

226 c 25
T H E

W O R K S

O F

THAT LEARNED AND JUDICIOUS DIVINE

MR. RICHARD HOOKER, */*

CONTAINING

E I G H T B O O K S

O F T H E

L A W S

O F

ECCELESIASTICAL POLITY,

A N D

SEVERAL OTHER TREATISES.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED

THE LIFE OF THE AUTHOR,

B Y

I S A A C W A L T O N.

TO THIS EDITION IS SUBJOINED

A NEW INDEX TO THE WHOLE.


VOLUME THE FIRST.

O X F O R D:

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MDCXCIII.

“ **IT IS VERY TRUE** that the new
“ modelling *Ecclesiastical* Government was the
“ principal point debated in that famous Dis-
“ pute (which gave rise to the following work):
“ But then the *Puritans* contended for that
“ Reformation on Principles that equally con-
“ cluded for a Reformation in the *Civil* like-
“ wise: And this, Mr. *Hooker* well under-
“ stood, when he took so much Pains to over-
“ throw their fundamental Maxim, the *Head*
“ *Theorem*, as he calls it, of their Scheme—
“ *That the Scripture of God is in such sort the*
“ *Rule of human Actions, that simply whatsoever*
“ *we do, and are not by it directed thereunto,*
“ *the same is Sin.* Now who sees not that
“ this Principle pursued, brings on, directly
“ and necessarily, a Reformation of the *Civil*
“ Government upon *Jewish* Ideas? the very
“ Error of the reformed Ministers of that
“ Time.



O F T H E
L A W S
O F
ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY.



B O O K I.

*Concerning Laws, and their several kinds in
general.*



The Matter contained in this First Book.

1. *The cause of writing this general Discourse concerning BOOK I.
Laws.*
2. *Of that Law which God from the beginning hath set
for himself, to do all things by.*
3. *The Law which natural Agents observe, and their
necessary manner of keeping it.*
4. *The Law which the Angels of God obey.*
5. *The Law whereby Man is in his Actions directed to
the Imitation of God.*
6. *Men's first beginning to understand that Law.*
7. *Of Man's Will, which is the first thing that Laws
of Action are made to guide.*

O

8. Of

- BOOK I. 8. *Of the natural finding out of Laws by the Light of Reason, to guide the Will unto that which is good.*
9. *Of the benefit of keeping that Law which Reason teacheth.*
10. *How Reason doth lead Men unio the making of human Laws, whereby politick Societies are governed, and to agreement about Laws, whereby the Fellowship or Communion of independent Societies standeth.*
11. *Wherefore God hath by Scripture further made known such supernatural Laws, as do serve for Men's direction.*
12. *The cause why so many natural or rational Laws are set down in holy Scripture.*
13. *The benefit of having divine Laws written.*
14. *The sufficiency of Scripture unto the end for which it was instituted.*
15. *Of Laws positive contained in Scripture; the mutability of certain of them, and the general use of Scripture.*
16. *A Conclusion, shewing how all this belongeth to the cause in question.*
-

The cause of writing this general Discourse.

HE that goeth about to persuade a Multitude, that they are not so well governed as they ought to be, shall never want attentive and favourable hearers; because they know the manifold defects whereunto every kind of Regiment is subject; but the secret lets and difficulties, which in publick proceedings are innumerable and inevitable, they have not ordinarily the judgment to consider. And because such as openly reprove supposed disorders of State, are taken for principal Friends to the common Benefit of all, and for Men that carry singular freedom of mind; under this fair and plausible colour, whatsoever they utter, passeth for good and current. That which wanteth in the weight of their speech, is supplied by the aptness of Men's minds to accept and believe it. Whereas on the other side, if we maintain

maintain things that are established, we have not BOOK I.
only to strive with a number of heavy prejudices, ———
deeply rooted in the hearts of Men, who think that
herein we serve the time, and speak in favour of the
present State, because thereby we either hold or seek
preferment; but also to bear such exceptions as
Minds, so averted before-hand, usually take against
that which they are loth should be poured into them.
Albeit therefore, much of that we are to speak in
this present cause, may seem to a number perhaps
tedious, perhaps obscure, dark and intricate, (for
many talk of the Truth, which never founded the
depth from whence it springeth: and therefore when
they are led thereunto, they are soon weary, as Men
drawn from those beaten paths wherewith they have
been inured;) yet this may not so far prevail, as to
cut off that which the matter itself requireth, how-
soever the nice humour of some be therewith pleased
or no. They unto whom we shall seem tedious, are
in no wise injured by us, because it is in their own
hands to spare that labour which they are not willing
to endure. And if any complain of obscurity, they
must consider, that in these matters it cometh no
otherwise to pass, than in fundry the works both of
Art, and also of Nature, where that which hath
greatest force in the very things we see, is notwith-
standing itself oftentimes not seen. The stateliness of
Houses, the goodliness of Trees, when we behold
them, delighteth the eye; but that Foundation which
beareth up the one, that Root which ministereth
unto the other nourishment and life, is in the bosom
of the earth concealed; and if there be occasion at
any time to search into it, such labour is then more
necessary than pleasant, both to them which under-
take it, and for the lookers-on. In like manner, the
use and benefit of good Laws, all that live under
them, may enjoy with delight and comfort, albeit
the grounds and first original causes from whence they
have sprung, be unknown, as to the greatest part
of

BOOK I. of Men they are. But when they who withdraw
—— their obedience, pretend, that the Laws which they should obey, are corrupt and vicious; for better examination of their quality, it behoveth the very foundation and root, the highest well-spring and fountain of them to be discovered. Which because we are not oftentimes accustomed to do, when we do do it, the pains we take are more needful a great deal than acceptable, and the matters which we handle, seem by reason of newness, (till the Mind grow better acquainted with them) dark, intricate and unfamiliar. For as much help whereof, as may be in this case, I have endeavoured throughout the body of this whole Discourse, that every former part might give strength unto all that follow, and every latter bring some light unto all before. So that if the Judgments of Men do but hold themselves in suspense, as touching these first more general Meditations, till in order they have perused the rest that ensue; what may seem dark at the first, will afterwards be found more plain, even as the latter particular decisions will appear, I doubt not, more strong, when the other have been read before. The Laws of the Church, whereby for so many ages together we have been guided in the exercise of Christian Religion, and the service of the true God, our Rites, Customs, and Orders of Ecclesiastical Government are called in question. We are accused as Men that will not have Christ Jesus to rule over them; but have wilfully cast his Statutes behind their backs, hating to be reformed and made subject unto the scepter of his Discipline. Behold therefore, we offer the Laws whereby we live unto the general Trial and Judgment of the whole World; heartily beseeching Almighty God, whom we desire to serve according to his own Will, that both we and others (all kind of partial affection being clean laid aside) may have eyes to see, and hearts to embrace the things that in his sight are most acceptable. And
because

because the point, about which we strive, is the BOOK I.
 Quality of our Laws, our first entrance hereinto
 cannot better be made, than with consideration of
 the Nature of Law in general, and of that Law
 which giveth life unto all the rest which are com-
 mendable, just and good, namely the Law whereby
 the Eternal himself doth work. Proceeding from
 hence to the Law, first of Nature, then of Scripture,
 we shall have the easier access unto those things
 which come after to be debated, concerning the par-
 ticular cause and question which we have in hand.

2. All things that are, have some operation not
 violent or casual: neither doth any thing ever begin
 to exercise the same, without some fore-conceived
 end for which it worketh. And the end which it
 worketh for, is not obtained, unless the work be
 also fit to obtain it by; for unto every end, every
 operation will not serve. That which doth assign
 unto each thing the kind, that which doth moderate
 the force and power, that which doth appoint the
 form and measure of working, the same we term
 a Law. So that no certain end could ever be
 attained, unless the actions whereby it is attained,
 were regular; that is to say, made suitable, fit and
 correspondent unto their end, by some Canon Rule
 or Law. Which thing doth first take place in the
 Works, even of God himself. All things therefore
 do work after a sort according to Law; all other
 things according to a Law, whereof some Su-
 perior, unto whom they are subject, is Author;
 only the Works and Operations of God, have him
 both for their Worker, and for the Law whereby
 they are wrought. The Being of God, is a kind
 of Law to his working; for that Perfection which
 God is, giveth perfection to that he doth. Those
 natural, necessary, and internal Operations of God,
 the Generation of the Son, the Proceeding of the
 Spirit, are without the compass of my present
 intent; which is to touch only such operations as
 have

Of that Law
 which God
 from before
 the begin-
 ning hath
 set for him-
 self to do all
 things by.

BOOK I. have their beginning and being by a voluntary purpose, wherewith God hath eternally decreed, when, and how they should be; which eternal Decree is that we term an eternal Law. Dangerous it were for the feeble brain of Man, to wade far into the doings of the most High; whom although to know be life, and joy to make mention of his Name; yet our foundest knowledge is, to know that we know him not as indeed he is, neither can know him: and our safest eloquence concerning him, is our silence, when we confess without confession, that his Glory is inexplicable, his Greatness above our capacity and reach. He is above, and we upon earth; therefore it behoveth our words to be wary and few. Our God is one, or rather very Oneness, and meer Unity, having nothing but Itself in Itself, and not consisting (as all things do besides God) of many things. In which essential Unity of God, a Trinity personal nevertheless subsisteth, after a manner far exceeding the possibility of Man's conceit. The works which outwardly are of God, they are in such sort of him being one, that each Person hath in them somewhat peculiar and proper. For being Three, and they all subsisting in the Essence of one Deity, from the Father, by the Son, through the Spirit, all things are. That which the Son doth hear of the Father, and which the Spirit doth receive of the Father and the Son, the same we have at the hands of the Spirit, as being the last; and therefore the nearest unto us in order, although in power the same with the Second and First. The wise and learned amongst the very Heathens themselves, have all acknowledged some First Cause, whereupon originally the being of all things dependeth. Neither have they otherwise spoken of that Cause than as an Agent, which knowing what and why it worketh, observeth in working a most exact Order or Law. Thus much is signified by

John xvi.
13, 14, 15.

by that which Homer mentioneth, * Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο BOOK I.
 βελή. Thus much acknowledged by Mercurius Trif-
 megistus, § Τὸν πάντα κόσμον ἐποίησεν ὁ δημιουργὸς ἔ
 χερσίν, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ. Thus much confest by Anaxago-
 ras and Plato, terming the Maker of the World an
Intellectual Worker. Finally, the Stoicks, although
 imagining the First Cause of all things to be Fire,
 held nevertheless, that the same Fire having art, did
 † Ὅδῳ βαδίζειν ἐπὶ γενέσει κόσμου. They all confest there-
 fore, in the working of that First Cause, that Counsel
 is used, Reason followed, a Way observed, that is to
 say, constant Order and Law is kept, whereof itself
 must needs be Author unto itself: otherwise it should
 have some worthier and higher to direct it, and so
 could not itself be first; being the first, it can have
 no other than itself to be the Author of that Law
 which it willingly worketh by. God therefore is a
 Law both to himself, and to all other things besides.
 To himself, he is a Law in all those things whereof our
 Saviour speaks, saying, *My Father worketh as yet, so* John v. 17.
I. God worketh nothing without cause. All those
 things which are done by him, have some end for
 which they are done; and the end for which they
 are done, is a reason of his Will to do them.
 His Will had not inclined to create Woman,
 but that he saw it could not be well if she were not Gen. ii. 18.
 created. *Non est bonum, It is not good, Man should be*
alone; therefore let us make an helper for him.
 That and nothing else is done by God, which to
 leave undone, were not so good. If therefore it be
 demanded, why God having power and ability infi-
 nite, the effects notwithstanding of that power are all
 so limited as we see they are? The reason hereof is,
 the End which he hath proposed, and the Law
 whereby his Wisdom hath stinted the effects of his

* Jupiter's Counsel was accomplished.

§ The Creator made the whole World not with hands, but by Reason. Stob. in Eclog. Phys.

† Proceed by a certain and set way in the making of the World.

BOOK I. power in such sort, that it doth not work infinitely, but correspondently unto that end for which it worketh, even all things, *χρήσως*, in most decent and comely sort, all things in measure, number, and weight. The general end of God's eternal working, is the exercise of his most glorious and most abundant Virtue. Which abundance doth shew itself in variety, and for that cause this variety is oftentimes in Scripture exprest by the name of Riches. *The Lord hath made all things for his own sake.* Not that any thing is made to be beneficial unto him, but all things for him to shew beneficence and grace in them. The particular drift of every act proceeding externally from God, we are not able to discern, and therefore cannot always give the proper and certain reason of his works. Howbeit, undoubtedly, a proper and certain reason there is of every finite work of God, inasmuch as there is a Law imposed upon it; which if there were not, it should be infinite even as the Worker himself is. They err therefore, who think that of the Will of God to do this or that, there is no reason besides his Will, Many times no reason known to us; but that there is no reason thereof, I judge it most unreasonable to imagine, inasmuch as he worketh all things, *Κατὰ τὴν βελὴν τῆς θελήματος αὐτοῦ*, not only according to his own Will, but *the Counsel of his own Will.* And whatsoever is done with counsel or wise resolution, hath of necessity some reason why it should be done, albeit that reason be to us in some things so secret, that it forceth the wit of Man to stand, as the blessed Apostle himself doth, amazed thereat; *O the depth of the riches, both of the Wisdom and Knowledge of God. How unsearchable are his Judgments, &c.* That Law eternal which God himself hath made to himself, and thereby worketh all things, whereof he is the Cause and Author; that Law in the admirable frame whereof shineth the most perfect beauty, the countenance of that Wisdom which hath testified concerning herself, *The Lord possessed*

essed me in the beginning of his way, even before his BOOK I.
works of old, I was set up ; that Law which hath been
the pattern to make, and is the card to guide the
World by ; that Law which hath been of God, and
with God everlastingly ; that Law, the Author and
Observer whereof is, one only God, to be blessed for
ever ; how should either Men or Angels be able per-
fectly to behold ? The Book of this Law we are
neither able nor worthy to open and look into.
That little thereof, which we darkly apprehend, we
admire ; the rest, with religious ignorance, we hum-
bly and meekly adore. Seeing therefore, that ac-
cording to this Law he worketh, *Of whom, through* Rom. ii. 36.
whom, and for whom, are all things ; although there
seem to us confusion and disorder in the affairs of this
present World. *Tamen quoniam bonus Mundum Reſtor* Boet. lib. 4.
temperat ; recte fieri cuncta ne dubites. Let no man de Conf. Philof.
doubt, but that every thing is well done, because
the World is ruled by so good a Guide, as transgres-
seth not his own Law : than which, nothing can be
more absolute, perfect and just. The Law whereby
he worketh, is eternal, and therefore can have no
shew or colour of mutability. For which cause, a
part of that Law being opened in the Promises
which God hath made (because his Promises are
nothing else but declarations, what God will do for
the good of Men) touching those Promises the
Apostle hath witnessed, that God may as possibly deny
himself, and not be God, as fail to perform them.
And concerning the Counsel of God, he termeth it
likewise a thing unchangeable ; the Counsel of God, 2 Tim. ii. 13.
and that Law of God, whereof now we speak, being Heb. vi. 17.
one. Nor is the freedom of the Will of God any
whit abated, let, or hindered, by means of this ;
because the imposition of this Law upon himself, is
his own free and voluntary act, This Law therefore,
we may name eternal, being that Order which God
before all ages hath set down with himself, for him-
self to do all things by.

BOOK. I.

2. I am not ignorant, that by Law eternal, the

The Law
which natu-
ral Agents
have given
them to ob-
serve, and
their neces-
sary manner
of keeping
it.

Learned for the most part do understand the Order, not which God hath eternally purposed himself in all his works to observe, but rather that, which with himself he hath set down as expedient to be kept by all his Creatures, according to the several conditions wherewith he hath endued them. They who thus are accustomed to speak, apply the name of Law unto that only rule of working, which superior Authority imposeth; whereas we somewhat more enlarging the sense thereof, term any kind of Rule or Canon whereby actions are framed, a Law. Now that Law, which as it is laid up in the bosom of God, they call eternal, receiveth according unto the different kind of things which are subject unto it, different and sundry kinds of names. That part of it which ordereth natural Agents, we call usually Nature's Law; that which Angels do clearly behold, and without any swerving observe, is a Law celestial and heavenly; the Law of Reason, that which bindeth Creatures reasonable in this World, and with which by Reason they most plainly perceive themselves bound; that which bindeth them, and is not known but by special Revelation from God, divine Law. Human Law, that which out of the Law, either of Reason or of God, Men probably gathering to be expedient, they make it a Law. All things therefore, which are as they ought to be, are conformed unto this second Law eternal; and even those things, which to this eternal Law are not conformable, are notwithstanding in some sort ordered by the first eternal Law. For what good or evil is there under the sun; what action correspondent or repugnant unto the Law which God hath imposed upon his creatures, but in, or upon it, God doth work according to the Law which himself hath eternally purposed to keep; that is to say, the first eternal Law? So that a twofold Law eternal being thus made, it is not hard to conceive how they both
take

take place in in § all things. Wherefore to come to BOOK I.
the Law of Nature, albeit thereby we sometimes
mean that manner of working which God hath
set for each created thing to keep; yet forasmuch
as those things are termed most properly natural
Agents, which keep the Law of their kind un-
wittingly, as the Heavens and Elements of the World,
which can do no otherwise than they do: and foras-
much as we give unto intellectual Natures, the name
of voluntary Agents, that so we may distinguish
them from the other, expedient it will be, that we
sever the Law of Nature observed by the one, from
that which the other is tied unto. Touching the
former, their strict keeping of one Tenure, Statute,
and Law is spoken of by all, but hath in it more than
Men have as yet attained to know, or perhaps ever
shall attain, seeing the travel of wading herein, is
given of God to the Sons of Men; that perceiving
how much the least thing in the World hath in it,
more than the wisest are able to reach unto, they
may by this means learn humility. Moses, in de-
scribing the work of Creation, attributeth speech
unto God: *God said, let there be light: let there be a
firmament: let the waters under the heavens be gathered
together into one place: let the earth bring forth: let*

§ Id omne quod in rebus creatis fit, est materia legis æternæ.
Th. 1. 1, 2. q. 93. art. 4, 5, 6. Nullo modo aliquid legibus
summi Creatoris ordinationique subtrahitur, a quo pax universita-
tis administratur. August. de Civit Dei, lib. 19. c. 22. Immo
et peccatum, quatenus a Deo juste permittitur, cadit in legem
æternam. Etiam legi æternæ subjicitur peccatum; quatenus vo-
luntaria legis transgressio pœnale quoddam incommodum animæ
inferit, juxta illud Augustini, Jussisti Domine, et sic est, ut pœna
sua sibi sit omnis animus inordinatus. Confes. lib. 1. cap. 12. Nec
male Scholastici, Quemadmodum, inquit, videmus res naturales
contingentes, hoc ipso quod a fine particulari suo, atque adeo a
lege æternâ exorbitant, in eandem legem æternam incidere,
quatenus consequuntur alium finem a lege etiam æterna ipsis in
casu particulari constitutum: sic verisimile est homines etiam cum
peccant et desciscunt a lege æterna ut præcipiente, reincidere in
ordinem æternæ legis ut punientis.

there

BOOK I. *there be lights in the firmament of heaven.* Was this only the intent of Moses, to signify the infinite greatness of God's Power, by the easiness of his accomplishing such effects, without travel, pain, or labour? Surely, it seemeth that Moses had herein, besides this, a further purpose, namely, first, to teach that God did not work as a necessary, but a voluntary Agent, intending beforehand, and decreeing with himself, that which did outwardly proceed from him. Secondly, to shew that God did then institute a Law natural to be observed by Creatures; and therefore according to the manner of Laws, the institution thereof is described, as being established by solemn injunction. His commanding those things to be which are, and to be in such sort as they are, to keep that tenure and course which they do, importeth the establishment of Nature's Law. The World's first Creation, and the preservation since of things created, what is it, but only so far forth a manifestation by execution, what the eternal Law of God is concerning things natural? And as it cometh to pass in a Kingdom rightly ordered, that after a Law is once published, it presently takes effect far and wide, all states framing themselves thereunto; even so let us think it fareth in the natural course of the World: since the time that God did first proclaim the edicts of his Law upon it, Heaven and Earth have hearkened unto his Voice, and their labour hath been to do his Will: He made a Law for the Rain; he gave his Decree unto the Sea, that the Waters should not pass his Commandment. Now, if Nature should intermit her course, and leave altogether, thought it were but for a while, the observation of her own Laws; if those principal and mother-elements of the World, whereof all things in this lower World are made, should lose the qualities which now they have; if the frame of that heavenly Arch erected over our heads, should loosen and dissolve itself; if celestial Spheres should forget their wonted motions, and by irregular volubility

bility turn themselves any way as it might hap- BOOK I.
 pen; if the Prince of the Lights of Heaven, which Pf. xix. 9.
 now as a Giant doth run his unwearied course, should,
 as it were, through a languishing faintness, begin to
 stand, and to rest himself; if the Moon should wan-
 der from her beaten way, the Times and Seasons of
 the Year blend themselves, by disordered and con-
 fused mixture, the Winds breathe out their last gasp,
 the Clouds yield no rain, the Earth be defeated of
 heavenly influence, the Fruits of the earth pine
 away, as Children at the breasts of their Mother, no
 longer able to yield them relief; what would be-
 come of Man himself, whom these things do now
 all serve? See we not plainly, that obedience of
 Creatures unto the Law of Nature, is the stay of
 the whole World? Notwithstanding, with Nature it
 cometh sometimes to pass as with Art. Let Phidias
 have rude and obstinate stuff to carve, though his
 art do that it should, his work will lack that beauty
 which otherwise in fitter matter it might have had.
 He that striketh an instrument with skill, may cause
 notwithstanding a very unpleasant sound, if the
 string whereon he striketh chance to be incapable
 of harmony. In the matter, whercof things natu-
 ral consist, that of Theophrastus takes place, Πολὺ
 τὸ ἔχ ὑπακχόν & δὲ δεχόμενον τὸ ἔν. *Much of it is often-* Theophrast.
times such, as will by no means yield to receive that im- in Metaph.
pression which were best and most perfect. Which de-
 fect in the matter of things natural, they who gave
 themselves unto the contemplation of Nature amongst
 the Heathen, observed often: But the true original
 cause thereof, divine Malediction, laid for the sin of
 Man upon these Creatures, which God had made
 for the use of Man, this being an article of that
 saving Truth which God hath revealed unto his
 Church, was above the reach of their merely natu-
 ral capacity and understanding. But howsoever,
 these swervings are now and then incident into the
 course of Nature; nevertheless so constantly the
 Laws of Nature are by natural Agents observed, that
 no

BOOK I.Arist. Rhet.
I. cap. 39.

no man denieth, but those things which Nature worketh, are wrought either always, or for the most part, after one and the same manner. If here it be demanded, what this is which keepeth Nature in obedience to her own Law, we must have recourse to that higher Law, whereof we have already spoken ; and because all other Laws do thereon depend, from thence we must borrow so much as shall need for brief resolution in this point. Although we are not of opinion therefore, as some are, that Nature in working, hath before her certain exemplary draughts or patterns, which subsisting in the bosom of the Highest, and being thence discovered, she fixeth her eye upon them, as travellers by sea, upon the Pole-star of the World, and that according thereunto she guideth her hand to work by imitation : although we rather embrace the oracle of Hippocrates,* *That each thing, both in small and in great, fulfilleth the task which Destiny hath set down.* And concerning the manner of executing and fulfilling the same, *What they do, they know not, yet is it in shew and appearance, as though they did know what they do ; and the truth is, they do not discern the things which they look on :* Nevertheless, for as much as the works of Nature are no less exact, than if she did both behold and study how to express some absolute shape or mirror always present before her ; yea, such her dexterity and skill appeareth, that no intellectual Creature in the World were able by capacity, to do that which Nature doth without capacity and knowledge ; it cannot be, but Nature hath some Director of infinite knowledge to guide her in all her ways. Who is the Guide of Nature, but only the God of Nature ? *In him we live, move, and are.* Those things which Nature is said to do,

Acts xvii.
28.

* Τὴν πεπρωμένην μοίρην ἕκαστον ἐκπληροῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μείον ὁ πράσσει, ἃ οὐκ οἶδασιν, οὐδὲ πράσσει δοκέουσιν εἰδέναι, καὶ θ' αὖ μὲν ὁρῶσι οὐ γινώσκουσι.

are by divine Art performed, using Nature as an instrument ; nor is there any such art or knowledge BOOK I.
 divine in Nature her self working, but in the Guide of Nature's work. Whereas therefore things natural, which are not in the number of voluntary Agents (for of such only we now speak, and of no other) do so necessarily observe their certain Laws, that as long as they keep those † Forms which give them their being, they cannot possibly be apt or inclinable to do otherwise than they do ; seeing the kinds of their operations are both constantly and exactly framed, according to the several ends for which they serve, they themselves in the mean while, though doing that which is fit, yet knowing neither what they do, nor why ; it followeth, that all which they do in this sort, proceedeth originally from some such Agent, as knoweth, appointeth, holdeth up, and even actually frameth the same. The manner of of this divine Efficiency being far above us, we are no more able to conceive by our Reason, than Creatures unreasonable by their Sense, are able to apprehend after what manner we dispose and order the course of our affairs. Only thus much is discerned, that the natural Generation and Process of all things, receiveth order of proceeding from the settled stability of divine Understanding. This appointeth unto them their kinds of working ; the disposition whereof, in the purity of God's own Knowledge and Will, is rightly termed by the name of Providence. The same being referred unto the things themselves, here disposed by it, was wont by the Ancients to be called Natural Destiny. That Law, the performance whereof we behold in things natural, is as it were an authentical, or an original draught, written in

† Form in other Creatures is a thing proportionable unto the Soul in living Creatures. Sensible it is not, nor otherwise discernible than only by effects. According to the diversity of inward Forms, things of the World are distinguished into their kinds.

BOOK I. the bosom of God himself; whose Spirit being to execute the same, useth every particular nature, every mere natural agent, only as an instrument created at the beginning, and ever since the beginning, used to work his own Will and Pleasure withal.* Nature therefore, is nothing else but God's instrument. In the course whereof, Dionysius perceiving some sudden disturbance, is said to have cried out, *Aut Deus naturæ patitur, aut Mundi machina dissolvitur*; either God doth suffer impediment, and is by a greater than himself hindered; or if that be impossible, then hath he determined to make a present dissolution of the World; the execution of that Law beginning now to stand still, without which the World cannot stand. This Workman, whose servitor Nature is, being in truth but only one, the Heathens imagining to be more, gave him in the sky, the name of Jupiter; in the air, the name of Juno; in the water, the name of Neptune; in the earth, the name of Vesta, and sometimes of Ceres; the name of Apollo in the sun; in the moon, the name of Diana; the name of Æolus, and divers other in the winds; and to conclude, even so many guides of Nature they dreamed of as they saw there were kinds of things natural in the World. These they honoured, as having power to work or cease accordingly as Men deserved of them: but unto us, there is one only Guide of all agents natural, and he both the Creator and the Worker of all in all, alone to be blessed, adored, and honoured by all for ever. That which hitherto hath been spoken, concerneth natural Agents, considered in themselves: but we must further remember also (which thing to touch, in a word, shall suffice,) that as in this respect they have their Law, which Law directeth them in the means

* Vide Tho. in Compend. Theol. cap. 3. Omne quod movetur ab aliquo, est quasi instrumentum quoddam primi moventis. Ridiculum est autem etiam apud indoctos ponere instrumentum moveri non ab aliquo principali agente.

whereby

whereby they tend to their own perfection; so like-BOOK I.
wise another Law there is, which toucheth them as
they are sociable parts united into one body: a Law
which bindeth them each to serve unto others good,
and all to prefer the good of the whole, before
whatsoever their own particular, as we plainly see
they do, when things natural in that regard, forget
their ordinary natural wont: that which is heavy,
mounting sometime upwards of its own accord, and
forsaking the center of the earth, which to itself is
most natural, even as if it did hear itself command-
ed to let go the good it privately wisheth, and to re-
lieve the present distrefs of Nature in common.

4. * But now that we may lift up our eyes (as it
were) from the Foot-ftool to the Throne of God,
and leaving these natural, confider a little the ftate
of heavenly and divine Creatures: touching Angels,
which are Spirits immaterial and intellectual, the
glorious Inhabitants of thofe facred Palaces, where
nothing but Light and bleffed Immortality, no sha-
dow of matter for tears, discontentments, griefs, and
uncomfortable paffions to work upon, but all joy,
tranquillity, and peace, even for ever and ever doth
dwell. As in number and order they are huge,
mighty, and royal Armies, fo likewise in perfection
of obedience unto that Law, which the Higheft,
whom they adore, love and imitate, hath impofed
upon them. Such obfervants they are thereof, that
our Saviour himfelf being to fet down the perfect
idea of that which we are to pray and wifh for on
Earth did not teach to pray or wifh for more, than

* The Law which Angels do work by. Pfal. civ. 4. Heb.
i. 7. Eph. iii. 10. Dan. vii. 10. Matth. xxvi. 53. Heb.
xii. 22. Luke ii. 13. Matth. vi. 10. and xviii. 10. Pfal.
xcī, 11, 12. Luke xv. 7. Heb. i. 14. Aët. x. 3. Dan. ix.
23. Dan. iv. 10. *Τῷ δὲ θρόνῳ πυρόεντι παραστᾶσιν πολυμάχοι*
ἄγγελοι, οἷσι μεμηλεῖσθόσις ὡς πάντα τελεῖται. Ariit. Metaph. xii. cap.
7. Job xxxviii. 7. Pfal. cxlviii. 2. Heb. i. 6. Ifai. vi. 3.

BOOK I.

only that here it might be with us, as with them it is in Heaven. God which moveth meer natural Agents as an efficient only, doth otherwise move intellectual Creatures, and especially his holy Angels: for beholding the face of God, in admiration of so great excellency, they all adore him; and being rapt with the love of his beauty, they cleave inseparably for ever unto him. Desire to resemble him in goodness, maketh them unweariable and even unsatiable in their longing, to do by all means, all manner of good unto all the Creatures of God, but especially unto the Children of Men. In the countenance of whose nature looking downward, they behold themselves beneath themselves, even as upward in God, beneath whom themselves are, they see that character which is no where but in themselves and us, resembled. Thus far even the Painims have approached; thus far they have seen into the doings of the Angels of God; Orpheus confessing, that the fiery throne of God is attended on by those most industrious Angels, careful how all things are performed amongst Men; and the mirror of human Wisdom plainly teaching, that God moveth Angels, even as that thing doth stir Man's heart, which is thereunto presented amiable. Angelical actions may therefore be reduced unto these three general kinds.* First, most delectable Love arising from the visible apprehension of the Purity, Glory and Beauty of God invisible, saving only unto Spirits that are pure: Secondly, Adoration, grounded upon the evidence of the greatness of God, on whom they see how all things depend: Thirdly, Imitation, bred by the presence of his exemplary goodness, who ceaseth not before them daily to fill Heaven and Earth with the rich treasures of most free and undeserved grace. Of Angels, we

* This is intimated wheresoever we find them termed the Sons of God, as Job i. 6. and xxxviii. 7. 2 Pet. ii. 4. Jude vers. 6. Psal. cxlviii. 2. Luke ii. 13. Mat. xxvi. 53. Heb. xii. 22. Apoc. xxii. 9.

are not to consider only what they are and do, in regard of their own being, but that also which concerneth them as they are linked into a kind of corporation amongst themselves, and of society or fellowship with Men. Consider Angels, each of them severally in himself, and their Law is that which the Prophet David mentioneth, *All ye his Angels praise him*. Consider the Angels of God associated, and their Law is that which disposeth them as an Army, one in order and degree above another. Consider finally the Angels, as having with us that communion which the Apostle to the Hebrews noteth; and in regard whereof, Angels have not disdained to profess themselves our fellow-servants. From hence there springeth up a third Law, which bindeth them to works of ministerial employment. Every of which their several functions, are by them performed with joy. A part of the Angels of God notwithstanding (we know) have fallen, and that their fall hath been through the voluntary breach of that Law, which did require at their hands continuance in the exercise of their high and admirable virtue. Impossible it was, that ever their will should change or incline to remit any part of their duty, without some object having force to avert their conceit from God, and to draw it another way; and that before they attained that high perfection of bliss, wherein now the Elect Angels are without possibility of falling. Of any thing more than of God, they could not by any means like, as long as whatsoever they knew besides God, they apprehended it not in itself, without dependency upon God; because so long, God must needs seem infinitely better than any thing which they so could apprehend. Things beneath them, could not in such sort be presented unto their eyes, but that therein they must needs see always, how those things did depend on God. It seemeth therefore, that there was no other way for Angels to sin, but by reflex of their understanding upon themselves; when being

BOOK I. held with admiration of their own sublimity and honour, the memory of their subordination unto God, and their dependency on him was drowned in this conceit ; whereupon their adoration, love and imitation of God, could not chuse but be also interrupted. The fall of Angels therefore, was Pride ; Since their fall, their practices have been the clean contrary unto those before mentioned ; for being dispersed, some in the air, some on the earth, some in the water ; some among the minerals, dens and caves that are under the earth ; they have, by all means, laboured to effect an universal rebellion against the Laws, and, as far as in them lieth, utter destruction of the Works of God. These wicked Spirits the Heathens honoured instead of Gods both generally under the name of *Dii inferi*, Gods infernal ; and particularly, some in Oracles, some in Idols, some as household Gods, some as Nymphs : In a word, no foul and wicked Spirit which was not one way or other honoured of Men as God, till such time as Light appeared in the World, and dissolved the works of the Devil. Thus much therefore may suffice for Angels, the next unto whom in degree are Men.

The Law
whereby
Man is in
his actions
directed to
the imita-
tion of God.

5. God alone excepted, who actually and everlastingly is, whatsoever he may be, and which cannot hereafter be, that which now he is not ; all other things besides, are somewhat in possibility, which as yet they are not in act. And for this cause there is in all things an appetite or desire, whereby they incline to something which they may be ; and when they are it, they shall be perfecter than now they are. All which perfections are contained under the general name of Goodness. And because there is not in the World any thing whereby another may not be made the perfecter, therefore all things that are, are good. * Again, sith there can be no goodness desired,

* Πάντα γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ὁρῶμεθα. Arist. de An. lib. 1. cap. 4.
which

which proceedeth not from God himself, as from the supreme Cause of all things; and every effect doth after a sort contain, at leastwise resemble the cause from which it proceedeth: all things in the World are said, in some sort, to seek the highest, and to covet more or less the participation of God himself; yet this doth no where so much appear, as it doth in Man, because there are so many kinds of perfection which Man seeketh. The first degree of goodness is, that general perfection which all things do seek, in desiring the continuance of their being; all things therefore coveting, as much as may be, to be like unto God in being ever, that which cannot hereunto attain personally, doth seek to continue itself another way; that is, by off-spring and propagation. The next degree of goodness is, that which each thing coveteth, by affecting resemblance with God, in the constancy and excellency of those operations which belong unto their kind. The immutability of God they strive unto, by working either always, or for the most part, after one and the same manner; his absolute exactness they imitate, by tending unto that which is most exquisite in every particular. Hence have risen a number of Axioms in Philosophy,† shewing, how the works of Nature do always aim at that which cannot be bettered. These two kinds of goodness rehearsed, are so nearly united to the things themselves which desire them, that we scarcely perceive the appetite to stir in reaching forth her hand towards them. But the desire of those perfections which grow externally, is more apparent, especially of such as are not expressly desired, unless they be first known, or such as are not for any other cause, than for knowledge itself desired. Concerning perfections in this kind, that by proceeding in

BOOK. I.
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† Ἐν τοῖς φύσει δεῖ τὸ βέλτιον, εἰάν ἐνδέχῃται ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον ἢ φύσις αἰεὶ ποιεῖ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων τὸ βέλτιστον. Arist. 2. de Cœl. cap. 5.

the

BOOK I. the knowledge of Truth, and by growing in the exercise of Virtue, Man, amongst the creatures of this inferior world, aspireth to the greatest conformity with God. This is not only known unto us, whom he himself hath so instructed, but even they do acknowledge, who amongst men are not judged the nearest unto him. With Plato, what one thing more usual, than to excite men unto a love of Wisdom, by shewing, how much wise Men are thereby exalted above men; how Knowledge doth raise them up into Heaven; how it maketh them, though not Gods, yet as Gods, high, admirable and divine? And Mercurius Trismegistus speaking of the virtues of a righteous Soul, † *Such Spirits* (saith he) *are never cloyed with praising and speaking well of all men, with doing good unto every one by word and deed, because they study to frame themselves according to the Pattern of the Father of Spirits.*

Men's first beginning to grow to the knowledge of that Law which they are to observe. Vide *Isai. vii. 16.*

6. In the matter of Knowledge, there is between the Angels of God, and the Children of Men this difference: Angels already have full and complete knowledge in the highest degree that can be imparted unto them: Men, if we view them in their spring, are at the first without understanding or knowledge at all. Nevertheless, from this utter vacuity they grow by degrees, till they come at length to be even as the Angels themselves are. That which agreeth to the one now, the other shall attain unto in the end; they are not so far disjoined and severed, but that they come at length to meet. The Soul of Man being therefore at the first as a Book, wherein nothing is, and yet all things may be imprinted; we are to search by what steps and degrees it riseth unto perfection of knowledge. Unto that which hath been already set down, concerning natural Agents, this we must add, that albeit therein we have comprised, as well creatures living, as void of life, if

† Ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ κόρον ἔδεποτε ἔχει, ὑμνεῖσα, εὐφημεῖσά τε πάντας ἀνδρώπεις, καὶ λόγοις καὶ ἔργοις πάντας εὐποιῶσα, μιμεμένη αὐτῆς τον πατέρα.

they

they be in degree of nature beneath Men; never-BOOK I.
theless, a difference we must observe between those
natural Agents that work altogether unwittingly;
and those which have, though weak, yet some un-
derstanding what they do, as Fishes, Fowls, and
Beasts have. Beasts are in sensible capacity as ripe,
even as Men themselves, perhaps more ripe. For as
stones, though in dignity of nature inferior to
plants, yet exceed them in firmness of strength, or
durability of being; and plants though beneath the
excellency of creatures endued with sense, yet exceed
them in the faculty of vegetation, and of fertility;
so Beasts, though otherwise behind Men, may not-
withstanding in actions of sense and fancy go beyond
them; because the endeavours of Nature, when it
hath an higher perfection to seek, are in lower the
more remiss, not esteeming thereof so much as those
things do, which have no better proposed unto them.
The Soul of Man therefore, being capable of a more
divine perfection, hath (besides the faculty of grow-
ing unto sensible knowledge, which is common unto
us with beasts) a further hability, whereof in them
there is no shew at all, the ability of reaching * higher
than unto sensible things. Till we grow to some
ripeness of years, the Soul of Man doth only store
itself with conceits of things of inferior and more
open quality, which afterwards do serve as instru-
ments unto that which is greater; in the mean while,
above the reach of meaner creatures it ascendeth not.
When once it comprehendeth any thing above this,
as the differences of time, affirmations, negations,
and contradiction in speech, we then count it to have
some use of natural Reason. Whereunto, if after-
wards there might be added the right helps of true

* Ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀναβαίνει, καὶ μετρεῖ αὐτὸν, καὶ
εἶδεν ποῖα μὲν εἰσὶν αὐτῷ ὑψηλὰ, ποῖα δὲ ταπεινὰ, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα
ἀκριβῶς μετράει. Καὶ τὸ πάντων μεῖζον, εἰδὲ τὴν γῆν καταλιπὼν ἄνω γί-
νεται. Merc. Trif. Aristotelical demonstration.

BOOK I. Art and Learning (which helps, I must plainly confess, this Age of the World, carrying the name of a learned Age, doth neither much know, nor greatly regard) there would undoubtedly be almost as great difference in maturity of judgment between Men therein inured, and that which now Men are, as between Men that are now, and innocents. Which speech, if any condemn, as being over hyperbolical, let them consider but this one thing: no Art is at the first finding out so perfect as industry may after make it; yet the very first Man that to any purpose knew the way we speak of and followed it, hath alone thereby performed more, very near, in all parts of natural knowledge, than since in any one part thereof the whole World besides hath done. In the poverty of that other new devised aid two things are notwithstanding singular. Of marvellous quick dispatch it is, and doth shew them that have it as much almost in three days as if it had dwelt threescore years with them. Again, because the curiosity of Man's wit doth many times with peril wade farther in the search of things than were convenient; the same is thereby restrained unto such generalities as everywhere offering themselves are apparent unto men of the weakest conceit that need be: so as following the Rules and Precepts thereof, we may find it to be an Art which teacheth the way of speedy discourse, and restraineth the Mind of Man that it may not wax overwise. Education and Instruction are the means, the one by use, the other by precept to make our natural faculty of Reason both the better and the sooner able to judge rightly between Truth and Error, Good and Evil. But at what time a man may be said to have attained so far forth the use of Reason as sufficeth to make him capable of those Laws whereby he is then bound to guide his actions; this is a great deal more easy for common sense to discern, than for any man by skill and learning to determine; even as it is not in Philosophers, who
best

best know the nature both of fire and gold, to teach BOOK I.
 what degree of the one will serve to purify the other,
 so well as the Artizan (which doth this by fire) dis-
 cerneth by sense when the fire hath that degree of
 heat which sufficeth for his purpose.

7. By Reason Man attaineth unto the knowledge Of Man's Will which is the thing that Laws of Action are made to guide.
 of things that are, and are not sensible; it resteth
 therefore, that we search how Man attaineth unto the
 knowledge of such things unsensible, as are to be
 known that they may be done. Seeing then that
 nothing can move unless there be some end, the
 desire whereof provoketh unto motion; how should
 that divine Power of our Soul, that *Spirit of our* Eph. iv. 23.
Mind, as the Apostle termeth it, ever stir itself unto
 Action unless it have also the like spur? The end
 for which we are moved to work, is sometimes the
 goodness which we conceive of the very working
 itself, without any further respect at all; and the
 cause that procureth Action is the meer desire of
 Action, no other good besides being thereby in-
 tended. Of certain turbulent Wits it is said, *Illis* Salust.
quieta movere magna merces videbatur. They thought
 the very disturbance of things established an hire
 sufficient to set them on work. Sometimes that
 which we do is referred to a further end, with-
 out the desire whereof, we would leave the same
 undone; as in their Actions that gave Alms to pur-
 chase thereby the praise of Men. Man in perfection Matt. vi. 2.
 of nature, being made according to the likeness of
 his Maker, resembleth him also in the manner of
 working; so that whatsoever we work as Men, the
 same we do wittingly work and freely: neither are
 we according to the manner of natural Agents any
 way so tyed, but that it is in our power to leave the
 things we do undone. The good which either is
 gotten by doing or which consisteth in the very
 doing itself causeth not Action, unless apprehending
 it as good we so like and desire it. That we do unto
 any such end, the same we choose and prefer before
 the

BOOK I. the leaving of it undone. Choice there is not, unless
 — the thing which we take to be so in our power that we might have refused and left it. If Fire consumeth the Stubble, it chooseth not so to do, because the nature thereof is such that it can do no other. To chuse, is to will one thing before another; and to will, is to bend our Souls to the having or doing of that which they see to be good. Goodness is seen with the Eye of the Understanding, and the Light of that Eye is Reason. So that two principal Fountains are of human Action, Knowledge and Will; which Will, in things tending towards any end is termed Choice. Concerning Knowledge; *Behold,* Deut. xxx. 19. *faith Moses, I have set before you this day, Good and Evil, Life and Death.* Concerning Will, he addeth immediately, *Chuse Life*; that is to say, the things that tend unto Life, them chuse. But of one thing we must have special care, as being a matter of no small moment, and that is, how the Will properly and strictly taken, as it is of things which are referred unto the end that Man desireth, differeth greatly from that inferior natural desire which we call Appetite. The object of Appetite is whatsoever sensible good may be wished for; the object of Will is that good which Reason doth lead us to seek. Affections, as Joy, and Grief, and Fear, and Anger, with such like, being as it were the fundry fashions and forms of Appetite, can neither rise at the conceit of a thing indifferent, nor yet chuse but rise at the sight of some things. Wherefore it is not altogether in our power, whether we will be stirred with Affections or no. Whereas Actions which issue from the disposition of the Will, are in the power thereof to be performed or stayed. Finally, Appetite is the Will's Sollicitor, and the Will is Appetite's Controller; what we covet according to the one, by the other we often reject. Neither is any other desire termed properly Will, but that where Reason and Understanding, or the shew of Reason, prescribeth

prescribeth the thing desired. It may be therefore a BOOK I.
question, whether those operations of Men are to be
counted voluntary, wherein that good which is sen-
sible provoketh Appetite, and Appetite causeth Ac-
tion, Reason being never called to counsel; as when
we eat or drink, and betake ourselves unto rest, and
such like. The truth is, that such Actions in Men
having attained to the use of Reason, are voluntary:
For as the Authority of higher Powers, hath force
even in those things which are done without their
privity, and are of so mean reckoning that to
acquaint them therewith it needeth not: in like sort,
voluntarily we are said to do that also, which the
Will, if it listed, might hinder from being done,
although about the doing thereof we do not ex-
pressly use our Reason or Understanding, and so
immediately apply our Wills thereunto. In cases
therefore of such facility the Will doth yield her
assent, as it were with a kind of silence, by not dis-
senting; in which respect her force is not so appa-
rent as in express mandates or prohibition, especially
upon advice and consultation going before. Where
Understanding therefore needeth, in those things Rea-
son is the Director of Man's Will by discovering in
Action what is good. For Laws of well-doing are
the Dictates of right Reason. Children which are
not as yet come unto those years whereat they may
have; again, Innocents which are excluded by natu-
ral defect from ever having; thirdly, Madmen,
which for the present cannot possibly have the use of
right Reason to guide themselves, have for their
guide the Reason that guideth other men, which are
Tutors over them to seek and procure their good for
them. In the rest there is that Light of Reason,
whereby Good may be known from Evil; and
which discovering the same rightly is termed right.
The Will, notwithstanding, doth not incline to have
or do that which Reason teacheth to be good, unless
the same do also teach it to be possible. For albeit
the

the Appetite, being more general, may wish any thing which seemeth good, be it never so impossible; yet for such things the reasonable Will of Man doth never seek. Let Reason teach impossibility in any thing, and the Will of Man doth let it go; a thing impossible it doth not affect, the impossibility thereof being manifest. There is in the Will of Man naturally that freedom, whereby it is apt to take or refuse any particular object whatsoever being presented unto it. Whereupon it followeth, that there is no particular object so good but it may have the shew of some difficulty or unpleasant quality annexed to it, in respect whereof, the Will may shrink and decline it; contrariwise (for so things are blended) there is no particular evil which hath not some appearance of goodness whereby to insinuate itself. For Evil, as Evil cannot be desired;* if that be desired which is evil, the cause is the goodness which is or seemeth to be joined with it. Goodness doth not move by being, but by being apparent; and therefore many things are neglected which are most precious, only because the value of them lieth hid. Sensible Goodness is most apparent, near, and present, which causeth the Appetite to be therewith strongly provoked. Now pursuit and refusal in the Will do follow, the one the affirmation, the other the negation of Goodness, which the Understanding apprehendeth, grounding itself upon sense, unless some higher Reason do chance to teach the contrary. And if Reason have taught it rightly to be good, yet not so apparently that the Mind receiveth it with utter impossibility of being otherwise, still there is place left for the Will to take or leave. Whereas therefore amongst so many things as are to be done there

§ *O mibi præteritos referat si Jupiter annos !*

* Εἰ δὲ τις ἐπὶ κακίαν ὁρμᾷ, πρῶτον μὲν, ἔχῃ ὡς ἐπὶ κακίαν αὐτὴν ὁρμήσει, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπ' ἀγαθόν. Paulo post. Ἀδύνατον γὰρ ὁρμᾶν ἐπὶ κακὰ βεβλόμενον ἔχειν αὐτὰ οὔτε ἐλπίδι ἀγαθῆς, ἔτε φόβῳ μείζοντος κακῆς.
Alcin. de Dog. Plat.

are so few, the goodnes whereof Reason in such sort BOOK 1.
doth or easily can discover, we are not to marvel at
the choice of evil even then when the contrary is
probably known. Hereby it cometh to pass, that
custom inuring the Mind by long practice, and so
leaving there a sensible impression, prevaileth more
than reasonable perswasion what way soever. Reason
therefore may rightly discern the thing which is
good, and yet the Will of Man not incline itself
thereunto as oft as the prejudice of sensible experience
doth over-sway. Nor let any man think, that this
doth make any thing for the just excuse of iniquity;
for there was never sin committed wherein a less
good was not preferred before a greater, and that
wilfully; which cannot be done without the singular
disgrace of Nature, and the utter disturbance of that
divine Order, whereby the pre-eminence of chiefest
acceptation is by the best things worthily challenged.
There is not that good which concerneth us, but it
hath evidence enough for itself if Reason were dili-
gent to search it out. Through the neglect thereof,
abused we are with the shew of that which is not;
sometimes the subtilty of Satan inveigling us, as it
did Eve; sometimes the hastiness of our Wills pre- 2 Cor. xi. 3.
venting the more considerate advice of sound Reason,
as in the Apostles, when they no sooner saw what Luke ix. 54.
they liked not, but they forthwith were desirous of
fire from heaven; sometimes the very custom of
evil making the heart obdurate against whatsoever
instructions to the contrary, as in them over whom
our Saviour spake weeping, *O Jerusalem, how often,* Mat. xxiii.
and thou wouldest not? Still therefore that wherewith 37.
we stand blameable and can no way excuse it, is, in
doing evil we prefer a less good before a greater, the
greatness whereof is by Reason investigable and may
be known. The search of knowledge is a thing
painful; and the painfulness of knowledge is that
which maketh the Will so hardly inclinable there-
unto. The root hereof, is divine Malediction; where-
by

BOOK I.

by the *instruments being weakened wherewithal the Soul (especially in reasoning) doth work, it preferreth rest in ignorance before wearisome labour to know. For a spur of diligence therefore, we have a natural thirst after knowledge ingrafted in us. But by reason of that original weakness in the instruments, without which the understanding part is not able in this world by discourse to work, the very conceit of painfulness is as a bridle to stay us. For which cause the Apostle, who knew right well that the weariness of the flesh is an heavy clog to the Will, striking mightily upon this key, *Awake thou that sleepest, cast off all which presseth down; watch, labour, strive to go forward and to grow in knowledge.*

Of the natural way of finding out Laws by Reason to guide the Will unto that which is good.

8. Wherefore to return to our former intent of discovering the natural way, whereby Rules have been found out concerning that Goodness wherewith the Will of Man ought to be moved in human actions; as every thing naturally and necessarily doth desire the utmost good and greatest perfection, whereof Nature hath made it capable, even so Man. Our felicity therefore being the object and accomplishment of our desire, we cannot chuse but wish and covet it. All particular things which are subject unto action, the Will doth so far forth incline unto, as Reason judgeth them the better for us, and consequently the more available to our blifs. If Reason err, we fall into evil, and are so far forth deprived of the general perfection we seek. Seeing therefore, that for the framing of Men's Actions, the Knowledge

* Sap. ix. 15, A corruptible Body is heavy unto the Soul, and the earthly Mansion keepeth down the Mind that is full of cares. And hardly can we discern the things that are upon Earth, and with great labour find we out the things which are before us. Who then can seek out the things that are in Heaven? Ephes. v. 14. Heb. xii. 1, 12. 1 Cor. xvi. 13. Prov. ii. 4. Luke xiii. 24.

of Good from Evil is necessary, it only resteth, that BOOK I.
 we search how this may be had. Neither must we
 suppose that there needeth one rule to know the
 Good, and another the Evil by. † For he that
 knoweth what is straight, doth even thereby discern
 what is crooked, because the absence of straightness
 in bodies capable thereof is crookedness. Goodness
 in actions is like unto straightness; wherefore that
 which is done well, we term right. For as the
 straight way is most acceptable to him that travel-
 leth, because by it he cometh soonest to his jour-
 ney's end; so that in Action, which doth lie the
 evenest between us and the end we desire, must
 needs be the fittest for our use. Besides which fitness
 for use, there is also in rectitude, beauty; as con-
 trariwise in obliquity, deformity. And that which
 is good in the actions of Men, doth not only delight
 as profitable, but as amiable also. In which con-
 sideration the Grecians most divinely have given to
 the active perfection of Men, a name expressing Καλοκα-
 both beauty and goodness; because goodness in γαθία.
 ordinary speech is for the most part applied only to
 that which is beneficial. But we in the name of
 Goodness, do here imply both. And of discerning
 Goodness, there are but these two ways; the one,
 the knowledge of the causes whereby it is made such;
 the other, the observation of those signs and tokens,
 which, being annexed always unto Goodness, argue,
 that where they are found, there also Goodness is,
 although we know not the cause by force whereof it
 is there. The former of these, is the most sure and
 infallible way, but so hard that all shun it, and had
 rather walk as men do in the dark by hap-hazard,
 than tread so long and intricate mazes for knowledge
 sake. As therefore Physicians are many times forced
 to leave such methods of curing as themselves know

† Τῷ εὐθεῖ καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ καμπύλον γινώσκουμεν· κριτὴς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν
 ὁ κατῶν. Arist. de An. lib. 1.

BOOK I. to be the fittest, and being over-ruled by their Patients' impatience are fain to try the best they can, in taking that way of cure which the cured will yield unto; in like sort, considering how the case doth stand with this present age full of tongue and weak of brain, behold we yield to the stream thereof; into the causes of Goodness we will not make any curious or deep inquiry; to touch them now and then it shall be sufficient, when they are so near at hand that easily they may be conceived without any far removed discourse: that way we are contented to prove, which being the worse in itself, is notwithstanding now by reason of common imbecility, the fitter and likelier to be brooked. Signs and tokens to know Good by are of fundry kinds; some more certain, and some less. The most certain token of evident Goodness is, if the general perswasion of all Men do so account it. And therefore a common received error is never utterly overthrown, till such times as we go from signs unto causes, and shew some manifest root or fountain thereof common unto all, whereby it may clearly appear how it hath come to pass that so many have been overseen. In which case surmises and slight probabilities will not serve, because the universal consent of Men is the perfectest and strongest in this kind, which comprehendeth only the signs and tokens of Goodness. Things casual do vary, and that which a Man doth but chance to think well of, cannot still have the like hap. Wherefore although we know not the cause, yet thus much we may know, that some necessary cause there is, whensoever the judgments of all Men generally, or for the most part, run one and the same way, especially in matters of natural discourse: for of things necessarily and naturally done, there is no more affirmed but this, * *They keep either always, or for the most part, one Tenure.* The general and per-

* Ἡ αἰὲν ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεον ὡσαύτως ἀποβαίνει. Arist. Rhet. l. i. c. 39.

petual voice of Men is as the sentence of God him-^{BOOK I.}
 self. ‡ For that which all Men have at all times
 learned, Nature herself must needs have taught; and
 God being the Author of Nature, her voice is but
 his instrument. By her, from him, we receive what-
 soever in such sort we learn. Infinite Duties there
 are, the goodness whereof is by this Rule sufficiently
 manifested, although we had no other warrant besides
 to approve them. The Apostle St. Paul having
 speech concerning the Heathen, saith of them,
They are a Law unto themselves. His meaning is, ^{Rom. ii. 14.}
 that by force of the Light of Reason wherewith
 God illuminateth every one which cometh into the
 world, Men being enabled to know truth from
 falshood, and good from evil, do thereby learn in
 many things, what the Will of God is; which Will
 himself not revealing by any extraordinary means
 unto them, but they by natural discourse attaining
 the knowledge thereof, seem the makers of those
 Laws which indeed are his, and they but only the
 finders of them out. A Law therefore generally
 taken, is a directive Rule unto goodness of opera-
 tion. The Rule of divine Operations outward, is
 the definitive appointment of God's own Wisdom
 set down within himself. The Rule of natural Agents
 that work by simple necessity, is the determination
 of the Wisdom of God, known to God himself, the
 principal Director of them, but not unto them that
 are directed to execute the same. The Rule of

‡ Non potest error contingere ubi omnes idem opinantur.
 Monticat. in 1. Polit. Quicquid in omnibus individuis unius spe-
 ciei communiter inest, id causam communem habeat oportet, quæ
 est eorum individuum species et natura. Idem. Quod à tota
 aliqua specie fit, universalis particularisque nature fit instinctu.
 Ficin. de Christ. Rel. Si proficere cupis, primò firmè id verum
 puta quod sana mens omnium hominum attestatur. Cusa in Com-
 pend. cap. 1. Non licet naturale universaleque hominum judicium
 falsum vanumque existimare. Telef. Ὁ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, τῶτο εἶναι
 φάμεν. Ὁ δὲ ἀναισῶν τέτην τὴν πίσυν οὐ πάνυ πισότερα ἔρει. Arist. Eth.
 lib. 10. cap. 2.

BOOK I. natural Agents which work after a sort of their own accord, as the beasts do, is the judgment of common sense or fancy concerning the sensible goodness of those objects wherewith they are moved. The Rule of ghostly and immaterial Natures, as Spirits and Angels, is their intuitive intellectual judgment concerning the amiable beauty and high goodness of that object which with unspeakable joy and delight doth set them on work. The Rule of voluntary Agents on Earth, is the sentence that Reason giveth concerning the goodness of those things which they are to do. And the sentences which Reason giveth are some more, some less general, before it come to define in particular actions what is good. The main principles of Reason are in themselves apparent. For to make nothing evident of itself unto Man's understanding, were to take away all possibility of knowing any thing. And herein that of Theophrastus is true, || *They that seek a reason of all things do utterly overthrow Reason.* In every kind of knowledge some such grounds there are, as that being proposed the Mind doth presently embrace them as free from all possibility of error, clear and manifest without proof. In which kind, axioms or principles more general, are such as this, *That the greater good is to be chosen before the less.* If therefore it should be demanded, what reason there is why the Will of Man, which doth necessarily shun harm and cover whatsoever is pleasant and sweet, should be commanded to count the pleasures of sin gall; and notwithstanding the bitter accidents wherewith virtuous actions are compast, yet still to rejoice and delight in them: surely this could never stand with Reason; but that Wisdom thus prescribing groundeth her Laws upon an infallible rule of comparison, which is, That small difficulties when exceeding great good is sure to ensue; and on the other side momentary

|| Ἀπείκτων ζητούντες λόγον, ἀναιροῦσι λόγον. Theoph. in Metaph. benefits

benefits when the hurt which they draw after them BOOK I.
is unspeakable, are not at all to be respected. This

Rule is the ground whereupon the wisdom of the Apostle buildeth a Law enjoining patience unto himself, *The present lightness of our affliction worketh unto us, even with abundance upon abundance, an eternal weight of glory: while we look not on the things which are seen, but on the things which are not seen: for the things which are seen, are temporal; but the things which are not seen, are eternal:* therefore Christianity to be embraced, whatsoever calamities in those times it was accompanied withal. Upon the same ground our Saviour proveth the Law most reasonable, that doth forbid those crimes which Men for gain sake fall into. For a Man to win the World, if it be with the loss of his Soul, what benefit or good is it? Matth. xvi. 26. Axioms less general, yet so manifest that they need no farther proof, are such as these, *God to be worshipped; Parents to be honoured; Others to be used by us, as we ourselves would be by them.* Such things, as soon as they are alledged, all Men acknowledge to be good; they require no proof or further discourse to be assured of their goodness. Notwithstanding whatsoever such principle there is, it was at the first found out by discourse, and drawn from out of the very bowels of Heaven and Earth. For we are to note, that things in the world are to us discernable, not only so far forth as serveth for our vital preservation, but further also in a twofold higher respect. For first, if all other uses were utterly taken away; yet the Mind of Man being by nature speculative and delighted with contemplation in itself, they were to be known even for meer knowledge and understanding's sake. Yea further besides this, the knowledge of every the least thing in the world, hath in it a second peculiar benefit unto us, inasmuch as it serveth to minister Rules, Canons, and Laws for Men to direct those actions by, which we properly term human. This did the very Heathens themselves

BOOK 1. selves obscurely insinuate, by making *Themis*, which which we call *Jus* or Right, to be the Daughter of Heaven and Earth. We know things either as they are in themselves, or as they are in mutual relation one to another. The knowledge of that which Man is in reference unto himself, and other things in relation unto Man, I may justly term the Mother of all those Principles, which are as it were Edicts, Statutes and Decrees in that Law of Nature, whereby human Actions are framed. First therefore, having observed that the best things where they are not hindered, do still produce the best operations; (for which cause, where many things are to concur unto one effect, the best is in all congruity of Reason to guide the residue, that it prevailing most the work principally done by it may have greatest perfection;) when hereupon we come to observe in ourselves, of what excellency our Souls are, in comparison of our Bodies, and the diviner part in relation unto the baser of our Souls; seeing that all these concur in producing human Actions, it cannot be well, unless the chiefest do command and direct the rest. The Soul then ought to conduct the Body; and the Spirit of our Minds, the Soul. This is therefore the first Law, whereby the highest power of the Mind requireth general obedience at the hands of all the rest concurring with it unto action. Touching the several grand mandates, which being imposed by the understanding faculty of the Mind must be obeyed by the Will of Man, they are by the same method found out, whether they import our duty towards God or towards Man. Touching the one, I may not here stand to open, by what degrees of discourse the Minds, even of meer natural Men, have attained to know, not only that there is a God, but also what power, force, wisdom, and other properties that God hath, and how all things depend on him. This being therefore presupposed, from that known relation

Arist. Polit.
i. cap. 5.

lation which God hath unto us * as unto Children, BOOK I.
 and unto all good things as unto effects, whereof
 himself is the ‡ principal Cause, these Axioms and
 Laws natural concerning our duty have arisen. || *That*
in all things we go about, his aid is by prayer to be
craved: § That he cannot have sufficient honour done
unto him, but the uttermost of that we can do to honour
him, we must; which is in effect the same that we
read, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy Deut. vi. 5.
heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy mind.
 Which Law our Saviour doth term, *The first, and* Matt. xxii.
the great Commandment. Touching the next, which, 38.
 as our Saviour addeth, is like unto this (he meaneth
 in amplitude and largeness, in as much as it is the
 Root out of which all Laws of duty to Men-ward
 have grown, as out of the former all Offices of
 Religion towards God) the like natural inducement
 hath brought Men to know that it is their duty no
 less to love others than themselves. For seeing those
 things which are equal must needs all have one mea-
 sure; if I cannot but wish to receive all good, even
 as much at every Man's hand as any Man can wish
 unto his own Soul, how should I look to have any
 part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be
 careful to satisfy the like desire which is undoubtedly
 in other Men, we all being of one and the same na-
 ture? To have any thing offered to them repugnant
 to this desire, must needs in all respects grieve them
 as much as me: so that if I do harm, I must look
 to suffer; there being no reason that others should
 shew greater measure of love to me, than they have
 by me shewed unto them. My desire therefore to
 be loved of my equals in nature as much as possible

* Οὐδεὶς Θεὸς δύναται ἀνθρώποις. Plat. in Theat.

‡ "Ὅτι γὰρ Θεὸς δοκεῖ τὸ αἰτίον πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή τις. Arist. Metaph. lib. 1. cap. 2.

|| 'Αλλ' ὡς Σώκρατες τῆτο γε δὲ πάντες ὅσοι καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ σωφροσύνης μετέχουσιν, ἐπὶ πάσῃ ὀρεμῇ καὶ μικρῇ ἢ μεγάλῃ πράγματι θεὸν αἰεὶ καλεῖσιν. Plat. in Tim.

§ Arist. Ethic. lib. 8. cap. ult.

BOOK I. may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to them-ward fully the like affection. From which relation of equality between ourselves, and them that are as ourselves, what several Rules and Canons natural Reason hath drawn for direction of Life no Man is ignorant; as namely, * *That because we would take no harm, we must therefore do none; That sith we would not be in any thing extremely dealt with, we must ourselves avoid all extremity in our dealings; That from all violence and wrong we are utterly to abstain,* with such like; which further to waste in would be tedious, and to our present purpose not altogether so necessary, seeing that on these two general heads already mentioned all other specialities are dependant. ‡ Wherefore the natural measure whereby to judge our doings, is the sentence of Reason determining and setting down what is good to be done. Which sentence is either mandatory, shewing what must be done; or else permissive, declaring only what may be done; or thirdly, admonitory, opening what is the most convenient for us to do. The first taketh place where the comparison doth stand altogether between doing and not doing of one thing, which in itself is absolutely good or evil; as it had been for Joseph to yield or not to yield to the impotent desire of his lewd Mistress, the one evil, the other good simply. The second is when of divers things evil, all being not evitable, we are permitted to take one; which one, saving only in case of so great urgency, were not otherwise to be taken; as in the matter of Divorce amongst the Jews. The last, when of divers things good,

Gen. xxxix.
9.

Mark x. 4.

* Quod quis in se approbat, in alio reprobare non posse. Lib. in arenam C. de inof. test. Quod quisque juris in alium statuerit, ipsum quoque eodem uti debere. Lib. quod quisque. Ab omni penitus injuria atque vi abstinendum. Lib. 1. sect. 1. Quod vi, aut clam.

‡ Matth. xxii. 40. On these two Commandments hangeth the whole Law.

one

one is principal and most eminent; as in their act who sold their possessions and laid the price at the Apostles' feet; which possessions they might have retained unto themselves without sin: again, in the Apostle St. Paul's own choice, to maintain himself by his own labour; whereas in living by the Church's maintenance, as others did, there had been no offence committed. In Goodness therefore there is a latitude or extent, whereby it cometh to pass that even of good actions some are better than other some; whereas otherwise one Man could not excel another, but all should be either absolutely good, as hitting jump that indivisible point or centre wherein Goodness consisteth; or else missing it, they should be excluded out of the number of well-doers. Degrees of well-doing there could be none, except perhaps in the seldomness and oftenness of doing well. But the nature of Goodness being thus ample, a Law is properly that which Reason in such sort defineth to be good that it must be done. And the Law of Reason or human Nature is that which Men by discourse of natural Reason have rightly found out themselves to be all forever bound unto in their actions. Laws of Reason have these marks to be known by: such as keep them resemble most lively in their voluntary actions that very manner of working which Nature herself doth necessarily observe in the course of the whole world. The works of Nature are all behoveful, beautiful, without superfluity or defect; even so their's, if they be framed according to that which the Law of Reason teacheth. Secondly, Those Laws are investigable by Reason, without the help of Revelation, supernatural and divine. Finally, In such sort they are investigable, that the knowledge of them is general, the World hath always been acquainted with them; according to that which one in Sophocles observeth, concerning

BOOK I.

Acts iv. 37.

& v. 4.

2 Thess. iii.

8.

BOOK I. ing a branch of this Law : * *It is no Child of to-day's, or yesterday's birth, but hath been no Man knoweth how long sithence.* It is not agreed upon by one, or two, or few, but by all. Which we may not so understand, as if every particular Man in the whole world did know and confess whatsoever the Law of Reason doth contain : but this Law is such, that being proposed, no Man can reject it as unreasonable and unjust. Again, there is nothing in it, but any Man (having natural perfection of wit, and ripeness of judgment) may by labour and travail find out. And to conclude, the general Principles thereof are such, as it is not easy to find Men ignorant of them. Law rational therefore, which Men commonly use to call the Law of Nature, meaning thereby the Law which human Nature knoweth itself in reason universally bound unto, which also for that cause may be termed, most fitly, the Law of Reason ; this Law, I say, comprehendeth all those things which Men by the light of their natural understanding evidently know, or at leastwise may know, to be becoming or unbecoming, virtuous or vicious, good or evil for them to do. Now, although it be true, which some have said, that whatsoever is done amiss, the Law of Nature and Reason thereby is transgressed, because even those Offences which are by their special qualities breaches of supernatural Laws, do also, for that they are generally evil, violate in general that Principle of Reason, which willeth universally to fly from evil ; yet do we not therefore so far extend the Law of Reason, as to contain in it all manner of Laws whereunto reasonable Creatures are bound, but (as hath been shewed) we restrain it to those only duties, which all Men by force of natural wit, either do, or might understand to be such duties as concern all Men.

* Οὐ γάρ τι νῦν τε, καὶ χθὲς, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ποτε Ζῆ τῶτο, καὶ ἔδειξ' οἶδεν ἔστι φάνη. Soph. Ant.

* *Certain half-waking Men there are (as St. Augustine noteth) who neither altogether asleep in folly, nor yet thoroughly awake in the light of true understanding, have thought that there is not at all any thing just or righteous in itself; but look wherewith Nations are inured, the same they take to be right and just. Whereupon their conclusion is, That seeing each sort of People hath a different kind of right from other, and that which is right of its own nature, must be every where one and the same; therefore in itself there is nothing right. These good folks (saith he, that I may not trouble their wits with the rehearsal of too many things) have not looked so far into the World as to perceive that, Do as thou wouldst be done unto, is a sentence which all Nations under heaven are agreed upon. Refer this sentence to the Love of God, and it extinguisheth all heinous crimes: refer it to the Love of thy Neighbour, and all grievous wrongs it banisheth out of the World. Wherefore, as touching the Law of Reason, this was (it seemeth) St. Augustine's judgment; namely, that there are in it some things which stand as Principles universally agreed upon; and that out of those Principles which are in themselves evident, the greatest moral Duties we owe towards God and Man may without any great difficulty be concluded. If then it be here demanded by what means it should come to pass (the greatest part of the Law moral being so easy for all Men to know) that so many thousands of Men notwithstanding have been ignorant, even of principal moral Duties, not imagining the breach of them to be sin; I deny not but lewd and wicked custom, beginning perhaps at the first amongst few, afterwards spreading into greater multitudes, and so continuing from time to time, may*

BOOK I.
Th. I, 2. q.
94. art. 3.

* Omnia peccata sunt in universum contra rationem et naturæ legem. Aug. de Civit. Dei, l. 12. cap. 1. Omne vitium naturæ nocet, ac per hoc contra naturam est. De Doc. Chr. lib. 3. cap. 14.

BOOK I.

be of force even in plain things, to smother the light of natural understanding, because Men will not bend their wits to examine whether things wherewith they have been accustomed be good or evil. For example sake, that groffer kind of heathenish Idolatry, whereby they worshipped the very works of their own hands, was an absurdity to Reason so palpable, that the Prophet David comparing Idols and Idolaters together, making almost no odds between them, but the one in a manner as much without wit and sense as the other; *they that make them are like unto them, and so are all that trust in them.* That wherein an Idolater doth seem so absurd and foolish, is by the wise Man thus exprest, *He is not ashamed to speak unto that which hath no life: He calleth on him that is weak, for health: He prayeth for life unto him which is dead: Of him which hath no experience, he requireth help: For his journey he sueth to him which is not able to go: For gain, and work, and success in his affairs he seeketh furtherance of him that hath no manner of power.* The cause of which senseless stupidity, is afterwards imputed to custom. *When a Father mourneth grievously for his Son that was taken away suddenly, he made an image for him that was once dead, whom now he worshippeth as a God, ordaining to his servants Ceremonies and Sacrifices.* Thus by process of time this wicked custom prevailed and was kept as a Law; the authority of Rulers, the ambition of Craftsmen, and such like means, thrusting forward the ignorant and encreasing their superstition. Unto this which the wise Man hath spoken somewhat besides may be added. For whatsoever we may have hitherto taught, or shall hereafter, concerning the force of Man's natural understanding, this we always desire withal to be understood, that there is no kind of faculty or power in Man or any other Creature which can rightly perform the functions allotted to it without perpetual aid and concurrence of that supreme Cause of all things. The benefit whereof as oft as we

Psal. cxxxv.
18.

Wisd. xiii.
17.

Wisd. xiv.
12.

cause

cause God in his justice to withdraw, there can no other thing follow than that which the Apostle noteth, even Men endued with the Light of Reason to walk notwithstanding *in the vanity of their mind,* Ephef. iv. 17. *having their cogitations darkened, and being strangers from the Life of God, through the ignorance which is in them, because of the hardness of their hearts.* And this cause is mentioned by the Prophet Ifaiah, speaking of the ignorance of Idolaters who see not how the manifest Law of Reason condemneth their gross iniquity and sin; they have not in them, saith he, so much wit as to think, *Shall I bow to the stock of a tree?* Isa. xliv. 18, 19. *All knowledge and understanding is taken from them; for God hath shut their eyes that they cannot see.* That which we say in this case of Idolatry serveth for all other things, wherein the like kind of general blindness hath prevailed against the manifest Laws of Reason. Within the compass of which Laws we do not only comprehend whatsoever may easily be known to belong to the duty of all Men, but even whatsoever may possibly be known to be of that quality, so that the same be by necessary consequence deduced out of clear and manifest principles. For if once we descend unto probable collections what is convenient for Men, we are then in the territory where free and arbitrary Determinations, the territory where human Laws take place, which Laws are after to be considered.

9. Now the due observation of this Law which Reason teacheth us cannot but be effectual unto their great good that observe the same. For we see the whole World and each part thereof so compacted, that as long as each thing performeth only that work which is natural unto it, it thereby preserveth both other things and also itself. Contrariwise, let any principal thing, as the Sun, the Moon, any one of the Heavens or Elements, but once cease, or fail, or swerve,

The benefit of keeping that Law which Reason teacheth.

BOOK I. swerve, and who doth not easily conceive that the sequel thereof would be ruin both to itself and whatsoever dependeth on it? And is it possible, that Man being not only the noblest Creature in the World, but even a very World in himself, his transgressing the Law of his Nature should draw no manner of harm after it? Yes, *Tribulation and anguish unto every soul that doth evil.* Good doth follow unto all things by observing the course of their nature, and on the contrary side evil by not observing it; but not unto natural Agents that good which we call Reward, not that evil which we properly term Punishment. The reason whereof is, because amongst Creatures in this World, only Man's observation of the Law of his Nature is Righteousness, only Man's transgression Sin. And the reason of this is, the difference in his manner of observing or transgressing the Law of his Nature. He doth not otherwise than voluntarily the one, or the other. What we do against our wills, or constrainedly, we are not properly said to do it, because the motive cause of doing it is not in ourselves, but carrieth us (as if the wind should drive a feather in the air) we no whit furthering that whereby we are driven. In such cases therefore the evil which is done moveth compassion. Men are pitied for it, as being rather miserable in such respect than culpable. Some things are likewise done by Man, though not through outward force and impulsion, though not against, yet without their Wills; as in alienation of Mind, or any the like inevitable utter absence of Wit and Judgment. For which cause, no Man did ever think the hurtful actions of furious Men and Innocents to be punishable. Again, some things we do neither against nor without, and yet not simply and meerly with our Wills, but with our Wills in such sort moved, that albeit there be no impossibility but that we might, nevertheless we are not so easily able to do otherwise. In this consideration, one evil deed

deed is made more pardonable, than another. Fi- BOOK I.
nally, that which we do being evil, is notwithstand-
ing by so much more pardonable, by how much the
exigence of so doing, or the difficulty of doing other-
wise, is greater; unless this necessity or difficulty
have originally risen from ourselves. It is no excuse
therefore unto him, who being drunk committeth in-
cest, and alledgeth that his wits were not his own;
inasmuch as himself might have chosen, whether his
wits should by that means have been taken from him.
Now Rewards and Punishments do always pre-
suppose something willingly done well or ill; with-
out which respect, though we may sometimes receive
good or harm, yet then the one is only a Benefit and
not a Reward, the other simply an Hurt not a Pu-
nishment. From the fundry dispositions of Man's
Will, which is the root of all his Actions, there grow-
eth variety in the sequel of Rewards and Punish-
ments, which are by these and the like rules mea-
sured: * *Take away the Will, and all acts are equal:*
That which we do not, and would do, is commonly ac-
cepted as done. By these and the like rules, Men's
Actions are determined of and judged, whether they
be in their own nature rewardable or punishable.
Rewards and Punishments are not received, but at
the hands of such as being above us have power to
examine and judge our deeds. How Men come to
have this authority one over another in external Ac-
tions, we shall more diligently examine in that which
followeth. But for this present so much all do ac-
knowledge, that sith every Man's heart and con-
science doth in good or evil, even secretly commit-
ted and known to none but itself, either like or dis-
allow itself, and accordingly either rejoice, very Na-
ture exulting, as it were, in certain hope of Reward,
or else grieve, as it were, in a sense of future Punish-

* Voluntate sublatâ, omnem actum parem esse. lib. fœdissi-
mam, de adult. Bonam voluntatem plerumque pro facto repu-
tari. l. si quis in Testament.

BOOK I. ment ; neither of which can in this case be looked for from any other, saving only from him who discerneth and judgeth the very secrets of all hearts : therefore he is the only Rewarder and Revenger of all such actions ; although not of such actions only, but of all, whereby the Law of Nature is broken whereof himself is Author.† For which cause, the Roman Laws, called The Laws of the Twelve Tables, requiring offices of inward affection which the eye of Man cannot reach unto, threaten the neglecters of them with none but divine punishment.

How Reason doth lead Men unto the making of human Laws, whereby politick Societies are governed, and to Agreement about Laws whereby the Fellowship or Communion of independent Society standeth.

10. That which hitherto we have set down, is (I hope) sufficient to shew their brutishness, which imagine that Religion and Virtue are only as Men will account of them ; that we might make as much account, if we would, of the contrary, without any harm unto ourselves, and that in nature they are as indifferent one as the other. We see then how Nature itself teacheth Laws and Statutes to live by. * The Laws, which have been hitherto mentioned, do bind Men absolutely, even as they are Men, although they have never any settled fellowship, never any solemn agreement amongst themselves what to do, or not to do. But forasmuch as we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with competent store of things needful for such a life as our nature doth desire, a life fit for the dignity of Man ; therefore to supply those defects and imperfections which are in us living single and solely by ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek Communion and Fellowship with others. This was the cause of Men's uniting themselves at the first in politick Societies, which Societies could not be without Government, nor Government without a distinct kind of Law from

† Divos cassè adeunto, pietatem adhibento : qui secus faxit, Deus ipse vindex erit.

* "Ἔστι γὰρ ὁ μανιεύονταί τι πάντες φύσει κοινὸν δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον, καὶ μηδεμίαν κοινωνίαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἢ μηδὲ συνθήκη. Arist. Rhet. 1.

that

that which hath been already declared. Two Foun-BOOK I.
dations there are which bear up publick Societies ;
the one, a natural Inclination whereby all Men
desire sociable life and fellowship ; the other, an Order
expresly or secretly agreed upon touching the manner
of their union in living together. The latter is that
which we call the Law of a Commonweal, the very
Soul of a politick Body, the parts whereof are by
Law animated, held together, and set on work in
such actions as the common good requireth. Laws
politick, ordained for external Order and Regiment
amongst Men, are never framed as they should be,
unless presuming the Will of Man to be inwardly
obstinate, rebellious, and averse from all obedience
unto the sacred Laws of his Nature : in a word, unless
presuming Man to be in regard of his depraved
mind, little better than a wild beast, they do accord-
ingly provide notwithstanding so to frame his out-
ward actions that they be no hindrance unto the
common good for which Societies are instituted ;
unless they do this, they are not perfect. It resteth
therefore, that we consider how Nature findeth out
such Laws of Government as serve to direct even
Nature depraved to a right end. All Men desire to
lead in this World an happy life : that life is led
most happily, wherein all Virtue is exercised without
impediment or let. The Apostle in exhorting Men 1 Tim vi. 8.
to contentment, although they have in this World
no more than very bare food and raiment, giveth us
thereby to understand, that those are even the lowest
of things necessary ; that if we should be stripped of
all those things without which we might possibly be,
yet these must be left ; that destitution in these is
such an impediment, as till it be removed suffereth
not the Mind of Man to admit any other care. For
this cause first God assigned Adam maintenance of Gen. i. 29,
life, and then appointed him a Law to observe : for & ii. 17, &
this cause after Men began to grow to a number, the iv. 2, 26.
first thing we read they gave themselves unto was the
tilling

BOOK I. tilling of the Earth and the feeding of Cattle. Having by this means whereon to live, the principal actions of their life afterward are noted by the exercise of their Religion. True it is, that the Kingdom of God must be the first thing in our purposes and desires. But inasmuch as a righteous life presupposeth life; inasmuch as to live virtuously it is impossible except we live; therefore the first impediment which naturally we endeavour to remove is penury and want of things without which we cannot live: Unto life many implements are necessary; more if we seek (as all Men naturally do) such a life as hath in it joy, comfort, delight and pleasure. To this end we see how quickly fundry Arts mechanical were found out in the very prime of the World. As things of greatest necessity are always first provided for, so things of greatest dignity are most accounted of by all such as judge rightly. Although therefore riches be a thing which every Man wisheth, yet no Man of judgment can esteem it better to be rich, than wise, virtuous, and religious. If we be both, or either of these, it is not because we are so born: for into the World we come as empty of the one as of the other, as naked in Mind as we are in Body. Both which necessities of Man had at the first no other helps and supplies than only domestical; such as that which the Prophet implieth, saying, *Can a Mother forget her Child?* such as that which the Apostle mentioneth, saying, *He that careth not for his own is worse than an Infidel:* such as that concerning Abraham, *Abraham will command his Sons and his household after him, that they keep the way of the Lord.* But neither that which we learn of ourselves, nor that which others teach us can prevail, where wickedness and malice have taken deep root. If therefore, when there was but as yet one only Family in the World, no means of instruction, human or divine, could prevent effusion of blood; how could it be chosen but that when Families were multiplied and encreased upon

upon earth ; after separation, each providing for BOOK I.
itself, envy, strife, contention, and violence, must
grow amongst them ? For hath not Nature furnish-
ed Man with wit and valour, as it were, with
armour, which may be used as well unto extreme
evil as good ? Yea, were they not used by the rest of
the World unto evil ? Unto the contrary only by
Seth, Enoch, and those few the rest in that line ? Gen. vi. 5.
We all make complaint of the iniquity of our times, Gen. v.
not unjustly, for the days are evil : but compare
them with those times wherein there were no civil
Societies, with those times wherein there was as
yet no manner of publick Regiment established,
with those times wherein there were not above
eight righteous Persons living upon the face of
the earth ; and we have surely good cause to think 2 Pet. ii. 5.
that God hath blessed us exceedingly, and hath made
us behold most happy days. To take away all such
mutual grievances, injuries and wrongs, there was
no way but only by growing unto composition and
agreement amongst themselves, by ordaining some
kind of Government publick, and by yielding them-
selves subject thereunto ; that unto whom they grant-
ed authority to rule or govern, by them the peace,
tranquility, and happy estate of the rest might be
procured. Men always knew, that when force and
injury was offered they might be defenders of them-
selves ; they knew that howsoever Men may seek
their own commodity, yet if this were done with
injury unto others it was not to be suffered, but by
all Men, and by all good means to be withstood ;
finally, they knew that no Man might in reason take
upon him to determine his own right, and according
to his own determination proceed in maintenance
thereof, inasmuch as every Man is towards himself,
and them whom he greatly affecteth, partial : and
therefore that strifes and troubles would be endless,
except they gave their common consent all to be or-

Rdered

BOOK I. dered by some whom they should agree upon. Without which consent there were no reason that one Man should take upon him to be Lord or Judge over another; because, although there be according to the opinion of some very great and judicious men, a kind of natural right in the noble, wise, and virtuous, to govern them which are of servile disposition; nevertheless, for manifestation of this their right, and Men's more peaceable contentment on both sides, the assent of them who are to be governed seemeth necessary. To Fathers within their private Families, Nature hath given a supreme Power; for which cause we see throughout the World, even from the foundation thereof, all Men have ever been taken as Lords and lawful Kings in their own Houses. Howbeit, over a whole grand Multitude, having no such dependency upon any one, and consisting of so many Families as every politick Society in the World doth; impossible it is that any should have complete lawful Power but by consent of Men, or immediate appointment of God; because not having the natural superiority of Fathers, their Power must needs be either usurped, and then unlawful; or if lawful, then either granted or consented unto by them over whom they exercise the same, or else given extraordinarily from God unto whom all the World is subject. It is no improbable opinion therefore which the Arch-philosopher was of, that as the chiefeſt Person in every Household was always as it were a King, so when numbers of Households joined themselves in civil Societies together, Kings were the first kind of Governours amongst them. Which is also (as it seemeth) the reason why the name of Father continued still in them, who of Fathers were made Rulers; as also the ancient custom of Governours to do as Melchisedeck, and being Kings to exercise the office of Priests, which Fathers did at the first, grew perhaps by the same occasion:

Arist. Polit.
lib. iii and
iv.

Arist. Polit.
lib. i. cap. 3.
Vide et Platonem
in iii. de legibus.

occasion: howbeit, this is not the only kind of Regiment that hath been received in the World. The inconveniencies of one kind have caused fundry other to be devised. So that, in a word, all publick Regiment, of what kind soever, seemeth evidently to have risen from deliberate advice, consultation, and composition between Men, judging it convenient and behoveful; there being no impossibility in Nature considered by itself, but that Men might have lived without any publick Regiment. Howbeit, the corruption of our nature being presupposed, we may not deny, but that the Law of Nature doth now require of necessity some kind of Regiment; so that to bring things unto the first course they were in, and utterly to take away all kind of publick Government in the World, were apparently to overturn the whole World. The case of Man's nature standing therefore as it doth, some kind of Regiment the Law of Nature doth require; yet the kinds thereof being many, Nature tyeth not to any one, but leaveth the choice as a thing arbitrary. At the first, when some certain kind of Regiment was once approved, it may be that nothing was then further thought upon for the manner of governing, but all permitted unto their wisdom and discretion which were to rule; * till by experience they found this for all parts very inconvenient, so as the thing which they had devised for a remedy did indeed but increase the fore which it should have cured. They saw that to live by one Man's will became the cause of all

* Cum premeretur initio multitudo ab iis qui majores opes habebant, ad unum aliquem confugiebant virtute præstantem; qui cum prohiberet injuriâ tenuiores, æquitate constituendâ summus cum infimis pari jure retinebat. Cum id minus contingeret, leges sunt inventæ. Cic. Offic. lib. 2. Τὸ γονέας τιμᾶν καὶ φίλους εἰποιεῖν, καὶ ταῖς εὐεργέταις χάριν ἀποδιδόναι, ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς ὅμοιαι ἐπιδείκναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οἱ γεγραμμένοι νόμοι ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἀγράφῳ καὶ κοινῷ νόμῳ νομίζεσθαι. Arist. Rhet. ad Alex.

BOOK I. Men's misery. This constrained them to come unto
 ——— Laws, wherein all Men might see their duties before-
 hand; and know the penalties of transgressing them.
 † If things be simply good or evil, and withal uni-
 versally so acknowledged, there needs no new Law
 to be made for such things. The first kind therefore
 of things appointed by Laws human containeth
 whatsoever being in itself naturally good or evil, is not-
 withstanding more secret than that it can be discerned
 by every Man's present conceit, without some deeper
 discourse and judgment. In which discourse, because
 there is difficulty and possibility many ways to err,
 unless such things were set down by Laws, many
 would be ignorant of their duties, which now are
 not; and many that know what they should do
 would nevertheless dissemble it, and to excuse them-
 selves pretend ignorance and simplicity, which now
 they cannot. And because the greatest part of Men
 are such as prefer their own private good before all
 things; even that good which is sensual before what-
 soever is most divine: and for that the labour of doing
 good, together with the pleasure arising from the con-
 trary, doth make Men for the most part slower to the
 one and proner to the other, than that duty prescribed
 them by Law can prevail sufficiently with them:
 therefore unto Laws that Men do make for the bene-
 fit of Men, it hath seemed always needful to add
 Rewards, which may more allure unto good than
 any hardness deterreth from it; and Punishments,
 which may more deter from evil than any sweetness
 thereto allureth. Wherein as the generality is natu-
 ral, Virtue rewardable, and Vice punishable; so the
 particular determination of the Reward and Punish-
 ment belongeth unto them by whom Laws are made.
 Theft is naturally punishable, but the kind of

† Tanta est enim vis voluptatum, ut et ignorantiam protulit
 in occasionem, et conscientiam corrumpat in dissimulationem.
 Tertul. lib. de spectacul.

punishment is positive; and such lawful as Men BOOK I.
shall think with discretion convenient by Law to ap-
point. In Laws, that which is natural bindeth uni-
versally; that which is positive, not so. To let go
those positive kind of Laws which Men impose upon
themselves, as by vow unto God, contract with
Men, or such like; somewhat it will make unto our
purpose, a little more fully to consider what things
are incident unto the making of the positive Laws for
the government of them that live united in publick
Society. Laws do not only teach what is good, but
they enjoin it, they have in them a certain constrain-
ing force; and to constrain Men unto any thing in-
convenient, doth seem unreasonable. Most requisite
therefore it is, that to devise Laws which all Men
shall be forced to obey, none but wise Men be
admitted. Laws are matters of principal conse-
quence; Men of common capacity, and but ordinary
judgment, are not able (for how should they?) to
discern what things are fittest for each kind and state
of Regiment. We cannot be ignorant how much
our obedience unto Laws dependeth upon this point.
Let a Man, though never so justly, oppose himself
unto them that are disordered in their ways, and
what one among them commonly doth not stomach
at such contradiction, storm at reproof, and hate
such as would reform them? Notwithstanding, even
they which brook it worst that Men should tell them
of their duties, when they are told the same by a
Law think very well and reasonably of it. For why?
They presume that the Law doth speak with all in-
differency; that the Law hath no side respect to their
persons; that the Law is as it were an Oracle pro-
ceeding from Wisdom and Understanding. Howbeit,
Laws do not take their constraining force from the
Quality of such as devise them, but from that Power
which doth give them the strength of Laws. That
which we spake before concerning the Power of
Government,

BOOK I. Government, must here be applied unto the Power of making Laws whereby to govern, which Power God hath over all ; and by the natural Law, whereunto he hath made all subject, the lawful Power of making Laws to command whole politick Societies of Men belongeth so properly unto the same entire Societies, that for any Prince or Potentate of what kind soever upon earth to exercise the same of himself, and not either by express commission immediately and personally received from God, or else by authority derived at the first from their consent upon whose persons they impose Laws, it is no better than meer tyranny. Laws they are not therefore which publick approbation hath not made so. But approbation not only they give who personally declare their assent, by voice, sign, or act ; but also when others do it in their names, by right originally, at the least, derived from them. As in Parliaments, Councils, and the like Assemblies, although we be not personally ourselves present, notwithstanding our assent is by reason of other agents there in our behalf. And what we do by others, no reason but that it should stand as our deed, no less effectually to bind us than if ourselves had done it in person. In many things assent is given, they that give it not imagining they do so because the manner of their assenting is not apparent. As for example, when an absolute Monarch commandeth his Subjects that which seemeth good in his own discretion ; hath not his Edict the force of a Law whether they approve or dislike it ? Again, that which hath been received long sithence, and is by custom now established, we keep as a Law which we may not transgress ; yet, what consent was ever thereunto sought or required at our hands ? Of this point therefore we are to note, that sith Men naturally have no full and perfect power to command whole politick Multitudes of Men ; therefore, utterly without our consent, we
could

could in such sort be at no Man's commandment BOOK I.
 living. And to be commanded we do consent, when
 that Society whereof we are part hath at any time
 before consented, without revoking the same after
 by the like universal agreement. Wherefore, as any
 Man's deed past is good as long as himself continu-
 eth; so the act of a publick Society of Men done
 five hundred years sithence, standeth as theirs who
 presently are of the same Societies, because Corpora-
 tions are immortal; we were then alive in our Pre-
 decessors, and they in their Successors do live still.
 Laws therefore human of what kind soever, are
 available by consent. If here it be demanded, how
 it comes to pass that this being common unto all
 Laws which are made, there should be found even
 in good Laws so great variety as there is? We must
 note the reason hereof to be, the fundry particular
 ends whereunto the different disposition of that sub-
 ject or matter for which Laws are provided, causeth
 them to have a special respect in making Laws. A
 Law there is mentioned amongst the Grecians, Arist. Polit.
lib. ii. cap.
ult.
 whereof Pittacus is reported to have been Author;
 and by that Law it was agreed, that he which being
 overcome with drink did then strike any Man, should
 suffer punishment double as much as if he had done
 the same being sober. No Man could ever have
 thought this reasonable that had intended thereby
 only to punish the injury committed according to the
 gravity of the fact: for who knoweth not, that
 harm advisedly done, is naturally less pardonable,
 and therefore worthy of sharper punishment? But
 forasmuch as none did so usually this way offend as
 Men in that case, which they wittingly fell into,
 even because they would be so much the more freely
 outrageous; it was for their publick good, where
 such disorder was grown, to frame a positive Law
 for remedy thereof accordingly. To this appertain
 those known Laws of making Laws; as that Law-
 makers

BOOK I. makers must have an eye to that place where, and to the Men amongst whom; that one kind of Laws cannot serve for all kind of Regiment; that where the Multitude beareth sway, Laws that shall tend to the preservation of that State must make common smaller Offices to go by lot, for fear of strife and division likely to arise; by reason that ordinary qualities sufficing for discharging of such Offices, they could not but by many be desired, and so with danger contended for, and not missed without grudge and discontentment; whereas at an uncertain lot, none can find themselves grieved, on whomsoever it lighteth. Contrariwise the greatest, whereof but few are capable, to pass by popular election, that neither the People may envy such as have those Honours, inasmuch as themselves bestow them, and that the chiefest may be kindled with desire to exercise all parts of rare and beneficial Virtue; knowing they shall not lose their labour by growing in fame and estimation among the People. If the Helm of chief Government be in the hands of a few of the wealthiest, that then Laws providing for continuance thereof must make the punishment of contumely and wrong offered unto any of the common sort, sharp and grievous; that so the evil may be prevented whereby the rich are most likely to bring themselves into hatred with the People, who are not wont to take so great offence when they are excluded from Honours and Offices, as when their Persons are contumeliously trodden upon. In other kinds of Regiment, the like is observed concerning the difference of positive Laws, which to be every where the same, is impossible, and against their nature. Now as the Learned in the Laws of this Land observe, that our Statutes sometimes are only the Affirmation or Ratification of that which by common Law was held before; so here it is not to be omitted, that generally all Laws human which are made for the ordering of politick Societies,

Staundf.
Pref. to the
Pleas of the
Crown.

Societies, be either such as establish some duty, whereunto all Men by the Law of Reason did before stand bound; or else such as make that a duty now, which before was none; the one sort we may for distinction sake call mixedly, and the other merely human. That which plain or necessary Reason bindeth Men unto, may be in sundry considerations expedient to be ratified by human Law. For example, if Confusion of Blood in Marriage, the Liberty of having many Wives at once, or any other the like corrupt and unreasonable Custom doth happen to have prevailed far, and to have gotten the upper hand of right Reason with the greatest part; so that no way is left to rectify such foul disorder without prescribing by Law the same things which Reason necessarily doth enforce, but is not perceived that so it doth; or if many be grown unto that which the Apostle did lament in some, concerning whom he writeth, saying, that *even what things they naturally know, in those very things, as Beasts void of Reason, they corrupted themselves*: or if there be no such special accident, yet forasmuch as the common sort are led by the sway of their sensual desires, and therefore do more shun sin for the sensible evils which follow it amongst Men than for any kind of sentence which Reason doth pronounce against it; * this very thing is cause sufficient, why duties belonging unto each kind of Virtue, albeit the Law of Reason teach them, should notwithstanding be prescribed even by human Law. Which Law in this case we term mixt, because the matter whereunto it bindeth, is the same which Reason necessarily doth require at our hands, and from the Law of Reason it differeth in the manner of binding only. For whereas Men before stood bound in conscience to do

Jud. ver. 10.

* 'Οι πολλοὶ ἀνάγκη μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ πειθαρχεῖσι καὶ ζημίαις ἢ τῷ καλῷ.
Arist. Eth. lib. x. cap. 10.

BOOK I.

as the Law of Reason teacheth ; they are now by virtue of human Law become constrainable, and if they outwardly transgress, punishable. As for Laws which are meerly human, the matter of them is any thing which Reason doth but probably teach to be fit and convenient ; so that till such time as Law hath passed amongst Men about it, of itself it bindeth no Man. One example whereof may be this ; Lands are by human Law in some places, after the Owner's decease, divided unto all his Children ; in some, all descendeth to the eldest Son. If the Law of Reason did necessarily require but the one of these two to be done, they which by Law have received the other, should be subject to that heavy sentence which denounceth against all that decree wicked, unjust and unreasonable things, Woe. Whereas now, whichever be received, there is no Law of Reason transgressed ; because there is probable reason why either of them may be expedient ; and for either of them more than probable reason there is not to be found. Laws, whether mixtly or meerly human, are made by politick Societies ; some only, as those Societies are civilly united ; some, as they are spiritually joined, and make such a body as we call the Church. Of Laws human in this latter kind, we are to speak in the third Book following. Let it therefore suffice thus far to have touched the force wherewith Almighty God hath graciously endued our Nature, and thereby enabled the same to find out both those Laws which all Men generally are forever bound to observe ; and also such as are most fit for their behoof, who lead their lives in any ordered state of Government. Now besides that Law which simply concerneth Men, as Men ; and that which belongeth unto them, as they are Men linked with others in some form of politick Society, there is a third kind of Law which toucheth all such several Bodies politick, so far forth as one of them hath publick Commerce with another. And this third is, the Law

Law of Nations. Between Men and Beasts there is no possibility of sociable Communion, because the well-spring of that Communion is a natural delight which Man hath to transfuse from himself into others, and to receive from others into himself, especially those things wherein the excellency of his kind doth most consist. The chiefest Instrument of human Communion therefore is Speech, because thereby we impart mutually one to another the conceits of our reasonable Understanding. And for that cause, seeing Beasts are not hereof capable, forasmuch as with them we can use no such conference, they being in degree, although above other Creatures on earth, to whom Nature hath denied sense, yet lower than to be sociable companions of Man, to whom Nature hath given Reason; it is of Adam said, that amongst the Beasts *he found not for himself any meet companion*. Civil Society doth more content the Nature of Man than any private kind of solitary living; because in Society this good of mutual Participation is so much larger than otherwise. Herewith notwithstanding we are not satisfied, but we covet (if it might be) to have a kind of Society and Fellowship even with all Mankind. Which thing Socrates intending to signify professed himself a Citizen not of this or that Commonwealth, but of the World. And an effect of that very natural desire in us, (a manifest token that we wish, after a sort, an universal Fellowship with all Men) appeareth by the wonderful delight Men have, some to visit foreign Countries, some to discover Nations not heard of in former ages, we all to know the affairs and dealings of other People, yea to be in league of amity with them. And this not only for traffick's sake, or to the end that when many are confederated each may make other the more strong; but for such cause also as moved the Queen of Sheba to visit Solomon; and in a word, because Nature doth presume, that how many Men there are in the World, so many Gods, as it were, there

BOOK. I.

Arist Polit.
i. cap. 2.

Gen. ii. 20.

Cic. Tusc.
v. & i. de
Legib.

1 Kings x.

1.
2 Chron. ix.

1.
Matth. xiii.

42.

Luke xi. 31.

BOOK I. there are; or at leastwise such they should be towards Men. Touching Laws which are to serve Men in this behalf; even as those Laws of Reason, which (Man retaining his original integrity) had been sufficient to direct each particular Person in all his affairs and duties, are not sufficient, but require the access of other Laws, now that Man and his Offspring are grown thus corrupt and sinful. Again, as those Laws of Polity and Regiment which would have served Men living in publick Society, together with that harmless disposition which then they should have had, are not able now to serve, when Men's iniquity is so hardly restrained within any tolerable bounds; in like manner, the national Laws of natural Commerce between Societies of that former and better quality might have been other than now, when Nations are so prone to offer violence, injury, and wrong. Hereupon hath grown in every of these three kinds that distinction between primary and secondary Laws; the one grounded upon sincere, the other built upon depraved Nature. Primary Laws of Nations are such as concern Embassage, such as belong to the courteous entertainment of Foreigners and Strangers, such as serve for commodious Traffick, and the like. Secondary Laws in the same kind, are such as this present unquiet World is most familiarly acquainted with; I mean Laws of Arms, which yet are much better known than kept. But what matter the Law of Nations doth contain I omit to search. The strength and virtue of that Law is such, that no particular Nation can lawfully prejudice the same by any their several Laws and Ordinances more, than a Man by his private resolutions the Law of the whole Commonwealth or State wherein he liveth. For as civil Law being the act of the whole Body politick, doth therefore over-rule each several part of the same Body; so there is no reason that any one Commonwealth of itself should, to the prejudice of another, annihilate that whereupon the whole

whole World hath agreed. For which cause, the BOOK I.
 Lacedæmonians forbidding all access of Strangers
 into their coasts, are in that respect both by Jose- Joseph. lib.
 phus and Theodoret deservedly blamed, as being ii. contra
 enemies to that hospitality which for common hu- Appion.
 manity's sake all the Nations on Earth should em- Theod. lib.
 brace. Now as there is great cause of Communion, ix. de fan-
 and consequently of Laws; for the maintenance of and. Græc.
 Communion amongst Nations; so amongst Nations Affect.
 Christian, the like in regard even of Christianity
 hath been always judged needful. And in this kind
 of correspondence amongst Nations the force of
 general Councils doth stand. For as one and the
 same Law divine, whereof in the next place we are
 to speak, is unto all Christian Churches a Rule for
 the chiefest things; by means whereof they all in
 that respect make one Church, as having all but
One Lord, one Faith, one Baptism; so the urgent ne- Ephes. iv. 5.
 cessity of mutual Communion for preservation of our
 Unity in these things, as also for Order in some other
 things convenient to be every where uniformly kept,
 maketh it requisite that the Church of God here on
 Earth have her Laws of spiritual Commerce be-
 tween Christian Nations; Laws, by virtue whereof
 all Churches may enjoy freely the use of those re-
 verend, religious, and sacred Consultations, which
 are termed Councils general. A thing whereof
 God's own blessed Spirit was the Author; a thing
 practised by the holy Apostles themselves; a thing Acts xv. 23.
 always afterwards kept and observed throughout the
 World; a thing never otherwise than most highly
 esteemed of, till Pride, Ambition, and Tyranny be-
 gan by factious and vile endeavours, to abuse that
 divine intention unto the furtherance of wicked pur-
 poses. But as the just authority of civil Courts and
 Parliaments is not therefore to be abolished, because
 sometimes there is cunning used to frame them ac-
 cording to the private intents of Men over-potent in
 the Commonwealth; so the grievous abuse which
 hath

BOOK I. hath been of Councils, should rather cause Men to study how so gracious a thing may again be reduced to that first perfection, than in regard of stains and blemishes, thence growing, be held forever in extreme disgrace. To speak of this matter as the cause requireth would require very long discourse. All I will presently say is this, whether it be for the finding out of any thing whereunto divine Law bindeth us, but yet in such sort, that Men are not thereof on all sides resolved; or for the setting down of some uniform judgment to stand touching such things, as being neither way matters of necessity, are notwithstanding offensive and scandalous, when there is open opposition about them; be it for the ending of strifes, touching matters of Christian Belief, wherein the one part may seem to have probable cause of dissenting from the other; or be it concerning matters of Polity, Order and Regiment in the Church; I nothing doubt but that Christian Men should much better frame themselves to those heavenly Precepts which our Lord and Saviour with so great instance gave, as concerning Peace and Unity, if we did all concur in desire to have the use of ancient Councils again renewed, rather than these proceedings continued, which either make all contentions endless, or bring them to one only determination, and that of all other the worst, which is by sword. It followeth therefore, that a new foundation being laid, we now adjoin hereunto that which cometh in the next place to be spoken of; namely, wherefore God hath himself by Scripture, made known such Laws as serve for direction of Men.

John xiv.
27.

Wherefore
God hath
by Scripture
further
made known
such super-
natural
Laws, as do
serve for
Men's di-
rection.

II. All things (God only excepted) besides the Nature which they have in themselves, receive externally some Perfection from other things, as hath been shewed. Inasmuch, as there is in the whole World no one thing great or small, but either in respect of knowledge or of use, it may unto our Perfection add somewhat. And whatsoever such Perfection

fection there is which our Nature may acquire, the BOOK I.
 same we properly term our Good ; our sovereign Good
 or Blessedness, that wherein the highest degree of all
 our Perfection consisteth, that which being once at-
 tained unto there can rest nothing further to be
 desired ; and therefore with it our Souls are fully
 content and satisfied, in that they have they rejoice,
 and thirst for no more. Wherefore of good things
 desired, some are such, that for themselves we covet
 them not, but only because they serve as instruments
 unto that for which we are to seek : of this sort, are
 Riches. Another kind there is, which although we
 desire for itself, as Health, and Virtue, and Know-
 ledge ; nevertheless, they are not the last mark
 whereat we aim, but have their further end where-
 unto they are referred : so as in them we are not sa-
 tisfied, as having attained the utmost we may, but
 our desires do still proceed. These things are linked,
 and as it were chained one to another. We labour
 to eat, and we eat to live, and we live to do good,
 and the good which we do, is as seed sown with re-
 ference unto a future harvest :* but we must come at
 length to some pause. For if every thing were to be
 desired for some other, without any stint, there could
 be no certain end proposed unto our Actions, we
 should go on we know not whither ; yea, whatsoever
 we do were in vain, or rather nothing at all were
 possible to be done. For as to take away the first
 efficient of our being were to annihilate utterly our
 persons ; so we cannot remove the last final cause
 of our working, but we shall cause whatsoever we
 work to cease. Therefore something there must be
 desired for itself simply, and for no other : that is
 simply for itself desirable, unto the nature whereof
 it is opposite and repugnant to be desired with rela-
 tion unto any other. The Ox and the Ass desire

* Gal. vi. 8. He that soweth to the Spirit, shall of the Spirit
 reap Life everlasting.

BOOK I.

Vide Arist.
Ethic. lib.
x. c. 10.
and Metaph.
I. xii. c. 6.
and c. 4. and
c. 30.

their food, neither propose they unto themselves any end wherefore ; so that of them this is desired for itself. But why ? By reason of their imperfection, which cannot otherwise desire it ; whereas that which is desired simply for itself, the excellency thereof is such as permitteth it not in any sort to be referred unto a further end. Now that which Man doth desire, with reference to a further end, the same he desireth in such measure as is unto that end convenient ; but what he coveteth as good in itself, towards that, his desire is ever infinite. So that unless the last Good of all, which is desired altogether for itself, be also infinite, we do evil in making it our end ; even as they who placed their felicity in wealth, or honour, or pleasure, or any thing here attained, because in desiring any thing as our final perfection which is not so, we do amiss. Nothing may be infinitely desired, but that Good which indeed is infinite : for the better, the more desirable ; that therefore is most desirable wherein there is infinity of Goodness : so that if any thing desirable may be infinite, that must needs be the highest of all things that are desired. No good is infinite but only God ; therefore he is our felicity and bliss. Moreover, desire tendeth unto union with that it desireth. If then in him we be blessed, it is by force of participation and conjunction with him. Again, it is not the possession of any good thing can make them happy which have it, unless they enjoy the things wherewith they are possessed. Then are we happy therefore, when fully we enjoy God as an object wherein the powers of our Souls are satisfied even with everlasting delight : so that although we be Men, yet by being unto God united, we live as it were the Life of God. Happiness therefore is that estate whereby we attain, so far as possibly may be attained, the full possession of that which simply for itself is to be desired, and containeth in it after an eminent sort the contentation of our desires, the highest degree of all
our

our perfection. Of such perfection capable we are BOOK I.
 not in this life. For while we are in the World we
 are subject unto fundry *imperfections, grief of
 Body, defects of Mind ; yea, the best things we do are
 painful, and the exercise of them grievous, being
 continued without intermission ; so as in those very
 actions whereby we are especially perfected in this
 life, we are not able to persist ; forced we are with
 very weariness, and that often, to interrupt them :
 which tediousness cannot fall into those operations
 that are in the state of blifs, when our union with
 God is compleat. Compleat union with him must
 be according unto every power and faculty of our
 Minds, apt to receive so glorious an object. Capable
 we are of God, both by Understanding and Will : by
 Understanding, as he is that sovereign Truth which
 comprehends the rich treasures of all Wisdom : by
 Will, as he is that sea of Goodness whereof who so
 tasteth shall thirst no more. As the Will doth now
 work upon that object by desire, which is as it were
 a motion towards the end as yet unobtained, so like-
 wise upon the same hereafter received it shall work
 also by Love. *Appetitus inbiantis fit amor fruentis,* Aug. de
 saith St. Augustine. *The longing disposition of them that* Trin. lib. ix.
thirst, is changed into the sweet affection of them that c. ult.
taste, and are replenished. Whereas we now love the
 thing that is good, but good especially in respect of
 benefit unto us ; we shall then love the thing that is
 good, only or principally for the goodness of beauty
 in itself. The Soul being in this sort as it is active,
 perfected by love of that infinite Good, shall, as it
 is receptive, be also perfected with those supernatu-
 ral passions of Joy, Peace, and Delight. All this

* Μόνον ὃ Ἀσκηλήπια τὸ ὄνομα τῆ ἀγαθῆ ἐν ἀνθρώποις· τὸ ἔργον ὕδαμῃ.
 Τὸ μὴ λίαν κακὸν, ἐνθάδε τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν. Τὸ δὲ ἐνθάδε ἀγαθὸν, μόριον τοῦ
 καλοῦ τὸ ἐλάχιστον. Ἀδύνατον οὖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐνθάδε καθαρεύειν τῆς κακίας,
 καὶ γὰρ ἡ χάριν ἔχω τῷ θεῷ τῷ εἰς νῦν μοι βαλόντι περὶ τῆ γνώσεως τῆ ἀλαθῆς,
 ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἐστὶν αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ εἶναι· ὁ γὰρ κόσμος πλῆρωμά ἐστι τῆς
 κακίας, ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἀγαθός, ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν θεός. Merc. Trif.

BOOK I. endless and everlasting. Which perpetuity, in re-
 gard whereof our blessedness is termed *a Crown which*
withereth not, doth neither depend upon the nature
 of the thing itself, nor proceed from any natural ne-
 cessity that our Souls should so exercise themselves
 for ever in beholding and loving God, but from the
 Will of God, which doth both freely perfect our
 nature in so high a degree, and continue it so per-
 fected. Under Man, no Creature in the World is
 capable of felicity and bliss. First, because their
 chiefest perfection consisteth in that which is best for
 them, but not in that which is simply best, as ours
 doth. Secondly, because whatsoever external per-
 fection they tend unto, it is not better than them-
 selves, as ours is. How just occasion have we there-
 fore, even in this respect, with the Prophet to admire
 the goodness of God? Lord, what is Man, that thou
 shouldst exalt him above the works of thy hands, so
 far as to make thyself the inheritance of his rest,
 and the substance of his felicity? Now, if Men
 had not naturally this desire to be happy, how were
 it possible that all Men should have it? All Men
 have. Therefore this desire in Man is natural. It
 is not in our power not to do the same; how should
 it then be in our power to do it coldly or remissly?
 So that our desire being natural, is also in that de-
 gree of earnestness whereunto nothing can be added.
 And is it probable that God should frame the hearts
 of all Men so desirous of that which no Man may
 obtain? It is an axiom of Nature, that natural de-
 sire cannot utterly be frustrate. This desire of ours
 being natural should be frustrate, if that which may
 satisfy the same were a thing impossible for Man to
 aspire unto. Man doth seek a triple Perfection;
 first, a sensual, consisting in those things which very
 life itself requireth as necessary supplements, or as

2 Tim. iv.
8.
1 Pet. i. 4.

Psal. viii.

Comment.
in Præm. ii.
Metaph.

Matth. xxv. The just shall go into life everlasting. Matth.
xxii. They shall be as the Angels of God.

beauties

beauties and ornaments thereof; then an intellectual, BOOK I.
 consisting in those things which none underneath
 Man is either capable of, or acquainted with; lastly,
 a spiritual and divine, consisting in those things
 whereunto we tend by supernatural means here, but
 cannot here attain unto them. They that make the
 first of these three, the scope of their whole life, are
 said by the Apostle to have no God but only their Phil. iii. 19.
 belly, to be earthly-minded Men. Unto the second
 they bend themselves, who seek especially to excel
 in all such Knowledge and Virtue as doth most com-
 mend Men. To this branch belongeth the Law of
 moral and civil Perfection. That there is somewhat
 higher than either of these two, no other proof doth
 need than the very process of Man's desire, which
 being natural should be frustrate, if there were not
 some farther thing wherein it might rest at the length
 contented, which in the former it cannot do. For
 Man doth not seem to rest satisfied, either with fru-
 ition of that wherewith his life is preserved, or with
 performance of such actions as advance him most
 deservedly in estimation; but doth further covet,
 yea, oftentimes manifestly pursue with great sedulity
 and earnestness that which cannot stand him in any
 stead for vital use; that which exceedeth the reach
 of Sense, yea somewhat above capacity of Reason,
 somewhat divine and heavenly, which with hidden
 exultation it rather surmisseth than conceiveth; some-
 what it seeketh, and what that is directly, it know-
 eth not; yet very intentive desire thereof doth so in-
 cite it, that all other known delights and pleasures
 are laid aside, they give place to the search of this
 but only suspected desire. If the Soul of Man did
 serve only to give him being in this life, then things
 appertaining unto this life would content him, as we
 see they do other Creatures; which Creatures enjoy-
 ing what they live by, seek no further, but in this
 contentation do shew a kind of acknowledgement
 that there is no higher good which doth any way be-
 long

BOOK I.

long unto them. With us it is otherwise. For although the Beauties, Riches, Honours, Sciences, Virtues, and Perfections of all Men living, were in the present possession of one; yet somewhat beyond and above all this, there would still be sought and earnestly thirsted for. So that Nature, even in this life doth plainly claim and call for a more divine Perfection than either of these two that have been mentioned. This last and highest estate of Perfection whereof we speak, is received of Men in the nature of a § Reward. Rewards do always presuppose such duties performed as are rewardable. Our natural means therefore unto blessedness, are our works; nor is it possible that Nature should ever find any other way to Salvation, than only this. But examine the works which we do, and since the first foundation of the World what one can say, My ways are pure? Seeing then all flesh is guilty of that for which God hath threatened eternally to punish, what possibility is there this way to be saved? There resteth therefore either no way unto Salvation, or if any, then surely a way which is supernatural, a way which could never have entered into the heart of Man as much as once to conceive or imagine, if God himself had not revealed it extraordinarily. For which cause, we term it the Mystery or secret way of Salvation. And therefore St. Ambrose in this matter appeal-appealeth justly from Man to God, *Cæli mysterium doceat me Deus qui condidit, non Homo qui seipsum ignoravit: Let God himself that made me, let not Man that knows not himself, be my Instructor concerning the mystical way to Heaven.* ‡ When Men of excellent wit (saith

Ambros.
contra,
Sym.

§ Matth. v. 12. Rejoice and be glad, for great is your reward in Heaven. Aug. de Doct. Christ. cap. 6. Summa merces est ut ipso perfruamur.

‡ Magno et excellenti ingenio Viri, cum se doctrinæ penitus dedidissent, quicquid laboris poterat impendi (contemptis omnibus et privatis et publicis actionibus) ad inquirendæ veritatis studium

Laëtantius) had wholly betaken themselves unto study, BOOK I.
 after farewell bidden unto all kind as well of private as
 publick action, they spared no labour that might be spent
 in the search of Truth; holding it a thing of much more
 price, to seek and to find out the reason of all affairs, as
 well divine as human, than to stick fast in the toil of
 piling up riches, and gathering together heaps of honours.
 Howbeit, they did both fail of their purpose, and got not
 so much as to quit their charges; because Truth, which
 is the secret of the most high God, whose proper handy-
 work all things are, cannot be compassed with that wit
 and those senses which are our own. For God and Man
 should be very near neighbours, if Man's cogitations were
 able to take a survey of the Counsels and Appointments of
 that Majesty everlasting. Which being utterly impossible,
 that the eye of Man by itself should look into the bosom
 of divine Reason; God did not suffer him, being desirous
 of the Light of Wisdom, to stray any longer up and
 down, and with bootless expence of travel to wander in
 darkness that had no passage to get out by. His eyes at
 the length God did open and bestow upon him the know-
 ledge of the Truth by way of donative, to the end that
 Man might both be clearly convicted of folly; and being
 through error out of the way, have the path that lead-
 eth unto Immortality laid plain before him. Thus far

dium contulerunt, existimantes multo esse præclarius humanarum
 divinarumque rerum investigare ac scire rationem, quàm struen-
 dis opibus aut cumulandis honoribus inhærere. Sed neque adepti
 sunt id quod volebant, et operam simul atque industriam perdi-
 derunt: Quia veritas, id est arcanum summi Dei qui fecit omnia,
 ingenio ac propriis sensibus non potest comprehendere. Alioqui
 nihil inter Deum hominemque distaret, si consilia et dispositiones
 illius Majestatis æternæ cogitatio assequeretur humana. Quod
 quia fieri non potuit ut homini per seipsum ratio divina notesceret,
 non est passus hominem Deus lumen sapientiæ requirentem diutius
 aberrare, ac sine ullo laboris effectu vagari per tenebras inextric-
 abile. Aperuit oculos ejus aliquando, et notionem veritatis
 munus suum fecit, ut et humanam sapientiam nullam esse mon-
 straret, et erranti ac vago viam consequendæ immortalitatis of-
 tenderet. Laëtant. lib. i. cap. i.

BOOK I. Lactantius Firmianus, to shew, that God himself is the Teacher of the Truth, whereby is made known the supernatural way of Salvation and Law for them to live in that shall be saved. In the natural path of everlasting Life the first beginning is that ability of doing good, which God in the day of Man's creation endued him with; from hence Obedience unto the Will of his Creator, absolute Righteousness and Integrity in all his actions; and last of all, the Justice of God rewarding the worthiness of his deserts with the Crown of eternal Glory. Had Adam continued in his first estate, this had been the way of Life unto him and all his Posterity. Whereas I confess notwithstanding, with the *wittiest of the School Divines, that if we speak of strict Justice, God could no way have been bound to requite Man's labours in so large and ample a manner as human Felicity doth import; inasmuch as the dignity of this exceedeth so far the other's value. But be it that God of his great liberality had determined in lieu of Man's endeavours to bestow the same, by the rule of that Justice which best beseemeth him, namely, the Justice of one that requireth nothing mincingly, but all with pressed and heaped and even over-enlarged measure; yet could it never hereupon necessarily be gathered, that such Justice should add to the nature of that reward the property of everlasting continuance; sith possession of Bliss, though it should be but for a moment, were an abundant retribution. But we are not now to enter into this consideration,

* Scot. lib. iv. Sent. dist. 49. 6. Loquendo de strictâ justitiâ, Deus nulli nostrum propter quacunque merita est debitor perfectionis reddendæ tam intensæ, propter immoderatum excessum illius perfectionis ultra illa merita. Sed esto quod ex liberalitate sua determinâset meritis conferre actum tam perfectum tanquam præmium tali quidem justitiâ qualis decet eum, scilicet supererogantis in præmiis: tamen non sequitur ex hoc necessario, quod per illam justitiam sit reddenda perfectio perennis tanquam præmium, imo abundans fieret retributio in beatudine unius momenti.

how gracious and bountiful our good God might still BOOK I.
 appear in so rewarding the Sons of Men, albeit they
 should exactly perform whatsoever duty their nature
 bindeth them unto. Howsoever God did propose
 this reward, we that were to be rewarded must have
 done that which is required at our hands ; we failing
 in the one it were in nature an impossibility that the
 other should be looked for. The Light of Nature
 is never able to find out any way of obtaining the
 reward of Bliss, but by performing exactly the
 duties and works of Righteousness. From Salvation
 therefore and Life, all Flesh being excluded this way,
 behold how the Wisdom of God hath revealed a way
 mystical and supernatural, a way directing unto the
 same end of Life by a course which groundeth itself
 upon the guiltiness of Sin, and though Sin desert of
 Condemnation and Death. For in this way, the first
 thing is the tender compassion of God respecting us
 drowned or swallowed up in misery ; the next is
 Redemption out of the same by the precious Death
 and Merit of a mighty Saviour, which hath wit-
 nessed of himself, saying, *I am the Way*, the way John xiv. 6.
 that leadeth us from Misery into Bliss. This super-
 natural way had God in himself prepared before all
 Worlds. The way of supernatural Duty which to us
 he hath prescribed, our Saviour in the Gospel of St.
 John doth note, terming it by an excellency, the
 Work of God : *This is the Work of God, that ye be-* John vi. 29.
lieve in him whom he hath sent. Not that God doth
 require nothing unto happiness at the hands of Men
 saving only a naked Belief (for Hope and Charity we
 may not exclude ;) but that without Belief all other
 things are as nothing, and it the ground of those
 other divine virtues. Concerning Faith, the prin-
 cipal object whereof is that eternal Verity which hath
 discovered the treasures of hidden Wisdom in Christ ;
 concerning Hope, the highest object whereof is that
 everlasting Goodness which in Christ doth quicken
 the dead ; concerning Charity, the final object where-
 of

BOOK I. of is that incomprehensible Beauty which shineth in the countenance of Christ the Son of the living God; concerning these Virtues, the first of which beginning here with a weak apprehension of things not seen, endeth with the intuitive vision of God in the World to come: the second beginning here with a trembling expectation of things far removed, and as yet but only heard of, endeth with real and actual fruition of that which no tongue can express; the third beginning here with a weak inclination of heart towards him, unto whom we are not able to approach, endeth with endless union, the mystery whereof is higher than the reach of the thoughts of Men; concerning that Faith, Hope, and Charity, without which there can be no Salvation, was there ever any mention made saving only in that Law which God himself hath from Heaven revealed? There is not in the World a syllable muttered with certain truth concerning any of these three, more than hath been supernaturally received from the mouth of the eternal God. Laws therefore concerning these things are supernatural, both in respect of the manner of delivering them, which is divine; and also in regard of the things delivered, which are such as have not in Nature any cause from which they flow, but were by the voluntary appointment of God ordained, besides the course of Nature, to rectify Nature's obliquity withal.

The cause why so many natural or rational Laws are set down in holy Scripture.

12. When supernatural Duties are necessarily exacted, natural are not rejected as needless. The Law of God therefore is, though principally delivered for instruction in the one, yet fraught with precepts of the other also. The Scripture is fraught even with Laws of Nature, insomuch that * Gratian defining natural Right (whereby is meant the right, which exacteth those general Duties that concern Men naturally even as they are Men) termeth natural

* Jus naturale est quod in Lege et Evangelio continetur, p. 1. d. 1.

Right, that which the Books of the Law and the Gospel do contain. Neither is it vain that the Scripture aboundeth with so great store of Laws in this kind: for they are either such as we of ourselves could not easily have found out, and then the benefit is not small to have them readily set down to our hands; or if they be so clear and manifest that no Man endued with Reason can lightly be ignorant of them, yet the Spirit, as it were, borrowing them from the School of Nature, as serving to prove things less manifest, and to induce a persuasion of somewhat which were in itself more hard and dark, unless it should in such sort be cleared, the very applying of them unto cases particular is not without most singular use and profit many ways for Men's instruction. Besides, be they plain of themselves or obscure, the evidence of God's own testimony added unto the natural assent of Reason concerning the certainty of them, doth not a little comfort and confirm the same. Wherefore, inasmuch as our Actions are conversant about things beset with many circumstances, which cause Men of sundry wits to be also of sundry judgments concerning that which ought to be done; requisite it cannot but seem the Rule of divine Law should herein help our imbecility, that we might the more infallibly understand what is good and what evil. The first Principles of the Law of Nature are easy; hard it were to find Men ignorant of them. But concerning the duty which Nature's Law doth require at the hands of Men in a number of things particular, so far hath the natural understanding

‡ Joseph. lib. secundo contra Apion. Lacedæmonii quomodo non sunt ob inhospitalitatem reprehendendi, fœdumque neglectum nuptiarum? Elienses vero et Thebani ob coitum cum masculis planè impudentem et contra naturam, quem rectè et utiliter exercere putabant? Cumque hæc omnino perpetrarunt, etiam suis legibus miscuere. Vid. Th. 12, q. 49. 4, 5, 6. Lex naturæ sic corrupta fuit apud Germanos, ut latrocinium non reputarent peccatum. August. aut quisquis author est Lib de quæst. nov. et vet. test. Quis nesciat quid bonæ vitæ conveniat, aut ignoret,

BOOK I. even of fundry whole Nations been darkened, that they have not discerned, no, not gross iniquity to be sin. Again, being so prone as we are to fawn upon ourselves, and to be ignorant as much as may be of our own deformities, without the feeling sense whereof we are most wretched; even so much the more, because not knowing them, we cannot as much as desire to have them taken away, how should our festered sores be cured, but that God hath delivered a Law as sharp as the two-edged sword, piercing the very closest and most unsearchable corners of the Heart, which the Law of Nature can hardly, human Laws by no means possibly reach unto? Hereby we know even secret concupiscence to be sin, and are made fearful to offend, though it be but in a wandering cogitation. Finally, of those things which are for direction of all the parts of our life needful, and not impossible to be discerned by the Light of Nature itself; are there not many which few Men's natural capacity, and some which no Man's hath been able to find out? They are, saith St. Augustine, but a few, and they endued with great ripeness of wit and judgment, free from all such affairs as might trouble their meditations, instructed in the sharpest and the subtlest points of learning, who have, and that very hardly, been able to find out but only the Immortality of the Soul. The Resurrection of the Flesh what Man did ever at any time dream of, having not heard it otherwise than from the School of Nature? Whereby it appeareth, how much we are bound to yield unto our Creator the Father of all Mercy eter-

ignoret quia quod sibi fieri non vult, aliis minimè debeat facere? At verò ubi naturalis lex evanuit oppressa consuetudine delinquendi tunc oportuit manifestari scriptis, ut Dei judicium omnes audirent: Non quod penitus oblitterata est, sed quia maxima ejus auctoritate carebat, idololatriæ studebatur, timor Dei in terris erat, fornicatio operabatur, circa rem proximi avida erat concupiscentia. Data ergo lex est, ut quæ sciebantur auctoritatem haberent, et quæ latere cœperant, manifestarentur.

nal thanks, for that he hath delivered his Law unto BOOK I.
the World; a Law wherein so many things are laid
open, clear, and manifest; as a Light, which other-
wise would have been buried in darknes, not with-
out the hazard, or rather not with the hazard, but
with the certain loss of infinite thousands of Souls,
most undoubtedly now saved. We see therefore
that our sovereign Good is desired naturally; that
God the Author of that natural desire, had appoint-
ed natural means whereby to fulfil it; that Man hav-
ing utterly disabled his Nature unto those means,
hath had other revealed from God, and hath received
from Heaven a Law to teach him how that which is
desired naturally must now supernaturally be attained.
Finally, we see, that because those latter exclude
not the former quite and clean as unnecessary, there-
fore together with such supernatural Duties as could
not possibly have been otherwise known to the
World, the same Law that teacheth them, teacheth
also with them such natural Duties as could not by
Light of Nature easily have been known.

13. In the first Age of the World God gave Laws The benefit
of having
divine Laws
written.
unto our Fathers, and by reason of the number of
their days their memories served instead of books;
whereof the manifold imperfections and defects be-
ing known to God, he mercifully relieved the same,
by often putting them in mind of that whereof it
behoved them to be specially mindful. In which
respect, we see how many times one thing hath been
iterated unto sundry, even of the best and wisest
amongst them. After that the lives of Men were
shortened, means more durable to preserve the Laws
of God from oblivion and corruption grew in use,
not without precise direction from God himself. First
therefore of Moses it is said, that he *wrote all the* Exod. xxiv.
4.
words of God; not by his own private motion and
device: for God taketh this act to himself, *I have* Hos. viii.
12.
written. Furthermore, were not the Prophets fol-
lowing commanded also to do the like? Unto the
holy

BOOK I. holy Evangelist St. John, how often exprefs charge is given, *Scribe, write these things?* Concerning the rest of our Lord's Disciples, the words of St. Augustine are, *Quicquid ille de suis factis et dictis nos legere voluit, hoc scribendum illis tanquam suis manibus imperavit.* Now although we do not deny it to be a matter meerly accidental unto the Law of God to be written; although writing be not that which addeth authority and strength thereunto; finally, though his Laws do require at our hands the same obedience, howsoever they be delivered; his Providence notwithstanding, which hath made principal choice of this way to deliver them, who seeth not what cause we have to admire and magnify? The singular benefit that hath grown unto the World by receiving the Laws of God, even by his own appointment committed unto writing, we are not able to esteem as the value thereof deserveth. When the question therefore is, whether we be now to seek for any revealed Law of God elsewhere than only in the sacred Scripture: whether we do now stand bound in the sight of God to yield to Traditions urged by the Church of Rome the same obedience and reverence we do to his written Law, honouring equally, and adoring both as divine? our answer is, No. They that so earnestly plead for the authority of Tradition, as if nothing were more safely conveyed than that which spreadeth itself by report, and descendeth by relation of former Generations unto the Ages that succeed, are not all of them (surely a Miracle it were if they should be) so simple, as thus to persuade themselves; howsoever, if the simple were so persuaded, they could be content perhaps very well to enjoy the benefit, as they account it, of that common error. What hazard the Truth is in when it passeth through the hands of report, how maimed and deformed it becometh, they are not, they cannot possibly be ignorant. Let them that are indeed of this mind, consider but only

Apoc. i. 11.
& xiv. 13.

Aug. lib. 1.
de Conf.
Evan. cap.
ult.

only that little of things divine which the * Heathen BOOK I.
have in such sort received. How miserable had the
state of the Church of God been long ere this, if want-
ing the sacred Scripture, we had no record of his Laws
but only the memory of Man receiving the same by
report and relation from his predecessors? By Scrip-
ture, it hath in the Wisdom of God seemed meet to
deliver unto the World much, but personally expe-
dient to be practised of certain Men; many deep
and profound points of Doctrine, as being the main
original ground whereupon the precepts of Duty
depend; many Prophecies, the clear performance
whereof might confirm the World in belief of things
unseen; many Histories to serve as looking-glasses
to behold the Mercy, the Truth, the Righteousness
of God towards all that faithfully serve, obey and
honour him; yea, many entire Meditations of Piety,
to be as patterns and precedents in cases of like na-
ture; many things needful for explication, many for
application unto particular occasions, such as the
Providence of God from time to time hath taken, to
have the several Books of his holy Ordinance writ-
ten. Be it then, that together with the principal
necessary Laws of God there are fundry other things
written, whereof we might haply be ignorant and
yet be saved: what? shall we hereupon think them
needless? shall we esteem them as riotous branches,
wherewith we sometimes behold most pleasant vines
overgrown? Surely, no more than we judge our
Hands or our Eyes superfluous, or what part soever;

* I mean those historical matters concerning the ancient state
of the first World, the Deluge, the Sons of Noah, the Children
of Israel's deliverance out of Egypt, the Life and Doings of
Moses their Captain, with such like: the certain truth whereof
delivered in holy Scripture, is of the Heathen which had them
only by report, so intermingled with fabulous vanities, that the
most which remaineth in them to be seen, is the shew of dark
and obscure steps, where some part of the truth hath gone.

which

BOOK I.

which if our Bodies did want, we might notwithstanding any such defect, retain still the compleat Being of Men. As therefore a compleat Man is neither destitute of any part necessary, and hath some parts, whereof though the want could not deprive him of his Essence, yet to have them standeth him in singular stead in respect of the special uses for which they serve; in like sort, all those Writings which contain in them the Law of God, all those venerable Books of Scripture, all those sacred Tomes and Volumes of holy Writ, they are with such absolute perfection framed, that in them there neither wanteth any thing, the lack whereof might deprive us of life, nor any thing in such wise aboundeth, that as being superfluous, unfruitful, and altogether needless, we should think it no loss or danger at all, if we did want it.

The sufficiency of Scripture unto the end, for which it was instituted.

14. Although the Scripture of God therefore be stored with infinite variety of matter in all kinds, although it abound with all sorts of Laws, yet the principal intent of Scripture is to deliver the Laws of Duties supernatural. Oftentimes it hath been in very solemn manner disputed, whether all things necessary unto Salvation be necessarily set down in the holy Scriptures or no *. If we define that necessary unto Salvation, whereby the way to Salvation is in any sort made more plain, apparent and easy to be known; then is there no part of true Philosophy, no Art of account, no kind of Science, rightly so called, but the Scripture must contain it. If only those things be necessary, as surely none else are, without the knowledge and practice whereof, it is not the will and pleasure of God to make any ordinary grant of Salvation; it may be notwithstanding, and oftentimes hath been demanded, how the Books

* *Utrum cognitio supernaturalis necessaria viatori, sit sufficienter tradita in sacra Scriptura?* This Question proposed by Scotus, is affirmatively concluded.

of holy Scripture contain in them all necessary BOOK I.
things, when of things necessary the very chief is to
know what Books we are to esteem holy; which
point is confessed impossible for the Scripture itself to
teach. Whereunto we may answer with truth, that
there is not in the world any Art or Science, which
proposing unto itself an end (as every one doth some
end or other) hath been therefore thought defective,
if it have not delivered simply whatsoever is needful
to the same end; but all kinds of knowledge have
their certain bounds and limits; each of them pre-
supposeth many necessary things learned in other
Sciences and known beforehand. He that should
take upon him to teach Men how to be eloquent in
in pleading Causes, must needs deliver unto them
whatsoever precepts are requisite unto that end;
otherwise he doth not the thing which he taketh
upon him. Seeing then no Man can plead eloquent-
ly, unless he be able first to speak; it followeth, that
ability of Speech is in this case a thing most neces-
sary. Notwithstanding every Man would think it
ridiculous, that he which undertaketh by writing to
instruct an Orator, should therefore deliver all the
precepts of Grammar; because his profession is to
deliver precepts necessary unto eloquent speech; yet
so, that they which are to receive them be taught
beforehand so much of that which is thereunto ne-
cessary as comprehendeth the skill of speaking. In
like sort, albeit Scripture do profess to contain in it
all things that are necessary unto Salvation; yet the
meaning cannot be simply of all things which are
necessary, but all things that are necessary in some
certain kind or form; as all things which are ne-
cessary, and either could not all, or could not easily
be known by the light of natural discourse; all
things which are necessary to be known that we may
be saved; but known with presupposal of knowledge
concerning certain principles whereof it receiveth us
already persuaded and then instructeth us in all the
residue

BOOK I. residue that are necessary. In the number of these principles, one is the sacred Authority of Scripture. Being therefore persuaded by other means that these Scriptures are the Oracles of God, themselves do then teach us the rest, and lay before us all the Duties which God requireth at our hands as necessary unto Salvation. Further there hath been some doubt likewise, whether *containing in Scripture* do import exprefs setting down in plain terms, or else comprehending in such sort that, by Reason, we may from thence conclude all things which are necessary. Against the former of these two constructions, instances hath fundry ways been given. For our belief in the Trinity, the Co-eternity of the Son of God with his Father, the proceeding of the Spirit from the Father and the Son, the duty of baptizing Infants: these, with such other principal points, the necessity whereof is by none denied, are notwithstanding in Scripture no where to be found by exprefs literal mention, only deduced they are out of Scripture by collection. This kind of comprehension in Scripture being therefore received, still there is no doubt, how far we are to proceed by collection, before the full and complete measure of things necessary be made up. For let us not think, that as long as the World doth endure, the wit of Man shall be able to found the bottom of that which may be concluded out of the Scripture; especially, if things contained by collection do so far extend, as to draw in whatsoever may be at any time out of Scripture, but probably and conjecturally surmised. But let necessary collection be made requisite, and we may boldly deny, that of all those things which at this day are with so great necessity urged upon this Church, under the name of reformed Church-discipline, there is any one which their Books hitherto have made manifest to be contained in the Scripture. Let them, if they can, alledge but one properly belonging to their cause, and not common to them and us, and
shew

shew the deduction thereof out of Scripture to be BOOK I.
 necessary. It hath been already shewed, how all
 things necessary unto Salvation, in such sort as before
 we have maintained, must needs be possible for Men
 to know; and that many things are in such sort ne-
 cessary, the knowledge whereof is by the Light of
 Nature impossible to be attained. Whereupon it
 followeth, that either all Flesh is excluded from
 possibility of Salvation, which to think were most
 barbarous; or else, that God hath by supernatural
 means revealed the way of Life so far as doth suffice.
 For this cause, God hath so many times and ways
 spoken to the Sons of Men: neither hath he by
 Speech only, but by Writing also instructed and
 taught his Church. The cause of Writing hath been,
 to the end that things by him revealed unto the
 World, might have the longer continuance, and the
 greater certainty of assurance; by how much that
 which standeth on record, hath in both those respects
 pre-eminence above that which passeth from hand to
 hand, and hath no pens but the tongues, no book
 but the ears of Men to record it. The several Books
 of Scripture having had each some several occasion
 and particular purpose which caused them to be
 written, the contents thereof are according to the
 exigence of that special end whereunto they are in-
 tended. Hereupon it groweth that every Book of
 holy Scripture doth take out of all kinds of truth,
 natural, historical, foreign, supernatural, so much as
 the matter handled requireth. Now forasmuch as
 there have been reasons alledged sufficient to con-
 clude that all things necessary unto Salvation must
 be made known, and that God himself hath therefore
 revealed his Will, because otherwise Men could not
 have known so much as is necessary; his surceasing
 to speak to the World, since the publishing of the
 Gospel of Jesus Christ and the delivery of the same
 in writing, is unto us a manifest token that the way
 of Salvation is now sufficiently opened, and that we
 need

Eph. v. 29.
 2 Tim. iii.
 8.
 Tit. i. 12.
 2 Pet. ii. 4.

BOOK I. need no other means for our full instruction than
 — God hath already furnished us withal. The main
 drift of the whole New Testament is that which St.

Joh. xx. 31. *These things are written, that ye might believe, that
 Jesus is Christ the Son of God, and that in believing, ye
 might have Life through his Name.* The drift of the

2 Tim. iii.
 15. *The holy Scriptures are able to make thee wise unto Sal-
 vation.* So that the general end both of Old and

New is one; the difference between them consisting
 in this, that the Old did make wise by teaching Sal-
 vation through Christ that should come; the New,

by teaching that Christ the Saviour is come; and
 that Jesus whom the Jews did crucify and whom
 God did raise again from the dead, is he. When the
 Apostle therefore affirmeth unto Timothy, that the
 Old was able to make him wise to Salvation, it

2 Tim. iii.
 14. was not his meaning, that the Old alone can do this
 unto us which live sithence the publication of the
 New. For he speaketh with presupposal of the
 Doctrine of Christ, known also unto Timothy; and
 therefore first it is said, *Continue thou in those things*

Verse 15. *which thou hast learned, and art persuaded, knowing of
 whom thou hast been taught them.* Again, those Scrip-
 tures he granteth were able to make him wise to

Salvation; but he addeth, *through the Faith which is
 in Christ.* Wherefore without the Doctrine of the
 New Testament, teaching that Christ hath wrought
 the Redemption of the World; which Redemption
 the Old did foreshew he should work; it is not the
 former alone which can on our behalf perform so
 much as the Apostle doth avouch, who presupposeth
 this, when he magnifieth that so highly. And as his
 words concerning the Books of ancient Scripture do
 not take place but with presupposal of the Gospel of
 Christ embraced; so our own words also, when we
 extol the complete sufficiency of the whole entire
 Body of the Scripture, must in like sort be under-
 stood

stood with this caution, that the benefit of Nature's BOOK I.
 Light be not thought excluded as unnecessary, because the necessity of a diviner Light is magnified. There is in Scripture therefore no defect, but that any Man, what place or calling soever he hold in the Church of God, may have thereby the light of his natural understanding so perfected, that the one being relieved by the other, there can want no part of needful instruction unto any good work which God himself requireth, be it natural or supernatural, belonging simply unto Men, as Men; or unto Men, as they are united in whatsoever kind of society. It sufficeth therefore, that Nature and Scripture do serve in such full sort, that they both jointly, and not severally either of them, be so complete, that unto everlasting felicity, we need not the knowledge of any thing more than these two may easily furnish our minds with on all sides. And therefore they which add Traditions, as a part of supernatural necessary Truth, have not the Truth, but are in error. For they only plead, that whatsoever God revealeth as necessary for all Christian Men to do or believe, the same we ought to embrace whether we have received it by writing or otherwise, which no Man denieth; when that which they should confirm, who claim so great reverence unto Traditions, is, that the same Traditions are necessary to be acknowledged divine and holy. For we do not reject them only because they are not in the Scripture, but because they are neither in Scripture, nor can otherwise sufficiently by any reason be proved to be of God. That which is of God, and may be evidently proved to be so, we deny not but it hath in his kind, although unwritten, yet the self-same force and authority with the written Laws of God. It is by ours acknowledged, *That the Apostles did in every Church institute and ordain some Rites and Customs, serving for the seemliness of Church-regiment: which Rites and Customs they have not committed unto writing.* Those Whitakerus
adversus
Bellarmin.
quæst. 6.
cap. 6.

BOOK I. Rites and Customs being known to be Apostolical, and having the nature of things changeable, were no less to be accounted of in the Church, than other things of the like degree; that is to say, capable in like sort of alteration, although set down in the Apostles' Writings. For both being known to be Apostolical, it is not the manner of delivering them unto the Church, but the Author from whom they proceed, which doth give them their force and credit.

Of Laws
positive con-
tained in
inScripture;
the mutabi-
lity of cer-
tain of them,
and the ge-
neral use of
Scripture.

15. Laws being imposed either by each Man upon himself, or by a publick Society upon the particulars thereof; or by all the Nations of Men upon every feveral Society; or by the Lord himself upon any or every of these; there is not amongst these four kinds any one, but containeth fundry both natural and positive Laws. Impossible it is, but that they should fall into a number of errors, who only take such Laws for positive as have been made or invented of Men; and holding this position, hold also, that all positive, and none but positive Laws are mutable. Laws natural do always bind; Laws positive not so, but only after they have been expressly and wittingly imposed. Laws positive there are in every of those kinds before-mentioned. As in the first kind, the Promises which we have past unto Men, and the Vows we have made unto God; for these are Laws which we tie ourselves unto, and till we have so tied ourselves they bind us not. Laws positive in the second kind, are such as the civil Constitutions, peculiar unto each particular Commonweal. In the third kind, the Law of Heraldry in war is positive: and in the last, all the judicials which God gave unto the People of Israel to observe. And although no Laws but positive, be mutable; yet all are not mutable which be positive. Positive Laws are either permanent, or else changeable, according as the matter itself is concerning which they were first made. Whether God or Man be the maker of them,
alteration

alteration they so far forth admit, as the matter doth BOOK I.
 exact. Laws that concern supernatural Duties, are
 all positive; and either concern Men supernaturally,
 as Men, or else as parts of a supernatural Society;
 which Society we call the Church. To concern
 Men as Men supernaturally, is to concern them as
 Duties, which belong of necessity to all, and yet
 could not have been known by any to belong unto
 them unless God had opened them himself; inasmuch
 as they do not depend upon any natural ground at
 all out of which they may be deduced; but are ap-
 pointed of God to supply the defect of those natural
 ways of Salvation, by which we are not now able to
 attain thereunto. The Church being a supernatural
 Society doth differ from natural Societies in this,
 that the Persons unto whom we associate ourselves in
 the one, are Men, simply considered as Men; but
 they to whom we be joined in the other are God,
 Angels, and holy Men. Again, the Church being
 both a Society, and a Society supernatural; although
 as it is a Society, it have the self-same original
 grounds which other politick Societies have, namely,
 the natural inclination which all Men have unto
 sociable life, and consent to some certain Bond of
 Association; which Bond is the Law that appointeth
 what kind of order they shall be associated in; yet
 unto the Church, as it is a Society supernatural,
 this is peculiar; that part of the Bond of their Asso-
 ciation which belongs to the Church of God, must
 be a Law supernatural which God himself hath re-
 vealed concerning that kind of worship which his
 People shall do unto him. The substance of the ser-
 vice of God therefore, so far forth as it hath in it
 any thing more than the Law of Reason doth teach,
 may not be invented of Men, as it is amongst the
 Heathens;* but must be received from God himself,
 as always it hath been in the Church, saving only

* Isa. xxix. 13. Their fear towards me, was taught by the precept of Men.

when

BOOK I. when the Church hath been forgetful of her duty.

Wherefore to end with a general rule concerning all the Laws which God hath tied Men unto: those Laws divine that belong, whether naturally or supernaturally, either to Men as Men, or to Men as they live in politick Society, or to Men as they are of that politick Society which is the Church, without any further respect had unto any such variable accident, as the estate of Men, and of societies of Men, and of the Church itself in this World is subject unto; all Laws that so belong unto Men, they belong for ever, yea, although they be positive Laws, unless being positive, God himself which made them, alter them. The reason is, because the subject or matter of Laws in general, is thus far forth constant: which matter is that for the ordering whereof Laws were instituted, and being instituted are not changeable without cause, neither can they have cause of change, when that which gave them first institution remaineth for ever one and the same. On the other side, Laws that were made for Men or Societies or Churches in regard of their being such, as they do not always continue, but may perhaps be clean otherwise awhile after, and so may require to be otherwise ordered than before; the Laws of God himself, which are of this nature, no Man endued with common sense will ever deny to be of a different constitution from the former, in respect of the one's constancy and the mutability of the other. And this doth seem to have been the very cause why St. John doth so peculiarly term the Doctrine that teacheth

Apcc.xiv.6. Salvation by Jesus Christ, *Evangelium æternum*, *An eternal Gospel*; because there can be no reason wherefore the publishing thereof should be taken away, and any other instead of it proclaimed, as long as the World doth continue: whereas the whole Law of Rites and Ceremonies, although delivered with so great solemnity, is notwithstanding clean abrogated, inasmuch as it had but temporary cause of God's ordaining

ordaining it. But that we may at length conclude BOOK I.
 this first general introduction unto the nature and
 original birth, as of all other Laws, so likewise of
 those which the sacred Scripture containeth, con-
 cerning the Author whereof, even Infidels have con-
 fessed, that he can neither err nor deceive; † albeit,
 about things easy and manifest unto all Men by
 common sense there needeth no higher consultation;
 because as a Man whose wisdom is in weighty affairs
 admired, would take it in some disdain to have his
 counsel solemnly asked about a toy; so the meanness
 of some things is such, that to search the Scripture
 of God for the ordering of them were to derogate
 from the reverend authority and dignity of the
 Scripture, no less than they do by whom Scriptures
 are in ordinary talk very idly applied unto vain and
 childish trifles; yet better it were to be superstitious,
 than prophane; to take from thence our direction
 even in all things great or small, than to wade
 through matters of principal weight and moment
 without ever caring what the Law of God hath either
 for or against our designs. Concerning the custom
 of the very Paynims, thus much Strabo witnesseth,
 † *Men that are civil do lead their lives after one common
 Law appointing them what to do. For that otherwise a
 multitude should with harmony amongst themselves concur
 in the doing of one thing, (for this is civilly to live) or
 that they should in any sort manage community of life, it
 is not possible. Now Laws or Statutes are of two sorts.
 For they are either received from Gods, or else from*

† Κομιδῇ ἄρα ὁ Θεὸς ἀπλὲν καὶ ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις καὶ ἐν λόγοις, καὶ ὅτε αὐτὸς μεδίεσται, οὔτε ἄλλως ἐξαπαλᾷ, οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας, οὔτε κατὰ λόγους, οὔτε κατὰ σημείων πομπᾶς, οὐδ' ὑπάρ' ἐδ' ὄναρ. Plat. in fine 2 Polit.

† Πολιτικοὶ ὄντες ἀπὸ προσαγματος κοινῇ ζῶσιν. Ἄλλως γὰρ εἴη οἶοντε τοὺς πολῖτας ἐν τι κατὰ ταυτὸ ποιεῖν ἡρμοσμένως ἀλλήλοις ὅπερ ἦν τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι· καὶ ἄλλως πῶς νέμειν βίον κοινόν. Τὸ δὲ προσαγμα δίτλον, ἢ γὰρ παρὰ θεῶν, ἢ παρὰ ἀνθρώπων. Καὶ οἱ γε ἀρχαῖοι τὸ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ἐπρέσβειον μᾶλλον, καὶ ἐσέμνυνον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ χρηστηριάζομενος ἦν τότε πολὺς. Strab. Geogr. lib. xvi.

Men.

BOOK I. *Men.* And our ancient predecessors did surely most honour and reverence that which was from the Gods. For which cause, consultation with Oracles was a thing very usual and frequent in their times. Did they make so much account of the voice of their gods, which in truth were no gods; and shall we neglect the precious benefit of conference with those Oracles of the true and living God, whereof so great store is left to the Church, and whereunto there is so free, so plain and so easy access for all Men? By thy Commandments (this was David's confession unto God) *thou hast made me wiser than mine enemies.* Again, *I have had more understanding than all my Teachers, because thy Testimonies are my meditations.* What pains would not they have bestowed in the study of these Books, who who travelled sea and land to gain the treasure of some few days talk with Men whose wisdom the World did make any reckoning of? That little which some of the Heathens did chance to hear concerning such matter as the sacred Scripture plentifully containeth, they did in wonderful sort affect; their speeches, as oft as they make mention thereof, are strange and such as themselves could not utter as they did other things, but still acknowledged that their wits, which did every where else conquer hardness, were with profoundness here over-matched. Wherefore seeing that God hath endued us with Sense, to the end that we might perceive such things as this present life doth need; and with Reason, lest that which Sense cannot reach unto, being both now and also in regard of a future estate hereafter necessary to be known, should lie obscure; finally, with the heavenly support of prophetic Revelation, which doth open those hidden Mysteries that Reason could never have been able to find out, or to have known the necessity of them unto our everlasting good: * use we the precious gifts of God unto his

Psal cxix.
98.

Vide Orphei
Carmina.

* Ὡν γὰρ ὁ νοῦς ἀπολείπεται πρὸς ταῦθ' ἡ προφητεία φθάνει. Philo de Mos.

glory and honour that gave them, seeking by all means to know what the Will of our God is; what righteous before him; in his sight what holy, perfect and good, that we may truly and faithfully do it. BOOK I.

16. Thus far therefore we have endeavoured in part to open, of what nature and force Laws are, according unto their several kinds: the Law which God with himself hath eternally set down to follow in his own Works: the Law which he hath made for his Creatures to keep: the Law of natural and necessary Agents; the Law which Angels in Heaven obey; the Law whereunto by the Light of Reason, Men find themselves bound, in that they are Men: the Law which they make by composition for Multitudes and politick Societies of Men to be guided by; the Law which belongeth unto each Nation: the Law that concerneth the Fellowship of all: and lastly, the Law which God himself hath supernaturally revealed. It might peradventure have been more popular and more plausible to vulgar ears, if this first discourse had been spent in extolling the force of Laws, in shewing the great necessity of them when they are good, and in aggravating their offence, by whom publick Laws are injuriously traduced. But forasmuch as with such kind of matter the passions of Men are rather stirred one way or other, than their knowledge any way set forward unto the trial of that whereof there is doubt made; I have therefore turned aside from that beaten path, and chosen, though a less easy, yet a more profitable way, in regard of the end we propose. Left therefore any Man should marvel whereunto all these things tend, the drift and purpose of all is this, even to shew in what manner, as every good and perfect gift, so this very gift of good and perfect Laws is derived from the Father of Lights, to teach Men a reason why just and reasonable Laws are of so great force, A Conclusion, shewing how all this belongeth to the cause in question.

Jam. i. 17.

BOOK I. force, of so great use in the World ; and to inform
 ——— their Minds with some method of reducing the Laws,
 whereof there is present controversy, unto their first
 original causes, that so it may be in every particular
 Ordinance thereby the better discerned, whether the
 same be reasonable, just and righteous, or no. Is
 there any thing which can either be thoroughly
 understood or soundly judged of till the very first
 causes and principles from which originally it spring-
 eth be made manifest? If all parts of knowledge
 Arist. Phys. lib. i. cap. I. have been thought by wise Men to be then most
 orderly delivered and proceeded in, when they are
 drawn to their first original ; seeing that our whole
 question concerneth the quality of Ecclesiastical
 Laws ; let it not seem a labour superfluous, that in
 the entrance thereunto, all these several kinds of
 Laws have been considered ; inasmuch as they all
 concur as principles, they all have their forcible
 operations therein, although not all in like apparent
 and manifest manner : by means whereof it cometh
 to pass, that the force which they have, is not observed
 of many. Easier a great deal it is for Men by Law
 to be taught what they ought to do, than instructed
 how to judge as they should do of Law ; the one
 being a thing which belongeth generally unto all ;
 the other, such as none but the wiser and more judi-
 cious sort can perform. Yea, the wisest are always
 touching this point the readiest to acknowledge, that
 soundly to judge of a Law is the weightiest thing
 which any Man can take upon him.* But if we will
 give judgment of the Laws under which we live ;
 first, let that Law eternal be always before our eyes, as
 being of principal force and moment to breed in
 religious Minds a dutiful estimation of all Laws, the
 use and benefit whereof we see ; because there

* Arist. Ethic. 10. Τὸ κρίναι ὀφθῶς, μέγιστον. Intelligit de legum
 qualitate iudicium.

can be no doubt, but that Laws apparently good, BOOK I.
 are (as it were) things copied out of the very Tables
 of that high and everlasting Law, even as the Book
 of that Law hath said concerning itself, *By me Kings* Prov. viii.
reign, and by me Princes decree Justice. Not as if ¹⁵
 Men did behold that Book, and accordingly frame
 their Laws; but because it worketh in them, because
 it discovereth, and (as it were) readeth itself to the
 World by them, when the Laws which they make
 are righteous. Furthermore, although we perceive
 not the goodness of Laws made; nevertheless, sith
 things in themselves may have that which we perad-
 venture discern not; should not this breed a fear
 into our hearts how we speak or judge in the worst
 part concerning that, the unadvised disgrace whereof
 may be no mean dishonour to him towards whom
 we profess all submission and awe? Surely there
 must be very manifest iniquity in Laws against
 which we shall be able to justify our contumelious
 invectives. The chiefest root whereof, when we use
 them without cause, is ignorance how Laws inferior
 are derived from that supreme or highest Law. The
 first that receive impression from thence are natural
 Agents. The Law of whose operations might be
 haply thought less pertinent, when the question is
 about Laws for human actions, but that in those
 very actions which most spiritually and super-
 naturally concern Men, the rules and axioms of
 natural operations have their force. What can
 be more immediate to our Salvation, than our per-
 suasion concerning the Law of Christ towards his
 Church? What greater assurance of love towards
 his Church, than the knowledge of that mystical
 Union, whereby the Church is become as near unto
 Christ as any one part of his flesh is unto another?
 That the Church being in such sort his, he must
 needs protect it; what proof more strong, than if a
 manifest Law so require, which Law it is not possible
 for Christ to violate? And what other Law doth
 the

BOOK I. the Apostle for this alledge, but such as is both com-
 mon unto Christ with us, and unto us with other
 Ephes. v. 29. things natural; *No man hateth his own flesh, but doth
 love and cherish it.* The Axioms of that Law there-
 fore, whereby natural Agents are guided, have their
 use in the moral, yea, even in the spiritual actions of
 Men, and consequently in all Laws belonging unto
 Men howsoever. Neither are the Angels themselves
 so far severed from us in their kind and manner of
 working, but that between the Law of their heaven-
 ly operations and the actions of Men in this our
 state of mortality, such correspondence there is as
 maketh it expedient to know in some sort the one
 for the others more perfect direction. Would An-
 gels acknowledge themselves Fellow-servants with
 the Sons of Men, but that both having one Lord,
 there must be some kind of Law which is one and
 the same to both, whereunto their obedience being
 perfecter, is to our weaker both a pattern and a
 spur? Or would the Apostles, speaking of that
 which belongeth unto Saints as they are linked to-
 gether in the bond of spiritual society, so often make
 mention how Angels are therewith delighted, if in
 things publickly done by the Church we are not
 somewhat to respect what the Angels of Heaven do?
 Yea, so far hath the Apostle St. Paul proceeded, as
 to signify that even about the outward Orders of the
 Church, which serve but for comeliness, some regard
 is to be had of Angels, who best like us when we are
 most like unto them in all parts of decent demean-
 our. So that the Law of Angels we cannot judge
 altogether impertinent unto the affairs of the Church
 of God. Our largeness of speech how Men do find
 out what things Reason bindeth them of necessity
 to observe, and what it guideth them to chuse in
 things which are left as arbitrary; the care we have
 had to declare the different nature of Laws which
 severally concern all Men, from such as belong unto
 Men either civilly or spiritually associated; such as
 pertain

Apo. xix.
10.

1 Pet. i. 12.
Ephes. iii.
10.

1 Tim. v. 21.

1 Cor. xi. 10.

pertain to the fellowship which Nations, or which BOOK. I.
Christian Nations have amongst themselves; and in
the last place, such as concerning every or any of
these, God himself hath revealed by his holy Word;
all serveth but to make manifest, that as the actions
of Men are of fundry distinct kinds, so the Laws
thereof must accordingly be distinguished. There
are in Men Operations, some natural, some rational,
some supernatural, some politick, some finally eccle-
siastical: which if we measure not each by his own
proper Law, whereas the things themselves are so
different, there will be in our understanding and
judgment of them, confusion. As that first error
sheweth whereon our opposites in this cause have
grounded themselves: for as they rightly maintain,
that God must be glorified in all things, and that the
actions of Men cannot tend unto his Glory unless
they be framed after his Law; so it is their error to
think that the only Law which God hath appointed
unto Men in that behalf is the sacred Scripture. By Pf. cxlviii.
that which we work naturally, as when we breathe, 7, 8, 9.
sleep, move, we set forth the Glory of God as na-
tural Agents do, albeit we have no express purpose
to make that our end, nor any advised determina-
tion therein to follow a Law, but do that we do
(for the most part) not as much as thinking thereon.
In reasonable and moral Actions another Law taketh Rom. i. 21.
place; a Law, by the observation whereof we glorify
God in such sort, as no Creature else under Man is
able to do; because other Creatures have not judg-
ment to examine the quality of that which is done
by them, and therefore in that they do they neither
can accuse nor approve themselves. Men do both, Rom. ii. 15.
as the Apostle teacheth; yea, those Men which have
no written Law of God to shew what is good or
evil, carry written in their Hearts the universal Law
of Mankind, the Law of Reason, whereby they
judge as by a Rule which God has given unto all
Men for that purpose. The Law of Reason doth
some-

BOOK I. somewhat direct Men how to honour God as their Creator ; but how to glorify God in such sort as is required, to the end he may be an everlasting Saviour, this we are taught by divine Law, which Law both ascertaineth the truth, and supplieth unto us the want of that other Law. So that in moral actions, divine Law helpeth exceedingly the Law of Reason to guide Man's life ; but in supernatural, it alone guideth. Proceed we further ; let us place Man in some publick society with others, whether civil or spiritual ; and in this case there is no remedy, but we must add yet a further Law. For although, even here likewise, the Laws of Nature and Reason be of necessary use ; yet somewhat over and besides them is necessary, namely, human and positive Law, together with that Law which is of commerce between grand societies, the Law of Nations, and of Nations Christian. For which cause, Rom.xiii.1. the Law of God hath likewise said, *Let every Soul be subject to the higher Powers.* The publick Power of all societies is above every Soul contained in the same societies. And the principal use of that Power is to give Laws unto all that are under it ; which Laws in such case we must obey, unless there be reason shewed which may necessarily inforce, that the Law of Reason or of God doth enjoin the contrary : because except our own private, and but probable resolutions, be by the Law of publick determinations over-ruled, we take away all possibility of sociable life in the world. A plainer example whereof than ourselves we cannot have. How cometh it to pass, that we are at this present day so rent with mutual contentions, and that the Church is so much troubled about the Polity of the Church ? No doubt, if Men had been willing to learn how many Laws their actions in this Life are subject unto, and what the true force of each Law is, all these controversies might have died the very day they were first brought forth. It is both commonly said, and truly

truly, that the best Men otherwise are not always the best in regard of society. The reason whereof is, for that the Law of Mens' actions is one, if they be respected only as Men ; and another, when they are considered as parts of a politick Body. Many Men there are, than whom nothing is more commendable when they are singled ; and yet in society with others, none less fit to answer the duties which are looked for at their hands.* Yea, I am persuaded, that of them, with whom in this cause we strive, there are whose betters among Men would be hardly found if they did not live amongst Men, but in some wilderness by themselves. The cause of which their disposition so unframable unto societies wherein they live is, for that they discern not aright what place and force these several kinds of Laws ought to have in all their actions. Is their question either concerning the Regiment of the Church in general, or about Conformity between one Church and another, or of Ceremonies, Offices, Powers, Jurisdictions in our own Church? of all these things, they judge by that rule which they frame to themselves with some shew of probability ; and what seemeth in that sort convenient, the same they think themselves bound to practise ; the same by all means they labour mightily to uphold ; whatsoever any Law of Man to the contrary hath determined, they weigh it not. Thus by following the Law of private Reason, where the Law of publick should take place, they breed disturbance. For the better inuring therefore of Men's Minds with the true distinction of Laws, and of their several force, according to the different kind and quality of our actions, it shall not peradventure be amiss to shew in some one example, how they shall take place. To seek no further, let but that be considered, than which there is not any thing

JOB xxxiv.
Ps.^{3.} cxlv. 15.
16.

* Πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις τῇ ἀρετῇ δύνανται χρῆσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον ἀδυνατῶσι. Arist. Ethic. lib. v. cap. 3.

BOOK I. more familiar unto us, our Food. What things are Food, and what are not, we judge naturally by Sense; neither need we any other Law to be our director in that behalf than the self-same which is common unto us with Beasts. But when we come to consider of Food, as of a benefit which God of his bounteous Goodness hath provided for all things living; the Law of Reason doth here require the duty of Thankfulness at our hands towards him, at whose hands we have it. And lest Appetite in the use of Food should lead us beyond that which is meet, we owe in this case obedience to that Law of Reason, which teacheth mediocrity in meats and drinks. The same things divine Law teacheth also, as at large we have shewed it doth all parts of moral duty, whereunto we all of necessity stand bound, in regard of the Life to come. But of certain kinds of Food the Jews sometimes had, and we ourselves likewise have a mystical, religious and supernatural use; they of their Paschal Lamb and Oblations; we of our Bread and Wine in the Eucharist; which use none but divine Law could institute. Now as we live in civil society, the state of the Commonwealth wherein we live both may and doth require certain Laws concerning Food; which Laws, saving only that we are Members of the Commonwealth, where they are of force, we should not need to respect as Rules of Action; whereas now in their place and kind they must be respected and obeyed. Yea, the self-same matter is also a subject wherein sometime Ecclesiastical Laws have place; so that unless we will be authors of confusion in the Church, our private discretion, which otherwise might guide us a contrary way, must here submit itself to be that way guided, which the publick judgment of the Church hath thought better. In which case, that of Zonaras concerning Fasts may be remembered. *Fastings are good, but let good things be done in good and convenient manner. He that transgresseth in his fasting the Orders of the holy Fathers, the positive Laws of the Church of* Christ,

Christ, must be plainly told, * *that good things do lose* BOOK I.
the grace of their goodness, when in good sort they are A&C: xv.20.
not performed. And as here Men's private fancies
must give place to the higher judgment of that
Church, which is in authority a Mother over them ;
so the very actions of whole Churches have, in
regard of commerce and fellowship with other
Churches, been subject to Laws concerning Food,
the contrary unto which Laws had else been thought
more convenient for them to observe ; as by that
order of abstinence from Strangled and Blood may
appear ; an order grounded upon that fellowship
which the Churches of the Gentiles had with the
Jews. Thus we see how even one and the self-same
thing is under divers considerations conveyed through
many Laws ; and that to measure by any one kind
of Law all the actions of Men, were to confound the
admirable Order wherein God hath disposed all Laws,
each as in nature, so in degree, distinct from other.
Wherefore that here we may briefly end : Of Law
there can be no less acknowledged, than that her
Seat is the Bosom of God, her Voice the Harmony
of the World : All things in Heaven and Earth do
her homage, the very least as feeling her care, and
the greatest as not exempted from her Power : both
Angels, and Men, and Creatures of what condition
soever, though each in different sort and manner, yet
all with uniform consent, admiring her as the Mo-
ther of their Peace and Joy.

* "Οτι οὐ καλὸν τὸ καλὸν, ὅταν μὴ καλῶς γίνεται. Zonar. in Can. Apost. 66.

End of the First Book.

O F T H E
L A W S
O F
ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY.

B O O K II.

Concerning their first Position who urge Reformation in the Church of England: namely, That Scripture is the only Rule of all things, which in this Life may be done by Men.

The Matter contained in this Second Book.

1. *An Answer to their first Proof brought out of holy Scripture, Prov. ii. 9.*
2. *To their second, 1 Cor. x. 31.*
3. *To their third, 1 Tim. iv. 5.*
4. *To their fourth, Rom. xiv. 23.*
5. *To their Proofs out of Fathers, who dispute negatively from the Authority of holy Scripture.*
6. *To their Proof by the Scripture's custom of disputing from divine Authority negatively.*

7. *An Examination of their Opinion concerning the force of Arguments taken from human Authority for the ordering of Men's Actions and Persuasions.*
 8. *A Declaration what the Truth is in this matter.*
-

BOOK II.

AS that which in the Title hath been proposed for the matter whereof we treat is only the Ecclesiastical Law whereby we are governed; so neither is it my purpose to maintain any other thing than that which therein Truth and Reason shall approve. For concerning the dealings of Men who administer Government, and unto whom the execution of that Law belongeth, they have their Judge who sitteth in Heaven, and before whose Tribunal-seat they are accountable for whatsoever abuse or corruption, which (being worthily disliked in this Church) the want either of care or of conscience in them hath bred. We are no patrons of those things therefore; the best defence whereof is speedy redress and amendment. That which is of God we defend to the uttermost of that ability which he hath given: that which is otherwise, let it wither even in the root from whence it hath sprung. Wherefore all these abuses being severed and set apart, which rise from the corruption of Men, and not from the Laws themselves: come we to those things which in the very whole entire form of our Church-polity have been (as we persuade ourselves) injuriously blamed by them who endeavour to overthrow the same, and instead thereof to establish a much worse, only through a strong misconceit they have, that the same is grounded on divine Authority. Now, whether it be that through an earnest longing desire

see things brought to a peaceable end; I do but imagine the matters whereof we contend to be fewer than indeed they are; or else for that in truth they are fewer when they come to be discussed by Reason than otherwise they seem when by heat of contention they are divided into many slips, and of every branch an heap is made: surely, as now we have drawn them together, chusing out those things which are requisite to be severally all discussed, and omitting such mean specialities as are likely (without any great labour) to fall afterwards of themselves; I know no cause why either the number or the length of these controversies should diminish our hope of seeing them end with concord and love on all sides; which of his infinite love and goodness the Father of all peace and unity grant. Unto which scope that our endeavour may the more directly tend, it seemeth fittest that first those things be examined, which are as seeds from whence the rest that ensue have grown. And of such the most general is that, wherewith we are here to make our entrance: a question not moved (I think) any where in other Churches, and therefore in ours the more likely to be soon (I trust) determined; the rather for that it hath grown from no other root than only a desire to enlarge the necessary use of the Word of God; which desire hath begotten an error, enlarging it further than (as we are persuaded) soundness of truth will bear. For where-
as God hath left sundry kinds of Laws unto Men, and by all those Laws the actions of Men are in some sort directed; they hold that one only Law, the Scripture, must be the Rule to direct in all things, even so far as to the taking up of a rush or straw. About which point there should not need any question to grow, and that which is grown might presently end, if they did yield but to these two restraints. The first is, not to extend the actions whereof they speak, so low as that instance doth import of taking up a straw, but rather keep themselves

T. C. I. i.
p. 59, 60.

BOOK II. at the least within the compass of moral actions, — actions which have in them Vice or Virtue. The second, not to exact at our hands for every action the knowledge of some place of Scripture out of which we stand bound to deduce it, as by divers testimonies they seek to enforce; but rather as the truth is, so to acknowledge, that it sufficeth if such actions be framed according to the Law of Reason; the general axioms, rules, and principles of which Law, being so frequent in holy Scripture, there is no let but in that regard, even out of Scripture such duties may be deduced by some kind of consequence, (as by long circuit of deduction it may be that even all Truth, out of any Truth, may be concluded) howbeit no Man is bound in such sort to deduce all his actions out of Scripture, as if either the place be to him unknown whereon they may be concluded, or the reference unto that place not presently considered of, the action shall in that respect be condemned as unlawful. In this we dissent, and this we are presently to examine.

The first pretended proof of the first Position out of Scripture.

1. In all parts of knowledge, rightly so termed, things most general are most strong. Thus it must be inasmuch as the certainty of our persuasion touching particulars, dependeth altogether upon the credit of those generalities out of which they grow. Albeit therefore every cause admit not such infallible evidence of proof as leaveth no possibility of doubt or scruple behind it; yet they who claim the general assent of the whole World unto that which they teach, and do not fear to give very hard and heavy sentence upon as many as refuse to embrace the same, must have special regard that their first foundations and grounds be more than slender probabilities. This whole question which hath been moved about the kind of Church-regiment we could not but for our own resolution sake endeavour to unrip and sift; following therein as near as we might, the conduct of that judicial method which serveth best for

for invention of Truth. By means whereof, having BOOK II.
found this the head Theorem of all their Discourses, ———
who plead for the change of Ecclesiastical Govern-
ment in England, namely, *That the Scripture of God*
is in such sort the rule of human actions, that simply
whatsoever we do, and are not by it directed thereunto,
the same is sin; we hold it necessary that the proofs
hereof be weighed. Be they of weight sufficient or
otherwise, it is not our's to judge and determine;
only what difficulties there are which as yet with-
hold our assent till we be further and better satisfied, I
hope, no indifferent amongst them will scorn or refuse
to hear. First, therefore, whereas they alledge, *That*
Wisdom doth teach Men *every good way**; and have
thereupon inferred that no way is good in any kind
of action unless Wisdom do by Scripture lead unto
it; see they not plainly how they restrain the mani-
fold ways which Wisdom hath to teach Men by unto
one only way of teaching, which is by Scripture?
The bounds of Wisdom are large, and within them
much is contained. Wisdom was Adam's Instructor
in Paradise. Wisdom endued the Fathers who lived
before the Law, with the knowledge of holy things;
by the Wisdom of the Law of God David attained to Psal. cxix.
excel others in understanding, and Solomon likewise 95.
to excel David by the self-same Wisdom of God,
teaching him many things besides the Law. The
ways of well-doing are in number even as many, as
are the kinds of voluntary actions; so that whatso-
ever we do in this World, and may do it ill, we
shew ourselves therein by well-doing to be wise.
Now if Wisdom did teach Men by Scripture not
only all the ways that are right and good in some

* Prov. ii. 9. T. C. l. i. p. 20. I say, that the Word of
God containeth whatsoever things can fall into any part of Man's
Life. For so Solomon saith in the second Chapter of the Pro-
verbs, My son, if thou receive my words, &c. then thou shalt
understand justice, and judgment, and equity, and every good
way.

BOOK II. certain kind, according to that of St. Paul*, concerning the use of Scripture, but did simply without any manner of exception, restraint, or distinction, teach every way of doing well, there is no Art but Scripture should teach it, because every Art doth teach the way how to do something or other well. To teach Men therefore Wisdom professeth, and to teach them every good way; but not every good way by one way of teaching. Whatsoever either Men on Earth, or the Angels of Heaven do know, it is as a drop of that unemptiable Fountain of Wisdom; which Wisdom hath diversly imparted her treasures unto the World. As her ways are of sundry kinds, so her manner of teaching is not merely one and the same. Some things she openeth by the sacred Books of Scripture; some things by the glorious Works of Nature; with some things she inspireth them from above by spiritual influence; in some things she leadeth and traineth them only by worldly experience and practice. We may not so in any one special kind admire her that we disgrace her in any other; but let all her ways be according unto their place and degree adored.

The second
Proof out of
Scripture.

2. That *all things be done to the glory of God*, & the blessed Apostle (it is true) exhorteth. The glory

* 2 Tim. iii. 16. "The whole Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable to teach, to improve, to correct, and to instruct in righteousness, that the Man of God may be absolute, being made perfect unto all good works." He meaneth all and only those good Works which belong unto us as we are Men of God, and which unto Salvation are necessary. Or if we understand by Men of God, God's Ministers, there is not required in them an universal skill of every good work or way, but an hability to teach whatsoever Men are bound to do that they may be saved: and with this kind of knowledge the Scripture sufficeth to furnish them as touching matter.

§1 Cor. x. 31. T. C. l. i. p. 26. St. Paul saith, "That whether we eat or drink, or whatsoever we do, we must do it to the glory of God." But no Man can glorify God in any thing but by obedience; and there is no obedience but in respect of the commandment and word of God; therefore it followeth that the word of God directeth a Man in all his actions.

of God is the admirable excellency of that Virtue BOOK II.
divine, which being made manifest, causeth Men
and Angels to extol his Greatness, and in regard
thereof to fear him. By being glorified, it is not
meant, that he doth receive any augmentation of
glory at our hands; but his Name we glorify, when
we testify our acknowledgment of his glory. Which
albeit we most effectually do by the virtue of obe-
dience; nevertheless it may be perhaps a question,
whether St. Paul did mean that we sin as oft as ever
we go about any thing without an exprefs intent and
purpose to obey God therein. He saith of himself,
I do in all things please all Men, seeking not mine own
commodity, but rather the good of many, that they may be
saved. Shall it hereupon be thought, that St. Paul
did not move either hand or foot, but with exprefs
intent even thereby to further the common Salva-
tion of Men? We move, we sleep, we take the cup at
the hand of our friend, a number of things we often-
times do only to satisfy some natural desire, without
present, exprefs and actual reference unto any Com-
mandment of God. Unto his glory even these things
are done which we naturally perform, and not only
that which morally and spiritually we do. For by
every effect proceeding from the most concealed in-
stincts of Nature, his power is made manifest. But
it doth not therefore follow, that of necessity we
shall sin unless we expressly intend this in every such
particular. But be it a thing which requireth no
more than only our general presupposed willingness
to please God in all things, or be it a matter wherein
we cannot so glorify the Name of God as we should,
without an actual intent to do him in that particular
some special obedience; yet for any thing there is in
this sentence alledged to the contrary, God may be
glorified by obedience, and obeyed by performance
of his Will, and his Will be performed with an
actual intelligent desire to fulfil that Law which
maketh known what his Will is, although no special
clause

BOOK II. clause or sentence of Scripture be in every such action set before Men's eyes to warrant it. For Scripture is not the only Law whereby God hath opened his Will touching all things that may be done; but there are other kind of Laws which notify the Will of God, as in the former Book hath been proved at large; nor is there any Law of God, whereunto he doth not account our obedience his glory. *Do therefore all things unto the glory of God, (saith the Apostle) be inoffensive both to the Jews and Grecians, and the Church of God; even as I please all Men in all things, not seeking mine own commodity, but many's, that they may be saved.* In the least thing done disobediently towards God or offensively against the good of Men, whose benefit we ought to seek for as for our own, we plainly shew that we do not acknowledge God to be such as indeed he is, and consequently that we glorify him not. This the blessed Apostle teacheth; but doth any Apostle teach that we cannot glorify God otherwise than only in doing what we find that God in Scripture commandeth us to do? The Churches dispersed among the Heathen in the east part of the Word are by the Apostle St. Peter exhorted to have their *conversation honest among the Gentiles, that they which speak evil of them as of evil-doers, might by the good works which they should see, glorify God in the day of visitation.* As long as that which Christians did was good and no way subject unto just reproof, their virtuous conversation was a mean to work the Heathen's conversion unto Christ. Seeing therefore this had been a thing altogether impossible, but that Infidels themselves did discern in matters of life and conversation, when Believers did well and when otherwise; when they glorified their heavenly Father, and when not: it followeth, that some things wherein God is glorified may be some other way known than only by the sacred Scripture; of which Scripture the Gentiles being utterly ignorant, did notwithstanding judge rightly of the quality of Christian Men's actions.

Most

Most certain it is, that nothing but only Sin doth dishonour God. So that to glorify him in all things, is to do nothing whereby the Name of God may be blasphemed; nothing whereby the Salvation of Jew or Grecian or any in the Church of Christ may be let or hindred; nothing whereby his Law is transgressed. But the question is, whether only Scripture do shew whatsoever God is glorified in?

3. And though Meats and Drinks be said to be sanctified by the Word of God and by prayer; yet neither is this a reason sufficient to prove, that by Scripture we must of necessity be directed in every light and common thing which is incident unto any part of Man's Life. Only it sheweth that unto us the Word, that is to say, the Gospel of Christ, having not delivered any such difference of things clean and unclean, as the Law of Moses did unto the Jews, there is no cause but that we may use indifferently all things as long as we do not (like swine) take the benefit of them without a thankful acknowledgement of his liberality and goodness by whose providence they are enjoyed. And therefore the Apostle gave warning before-hand to take heed of such as should enjoin to *abstain from Meats, which God hath created to be received with thanksgiving, by them which believe and know the Truth. For every Creature of God is good, and nothing to be refused, if it be received with thanksgiving, because it is sanctified by the Word of God and Prayer.* The Gospel, by not making many things unclean, as the Law did, hath sanctified those things generally to all, which particularly each Man unto himself must sanctify by a reverend and holy use. Which will hardly be drawn so far as to serve their purpose, who have imagined the Word in such sort to sanctify all things, that neither Food can be tasted nor Raiment put on, nor in the World any thing done, but this deed must needs be sin in them which do not first know it appointed unto them by Scripture before they do it.

BOOK II.

Rom. ii. 34.

1 Cor. x. 32.

Rom. ii. 23.

The third

Scripture-

proof, 1 Tim.

4. 5. and that

which St.

Paul said of

Meats and

Drinks, that

they are

sanctified

unto us by

the Word of

God, the

same is to be

understood

of all things

else whatso-

ever we have

the use of.

T. C. l. i.

p. 26.

1 Tim. iv.

4. But

BOOK II.

The fourth
Scripture-
proof, Rom.
xiv. 23.
T. C. l. i.
p. 27.

4. But to come unto that which of all other things in Scripture is most stood upon; that place of St. Paul, they say, is of all other most clear, where *speaking of those things which are called indifferent*, in the end he concludeth, *That whatsoever is not of faith, is sin; but faith is not but in respect of the Word of God; therefore whatsoever is not done by the Word of God, is sin.* Whereunto we answer, that albeit the name of Faith being properly and strictly taken, it must needs have reference unto some uttered Word as the object of belief: nevertheless, sith the ground of credit is the credibility of things credited; and things are made credible, either by the known condition and quality of the utterer, or by the manifest likelihood of truth which they have in themselves; hereupon it riseth, that whatsoever we are persuaded of, the same we are generally said to believe. In which generality the object of Faith may not so narrowly be restrained, as if the same did extend no further than only to the Scriptures of God. *Though (saith our Saviour) ye believe not me, believe my works, that ye may know and believe that the Father is in me, and I in him. The other Disciples said unto Thomas, We have seen the Lord; but his answer unto them was, Except I see in his hands the print of the nails, and put my finger into them, I will not believe.* Can there be any thing more plain, than that which by these two sentences appeareth; namely, that there may be a certain belief grounded upon other assurance than Scripture; any thing more clear, than that we are not said only to believe the things which we know by another's relation, but even whatsoever we are certainly persuaded of, whether it be by Reason or by Sense? Forasmuch therefore as *it is

* And if any will say, that St. Paul meaneth there a full *πειθοσφορίαν* and persuasion that that which he doth is well done, I grant it: but from whence can that spring but from Faith? How can we persuade and assure ourselves that we do well, but whereas we have the Word of God for our warrant? T. C. l. i. c. 27.

granted

granted that St. Paul doth mean nothing else by BOOK II.
Faith, but only a full persuasion that that which
we do is well done; against which kind of Faith or
Persuasion, as St. Paul doth count it sin to enter-
prize any thing, ‡ so likewise some of the very
Heathen have taught, as Tully, *That nothing ought
to be done whereof thou doubtest, whether it be right or
wrong*; whereby it appeareth that even those which
had no knowledge of the Word of God, did see
much of the equity of this which the Apostle re-
quireth of a Christian Man; I hope we shall not
seem altogether unnecessarily to doubt of the found-
ness of their opinion, who think simply that nothing
but only the Word of God can give us assurance in
any thing we are to do, and resolve us that we do
well. For might not the Jews have been fully per-
suaded that they did well to think (if they had so
thought) that in Christ God the Father was, al-
though the only ground of this their Faith, had been
the wonderful Works they saw him do? Might not,
yea, did not Thomas fully in the end persuade him-
self, that he did well to think that Body which now
was raised, to be the same which had been crucified?
That which gave Thomas this assurance was his
sense; *Thomas, because thou hast seen, thou believest*, John xx.
faith our Saviour. What Scripture had Tully for 29.
his assurance? Yet I nothing doubt, but that they
who alledge him, think he did well to set down in
writing a thing so consonant unto truth. Finally, we
all believe that the Scriptures of God are sacred,
and that they have proceeded from God, ourselves

‡ What also that some even of those Heathen Men have taught,
that nothing ought to be done, whereof thou doubtest whether it
be right or wrong? Whereby it appeareth, that even those which
had no knowledge of the Word of God, did see much of the
equity of this which the Apostle requireth of a Christian Man:
and that the chiefest difference is, that where they sent Men for
the difference of good and evil to the light of Reason, in such
things the Apostle sendeth them to the School of Christ in his
Word, which only is able through Faith to give them assurance and
resolution in their doings, T. C. l. i. p. 60.

BOOK II. we assure that we do right well in so believing. We have for this point a demonstration sound and infallible. But it is not the Word of God which doth or possibly can assure us, that we do well to think it his Word. For if any one Book of Scripture did give testimony to all; yet still that Scripture which giveth credit to the rest, would require another Scripture to give credit unto it; neither could we ever come unto any pause whereon to rest our assurance this way; so that unless beside Scripture, there were something which might assure us that we do well, we could not think we do well; no, not in being assured that Scripture is a sacred and holy rule of well-doing. On which determination we might be contented to stay ourselves without further proceeding herein, but that we are drawn on into a larger speech by reason of their so great earnestness, who beat more and more upon these last alledged words, as being of all other most pregnant. Whereas therefore they still argue, That *wheresoever Faith is wanting, there is Sin*; and, *in every Action not commanded, Faith is wanting*; ergo, *in every Action not commanded, there is Sin*; I would demand of them; first, forasmuch as the nature of things indifferent is neither to be commanded nor forbidden, but left free and arbitrary; how there can be any thing indifferent, if for want of Faith Sin be committed, when any thing not commanded is done? So that of necessity they must add somewhat, and at leastwise thus set it down: In every Action not commanded of God, or permitted with approbation, Faith is wanting, and for want of Faith there is Sin. The next thing we are to enquire is, what those things be which God permitteth with approbation, and how we may know them to be so permitted? When there are unto one end fundry means; as for example, for the sustenance of our bodies many kinds of food, many sorts of raiment to clothe our nakedness, and so in other things of like condition: here the end of it-
self

T. C. 1. ii.
p. 58.

self being necessary, but not so any one mean there-
unto; necessary that our bodies should be both fed
and cloathed, howbeit no one kind of food or rai-
ment necessary; therefore we hold these things free
in their own nature and indifferent. The choice is
left to our own discretion, except a principal bond
of some higher duty remove the indifferency that
such things have in themselves. Their indifferency
is removed, if either we take away our own liberty,
as Ananias did, for whom to have sold or held his
possessions it was indifferent till his solemn vow and
promise unto God had strictly bound him one only
way; or if God himself have precisely abridged the
same, by restraining us unto, or by barring us from
some one or more things of many, which otherwise
were in themselves altogether indifferent. Many
fashions of priestly attire there were, whereof Aaron
and his sons might have had their free choice with-
out sin, but that God expressly tied them unto one.
All meats indifferent unto the Jew, were it not that
God by name excepted some, as swine's flesh. Im-
possible therefore it is we should otherwise think,
than that what things God doth neither command
nor forbid, the same he permitteth with approbation
either to be done or left undone. *All things are law-
ful unto me*, saith the Apostle, speaking as it seem-
eth, in the person of the Christian Gentile for main-
tenance of liberty in things indifferent; whereunto
his answer is, that nevertheless, *All things are not ex-
pedient*; in things indifferent there is a choice, they
are not always equally expedient. Now in things al-
though not commanded of God, yet lawful, because
they are permitted, the question is, what light shall
shew us the conveniency which one hath above ano-
ther? For answer, their final determination is, that
*whereas the Heathen did send Men for the difference of
Good and Evil to the light of Reason, in such things the
Apostle sendeth us to the School of Christ in his Word,
which only is able through Faith to give us assurance and
resolution*

Acts v.

Exod. xxviii.
4, 43.
Levit. xi.

1 Cor. vi.
12.

BOOK II. *resolution in our doings.* Which word *only*, is utterly without possibility of ever being proved. For what if it were true concerning things indifferent, that unless the Word of the Lord had determined of the free use of them, there could have been no lawful use of them at all; which notwithstanding is untrue; because it is not the Scripture's setting down such things as indifferent, but their not setting down as necessary that doth make them to be indifferent; yet this to our present purpose serveth nothing at all. We enquire not now, whether any thing be free to be used which Scripture hath not set down as free? but concerning things known and acknowledged to be indifferent, whether particularly in chusing any one of them before another, we sin, if any thing but Scripture direct us into this our choice. When many meats are set before me, all are indifferent, none unlawful; I take one as most convenient. If Scripture require me so to do, then is not the thing indifferent, because I must do what Scripture requireth. They are all indifferent; I might take any; Scripture doth not require of me to make any special choice of one; I do notwithstanding make choice of one, my discretion teaching me so to do. A hard case, that hereupon I should be justly condemned of sin. Nor let any Man think that following the judgment of natural discretion in such cases, we can have no assurance that we please God. For to the Author and God of our nature, how shall any operation proceeding in natural sort, be in that respect unacceptable? The nature which himself hath given to work by, he cannot but be delighted with, when we exercise the same any way, without commandment of his to the contrary. My desire is to make this cause so manifest, that if it were possible no doubt or scruple concerning the same might remain in any Man's cogitation. Some Truths there are, the verity whereof time doth alter. As it is now true that Christ is risen from the dead; which
thing

thing was not true at such time as Christ was living BOOK II.
on earth, and had not suffered. It would be known
therefore, whether this which they teach concerning
the sinful stain of all actions not commanded of God,
be a Truth that doth now appertain unto us only, or
a perpetual Truth, in such sort that from the first
beginning of the World unto the last consummation
thereof it neither hath been, nor can be otherwise.
I see not how they can restrain this unto any parti-
cular time, how they can think it true now, and not
always true, that in every action not commanded
there is for want of Faith Sin. Then let them cast
back their eyes unto former Generations of Men,
and mark what was done in the prime of the World.
Seth, Enoch, Noah, Sem, Abraham, Job, and the
rest that lived before any syllable of the Law of God
was written, did they not sin as much as we do in
every action not commanded? That which God is
unto us by his sacred Word, the same he was unto
them by such like means as Eliphaz in Job describ- Job iv. 19.
eth. If therefore we sin in every action which the
Scripture commandeth us not; it followeth that
they did the like in all such actions as were not by
Revelation from Heaven exacted at their hands.
Unless God from Heaven did by vision still shew
them what to do, they might do nothing, not eat,
not drink, not sleep, not move. Yea, but even as
in darkness, candle-light may serve to guide Men's
steps, which to use in the day were madness; so
when God hath once delivered his Law in writing, it
may be they are of opinion, that then it must needs
be sin for Men to do any thing which was not there
commanded for them to do, whatsoever they might
do before. Let this be granted, and it shall hereupon
plainly ensue, either that the light of Scripture once
shining in the World, all other light of Nature is
therewith in such sort drowned, that now we need it
not, neither may we longer use it; or if it stand us
in any stead, yet as Aristotle speaketh of Men whom Arist. Pol. i.

BOOK II. Nature hath framed for the state of servitude, saying, *They have reason so far forth as to conceive when others direct them*, but little or none in directing themselves by themselves; so likewise our natural capacity and judgment must serve us only for the right understanding of that which the sacred Scripture teacheth. Had the Prophets who succeeded Moses, or the blessed Apostles which followed them, been settled in this persuasion, never would they have taken so great pains in gathering together natural arguments, thereby to teach the Faithful their duties. To use unto them any other motive than *Scriptum est, Thus it is written*, had been to teach them other grounds of their actions than Scripture; which, I grant, they alledge commonly, but not only. Only Scripture they should have alledged, had they been thus persuaded, that so far forth we do sin as we do any thing otherwise directed than by Scripture. St. Augustine was resolute in points of Christianity to credit none, how godly and learned soever he were, unless he confirmed his sentence by the Scriptures, *or by some reason not contrary to them*. Let them therefore with St. Augustine reject and condemn that which is not grounded either on the Scripture, or on some reason not contrary to Scripture, and we are ready to give them our hands in token of friendly consent with them.

August. Ep.
18.

The first Assertion endeavoured to be proved by the use of taking Arguments negatively from the Authority of Scripture; which kind of disputing is usual in the Fathers.

5. But against this it may be objected, and is, that the Fathers do nothing more usually in their Books, than draw Arguments from the Scripture negatively in reproof of that which is evil; *Scriptures teach it not, avoid it therefore*. These Disputes with the Fathers, are ordinary, neither is it hard to shew that the Prophets themselves have so reasoned. Which Arguments being sound and good, it should seem that it cannot be unsound or evil to hold still the same assertion, against which hitherto we have disputed. For if it stand with reason thus to argue, such a thing is not taught us in Scripture, therefore

we

we may not receive or allow it; how should it seem unreasonable to think that whatsoever we may lawfully do the Scripture by commanding it must make it lawful. But how far such Arguments do reach, it shall the better appear by considering the matter wherein they have been urged. First therefore this we constantly deny, that of so many testimonies as they are able to produce for the strength of negative Arguments, any one doth generally (which is the point in question) condemn either all Opinions as false, or all Actions as unlawful which the Scripture teacheth us not. The most that can be collected out of them is only, that in some cases a negative Argument taken from Scripture is strong, whereof no Man endued with judgment can doubt. But doth the strength of some negative Argument prove this kind of negative Argument strong, by force whereof all things are denied which Scripture affirmeth not, or all things which Scripture prescribeth not condemned? The question between us is concerning matter of Action, which things are lawful or unlawful for Men to do. The sentences alledged out of the Fathers, are as peremptory, and as large in every respect for matter of Opinion, as of Action. Which argueth that in truth they never meant any otherwise to tie the one than the other unto Scripture, both being thereunto equally tied, as far as each is required in the same kind of necessity unto Salvation. If therefore it be not unlawful to know, and with full perswasion to believe much more than Scripture alone doth teach; if it be against all Sense and Reason to condemn the knowledge of so many arts and sciences as are otherwise learned than in holy Scripture, notwithstanding the manifest speeches of ancient Catholick Fathers which seem to close up within the bosom thereof all manner of good and lawful knowledge, wherefore should their words be thought more effectual to shew that we may not in deeds and practice, than they are to prove that in speculation

BOOK II. speculation and knowledge we ought not to go any farther than the Scripture; which Scripture being given to teach matters of belief, no less than of action; the Fathers must needs be, and are even as plain against credit besides the relation, as against practice without the injunction of the Scripture. St. Augustine hath said, **Whether it be question of Christ, or whether it be question of his Church, or of what thing soever the question be: I say not, if we, but if an Angel from Heaven shall tell us any thing beside that you have received in the Scripture under the Law and the Gospel, let him be accursed.* In like sort Tertullian, *We may not give ourselves this liberty to bring in any thing of our will, nor chuse any thing that other Men bring in of their will; we have the Apostles themselves for Authors, which themselves brought nothing of their own will; but the Discipline which they received of Christ, they delivered faithfully unto the People; in which place the name of Discipline importeth not, as they who alledge it would fain have it construed, but as any Man (who noteth the circumstance of the place, and the occasion of uttering the words) will easily acknowledge, even the self-same thing it signifieth which the name of Doctrine doth; and as well might the one as the other there have been used.* To help them farther, doth not St. Jerome, after the self-same manner dispute, *We believe it not, because we read it not; yea, We ought not so much as to know the things which the Book of the Law containeth not,* saith St. Hilary. Shall we hereupon then conclude, that we may not take knowledge of, or give credit unto any thing which sense, or experience, or report, or art doth propose,

Aug. cont.
liter. Petil.
l. iii. c. 6.

Tertul. de
præscrip. ad-
vers.

Hierom.
contra Hel-
vid. Hilar.
in Ps. cxxxii.

* T. C. l. ii. p. 81. Augustine saith, *Whether it be question of Christ, or whether it be question of his Church, &c.* And lest the Answer should restrain the general saying of Augustine, unto the Doctrine of the Gospel, so that he would thereby shut out the Discipline; even Tertullian himself, before he was embroiled with the Heresy of Montanus, giveth testimony unto the Discipline in these words, *We may not give ourselves, &c.*

unless

unless we find the same in Scripture? No, it is too plain that so far to extend their speeches, is to wrest them against their true intent and meaning. To urge any thing upon the Church, requiring thereunto that religious assent of Christian Belief, wherewith the words of the holy Prophets are received; to urge any thing as part of that supernatural and celestially revealed Truth which God hath taught, and not to shew it in Scripture, this did the ancient Fathers evermore think unlawful, impious, execrable. And thus as their speeches were meant, so by us they must be restrained. As for those alledged words of Cyprian, † *The Christian Religion shall find, that out of this Scripture Rules of all Doctrines have sprung, and that from hence doth spring, and hither doth return whatsoever the Ecclesiastical Discipline doth contain*; surely this place would never have been brought forth in this cause, if it had been but once read over in the Author himself out of whom it is cited. For the words are uttered concerning that one principal Commandment of Love; in the honour whereof he speaketh after this sort: † *Surely this Commandment containeth the Law and the Prophets, and in this one Word is the Abridgment of all the Volumes of Scripture: this Nature, and Reason, and the authority of thy Word, O Lord, doth proclaim; this we have heard out of thy mouth; herein the perfection of all*

† T. C. l. ii. p. 8. Let him hear what Cyprian saith, The Christian Religion (saith he) shall find, that, &c.

† Vere hoc mandatum Legem complectitur et Prophetas, et in hoc verbo omnium Scripturam volumina coarctantur. Hoc natura, hoc ratio, hoc Domine, verbi tui clamat autoritas, hoc ex ore tuo audivimus, hic invenit consummationem omnis Religio. Primum est hoc mandatum et ultimum, hoc in libro vitæ conscriptum indeficientem et Hominibus et Angelis exhibet lectionem. Legat hoc unum verbum et in hoc mandato meditetur Christiana Religio, et invenit ex hac Scriptura omnium doctrinarum regulas emanasse, et hinc nasci et huc reverti quicquid Ecclesiastica continet disciplina, et in omnibus irritum esse et frivolum quicquid Dilectio non confirmat.

Religion

BOOK II. *Religion doth consist. This is the first Commandment and the last: this being written in the Book of Life, is (as it were) an everlasting Lesson both to Men and Angels. Let Christian Religion read this one Word, and meditate upon this Commandment, and out of this Scripture it shall find the Rules of all Learning to have sprung, and from hence to have risen, and hither to return, whatsoever the Ecclesiastical Discipline containeth; and that in all things it is vain and bootless which Charity confirmeth not.* Was this a sentence (trow you) of so great force to prove that Scripture is the only Rule of all the actions of Men? Might they not hereby even as well prove, that one Commandment of Scripture is the only Rule of all things, and so exclude the rest of the Scripture, as now they do all means besides Scripture? But thus it fareth, when too much desire of contradiction causeth our speech rather to pass by number than to stay for weight. Well, but Tertul-
Tertul. lib.
de Monog.
lian doth in this case speak yet more plainly: § *The Scripture (saith he) denieth what it noteth not*: which are indeed the words of Tertullian. But what? the Scripture reckoneth up the Kings of Israel, and amongst those Kings, David; the Scripture reckoneth up the Sons of David, and amongst those Sons, Solomon. To prove that amongst the Kings of Israel, there was no David but only one; no Solomon but one in the Sons of David, Tertullian's Argument will fitly prove. For inasmuch as the Scripture did propose to reckon up all; if there were more, it would have named them. In this case the *Scripture doth deny the thing it noteth not*. Howbeit I could not but think that Man to do me some piece of manifest injury which would hereby fasten upon me a general opinion, as if I did think the Scripture to deny the very reign of King Henry the eighth, because it nowhere noteth that any such King did reign. Tertul-

§ T. C. l. ii. p. 81. And in another place Tertullian saith, That the Scripture denieth that which it noteth not.

lian's

lian's speech is probable concerning such matter as he there speaketh of. *There was, saith Tertullian, no second Lamech like to him that had two Wives; the Scripture denieth what it noteth not.* As therefore it noteth one such to have been in that Age of the World; so had there been more, it would by likelihood as well have noted many as one. What infer we now hereupon? *There was no second Lamech; the Scripture denieth what it noteth not.* Were it consonant unto Reason to divorce these two sentences, the former of which doth shew how the latter is restrained, and not marking the former, to conclude by the latter of them that simply whatsoever any Man at this day doth think true is by the Scripture denied, unless it be there affirmed to be true? I wonder that a case so weak and feeble hath been so much persisted in. But to come unto those their sentences wherein matters of action are more apparently touched, the name of Tertullian is as before, so here again pretended; * who writing unto his Wife two Books, and exhorting her in the one to live a Widow, in case God before her should take him unto his mercy; and in the other, if she did marry, yet not to join herself to an Infidel, as in those times some Widows Christian had done for the advancement of their estate in this present World, he urgeth very earnestly St. Paul's words, *Only in the Lord*: whereupon he demandeth of them that think they may do the contrary, what Scripture they can shew where God hath dispensed and granted licence to do against that which the blessed Apostle so strictly doth enjoin? And because in defence it might perhaps be replied; Seeing God doth will that Couples which are married when both are Infidels, if either Party

* T. C. l. ii. p. 80. And that in indifferent things it is not enough that they be not against the Word, but that they be according to the Word, it may appear by other places, where he saith, That whatsoever pleaseth not the Lord, displeaseth him, and with hurt is received, lib. ii. ad uxorem.

BOOK II. chance to be after converted unto Christianity, this should not make separation between them as long as the unconverted was willing to retain the other on whom the Grace of Christ had shined; wherefore then should that let the making of Marriage, which doth not dissolve Marriage being made? After great reasons shewed why God doth in Converts being married allow continuance with Infidels, and yet disallow that the Faithful when they are free should enter into bonds of Wedlock with such, he concludeth in the end concerning those Women that so marry, † *They that please not the Lord, do even thereby offend the Lord; they do even thereby throw themselves into evil; that is to say, while they please him not by marrying in him, they do that whereby they incur his displeasure; they make an offer of themselves into the service of that enemy with whose Servants they link themselves in so near a bond. What one syllable is there in all this prejudicial any way to that which we hold? For the words of Tertullian, as they are by them alledged, are two ways misunderstood; both in the former part, where that is extended generally to all things in the neuter gender, which he speaketh in the feminine gender of Women's persons; and in the latter, where, received with hurt, is put instead of wilful incurring that which is evil. And so in sum, Tertullian doth neither mean nor say as is pretended, Whatsoever pleaseth not the Lord, displeaseth him, and with hurt is received; but, Those Women that please not the Lord by their kind of marrying, do even thereby offend the Lord, they do even thereby throw themselves into evil.* * Somewhat more shew there is in a second

† Quæ Domino non placent, utique Dominum offendunt, utique malo se inferunt.

* T. C. l. ii. p. 81. And to come yet nearer, where he disputeth against the wearing of Crown or Garland (which is indifferent in itself) to those which objecting asked, Where the Scripture saith, that a Man might not wear a Crown? He answereth, by asking where the Scripture saith that they may wear? And

place of Tertullian, which notwithstanding when BOOK II.
we have examined, it will be found as the rest are. —

The Roman Emperor's custom was at certain solemn times to bestow on his Soldiers a Donative; which Donative they received, wearing Garlands upon their Heads. There were, in the time of the Emperors Severus and Antoninus, many who, being Soldiers, had been converted unto Christ, and notwithstanding continued still in that military course of life. In which number, one Man there was amongst all the rest, who at such a time coming to the Tribune of the Army to receive his Donative, came, but with a Garland in his Hand, and not in such sort as others did. The Tribune, offended hereat, demanded what this great singularity would mean: to whom the Soldier, *Christianus sum, I am a Christian*. Many there were so besides him, which yet did otherwise at that time; whereupon grew a question, whether a Christian Soldier might herein do as the unchristian did and wear as they wore. Many of them which were very sound in Christian belief, did rather commend the zeal of this Man than approve his action. Tertullian was at the same time a Montanist, and an enemy unto the Church for condemning that prophetic Spirit which Montanus and his Followers did boast they had received; as if in them Christ had performed his last promise; as if to them he had sent the Spirit that should be their Perfector and final Instructor in the Mysteries of Christian Truth.

And unto them replying that it is permitted which is not forbidden, he answereth, that it is forbidden, which is not permitted. Whereby appeareth, that the Argument of the Scriptures negatively, holdeth not only in the Doctrine and Ecclesiastical Discipline, but even in matters arbitrary and variable by the advice of the Church. Where it is not enough that they be not forbidden, unless there be some word which doth permit the use of them: it is not enough that the Scripture speaketh not against them, unless it speak for them: and finally, where it displeaseth the Lord which pleaseth him not, we must of necessity have the Word of his mouth to declare his pleasure.

Which

BOOK II.

Tert. de
Coron.
Milit.

Which exulceration of Mind made him apt to take all occasions of contradiction. Wherefore in honour of that action, and to gall their minds who did not so much commend it, he wrote his Book *De Corona Militis*, not dissembling the stomach wherewith he wrote it. For first, the Man he commended as one more constant than the rest of his Brethren, *who presumed*, saith he, *that they might well enough serve two Lords*. Afterwards choler somewhat rising within him, he addeth, *It doth even remain that they should also devise how to rid themselves of his Martyrdoms, towards the Prophecies of whose Holy Spirit they have already shewed their disdain. They mutter that their good and long peace is now in hazard. I doubt not but some of them send the Scriptures before, truss up bag and baggage, make themselves in a readiness that they may fly from city to city; for that is the only point of the Gospel which they are careful not to forget. I know even their Pastors very well what Men they are; in peace Lions, Harts in time of trouble and fear: now these Men, saith Tertullian, They must be answered, Where do we find it written in Scripture, that a Christian Man may wear a Garland? And as Men's speeches uttered in heat of distempered affection, have oftentimes much more eagerness than weight; so he that shall mark the proofs alledged, and the answers to things objected in that Book will now and then perhaps espy the like imbecility. Such is that Argument whereby they that wore on their Heads Garlands are charged as transgressors of Nature's Law, and guilty of Sacrilege against God the Lord of Nature, inasmuch as Flowers in such sort worn, can neither be smelt nor seen well by those that wear them; and God made Flowers sweet and beautiful, that being seen and smelt unto they might so delight. Neither doth Tertullian bewray this weakness in striking only, but also in repelling their strokes with whom he contendeth. They ask, saith he, *What Scripture is there which doth teach that we should**

should not be crowned? And what Scripture is there BOOK II.
which doth teach that we should? for in requiring
on the contrary part the aid of Scripture, they do give sen-
tence beforehand, that their part ought also by Scripture
to be aided. Which answer is of no great force.
 There is no necessity, that if I confess I ought not
 to do that which the Scripture forbiddeth me, I
 should thereby acknowledge myself bound to do no-
 thing which the Scripture commandeth me not. For
 many inducements besides Scripture may lead me to
 that, which if Scripture be against, they all give
 place and are of no value, yet otherwise are strong
 and effectual to persuade. Which thing himself well
 enough understanding, and being not ignorant that
 Scripture in many things doth neither command nor
 forbid, but use silence, his resolution in fine, is, that
 in the Church a number of things are strictly observ-
 ed, whereof no Law of Scripture maketh mention
 one way or other; that of things once received and
 confirmed by use, long usage is a Law sufficient;
 that in civil affairs, when there is no other Law,
 custom itself doth stand for Law; that inasmuch
 as Law doth stand upon Reason, to alledge Reason
 serveth as well as to cite Scripture; that whatsoever
 is reasonable, the same is lawful, whosoever is the
 author of it; that the authority of custom is great;
 finally, that the custom of Christians was then, and
 had been a long time, not to wear Garlands, and
 therefore that undoubtedly they did offend who pre-
 sumed to violate such a custom by not observing that
 thing, the very inveterate observation whereof was
 a Law sufficient to bind all Men to observe it, unless
 they could shew some higher Law, some Law of
 Scripture to the contrary. This presupposed, it may
 stand then very well with strength and soundness of
 reason, even thus to answer, *Whereas they ask what*
Scripture forbiddeth them to wear a Garland? we are
in this case rather to demand, What Scripture commandeth
them? They cannot here alledge, that that is permitted
which

BOOK II. *which is not forbidden them: no, that is forbidden them which is not permitted.* For long received custom forbidding them to do as they did (if so be it did forbid them) there was no excuse in the world to justify their act, unless in the Scripture they could shew some Law that did licence them thus to break a received custom. Now whereas in all the Books of Tertullian besides, there is not so much found as in that one, to prove not only that we may do, but that we ought to do fundry things which the Scripture commandeth not; out of that very Book these sentences are brought, to make us believe that Tertullian was of a clean contrary mind. We cannot therefore hereupon yield; we cannot grant, that hereby is made manifest the Argument of Scripture negative to be of force, not only in Doctrine and Ecclesiastical Discipline, but even in matters arbitrary. For Tertullian doth plainly hold even in that Book, that neither the matter which he entreateth of was arbitrary, but necessary, inasmuch as the received custom of the Church did tie and bind them not to wear Garlands as the Heathens did; yea, and further also he reckoneth up particularly a number of things whereof he expressly concludeth, *Harum et aliarum ejusmodi disciplinarum si legem expostules Scripturarum, nullam invenies*; which is as much as if he had said in express words, Many things there are which concern the Discipline of the Church and the Duties of Men, which to abrogate and take away, the Scriptures negatively urged may not in any case persuade us, but they must be observed, yea, although no Scripture be found which requireth any such thing. Tertullian therefore undoubtedly doth not in this Book shew himself to be of the same mind with them, by whom his name is pretended.

The first
Assertion
endeavoured
to be con-
firmed by

6. But sith the sacred Scriptures themselves afford oftentimes such Arguments as are taken from divine

the Scripture's custom of disputing from divine Authority negatively, 1 Joh. ii, 5,

Authority both one way and the other ; *The Lord* BOOK I.
hath commanded, therefore it must be : And again, in
 like sort, *He hath not, therefore it must not be* ; some
 certainty concerning this point seemeth requisite to
 be set down. God himself can neither possibly err,
 nor lead into error. For this cause his Testimonies,
 whatsoever he affirmeth, are always truth and most
 infallible certainty. Yea, further, because the things
 that proceed from him are perfect without any man-
 ner of defect or maim ; it cannot be but that the
 words of his mouth are absolute, and lack nothing
 which they should have for performance of that thing
 whereunto they tend. Whereupon it followeth, that
 the end being known whereunto he directeth his
 speech, the Argument negatively is evermore strong
 and forcible concerning those things that are ap-

ii. 5. God is Light, and there is in him no Darknes at all. Heb.
 vi. 18. It is impossible that God should lye. Numb. xxiii. 19.
 God is not as Man, that he should lye. T. C. l. ii. p. 48. “ It is
 not hard to shew that the Prophets have reasoned negatively.
 As when in the Person of the Lord the Prophet saith, Whereof I
 have not spoken, Jer. xix. 5. And which never entered into my
 Heart, Jer. vii, 31, 32. And where he condemneth them, be-
 cause they have not asked Counsel at the mouth of the Lord, Isai.
 xxx. 2. And it may be shewed, that the same kind of Argu-
 ment hath been used in things which are not of the substance of
 Salvation or Damnation, and whereof there was no Command-
 ment to the contrary (as in the former there was. Levit. xviii. 21.
 and xx. 3. Deut. xvii. 16.) In Joshua the Children of Israel
 are charged by the Prophet that they asked not Counsel at the
 mouth of the Lord, when they entered into Covenant with the
 Gibeonites, Joshua xix. 14. And yet that Covenant was not
 made contrary unto any Commandment of God. Moreover, we
 read that when David had taken this counsel, to build a Temple
 unto the Lord, albeit the Lord had revealed before in his Word,
 that there should be such a standing-place, where the Ark of the
 Covenant and the Service should have a certain abiding ; and
 albeit there was no Word of God which forbad David to build
 the Temple ; yet the Lord (with commendation of his good
 affection and zeal he had to the advancement of his Glory) con-
 cludeth against David’s resolution to build the Temple, with this
 reason ; namely, that he had given no Commandment of this
 who should build it, 1 Chron. xvii. 6.”

parently

BOOK II. parently requisite unto the same end. As for example; God intending to set down fundry times that which in Angels is most excellent, hath not any where spoken so highly of them as he hath of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ; therefore they are not in dignity equal unto him. It is the Apostle St. Paul's Argument. The purpose of God was to teach his People, both unto whom they should offer Sacrifice, and what Sacrifice was to be offered. To burn their Sons in fire unto Baal he did not command them, he spake no such thing, neither came it into his mind; therefore this they ought not to have done. Which Argument the Prophet Jeremy useth more than once, as being so effectual and strong, that although the thing he reproveth were not only not commanded, but forbidden them and that expressly; yet the Prophet chuseth rather to charge them with the fault of making a Law unto themselves, than the crime of transgressing a Law which God had made. For when the Lord hath once himself precisely set down a form of executing that wherein we are to serve him; the fault appeareth greater to do that which we are not, than not to do that which we are commanded. In this we seem to charge the Law of God with hardness only, in that with foolishness; in this we shew ourselves weak and unapt to be doers of his Will, in that we take upon us to be Controllers of his Wisdom: in this we fail to perform the thing which God seeth meet, convenient and good; in that we presume to see what is meet and convenient better than God himself. In those actions therefore, the whole form whereof God hath of purpose set down to be observed, we may not otherwise do than exactly as he hath prescribed: in such things negative Arguments are strong. Again, with a negative Argument David is pressed concerning the purpose he had to build a Temple unto the Lord: *Thus saith the Lord, Thou shalt not build me an House to dwell in. Wheresoever I have walked*

Levit. xviii.
21. and xx.

3.
Deut. xxviii.

1 Chron.
xvii. 6.

walked with all Israel, spake I one word to any of the BOOK II.
 Judges of Israel, whom I commanded to feed my People, —
 saying, *Why have ye not built me an House?* The Jews
 urged with a negative Argument touching the aid
 which they sought at the hands of the King of
 Egypt; *Wo to those rebellious Children* (saith the Lord) Isaiah xxx.
1.
*which walk forth to go down into Egypt, and have not
 asked counsel at my mouth, to strengthen themselves with
 the strength of Pharaoh.* Finally, the league of Joshua
 with the Gibeonites is likewise with a negative Argu-
 ment touched. It was not as it should be: and why?
 the Lord gave them not that advice: *They sought not* Josh. ix. 14.
counsel at the mouth of the Lord. By the virtue of
 which examples, if any Man should suppose the
 force of negative Arguments approved, when they
 are taken from Scripture, in such sort as we in this
 question are pressed therewith, they greatly deceive
 themselves. For unto which of all these was it said,
 that they had done amiss in purposing to do, or in
 doing any thing at all which the Scripture com-
 manded them not? Our question is, whether all be
 sin which is done without direction by Scripture, and
 not whether the Israelites did at any time amiss by
 following their own minds without asking counsel of
 God. No, it was that People's singular privilege, a
 favour which God vouchsafed them above the rest of
 the World, that in the affairs of their estate, which
 were not determinable one way or other by the Scrip-
 ture, himself gave them extraordinary direction and
 counsel as oft as they sought it at his hands. Thus
 God did first by Speech unto Moses; after by Urim
 and Thummin unto Priests; lastly, by Dreams and
 Visions unto Prophets, from whom in such cases they
 were to receive the answer of God. Concerning
 Joshua therefore, thus spake the Lord unto Moses
 saying, *He shall stand before Eleazar the Priest, who* Num. xxvii.
21.
shall ask counsel for him by the judgment of Urim
before the Lord; whereof had Joshua been mindful,
 the fraud of the Gibeonites could not so smoothly
 have

BOOK II. have past unespied till there was no help. The
 ——— Jews had Prophets to have resolved them from the
 mouth of God himself whether Egyptian aids should
 profit them, yea or no; but they thought themselves
 wise enough, and him unworthy to be of their coun-
 sel. In this respect therefore was their reproof,
 though sharp, yet just, albeit there had been no
 charge precisely given them that they should always
 take heed of Egypt. But as for David, to think that
 he did evil in determining to build God a Temple,
 because there was in Scripture no commandment
 that he should build it, were very injurious; the
 purpose of his heart was religious and godly, the act
 most worthy of honour and renown; neither could
 Nathan chuse but admire his virtuous intent, exhort
 him to go forward, and beseech God to prosper him
 therein. But God saw the endless troubles which
 David should be subject unto during the whole time
 of his regiment, and therefore gave charge to defer
 so good a work till the days of tranquillity and peace,
 wherein it might without interruption be performed.
 David supposed that it could not stand with the duty
 which he owed unto God to set himself in an house
 of cedar-trees and to behold the Ark of the Lord's
 Covenant unsettled. This opinion the Lord abateth,
 by causing Nathan to shew him plainly that it should
 no more imputed unto him for a fault than it had
 been unto the Judges of Israel before him, his case
 being the same which theirs was, their times not
 more unquiet than his, nor more unfit for such an
 action. Wherefore concerning the force of negative
 Arguments so taken from the Authority of Scrip-
 ture, as by us they are denied, there is in all this
 less than nothing, And touching that which unto
 this purpose is borrowed from the controversy some-
 times handled between * Mr. Harding and the wor-

2 Chron.
xvii.

* T. C. l. ii. p. 50. Mr. Harding reproacheth the Bishop of Salisbury with this kind of reasoning; unto whom the Bishop answereth, The Argument of Authority negatively is taken to
be

thiest Divine that Christendom hath bred for the
 space of some hundreds of years, who being brought
 up together in one University, it fell out in them
 which was spoken of two others, ‡ *They learned in
 the same, that which in contrary Camps they did practise.*
 Of these two the one objecting that with us Argu-
 ments taken from Authority negatively are over
 common; the Bishop's answer hereunto is, that
*this kind of Argument is thought to be good, whensoever
 proof is taken of God's Word; and is used not only by us,
 but also by St. Paul, and by many of the Catholick
 Fathers. St. Paul saith, God said not unto Abraham,* Gal. iii.
*In thy Seeds all the Nations of the Earth shall be blessed;
 but, in thy Seed, which is Christ; and thereof he
 thought he made a good Argument. Likewise, saith Ori-
 gen, The Bread which the Lord gave unto his Disciples,* Orig. in
saying unto them, Take and eat, he deferred not, nor Levit. Hom.
*commanded to be reserved till the next day. Such Argu-
 ments Origen and other learned Fathers thought to stand
 for good, whatsoever misliking Mr. Harding hath found
 in them, This kind of proof is thought to hold in God's
 Commandments, for that they be full and perfect: and
 God hath specially charged us, that we should neither put
 to them nor take from them; and therefore it seemeth
 good unto them that have learned of Christ, Unus est
 Magister vester Christus, and have heard the Voice of* Matth. xxiii.
 Matth. xvii.

be good, whensoever proof is taken of God's Word, and is used
 not only by us, but also by many of the Catholick Fathers. A
 little after he sheweth the reason why the Argument of Authority
 of the Scripture negatively is good; namely, for that the Word
 of God is perfect. In another place unto Mr. Harding, casting
 him in the teeth with negative Arguments, he alledgeth places out
 of Irenæus, Chrysostom, Leo, which reasoned negatively of the
 Authority of the Scriptures. The places which he alledgeth be
 very full and plain in generality, without any such restraints as the
 Answerer imagined, as they are there to be seen.

‡ Vell. Paterc. Jugurtha ac Marius sub eodem Africano mili-
 tantes, in iisdem castris didicere quæ postea in contrariis facerent.
 Art. 1. Divis. 29.

BOOK II. *God the Father from Heaven, Ipsum audite. But unto them that add to the Word of God what them listeth, and make God's will subject unto their will, and break God's Commandments for their own Traditions sake, unto them it seemeth not good. Again, the English Apology alledging the example of the Greeks, how they have neither private Masses, nor mangled Sacraments, nor Purgatories, nor Pardons; it pleaseth Mr. Harding to jest out the matter, to use the help of his wits where strength of truth failed him, and to answer with scoffing at Negatives. The Bishop's defence in this case is, The ancient learned Fathers having to deal with politick Hereticks, that in defence of their errors avouched the judgement of all the old Bishops and Doctors that had been before them, and the general consent of the primitive and whole universal Church, and that with as good regard of truth, and as faithfully as you do now; the better to discover the shameless boldness and nakedness of their Doctrine, were oftentimes likewise forced to use the negative, and so to drive the same Hereticks, as we do you, to prove their affirmatives, which thing to do it was never possible. The ancient Father Irenæus thus stayed himself, as we do, by the negative, Hoc neque Prophetæ prædicaverunt, neque Dominus docuit, neque Apostoli tradiderunt; This thing neither did the Prophets publish, nor our Lord teach, nor the Apostles deliver. By a like Negative, Chrysostom saith, This Tree neither Paul planted, nor Apollos watered, nor God increased. In like sort Leo saith, What needeth it to believe that thing that neither the Law hath taught, nor the Prophets have spoken, nor the Gospel hath preached, nor the Apostles have delivered? And again, How are the new devices brought in that our Fathers never knew? St. Augustin having reckoned up a great number of the Bishops of Rome, by a general Negative saith thus, In all this order of succession of Bishops, there is not one Bishop found that was a Donatist. St Gregory being himself a Bishop of Rome, and writing against the Title of Universal Bishop, saith thus,*

None

Defens. par.
v. ca. 15.
divis. 1.

Lib. I cap. 1.

De incomp.
nat. Dei,
hom. 3.
Epist. xciii.
c. 12.

Epist. xcvi.
c. 3.
Epist. clxv.

*None of all my Predecessors ever consented to use this ungodly title; no Bishop of Rome ever took upon him this name of singularity. By such Negatives, Mr. Harding, we reprove the vanity and novelty of your Religion; we tell you none of the Catholick, ancient, learned Fathers, either Greek or Latin, ever used either your private Mass, or your half Communion, or your barbarous unknown Prayers. Paul never planted them, Apollos never watered them, God never increased them; they are of yourselves, they are not of God. In all this there is not a syllable which any way crosseth us. For concerning Arguments negative, taken from human Authority, they are here proved to be in some cases very strong and forcible. They are not in our estimation idle reproofs, when the Authors of needless Innovations are opposed with such Negatives, as that of Leo, *How are these new devices brought in which our Fathers never knew?* When their grave and reverend Superiours do reckon up unto them, as Augustin did to the Donatists, large catalogues of Fathers, wondred at for their wisdom, piety and learning, amongst whom for so many ages before us no one did ever so think of the Church's affairs as now the World doth begin to be persuaded; surely by us they are not taught to take exception hereat, because such Arguments are negative. Much less when the like are taken from the sacred Authority of Scripture if the matter itself do bear them. For in truth the question is not, whether an Argument from Scripture negatively may be good, but whether it be so generally good, that in all actions Men may urge it? The Fathers, I grant, do use very general and large terms, even as Hiero the King did in speaking of Archimedes, *From henceforward whatsoever Archimedes speaketh, it must be believed.* His meaning was not that Archimedes could simply in nothing be deceived, but that he had in such sort approved his skill, that he seemed worthy of credit for ever after in matters appertaining unto the science he was skilful*

BOOK II.

Lib. iv.

Ep. 32.

BOOK II. ful in. In speaking thus largely it is presumed, that
 — Men's speeches will be taken according to the matter whereof they speak. Let any Man therefore that carrieth indifferency of judgment, peruse the Bishop's speeches, and consider well of those Negatives concerning Scripture, which he produceth out of Irenæus, Chrysostom and Leo, which three are chosen from among the residue, because the sentences of the others (even as one of theirs also) do make for defence of negative Arguments taken from human Authority, and not from divine only. They mention no more restraint in the one than in the other; yet I think themselves will not hereby judge, that the Fathers took both to be strong, without restraint unto any special kind of matter wherein they held such Argument forcible. Nor doth the Bishop either say or prove any more, than that an Argument in some kinds of matter may be good, although taken negatively from Scripture.

Their opinion concerning the force of Arguments taken from human Authority for the ordering of Men's actions or persuasions.

7. An earnest desire to draw all things unto the determination of bare and naked Scripture, hath caused here much pains to be taken in abating the estimation and credit of Man. Which if we labour to maintain as far as Truth and Reason will bear, let not any think that we travel about a matter not greatly needful. For the scope of all their pleading against Man's Authority, is to overthrow such Orders, Laws and Constitutions in the Church, as depending thereupon, if they should therefore be taken away, would peradventure leave neither face nor memory of Church to continue long in the World, the World especially being such as now it is. That which they have in this case spoken, I would for brevity sake let pass, but that the drift of their speech being so dangerous. their words are not to be neglected. * Wherefore to say that simply an Ar-

* T. C. l. i. p. 25. When the question is of the Authority of a Man, it holdeth neither affirmatively nor negatively. The reason is, because the infirmity of Man can never attain to the perfection of

gument taken from Man's Authority doth hold no way, neither affirmatively nor negatively, is hard. By a Man's Authority we here understand the force which his word hath for the assurance of another's mind that buildeth upon it; as the Apostle somewhat did upon their report of the House of Chloe; and the Samaritans in a matter of far greater moment upon the report of a simple Woman. For so it is said in St. John's Gospel, *Many of the Samaritans of that city believed in him for the saying of the Woman, which testified, He hath told me all things that ever I did.* The strength of Man's Authority is affirmatively such, that the weightiest affairs in the World depend thereon. In judgment and justice are not here-upon proceedings grounded? Saith not the Law, that *in the mouth of two or three Witnesses every word shall be confirmed?* This the Law of God would not say if there were in a Man's testimony no force at all to prove any thing. And if it be admitted that in matter of fact there is some credit to be given to the testimony of Man but not in matter of opinion and judgment, we see the contrary both acknowledged and universally practised also throughout the World. The sentences of wise and expert Men were never but highly esteemed. Let the title of a Man's right be called in question, are we not bold to rely and build upon the judgment of such as are famous for their skill in the Laws of this Land? In matter of State, the weight many times of some one Man's authority is thought reason sufficient even to sway over whole Nations. And this is not only with the

Deut. xix.

15.

Matt. xviii.

16.

of any thing whereby he might speak all things that are to be spoken of it; neither yet be free from error in those things which he speaketh or giveth out. And therefore this Argument neither affirmatively nor negatively compelleth the Hearer, but only induceth him to some liking or disliking of that for which it is brought, and is rather for an Orator to persuade the simpler sort, than for a Disputer to enforce him that is learned, 1 Cor. i. 11. John iv. 39.

simple

BOOK II. simpler sort, but the learned and wiser we are, the more such Arguments in such cases prevail with us. The reason why the simpler sort are moved with Authority, is the conscience of their own ignorance; whereby it cometh to pass that, having learned Men in admiration, they rather fear to dislike them than know wherefore they should allow and follow their judgments. Contrariwise with them that are skilful, Authority is much more strong and forcible; because they only are able to discern how just cause there is why to some Men's authority so much should be attributed. For which cause the name of Hippocrates (no doubt) was more effectual to persuade even such Men as Galen himself than to move a silly Empirick. So that the very self-same Argument in this kind which doth but induce the vulgar sort to like, may constrain the wiser to yield. And therefore not Orators only with the People, but even the very profoundest Disputers in all faculties have thereby often with the best learned prevailed most. As for Arguments taken from human Authority, and that negatively, for example sake, if we should think the assembling of the People of God together by the sound of a Bell, the presenting of Infants at the holy Font by such as we commonly call their Godfathers, or any other the like received custom to be impious, because some Men of whom we think very reverently, have in their books and writings no where mentioned or taught that such things should be in the Church, this reasoning were subject unto just reproof; it were but feeble, weak, and unsound. Notwithstanding even negatively an Argument from human Authority may be strong, as namely thus: the Chronicles of England mention no more than only six Kings bearing the name of Edward since the time of the last Conquest; therefore it cannot be there should be more. So that if the question be of the authority of a Man's testimony, we cannot simply avouch either that affirmatively it doth not any way

way hold, or that it hath only force to induce the simpler sort, and not to constrain Men of understanding and ripe judgment to yield assent; or that negatively it hath in it no strength at all. For unto every of these the contrary is most plain. Neither doth that which is alledged concerning the infirmity of Men overthrow or disprove this. Men are blinded with ignorance and error; many things escape them; and in many things they may be deceived; yea, those things which they do know, they may either forget, or upon sundry indirect considerations let pass; and although themselves do not err, yet may they through malice or vanity even of purpose deceive others. Howbeit, infinite cases there are wherein all these impediments and lets are so manifestly excluded, that there is no shew or colour whereby any such exception may be taken, but that the testimony of Man will stand as a ground of infallible assurance. That there is a City of Rome, that Pius Quintus and Gregory the Thirteenth, and others have been Popes of Rome, I suppose we are certainly enough persuaded. The ground of our persuasion, who never saw the place nor persons before named, can be nothing but Man's testimony. Will any Man here notwithstanding alledge those mentioned human infirmities as reasons why these things should be mistrusted or doubted of? yea, that which is more, utterly to infringe the force and strength of Man's testimony were to shake the very fortrefs of God's Truth. For whatsoever we believe concerning Salvation by Christ, although the Scripture be therein the ground of our belief; yet the Authority of Man is, if we mark it, the key which openeth the door of entrance into the knowledge of the Scripture. The Scripture doth not teach us the things that are of God, unless we did credit Men who have taught us that the words of Scripture do signify those things. Some way therefore, notwithstanding Man's infirmity, yet his Authority may enforce

BOOK II. enforce assent. Upon better advice and deliberation so much is perceived and at the length confessed that Arguments taken from the Authority of Men, may not only so far forth as has been declared, but further also be of some force in human sciences; which force be it never so small, doth shew that they are not utterly naught. But in matters divine it is still maintained stiffly that they have no manner of force at all.* Howbeit, the very self-same reason, which causeth to yield that they are of some force in the one, will at the length constrain also to acknowledge that they are not in the other altogether unforcible. For if the natural strength of Man's wit may by experience and study attain unto such ripeness in the knowledge of things human, that Men in this respect may presume to build somewhat upon their judgment, what reason have we to think but that even in matters divine, the like wits furnished with necessary helps, exercised in Scripture with like diligence, and assisted with the Grace of Almighty God, may grow unto so much perfection of knowledge, that Men should have just cause, when any thing

* T. C. l. i. p. 10. Although that kind of Argument of Authority of Men is good neither in human nor divine Sciences; yet it hath some small force in human Sciences, forasmuch as naturally, and in that he is a Man, he may come to some ripeness of judgment in those Sciences, which in divine matters hath no force at all; as of him which naturally, and as he is a Man, can no more judge of them than a blind Man of colours, yea so far is it from drawing credit if it be barely spoken without reason and testimony of Scripture, that it carrieth also a suspicion of untruth whatsoever proceedeth from him; which the Apostle did well note, when to signify a thing corruptly spoken, and against the truth he saith, That it is spoken according to Man, Rom. iii. He saith not as a wicked and lying Man, but simply as a Man: and although this corruption be reformed in many, yet for so much as in whom the knowledge of the Truth is most advanced, there remaineth both ignorance and disordered affections (whereof either of them turneth him from speaking of the Truth) no Man's Authority, with the Church especially, and those that are called and persuaded of the Authority of the Word of God, can bring assurance unto the conscience.

pertinent

pertinent unto Faith and Religion is doubted of, the more willingly to incline their Minds towards that which the sentence of so grave, wise, and learned in that faculty shall judge most sound? For the controversy is of the weight of such Men's judgments. Let it therefore be suspected; let it be taken as gross, corrupt, repugnant unto the truth, whatsoever, concerning things divine above Nature, shall at any time be spoken as out of the mouths of meer natural Men, which have not the eyes wherewith heavenly things are discerned; for this we contend not. But whom God hath endued with principal gifts to aspire unto knowledge by; whose exercises, labours, and divine studies he hath so blest, that the World for their great and rare skill that way hath them in singular admiration; may we reject even their judgment likewise, as being utterly of no moment? For mine own part, I dare not so lightly esteem of the Church, and of the principal Pillars therein. The truth is, that the Mind of Man desireth evermore to know the Truth according to the most infallible certainty which the nature of things can yield. The greatest assurance generally with all Men, is that which we have by plain aspect and intuitive beholding. Where we cannot attain unto this, there what appeareth to be true by strong and invincible demonstration, such as wherein it is not by any way possible to be deceived, thereunto the Mind doth necessarily assent, neither is it in the choice thereof to do otherwise. And in case these both do fail, then which way greatest probability leadeth, thither the Mind doth evermore incline. Scripture with Christian Men being received as the Word of God; that for which we have probable, yea, that which we have necessary reason for, yea, that which we see with our eyes, is not thought so sure as that which the Scripture of God teacheth; because we hold that his Speech revealeth there what himself seeth, and therefore the strongest proof of all,

BOOK II. all, and the most necessarily assented unto by us (which do thus receive the Scripture) is the Scripture. Now it is not required, nor can be exacted at our hands, that we should yield unto any thing other assent than such as doth answer the evidence which is to be had of that we assent unto. For which cause even in matters divine, concerning some things we may lawfully doubt and suspend our judgment, inclining neither to one side or other; as namely, touching the time of the fall both of Man and Angels; of some things we may very well retain an opinion that they are probable and not unlikely to be true, as when we hold that Men have their Souls rather by creation than propagation, or that the Mother of our Lord lived always in the state of Virginitie as well after his birth as before (for of these two, the one, her Virginitie before, is a thing which of necessity we must believe; the other, her continuance in the same state always, hath more likelihood of truth than the contrary;) finally, in all things then are our consciences best resolved, and in a most agreeable sort unto God and Nature settled, when they are so far persuaded as those grounds of persuasion which are to be had will bear. Which thing I do so much the rather set down, for that I see how a number of Souls are for want of right information in this point oftentimes grievously vexed. When bare and unbuilded conclusions are put into their Minds, they finding not themselves to have thereof any great certainty, imagine that this proceedeth only from lack of Faith, and that the Spirit of God doth not work in them as it doth in true Believers. By this means their hearts are much troubled, they fall into anguish and perplexity; whereas the truth is, that how bold and confident soever we may be in words, when it cometh to the point of trial, such as the evidence is, which the Truth hath either in itself or through proof, such is the heart's assent thereunto; neither can it be stronger, being grounded as it

it should be. I grant that proof derived from the Authority of Man's judgment is not able to work that assurance which doth grow by a stronger proof; and therefore although ten thousand general Councils would set down one and the same definitive sentence concerning any point of Religion whatsoever, yet one demonstrative Reason alledged, or one manifest Testimony cited from the mouth of God himself to the contrary could not chuse but over-weigh them all; inasmuch as for them to have been deceived, it is not impossible; it is, that demonstrative Reason or Testimony divine should deceive. Howbeit, in defect of proof infallible, because the Mind doth rather follow probable persuasions than approve the things that have in them no likelihood of truth at all; surely if a question concerning matter of Doctrine were proposed, and on the one side no kind of proof appearing, there should on the other be alledged and shewed that so a number of the learnedest Divines in the World have ever thought; although it did not appear what Reason or what Scripture led them to be of that judgment, yet to their very bare judgment somewhat a reasonable Man would attribute, notwithstanding the common imbecilities which are incident unto our nature. And whereas it is thought, that especially with the Church, and those that are called and persuaded of the Authority of the Word of God, Man's Authority with them especially should not prevail; it must and doth prevail even with them, yea, with them especially as far as equity requireth, and farther we maintain it not. *For Men to be tied and led by Authority, as it were with a kind of captivity of judgment, and

* T. C. 1. ii. p. 21. Of divers Sentences of the Fathers themselves (whereby some have likened them to brute beasts without Reason, which suffer themselves to be led by the judgment and authority of others, some have preferred the judgment of one simple rude Man alledging Reason, unto companies of learned Men) I will content myself at this time with two or three

BOOK II. though there be reason to the contrary not to listen unto it, but to follow like beasts the first in the herd, they know not, nor care not whither, this were brutish. Again, that Authority of Men should prevail with Men either against or above Reason, is no part of our belief. Companies of learned Men be they never so great and reverend are to yield unto Reason, the weight whereof is no whit prejudiced by the simplicity of his person which doth alledge it, but being found to be sound and good, the bare opinion of Men to the contrary must of necessity stoop and give place. Irenæus writing against Marcion, which held one God Author of the Old Testament and another of the New, to prove that the Apostles preached the same God which was known before to the Jews, he copiously alledgeth fundry their sermons and speeches uttered concerning that matter and recorded in Scripture. And lest any

three Sentences. Irenæus saith, Whatsoever is to be shewed in the Scripture, cannot be shewed but out of the Scriptures themselves, lib. iii. cap. 12. Jerome saith, No Man, be he never so holy or eloquent, hath any authority after the Apostles, in Psal. lxxxvi. Augustin saith, That he will believe none, how godly and learned soever he be, unless he confirm his sentence by the Scriptures, or by some reason not contrary to them, Ep. xviii. And in another place, Hear this, the Lord saith; hear not this, Donatus saith, Rogatus saith, Vincentius saith, Hilarius saith, Ambrose saith, Augustin saith, but hearken unto this, The Lord saith, Ep. viii. And again, having to do with an Arian, he affirmeth, that neither he ought to bring forth the Council of Nice, nor the other the Council of Arimine, thereby to bring prejudice each to other; neither ought the Arian to be holden by the authority of the one, nor himself by the authority of the other, but by the Scriptures, which are witnesses proper to neither, but common to both, matter with matter, cause with cause, reason with reason ought to be debated, Cont. Max. Arian. l. iii. c. 14. And in another place against Petil. the Donatist, he saith, Let not these words be heard between us, I say, You say; let us hear this, Thus saith the Lord. And by and by speaking of the Scriptures, he saith, There let us seek the Church, there let us try the cause. De unit. Eccles. cap. 3. Hereby it is manifest, that the Argument of the Authority of Man affirmatively is nothing worth.

should

should be wearied with such store of allegations, in BOOK II.
 the end he concludeth, *While we labour for these de-*
monstrations out of Scripture, and do summarily declare
the things which many ways have been spoken, be con-
tented quietly to hear, and do not think my speech tedi-
ous: Quoniam ostensiones quæ sunt in Scripturis,
 non possunt ostendi nisi ex ipsis Scripturis, *Because*
demonstrations that are in Scripture may not otherwise be
shewed, than by citing them out of the Scriptures them-
selves where they are. Which words make so little
 unto the purpose, that they seem, as it were, offended
 at him which hath called them thus solemnly forth
 to say nothing. And concerning the verdict of St.
 Jerome, if no Man, be he never so well learned,
 have after the Apostles any authority to publish new
 Doctrine as from Heaven, and to require the World's
 assent as unto Truth received by propheticall Reve-
 lation; doth this prejudice the credit of learned
 Men's judgments in opening that truth, which by
 being conversant in the Apostles' Writings, they
 have themselves from thence learned? St. Augustin
 exhorteth not to hear Men, but to hearken what God
 speaketh. His purpose is not (I think) that we
 should stop our ears against his own exhortation, and
 therefore he cannot mean simply that audience should
 altogether be denied unto Men; but either that if
 Men speak one thing, and God himself teach ano-
 ther, then he, not they, to be obeyed; or if they
 both speak the same thing, yet then also Man's
 speech unworthy of hearing, not simply, but in
 comparision of that which proceedeth from the
 mouth of God. Yea, but we doubt what the Will
 of God is. Are we in this case forbidden to hear
 what Men of judgment think it to be? If not,
 then this allegation also might very well have been
 spared. In that ancient strife which was between the
 Catholick Fathers and Arians, Donatists and others
 of like perverse and froward disposition, as long as
 to Fathers or Councils alledged on the one side, the
 like

BOOK II. like by the contrary side were opposed, impossible it was that ever the question should by this means grow unto any issue or end. The Scripture they both believed; the Scripture they knew could not give sentence on both sides; by Scripture the controversy between them was such as might be determined. In this case what madness was it with such kinds of proofs to nourish their contention, when there were such effectual means to end all controversy that was between them? Hereby therefore it doth not as yet appear that an Argument of authority of Man affirmatively is in matters divine nothing worth. Which opinion being once inserted into the minds of the vulgar sort, what it may grow unto God knoweth. Thus much we see, it hath already made thousands so headstrong even in gross and palpable errors, that a Man whose capacity will scarce serve him to utter five words in sensible manner, blusheth not in any doubt concerning matter of Scripture to think his own bare *Yea*, as good as the *Nay* of all the wise, grave and learned judgments that are in the whole World: which insolency must be repressed, or it will be the very bane of Christian Religion. Our Lord's Disciples marking what speech he uttered unto them, and at the same time calling to mind a common opinion held by the Scribes, between which opinion and the words of their Master it seemed unto them that there was some contradiction, which they could not themselves answer with full satisfaction of their own minds; the doubt they propose to our Saviour, saying, *Why then say the Scribes that Elias must first come?* They knew that the Scribes did err greatly, and that many ways even in matters of their own profession. They notwithstanding thought the judgment of the very Scribes in matters divine to be of some value; some probability they thought there was that Elias should come, inasmuch as the Scribes said it. Now no truth can contradict any truth. Desirous therefore they

they were to be taught, how both might stand to-^{BOOK II.}
 gether; that which they knew could not be false,
 because Christ spake it; and this which to them did
 seem true, only because the Scribes had said it. For
 the Scripture from whence the Scribes did gather it,
 was not then in their heads. We do not find that
 our Saviour reproveth them of error for thinking the
 judgment of the Scribes to be worth the objecting,
 for esteeming it to be of any moment or value in
 matters concerning God. We cannot therefore be
 persuaded that the Will of God is, we should so far
 reject the Authority of Men as to reckon it nothing.
 No, it may be a question, whether they that urge
 us unto this be themselves so persuaded indeed. Men
 do sometimes bewray that by deeds, which to confess
 they are hardly drawn. Mark then if this be not
 general with all Men for the most part. When the
 judgments of learned Men are alledged against them,
 what do they but either elevate their credit, or
 oppose unto them the judgments of others as learn-
 ed? Which thing doth argue that all Men ac-
 knowledge in them some force and weight, for
 which they are loth the cause they maintain should
 be so much weakened as their testimony is available.
 Again, what reason is there why, alledging testi-
 monies as proofs, Men give them some title of
 credit, honour and estimation, whom they alledge,
 unless before-hand it be sufficiently known who they
 are? What reason hereof but only a common en-
 grafted persuasion, that in some Men there may be
 found such qualities as are able to countervail those
 exceptions which might be taken against them, and
 that such Men's authority is not lightly to be shaken
 off? Shall I add further, that the force of Argu-
 ments drawn from the Authority of Scripture itself,
 as Scriptures commonly are alledged, shall (being
 sifted) be found to depend upon the strength of this
 so much despised and debased Authority of Man?
 Surely it doth, and that oftener than we are aware
 of.

BOOK II. of. For although Scripture be of God, and therefore the proof which is taken from thence must needs be of all other most invincible; yet this strength it hath not, unless it avouch the self-same thing for which it is brought. If there be either undeniable appearance that so it doth, or reason such as cannot deceive, then Scripture-proof (no doubt) in strength and value exceedeth all. But for the most part, even such as are readiest to cite for one thing five hundred sentences of holy Scripture; what warrant have they, that any one of them doth mean the thing for which it is alledged? Is not their surest ground most commonly, either some probable conjecture of their own, or the judgment of others taking those Scriptures as they do? Which, notwithstanding to mean otherwise than they take them, it is not still altogether impossible. So that now and then they ground themselves on human Authority, even when they most pretend divine. Thus it fareth even clean throughout the whole controversy about that Discipline which is so earnestly urged and laboured for. Scriptures are plentifully alledged to prove that the whole Christian World for ever ought to embrace it. Hereupon Men term it, *The Discipline of God*. Howbeit, examine, sift, and resolve their alledged proofs, till you come to the very root from whence they spring, the heart wherein their strength lieth; and it shall clearly appear unto any Man of judgment, that the most which can be inferred upon such plenty of divine testimonies is only this, That some things which they maintain, as far as some Men can probably conjecture, do seem to have been out of Scripture not absurdly gathered. Is this a warrant sufficient for any Man's conscience to build such proceedings upon, as have been, and are put in ure for the establishment of that cause? But to conclude, I would gladly understand how it cometh to pass, that they which so peremptorily do maintain that human Authority is nothing worth, are in the cause
which

which they favour so careful to have the common sort of Men persuaded, that the wisest, the godliest, and the best learned in all Christendom are that way given, seeing they judge this to make nothing in the world for them? Again, how cometh it to pass, they cannot abide that Authority should be alledged on the other side, if there be no force at all in Authorities on one side or other? Wherefore labour they to strip their Adversaries of such furniture as doth not help? Why take they such needless pains to furnish also their own cause with the like? If it be void and to no purpose that the names of Men are so frequent in their Books, what did move them to bring them in, or doth to suffer them there remaining? Ignorant I am not how this is solved, ** They do it but after the truth made manifest, first by Reason, or by Scripture: they do it not, but to controul the enemies of Truth, who bear themselves bold upon human Authority, making not for them, but against them rather.* Which answers are nothing: for in what place, or upon what consideration soever it be they do it, were it in their own opinion of no force being done, they would undoubtedly refrain to do it.

8. But to the end it may more plainly appear what we are to judge of their sentences, and of the cause itself wherein they are alledged; first, it may not well be denied, that all actions of Men endued with the use of Reason are generally either good or evil. For although it be granted that no action is properly termed good or evil unless it be voluntary; yet this can be no let to our former assertion, that all actions of Men endued with the use of Reason

A Declaration what the truth is in this matter.

* T. C. lib. ii. c. 21. If at any time it happened unto Augustin (as it did against the Donatists and others) to alledge the authority of the ancient Fathers, which had been before him; yet this was not done before he had laid a sure foundation of his cause in the Scriptures, and that also being provoked by the Adversaries of the Truth, who bare themselves high of some Council, or of some Man of name that had favoured that part.

BOOK II. are generally either good or evil; because even those things are done voluntarily by us which other Creatures do naturally, inasmuch as we might stay our doing of them if we would. Beasts naturally do take their food and rest when it offereth itself unto them. If Men did so too, and could not do otherwise of themselves, there were no place for any such reproof as that of our Saviour Christ unto his Disciples, *Could ye not watch with me one hour?* That which is voluntarily performed in things tending to the end, if it be well done, must needs be done with deliberate consideration of some reasonable cause wherefore we rather should do it than not. Whereupon it seemeth, that in such actions only those are said to be good or evil which are capable of deliberation: so that many things being hourly done by Men, wherein they need not use with themselves any manner of consultation at all, it may perhaps hereby seem that well or ill doing belongeth only to our weightier affairs, and to those deeds which are of so great importance that they require advice. But thus to determine were perilous, and peradventure unfound also. I do rather incline to think, that seeing all the unforced actions of Men are voluntary; and all voluntary actions tending to the end have choice: and all choice presupposeth the knowledge of some cause wherefore we make it; where the reasonable cause of such actions so readily offereth itself that it needeth not be sought for, in those things though we do not deliberate, yet they are of their nature apt to be deliberated on, in regard of the will which may incline either way, and would not any one way bend itself, if there were not some apparent motive to lead it. Deliberation actual we use, where there is no doubt what we should incline our wills unto. Where no doubt is, deliberation is not excluded as impertinent unto the thing, but as needless in regard of the agent, which seeth already what to resolve upon. It hath no apparent absurdity therefore

Matt. xxvi.
40.

therefore in it to think that all actions of Men en-BOOK II.
 dued with the use of Reason, are generally either ———
 good or evil. Whatsoever is good, the same is also
 approved of God; and according unto the fundry
 degrees of goodness, the kinds of divine approbation
 are in like sort multiplied. Some things are good,
 yet in so mean a degree of goodness, that Men are
 only not disproved nor disallowed of God for them.
No Man hateth his own flesh. If ye do good unto them Ephes. v.
that do so to you, the very Publicans themselves do as ^{29.} Matth. v.
much. They are worse than Infidels that have no care to ^{46.}
provide for their own. 1 Tim. v. 8. In actions of this sort, the
 very light of Nature alone may discover that which
 is so far forth in the sight of God allowable. Some
 things in such sort are allowed, that they be also
 required as necessary unto Salvation, by way of
 direct, immediate and proper necessity final, so that
 without performance of them we cannot by ordinary
 course be saved, nor by any means be excluded from
 Life observing them. In actions of this kind our
 chiefest direction is from Scripture; for Nature is
 no sufficient Teacher what we should do that we may
 attain unto Life everlasting. The insufficiency of
 the light of Nature is by the light of Scripture so
 fully and so perfectly herein supplied, that further
 light than this hath added there doth not need unto
 that end.

Finally, some things although not so required of
 necessity, that to leave them undone excludeth from
 Salvation, are notwithstanding of so great dignity
 and acceptation with God, that most ample reward
 in Heaven is laid up for them. Hereof we have no
 commandment either in Nature or Scripture which
 doth exact them at our hands; yet those motives
 there are in both, which draw most effectually our
 Minds unto them. In this kind there is not the least
 action, but it doth somewhat make to the accessory
 augmentation of our blifs. For which cause our
 Saviour doth plainly witness, that there shall not be

BOOK II. as much as *a cup of cold Water bestowed for his sake*
 without reward. Hereupon dependeth whatsoever
 difference there is between the states of Saints in
 glory; hither we refer whatsoever belongeth unto
 the highest perfection of Man by way of service to-
 wards God: hereunto that fervour and first love of
 Christians did bend itself, causing them to *sell their*
possessions, and lay down the price at the blessed Apostles'
feet. Hereat St. Paul undoubtedly did aim, in so
 far abridging his own liberty, and exceeding that
 which the bond of necessary and enjoined duty tied
 him unto. Wherefore seeing that in all these several
 kinds of actions, there can be nothing possibly evil
 which God approveth; and that he approveth much
 more than he doth command; and that his very
 Commandments in some kind, as namely, his Pre-
 cepts comprehended in the Law of Nature, may
 be otherwise known than only by Scripture; and
 that to do them, howsoever we know them, must
 needs be acceptable in his sight; let them with
 whom we have hitherto disputed consider well,
 how it can stand with Reason to make the bare
 Mandate of sacred Scripture the only Rule of all
 good and evil in the Actions of mortal Men. The
 Testimonies of God are true, the Testimonies of
 God are perfect, the Testimonies of God are all-
 sufficient unto that end for which they were given.
 Therefore accordingly we do receive them, we do
 not think that in them God hath omitted any thing
 needful unto his purpose, and left his intent to be
 accomplished by our devisings. What the Scripture
 purposeth, the same in all points it doth perform.
 Howbeit, that here we swerve not in judgment one
 thing especially we must observe, namely, that the
 absolute perfection of Scripture is seen by relation
 unto that end whereto it tendeth. And even hereby
 it cometh to pass, that first such as imagine the
 general and main drift of the body of sacred Scrip-
 ture not to be so large as it is, nor that God did
 thereby

Maith. x.
42.

Acts iv. 31.
1 Theff. ii.
7, 9.

thereby intend to deliver, as in truth he doth, a full instruction in all things unto Salvation necessary, the knowledge whereof Man by nature could not otherwise in this life attain unto; they are by this very mean induced either still to look for new Revelations from Heaven, or else dangerously to add to the Word of God uncertain Tradition, that so the Doctrine of Man's Salvation may be compleat; which Doctrine we constantly hold in all respect without any such thing added to be so compleat, that we utterly refuse as much as once to acquaint ourselves with any thing further. Whatsoever, to make up the Doctrine of Man's Salvation is added as in supply of the Scripture's unsufficiency, we reject it. Scripture purposing this, hath perfectly and fully done it. Again, the scope and purpose of God in delivering the holy Scripture, such as do take more largely than behoveth, they on the contrary side racking and stretching it further than by him was meant, are drawn into fundry as great inconveniencies. These pretending the Scripture's perfection, infer thereupon, that in Scripture all things lawful to be done must needs be contained. We count those things perfect which want nothing requisite for the end whereto they were instituted. As therefore God created every part and particle of Man exactly perfect, that is to say, in all points sufficient unto that use for which he appointed it; so the Scripture, yea, every sentence thereof is perfect, and wanteth nothing requisite unto that purpose for which God delivered the same. So that if hereupon we conclude, that because the Scripture is perfect, therefore all things lawful to be done are comprehended in the Scripture; we may even as well conclude so of every sentence, as of the whole sum and body thereof, unless we first of all prove that it was the drift, scope and purpose of Almighty God in holy Scripture to comprise all things which Man may practise. But admit this, and mark, I beseech you, what would follow. God in delivering Scripture to

BOOK II. his Church should clean have abrogated amongst them the Law of Nature, which is an infallible knowledge imprinted in the Minds of all the Children of Men, whereby both general principles for directing of human actions are comprehended, and conclusions derived from them; upon which conclusions groweth in particularity the choice of good and evil in the daily affairs of this life. Admit this, and what shall the Scripture be but a snare and a torment to weak Consciences, filling them with infinite perplexities, scrupulosities, doubts insoluble, and extreme despairs? * Not that the Scripture itself doth cause any such thing (for it tendeth to the clean contrary, and the fruit thereof is resolute assurance and certainty in that it teacheth), but the necessities of this life urging Men to do that which the light of Nature, common discretion, and judgment of itself directeth them unto; on the other side, this Doctrine teaching them that so to do were to sin against their own Souls, and that they put forth their hands to iniquity whatsoever they go about and have not first the sacred Scripture of God for direction; how can it chuse but bring the simple a thousand times to their wits end, how can it chuse but vex and amaze them? For in every action of common life to find out some sentence clearly and infallibly setting before our eyes what we ought to do (seem we in Scripture never so expert) would trouble us more than we are aware. In weak and tender Minds we little know what misery this strict opinion would breed, besides the stops it would make in the whole course of all Men's lives and actions. Make all things sin which we do by direction of Nature's light and by the rule of common discretion without thinking at all upon Scripture; admit this position, and Parents shall

* T. C. lib. ii. p. 6. Where this Doctrine is accused of bringing Men to despair; it hath wrong. For when doubting is the way to despair, against which this Doctrine offereth the remedy; it must need be that it bringeth comfort and joy to the Conscience of Man.

cause their Children to sin as oft as they cause them BOOK II.
 to do any thing before they come to years of capacity and be ripe for knowledge in the Scripture. Admit this, and it shall not be with Masters as it was with him in the Gospel; but Servants *being commanded to go*, shall stand still till they have their errand warranted unto them by Scripture. Which as it standeth with Christian duty in some cases, so in common affairs to require it were most unfit. Two opinions therefore there are concerning sufficiency of holy Scripture, each extremely opposite unto the other, and both repugnant unto truth. The Schools of Rome teach Scripture to be insufficient, as if, except Traditions were added, it did not contain all revealed and supernatural Truth which absolutely is necessary for the Children of Men in this life to know that they may in the next be saved. Others justly condemning this opinion, grow likewise unto a dangerous extremity, as if Scripture did not only contain all things in that kind necessary, but all things simply, and in such sort, that to do any thing according to any other Law, were not only unnecessary, but even opposite unto Salvation, unlawful and sinful. Whatsoever is spoken of God, or things appertaining to God, otherwise than as the truth is, though it seem an honour, it is an injury. And as incredible praises given unto Men, do often abate and impair the credit of their deserved commendation; so we must likewise take great heed, lest in attributing unto Scripture more than it can have, the incredibility of that, do cause even those things which indeed it hath most abundantly, to be less reverently esteemed. I therefore leave it to themselves to consider, Whether they have in this first point overshot themselves or not; which, God doth know, is quickly done, even when our meaning is most sincere, as I am verily persuaded theirs in this case was.

End of the Second Book.