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Religious Communications.

LECTURES ON THE SHORTER CATECHISM OF THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY OF DIVINES—ADDRESSED TO YOUTH.

LECTURE XLVII.

2. *Of Parents and Children.* The duties of parents to their children commence as soon as children are born. They are to be viewed as the gift of God; and the first duty is to dedicate, or give them back again, to the great Author of their being. This should be done in prayer, and many a fervent aspiration of the heart, even before they are formally set apart as the Lord's property, in the sacrament of baptism, which has been mercifully ordained for this purpose.

The first years of children are, or ought to be, chiefly spent in the presence and under the care of their mothers. The mother who trusts her tender offspring entirely or chiefly to the charge of a servant, or hireling, unless compelled by absolute necessity, acts a most unnatural and inhuman part; and has no cause to wonder or complain, if the most serious and lasting evils are the consequence of her unfaithfulness to her sacred trust. On the other hand, the happiest effects may reasonably be expected, for they have often and indeed usually been realized, when a prudent and pious mother has devoted herself to her children, and has suffered no desire

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of personal ease or gratification, to withdraw her from the care, and governance, and instruction of her precious charge. Nor can I forbear to mention, that fathers, as well as mothers, will best perform their duty, by spending more time in the company, instruction, and superintendence of their children, than is commonly seen, even in those who are not usually considered as deficient in this duty—There is no possible substitute, or equivalent, for parental affection, example, instruction and influence. Instances there may be, and a few there are, where a parent's part has been happily performed, by others than natural parents; but this is no real exception to the general truth—parental influence has still been employed. It would surely be considered as a waste of words, to spend many, in showing that parents ought to love their children; and yet there is a real defect of a proper manifestation of affection for their offspring, in those parents who almost wholly avoid the company of their children in their early years.

At a very early age, children should be imbued with the principles of piety; be taught, in language carefully brought down to their capacity, to know their Creator and Redeemer; to address their heavenly Father in prayer and praise; to be reminded of his constant presence and all-seeing eye;

Y

THE CHEROKEE.

Gaze on this landscape! once in fleet
career,
The desert chieftain trod exulting here!
Cleft with light bark the still and shaded
floods,
Pierced the recesses of the old gray
woods;
Pour'd midst their hidden dells his wild
halloo,
And the light shaft with aim unerring
threw.
Proud was his spirit, fierce, untamed and
free,
Scorning to crouch to pain, from death to
flee,
With feelings suited to his savage state,
Faithful alike to friendship or to hate,
Seeking no meed beyond a warrior's
fame,
And fearing nought except a coward's
shame.
These wilds were his;—amidst his chosen
dell,
Where clustering wild flowers fringed
the gushing well,
His hut was rear'd; and there, at closing
day,
He heard his childrens' laughter-shout of
play,
While, weary with the chase, his limbs
were laid
In listless rest, beneath the oak tree's
shade.
Then o'er the ocean-sea the white man
came,
Held to his lips the cup of liquid flame,
With smooth, false words, and bold en-
croaching hand,
Wrench'd from the Cherokee his father's
land,
Still on his fast receding footsteps prest,
And urged him onwards to the distant
west,
'Till all the precincts of his narrowed
ground,
Were closely hemm'd with cultured life
around;
And burning cottages and mangled slain,
Had mark'd war's footsteps o'er the ra-
vaged plain.

Wearied, at length, the pale brow'd
stranger swore,
To seek the Indian's hunting ground no
more;
Treaties and oaths the solemn compact
seal'd,
And plenty crown'd once more the blood
stain'd field.
Then o'er the red mens' alter'd nature
smiled
A kindlier spirit, and a soul more mild;
Bright knowledge pour'd its sunlight o'er
his mind,
His feelings soften'd, and his heart re-
fin'd.

No longer then, when pass'd the storm-
flash by,
He saw the lightning of Manitto's eye,
Or listen'd trembling, while his anger
spoke,
As high o'er head the pealing thunder
broke.
He learn'd to light in heaven his spirit's
flame,
And blend a Saviour's with Jehovah's
name.
Then tell us, ye, who have the power to
save,
Shall all his hopes be crush'd in one wide
grave?
Shall lawless force, with rude, remorse-
less hand,
Drive out the Indian from his father's
land,
Burst all the ties that bind the heart to
home,
And thrust him forth, mid distant wilds to
roam?
Oh no! to mercy's pleading voice give
ear,
The wak'ning wrath of outraged justice
fear,
Stain not with broken faith our country's
name,
Nor weigh her tresses to the dust with
shame!
Remember yet the solemn pledge you
gave,
And lift the potent arm, to shield and
save!

E. M. C.

Review.

JEFFERSON'S PAPERS.

(Continued from p. 142.)

Of God.—Mr. J. sometimes speaks of the Deity in a style of levity and irreverence, after the worst manner

of the school of Voltaire. We could point to many examples, but our readers must already have observed one, in the beginning of the long quotation on which we have remarked. It is in these words—

"He who made us would have been a pitiful bungler, if he had made the rules of our moral conduct a matter of science." No man could have written this, who had any right apprehension of the infinite majesty and glory of that Being, in comparison with whom all creatures are "less than nothing and vanity!" Besides, our moral conduct, as we have undeniably shown, is often made a matter of science—if by science we understand, as here we ought, *knowledge* acquired by instruction and reflection. And what follows from this, but that Mr. J. has implicated himself in a most blasphemous charge against the God who made him? Another example of his profane levity in speaking of the Supreme Being, appears in vol. i. p. 321, where, describing the state of society in Europe, he says, "I find the fate of humanity here most deplorable. The truth of Voltaire's observation, offers itself perpetually, that every man here must be either the hammer or the anvil. It is a true picture of that country to which they say we shall pass hereafter, and where we are to see God and his angels in splendour, and crowds of the damned trampled under their feet." He must have thought this last expression uncommonly smart, for we find him repeating it, nearly verbatim, on another occasion.

Mr. J. was a materialist, even to the extent of maintaining that God is matter. A letter to the elder President Adams, in 1820, contains the following passage:

"But enough of criticism: let me turn to your puzzling letter of May the 12th, on matter, spirit, motion, &c. Its crowd of scepticisms kept me from sleep. I read it, and laid it down: read it, and laid it down, again and again: and to give rest to my mind, I was obliged to recur ultimately to my habitual anodyne, 'I feel therefore I exist.' I feel bodies which are not myself: there are other existences then. I call them *matter*. I feel them changing place. This gives me *motion*. Where there is an absence of matter, I call it *void*, or *nothing*, or *immaterial space*. On the basis of sensa-

tion, of matter and motion, we may erect the fabric of all the certainties we can have or need. I can conceive *thought* to be an action of a particular organization of matter, formed for that purpose by its Creator, as well as that *attraction* is an action of matter, or *magnetism* of load-stone. When he who denies to the Creator the power of endowing matter with the mode of action called *thinking*, shall show how he could endow the sun with the mode of action called *attraction*, which reins the planets in the track of their orbits, or how an absence of matter can have a will, and by that will put matter into motion, then the materialist may be lawfully required to explain the process by which matter exercises the faculty of thinking. When once we quit the basis of sensation, all is in the wind. To talk of *immaterial* existences, is to talk of *nothings*. To say that the human soul, angels, God, are immaterial, is to say, they are *nothings*, or that there is no God, no angels, no soul. I cannot reason otherwise: but I believe I am supported in my creed of materialism by the Lockes, the Tracys, and the Stewarts. At what age* of the church this heresy of *immaterialism*, or masked atheism, crept in, I do not exactly know. But a heresy it certainly is. Jesus taught nothing of it. He told us, indeed, that 'God is a spirit,' but he has not defined what a spirit is, nor said that it is not *matter*. And the ancient fathers generally, of the three first centuries, held it to be matter, light and thin indeed, an ethereal gas; but still matter."

He then quotes Origen, Tertulian, St. Macarius, and refers to a catalogue of others, and adds—

"Others, with whose writings I pretend not a familiarity, are said by those who are better acquainted with them, to deliver the same doctrine. (Enfield x. 3. 1.) Turn to your Ocellus d'Argens, 97, 105, and to his Timæus 17, for these quotations. In England, these immaterialists might have been burnt until the 29 Car. 2, when the writ *de heretico comburendo* was abolished; and here until the revolution, that statute not having extended to us. All heresies being now done away with us, these schismatists are merely atheists, differing from the material atheist only in their belief, that 'nothing made something,' and from the material deist, who believes that matter alone 'can operate on matter.'—Vol. iv. pp. 331, 332.

We have no inclination, and we suppose there is no need, to enter

* That of Athanasius and the Council of Nicæa, anno. 324.

into an argument to prove that God is not matter. We think it right, however, and of some importance, to expose the misrepresentations of Mr. J. in quoting authorities on this occasion. He says—"I believe I am supported in my creed of materialism by the Lockes, the Tracys, and the Stewarts." We do not wish to detract more than we are compelled to do, from the high pretensions to reading and scholarship, which every where appear in these papers. Yet we are constrained to suppose, either that Mr. J. had never read Locke's far famed "Essay on the Human Understanding," or else that he wilfully prevaricated, in saying that he believed he was supported in his "creed of materialism" by this eminent reasoner—We choose the former part of the alternative. We would willingly impute what he says to forgetfulness, if Locke had not made this subject so prominent, that any one who reads the essay and remembers any of its contents, cannot reasonably be supposed to have let this part slip from his recollection; and if no part was remembered, Mr. J. surely had no right to say he believed it contained the very opposite of what the author has laid out all his strength to prove. We regret that our space does not permit us to quote *in extenso* Locke's argument on this subject, in the tenth chapter of his fourth book on the Human Understanding—We shall, however, let our readers see what were his sentiments on this important topick. The chapter to which we have referred is entitled "Of our knowledge of the existence of a God;" and agreeably to the uniform usage of this writer, a summary of each chapter, and of each section, is given at the beginning. The contents of the sections from the 8th to the 19th and last, is as follows:—"Something from eternity—Two sorts of beings, cogitative and incogitative—Incogitative being cannot produce cogitative—Therefore

there has been an eternal Wisdom—Whether material or no—NOT MATERIAL, first, because every particle of matter is not cogitative—Secondly, one particle alone of matter cannot be cogitative—Thirdly, a system of incogitative matter cannot be cogitative—Whether in motion or at rest—Matter not co-eternal with an eternal mind." Now if, in addition to what is before the reader, Locke's own opinion of what he has proved in this chapter is desirable, it may be found in the controversy, which all who have read his works know that he had with the Bishop of Worcester, particularly in regard to what the Essay contains in relation to *spirits*. In discussing that subject, Locke had shown that it was *in the highest degree probable*, that the human soul is *immaterial*; but had also said that he was not prepared to affirm that it was not competent to almighty power and wisdom, to endow some modification of matter with the capacity of thought. We do not profess to have here given his very words, but it will be seen by the following quotations, that we have not stated his opinion too strongly; and we hope our readers will remark how directly he contradicts the representation of Mr. J. Having given a quotation from Virgil, Locke proceeds—

"I would not be thought hereby to say, that *spirit* never does signify a purely immaterial substance. In that sense the scripture, I take it, speaks, when it says, *God is a spirit*; and in that sense I have used it; and in that sense I have proved from my principles, that there is a *spiritual substance*; and am certain that there is a *spiritual immaterial substance*: which is, I humbly conceive, a direct answer to your lordship's question in the beginning of this argument, viz. *How we come to be certain that there are spiritual substances, supposing this principle to be true*, that the simple ideas by sensation and reflection are the sole matter and foundation of all our reasoning? But this hinders not, but that if God, that infinite, omnipotent, and perfectly immaterial spirit, should please to give to a system of very subtile matter, sense, and motion, it might, with proprie-

ty of speech, be called *spirit*; though materiality were not excluded out of its complex idea."

He then quotes a number of sentences from the Bishop's publication, ending with these words—"We can have no certainty upon these principles, whether we have any spiritual substance within us or not." On this Locke remarks as follows:

"Your lordship, in this paragraph, proves, that from what I say, *We can have no certainty whether we have any spiritual substance in us or not.* If, by *spiritual substance*, your lordship means an *immaterial substance* in us, as you speak, I grant what your lordship says is true, that it cannot, upon *these principles*, be demonstrated. But I must crave leave to say, at the same time, that upon *these principles*, it can be proved, to the highest degree of probability. If, by *spiritual substance*, your lordship means a *thinking substance*, I must dissent from your lordship, and say, *that we can have a certainty, upon my principles, that there is a spiritual substance in us.* In short, my lord, upon *my principles*, i. e. from the idea of *thinking*, we can have a certainty, that there is a *thinking substance in us*; from hence we have a certainty that there is an eternal *thinking substance*. This thinking substance, which has been from eternity, I have proved to be *immaterial*. This eternal, immaterial, thinking substance, has put into us a thinking substance, which, whether it be a material or immaterial substance, cannot be infallibly demonstrated from our ideas; though from them it may be proved that it is to the highest degree probable that it is immaterial."

In another part of the same controversy he says—

"Perception and knowledge in that one eternal Being, where it has its source, it is visible, must be essentially inseparable from it; therefore the actual want of perception in so great a part of the particular parcels of matter, is a DEMONSTRATION that the first Being, from whom perception and knowledge is inseparable, IS NOT MATTER."

Thus it appears that Locke is as directly opposed to Mr. J. as one writer can be to another. Yet Mr. J. "believes" that he is supported in his "creed of materialism" by Locke! Is it easy to believe the allegations of a man who believes in this manner?

We have never read the work of Tracy, to which Mr. J. refers; and of what we have not read we do not choose to speak. But we never before heard that Stewart was suspected of being a materialist; nor do we believe that a passage can be pointed out in all that he has written, that would justify such a suspicion. Were it necessary, we think we could show that "the belief" of Mr. J., as it relates to him, is as unfounded as we have shown it to be in reference to Locke. But it is not necessary—A man who makes such groundless representations as he has done, has no claim to be accredited in matters of this kind. And for this reason we shall not give ourselves the trouble to say more on his quotations from some of the early Christian writers, and his reference to others, than that we believe the quotations to be garbled, and the allegations to be unfounded—perhaps with the exception of Tertullian and Origen, both of whom, it is well known, mixed Christianity with some whimsies of their own, of the most exceptionable character. If any of our readers are disposed to think that we do not show sufficient respect to Mr. J., in treating his verbal quotations as unworthy of credit, we will only request them to look at the following extract, fairly and fully taken from a letter of his to Mr. Gerry—Vol. iv. p. 176. Speaking of the party in politics that opposed him and Mr. G., he says—"There was but a single act of my whole administration of which that party approved. That was the proclamation on the attack of the Chesapeake. And when I found they approved of it, I confess I began strongly to apprehend I had done wrong, and to exclaim with the Psalmist, 'Lord, what have I done, that the wicked should praise me!'" Yes, reader, he gives the marks of quotation, note of admiration and all; and when we shall be shown that this sentence, or any thing like it, is in the writings of the

Psalmist, or in any other part of the English translation of the Bible, then blame us as much as you please, for what we have said of Mr. J.'s quotations—till then we shall hold ourselves guiltless.*

Mr. J. was probably aware that those who hold that there is nothing in the universe but matter, have generally been considered and called *Atheists*. He endeavours, therefore, to turn the tables on his opponents, and brands as schismaticks and atheists, all who do not believe in materialism—believe that their Maker is of the same substance, under a different modification, with the ground on which they tread! This was the system of Spinoza, the absurdity of which has been triumphantly shown a hundred times. Locke, we have seen, says, that, in the chapter to which we have referred, he has given a *demonstration* of its falsehood.

Of the Trinity.—Nothing but a conviction that the publick good requires that the impiety of these papers should be clearly exposed, and that any statement in other words than those of Mr. J. would be questioned, could ever induce us to pollute our pages with such a sentence as the following, in which Mr. J. (Vol. iv. p. 360) speaks of the trine God—"The hocus-pocus and phantasm of a God like another

* We remember to have heard the late Rev. Dr. Witherspoon mention the following occurrence, as having taken place in the Continental Congress that declared American Independence. On an interesting discussion, a member began his speech nearly in these words:—Mr. President—There is an old and good book, which is not read as much as it ought to be—I mean the Bible, Sir—which says, "Of two evils we should always choose the least." The Dr. rose hastily and said, Mr. President—The gentleman will greatly oblige us, if he will refer to *chapter und verse*. Members of Congress since their debates have been in publick, have sometimes shown a pitiable ignorance, and at other times a lamentable profaneness, by affecting a familiarity with the sacred scriptures, or by grossly misapplying them.

Cerberus, with one body and three heads, had its birth and growth in the blood of thousands and thousands of martyrs." Horrible! This is the very buffoonery of blasphemy. Neither Tom Paine nor Voltaire ever exceeded it. An historical falsehood, too, is connected with the blasphemy. The sacred doctrine which Mr. J. reviles, had not its *birth* in the blood of martyrs, nor in any blood—Mosheim, the best authority, states expressly, that during the three first centuries of the Christian church, this doctrine was held without dispute or controversy; with some variety of opinion indeed, as to the mutual relation of the three persons in the Godhead to each other, but "without giving the least offence."* The Arian heresy, which sprung up in the fourth century, did certainly agitate and distract the church most grievously, and for a long period; but to say that even then, or ever afterward, it occasioned "the blood of thousands and thousands of martyrs," is going far beyond the truth.

The stale and groundless objection to the doctrine of the Trinity, on which Mr. J. constantly harps, and which constitutes the whole of his argument on the subject, is what he calls "the Athanasian paradox, that one is three and three but one." To which we shall only reply in the words of Dr. Witherspoon, in his lecture on the Trinity. "Though we say that the Trinity in Unity is incomprehensible, or above reason, we say nothing that is absurd or contrary to reason; so far from it, I may say rather it is consonant to reason and the analogy of nature, that there should be many things in the divine nature that we cannot fully comprehend. There are many such things in his providence, and surely much more in his essence. But when our adversaries are pressed upon this subject, they say sometimes—it is not an incomprehensi-

* Church Hist. Vol. i. p. 411. London edition.

ble mystery that we find fault with, but an apparent contradiction, that God should be three and one. We know very well what numbers are, and we know perfectly whatever is three cannot be one, or one three—But this is owing to great inattention or great obstinacy. We do not say there are three Gods, and yet one God; three persons and yet one person; or that the Divine Being is three in the same sense and respect that he is one; but only that there is a distinction, consistent with perfect unity of nature.”

Of the Incarnation.—“The day will come, when the mystical generation of Jesus, by the Supreme Being as his father, in the womb of a virgin, will be classed with the fable of the generation of Minerva in the brain of Jupiter.” (Vol. iv. p. 365.) Is the reader shocked and disgusted by this quotation, almost beyond endurance? So are we; and we repeat that this abominably impious ribaldry should not have defiled our pages, if we had not felt it to be an imperious duty, to let our readers know what a detestable work is widely circulated in the United States, and to our disgrace, in Britain also. Yes, truly the day *has* come, when the sacred doctrine of the incarnation of the

Son of God, our blessed Saviour, is classed with one of the most contemptible fables of the heathen mythology; and this in a letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams—printed and distributed largely in the country of which they were, in succession, the chief magistrates. But we have no fear that the day *will* ever come, in which this horri-fying blasphemy will become popular, in this or in any other Christian land. But we know—and the thought is awful—that the day will assuredly come, when “the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven, with his mighty angels, in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ; who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his power, when he shall come to be glorified in his saints, and to be admired in all them that believe—and to execute judgment upon all, and to convince all that are ungodly among them, of all their ungodly deeds which they have ungodly committed, and of all their hard speeches, which ungodly sinners have spoken against him.”

(*To be continued.*)

Literary and Philosophical Intelligence, etc.

Lightning Rods before Franklin.—The following curious paragraph is from the London Monthly Review. An iron conductor raised in the air from any building, without an immediate connexion with the ground, would not only be a very unphilosophical lightning rod, but would, in this country, almost inevitably secure the destruction of the building to which it should be attached. How a *pointed* halbert could receive a spark from such an instrument we cannot explain. Whenever a nation or an individual succeeds in making a great and useful discovery of any kind, there is a wonderful tendency in the human mind to reduce the merit of it, as low as possible, or to destroy it altogether.

“It is curious to find that the conductor or lightning rod, which so many men of genius, learning, and ingenuity, have been at the pains to complete—which in fact has been always regarded as one of the proudest trophies of science—was known and employed by a people of no more refined cultivation than the wild peasantry of Lombardy. The Abbe Berthollet, in his work on the Electricity of Meteors, describes a practice used on one of the bastions of the Castle of Duino, on the shores of the Adriatick, which has existed from time immemorial, and which is literally neither more nor less than the process that enabled Franklin to bring down lightning from the clouds. An iron staff, it seems, was erected on the bastion