles* upon which their "school duties" depend, will most certainly overcome all opposition on the part of every judicious and discerning parent. He will soon be able to demonstrate, that, in this way, more time will be saved from the exercise of harsh discipline, than will be sufficient for an intelligent acquisition of the first principles of ethical philosophy.

Children *are* governed by *moral* reasons, even when *corporal* punishments are resorted to. The latter can only hold in abeyance the wayward tendencies of youth, until rational motives can be brought to bear upon the understanding and the heart. There would be much less occasion for a resort to corporal inflictions, if moral culture was better understood and more correctly appreciated.

The advantages resulting from an intelligent and practical inculcation of moral principles, even in our primary shoools,

would be incalculable. I do not here mean instruction given in the principles of ethics, as a science merely; but the application of them to the art of regulating, with propriety, the intercourse of the pupils with their instructers and with each other.

Why could not the *reason* of every requisition be pointed out to the pupils? Why could not the *principle* be stated, when the *law* is promulged? Why might not the uniform coincidence of duty and interest be clearly exhibited, so as to remove all suspicion of arbitrary control, in the exercise of those functions which devolve upon the teacher? Unless this is done, there will be a constant competition between privilege and authority; the pupils looking upon every requisition as an infringement of their rights; and the teacher regarding every act, not authorized by the rules, (though it may not have been forbidden) as an encroachment upon his prerogative. The boys will try how much they may safely violate the rules: and the instructer, how far he may venture to extend their principles beyond their letter; and thus the whole will degenerate into a system of mutual strife and coercion.

Tell a boy, in tones of authority, that he *must*, and *shall* abstain from whispering, for example, and he will be likely to feel some additional motive to continue the practice, from the manner in which the prohibition was expressed. But show him that it is reasonable to grant a request, when properly made; and that it is not only proper, but requisite that you should make such a request; and that it would be proper and right that he should be silent in school, even if you had not requested it, *because* whispering disturbs you and annoys his schoolmates, while it is of almost no advantage, nor even gratification to him: and you will rarely have occasion to repeat the argument—especially if you succeed in producing conviction, as you advance with the reasonings above suggested.

But, to take a more general principle: why cannot children be made to comprehend the difference between coercion and motive? Tell them, that a cat, or a dog may be governed by fear; but that boys and girls ought to be influenced by principle. Say to them, "you cannot convince a mere animal that it has done wrong, so that it will be sorry, and not do so again. But children know the difference between right and wrong; and may, and ought to be persuaded to leave off their bad habits, not so much from fear of punishment, as because they are wrong."

Nothing weighs so much, with an ingenuous youth, as motives drawn from the dignity of his nature; except it be those arising from a sense of duty. He is thus put upon his honor; an appeal which is rarely made in vain. The complaint so generally, and what is worse, so justly made against American, and especially against western institutions, on the score of want of discipline,

will continue, and increase, until the *consciences* of the young are more systematically and directly appealed to, by those who have the care of their education.

Free governments cannot be maintained without *religion* among the people: nor can rational discipline be supported in our schools, without a high, and intelligent, and conscientious regard to duty on the part of those who are their inmates.

AMERICAN HISTORY FOR SCHOOLS.

It is a custom, in many parts of the western country, to use histories of England, Rome and Greece, as class-books, in the schools, almost to the exclusion of American history. This is a bad custom. Our youth, who, in a few years, will have the whole weight of the government upon their shoulders, should not be ignorant of the history of their country. They should possess full information about the origin, the nature, the cost and the value of the great inheritance, which is about to fall into their hands. They should be made familiar, in early life, with the pure models of public virtue, which illustrated the first days of the republic. It is also important, that they should study our history, in order to acquire that proper degree of national pride and that delicate sense of national honor, which are indispensable to an elightened, ardent and enduring patriotism.

It is not in the human heart to love a country of no character or distinction in the world, so well as one whose history is glorious and honorable. We love Poland the better, and feel more compassion for its fate, because it is the land of DeKalb and Koskiusko. In like manner, the whole world loves Greece—not for what she is, but for what she has been—not for her living, but for her dead—and will continue to love her and feel a kind of consanguinity to her, so long as her soil inurns the ashes of her ancient illustrious men. And wherever, over the wide world, we meet an honorable, generous-hearted Irishman, we cannot help feeling, that, apart from the virtues of the man, some little regard is justly due to the countryman of Grattan, of Moore, of Curran and of Emmet. We almost unconsciously transfer to the country itself—to its inhabitants—something of the admiration which we feel for its distinguisded citizens.

This disposition of the heart operates with increased force, in relation to one's own country. Let the reader analyze his