

# An ESSAY,

To defend some of the most important Principles in  
the Protestant Reformed System of Christianity,  
on which the Churches of Christ in *New-England*,  
were originally founded :

*Edw.<sup>d</sup>* More ESPECIALLY; *Hollid.*

The Doctrine of Christ's Sacrifice and Atonement, as being  
absolutely necessary to the Pardon of Sin, consistently with  
God's infinite and unchangeable *Reſtitution*; against the  
injurious Aspersions cast on the same, by JONATHAN  
MAYHEW, D. D. in his late Thanksgiving Sermons on  
Pſal. CXLV. 9.

In which

Some of the Doctor's Mistakes, Inaccuracies and Incon-  
sistencies, are pointed out.

By *John Cleaveland, V. D. M.*  
Pastor of a Church in *Ipswich*.

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“ He is the Rock, his Work is perfect; for all his Ways are  
Judgment: a God of Truth, and without Iniquity, just and right-  
eous is He.”  
Moses.

“ Touching the Almighty, we cannot find him out; He is  
excellent in Power, and in Judgment, and in Plenty of Justice:  
He will not afflict.”  
Elihu.

“ The LORD is known by the Judgment which he executeth:  
the Wicked is snared in the Work of his own Hands. The Wicked  
shall be turned into Hell, and all the Nations that forget  
God.”  
David.

“ To me belongeth Vengeance and Recompence: Vengeance  
is mine; I will repay:— And will by no Means clear the guilty.”  
JEHOVAH.


“ I am the Way, and the Truth and the Life:—No Man  
cometh unto the Father, but by me.”  
JESUS CHRIST.

“ Neither is there Salvation in any other: for there is none  
other Name, &c.  
Apost. Peter.

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*Sam<sup>l</sup> Ruggles*



# An Essay to, &c.



 Have read Doctor MAYHEW's thanki-  
giving sermons " upon the nature, ex-  
tent, & perfection of God's goodness :"  
And can't but think, that his descrip-  
tion of the divine attributes, in many  
respects, is very confused and confounding ;—that  
his treatment of several most important principles in  
the protestant reformed system of christianity, on  
which the New-England churches of Christ were ori-  
ginally founded, is injurious :—And that some things  
advanced by him, are, in their tendency, not only  
subversive of the orthodox faith, but even of mora-  
lity or true virtue.

And as he appears very bold and dogmatical,  
I marvel that none of our Divines of indis-  
putable ability for such an undertaking, have  
attempted to vindicate the truth against him, and  
to point out, at least some of his most material mis-  
takes and inconsistencies :—We ought " to contend  
earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints,"  
and " to be valiant for the truth ;"—if we believe  
our system of christianity to be founded on divine  
revelation, we must look upon it to be most impor-  
tant

tant, and worthy to be defended :—And besides, a tender regard to the good and benefit of such as oppose themselves, ought to be a motive to defend the truth ; not merely to stop the mouths of Gainsayers, but if possible to recover such as have been under the impressions not only of a good education, but of the spirit of God, by some of the most important principles in our system ; and to convince such as have not, if any there be.

But as none have attempted it against the Dr. I think it my duty to appear in defence of my country's system of christianity ; which I have an undoubted right to do, as it is my own system, or what *I believe* to be founded on the word of God :—If the Dr. opposes what is my faith, and that publicly, he can't in reason find fault with my defending it as publickly ; And if he has published mistakes, inaccuracies, and inconsistencies ; he can blame none of his readers, for pointing out the same to him ; or for insisting upon his making out his assertions.

I shall proceed in the following method, with as much brevity, as I can conveniently, viz.

I. Mention several things, we agree with the Dr. in.

II. Take notice of the Dr's evident design.

III. Give a concise representation of the doctrine of the divine attributes ; together, with some of the natural inferences, as held by protestant reformers.

And IV. Point out some of the Dr's inaccuracies and inconsistencies.—

I. I shall mention several things, we agree with the Dr. in ; and

1. We are agreed in this, “ that in God there is no distinction or distribution of attributes into essential and non-essential ; in him nothing, whether power, knowledge

knowledge or goodness, or any other attribute, \* is accidental or adventitious, acquired or derived from without ; all is eternal, all essential, and all equally necessary :—He is of consequence in the strictest sense, “ without variableness or shadow of turning.” Wholly and absolutely, necessarily and immutably the same, even “ from everlasting to everlasting.” P. 11.

2. We are agreed, that God has a positively good and valuable end in punishing transgressors or sinners, P. 24. and that the end, God pursues in all his conduct towards his creatures, without meeting with any possible difficulty or discouragement to attain the same, is truly “ great, noble and excellent,” P. 45.— But as to the end itself, we are not agreed : The Dr. says, “ it is the happiness of his creatures,” and even in punishing, “ his end is, either the good of such as are punished, or the good of the other members of his household or kingdom.” P. 25. And says in P. 77. “ If any chuse to express it thus, that God’s view is to promote *his own glory, by doing good*, making the latter the *means*, and the former the *end*, I have no objection, except it may, perhaps, seem to represent him, *rather* as an ambitious Being, who desires the praise and homage of his creatures, than an infinitely good *one*, who aims at making them happy without any selfish end, incompatible with a perfect character, and with absolute self-sufficiency.” And altho’ he adds, “ but I assert nothing upon this point,” yet as he had asserted much before of the same import, we may conclude, without doing him any injustice, that it seems to him more compatible with a perfect character and with absolute self-sufficiency, to represent the divine Being to be such an infinitely good  
good

\* For *attribute*, the Dr. puts *quality*, these two terms are used by him as synonymous, but they are not so with me.

good One, who aims at making his creatures happy, without any selfish end, than to represent him, as a Being who does all things for his own glory :—But we apprehend, that as the *Godhead*, is the peculiar and unalienable prerogative of God ; or because it is infinitely right and fit, that God should be God, and maintain his character, that the manifesting and maintaining the glory, the dignity and the excellence of his nature or properties, is the truly great, noble and excellent end, which God aims at, and infallibly attains, in all his works.—

3. We are agreed, “ that if God has left the whole heathen world to unavoidable and eternal misery,—they will be punished *only* for their sins, and in due measure only,” P. 65. Nor will that everlasting punishment (which the Dr. grants) the wicked at the day of judgment, “ shall go away into, in the place prepared for the devil and his angels,” be for any thing but for sin, and it shall be in due measure only, P. 86, and 87, and even “ that much sorer punishment, which gospel-sinners shall be tho’t worthy of.”—The wicked shall receive *only* the just wages of sin or of unrighteousness, as the Dr. terms it, “ God will judge the world in righteousness, and give to every one according to his works.”

4. We are agreed, that “ one principal end of Christ’s coming into this apostate world, was to proclaim the glad tidings of pardon and eternal life to sinners, as the free gift of God thro’ his mediation, particularly thro’ the atonement to be made by his blood, when he should offer himself up to God, as a lamb without blemish, and without spot ;—that it is both a faithful saying and worthy of all acceptation, that Jesus Christ came into the world to save even the chief of sinners.” P. 49. That “ the greatness of our past sins, will be no objection against our be-

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ing accepted in Christ, if we come unto God by him ; God expects no righteousness in or of us, in order to our being forgiven of him, but only a truly penitent and humble sense of our unrighteousness, \* and an hearty consent to receive eternal life as his gift thro' Jesus Christ our Lord, P. 83."—That it is a groundless presumption for any person, unless he can plead a sinless innocence and perfection, to rely upon the divine goodness and mercy, in the practice of his supposed duties and moral virtues, while he rejects the gospel of Christ, or that method of salvation revealed therein :—It is the greatest presumption and madness for any person, to whom the gospel is preached, to rely on the mercy of God, in any other way, course or practice, than that which God himself has marked out.—To depend on it in any other way, is at once absurd and impious ; this being in effect making God a liar, and assuming to ourselves a right of prescribing to the Almighty, what channel his goodness & mercy shall flow in, even contrary to his own declared will and purpose. Know ! that the counsel of God shall stand, and stand more immutable than the foundations of the earth, or the pillars of heaven,—with whatever presumptuous hopes vain men may amuse or deceive themselves, P. 87.

5. We are agreed, " that when the goodness of God is spoken of in a general way, it comprehends many, if not strictly all of his particular moral attributes." P. 19 : Yea, we stick not to say, it comprehends all of his particular moral attributes, if by the goodness of God spoken of in a general way be meant

\* If " by a truly penitent and humble sense of our unrighteousness," preceding faith in Christ, the Dr. means *legal* ; we agree that such a sense is necessary in order to our receiving Christ as the end of the law for righteousness : But evangelical repentance and humility, don't precede faith in Christ. —————

meant his infinite moral rectitude. The infinite moral rectitude of God, is his infinite moral goodness; what is infinitely right in a moral sense, must be infinitely good in the same sense; and what is opposite, repugnant and contrary in it's nature to that which is infinitely right, must be infinitely wrong; therefore God sees nothing to be infinitely right, fit, or good in a moral sense, but the infinite moral rectitude of his nature and will; and what he sees to be contrary to the infinite moral rectitude of his nature and will, he must hate with infinite abhorrence as being moral evil, enmity and malignity against that which is infinitely right or good: Sin must be infinite evil—God looks upon it to be so, as it is enmity against God, and lusts against the spirit, and will be satisfied with nothing, less than the destruction of God, the destruction of infinite moral rectitude, which is God's essence and beauty. And it must be observed, as moral evil is opposed to moral good; and as injustice, lying and unfaithfulness, are as really moral evils, as unkindness & unmercifulness, it must follow, that justice, truth & faithfulness, are as really moral goodness, as kindness, mercifulness or pity.— But tho' the Dr. pretends to speak of the goodness of God in a general way, as comprehending all of his particular moral attributes, and attempts to shew, that justice, even punitive justice, is a branch or mode of it; yet he does not even then consider it, as the infinite moral rectitude of God's nature, as being infinitely opposite to, and infinitely hating all moral evil: But goes on to consider divine goodness, only as manifesting itself in acts of kindness & beneficence towards his creatures, and does in effect deny, there is any such infinite, absolute moral rectitude in God: It is a principle he goes upon, “ that all God's acts of punishing must flow either from a principle of actual

actual kindness, or of positive cruelty." And as cruelty can't be right, God's moral rectitude or goodness consists wholly in a principle of kindness, benevolence and bounty : According to this, there is no such absolute justice, righteousness, or rectitude in God, that obliges him to punish sinners for their sin, because sin deserves punishment ; or because such punishment is infinitely *just* ; or because God infinitely hates sin : that God don't punish for sin to shew the infinite rectitude of his nature, and how much he hates sin, without any view to the good and happiness of such as he punishes : In this we are not agreed, as will more fully appear before I have done.

II. The second thing proposed, is to take notice of the Dr's evident design : Which is, to represent the divine goodness in such a light as to shew, there was no absolute necessity of the sacrifice of Christ to make atonement, or to satisfy divine justice in order to God's forgiving the sins of men consistently with his moral goodness.

This appears by his labouring (in opposition to what has been held and taught by protestant divines) to explain away divine justice, and what he calls punitive justice, into a mere mode or modification of God's goodness, i. e. kindness & beneficence towards his creatures ; see his ten observation. P. 20, to 26. Now if justice, even punitive justice in God, is only a mode or modification of his goodness, or kindness and beneficence towards his creatures, then the great end (as the Dr. says it is) of God's exercising punitive justice, must be "the good of his creatures," and even the good of those, that it is exercised upon ; and hence every act of punitive justice must be an act of kindness, "for it is goodness itself, that gives the blow." P. 21. And if God is "either actually kind or positively cruel in punishing sinners,

as the Dr. says he must be," then it must follow (1.) That God would be positively cruel and unmerciful to sinners, if he should punish them any farther than would be actually for their good. (2.) That there is no such absolute justice or rectitude in God, that is offended at sin ;—that can't look on it, but with infinite displeasure ; and that " will by no means clear the guilty," or pardon sinners without plenary satisfaction : And if so, there was no need of an atonement in reference to divine justice, to satisfy it, in order to the pardon of sin. There was no need of Christ's suffering, the just for the unjust, but on the contrary, there was a necessity of God's forgiving sinners, even from his very goodness, as God would not be perfectly good but cruel, if he should punish them any farther than would be for their good or happiness ; at least, he must stay his hand from punishing, where punishment should cease to be for their good or happiness : And if God's punitive justice is positive kindness, or all his acts of punishing, are acts of positive kindness, how could the suffering of Christ, the just for the unjust, be an effect of God's love, mercy and grace ? Is it an act of love, mercy and grace, to withhold from sinners an act of positive kindness ?

This design farther appears from what the Dr. says in P. 64, and 65 ; where he plainly intimates, that there was no necessity of the atonement of Christ, in reference to any such divine justice in God, that must be satisfied by the sufferings or death of Christ, that men might be pardoned or saved, " such idea of divine justice, must be wholly & forever excluded."— " We are assured (says he) in the holy scriptures, that God forgives the sins of men thro' this great sacrifice (of Christ) intervening, *rather* than without any." q. d. " There was no absolute necessity of this sacrifice

sacrifice intervening ; God might have forgiven sin without any ; but of the two, he chose *rather* to do it with than without any." But why did God chuse to do it with a sacrifice, *rather* than without any ? And where are we assured of this in the holy scriptures ?—" In this sense (says the Dr.) the Apostle having observed, *that Christ by the grace of God tasted death for every man*, adds, *For it BECAME him, for whom are all things, & by whom are all things, in bringing many sons to glory, to make the captain of their salvation perfect thro' sufferings* : It became his wisdom, it became his goodness, it became his mercy, even that very grace of God, by which Christ tasted death for every man ; there was a fitness and congruity in it, as the *wisest* and *best* method for saving sinful men, *without any kind of reference to that common, but yet strange* supposition of divine justice being entirely distinct from divine goodness."—The common supposition of divine justice is, that it is so absolute in God, or that God is such essential and absolute moral rectitude, that he cannot consistently with his justice, righteousness or moral rectitude, forgive the sins of men, without satisfaction for sin or an atonement ; now the Dr. says, it became God, to make the captain of our salvation perfect thro' sufferings, without any kind of reference to such divine justice in God, God might have forgiven the sins of men without an atonement ; yea, and he must do it now without an atonement, if at all ; for Christ made no atonement by his sacrifice or sufferings, if his sacrifice or sufferings were without any kind of reference to any such divine justice in God, that must be satisfied, appeased or reconciled thereby, or otherwise sinners must never be pardoned :—And that the Dr. means there is no such divine justice in God to satisfy which, we say, Christ died, appears from what he farther says, viz.

“ Christ’s dying, *the just for the unjust*, as consequential to, and the effect of God’s love, mercy and grace, is so far from supposing *any such justice in God*, distinct in nature from goodness, and to *satisfy which*, it is said, *Christ died* ; that it appears to me absolutely irreconcilable therewith.” From whence I think it must be evident to every reader, that the Dr. does not hold, Christ died, “ the just for the unjust,” to satisfy divine justice in God :—That he denys, there is any such divine justice in God, to satisfy which Christ died. And therefore, he adds, “ Neither does it seem, or even possible to assert and solidly to maintain, the most important doctrine of our redemption by the blood of Christ ; but upon the supposition of it’s being the *wisest and best*, i. e. the most *benevolent and gracious* method of dispensing pardon and life to sinners ; in such sense, as *wholly and forever to exclude any such idea of divine justice, as is often given us.*” — Now the idea of divine justice, which is often given us, which the sacrifice of Christ, or our redemption by the blood of Christ (thro’ which we receive forgiveness) hath a special reference to ; is not a mere mode or modification of goodness or kindness, and benevolence, but it is the absolutely righteous & vindictive nature of God, that will by no means clear the guilty without full satisfaction for sin ; and hence that “ Christ offered up himself a sacrifice to satisfy divine justice, and reconcile us to God,” *that God might be just, and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus.*— Which implies that the only way in which God can be just in justifying or in forgiving sinners, is thro’ the redemption, atonement or satisfaction of Christ ; therefore if such idea of divine justice is excluded, the necessity of an atonement must be excluded, & Christ did not die to make an atonement : And if that idea of divine justice, which we maintain, be wholly excluded,

cluded, I challenge the Dr. and all the world, to shew there was any necessity of an atonement, or that Christ has made an atonement by the sacrifice of himself.

Now if what I have mentioned, is not the Dr's evident design, why does he labour, wholly and forever to exclude all such divine justice as stands in the way of a sinner's pardon, without plenary satisfaction, or without an atonement by the sacrifice of Christ? Why does he say, it became the wisdom, the goodness, the mercy, &c of God, to make the captain of our salvation perfect thro' sufferings—without any kind of reference to divine justice, as it is commonly received?—Why does he more than intimate that such divine justice, being in God, to satisfy which, it is said, Christ died, appears to him absolutely irreconcilable with Christ's dying, the just for the unjust, as consequential to, and the effect of God's love, mercy and grace; if he does not think God to be all kindness and benevolence, and hence that there was no absolute necessity of an atonement or plenary satisfaction for sin, in order to the forgiveness of it?—Yea, why does he represent the moral goodness of God, as consisting wholly in benevolence, positive kindness and beneficence,—that punitive justice is only a branch or mode of positive kindness, and that God's great end which he pursues, and even in punishing, is the good or happiness of his creatures; if his design is not to shew,—that there is no such absolute moral rectitude, justice or righteousness, which absolutely and necessarily forbids the pardon of sin without satisfaction, or an atonement;—that there is no absolute eternal rule of right in God's nature;—that the only rule of right is the happiness of his creatures, what is for their happiness is right, and what is not for their happiness is wrong:—That there is no infinite moral evil, nor infinite desert of punishment in sin;

sin ; and consequently, that God might *well & wisely* have forgiven the sins of men without any sacrifice or atonement ?—And why does the Dr. represent divine justice as it is commonly received, to be “opposite and repugnant to, and at variance with divine goodness,” as he does in his sermons, “he that runs, may read this.” I say, why does he thus represent it, if his design is not to shew, there is nothing in God, which forbids the forgiving of sin without an atonement ? q. d. “If there is such divine justice in God, as is often spoken of, that must be satisfied, before sinners can consistently be forgiven, justice is opposite and repugnant to, and at variance with goodness, that can and is inclined to, forgive without any sacrifice ; and therefore as such justice can be no branch or mode of goodness, or positive kindness, it must be wholly and forever excluded.” \*—If I have not

\* The Dr. appears full in that scheme (at least as to the fundamental and leading principles of it) which the Revd. President CLAP, of Yale-Colledge, collected out of several authors, viz. *Chubb, Taylor, Foster, Hutchinson, Campbell, and Ramsay* ; and calls, *A new scheme of Divinity*. These that follow are fundamental and leading principles in that scheme, viz. “That the only end & design of the creation is the happiness of the creature.”—“That the only criterion of duty to God, is self-interest.”—“That God annexes penalties only for the good of the creature, and the only end of punishment, is the good of those upon whom it is inflicted ; or at least for the good of the System of moral agents in general.”—“That no satisfaction is necessary in order to the forgiveness of sin ; and therefore Christ did not die to make satisfaction.”—From whence it is concluded, that there is no need of supposing him to be essentially God, but only a most perfect and glorious creature.”—“And from the first principle cited here, they pretend to demonstrate, that all reasonable creatures, men and angels shall finally be happy in Heaven, in this manner, viz.

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not hit upon the Dr's evident design, I confess, it is because I can't comprehend him : However, I appeal to his judicious readers, whether, what I have mentioned, is not the very spirit of his sermons ?—  
I pass on——

III. In the third place, to give a concise representation of the doctrine of the divine attributes, together with some of the natural inferences, as held by protestant reformers.

Altho' " touching the Almighty, we cannot find him out unto perfection." And none, but that mind, which is infinite, can have an adequate knowledge of what is infinite ; yet we may have some just apprehensions of God, what he is ; and may rationally conclude what a being he must be : And we ought to acknowledge him to be, what he hath discovered himself to be, by his works ; and believe him to be such a being, as he declares himself to be in his infallible word.

We apprehend God, to be absolute, underived, and independent being : And hence, that he must  
be

" The ultimate end and design of God in the creation, is the happiness of the creature."

" God's ultimate end and design never can be finally frustrated or defeated : Therefore all intelligent creatures shall finally be happy."

I deny the major or first proposition, and let such who assert it, first prove it, before they draw their conclusion from it.

Tho' the Dr. in p. 68. allows, the duration of the future punishment of wicked men, is divers times express'd by the words, *eternal*, *everlasting*, for ever and ever, and the like." and in p. 86. that at the great day, the wicked shall go away into everlasting punishment, in the Place prepared for the devil and his angels." Yet from p. 89. to the end, he speaks as tho' he expected, in the revolution of ages, or in some future period, a universal salvation, or release of the whole creation, and every creature from a subjection to punishment.

be eternal, infinite and unchangeable ; and eternally, infinitely and unchangeably happy or blessed in himself ; and therefore, that he must be eternal, infinite and unchangeable perfection or moral rectitude.

If we apprehend God to be a spirit infinite, eternal and unchangeable ; and that he has happiness adequate to his being, we must also allow, the ground of his happiness to be adequate to his being ; and as we can't conceive how any thing can be the proper ground of happiness to an intelligent spiritual existence, but moral rectitude, or moral goodness ; we must conclude that the ground of God's infinite happiness, is the infinite moral rectitude of his nature ; and hence, that God must be essentially and necessarily, infinitely and eternally, unchangeably and absolutely, moral rectitude, or moral goodness.

When we apprehend God to be such a Being, we necessarily conclude, that He is omniscient, or that He is a Being of infinite understanding, and that all things lie open to his all-comprehensive view from eternity to eternity :—That he is omnipresent,—inhabits eternity or infinitude itself ; he is infinitely immense :—And that he is omnipotent, of infinite ability to do whatsoever he pleases to do ; yea and any thing that does not imply inconsistency.

And when we consider God's infinite moral rectitude, we must take in all those particular moral attributes or properties which are necessary to a complete or perfect moral character, infinitely amiable :—And as God's infinite moral rectitude is his essence, all these particular moral attributes must be of the essence of God — That God cannot be God, without being essentially, what these divine properties import : Take away either of them (and no matter which) and you deny God to be God ; for if God is not essentially what this & the other moral attribute imports, he

he ceases to be infinite moral rectitude ; or rather, he is not and never was, infinite moral rectitude in his nature, if he is not essentially, what all his particular moral attributes import ; hence we say with the Dr. “ all are eternal, all essential, and all equally necessary.”

Now these moral attributes or divine properties, which we apprehend necessary to a compleat moral character, infinitely amiable, comprized in God's infinite moral perfection, are *wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness and truth.* \*

We can't so well apprehend these particular moral attributes in their essence, as we may, by considering them in their efficiency, or exercise ; but whatever God manifests or makes known himself, to be, by his efficiency, the same we are sure he is in his essence.

Neither can we conclude, that God is of an infinitely perfect moral character, if we don't apprehend him to be infinite in wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness and truth. God, considered as infinite in wisdom, sees what is infinitely right ; what is infinitely worthy of his choice ;—what an end is truly great, noble and excellent, or worthy and becoming such an

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\* Tho' holiness and moral power, in this Essay, are considered as particular attributes, agreeable to the common distinction in the orthodox system ; the author apprehends, they may be considered in a more general way, as being common to all God's particular moral attributes : That holiness is the purity and beauty of the whole of God's moral nature : That moral power is necessarily implied in moral rectitude. That the acts peculiar to each of God's moral attributes, are equally acts of his moral power :—Also, the author includes God's faithfulness in his truth, his righteousness in his justice, and his knowledge in his wisdom, and indeed “ each one perfection implieth in it in some way, all the rest, from the peculiar simplicity and excellence of the divine nature.”

infinitely perfect Being, to pursue ; and what are the best means for the attaining such a noble end ; and such he chuses or determines upon, without being subject to any possible error or mistake ; therefore he is said not only to be “ a God of judgment, but excellent in judgment.”

God, considered as infinite in moral power, is infinitely able to act right always, i. e. eternally and unchangeably, without any possibility of acting wrong : To act wrong, to lie, to be cruel, or unfaithful, or unjust, would be to deny himself.—To deny his infinite ability *always* to act right, or eternally and immutably to act right, would be a denying his infinite, eternal, absolute and unchangeable moral rectitude ; for infinite moral ability always to act right, is essential to the infinite moral perfection of God’s nature ; hence “ He is excellent in power.”

God, considered as infinite in holiness, is at an infinite remove from all moral impurity ; infinitely loves his own essential and infinite moral purity and perfection ; delights in the image and likeness of his own moral perfections, in his moral works ; and infinitely hates all moral evil, as it is a contrariety to his own infinite beauty & perfection, enmity against absolute moral rectitude, and is infinitely wrong. — Hence God “ is of purer eyes than to behold evil, and he cannot look on iniquity” but with infinite detestation. “ Sin is the abominable thing, which his soul hates.”—“ He is glorious in holiness.”

God, considered as infinite in justice, is essentially inclined and disposed, according to the infinite moral rectitude of his nature, to give himself, what he sees to be his own proper due ; and to give reasonable creatures, his created moral agents, what becomes their due, either by merit, or according to covenant-constitutions.

God gives to himself what is his own proper due, by making the manifestation of his own glory, his truly great end :—To be *Jebovab*, is God's unalienable prerogative ;—this is his *name*,—his *memorial*,—his glory ! which he will give to none but himself, whose it is, and to whom alone it belongs : It is justice in God to himself, to aim at the manifestation of his being what he has an unalienable right to be ; and the maintaining his character, that he is God, infinitely worthy of the highest esteem ; as his end truly great, noble and excellent, in all his counsels, works and dispensations : And indeed, the manifesting himself to be a God of infinite moral perfection, and the maintaining his character, that he is such a Being, from a principle of justice to himself, that this is his due ; is the grand motive with him, of giving created moral agents, what becomes their due, according to any law, system or covenant.—None will say, that when God created moral agents, he was bound in justice to them, to put them into such a state, that they should not be liable to fall ;—hence then, as making them moral agents, manifested God to be a good Being, so his promising to put them into a state of everlasting felicity, upon a condition, which they had ability to perform, manifested God to be a Being graciously and bountifully good : If the condition is performed, the thing promised becomes due according to covenant, which God will certainly make good, to manifest that he is a God of truth and faithfulness. In this way he manifests and maintains his moral character in justice to himself ; it is not for their sakes, but for his own name sake, that he makes good his promise :—But in case these moral agents transgress the moral rule of right, they sin against heaven, deny the God that is above, rob him of his glory, and merit God's infinite displeasure, and there-

for punishment adequate to his displeasure, becomes their due ; now as in punishing them, God gives them what is their due, so the grand motive with him in giving them the punishment, which they deserve, is the manifestation of his infinite moral rectitude, that he essentially *loves righteousness, and hates iniquity* ; and the maintaining his character, that he is such a Being, from a principle of justice to himself, that it is his due to be such a God.

Moreover, God would do himself great injustice, if he should make any thing his great end, but his own glory : If such deny the God that is above, who serve the creature more than the creator ; would not God deny himself, if he should make the creature's happiness, his great end ?—To be sure if God may set up the happiness of his creatures, above his own glory, without doing injustice to himself ; reasonable creatures may do the same, who are not required to be more perfect than God is. God is not infinitely perfect, if he does not make his own glory his great end ; neither is he infinitely wise, self-sufficient and independent : That which is God's grand end, must be his grand motive ; this motive must be either what God sees in himself infinitely fit, or else it is what he sees out of himself : If it be something out of himself, God must see something out of himself, that is infinitely fit to move him, then there must be something out of God, that is infinitely fit to move God :—But if there is nothing out of God infinitely fit to move him, and yet he is moved by something out of himself, then it will follow that God is moved by something that is not infinitely fit to move him ;—and whether God sees any thing out of himself to be infinitely fit to move him, or not infinitely fit, it must follow that if he is moved by any thing out of himself, he is not infinitely perfect, self-sufficient and independent in himself. God,

God, considered as infinite in goodness, is primarily the infinite source of his own infinite felicity ; hence a God of infinite goodness, means the same as a God of infinite moral rectitude ; for it is the infinite moral rectitude of his nature, which God takes infinite complacence or delight in :—Divine goodness also signifies, the loveliness and bountifulness of God's nature, whereby he commends himself to his creatures. This loveliness of God is the beauty of his nature, and is comprehensive of all his moral perfections : But the bountifulness of his nature, which is called a particular attribute or property, and is distinguished by the term *goodness*, is the source of all his acts of bounty, beneficence, grace and mercy. But tho' this source ( which is called the *riches of God's goodness, the riches of his grace and mercy* ) is infinite in God, being of his essence, yet it is exercised & extended towards his creatures, only *as seemeth good in his sight, according to the counsel of his own will*, in such a way as is for the honour of his infinite moral rectitude.

And God, considered as infinite in truth, is infinitely, eternally and unchangeably of one mind ; perfectly agreeable to and consistent with himself, in his purposes, word and works ; faithful to himself, in prosecuting the *plan* of his infinite wisdom, *according to the counsel of his own will* ; faithful to his promises which he has made, *who cannot lie*,—and which *he* has sworn to, *with whom it is impossible to lie* : And faithful to himself, to maintain his own character & glory, as a Being infinite in wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness and truth ; “ *He is the rock, his work is perfect : for all his ways are judgment, a God of truth, and without iniquity ; just and right is He.*”—“ *With God is terrible majesty ; touching the Almighty, we cannot find him out : He is excellent in power, and in judgment, and in plenty of justice ; he will not afflict :*”—  
“ *For*

*“ For of him, and through him, and to him are all things ; to whom be glory for ever amen.”*

Now if God is infinite moral rectitude in his nature ; infinitely, eternally & unchangeably, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness & truth, and essentially and equally, necessarily God in all these divine properties, where is that entire distinction in nature, which implies opposition and repugnance, between any of these divine properties, which the Dr. has the boldness to charge our system of doctrine with ?— We may with greater propriety charge him with a robbing of God, of what he esteems his glory (*that he is excellent in plenty of justice*) in excluding the attribute of divine justice : For if God is not justice itself, he is not infinitely perfect in his moral goodness or moral character ; and hence is not infinitely suitable to be the moral governour, and judge of all the earth. Yea, if God is not justice essentially and infinitely in his nature, his acts of punishing are not acts of justice; especially such as respect the wicked in the other world. Nor are these acts of kindness to them, but of cruelty ; it is impossible to maintain that God is infinite moral goodness in his nature, of an infinitely perfect moral character, without maintaining, that he is infinite justice in his nature :—But when we apprehend him to be infinite moral rectitude, as he is infinite in wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness and truth ; we see nothing wanting in him, that is necessary to an infinitely compleat moral character, or to a Being infinitely amiable, and in the most perfect sense, suitable to govern the moral world ; and to be, the object of all moral obedience, love, fear, hope, trust, &c. of all created moral agents.

And as God is infinite moral goodness in his nature, we conclude, he is the original source or fountain of all morality ; that there is no such thing as morality,

morality, or moral right or justice, or goodness or moral truth, in nature—in created moral agents or moral systems and government; but originates from the moral rectitude of God, and is no farther true morality, or moral goodness, than as it is agreeable or conformable to God's moral goodness:—Hence the moral rectitude of God, is the original rule and standard of all morality, by which all our roving ideas about moral systems—moral agents—moral law and government, must be regulated.—By this criterion must they be tried, judged, justified or condemned:—What is clearly consequential on this eternal—this essential principle of morality, we may, yea must depend on as certain;—and what is repugnant thereto, we must reject.

Now if the above description of God's moral rectitude is not just; or if God's moral character can be infinitely perfect and amiable, without comprehending all those moral attributes in it essentially, that I have mentioned, the Dr. is desired to shew the same.

I shall now proceed to mention some of the natural and just inferences from the doctrine of God's infinite moral rectitude or goodness: And

*First,* That the infinite moral rectitude of God's nature, must be the basis of all created morality, as well as the fountain of it. Upon this it was plan'd—by this it is regulated—and to this it must conform, in its nature—constitution—mode and form: It must be equally so, with respect either to a moral agent, a moral law or system, or a moral government constituted of God.—To suppose God to be perfect moral rectitude; and yet, when he form'd a moral agent, and a moral system or law, for the rule of the creature's moral obedience, and God's moral government of him, to say he did not make his moral rectitude the basis of his plan, will be attended with the grossest absurdities,

absurdities, too many to mention here. It will be sufficient to say, that this imports, that God did not act agreeably to his nature, which is infinite moral rectitude —It is also an impossibility; for nothing can be moral, that is essentially different in it's nature or qualities from the morality of God's nature :—Hence it was impossible to form moral agents, moral systems, &c. without making them in conformity to his moral nature ;—his moral rectitude must be the basis on which he plan'd this work :—Moral laws, moral agents and moral government, are no farther moral, than they are agreeable to the moral nature of God.

*Secondly,* That whatever God does of a moral kind; whether in planning, making, or governing his creature-moral agents; it is the effect of all his moral attributes; or God acts in the whole agreeable to his character, as a God of infinite wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness and truth :—It is not the effect of a God of infinite wisdom and goodness only; but equally of a God of justice, holiness & truth. God, by his moral works, makes manifest the perfection and glory of his moral nature: This inference looks with a frowning aspect on such as maintain God to be all kindness and beneficence, so as wholly and absolutely to exclude the idea of divine justice, and plenary satisfaction for sin, in order to the forgiveness of it :—And this frown they must bear, until they can shew, either that a God of infinite goodness, is not a God of infinite holiness, justice and truth; or that God in his moral works does not act agreeably to his whole moral character; or that God in his counsel and works, is divided against himself :—Or that when God plans or performs a moral work, he has not an equal regard to all the essential properties of his own moral nature !—

*Thirdly,*

*Thirdly*, That if God is perfect moral rectitude; and if he makes his moral rectitude the basis of all morality in his creatures, and if in all his moral works, he has an equal regard to all the properties of his moral nature; it must follow from the whole, that every moral agent God forms, and the moral law or system, he places the same under, must bear a likeness to God's moral nature. The law must be a transcript of God's moral nature; it must at least, be *just, holy and good*: It must be *very pure*;—it must be *perfect*. And the moral agent must in his temper, or in the *spirit of his mind*, resemble the moral nature of God.—He must have the image of God's moral rectitude; that is, he must have a principle of moral wisdom, moral power or ability to act right; of justice, holiness, goodness and truth.—Things in nature produce their like—and so do moral productions resemble their moral cause:—*That which is born of the flesh, is flesh*; this is true, whether *flesh* be considered in a natural or moral sense: So *that which is born of the spirit, is spirit*.—The moral effect, resembles the moral cause; and so it must in the case under consideration.

As this is an important point, I will offer something farther for the proof of it, and say something distinctly both as to the created moral agent, and the moral law, which was given him.

1. As to created moral agents, it will be enough to prove, that our *first parents* were made in the moral image and likeness of God's moral nature.

Now when God was about to make man, he expressly said, *let us make man, in our image, after our likeness*; and it is added, *so God created man in his own image; in the image of God created he him*. This was the moral image of God; I prove it thus, *viz.* This image consisted, either in man's outward corporal form, or in his mere rational endowments; or else

In his moral endowments : If it consisted neither in the first nor in the second, it must consist in the last.— It did not consist in the first, because God has no outward corporeal form ; it did not in the second, because, tho' fallen men, yea, the wickedest upon earth still retain their mere rational endowments ; they are described every where in the holy scriptures, as having lost that life in which the image of God consisted, and as being without any likeness to God ;— on the contrary, as being disagreeable to God, possess'd of the very image of the devil :—Now as this life which they have lost, was a moral life, as I shall evince ;—and as it is the moral image of God, that wicked men are wholly destitute of,—and as it is the immoral image of the devil, which they now have ; it must follow, that the image and likeness of God, which man was created in, consisted not in his mere rational, but especially, in his moral endowments.—

Now if it be made to appear that *Adam* had a moral life, which he might and did lose by sin, consistently with the continuation of his natural life for a vast number of years ; and also, consistently with his retaining his mere rational endowments : It will be demonstrably evident, that the image of God, he was created in, was the moral image of God.

For the evincing of this, I shall offer several things, which I desire may be considered in their connection with, and dependance on each other :—And (1.) God threatned *Adam* with death, in case of disobedience, yea and that he *should surely die* in the very day he should rebel ;—I allow he became dead in law, that very day, as *judgment came* on him, and on all his posterity in him by his offence *unto condemnation*, as the apostle observes :—I also allow that he became immediately mortal, *that death entered by his offence* ;  
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but all this does not come fully up to what the threatening naturally imports, *in the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die* ; q. d. “ thou shalt in that very day actually lose a very important life.” Now if he had a moral life, and if he lost it when he sinned, he lost a very important life ; as by the loss of this he not only lost all his happiness in the likeness, favour and fellowship of God ; but as hereby he became exposed unto all misery. On this supposition it might well be said, in that very day Adam fell, he did *surely die*. Now add to this (2.) The change, which immediately appeared in *Adam*, after he transgressed the divine prohibition :—He not only saw his nakedness with shame, but heard the voice of the Lord God, with slavish fear, and terrifying or tormenting guilt, and wanted to hide himself from God : Such *fear hath torment in it*, but *perfect love*, in which the moral image of God chiefly consists, *casteth out this fear* ; and it can't enter where this love is perfect. Hence if he ever had this perfect love to God, it is certain he lost it, when he fell, and so lost the moral life or image of God, which once he had.—Connect with these (3.) The promise of God for man's recovery : *The seed of the woman, shall bruise the serpent's head*. Now if by the serpent's head, be meant his dominion, then it implies that *Satan* had got the dominion over man, otherwise the relief promised was not suited to man's condition :—But it is certain the devil has his dominion, where sin has got dominion, for he rules “ in the hearts of the children of disobedience.” *He works in them, as the ruler of the darkness of this world* ; and he has nothing in such, as have no sin, no immorality in them. This promise does something more than intimate, that man was now become immoral, and therefore under the dominion of the devil : And if man was become immoral, it was

by the loss of the moral image of God, or his moral life. There is no medium betwixt a moral principle, and an immoral one, in a reasonable creature.—Add to these (4.) The frequent declarations of sacred scripture, that fallen man is in a state of death, even while he lives a natural life, and is possess'd of his rational endowments ; yea in a state of moral death, *alienated from the life of God,—dead in trespasses and sins* : And that such as are thus dead, *walk according to the course of this world, and according to the prince of the power of the air, the spirit which worketh in the children of disobedience.* Now the scripture is true or it is false ; if you say it is false, then you must renounce all revealed religion : But as the holy scripture is true ; that death, which is in trespasses and sins, must signify a moral death—the loss of a moral life, called the *glory of God, which all have come short of, or destitute of, as all have sinned* ; Which glory must be the moral image of God.—And *lastly*, add to all these, what puts this thing out of all dispute, viz. what the holy scriptures say of man's recovery, and what that consists in :—So far as it respects the moral qualities of the soul, it is expressed by *renewing the mind.—Being renewed in the spirit of your mind—being quickned, and raised from the dead—being created after God in righteousness and true holiness—being made partakers of the divine nature—the workmanship of God, created in Christ Jesus unto good works ; redeemed from all iniquity, to be zealous of good works ; redeemed unto God ; to be holy in all manner of conversation, as he that hath called them is holy ; changed into the image of God ; made free from sin, and become the servants of righteousness, having their fruit unto holiness ; living to God ; walking in newness of life ; spiritually minded, which is life and peace ; the wisdom from above is first pure, &c.* Now taking all these considerations together, and  
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what person of reason can doubt of the conclusion, that man was made in the moral image of God—that this was his moral life, and that this he totally lost, when he rebelled against heaven?—

Tho' I apprehend the point is sufficiently proved ; yet it may not be amiss to mention two things more, which ought to be mentioned some where, that are arguments for the point under consideration.—And (1.) That there is no medium (as I hinted before) betwixt morality and immorality, or betwixt a moral principle and an immoral one, in a reasonable creature : A reasonable creature has, either moral ability to act right, or moral inability to act right ; or which comes to the same, he has either an inclination to act right, or a disinclination to act right : And if he has a disinclination to act right, he has a positive inclination to act wrong.—An inclination to act right, is a moral principle to act right ; a disinclination to act right, or an inclination to act wrong, is a positive principle of immorality.—Now no creature can be a moral agent, or be a subject capable of a moral principle, and hence of moral agency, that is not endowed with the natural power of reason : But as a created intelligence, or a reasonable existence, is capacitated in his very frame and constitution to act reasonably ; so it has all the *natural* capacities requisite to act morally : And from its natural capacity, or *natural ability* to act reasonably, it is infinitely fit or right, that it should act morally ; and for such a creature not to act morally, or for it to act immorally, is unreasonable, unfit and wrong.—It is the duty of a reasonable creature to be moral, because he is reasonable :—It is his duty to love and obey God, or to act right with all his heart, soul and strength ; or to the utmost extent of his rational endowments or faculties : And this continues to be his duty so long as he continues,

continues to be a reasonable creature—The want of a moral ability to act right, does not lessen his duty or obligation to act right; because this want of moral ability to act right, consists in a disinclination to act right, which is a positive inclination to act wrong, and this is a sinful inclination. From hence it appears, that every reasonable creature must be either morally good, or morally evil, holy or unholy in the temper and qualities of his mind; and therefore it must follow, that when God created *Adam*, a reasonable creature, he form'd him, either morally good or morally evil; either holy or unholy: But as none I trust will presume to assert the latter, the former must stand good, that *Adam* was made in the image of God's moral perfections—(2.) The other thing, that I shall just mention, is the manifest end which God had in view in making reasonable creatures; which was the manifestation of himself, the manifestation of what he esteems his perfection and glory: And in subordination to his own glory, he made them reasonable creatures, that they might be capable of such happiness, which in it's nature, should be as much like his own happiness, as was possible for a created existence to have, that is necessarily dependent.—He made them reasonable creatures, that they might serve and glorify him with reasonable service; or as is infinitely becoming reasonable creatures, in which they should enjoy such happiness as is suitable to their reasonable nature, and as much as their capacities would admit of.—Now, how was it possible for God, to manifest the perfection and glory of his moral rectitude, in creating reasonable creatures, without making them in the image and likeness of his moral perfections? And how was it possible for these creatures (when made) to glorify and adore God as a Being of infinite moral rectitude, amiableness and perfection,

perfection, without any manifestation made to them, of God's being such a God? And how was it possible for these reasonable creatures to have any happiness suitable to their reasonable nature, resembling the happiness of God, without being made in the moral image and likeness of God?

If God is a *Being* of infinite reason and understanding, and if he enjoys happiness in nature & perfection adequate to his Being, and if this happiness consists in the infinite esteem he has of, and infinite delight he takes in, infinite moral rectitude; And if such an infinite Being could not infinitely esteem and delight in infinite moral rectitude, if he was not infinite moral rectitude in his nature; it must follow, that reasonable creatures cannot have such happiness, as is suitable to their reasonable nature, if they have not a supream esteem of, and complacence in the moral perfection of God, and they cannot have this supream esteem of, and complacence in God, if they have not the moral image and likeness of God in the temper of their hearts. What is the nature of such inability, I have before shewed.—I conclude on the evidence given, that man was made in the moral image of God, and that in his moral qualities, had a moral life.—

2. As to the moral law given to this moral agent, or the law he was placed under; this must in all its parts be agreeable to the moral nature, both of the moral governour and of the created moral agent;—and adapted to answer the end of God's creating reasonable creatures, and forming them moral agents. Now as his grand end was the manifestation of his own moral perfection and glory:—And as in subordination to this end he formed them moral agents, with a design of putting them into a capacity of enjoying the highest happiness they were capable of,

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in glorifying God, by a perfect conformity to the law, which he gave for the rule and regulation of their conduct ; it must follow that this law was a transcript of God's moral perfection : If it was not a transcript of God's moral perfection, it was not agreeable to his moral nature, and hence could be no manifestation of the glory of his moral nature ; neither could the creature's conformity to such a law, manifest or testify the glory of God's moral nature.—And farther, if it was not a transcript of God's moral perfection, it could not be agreeable to the moral nature of the creature placed under it, how then could the creature in the highest sense he was capable of, be happy, in the observation of, or conformity to a law which is not agreeable to his moral nature ?

But that the law which was given to man, was a transcript of the moral perfections of God, sufficiently appears from it's being clothed with the same epithets, which are given to the moral perfections of God, some of which I have mentioned before. In short, the moral law may be called nothing less than the moral will of God ; or the will of his moral nature : What the law requires, is what a God of infinite wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness and truth requires, yea sees to be infinitely fit and agreeable to his own infinite rectitude to require of creatures, which he was pleased to endow with reason.—Is it not infinitely fit and right, that reasonable creatures should love God with all their heart, soul and strength ? Is not God infinitely worthy of it ? Is it not infinitely right that they should always fear, adore, obey and serve God, yea and glorify him, making his glory their highest or chief end, in every thing they do ? Yea, is it not right, that we should love our neighbour as ourselves, and do unto others whatsoever we would have them do to us ?—And as this is calculated for the manifestation

festation of the glory of God, is it not also for the highest happiness of the creature in subordination to it ?

Thus much is sufficient to shew what our apprehensions are, of the moral state of man when first formed, and of the law which he was placed under : I pass on——

*Fourthly*, We infer from God's infinite moral rectitude, that real, perfect, or absolute moral good, is to be looked for no where but in the divine essence.—Hence we are assur'd “ there is none good, save one, which is God.”—“ None holy as the Lord is.” None just or true, or wise but God. There is no infinite fitness or right but in his moral nature, of a moral kind : And as absolute goodness or rectitude is essential to the infinite Being, it is his incommunicable prerogative, which cannot be dispensed to any creature. All therefore that is called moral goodness in creatures, is no farther good than it is the image or likeness of God's moral goodness, and is as dependent on God's absolute goodness for it's *being*, as the created subject of it, is on the power of God :—God's absolute goodness, is independent goodness. It might as well be said, that God's absolute independent being, was dependent on created *beings* ; as to say his absolute goodness in any measure or sort, was dependent on created goodness :—Yea to suppose that God's goodness in any measure or sort depended on created goodness, would imply, that God is not absolute goodness ; and that before he created the world, he was not so good, so glorious, so perfect and so happy as he was afterwards : Which would be to make the creator and the creature, reciprocally or interchangeably dependent on each other.

But the Dr. allows as well as we, that God is eternally, essentially, absolutely, necessarily and independently

dently good.—Now if this be so, as both he and we affirm, all created good must be derived from—dependent on—and designed to illustrate or manifest the glory of God's absolute goodness.—The glory of his absolute goodness or infinite rectitude, he must have his eye upon, yea a constant regard to, and make all things in all his works, subservient to the manifestation of :—The Dr. says, “ He should have no objection against this, except it may perhaps seem to represent God rather as an ambitious Being, who desires the praise and homage of his creatures, than an infinitely good One, who aims at making them happy, without any selfish end, incompatible with a perfect character, and absolute self-sufficiency.” P. 77. But to me, it appears incompatible with such a perfect character as God has ; such absolute goodness, absolute self-sufficiency and infinite wisdom, which belong to God, to suppose he aims at making his creatures happy, without any view to his own glory :—It is a matter of the highest judgment, and argues the most consummate wisdom and justice, for God to esteem his absolute goodness as only worthy of his supreme regard. But to regard any thing else in competition with this, or without any view to the manifesting and maintaining the glory of this, would not only argue weakness, and want of sound judgment ; but also that he does esteem the happiness of his creatures a greater good, more worthy of his attention and regard, than the manifesting and maintaining the glory of his own absolute moral goodness. These comprehensive words of the apostle, with which I conclude this inference, the Dr. would do well to consider, viz. “ For of him and thro' him and to him are all things, to whom be glory for ever amen.”——

*Fifthly*, From what has been said of the absolute moral rectitude of God, together with the natural

consequences of the same, before mentioned ; we conclude, that a created moral agent, can neither maintain his character nor his usefulness, any longer than he continues what he was when God made him.

Now, for such a moral agent, to continue what he was, is to continue morally good ; or in the image and likeness of God's moral nature : If therefore he loses this moral image or likeness, he ceases to be morally good, and becomes entirely useless and good for nothing, with regard to the end he was made fit to answer, both as to God and himself. He was made fit to manifest and reflect the glory of God, as he was made in the image and likeness of God's glory ; and to glorify God by a conformity to, and observation of that law, which was a transcript of God's moral nature : To do which, would be to be practically " holy, as God is holy."—He would follow or imitate God, and thus answer God's grand end, which he made and fitted him for : Which fitness consisted in his being morally good.

Therefore when man lost his moral goodness by the fall, as hath already been proved ; of which we are all sad witnesses also ; as none can say, *he is clean.—That he has not sinned, and come short, or become destitute of the glory of God ; that he has not a law of sin in his members, & a body of death in him :—* I say when a man lost his moral goodness by the fall, he lost his moral fitness, suitableness and ability, to answer those moral purposes, for which he was formed. Having lost the moral image of God, he was no more fit to manifest and reflect the moral glory of God, than a beast or stone is ; for that which was the glory of God, or a reflection of his moral glory, is gone, so far as it respected man's moral qualities : And having lost the moral image of God, he lost all his moral power or ability to glorify God, by a true

conformity to, and observation of, God's moral law.— There is nothing more evident than this ; for the great thing required in the law, is *to love God with all our heart* : But if we have lost the moral image of God, it is certain we have no moral likeness to God. And if we have no moral likeness to God, it is as certain that we have no moral ability to love God, and if we have no moral ability to love God with all the heart, we have none to keep the law truly, and hence we are become morally unable to glorify God by obedience.—And as to man's happiness, by losing the moral image of God, he has wholly lost *that*, and is rendered incapable of it ; or he cannot be happy, while he remains in his fallen state, destitute of the moral image of God. This is evident, if man's happiness as a reasonable creature was to consist in his moral likeness to God, and in his moral conformity to his law :—If in this way, he was to enjoy the favour and friendship of God ; then by losing the image of God, he has lost his happiness, and can't possibly be happy while in that state.

Now if we should take no farther view of the consequences of man's losing the moral image of God, we may be sure, when God looked down upon him, he must see him “altogether become unprofitable ;” like a potter's marred vessel “in which there is no pleasure ;”<sup>\*</sup> quite unfit and unsuitable for the moral purposes, which he fitted and formed him for : And as such might have forever rejected him as good for nothing. And to be thus rejected, without any positive punishment, would have been “ruinous and fatal.” As the Dr. justly observes, P. 86.

But this is not all ; man when he lost the moral image of God, sinned against heaven, and became a sinful, immoral creature.—I have already shew'd  
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<sup>\*</sup> Jer. 18. 4. compared with Chap. 21. 28.

how there can be no medium betwixt a moral and immoral principle in a reasonable creature : And tho' this immoral principle is called *death*, as opposed to a moral one called *life* ; yet it is a positive principle of evil, or immorality, and is expressly called *enmity against God*—*which is not subject to the law of God, nor indeed can be.*—This God saw, to be the case and condition of the world after the fall, *God saw every imagination of the tho't of man's heart, was only evil continually.*—And this is what we see in ourselves, when the spirit of God *convinces us of sin, of righteousness and of judgment.* We see ourselves to be *car-nal, sold under sin ;—that sin has dominion over us, reigns in us :* And as we are *free from righteousness, we yield ourselves servants to obey sin :* And it is from this *evil treasure of the heart, that all evil things, in practice, proceed ;* which this apostate world is full of, *that lies in wickedness, alienated from the life of God, and dead in trespasses and sins.*

Now as sin (and a sinful principle too) is the image of the devil, enmity against God—moral evil & contrariety to the moral will, and infinite moral rectitude of God ; it must be infinitely wrong.—And hence what God as infinite rectitude, from a moral necessity of nature, must infinitely hate and abhor ;—and must be infinitely displeas'd with man ; not only because he has committed that abominable thing, which his infinite soul hates ; but also because he has done the greatest wrong to God, which he was capable of ;—robb'd him of his glory in defacing his moral image ; yea, not only defaced, but blotted it out—trampled on his authority—given God the *lie*—and not only deny'd God that love, reverence and obedience, which was his due ; but transgressed the rule of right, the transcript of God's moral nature—put on the devil's livery, and joined with him, in rebellion against the  
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God of heaven and earth. All this is implied in man's apostacy :—This evil, this abominable evil, called sin, possesses all sinful men—all while they remain in their fallen state, voluntarily yield themselves servants to obey it. Hence man by losing the moral image of God, and becoming sinful, possess'd of the immoral image of the devil, instead of being fit to reflect the glory of God's moral nature, continually blasphemes God his maker, and provokes him to anger.

Now who can imagine, that any person could possibly hint that God might *well* and *wisely* have forgiven the sins of men, without an intervening sacrifice ; after allowing, as the Dr. does, that man is *fallen*—*is sinful*—*guilty*—*ungodly*—*apostate*—*an enemy* ; all which terms he applies to *mankind* ? Yea, how was it possible for God to maintain his character, that he is of infinite moral rectitude ?—How could he infinitely love righteousness, and hate iniquity ?—Or how could he be infinitely displeas'd at sin, and with sinners for sin, without discovering his righteous displeasure by punishing sinners ? Or by executing the penalty ?—Nothing can be more inconsistent with, and repugnant to, the infinite moral rectitude of God ; and consequently, nothing (that I can conceive of) reflects such dishonour on the infinitely perfect Being, as does this notion—that God might have forgiven the sins of men without plenary satisfaction to divine justice ; and more so, as it is built upon a total and perpetual exclusion of any such idea of divine justice, *to satisfy which* (as we assert & maintain) *Christ died.* To exclude such divine justice, that demands satisfaction for our offences, and which, Christ offer'd up himself a sacrifice, to satisfy ; is to exclude the infinite moral perfection or rectitude of the divine nature : And if this is not blasphemous against the God  
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of heaven and earth, it will not be easy to say what is !—I must mention one inference more, before I draw to a close engagement.—

*Sixtly*, If God is perfect, absolute and unchangeable moral rectitude ; and if he made man such a moral agent, and gave him such a moral law as hath been proved—and also, if man hath broken or transgressed that law, as also hath been shewed, there was an absolute moral necessity of his suffering the penalty of that law, or that the penalty be put in execution.

1. A law is of no force, authority or effect, without a sanction, and a sanction necessarily implies a penalty, to be put in execution on the breakers of the law, and even such a penalty as the lawgiver judges adequate to the importance of the law, and necessary to preserve the honour and authority of the same.

From hence it must follow, that if the moral law, is the transcript of God's moral rectitude ; or if it is the moral will of God, or the will of his moral nature, the penalty which he fixed to the breach or transgression of the moral law, must be what infinite wisdom judged adequate to the importance of his moral rectitude, and necessary to preserve the honour, dignity & authority of the same. From whence we justly infer, that the punishment of sinners must be eternal in duration ; for that punishment which is adequate to the importance of God's infinite moral rectitude, must be infinite : But an infinite punishment cannot be suffered by creatures, as they are finite, in any other way but by an eternal duration of their suffering.

Now as we believe Christ to be an infinite divine person—(and believe he was substituted, of the Father, to which he voluntarily consented, to stand in our law-place, to suffer the penalty of the law in our stead—*the just for the unjust*) we believe he was capable

ble of it, and actually did suffer, such a punishment as was adequate to the importance, and necessary to preserve the dignity, honour and authority of God's infinite moral rectitude, that the divine law is a transcript of ; and therefore God can be just in forgiving us in Christ, or thro' the plenary satisfaction which Christ has made to divine justice, by suffering the penalty for our sins.

But to suppose that God could remit the penalty, or forgive the sins of men, without plenary satisfaction, by an intervening sacrifice, necessarily implies (1.) That God could alter or make void the moral law : For to remit the penalty, is to remit the sanction ; and to remit the sanction, is to make void the law.— And if God could make void the moral law, he could make void the eternal rule of right ; or his own infinite moral rectitude : For so long as God is infinite moral rectitude, it is infinitely right for him to require of his reasonable creatures, what he does require ; and that too, upon pain of suffering his infinite displeasure *for every transgression and disobedience, as a just recompence of reward.*—(2.) That God could look upon the preservation of the honour, dignity and authority of the moral law, and consequently of his own infinite moral perfection, to be of no importance : For if God gives a law, and such an one, as is the transcript of his own perfections, and yet remits the penalty of it's breaches ; it is practically to say, that he esteems neither the honour, dignity and authority of the moral law, nor of his own moral perfection, as being of any importance, at least comparatively, that is, compared with the happiness of his sinful, rebellious creatures.—(3.) That God could act against and wholly make void the counsel or judgment of his infinite wisdom ; for if God gave a law with a penalty for the breaches of it, the penalty must be such, as infinite wisdom

wisdom judged to be equal and just. This none can deny ; but if God could remit the penalty of sin, he could repeal or counter-act the judgment of infinite wisdom ; that is, he could either act against his own unerring and immutable judgment, or else he might change his immutable judgment. (4.) That God could lie ; which God forbid ! The scriptures say, *it is impossible for God to lie* : But to suppose God could forgive sin, without plenary satisfaction ; or that he could remit the penalty, implies that it was possible for God to lie. Perhaps it will be said, how so ? I answer thus : (1.) If God can deny himself, he can lie ; for his truth or veracity consists in his acting agreeable to himself : Therefore to act contrary to himself, is opposed to his being true to himself. And what shall we call this ! Now for God to remit the penalty, which, from the moral necessity of his infinite rectitude, he has fixed to the breach of his moral law, would be to deny or counter-act himself : At least he would not act agreeable to himself. (2.) If there was yea and nay in God's word of threatening, which contains the penalty, then it is possible for God to lie. Now to say God might have remitted the punishment, which he expressly declared, should be put in execution, is a making God's word yea and nay : Or at least implies, that God might contradict or act directly contrary to his express and declared will.—

From what has already been said under this inference, it fully appears, that there was an absolute moral necessity, for a God of infinite moral rectitude, to execute the penalty of his broken moral law :— And hence this notion, which supposes that God might have forgiven the sins of men, without the penalty's being executed on Christ to the full satisfaction of divine justice, the Dr. must shew that it is

not, at once, the grossest of all absurdities, and blasphemous against the God of infinite moral perfection.—

2. If God is infinite moral rectitude, and if man was made a moral agent—and if the law which was given him, is moral ; then God has constituted a moral government, and is himself the moral governour : But the good and honour of moral government, cannot be maintained except the sanctions of the law and rule of government are executed. This is so evident, that even the Dr. allows “ that God has established a moral government in the universe, as best adapted to promote his own glory, and the common felicity of his intelligent creatures : And (says) such a kind of government, in it’s very nature, supposes, that the obstinately wicked and impenitent under it, shall be punished by him, as Lord and Judge of all.” P. 86. And in P. 64. speaking of God’s forgiving sin thro’ the sacrifice of Christ intervening, says, “ Taking such a method herein as is in it’s nature admirably adapted to magnify the law, and make it honourable ; that is, to beget and preserve in the minds of his reasonable creatures, a just sense of God’s authority, the dignity of his laws and government.” Which naturally import, that God could not keep up or maintain his own authority as moral governour, nor the dignity of his laws and government, without executing the sanctions of his law : And therefore that God could not consistently with his own authority, as moral governour ; nor with the dignity of his law and government, forgive the sins of men, without that great sacrifice of Christ intervening ; or without executing the penalty of the law on Christ standing in our stead, and so suffering for our sins, the just for the unjust.—It may possibly seem strange to some, that the Dr. should be so heedless, as to cut his  
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his own fingers at this rate, & especially in this place ; where he was just saying, “ That we are assured in the holy scriptures, that God forgives the sins of men, thro’ this great sacrifice intervening, *RATHER* than without *any*.” q. d. “ He might have done it, without *any* ; there was no absolute necessity of his doing it in this way, or not all :” And yet immediately adds, “ There was a necessity of God’s doing it, in this way ; otherwise he could not maintain his own authority, nor the dignity of his laws and government.—

And altho’ the Dr. allows, as just mentioned, that there was a necessity of God’s executing the sanctions of his law, to maintain his own authority, and the dignity of his laws and government : Yet in P. 22. supposes, “ That in government among men, the end may be best answered sometimes, by overlooking or pardoning the fault. And when this is the case, a good sovereign Prince will not think himself *bound in justice* to punish the transgressor ; but on the contrary think himself *obliged in reason* to remit the fault, or to *shew clemency* :” And therefore to punish in such supposed cases, would be unreasonable and cruel. And in P. 24. says, “ God governs his great family, his universal kingdom, according to those general rules and maxims, which are in themselves most wise and good ; such as the wisest and best kings govern by.” The natural consequence is, that God may sometimes in some cases, better maintain his own authority, and the dignity of his laws and government, by remitting the penalty, than by executing of it : And if he should execute it, in such a supposed case, it would be unreasonable & cruel.—But the Dr. ought to have considered, that when it is the case, in human government, as he hath supposed it may ; it has it’s source in some sort of imperfection or other—either from a want of wisdom or justice, or foresight, in making the  
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law,

law, or proportioning the penalty to the offence ; or from some circumstances attending others, that in some point of light or other, may be relatives to the cause, so that it may be best on the whole to remit the punishment. But is any of this supposeable, with respect to God, his laws and government ? Did not God perfectly foresee every possible circumstance from the beginning ? If so, his strict adherence to his law, in executing the sanctions of it, in every instance of transgression and disobedience, that he observes ; is so far from a degeneracy into tyranny, that it is an argument of God's omniscience, and of the immutability of his moral rectitude.

The Dr. in P. 48. says, " Whatever sinful creatures might imagine, they could not, without an express revelation from heaven, know that God would *certainly pardon their sins on repentance*. This might seem *probable* ; but it could not be entirely depended on, to the exclusion of doubt." But why not, seeing " it is demonstrably certain upon principles of reason (as the Dr. says) that God is perfectly good & merciful ?" Because " that *punitive justice* is a branch of goodness, in such sort, that a perfectly good and merciful Being may in *many cases* be obliged to punish transgressors, in pursuance of his general benevolent designs towards his creatures, for the support of order, right, &c."—What apprehensions could sinful guilty creatures have of God's benevolent designs, without a revelation ?—If punitive justice may, in many cases oblige God to punish transgressors, why don't it oblige him in every case ? And as to repentance, was there a word of it, in this whole moral system ? The threatening thundered out immediate death—not the least hint of mercy, nor of repentance ! But why was not there an intimation, that should make it seem, at least, probable, that God would pardon them on their repentance ?

repentance ? Because it was inconsistent with God's absolute perfection, and the nature of the moral law, to forgive sin, without a full and perfect atonement. Repentance if true, could not make atonement : It was but a vain expectation then, to look for the grace of repentance, and the mercy of forgiveness, without an atonement made to divine justice for sinners ; and as vain and fruitless, now to expect it, but in Christ, *by whom we have received the atonement.*

But what repentance, was it probable, the miserable creatures would have, while under the power of enmity against God ; and without any apprehension of the mercy of God ? Just, they might see God, to be, but merciful they could not, without a mediator : But what a condition would they have been in, had they been pardoned without an atonement (which is impossible, as hath been sufficiently demonstrated) while they should remain under the power of enmity against God ? Happy, they could not be. The Dr. allows, P. 82. " That the holy, just and good commandments of God, are adapted in their very nature to promote our happiness ; and to disobey them, is to bring mischief on ourselves." And disobey them, sinners *will* constantly ; notwithstanding, their pardon, except the moral image of God be reinstamped on their hearts, in a new creation :—Perhaps, it will be said, " God might have restored his moral image, without a mediator, as well as have dispensed a pardon." I answer, May it not be justly said (as a true consequence from these wild notions, which have not the least foundation in either reason or scripture) *that Christ died in vain ?*

But supposing they had been pardoned and made holy too, without a mediator, and without suffering for their sins, what would have been the consequence ? Would they be more likely to stand now, than before ?

fore ? Would they not question the truth of God ; and have reason to do it, Before those words, *ye shall SURELY die*, sounded in their ears ? But now they would say (in the language of the old serpent) *we shall not surely die*. 'Though we do break God's laws, and there is nothing to be feared in the threatening ; God is all mercy, all goodness ; there is no justice, that requires satisfaction for sin, by suffering the penalty—nor truth to make his word of threatening good.

And in such a case, what astonishment must the holy angels be struck with ! “ Is there no dependance on the truth of God ! Where is our safety then, even in our continuing loyal ! He has indeed promised us, a confirmed state of happiness, upon condition of our making full proof of our loyalty : But if God is not essentially and absolutely truth, what reason have we to depend on his promise ?”——

Yea, upon this supposition ; why might not the devils muster, and demand a pardon upon the footing of God's absolute goodness, that might have forgiven sin, without satisfaction to divine justice ?—But I forbear ; and only say, that the supposition (had it took place) of God's forgiving sin, without satisfaction to divine justice, would have bro't God's moral government into the utmost confusion, and the infinitely glorious moral governour, in horrible contempt !

Thus I have given a description of that scheme or system of doctrine, respecting the divine attributes, together with some of the natural inferences ; which is embraced and professed in the truly protestant and reformed churches : Against some of the leading and fundamental principles of which, the Dr. appears in opposition ; asserting, that they are opposite and repugnant to, and absolutely irreconcilable with the doctrine

doctrine of God's absolute goodness : And that the whole scheme or system, so far as it is dependent on, and connected with those leading principles, is false, wholly and absolutely false.

Here, he has our scheme or system ; and what in particular leads us to this conclusion, that God could not forgive the sins of men, without satisfaction to divine justice, by the sacrifice of Christ :—It is plain, concise and easy to be understood. Let him now exercise his talents, and shew by fair reasoning, from well established principles, that this scheme is false ; wholly and absolutely false : Or otherwise retract what he has shamefully advanc'd against the common faith of the protestant reformed churches ; *which* the churches of New-England, originally were founded on.—I pass on to the last general head proposed, viz.

IV. To take notice of some of the Dr's inaccuracies and inconsistencies, observable in his said sermons.—

I say, some of them ; for they are so numerous, that time would fail me, to speak of them all :—Some I purpose to consider closely.—Some I shall only glance upon :—And some I must pass over, that are less material, without any notice.

It is very observable, that the Dr. sometimes calls the divine properties, *Attributes*, and sometimes *Qualities*, inherent in God, and sometimes *parts* of his essence : And all are eternal, all essential, and all equally necessary. See P. 10 & 11. And some that he calls adorable attributes, and particular moral attributes ; at another time, says they are only different branches and modes of goodness, which he says is an attribute or property inherent in, and essential to God. See P. 10, 17 & 18. Yea in P. 18. he calls immensity and eternity adorable attributes : But in

**P. 45.** he speaks of them as the attributes or properties of *space* and of *time* without beginning — Whether this manner of writing or speaking is accurate and consistent, becoming a *Doctor of Divinity*, the Dr. knows ; however it might not have been amiss in him, if he had condescended a little to men of a lower *degree*, whom, he may possibly, look upon, to be of lower capacities too :—Perhaps the Dr. would impute it to a *sadly depraved judgment* in us, if we should say, that to call the divine attributes, *qualities inherent in God*, imports that God is a subject in which these *inhere* ; and to call these *qualities parts* of his *essence*, imports that they are self-inherent or self-existent parts of God : For the essence of God, is God.—Therefore, if these qualities, which inhere in God, are parts of his essence, they must, so far as they are the essence of God, be self-inherent : If they are inherent in God, they are inherent in his essence, and if in his essence, in themselves ; otherwise they are not parts of his essence ; and to be self-inherent, is to be self-existent.—Hence according to the Dr. God is a compound Being, made up of as many distinct self-existent qualities or parts, as he has divine attributes.—

Again, to call punitive justice an adorable attribute of God, that may be considered independently of his goodness : And to call it a particular moral attribute of God, and then to say, it is only a different branch or mode of goodness, imports that one adorable attribute, is a branch or mode of another adorable attribute. And that a branch or mode of goodness, is an adorable attribute, that may be considered independently of divine goodness, that it is a branch or mode of.—Now if substance and mode are correlatives, the substance is not the mode, nor is the mode the substance ; it will follow, that divine goodness.

ness, which is the substance, is not divine justice, for that is the mode : And divine justice, is not divine goodness, for this is the substance.—And if the branch of any thing is of the same nature or essence, as the thing is, that it is a branch of ; and the thing itself wholly consists of the several branches ; so that if all the branches are removed, the thing itself ceaseth to be ; must it not follow, that if the thing itself consisting of these branches, is the substance, that the branches themselves are the substance ? And if they are the substance, how can they be the mode ? But if this is set aside as nothing, yet consider what he says of divine justice being an adorable attribute of God ; and then as being only a branch or mode of divine goodness, with what he says of all the divine attributes, as qualities inherent in God, parts of his essence, all eternal, &c. and you'll see what an accurate and consistent description the Dr. gives of the One, only living & true God. q. d. “ God is a compound Being, made up of eternal, essential and equally necessary, self-existent particular parts : And tho' these parts may be considered independently one of another ; yet some of them at least, which are adorable attributes, and particular attributes too, are no attributes : But only branches or modes of a self-existent quality inherent in God.”

I must pass over his calling immensity and eternity adorable attributes of God ; and his speaking of them afterwards as being, the one, an expression of space, and the other, of time without beginning : I never tho't space or time without beginning, were adorable ! I know *God inhabits eternity* ; but have no idea of time without beginning ; nor any apprehension of immensity, but in the divine Being. I believe God to be absolute Being ; that there is nothing past nor to come with him, nor any space that he does not fill ;

And when he calls himself, *I AM*, no doubt he means that he is infinite, absolute Being ; or that his being is one unchangeable, infinite and eternal *NOW*.—

But to proceed,

The Dr. in P. 8. exhorts his hearers, “ *To taste and see that the Lord is good !* Without fear that they may err, by thinking him better, or more extensively good, gracious & merciful than he actually is : This is impossible.” And a little lower adds, “ A goodness, which is itself without measure, without bounds.”—If the Dr. means the absolute goodness of the divine nature, he speaks truth, tho’ nothing to his purpose : For this remains the same without change, tho’ the sinner perishes for ever.—But if he means God’s beneficence, or his good and bountiful acts (as he describes God’s communicative goodness) towards his creatures, under all circumstances supposeable, to be without measure, without bounds ; it is neither true, nor consistent with what, he elsewhere asserts : That the Dr. means beneficence here, appears evident, by his adding, “ This is impossible.” These words, viz. “ If we can believe God himself, who cannot lie, the Lord is indeed good to all, and his tender mercies are over all his works.” This is the goodness “ that is without measure, without bounds.” And yet in P. 14. he says, “ The goodness of God, as it is the property of his nature, should always be considered as inseparably connected with his wisdom ; and regulated thereby in all it’s operations. It is not to be considered as a sort of blind instinct, or good-nature, detached from reason and right, or a regard to fitness and propriety ; the goodness of God, is not simply a disposition of his nature to do good, uncontrouled, undirected by wisdom.—Wisdom is undoubtedly the leading, regulating and all-directing attribute of his nature ; “ *yea every*

every thing that is done by him, is done according to the immutable rule of wisdom or reason : Of which he himself, and only he, is in all cases, an adequate judge." P. 18.—Now then, if wisdom, reason and right, controul, regulate and direct all the acts or operations of goodness, and God himself is the only adequate judge of that ; what reason have I to expect, that because God is absolutely good in his nature, that he will therefore communicate good to me, except I am sure, that it is reasonable, wise and right, for him to do it ? And how can I be sure of this, if God is the only adequate judge of this ? Moreover, is it impossible to think God's goodness in it's acts and operations, is without measure, without bounds ; when at the same time, it is controuled, regulated and directed by wisdom, according to rule, reason and right ? What is controuled & regulated, I tho't was *bounded and limited* !—Whether the Dr. by goodness, means the absolute goodness of God's nature, or his beneficence, he affords no ground of hope from it, any farther than we can be sure, that it is agreeable to the immutable rule of wisdom, perfect reason and right, to distribute the same. And as God is the only adequate judge of this, we can never know, whether he can consistently with the rule of right, extend his goodness towards us, before he does do it.—But if the Dr. means that both absolute and communicative goodness, are without measure, without bounds, and that his meaning is, because God is absolutely and unboundedly good in his nature, he must be so to his creatures, this would be sufficient ground for all his creatures to hope in him, were it true : But it is neither true, nor consistent, with it's being controuled, regulated and directed by the immutable rule of wisdom, perfect reason and right.—If the Dr. does not take care, he will introduce that idea of di-

vine justice, which he would have “ wholly and for ever excluded, viz. such divine justice, to satisfy which Christ died,” that goodness, which otherwise would have been controuled according to the rule of right, might flow towards miserable guilty finners in acts of mercy and grace, consistently with justice or the rule of right.—And we are now sure, since Christ has satisfied divine justice for us, God can consistently with the rule of right, bestow the special blessings of his goodness upon us, and that we may safely trust in his mercy and grace, in Christ.

The Dr. in P. 19, & 20. says, “ That the goodness of God, when spoken of in a general way, comprehends many, if not strictly all of his particular moral attributes ; such for example, as are distinguished by the terms, *Mercy, Clemency, Kindness, Compassion, Pity, Grace, Patience, Forbearance, Long-suffering*, and even *justice* : That all these are only so many different branches or modes of goodness.”—Here is something very curious ! If this contains nothing new to gratify the curiosity of his hearers ; yet certain I am, we need (to use the Dr’s words) “ some very acute distinguisher ”—to shew the difference betwixt several of these particular attributes, which the Dr. says are distinguished by those terms he mentions : I believe, “ it would be in vain for an ordinary genius to attempt it.” I should be glad, if the Dr. would attempt it, and display his superior genius !—If there is no difference, it may not be easy for an ordinary genius, to see how they may be called particular attributes distinguished ; nor how they may be called different branches, or different modes of goodness, as the Dr. says they are.

It must be observed, that if the Dr. is consistent here ; *particular moral attributes of God distinguished,—different branches, and different modes of goodness, are all*

all fynonymous, or equipollent terms, expreffive of the fame ideas in his mind :—Well then, *mercy*, *compassion* and *pity*, are three particular distinguished moral attributes ; three particular different branches or modes of goodness. But I beg leave to query ;—wherein does the attribute, branch or mode that is distinguished by the term *mercy*, differ from that which is distinguished by the term *compassion* ? And wherein does that, which is distinguished by the term *pity*, differ from either of the former ?—Again, *patience*, *forbearance*, and *long-suffering*, are three particular distinguished moral attributes of God, three different branches or modes of goodness. I wish the Dr. would be so good, as to shew, wherein the particular distinguished attribute, branch or mode of patience, differs from that of forbearance or long-suffering.—As to *clemency*, the term is but once used, as I know of, in our English-translation of the bible. But the *Greek* word,\* which is there rendered *clemency*, is in some other places, rendered *Gentleness* † and *Moderation*. ‡ And I don't see why the Dr. might not have said, with as much propriety, as to say what he has above, that there are three particular moral attributes of God, which are distinguished by the terms, *Clemency*, *Gentleness* and *Moderation* ; which are only so many different branches or modes of goodness.

He that sets himself to oppose the common doctrine acknowledged by the protestant reformed churches ; and in particular some of the leading and fundamental principles of the system of his country's faith, allowed by himself, to be the faith of the reformed part of the church ; and to pronounce the whole scheme or system to be false, wholly and absolutely false, so far as it is dependant on and connected with those

\* ἡπιεικεία. Act. 24. 4. † 2 Cor. 10. 1. ‡ Phil. 4. 5.

those leading fundamental principles, no doubt esteems himself a person of superior abilities : And indeed, it must be acknowledged, that the Dr. is a person of most superior abilities, if he is able in one breath to create, make or constitute, ten particular distinguished moral attributes of God, and in the next breath, to annihilate them, or at least, so to transform them into *only* so many different branches or modes of what he calls one divine attribute, that they cease to be so many particular distinguished moral attributes.—When the Dr. says, “They are, so many particular moral attributes of God *distinguished*.” I take it, that he would have us believe, they were, so many *particular distinct* moral attributes : And when he says they are, (as he does, P. 20.) “*only* so many different branches or modes of goodness, denominated respectively, with reference to the persons, to whom, or the particular manner and circumstances in which, God manifests them, which in him is one simple uniform principle.” I take it, that he would have us believe, that they are not particular distinct moral attributes of God, but *only* different branches or modes of the particular moral attribute of goodness.—As to *justice*, which he suppos'd we should not so readily consent to his annihilating, as a particular distinct moral attribute, so soon (after he had pronounced it one) as we might the rest ; he expressly says in P. 63. “Justice, which is not supposed to be any attribute of God *distinct* from, but one branch or mode of his essential goodness.” This is spoken in reference to what he had said from P. 20th to 26th, where by ten observations, he labours to prove, that divine justice is only a branch or mode of divine goodness.

The Dr. discovers such elaborate and accurate reasoning in those ten observations, to prove that puni-

tive justice, is only a branch or mode of divine goodness ; I may be tho't to do him injustice, if I should pass the same over without any notice.

But I must first grant, that if the Dr. means by the goodness of God spoken of in a general way, the same as the infinite moral rectitude of God's nature, it doth comprehend all the particular moral attributes of God, even such as are distinguished by the terms wisdom, moral power, holiness, justice, goodness and truth : And that goodness considered as a particular, essential attribute or property of God (by which " is intended, the kindness, benevolence and bounty of his nature," P. 10.) is as much a branch of divine goodness spoken of in a general way, or of moral rectitude ; as justice or truth, or any other particular moral attribute is.—And therefore, tho' the Dr. should prove, that divine justice is a branch of God's infinite moral goodness, or rectitude ; it will not follow, that *justice* and *goodness* considered as particular moral attributes or branches (to use the Dr's words) are not distinct attributes or branches : The Dr. allows *Kindness* is a different branch from justice : Therefore we must conclude, that when the Dr. labours to prove divine justice, to be a branch of divine goodness ; his aim is, either to prove it to be a branch of God's general goodness, his infinite moral rectitude ; or else, to be a branch of the particular attribute of goodness.—If he is labouring to prove the former ; he is very unjust, in supposing, that we have different conceptions of this matter, provided he means, by a branch of God's general goodness, the same as by an essential attribute of God's moral perfection :—But if he is labouring to prove the latter, he is endeavouring to prove, that one branch is the branch of another branch ; or that one particular moral attribute of God, is an attribute of another particular attribute ;

tribute ; or else, that one particular attribute is a double attribute, consisting of two particular branches or attributes ; and that this particular double attribute consisting of two branches, which is called goodness, and by which, “ is intended, the kindness, benevolence & bounty of God’s nature,” is distinguished in its branches, by the term *justice* and—— What is the term, by which the other branch is distinguished ? It is not *goodness*, for this is the common term ; it is neither *kindness*, *benevolence* nor *bounty* ; for these are the definition of the common term : Yea, if we should look into the Dr’s arguments to prove, that *justice* is a branch of goodness, we shall find they all center here, viz. that *punitive justice*, is either actual *kindness* or *positive cruelty* ; and as he rejects the latter, he maintains the former : So that after all our search, we are likely to find but one branch of the particular double attribute of goodness ; which is sometimes called kindness, sometimes mercifulness, and sometimes *justice*. And this last term, when *punitive* is joined to it, must signify the same as the first term, or otherwise, it will import the same as *positive cruelty*.

Here I will recite, and would have the same stand in capitals, what no doubt the Dr. esteems a self-evident principle, viz. P. 35. “ *There is no medium betwixt God’s being actually kind and merciful to ALL, and his being positively cruel, and unmerciful to some.*”— But I must ask the Dr. whether God is actually kind and merciful to devils and damned sinners, in punishing them with everlasting destruction ? (He allows, that the scriptures teach us, that their punishment will be everlasting :) If he says no ; then, according to his principle, God is positively cruel and unmerciful to some : If he shall say, as he does, P. 22. “ God punishes for a good end, either with respect  
to

to the delinquents themselves or others." Or as in P. 25. " If God ever punishes his creatures, without any good end, either with respect to themselves, or the other members of his household or kingdom ; would not this be in effect making his creatures miserable, either for no end at all, or a positively bad and evil one ? " Then I say, he varies from his principle ; for here he allows that God is not cruel in punishing, if the end be the good of his household in general, even tho' he should have no view to the good of such as he does punish :—But if God has no view to the good of such as he punishes, his punishments can't be called acts of kindness to them, and if God is not actually kind and merciful to them, in punishing them, he must, according to the Dr's self-evident principle, be actually or positively cruel and unmerciful to them.

But to pay the Dr. some respect for his accurate reasoning to prove divine justice to be only a branch or mode of divine goodness, considered as a particular attribute, and not considered in a general way, as comprehending all God's moral perfections ; for thro' all his reasoning, it is evident to any, that he does not speak of divine goodness as comprehending any more, than his definition of the particular attribute of divine goodness, including the exercise or manifestation of it, in beneficence or good and bountiful acts towards his creatures : I say, to pay the Dr. some respect for his accurate reasoning, we must take notice of the principles he reasons from : Which are,

1. " That the truly great, noble and excellent end, which a good God has in view, is the happiness of his creatures, and the making them happy, without any selfish end." And this is the end he has in view, even in punishing, just the same as a good parent ought to have in view in chastizing his children ; or a good magistrate in punishing his delinquents, as may be seen P. 26—26.

God's correcting his own children that are in a state of friendship with him, as a father, for their good, to manifest himself to be a God of goodness & faithfulness : And his punishing such as are in a state of guilt and wrath, as a righteous vindictive judge, to shew himself righteous, in giving them the wages of their unrighteousness, are not distinguished by the Dr. And indeed this distinction is foreign to his scheme ; and being allowed, would overthrow his whole reasoning to prove punitive justice to be only a branch or mode of goodness or kindness : And the Dr's making the happiness of the creatures, God's end in punishing, will plunge him into no small difficulties, as I may shew.

2. Another principle the Dr. argues from, is that the nature or quality of God's moral acts, must be denominated from the end he has in view ; as if it should be said, " Such as God's end is, such must his principle be, and such must be the nature or quality of his moral acts." I find no fault with this principle ; but the Dr. does not reason justly according to it, and never can, so long as he makes the happiness of the creatures God's end, " truly great, noble and excellent, which (he says) God pursues." As the Dr. makes the happiness of the creatures God's end, he argues thus to prove punitive justice to be a branch of goodness, viz. " God's end must be either positively good, or positively bad ; if it be the creature's happiness, it is positively good ; if it be the creature's misery, it is positively bad and cruel. Wherefore, if it be thus positively good, it is from a positively good principle ; hence punitive justice from such a principle, punishing for such a good end, must be goodness, kindness, or a branch of goodness :—But if God's end in punishing, is the misery of his creatures, it is bad ; and hence his act of punishing must be

be from a bad principle, and is itself bad, or a cruel act. From whence the Dr. infers, that such as hold God has abandoned some of his creatures, to unavoidable misery, “do in effect unite in their imaginations, the two independant and opposite principles of the Manichæans, the one good, the other evil, into one self-contradictory being, whom they call, and whom they worship under the name of the one God and Father of all.” P. 37.

I allow, that if the Dr's first principle is true, viz. That the happiness of the creatures, is God's great end in punishing, that punitive justice is goodness or kindness according to the second principle ; and it must infallibly follow from these two principles, as connected together by the Dr. either that God actually aims at the happiness of devils and wicked men, in punishing them in hell with everlasting misery and destruction, or he is cruel : For it is only according to these principles as connected by the Dr. that the aforementioned principle is true, viz. “That there is no medium betwixt God's being actually kind and merciful to all, and his being positively cruel and unmerciful to some.” According to these principles, God, in punishing devils and wicked men in the other world, aims either at making them happy, or at making them miserable without any view to his own glory in either. The great end God aims at, terminates upon the creatures ; if his aim terminates in their everlasting happiness, his end is good, and God is good : But if it terminates in their eternal misery, his end is positively bad & evil, and God is positively evil. Hence if all reasonable creatures are not eternally happy, but some are eternally miserable, God is not actually kind and merciful to all, but positively cruel and unmerciful to some : Therefore if the Dr. can't but allow, that God will abandon the wicked

to unavoidable misery, at the great day, when they shall go away into everlasting punishment (as he says they shall) “ In the place prepared for the devil and his angels.” He must either prove that God will aim at making them happy, in punishing them eternally ; or else, allow the above-mentioned horrible doctrine of the *Manichæans*, to be perfectly consistent with his own strange principles in their connection : I mean the two independent and opposite *principles*, the one good, and the other evil, united (as the Dr. says) into one self-contradictory being, &c. is but a just consequence from the Dr’s positions.

Let us see how the Dr. reconciles God’s leaving the heathen world to unavoidable and eternal misery, with his being actually kind and merciful to all :— “ First (says he) it is by no means a clear and certain point, either from reason or revelation, that *all* the heathen will actually be miserable in the world to come.” P. 65. A satisfactory answer this !—What then ? Is God actually kind and merciful to such of them as will actually be miserable in the world to come ?—See his second reason ; “ Secondly, that if they shall be so (all miserable in the world to come) they will *be punished only for their sins, and in due measure only.*” This is enough to satisfy some I trow !—But will their punishment for their sins in due measure, be an act of kindness and mercy to them ? If it will not, how does this answer reconcile their eternal punishment, with God’s being actually kind and merciful to all ? If this principle of the Dr. be true, viz. “ There is no medium betwixt God’s being actually kind and merciful to all, and his being positively cruel and unmerciful to some, then God’s *punishing* the wicked in the other world, must be an act, either of *kindness* or of *cruelty to them* ; the Dr. adds, “ To punish them thus (that is, for their sins, and

and in due measure) is not, certainly, inconsistent with the most perfect goodness." P. 66. By the most perfect goodness, he must mean either *kindness*, or else God's absolute moral rectitude : If he means the *former*, as he must, to be consistent with his principle ; then he must maintain, that God's punishing the wicked for their sins, in due measure in the other world, is actual kindness to them. God aims at making them happy, in punishing them *thus* : But if he means the *latter*, viz. God's absolute moral rectitude, as including absolute *justice*, he evades the point, and overthrows his own principle, and all his reasoning too, to prove punitive *justice* to be only a branch or mode of goodness or kindness. For if *due measure* of punishment for sin, is a just measure ; and if a just measure of punishment, signifies such a measure, as justice requires, then the wicked in the other world, will suffer such a measure of punishment as justice requires, whether it shall be executed upon them out of kindness to them or not : But if such punishment as justice requires, cannot be laid upon them out of kindness to them ; or if God's punishing them eternally, as justice requires, cannot be an act of kindness to *them*, punitive justice is not a branch of kindness in this *strange work*, as the Dr. calls it. And there is a medium betwixt God's being actually kind and merciful to all, and his being positively cruel and unmerciful to some. God is neither kind nor cruel to the wicked, in giving them the pure wine of his wrath without mixture, in their everlasting punishment :—  
*But just and righteous, yea excellent in plenty of justice.*

I must leave the Dr. a few minutes, to exhibit a brief specimen of the amiable consistency of our principles, with a principle the Dr. uses or rather abuses, mentioned above, viz. " Such as God's end is, such is his principle, and such must be the nature or quality

lity of his moral acts." *God is the rock*,—he is perfect moral rectitude ; *his work is perfect*, his moral work is agreeable to his moral nature : *For all his ways are judgment*,—The end he has in view in all his dispensations, is what infinite wisdom judges to be perfectly agreeable to absolute perfection, and infinitely becoming such a Being. And all the ways and means for the attaining this noble end, are agreeable to the principle of moral perfection, &c.

Now we assert and maintain, that God's great end, is neither the happiness, nor the misery of his creatures ; but the manifesting and maintaining the glory of his moral nature : This is the end of all his moral works. Hence whatever work or dispensation manifests the wisdom of God, we conclude it is from a principle of wisdom in God, and to manifest the glory of his wisdom, & the work or dispensation is *wise*.—What manifests the holiness of God, is from a principle of holiness ;—to manifest the glory of his holiness, and the work or dispensation, is *holy*. What manifests the justice of God (as all God's acts of punishing do) is from a principle of justice, to manifest the glory of justice, and the work, dispensation or act, is *just and righteous*.—What manifests the goodness of God, is from a principle of goodness or kindness, to manifest the glory of God's goodness or kindness, and the work or act is good and kind, or a work of goodness. So are all God's acts of *mercy and grace* to miserable sinners, from the mercy and grace of God, for the glory of his mercy and grace, and are gracious and merciful acts, &c.

The end which God aims at, in punishing sinners with everlasting punishment, is not their eternal misery, this is not the thing God delights in ; but the manifestation of the glory of his justice, by shewing his infinite displeasure at sin or hatred of it, from the  
infinite

infinite perfection of his nature : So the end which God aimed at, *in bruising the son of his love, and putting him to grief, when he laid on him the iniquities of us all, which filled him with sore amazement, and caused him to sweat great drops of blood, when he cried if it be possible, let this cup pass from me, &c.* was not the misery of Christ ; but the manifestation of the glory of divine justice ; in the execution of that penalty, which infinite wisdom saw to be the just demerit of our sin, and which, otherwise we must unavoidably, have been made to suffer : And as this was the *only* way, in which, grace and mercy could be extended towards miserable sinners. The gift of Christ to die for our sins, or to satisfy divine justice, by suffering for us, *that whosoever believeth on him, should not perish, but have everlasting life* ; is a surprising display of God's compassion and grace towards the sinners of mankind.

But the Dr. is quite of another mind, if he has any settled principles at all ! For in P. 64. speaking of the sacrifice of Christ, he says, " We are assured in the holy scriptures, that God forgives the sins of men, thro' this great sacrifice intervening, **RATHER** than *without any.*" And in the same Page, speaking of it's *becoming* God to make the captain of our salvation perfect thro' sufferings, says, " It became his wisdom, it became his goodness, it became his mercy, even that very grace of God, by which Christ tasted death for every man. There was a fitness and congruity in it, as the *wisest* and *best* method, for saving of sinful men, *without any kind of reference* to that *common*, but yet *strange* supposition, of *divine justice* being entirely *distinct* from *divine goodness.*" And in the next Page, says, " The representations of Christ's dying, *the just for the unjust*, as consequential to, and the effect of, God's love, mercy and grace, are so far from

from supposing any *such justice* in God, as is often spoken of, distinct in nature from goodness, and to satisfy which it is said, *Christ died* ; that they appear to me, absolutely irreconcilable therewith. Neither does it seem even possible to assert, and solidly to maintain, this most important doctrine of our redemption by the blood of Christ, but upon the supposition of its being the *wisest* and *best*, i. e. the *most* benevolent and gracious method of dispensing pardon and life to sinners : In such a sense as wholly and forever to exclude *any such idea of divine justice* as is often given us."

It must be observed, that the *divine justice*, which the Dr. would have, wholly and forever excluded, is what *commonly*, and for ought I know, always 'till now, has been held to be a particular attribute of God's moral nature, and not a branch or mode of the particular attribute of goodness, kindness, benevolence or bounty ; which justice Christ died to satisfy, when *he suffered for our sins, the just for the unjust*, that *God might be just in justifying*, and even in forgiving such as *believe in Jesus Christ*.

It must also be observed, that the Dr. supposes, God might have *well* and *wisely* forgiven the sins of men, *without* the sacrifice or satisfactory sufferings of Christ : Or that there was some other *wise* and *good*, i. e. benevolent and gracious method of dispensing pardon and life to sinners ; some other fit and congruous method ; but *this thro' the sacrifice of Christ* intervening, was *rather the best*, the *wisest*, the most benevolent and gracious method, and we are assured of this in the holy scriptures. " It became the wisdom, it became the goodness, mercy and grace of God, to make the captain of our salvation perfect thro' sufferings ; but it did not become the particular attributes of divine justice, Christ's dying, or suffering,

suffering, had no kind of reference to divine justice *to satisfy it*. Such an idea of divine justice, must wholly and forever be excluded : For if there is any such idea of divine justice, or any such essential attribute in God, that must be satisfied, reconciled, or become propitious thro' the sacrifice of Christ, or otherwise, sinners must not be pardoned ; it will follow, that our redemption by the blood of Christ, is the *only wise and good, fit and congruous, benevolent and gracious* method of dispensing pardon and life to sinners : And if it is the only method, it is not the *wisest and best, &c.* And if it is not the wisest and best, it don't seem even *possible* to assert, and solidly to maintain this most important doctrine of our redemption by the blood of Christ : And as to Christ's dying, *the just for the unjust, to satisfy divine justice*, this appears absolutely irreconcilable with his dying, as consequential to, and the effect of God's love, mercy and grace."

But (1.) I deny what the Dr. asserts viz. " We are assured in the holy scriptures, that God forgives the sins of men, thro' the sacrifice of Christ intervening, *rather than without any.*" The holy scriptures give not the least hint, that there was any other *good and wise or possible way* of forgiving the sins of men, consistently with God's absolute moral perfection. The scriptures assure us, that *God will by no means clear the guilty* :—That God says, *Vengeance in mine, I will repay* :—That *God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have everlasting life* : That the wrath of God abideth on such as believe not : That, *without the shedding of blood, there is no remission* : That *Christ is the way, the truth and the life ; no man cometh to God, but by him* : *Neither is there salvation in any other ; for there is no other name under heaven, given among men, whereby we MUST be saved.* All these

texts, and many more, teach that Christ is the only way, and that all must have perished unavoidably, if Christ had not appeared to take away sin by the sacrifice of himself : And all shall perish that neglect this so great salvation.—But,

(2.) Supposing there had been some other *wise* and *good* method of dispensing pardon to sinners, and this by Christ God saw to be the wisest and best, and therefore chose it ; does not this presuppose a necessity in God to dispense pardon and life to sinners, some way or other ? And as he is infinitely wise and good, a necessity of choosing the wisest and best method ? And if so, a necessity even from the wisdom and goodness of God, to dispense pardon and life to sinners, thro' Christ, and in no other way, as this is acknowledged to be the wisest and best ?

But we have no apprehension that God was under any moral necessity from any of his moral perfections, to dispense pardon and life to sinners ; for if he had been, we make no doubt, he would actually dispense the same to all sinners, without exception, to devils as well as to fallen men. On the contrary we believe, God appointed this method, *because it so seemed good in his sight* : That the gift of Christ to be a saviour, was unspeakably free : *That by grace we are saved*, and that God is actually *gracious* to whom *he will* be gracious, and *merciful* to whom *he will* be merciful ; *working all things after the counsel of his own will* : *For who hath known the mind of the Lord ? Or who hath been his counsellor ? For of him and thro' him, &c.*—But (3.) Why can't we possibly assert, and solidly maintain this most important doctrine of our redemption by the blood of Christ, but upon the supposition that it is the wisest and best method of dispensing pardon and life to sinners, in such sense as wholly and forever to exclude the moral attribute of  
divine

divine justice ? Why is not this method (which the Dr. allows to be the only method God has fixed upon in his counsel, which “ shall stand, and stand more immutable, than the foundations of the earth or the pillars of heaven”) as good and wise, benevolent and gracious, considered as the *only* possible method ; as it would be, upon a supposition, there were ten thousand other methods less wise and good, benevolent and gracious ? Would this be any better or wiser, for being comparatively the best and wisest ? There is but one God, and there is *none good but God*, and he is *God the only wise*. Now would God be any better and wiser than he is, if there were ten thousand other deities, not so good and wise as God is ? In P. 45. the Dr. presumes to tell, how *God became infinitely, perfectly good* ; viz. *Seeing “ the fitness and reasonableness of his being so, determined him to be so.* Whether God saw this fitness and reasonableness of his being infinitely, perfectly good, in a comparative light as being the wisest and best, before he determined himself to be infinitely, perfectly good, the Dr. does not inform us ; but perhaps the Dr. will say, that we can’t solidly maintain the most important doctrine of God’s infinite, perfect goodness, but upon a supposition, that when God determined himself to be infinitely, perfectly good, he saw it in a comparative light, the fittest and most reasonable to be so :—Tho’ the Dr. says, “ He is far from designing to suggest, either that there was a time when God was not good, or that he might possibly have been otherwise ; that he means the direct contrary in both respects.” And then tells what he does mean, viz. “ That as this fitness was eternally *seen*, God was eternally good ; and as he saw it necessarily, he was as necessarily good : And yet not contrary to his own will or choice, which were a contradiction ; but in conformity thereto from

eternity." Yet from his own explanation, it appears, that I took him right, viz. That God is infinitely, perfectly good, because he determined himself to be so, by his own will or choice : And he determined himself to be so, because he saw the fitness and reasonableness of being so. God's infinite, perfect goodness, as appears both from the Dr's position, and the explanation of it, is the effect of God's own will, choice or determination ; and if it is an effect, it is not his nature or essence. If the Dr. has a mind to gratify the *curiosity* of his hearers, he had better attempt it about things he understands, than to shew how absolute being came to be what he is : Which the highest seraph, or tallest arch-angel, never did, never will and never can know.

But to return, I must insist to know why we can't solidly maintain the most important doctrine of our redemption by the blood of Christ, but upon a supposition, which the Dr. would have wholly and forever excluded, the attribute of divine justice, as it is often held forth to us ? Also, I must insist to know, how it could become the wisdom, goodness, mercy and grace of God, to make the captain of our salvation perfect thro' sufferings, without any kind of reference to divine justice, that was to be satisfied thereby ? And farther I must insist to know, why Christ's dying to satisfy divine justice for us (or otherwise we must have been made unavoidably to suffer the penalty of the law forever) is absolutely irreconcilable with Christ's suffering, *the just for the unjust*, as consequential to, and the effect of, God's love, mercy, grace ?

If the Dr. shall ever think proper to publish any thing more upon this subject, there are some things, which I should be glad he would plainly express his mind upon, viz.

(1.) What

(1.) What idea he fixes to the term *justice*, when he calls it a particular moral attribute? And what idea he fixes to the term *punitive justice*, which he says, is “an adorable attribute of God?” Whether he has the same idea affixed to *punitive justice*, as he has to *goodness, mercy, kindness*? *Behold the goodness and severity of God!* Whether these two terms express the same individual idea? Or when he says *punitive justice* is an adorable attribute, whether he means something or nothing thereby? If nothing, that he would let us know it; but if he means something, and even what such terms are commonly understood to import: Then, when he says *punitive justice* is an adorable attribute of God, he must mean that it is an essential attribute of God. And hence that there is a punitive attribute, or a punishing property in the very nature or essence of God; for the Dr. says P. 11. “In God, there is no such distinction, or distribution of attributes, into essential and non-essential—all is eternal, all essential, all equally necessary.” Hence *punitive justice* is an attribute in God, eternal, essential, and equally necessary with all his other attributes; and if God is infinite, eternal and unchangeable, necessarily, in his other attributes, he must be equally so in his *punitive justice*.—And if, as the Dr. says P. 17. “There is no material difference betwixt God’s not having and not exercising wisdom. What is not used, is as nothing.” It must follow, that if any of God’s creatures deserve punishment, God is under a moral necessity to punish them, even from his very essence; if he does not punish them, he does not exercise *punitive justice*, which is the same as not to have it: Yea, if he should forgive sinners, without executing the penalty for sin, it would be acting against, and a denying an essential property of his nature. But God cannot deny himself; and

as God cannot deny himself, nor act contrary to his essential properties, it did in an essential manner become the justice of God, in order *that many sons* might be forgiven and saved ; or be bro't out of a state of guilt, condemnation and 'wrath, into a state of forgiveness, justification and glory, to make the captain of their salvation perfect thro' sufferings : For being thus made perfect, he became the author of eternal salvation, unto all them that obey him. The penalty of the law being executed on Christ, he has redeemed us from the curse of the law, and there is remission of sin in his blood that was shed. Hence the Dr. must, either say he meant nothing, when he called punitive justice an adorable attribute of God ; or else, that he meant nothing, when he said, God's making the captain of our salvation perfect thro' sufferings, became his wisdom, goodness, &c. without any kind of reference to divine justice : Or else, that he is inconsistent with himself.

(2.) Another thing I desire the Dr. to speak to, is what he means, when he speaks " of the pardon of sin thro' the atonement of Christ ;" and " of God's forgiving the sins of men thro' the sacrifice of Christ," and of his " dispensing pardon and life to sinners, thro' the redemption of Christ, by his blood."

Whether he means, by sinners being pardoned or forgiven, that they are delivered from a state of condemnation & guilt, in which they were justly liable to suffer the adequate punishment of sin ?—And whether, by our being forgiven thro' the sacrifice, atonement & redemption of Christ by his blood, he means, that Christ suffered in our stead, which is the ground or reason of God's discharging such as believe on Christ, from an obligation of suffering that punishment, which they justly deserved to suffer ? If he does not mean this, I don't know what he means ; nor what

what ideas he fixes to the terms, *pardon & forgiveness*, and *atonement, propitiation, sacrifice, and redemption by the blood of Christ*.—But if he means what I have just observed in the two queries ; then our being pardoned or forgiven thro' the sacrifice, atonement, propitiation and redemption of Christ by his blood, must necessarily import that Christ suffered the penalty of the law for us, and thereby redeemed us from the curse : And if he suffered the penalty of the law, he suffered from the hand of punitive justice. And that divine justice has received such satisfaction by Christ's suffering the penalty, that God can on his account, consistent with the demands of justice on sinners, discharge them from an obligation of suffering it :—Wherefore to exclude the justice of God in this matter, as the Dr. would have us, would be to exclude every just idea from all gospel expressions, of the forgiveness of sins thro' the atonement, propitiation, &c. of Christ by his blood, and turn the gospel into an unintelligible jargon of unmeaning and insignificant terms. Moreover, if the justice of God did not require the execution of the penalty of the law on sinners ; and if Christ did not suffer the penalty of the law to satisfy divine justice, that they might be pardoned, it is impossible to reconcile the extream sufferings of Christ, from his Father, with goodness : For if it did not become the justice of God, even punitive justice, it could not become either the wisdom, goodness, mercy or grace of God.—It behoves the Dr. to shew how it could.—

The Dr's evident design, as has been observed, is to shew, that God's goodness is such, that he might have forgiven sin, without a sacrifice or atonement : And this seems to be the grand reason, why he would exclude justice from being *equally* a particular essential attribute of God, with his particular attribute of  
goodness.

goodness. But every method he has taken to do this, has run him into shameful inconsistencies ; \* and

\* The idea of divine justice which the Dr. would wholly and for ever exclude, is our idea or the common idea of divine justice, which in P. 63. he calls, “ *A false idea of divine justice.*” His idea of divine justice is true, but our idea is false ; but wherein does his true, and our false idea of divine justice differ ? Why, his idea of it is, “ That it is not any attribute of God distinct from, but one branch or mode of his essential goodness.” *Ibid.* But our false idea of it is, that it is an attribute of God, “ entirely distinct from divine goodness.” P. 64. “ Distinct in nature.” P. 65. His idea of punitive justice, or of God’s acts of just punishment, is, that they are acts of positive kindness, or otherwise they must be acts of positive cruelty. From whence we infer, that the Father’s bruising his son, when the iniquities of us all were laid upon him, and he suffered for our sins, the just for the unjust, was in itself either an act of positive kindness and mercy to Christ, or else an act of positive cruelty ; but our false idea of divine justice is, “ that Christ died to satisfy it,” which appears to the Dr. absolutely irreconcilable with Christ’s dying, as consequential to, and the effect of God’s love, mercy and grace. P. 65.—But I must confess, that if punitive justice or God’s acts of just punishment, are acts of positive goodness or kindness, and Christ did not die to satisfy divine justice ; I don’t see how Christ’s dying for our sins, the just for the unjust, was consequential to, and the effect of God’s love, mercy and grace to the sinners of mankind, except it can be made to appear, that it was a display of God’s love, mercy and grace, to a sinful perishing world, to appoint his son to sustain acts of positive kindness and mercy in our stead, that they might not be extended towards us.

But if our idea of divine justice is false, because we suppose (as the Dr. says) that divine justice is not a branch or mode of divine goodness, but an attribute of God intirely distinct, and distinct in nature from divine goodness, then the idea which the Dr. elsewhere gives us of divine justice, is a false idea. In P. 10. the Dr. calls the goodness of God “ an attribute or property inherent in, and essential to him.” And in P. 18. calls “ punitive justice

and often asserts, what by it's just consequence overthrows the point he labours to establish.—This appears from some things, that already have been animadverted on ; and from many more, that I can't spend time to take under particular consideration : I shall only glance upon a few.—

In P. 14, 15, 16, 17. The Dr. speaks of wisdom as the great controuler and all-directing regulator of God's goodness, in the exercise of beneficence ; which directs, controules and regulates according to the unerring rule of right : He then considers justice only

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an adorable attribute." And P. 19 & 20. justice is a particular distinguished moral attribute ; and speaking of God's perfect purity, holiness, and punitive justice, and some other attributes as he calls them in P. 18 & 19. says, " Tho' all adorable attributes, yet being considered independently of his bounty, clemency & mercy, rather astonish, &c."— Again, " What consolation can weak and sinful creatures draw from a consideration of *those other* divine attributes alone, or independently of goodness and mercy ?" Now if goodness is a divine attribute, and punitive justice is another divine attribute that may be considered *alone* or *independently* of goodness, it is not a branch or mode of; but a particular attribute entirely distinct from that of goodness. In P. 11. He calls the divine attributes " qualities." Now if a plurality of qualities in a subject, imply a distinction, an entire distinction, a distinction in the nature of the several qualities which makes them several qualities ; and if the attributes of God are so many qualities inherent in God, and goodness is one attribute or quality inherent in God, and justice is another, as the Dr. says ; then the idea the Dr. gives us of divine justice, is, that it is an attribute or quality entirely distinct, yea distinct in nature from divine goodness : And this idea is either true or false ; if it be true, he would forever exclude a true idea of divine justice ; (and besides, his other idea of divine justice, that it is *only* a branch or mode of goodness, is false.) But if it be false, he ought to offer public satisfaction for giving the publick a false idea of divine justice.

■ *punitive*, and includes it in the bowels of goodness, exercising itself in the way of kindness or beneficence ; hence goodness, including punitive justice is controuled by wisdom.—But as wisdom controuls, directs and always regulates according to the unerring rule of right ; wisdom must also be controuled, directed and regulated in its determinations, by this rule of right : Now if there is no eternal rule of right, but the infinite moral rectitude of God, for the regulation of the Almighty's moral conduct ; then infinite wisdom sees and determines upon nothing to be done, as being wise, fit, congruous or good, but what is agreeable to his infinite moral rectitude : And as God is not absolute perfect moral rectitude, if justice is not an essential moral attribute of his nature ; it must follow, that infinite wisdom must have a regard to the whole moral rectitude as the rule of right, and equally to justice with goodness. Hence infinite wisdom determining upon this glorious method of dispensing pardon to sinners thro' the redemption of Christ, must have a regard to divine justice, and therefore it became the justice of God as well as his goodness, “ to make the captain of our salvation perfect thro' sufferings.”

In P. 48. The Dr. says, “ That punitive justice is a branch of goodness in such sort, that a perfectly good and merciful Being, may in many cases be obliged to punish transgressors—for the support of order, right, &c.—None but God himself, who knoweth all things, certainly knoweth, who may, or may not, be pardoned consistently with the eternal rule of right, &c.” The Dr. is speaking here of the necessity of a revelation from heaven, to assure us how and in what way sinners may be pardoned, consistently with the eternal rule of right ; and here are two things he allows that must be remembered, viz. (1.) That a perfectly good  
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and merciful Being may in some cases be *obliged* to punish transgressors, for the support of order, right, &c. because *punitive justice* is a branch of his goodness. (2.) That whether God punishes or pardons sinners, he does the same, consistently with the eternal rule of right.—In the next P. he speaks of the revelation from heaven, which assures us, in what way God may pardon sinners consistently with the eternal rule of right, viz. “ Thro’ Christ’s mediation ; particularly thro’ the atonement to be made by his blood, when he should offer himself up to God as a lamb without blemish and without spot : thereby supporting the honour of God’s violated commandments, and the dignity of his government.” Now if the moral rectitude of God, comprehending all the moral attributes of his nature, is this eternal rule of right (as I observ’d before, and if I am wrong, the Dr. is desired to shew it) we must be sure that such as God punishes, he punishes consistently with his absolute unchangeable rectitude ; and such as he pardons, he also pardons consistently therewith : And therefore if to pardon this and that person, is an act, including the ground of it, consistent with the eternal rule of right, to execute the penalty on these persons, considered in relation to the ground of pardon, would not be an act consistent with the eternal rule of right, and *vice versa*.— And as the gospel-revelation assures us, that guilty sinners may receive forgiveness thro’ the sacrifice or atonement of Christ by his blood ; and that all that believe in Christ are pardoned, and that such as finally neglect to believe in Christ, shall be damned ; we conclude, that it is consistent with the eternal rule of right, for God to pardon all that believe in Christ, and to punish any with damnation that believe in Christ, would not be consistent with the eternal rule of right :

And God's damning such as don't believe in Christ, must be consistent with the eternal rule of right, and to pardon them would be inconsistent therewith. The reason which the revelation from heaven gives us, why it is consistent with the eternal rule of right, for God to pardon such as believe in Christ, is because Christ is the end of the law for righteousness, to such as believe, he has made peace, made an atonement by his blood, to the full satisfaction of justice, in which righteousness and atonement such are interested by faith; hence "there is now no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus:" But such as believe not in Christ, have no actual interest in his righteousness and atonement; and these "are condemned already, and the wrath of God *abideth* on them." And while they have no interest in the righteousness and atonement of Christ, it could not be consistent with the eternal rule of right, for God to pardon them:—How then, could God *well* and *wisely* forgive the sins of men, without this sacrifice of Christ intervening, seeing he could not do it consistently with the eternal rule of right; and also seeing the honour of God's violated commandments, and the dignity of his moral government, could not be supported, but must sink without such a sacrifice?

But I must not pass from this without taking some notice of the Doctor's consistency, or rather inconsistency: Says he, "A good God from his punitive justice, which is a branch of his goodness, may be obliged to punish transgressors, for the support of order, right, &c. or of the honour of God's violated commandments, and the dignity of his moral government—Christ suffered from punitive justice, and was numbered with transgressors (tho' he was without sin, a lamb without blemish and without

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“ out spot, for he suffered the just for the unjust) when  
 “ he made atonement by his blood, and thereby sup-  
 “ ported the honor of God’s violated commandments,  
 “ and the dignity of his government, in such sort  
 “ that guilty sinners might be pardoned consistently  
 “ with the eternal rule of right ; but tho’ God may  
 “ from punitive justice be obliged to punish sinners  
 “ for the support of order, right, &c. and when he  
 “ punished Christ, the just for the unjust, it was to  
 “ support the honour of his violated laws, and the  
 “ dignity of his government, and that guilty sinners  
 “ might be pardoned consistently with the eternal  
 “ rule of right : Yet Christ’s sufferings were without  
 “ any kind of reference to divine justice to satisfy that,  
 “ for this is absolutely irreconcilable with Christ’s dy-  
 “ ing the just for the unjust, as consequential to, and  
 “ the effect of, God’s love, mercy and grace.—And  
 “ tho’ punitive justice in God, regarding the eternal  
 “ rule of right, and the support of the honour and  
 “ dignity of God’s laws and moral government, in  
 “ order that we guilty sinners might be pardon’d con-  
 “ sistently therewith ; obliged God to lay on Christ  
 “ the iniquities of us all, and to bruise the son of his  
 “ love in our stead : Yet there was no absolute ne-  
 “ cessity of Christ’s atonement in reference to justice  
 “ being satisfied thereby, such idea of divine justice  
 “ must be wholly and forever excluded ; God might  
 “ have forgiven the sins of men without any sacrifice  
 “ intervening ; indeed, it was *rather* the best and  
 “ wisest method to forgive the sins of men, thro’ the  
 “ great sacrifice of Christ intervening, than without  
 “ any. The eternal rule of right, and the honour  
 “ and dignity of God’s moral law and government are  
 “ of so small weight, that they did but just turn the  
 “ scale in favour of an atonement to be made for sin,  
 “ by

“ by the sacrifice of Christ : And tho’ the result was,  
 “ that Christ was to make an atonement by suffering  
 “ the penalty of the law at the hands of punitive just-  
 “ ice, yet this must be without any kind of reference  
 “ to divine justice, to satisfy that.”—O Doctor! can  
 God the Judge of all the earth, require an atonement  
 to be made, if he is not offended? And can he be  
 offended, and yet not justly offended? Can he be just-  
 ly offended, if he is not wronged or injured by his  
 creatures? And what is God’s anger, wrath or venge-  
 ance, if it is not vindictive justice incensed or pro-  
 voked? And can Christ appease, reconcile or atone  
 vindictive justice incensed & provoked, by suffering  
 the penalty of the law for us; or by offering up him-  
 self to God a sacrifice for us, without any kind of re-  
 ference to divine justice to satisfy that?—Will the  
 Dr. say, “ It was the honour of violated command-  
 ments, and the dignity of God’s moral government,  
 that were to be supported by the atonement of Christ?”  
 But what honour and dignity can there be in laws  
 and government, that are not founded in justice? If  
 God’s moral law and government are founded in jus-  
 tice, then God the founder of them is just, and had  
 a special regard to his justice both in founding, and  
 also in vindicating the honour and dignity of them  
 by the atonement of Christ: But if the atonement of  
 Christ, by which the honour and dignity of God’s mo-  
 ral law and government were supported, had no kind  
 of reference to divine justice as a satisfaction for our  
 offences; then the moral law and government of God,  
 were not founded in justice. And then what is the just  
 consequence from the Dr’s principles? Why, that an in-  
 finitely good God, could with pleasure (“ for it pleas’d  
 the Lord to bruise him”) look on, and see his well-  
 beloved son, weltering under the most amazing and  
 excruciating

excruciating misery, for the support of the dignity and honour of a law and government, which according to his principles could have no honour nor dignity belonging to them, and might as well be contemned and disregarded as not, as to any concern or interest justice has in them, for it has none : But if the Dr. shall say “ no ; I agree with the scriptures, that the law is *just*, holy and good, and that God’s work is perfect, and all his ways are judgment ;” Then I will venture to say, that all his bustle in this matter, is but a windy and empty puff, if not an abuse of the truth, and “ an insult on the common sense of mankind.”

In P. 65, 66 & 67. The Dr. speaking of the punishment of the heathen, and also of finally impenitent sinners under the gospel, which they shall suffer in the other world, “ how terrible soever in it’s nature and duration, such punishment shall be,” says “ they will be punished only for their sins, and in due measure only, and to punish them thus, is not, certainly, inconsistent with the most perfect goodness.” Yea, says he, “ Goodness, perfect goodness, *NAY TENDER MERCY* itself requires this ; God would not be perfectly good and merciful, if he did not inflict such punishment !”—This is, as we say, driving up to the very Hubb, if not beyond it : For I have no apprehension, that tender mercy itself, will manifest and exercise itself, towards the wicked in their terrible punishment in the other world. If tender mercy itself requires such punishment, it will be exercised in the execution, and be manifested by the effect of such punishment, which will be exquisite and intolerable misery : But how tender mercy to the miserable is manifested, in making the miserable as miserable as they can be, by executing punishment upon them for their sins, in the due measure they deserve, is beyond my apprehension !

apprehension ! I believe, if the Dr. was to suffer the punishment of hell, he would have no discovery at all, of the tender mercy of God towards him in such a terrible punishment ! I pray God, that neither of us, may ever know what that punishment is, by experiencing the same, in the other world ! Or does the Dr. mean the same by *tender mercy itself*, as he does by *punitive justice* ? If so, why didn't he say, " that punitive justice itself, " an adorable attribute of God," requires such punishment, and God would not be perfectly just, if he did not inflict such punishment, how terrible soever in it's nature and duration it is," that people might understand him. But if by *tender mercy itself*, he means the same as *punitive justice*, he abuses language, not to say mankind too !—If he don't mean this, it is no easy task to make sense of what he says.

However, I will pay the Doctor the honour, to acknowledge he speaks the truth, when speaking of the punishment of the wicked in the other world, that have died or shall die without any saving benefit by the atonement of Christ, " that they shall be punished for their sins, and in due measure only; how terrible soever the nature or duration of their punishment shall be—and that goodness, perfect goodness requires this—and God could not be perfect goodness, if he did not inflict such punishment." I say he speaks truth here, if by goodness, perfect goodness, he means God's absolute moral rectitude, including all God's moral attributes, and not a particular attribute only, which he calls " the kindness, benevolence & bounty of God's nature."—And hence we argue (and if it is not justly, the Dr can shew it) that if God must punish sinners in hell for their sins in due measure, who have died without any interest in, or saving benefit

fit by the atonement of Christ, or otherwise he cannot be perfect goodness, perfect and absolute moral rectitude; then it must infallibly follow, that God could not consistently with his absolute moral goodness or rectitude, forgive the sins of men without the sacrifice of Christ intervening.

What the Dr. says in P. 75. I acquiesce in as being quite just, viz. "That God's goodness comprehending not only justice, but all God's moral perfections in it, is God's moral character.—And that God is to be loved as a Being of such a character; a character in it's own nature infinitely amiable!" Here the Dr. does not consider goodness, "in the common restrained sense of the word *benevolence*," as including only kindness and beneficence, as he had evidently done before, when he laboured to prove *punitive justice* to be *only* a branch or mode of goodness; but as comprehending the whole moral character of God; and says, "God is to be loved, under the character of a most holy, just and righteous, as well as kind and beneficent Being." So that the Dr. and we are agreed, that God's infinitely amiable character consists in his whole moral perfection or rectitude:—Now let us see the consequence; if God is a most holy, just & righteous Being, he must have the properties of holiness and justice, or righteousness in his nature; and is absolutely holy, just and righteous, as well as punitively so: And if the whole moral character is to be taken together as the Dr. says, and this character thus taken together, is infinitely amiable; how does the common doctrine, which supposes God to be infinitely holy, just & righteous, reflect dishonour on his goodness, as the Dr. supposes it does? Or wherein is it impious or blasphemous to say, that God cannot pardon sin consistently with his moral rectitude, if he can't do it justly, or agreeable to justice & righteousness?

ness?—If holiness, justice and righteousness, are necessary to compleat God's infinitely amiable character, they must be infinitely good in a moral sense; for nothing can be infinitely amiable in a moral sense, that is not infinitely good in the same sense: And if they are infinitely amiable or good in a moral sense, they must be worthy of God's infinite delight and regard; and God cannot maintain his infinitely perfect and amiable moral character, if he neglects to maintain the honour, glory and dignity of his holiness, justice and righteousness. But if God should receive sinners into his favour, without manifesting his infinite hatred of sin by executing the penalty suitable for that purpose, where would be the glory, dignity and honour of his absolute holiness, which "cannot behold evil or look on iniquity but with infinite abhorrence? And if God should forgive sinners without an atonement, or plenary satisfaction to divine justice, for the offences and injuries against the divine Majesty, where would be the honour, dignity & glory of divine justice, which must assert, maintain, defend & vindicate God's rights, prerogatives & dues—The honour of the eternal rule of right—the moral law, a transcript of God's moral glory; and the dignity of his moral government, against all adversaries, rebels, enemies, malecontents and disaffected ones whatsoever, let the consequence be never so terrible to them; or otherwise forfeit the character of absolute justice and righteousness?

Wherefore to assert God's absolute holiness, justice and righteousness to be such, that God cannot consistently therewith, forgive the sins of men, without plenary satisfaction by the sacrifice and atonement of Christ, is a pleading for the glory & honour of God's infinitely amiable character; and that system, which is connected with and dependent on a principle, that  
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reflects such honour upon God, without doubt, is agreeable to God, and what he will maintain & defend as his own cause :—It is a system that God has put a distinguishing mark of favour upon, and owned as a means of saving thousands and ten thousands, that were ready to perish ! This was the system of christianity, which the Apostles of Christ propagated among the Gentiles, as may be easily demonstrated ; I challenge the Doctor, or any other person, to shew that it was not.—This was the system, that the reformed churches embraced, and which was preached up by the great reformers, when “ they came out of Babylon, the mother of harlots & abominations, and renounced the beast which came out of the bottomless pit,” as may appear from the confessions of faith exhibited by the protestant reformed churches, and other writings of the great reformers.—This was the system of those excellent *Puritans*, eminent for soundness of judgment, “ *well informed consciencies*,” and the most exemplary piety & good conversation ; who composed the first constituted churches of Christ in *New England*, as appears from our own confession of faith, catechisms, &c. handed down from them to us :—This is the system, and such the men, that Dr. MAYHEW sets himself up in opposition to, if I mistake not.

Now as to plead for the above-mentioned principle, that this system is connected with, and dependent on, is a pleading for the honour and glory of God : So on the other hand, to assert & endeavour to maintain, that God could forgive the sins of men without the sacrifice of Christ intervening ; or to build the system of our faith and practice, upon the particular attribute of goodness, i. e. kindness, benevolence and bounty, controuled, regulated and directed by wisdom, yet in such a way as wholly and forever to exclude the attribute of divine justice, as claiming ple-

nary satisfaction for sin, before the sinner can possibly be discharged ; is a reflecting the greatest dishonour and reproach on God, as it is a denying him to be infinite moral rectitude, and as such, infinitely amiable. This I take to be a fair consequence from what has been observed : If it is not, I desire the Dr. to shew it.

The Dr. in P. 71. speaking of the distinguishing favours of heaven towards us, among others, says, “ We are still farther distinguished and favoured of God, by having been born and bred in a protestant country, and a reformed part of the christian church ; instead of a roman-catholick country, and in the errors, superstitions & idolatries of the church of Rome.”— I own that the Dr. is quite right here, and any person would be ready to conclude from these words, that the Dr. believes the scheme or system of protestant religion, at least, in this protestant country, and as professed by this reformed part of the christian church, which is in *New-England*, where we have been born and bred, to be a true system of christianity ; at least, the main and substance of it—and that, on account of our being born in such a country, and being bred or trained up in the belief of such a system of christianity, so opposite to the errors of the roman-catholick church, he pronounces us, to be distinguished and favoured of God :—But please to turn to P. 85. and you will find (if I mistake not) the Dr. pronouncing this scheme or system of christianity, to be false ; wholly and absolutely false. His words are, “ If therefore, my brethren, you know of any particular scheme or system of christianity (so called) *two* or *three* of the most distinguishing and leading principles of which, and the basis on which the whole rests, are plainly & certainly repugnant to the doctrine of God’s universal goodness, and his tender mercies over all his works ; you may be certain, that such  
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scheme or system is *false* ; absolutely & wholly false, so far as it hath any connection with, or dependence upon, those leading, fundamental and most distinguishing principles.”—Now if the scheme or system of christianity, professed in this protestant country by a reformed part of the christian church, is false ; absolutely and wholly false ; how can it be said, that on account of such a religion, we are distinguished and favoured of God, in being born in such a country, and in such a part of the christian church, whose system of christianity (so called) is absolutely & wholly false ? Is it a distinguished favour of God, to be bred up in a system of religion that is false, absolutely and wholly false ?

This system the Dr. refers to is, he says, “ By the fautors and asserters of it, cried up, as peculiarly the doctrine of evangelical grace.” P. 85. This by way of distinction, is called the calvinistic system of doctrine : On this system the churches of *New-England* were originally founded ; and this is the system contained in the *New-England* confession of faith, as well as in the *Westminster* confession & catechisms. Three of the leading and distinguishing principles of this system, the Dr. speaks of and declares each of them to be repugnant to, and irreconcilable with the doctrine of God’s universal goodness and tender mercy over all his works, as he describes the same : It is a system that is maintained by “ many wise and excellent men” as the Dr. acknowledges ; therefore till the Dr. shall give us reason to think otherwise, we must believe the system which he declares to be false ; absolutely and wholly false, is that which the churches of *New-England* were originally founded on, and which is yet the common system of doctrine, and the only system publickly made known, by the mutual consent and agreement of the churches of Christ in  
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this country : If the Dr. is consistent here, he is desired to make it manifest.

The three leading and distinguishing principles in our system, the Dr. speaks of, are (1.) The doctrine of the divine decrees, or predestination. (2.) Of original sin. (3.) Of the absolute necessity of an atonement, or of plenary satisfaction to divine justice, that sin may be pardoned consistently with God's absolute moral rectitude.

As to the last, we have fully seen how the Dr. expresses himself :—That to plead the necessity of such satisfaction, is to make divine justice opposite and repugnant to and irreconcilable with divine goodness. Enough has been observed upon what the Dr. says respecting this principle ; not only to vindicate the true doctrine, but also to expose his inconsistencies.

I shall observe a few things briefly relating to the other two ;—and 1. As to the doctrine of the divine decrees or predestination, it is well known, that this is a leading principle in our system of doctrine, and is thus expressed, viz. “ The decrees of God, are his eternal purpose, according to the counsel of his own will, whereby for his own glory, he hath fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass.” Thus in general, but more particularly, “ That it was the eternal purpose of God, according to the counsel of his own will, to make a certain definite number of mankind heirs of eternal salvation, for the glory of his grace and mercy, in an eminent manner ; who are termed *vessels of mercy*, and were chosen in Christ before the foundation of the world, and given to Christ in the covenant of redemption : Concerning which the Father promised that Christ should see or enjoy them, in consequence of his “ making his soul an offering for sin ;” or that they should be “ called justified & glorified.” That the rest of mankind are not predestinated unto  
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life eternal, but unto everlasting punishment, which is the just desert of sin, for the praise of the glory of divine justice ; and these are termed *vessels of wrath* : And by sin and unrighteousness, the wages of which are eternal death, they are fitted “unto destruction.” Now this last, which is called reprobation, the Dr. does in effect thunder out his *Anathema*’s against, with as much seeming infallibility & misguided zeal, as ever the grand Pontiff of *Rome* did, after he had taken the liberty to cloath it, as he pleased : However, it is the doctrine of the divine decrees itself, that he sets himself against ; such as deny any of the divine purposes to be eternal and absolute, must deny that there is any absolute eternal decree, purpose or determination at all.

The Dr. places in the margin of P. 83, and 84. a passage of the learned Mr. *Calvin*, concerning the reprobate, and says, “ That a certain decree of reprobation, was the known opinion of that learned man :” And adds, “ A sentiment, at once unsupported by reason or scripture ; nay contrary to both, highly derogatory to the goodness and grace of God, and of dangerous tendency.”

But in P. 66. The Dr. states the doctrine, in an objection, but discovers himself disingenuous and abusive in the manner of his stating it, and then vents his indignation against the doctrine, not sparing to lash all that maintain it :—But we don’t hold it, as he states it ; neither can he shew, that the manner in which he states it, can be justly inferred from the manner of our expressing it.—His words are—“ The doctrine of God’s having reprobated a great proportion of mankind ; or from eternity devoted them in his absolute decree & purpose to eternal torments, *without any respect or regard to any sins of theirs*, as the *procuring and meritorious* cause of their *perdition*, and  
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this at the same time, to make manifest, and glorify his *justice*."—But, that sin is the whole procuring, or the meritorious and only meritorious cause of the eternal perdition of sinners, the Dr. must know, we assert & maintain with more consistency than he can, while he "absolutely and forever excludes the idea of such divine justice in God; to satisfy which (we say) Christ died."—We assert, that because sin is the meritorious cause of the perdition of sinners, justice is made manifest and glorified in their perdition; or in that eternal punishment which they have merited by sin, the just wages of which, is death: "It is a just or righteous thing with God to recompence that tribulation or punishment to sinners, which they deserve." Or to accommodate myself a little to the Dr's manner of speaking (tho' inconsistent with the evident design of his discourses) it is a righteous and just thing with God "to punish sinners for their sins, and in due measure." And God makes manifest and glorifies his justice in this way: And as the Dr. allows, "That God will punish the heathen, and such as die in their impenitence under the gospel, in the other world, in due measure, with a terrible punishment both as to its nature and duration; and that God would not be perfectly good, if he should not; his absolute and perfect goodness requires him to do it—because punitive justice is a branch of his goodness." Then we conclude, That God manifests and glorifies his justice, an essential branch of his goodness or moral rectitude, in punishing sinners in the other world, with everlasting punishment.—And also we conclude, that if God "worketh all things after the counsel of his own will;" and if "God's counsel stands immutable" as the Dr. says it does, "even more immutable than the foundations of the earth, and the pillars of heaven." And if "known to God, are all his works from the beginning.

beginning, from everlasting," that it must follow, "that God's inflicting this terrible punishment on the wicked in the other world" (which the Dr. says "is called God's strange *work*") is, his working according to the counsel of his own will, and even that counsel of his own will, which is from everlasting and is immutable: And what does this imply less, than an absolute eternal decree and purpose to punish such (as shall be punished in the other world) with an everlasting punishment, as the due reward of sin, for the manifesting and glorifying divine justice?

The Dr. must either deny, that God will punish impenitent sinners in the other world with everlasting punishment, which would be a flat contradiction of what he has again and again allowed to be asserted in the holy scriptures; or else if he will stand by that, he must deny, that God in punishing them, worketh according to the counsel of his own will, and that this work of punishing sinners was certainly known to God from the beginning, even from everlasting: Or if the Dr. can't deny either of these, he must yield the point, and acknowledge the doctrine of the divine decrees, to be a true principle, as it is asserted and maintained in our system.

The Dr. says in P. 18. That "infinite knowledge is an adorable attribute of God." He also says, "In God there is no such distinction or distribution of attributes into essential and non-essential;—all is eternal, all essential, all equally necessary." Hence God's infinite knowledge, must be eternal, essential, and equally necessary; therefore to deny, that God certainly knew what would be the everlasting state of every one of his reasonable creatures, is to deny (what the Dr. says is) an adorable, essential, eternal, and equally necessary attribute of God:—But—If God's knowledge is infinite, eternal essential & necessary, must

not God from eternity, certainly, infallibly & necessarily foreknow all things that do or shall come to pass to eternity? And mustn't every thing infallibly and necessarily come to pass, according to God's fore-knowledge; otherwise his fore-knowledge is not certain and infallible? And if God worketh all things after the counsel of his own will, mustn't it follow, that God's determinate counsel, is commensurate with his fore-knowledge of what shall infallibly come to pass, either thro' his own efficiency, or the agency of creatures dependent on the word of his power? Or can the Doctor, or any body else possibly shew, that any thing but the determinate counsel or decretive will of God, made the difference in the divine mind or knowledge; betwixt what *may be*, and what *shall be*; what is possible to be, and yet God knows, it shall not be; and the certain futurity of what God, from eternity, knew should infallibly be? Wasn't it possible for God to bring a greater number of creatures into existence, than are or ever will be bro't into existence?—As God is infinite in power, and as space is infinite or immense (as the Dr. says) God might have continued creating worlds to eternity, without filling infinite space, for that which is infinite can't be filled with creatures, except the creatures should be infinite; or an infinite creation should be made, commensurate with the infinite space: Which, I suppose, the Dr. will not assert.—Again, will God bring any thing into existence, that he did not determine from eternity to bring into existence? Or will God punish any person in the other world, that he did not determine from eternity to punish for sin? And could God certainly foreknow what he should certainly bring into existence; and whom he should glorify, and whom he should punish in the other world, if he had not pre-determined the same? Or is not the infallibility of

of God's fore-knowledge of all events, grounded on his absolute decree ? If it is not, the Dr. is desired to shew what it is grounded on.

I know that persons who can't, or are not willing to distinguish justly ; and can't find any other way to evade the force of this argument, will say, it makes God the author of sin ! Such men the apostle *Paul* met with, who said, " Why doth he yet find fault ? For who hath resisted his will ? q. d. " If the will, decree or purpose of God, hath absolutely and infallibly predetermined every thing that comes to pass, or that shall come to pass ; he has predetermined, that we should sin in all respects just as we do, and we must necessarily sin ; and if so, he is the author or cause of our sinning : Why then does he find fault ? How can he blame us for doing what he has predetermined that we should do ? For who has resisted his will ? We have not resisted his determinate counsel."

But we boldly assert and maintain, that sin is not a creature of God : The holy scriptures say, " It is of the devil, and he is the father of it." It is the destruction of the moral image of God in reasonable creatures—a want of conformity to the moral nature and will of God—an aberration from the eternal rule of right :—It is moral evil—rebellion and enmity against God, and hence what the nature of God infinitely hates, and what deserves his infinite displeasure. And the subjects and actors of sin are the blameable cause of sin, and therefore God justly finds fault with sinners.

Again, that sin is in the world of mankind, none can deny :—That God made man upright, in the image and likeness of his own moral perfections, neither can any justly deny.—That it was possible for a holy creature to loose his holiness, and become a sinful creature, by an act of disobedience to his God, we

can't deny, so long as we allow the holy scriptures to be the truth of God :—That God was under an obligation, either from the perfection of his nature, or from any gracious promise, to restrain or hinder man from sinning, by any special act of his power, none will assert ; for in that case, he would certainly have done it.

Farther, that the decree of God determining the certain futurition of all things, can no more justly be called the cause of sin, than God's certain fore-knowledge of the being of sin, was the cause of sin : What God hath decreed to be, will infallibly be ; but the decree is not the efficient or compulsive cause, and the thing to be, the effect : But the decree is the antecedent, and the existence of the thing decreed, the consequent of the decree.—Just the same may be said of God's fore-knowledge ; what God foreknows will be, will infallibly be according to his fore-knowledge :—God certainly foreknew, before he created man, that man would sin after he had created him, just as he did. But this fore-knowledge was not the cause of his sinning :—God certainly foreknew, that when Christ should come into “ this apostate world, to make atonement for sin ; *Judas*, when the hour prefixed or predetermined was come, would betray Christ, hang himself and go to his own place.” And *Herod*, *Pontius Pilate*, and the *Gentiles* with the *Jews*, would conspire against Christ, and “ with wicked hands, crucify and slay him :” And the *Apostle* says they did this “ according to God's determinate counsel and fore-knowledge,” that they “ did what God's counsel, and his hand determined before, to be done.”——But to return——

¶ The Dr. says in P. 45. “ God being all-knowing, must know what is in itself good, as an end, viz. happiness.—He must also know all the possible means

or

or ways—and which are the best, the properest and most effectual ; so as to be subject to no mistake or error.—Moreover, being independent and all-powerful, he cannot be under any wrong bias, or have any difficulties to discourage him in pursuing any end truly great, noble and excellent.”—Now what the Dr. says here plainly imports, that the all-knowing God, fixed on an end to pursue, that is truly great, noble and excellent ; this end, he says, is happiness : I suppose he means, the happiness of God’s household or kingdom in general, as elsewhere he sometimes speaks ; and that, as this all-knowing Being, must know all possible means or ways, and which are the best, the properest & most effectual for the attaining this end, he must determine upon such as are the best, the properest and most effectual, without any mistake or error in his judgment or choice : And these means being determined upon, & God being all-powerful and independent, it became infallibly certain, that the determined plan should be put in execution, both with respect to the end, and all the means fixed upon for the attaining the same. God could have no difficulties to discourage him, in pursuing his end, in the use of all those “ best, properest & most effectual means, which he had made choice of, or determined upon.”

Now according to the Doctor’s scheme, we must be sure, that whatever means God does or shall make use of, the same he chose, as the best, the properest and most effectual : These he determined upon, when he laid his plan.—Well, speaking of the punishment of the wicked in the other world, in P. 67. The Dr. says, “ Why then should God, the great and only Potentate, be tho’t the less good or merciful, for inflicting such punishment on wicked men, as the support of his government, and the *great end thereof* call for ?—God would not be perfectly good and merciful,

ful, if he did not inflict such punishment, how terrible soever in it's nature and duration, as is *requisite to this end*?—It must be noted, that the *great end* of God's government, with the Doctor, is the happiness of his household or kingdom, or *their good*, and this is the end of God's punishing the wicked, as more fully appears in P. 24 & 25. and in divers other places: And hence the punishment of the wicked in the other world, is a means requisite to this end.—And as the Dr. says, “God's knowledge (which formed his plan”) or his wisdom, which in P. 15. he says, “is the leading, regulating, and all-directing attribute of God's nature, that cannot err.” I say, as he says this knowledge or wisdom is infinite, eternal, essential and equally necessary, this plan must be laid, or was concluded upon from eternity.

Wherefore, according to the Dr's scheme, “God from eternity devoted all that shall perish in the other world, in his absolute decree and purpose, in which he could be subject to no mistake or error, to eternal torments, as what he saw to be the best, the properest, and most effectual means, requisite to his great end, viz. the good & happiness of the rest of his household or kingdom.”—This is the unavoidable consequence of the Dr's positions; and if it is not, the Dr. is desired to shew it:—And this scheme, so far as it respects the end the Dr. mentions, viz. the good and happiness of the creatures. The Dr. might with propriety say, “Neither any man on earth, nor angel in heaven can reconcile it, with the goodness of God;” that is, his absolute moral rectitude:—But as to the doctrine of the divine decrees, as asserted in our system, this is fully supported both by scripture and reason. And I challenge the Dr. to shew, that the decree of reprobation (as asserted in our system) may not be justly inferred from that infinite knowledge, wisdom,

wisdom, independancy and sovereignty, which he allows are in God essentially and eternally ; considered together, with that terrible punishment of the wicked, which God will inflict on them in the other world for their sins in due measure, “ the duration of which (the Dr. says) you know, is divers times expressed by the words, *eternal, everlasting, for ever and ever*, and the like.” P. 68.

2. I must speak a little to the second principle (as I noted them) in our system of doctrine, which the Dr. declaims against as “ the grossest of all absurdities,” viz. *The doctrine of original sin* ; and says respecting the same, “ they who are capable of believing such unscriptural & irrational doctrine ; and of thinking justice so much at variance with goodness, wisdom and mercy, as this supposes, are to be pitied as persons of a sadly depraved judgment.” P. 63. The doctrine he delivers in these words, viz. “ To suppose that the sin of *Adam* and *Eve*, is, or can be, so imputed to them (infants) as to render them justly liable to eternal misery, without any offence of their own, is one of the grossest of all absurdities.” \* The Dr.

\* Altho’ the Dr. styles, the supposition, “ That the sin of Adam and Eve, is or can be so imputed to infants, as to render them justly liable to eternal misery, without any offence of their own.”—The grossest of all absurdities ; and affirms it to be a doctrine “ unscriptural and irrational” which “ supposes justice to be at variance with goodness, wisdom and mercy.” Yet he allows in P. 62. That “ some children are born, live, and soon die in pain ; before they have done any evil, or committed any fault.” From whence we may conclude, that with the Dr. it is quite absurd, for God to subject infants to misery for the sin of our first father Adam ; but it is not at all absurd or inconsistent with his goodness, to subject them to misery for no sin at all :—But to shew the absurdity of the latter, I shall transcribe here the words of the late Rev. and very worthy Mr. CUMMING, which stand in the margin under P. 30 & 31.

Dr. no doubt, was taught in his childhood, that this is a great truth; viz. "That all mankind by the fall lost communion with God, and are under his wrath and curse, and so made *liable* to all the miseries in this life, to death itself, and the pains of hell for ever." Such as deny original guilt, must deny original sin: To acknowledge original sin or pollution, and at the same time to deny original guilt, is inconsistent & absurd.

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of his Animadversions; and which, I doubt not, were originally wrote in reference to what the Dr. here allows and supports, viz. "If God can subject any rational creature, that is in no respect faulty, or obnoxious in the sight of the law, to misery or *pain* for *one* day, hour, or *moment*, he can do so for *two*: For the second moment is no more contrary to goodness, than the first. He can do so for three, four or five millions, for the same reason. And for the same reason, he can do so *eternally*, as well and as *justly* as one moment. And on this state of things, and account of God's character and principles of conduct, where are we!—If it be said, that it is not contrary to the goodness of God, to subject a creature, that has in no respect any fault or guilt of its own, to misery for a certain time; because he can make up the misery he brings upon it, by a greater quantity of happiness in some future period. This is only evading the difficulty. I do not see it helps or easeth the matter at all. The difficulty here is, how it is consistent with the *nature of goodness itself*, not to mention justice, or with the character of an infinitely perfect and good Being, to make an innocent creature miserable for any term of its existence, longer or shorter. To say, that God will compensate it's undeserved sufferings afterwards with happiness; if it contain any solution of the difficulty, I own 'tis too nice and metaphysical for my sight. How God can, consistently with justice or goodness, make any creature miserable, or have any hand therein, in any degree, or for any term of time, without any fault or demerit that is in any respect it's own, is to me as unintelligible as the *grossest absurdity*. And how rational men are capable of believing so irrational and unscriptural a doctrine, who yet boggle at mysteries, is certainly not easy to account for on mere principles of reason."

The Dr. knew very well what system contained his doctrine, and what men have asserted and do maintain the same : And tho' he says here, " They that are capable of believing such unscriptural and irrational doctrine, are to be pitied as persons of a sadly depraved judgment." Yet in P. 65. says, " Tho' by the way, these things are not said by me, but with an high veneration, for those many wise and excellent men, who either have or seem to have, different conceptions of this matter." He is speaking there, in reference to another principle in our system :—" He has a high veneration for many of us, *as wise and excellent men, that are to be pitied as persons of a sadly depraved judgment.*"

But to return to the point. The Dr. in P. 89. speaks of the *apostacy* of our first parents, in consequence of which (he says) " The world has been full of folly, superstition & wickedness."—In P. 58. says, " That *mankind* in their present state, actually need trials"—Which it is probable they would not "*bad mankind persevered in their original innocence.*"—In P. 19. he says, "*We guilty creatures.*"—P. 42. speaks of our being immortally happy, *thro' the second Adam, the Lord from heaven.*" In P. 89. speaks of a parallel instituted and carried on by the apostle *Paul*, between the *first and second Adam*, in his epistle to the *Romans*. In P. 49. says, " That one principle end of Christ's coming into this *apostate world*, was to proclaim the glad tidings of *pardon to sinners*"—*sinful men*—and *sinful children of men*, in the same P. In P. 50. He " laments that the gospel—glad tidings of great joy to *all people*—such a wonderful manifestation of the love of God to *mankind*, should be so perverted by many, so *restrained* as to the *number*, to whose *salvation* it was *designed.*" In P. 64. says, " That God forgives the *sins of men thro' the sacrifice of Christ*—

that Christ tasted death *for every man*.—This is the wisest and best method of *saving sinful men*.” In P. 65. says, “ Christ died *for sinners, the just for the unjust*.—God sent his son be a propitiation *for our sins* ; This, the most gracious and benevolent method of dispensing *pardon and life to sinners* ” In P. 70, and 71. says, “ If we consider ourselves in the first place as men, and in the next place as *creatures redeemed from sin and death*, by the son of God in human flesh.” “ God is in Christ reconciling the *world itself*, unto himself—for Christ is a propitiation for the sins of the *whole world*.”—In P. 77. “ That Christ died for us, as *sinners and enemies*.”—In P. 82. says. “ Can you possibly doubt of a gracious pardon from him, who has so loved *the world* as to give his only begotten son to *save it* ?—who would have *all men to be saved*.” Yea above, “ Christ, who appeared to take away *the sins of the world* ;—and whose professed design in coming into it, *was to seek and to save that which was lost* :” And divers other expressions of the same import.

Now what could the Dr. mean by all these expressions, of an *apostate, sinful, guilty lost world*, when he speaks of the world of *mankind*, in the most general and universal terms, as comprehending *the whole world, all men, and every man*, as having lost their *original innocence*, and become *sinners, enemies, guilty and dead* ;—and as needing *pardon, reconciliation, salvation and life* ? And what could he mean by calling Christ the *second Adam* ? And by approving of the parallel which the apostle *Paul* speaks of between the *first and second Adam*, in the fifth chapter to the Romans, where it is said, *By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death hath passed upon all men, for that (or in whom) all have sinned—By the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation : For by one man's disobedience, many were made sinners* ?—What could

could his honoured and judicious hearers think, was his meaning ?—

Can any person believe that the *whole world of mankind* is *sinful, guilty, condemned, lost & dead* (in a legal and moral sense) as needing *pardon, salvation & life* ; and yet at the same time not believe, that the *whole world*, considered in that fallen state, is justly liable to eternal misery ? Or can any believe this to be the condition of the *whole world of mankind* by nature ; and yet exclude all infants, from being any part of the whole world of mankind, that is *sinful, guilty, condemned, lost and dead* ? That the judgment, by the one offence of *Adam*, came on *all men* to condemnation, and yet that it did not come on infants ? Or can any person believe that Christ came to seek and to save them that were *lost* ; and was given to save lost sinners ; and that God is in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, and not a comparatively small part neither, but the whole world, (as the Dr. says) and yet not believe that infants are included *in the whole world*, that Christ is the redeemer and saviour of ? Does the Dr. hold, that Christ did not die for infants ? That no infants are redeemed and saved by Christ ? And does he deny infant-baptism ? For if baptism is a sacramental sign of the washing of regeneration, and of justification or pardon, thro' the sprinkling of the blood of atonement, on our guilty souls, purging them from guilt ; then all that maintain the doctrine of infant-baptism, to be consistent, must believe that infants in their natural state have original sin and guilt, and really need to be "*washed, sanctified and justified in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the spirit of God.*"—But such as deny infants to be sinful and guilty, must deny infant-baptism, or otherwise use it as an insignificant sign ! Yea, such as deny infants to be sinful and guilty, must deny that they

have any part in the redemption and salvation by Christ, for Christ died to save lost, sinful, guilty and ungodly creatures.—But if it be granted, that Christ died for infants, then it must follow, that infants considered in their natural fallen state, are sinful and guilty, and hence justly liable to eternal misery :—“ Because we thus judge, that if one died for all, then were all dead.”

What astonishment must the Dr's judicious and attentive hearers be struck with, after observing so much said about an apostate, sinful, guilty, lost world of mankind ; to hear the Dr. say, “ To suppose that the sin of *Adam* (and *Eve* \*) is, or can be so imputed to infants as to render them justly liable to eternal misery, without any offence of their own, is one of the grossest of all absurdities ?”

But why mayn't they be justly liable by the imputation of sin, without having committed any offence personally ? How could God justly impute our sin to Christ, or lay on him the iniquities of us all, and put him to grief, who had no sin of his own ? How can God justly forgive us thro' the atonement of Christ, and make us heirs of life thro' the righteousness of Christ, who have none of our own, that will do for that purpose, as the Dr. acknowledges, P. 83. “ The greatness of your past sins (says he) will be no objection against your being accepted in Christ, if you come to God by him ; God expects no righteousness in or of you, in order to your being forgiven of him.”—But how can we be forgiven thro' the righteousness of Christ, if that righteousness be not imputed

\* I don't know why the Dr. mentions *Eve* in the case of imputation of sin, except he had a mind to misrepresent the doctrine : For he well knows, that we hold with the *Apostle*, “ that by the offence of *one*, judgment came upon all men to condemnation.” And by “ *one man's* disobedience, many were made sinners.”

ted to us ? And how can we be justly discharged from guilt, and be made heirs of life on account of a righteousness imputed to us, without any personal righteousness of our own ? But if God might justly put Christ to grief, when our sins were laid upon or imputed to him, and if he is just, in justifying such as believe in Jesus Christ, on account of his righteousness imputed to them ; why mayn't the sin of the *first Adam*, who was a figure of Christ, the *second Adam*, in his publick capacity (as the Dr. acknowledges) be so imputed to his posterity, as to make them justly liable to eternal misery, without any offence of their own ? Why mayn't the judgment of God, which by the offence of Adam, came upon all men to condemnation, be a just and righteous judgment ? The Dr. will not say, it was the effect of a sadly depraved judgment in the Almighty !

But that infants have no offence or sin of their own, is what we deny, and the Dr. must too ; or else recant what he has abundantly asserted elsewhere : For if a person's innocence, or inherent righteousness, may be called *his own*, his sinfulness must also be called *his own*. Hence if *mankind* or the *whole world* have lost their *innocence*, and become *sinful, wicked—enemies*, &c. then there is no man in this fallen or apostate world, but has *sinfulness, wickedness, enmity*, &c. which is *his own* : And as all must be concluded under sin, if all are sinful ; it must follow, that “ the whole world is become guilty before God.” And if guilty before God, they must be justly liable to eternal misery, for their own sinfulness, wickedness, enmity, &c.—Hence the Dr. does not state the doctrine right, when he says, “ Without any offence of their own.” However, when the Dr. shall make it to appear, that mankind, even the whole world are sinful in their apostate or fallen estate, and yet infants are not sinful ;

ful ; or that the whole world are sinful, and yet have no sin of their own :—That the whole world are guilty, and yet infants are not guilty.—And that the whole world are both sinful and guilty, and yet not justly liable to eternal misery ; and that judgment is come upon all men to condemnation, by the offence of the *first Adam*, and we are made immortally happy only thro' the atonement and righteousness of the *second Adam*, the Lord from heaven ; and yet the sin of the first *ADAM* is not so imputed to his sinful and guilty posterity, as to make them justly liable to eternal misery : I say, when the Dr. shall make these to appear, or reconcile these together, he may then state the doctrine as he does, and pronounce it the grossest of all absurdities; when he has done it ; yea and pour out his pity too, towards such men “ as are capable of believing such unscriptural and irrational doctrine, as men of a sadly depraved judgment.”

Thus I have, as I proposed, pointed out some of the Dr's inaccuracies & inconsistencies ! If any shall ask, why I have not attempted a more particular defence of the two principles in our system, that I have last been considering, viz. the doctrine of the divine decrees—and of original sin ? It will be enough to say, that there has been nothing offered by the Dr. against them, either from scripture or reason.

And if his hearers or others, shall add, “ But the Dr. declares with the highest assurance, that they are *unscriptural & irrational*—and are supported, neither by scripture nor reason, but are contrary to both !”—I shall only reply, are they so, because the Dr. says, they are so ? Are the Dr's naked assertions, demonstrations with his hearers or any others ? Is it enough to satisfy them, it must be so, because the Dr. says it is so ? This is reason enough with Roman Catholicks in popish countries : But is it so, with such as “ are distinguished

distinguished and favoured of God, in being born and bred in a protestant country, and a reformed part of the christian church ?"—But if the Dr. says, they are supported neither by scripture nor reason, his assertion is not true : For they have been demonstrated to be truths, both from scripture & reason, by " many wise and excellent men." And therefore, for the Dr. without pretending to remove these supports ; or so much as offering one argument, from either scripture or reason, against them ; to pronounce them " unscriptural and irrational." And to add, that " such as are capable of believing such doctrine, are to be pitied as persons of a sadly depraved judgment," is very imperious ! not to say, a making himself ridiculous in the esteem of all men, of sober reason, and serious judgment. \*

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\* According to the Dr's sentence the *Westminster* assembly of Divines " Are to be pitied as persons of a sadly depraved judgment." If it is supposed, they were " capable of believing" the doctrines which they drew up as articles of faith ; who say " The covenant being made with *Adam*, not only for himself, but for his posterity, all mankind descending from him by *ordinary* generation, sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression ;—The sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell, consisteth in the guilt of *Adam's* first sin, the want of original righteousness, and corruption of his whole nature.—The fall bro't upon mankind, the loss of communion with God, his displeasure and curse ; so as we are by nature, children of wrath, bond-slaves to *satan*, and *justly liable* to all punishments in this world, and in that which is to come—*liable* to the pains of hell for ever."—See their larger and shorter catechisms.—They assert the same doctrine in their confession of faith, which was approved of by the synod of *Cambridge* in *New-England* Anno 1648. as also by a general assembly in *Scotland*.

Also, the synod held at the *Savoy* in *London*, and the synod held in *New-England*, Anno 1680. who assert the same doctrine, as may be seen in the *New-England* confession of faith.

Likewise

To conclude, if the Dr. shall think proper to make any reply in vindication of his scheme or system, to what is offered against it in these sheets ; it is justly expected, that he will not debase his noble powers, in raking together, and throwing dirt ;\* but consider foundation-principles : particularly,

Whether Likewise Dr. *Wigglesworth* with all the divines called *Calvanists* who assert "That guilt is an obligation on a person to suffer deserved punishment for sin.—To have the guilt of any sin imputed, is for the person to whom it is imputed to be some way or other *justly* liable to punishment on account of it. And therefore for the guilt of the sin of *Adam* to be imputed to his posterity, is for them to be bound to sustain the penalty of it. *Adam's* sin is become theirs, and that in the full demerit of it, so far as it is a transgression of the law, and a breach of the covenant : And it brings his posterity under the *desert* of the wrath of God, and they are *legally* accounted sinners. Tho' they have not committed sin in their own persons ; yet because their persons were *legally* in him, as the person of the debtor is in the surety, or the person of the prince in the ambassador ; hence it is all put down upon their account as *legally*, as it is upon *Adam's* : They stand forth as delinquents, and are bound to answer for that sin. His act of treason, hath tainted all his blood and posterity derived from him."

Dr. *Wigglesworth's* enq. or imputation of *Adam's* first sin to his posterity.

The late president *Dickinson* of *New-Jersey College*, spake as if he was capable of believing this doctrine, when he said "It is therefore a sad and dreadful truth ; and will certainly be found so in the conclusion, whatever imaginations men may entertain to the contrary, that our *original sin* is in *itself* sufficient to render us eternally miserable, if it be not washed away in the blood of Christ." See his discourse on original sin.

And the late president *Edwards* of *New-Jersey College*, asserts the same doctrine fully, in his book on original sin, and expressly

\* It is left to the Dr. to say, whether he hasn't given grounds for such a caution.

Whether God can be of an infinitely amiable moral character, if he is not essential and absolute moral rectitude ?

Whether God can be essential and absolute moral rectitude, without being essentially and absolutely justice and righteousness in his very nature ? Yea, whether there can be any eternal rule of right, if God is not essentially and absolutely justice and righteousness in his very nature ? Also, whether there can be moral evil, such as is the meritorious cause of punishment, if God is not essentially and absolutely moral rectitude ?—And whether, to exclude divine justice, even such justice to satisfy which, we say, Christ died, and to assert, that punitive justice is only a branch or mode of positive goodness or kindness,—that there is no medium betwixt God's being actually kind & merciful to all, and his being positively cruel & unmerciful to some :—And that the great end God aims at, is the good and happiness of his creatures, and that even in punishing, don't necessarily imply, that God is not essential and absolute moral rectitude—that there is no eternal rule of right in the nature of God, which he has a supreme and invariable regard to—that the only rule of right is the good or happiness of

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expressly mentions infants in P. 284. as being liable to that utter destruction which sin deserves, who could be sinners no other way, than by virtue of *Adam's* transgression, having never in their own persons actually sin'd as Adam did.

N. B. These authorities are not bro't to establish the truth of the doctrine ; but to shew who are, according to the Dr's sentence, “ to be pitied as persons of a sadly depraved judgment.”—Also I desire it may be observed, that it is one thing to assert, that infants by virtue of *Adam's* first sin imputed to them, are justly liable to eternal misery ; and another thing to assert, that such as die in their infancy will be eternally miserable : The latter we don't assert, because we don't know but such were chosen in and redeemed by Christ : There is salvation in Christ and in no other ; whereby we mankind-sinners must be saved.

his creatures—that there is no infinite evil in sin, or that God does not essentially and infinitely hate sin—and that God does not punish sin to shew the infinite perfection of his nature, & how infinitely he hates sin?

Whether, if God be essential, absolute and infinite moral perfection or rectitude, he must not necessarily hate sin with an infinite hatred? Or whether his very nature or essence which is infinite, must not necessarily hate sin?

Whether, if God must necessarily hate sin, he was not under a moral necessity of shewing or manifesting his hatred of sin? Or whether God could have infinite hatred of sin in his nature, and yet look on sin, without shewing or manifesting his infinite hatred of it?

Whether God can shew or manifest his infinite hatred of sin, without inflicting a penalty for sin, and even a penalty, which is either infinite in weight, or eternal in duration?—To forgive sinners without a sacrifice or an atonement intervening, is the same thing as to remit the penalty; therefore, the question is, whether God could manifest his infinite hatred of sin, without executing the penalty? Also, whether a penalty that is not either infinite in weight, or eternal in duration, can manifest God's infinite hatred of sin—that sin is such moral evil as God's very soul, nature or essence hates?

Whether, seeing sinners are finite creatures, and therefore cannot bear a penalty infinite in weight, God can in punishing them manifest his infinite hatred of sin, without punishing them with an everlasting punishment?

As the Dr. says, “Christ proclaims pardon and life to an apostate world, as the free gift of God thro' his mediation; particularly, thro' his atonement to be made by his blood.” And that “God forgives the sins of men thro' Christ's great sacrifice intervening.”

We

We infer as a just consequence of these assertions, considered in connection with the principles, just mentioned above, that Christ suffered such a penalty in our stead, the just for the unjust, as manifested God's infinite hatred of sin, to his infinite satisfaction ; otherwise there could have been no atonement made by his blood ; nor could God consistently with his infinite moral perfection, forgive the sins of men thro' Christ's great sacrifice intervening :—And that Christ must be an infinite person, of infinite dignity.—The Dr. well knows, we assert and maintain, that the same person, who being in the essential form of God, tho't it not robbery to be counted equal with God (the Father) in all divine properties, made himself of no reputation, when he took on him the form of a servant : And that this same infinite person humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross, and bore our sins in his own body on the tree.—And it is, on the infinite dignity of *his* person, who is God by nature, and was made manifest in the flesh, that we apprehend, his satisfactory atonement is grounded.—Now if the Dr. has different apprehensions of the person of Christ, and of the end of his sufferings, it behoves him to shew, how Christ could make atonement by his blood, without suffering the penalty of the law for sinners :—How he could make atonement, without any kind of reference to divine justice to satisfy it, by suffering :—How Christ could make atonement without suffering such a penalty as manifested God's infinite hatred of sin :—And how Christ could suffer such a penalty, if he were not an infinite person.

Moreover, if the moral law is founded on God's infinite moral perfection, and if God judges the evil and demerit of sin, from his estimation of his own infinite moral perfection, and accordingly determined the penalty of sin ; it will become the Dr. with all  
reverence

