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RELIGIOUS COMMUNICATIONS.

THE FIRST EPISTLE OF IGNATIUS.

IGNATIUS, who is also called Theophorus, to the Church which is at Ephesus in Asia deservedly blessed, health in Jesus Christ and in his immaculate grace.

I have learned your character in the Church, that according to the faith and love which is in Christ, ye are followers of God, and stir yourselves up to good works by the efficacy of his blood: and that more especially since ye heard that I had been sent in bonds out of Syria for our common name and hope, expecting to combat with wild beasts at Rome, in order that by martyrdom I may attain to be his disciple, who offered himself a sacrifice for us.

I have learned also how numerous a people ye are, from Onesimus your bishop, whom I entreat you that *after* Christ ye love, and endeavour to conform yourselves to his example. Blessed be he who hath made you worthy of such a pastor! With respect to Burrhus, your deacon, it is my wish that he may continue,* for your honour and that of your bishop. Crocus also, who is a pattern of charity, relieved me in all my wants, and may the father of Jesus Christ relieve him, together with Onesimus, Burrhus, Euplus, and Fronto, through whose services I have been made partaker of the bounty of you all! If I am worthy, may I also be made partaker of your company to eternity!

But it behoves you, brethren, to glorify Christ, who hath glorified you, that in obedience ye be perfect, of the same mind, and speaking the same things, that being subject to the bishop and presbytery, ye many be sanctified in all things. Yet I do not prescribe to you as though I myself were any thing; but since charity suffereth me not to hold my peace, I have taken this occasion of warning you to be subject to the will of God; for even Christ, the *inseparable* life of believers, is the will of God, and in like manner the bishops of his Church, within their several limits, are of the will of Christ.

It is your duty, therefore, to yield obedience to your bishop, which indeed ye do; for if in so short an intercourse I contracted with him an intimate and spiritual friendship, how much happier is your lot, united to him as the Church to Christ, and as Christ to the Father. Let no one deceive himself: if any one be estranged from the altar he is bereft of the bread of life. For if the prayer of one or two be of so much efficacy, how much more that of the Bishop and Church united? He, therefore, who separates himself from the public assemblies, is puffed up with pride, and hath condemned himself.

And the more modest you perceive him to be, the more is he entitled to reverence. For whom the father of the family hath sent to govern his household, him ye are bound to receive as the master who sent him. And, indeed, Onesimus himself commends your decency and good order, declaring that ye all walk according to the truth, and that heresy hath no place among you.

But there are some of other Churches, who use the name of Christ deceitfully, whom ye ought to avoid as wild beasts that bite in secret. The cure of such wounds is not easy: but

* There is at present some ambiguity in the word παραμεινας, from our ignorance of the particular circumstances of the case. It may, and most probably does, mean, "continue in his office."

in introducing it, by that happy regulation which prevails amongst them. And while they pay that deference they profess to their parochial ministers, I cannot apprehend but that they must be very serviceable to the interests of religion, and may contribute very much to revive that true spirit of Christianity which was so much the glory of the primitive times. And I see no reason why men may not meet and consult together, to improve one another in Christian knowledge, and by mutual advice take measures how best to further their own salvation, as well as promote that of their neighbours, when the same liberty is taken for the improvement of trade and for carrying on the pleasures and diversions of life. And as for those objections which are urged against these societies from some canons of the Church (xci. and lxxiii.) they seem to be founded upon a mi-understanding of the sense of those canons, &c."

The opinion maintained on this subject by the author of the work now under review, stands opposed likewise to that of the numerous body of clergy, who in 1800 published a report on the state of religion in a part of the diocese of Lincoln.

Concerning *pamphlets* and *publications*, this author says,

"That these are another powerful engine in the hands of our adversaries, no one can have any doubt that has any knowledge of the history of past times, or any experience of his own."

Here it may be asked, is it not right and expedient for us to counteract these attacks of our adversaries, by using similar means for our defence, (namely, those of pamphlets and publications)?—Yes; it is both right and expedient to do this: and some friends to the Church have exercised their zeal and ability in writing pamphlets, for the purpose of their being dispersed as antidotes to the poison of disaffection, and in vindication of a calumniated Church. And it might be expected, that the members and professed friends of such a Church would have shewn a correspondent zeal, in the circulation of such pamphlets as defended it with truth and Christian moderation. But have they done this?—We are, indeed, ashamed to reply; yet we must not suppress the mortifying confession that they have *not*. They are, for the most part, supine; while their adversaries are alert and diligent: and yet the former wonder and complain, that their adversaries are gaining ground, while themselves are losing it! While of such pamphlets as Dr. Gill's, in praise and recommendation of *schism*, one edition is rapidly disposed of, and a second, (perhaps a third) as rapidly supplied; such sober, wise, and candid defences of the Church, as Mr. Hart's Reply to Dr. Gill lie, for the most part, uncalled for, in the lumber-room of the bookseller, and their authors derive no other gratification (independent of a consciousness of well intentioned exertions) than that of finding, from the balance of their printer's account, that their zeal for the Church has rendered them considerably his debtors.

In reference to this subject, and also to others of equal concern, we deeply sympathize with the writer before us, in lamenting

"That indifference on the part of those who are still in the number of our friends, that want of zeal to strengthen and uphold the Church to which they profess attachment, that lukewarm affection which can behold its danger without concern, that can be uninterested spectators of its decay, that instead of lending a helping hand to prop the falling pile, they are, by their own neglect of its valuable uses and ends, if not by an increasing dissoluteness of manners, no less dangerous than the opposite measures of its enemies, hastening, perhaps, the hour of its fall." (p. 166.)

(To be continued.)

LXXIX. *Natural Theology; or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity, collected from the Appearances of Nature.* By WILLIAM PALEY, D. D. Archdeacon of Carlisle. Faulder, London, 1803.

To those whose minds have been long since firmly established in the belief of the truths, not only of natural but of revealed religion, publications, whose object is limited to the defence or illustration of the former, are apt to appear but of secondary importance; yet even to them, whatever tends to confirm their faith, though confined to points concerning which they are least disposed to doubt, cannot but be interesting, if not immediately productive of the highest advantage. But when it is considered, how large a class of men, in every age, have either questioned the truth of the first principles of religion, or carelessly disregarded

them, it will be manifest, that whoever has attempted, though feebly and unsuccessfully, to convince and satisfy the one, and to awaken the attention of the other, has deserved well of every real friend to the happiness of mankind. Various efforts of this kind were made at the beginning of the last century, when a daring spirit of scepticism and unbelief was very generally prevalent in the world. The labours of Bently and Clarke to demonstrate the being and attributes of God, by the refinements of metaphysical discussion, and those of Boyle, Derham, and others, to establish the same great truths, by arguments drawn from the external frame and operations of the natural world, are still remembered and admired; and at a later period the incomparable "Analogy" of Butler confirmed the fundamental doctrines both of natural and revealed religion, by a train of reasoning, which has hitherto resisted every attempt to weaken or overturn it. Still, however, atheism continues to maintain its ground; and though perpetually defeated, varies and renews its attacks. In our own days, we have witnessed in a neighbouring country, a general and open profession of its principles; and though a favourable change of opinion, in this respect, may have lately taken place, the seeds of doubt and unbelief are widely scattered, and have even obtained but too extensive a reception amongst ourselves. Atheism has of late years been chiefly supported by considerations drawn from the mechanical structure of the whole natural world, and, particularly, of the human frame. It is, therefore, with peculiar satisfaction, that we enter upon the review of so able and interesting a work as that of the "Natural Theology" of Dr. Paley, in which, while there are some things liable to just objection, the same powers of acuteness, perspicuity, and masterly illustration, which characterize the former productions of that author, are successfully applied to the confutation of the prevailing atheism of the present day, and to the establishment of the existence and attributes of the Supreme Being.

The particular object, and the general plan, of this important work, will be most advantageously perceived by the following extracts from the first chapter, which contains the "State of the Argument."

"In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a *stone*, and were asked how the stone came to be there, I might possibly answer, that, for any thing I knew to the contrary, it had lain there for ever: nor would it perhaps be very easy to shew the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had found a *watch* upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place, I should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that, for any thing I knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch, as well as for the stone? Why is it not as admissible in the second case, as in the first? For this reason, and for no other, viz. that, when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we could not discover in the stone) that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose, e. g. that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day; that, if the several parts had been differently shaped from what they are, of a different size from what they are, or placed after any other manner, or in any other order than that in which they are placed, either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none which would have answered the use, that is now served by it.

"This mechanism being observed, the inference, we think, is inevitable; that the watch must have had a maker; that there must have existed, at some time and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer; who comprehended its construction, and designed its use." (p. 1—4.)

The force of this conclusion, Dr. Paley very ably argues, would not be weakened by our never having seen a watch made, or known an artist capable of making one; or by our incapacity to execute such a piece of mechanism ourselves, or even to understand how it was performed; neither would it be invalidated by the watch sometimes going wrong or seldom going exactly right, (perfection not being necessary to prove contrivance;) nor yet by our ignorance of the manner in which the different parts of the machine conducted to the general effect. Still less, as he satisfactorily proves, would it account for the existence of the watch, on the supposition of the absence of design, to be told, in the language of modern atheists, that the watch was merely one out of many

possible combinations of material forms; or that it owed its present form and structure to a principle of order, (for what idea can be formed of "a principle of order distinct from the intelligence of the watchmaker;") or that the mechanism of the watch was no proof of contrivance, only a motive to induce the mind to think so; or that it was "nothing more than the result of the laws of *metallic* nature," (an expression quite as justifiable as the jargon so frequently heard respecting "the law of vegetable nature," "the law of animal nature," or even "the law of nature, when intended to exclude the ideas of agency and power in the production of natural phenomena.") Neither, as he shews in the last place, would it draw the observer of the watch from his conclusion to say, that he knew nothing at all of the matter. "He knows enough for his argument. He knows the utility of the end. He knows the subserviency and adaptation of the means to the end. His ignorance of other points, his doubts concerning other points, affect not the certainty of his reasoning. The consciousness of knowing little, need not beget a distrust of that which he does know." (p. 4—8.)

In the second chapter, which contains "the State of the Argument continued," a supposition is made respecting the mechanism of the watch, for the purpose of exposing the absurdity of that system of atheism, which would preclude the necessity of a supreme intelligent and designing mind, by referring all appearances of order and design to natural organization. Suppose the person who found the watch to have unexpectedly discovered, that, in addition to its other properties, it contained within it a mechanism evidently calculated to produce in the course of its movements another watch; "what effect," he asks, "ought such a discovery to have upon his former conclusion?"

"The first effect," he answers, "would be to increase his admiration of the contrivance, and his conviction of the consummate skill of the contriver." (p. 9.)

"He would reflect also, that though the watch before him were, in *some sense*, the maker of the watch, which was fabricated in the course of its movements, yet it was in a very different sense from that in which a carpenter, for instance, is the maker of a chair; the author of its contrivance, the cause of the relation of its parts to their use." (p. 10.)

"Therefore, though it be now no longer probable, that the individual watch which our observer had found, was made immediately by the hand of an artificer, yet doth not this alteration in any wise affect the inference, that an artificer had been originally employed and concerned in the production. The argument from design remains as it was." (p. 11.)

"Nor is any thing gained by supposing the watch before us to have been produced from another watch, that from a former, and so on indefinitely. Contrivance is still unaccounted for. We still want a contriver. A designing mind is neither supplied by this supposition, nor dispensed with." (p. 18.)

"The conclusion which the *first* examination of the watch, of its works, construction, and movement suggested, was, that it must have had, for the cause and author of that construction, an artificer, who understood its mechanism, and designed its use. This conclusion is invincible. A *second* examination presents us with a new discovery. The watch is found, in the course of its movements, to produce another watch, similar to itself: and not only so, but we perceive in it a system of organization, separately calculated for that purpose. What effect would this discovery have, or ought it to have, upon our former inference? What, as hath already been said, but to increase, beyond measure, our admiration of the skill, which had been employed in the formation of such a machine? Or shall it, instead of this, all at once turn us round to an opposite conclusion, viz. that no art or skill whatever has been concerned in the business, although all other evidences of art and skill remain as they were, and this last and supreme piece of art be now added to the rest? Can this be maintained without absurdity? Yet this is atheism." (p. 18.)

This third chapter opens with "the application" of the preceding argument.

"This," continues the learned author, "is atheism: for every indication of contrivance, every manifestation of design, which existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature; with the difference, on the side of nature, of being greater and more, and that in a degree which exceeds all computation. I mean that the contrivances of nature surpass the contrivances of art, in the complexity, subtlety, and curiosity of the mechanism; and still more, if possible, do they go beyond them in number and variety." (p. 19.)

Dr. Paley immediately proceeds to exemplify and illustrate the truth of this assertion; and as the instance which he has selected for this purpose is particularly interesting, as well as decisive of the point in question, and affords, at the same time, a very pleasing specimen of

the author's manner, we presume that the following extracts from this chapter will prove highly gratifying to our readers.

"I know no better method of introducing so large a subject, than that of comparing a single thing with a single thing; an eye, for example with a telescope. As far as the examination of the instrument goes, there is precisely the same proof that the eye was made for vision, as there is that the telescope was made for assisting it." (p. 19, 20.)

"To some it may appear a difference sufficient to destroy all similitude between the eye and the telescope, that the one is a perceiving organ, the other an unperceiving instrument. The fact is, that they are both instruments." (p. 20.)

"The end is the same; the means are the same. The purpose in both is alike; the contrivance for accomplishing that purpose is in both alike. The lenses of the telescope, and the humours of the eye bear a complete resemblance to one another, in their figure, their position, and in their power over the rays of light, viz. in bringing each pencil to a point at the right distance from the lens, namely, in the eye, at the exact place where the membrane is spread to receive it. How is it possible, under circumstances of such close affinity, and under the operation of equal evidence, to exclude contrivance from the one; yet to acknowledge the proof of contrivance having been employed, as the plainest and clearest of all propositions, in the other?

"The resemblance between the two cases is still more accurate, and obtains in more points than we have yet represented, or than we are, on the first view of the subject, aware of. In dioptric telescopes there is an imperfection of this nature Pencils of light, in passing through glass lenses, are separated into different colours, thereby tinging the object, especially the edges of it; as if it were viewed through a prism. To correct this inconvenience had been long a desideratum in the art. At last it came into the mind of a sagacious optician, to inquire how this matter was managed in the eye: in which there was exactly the same difficulty to contend with, as in the telescope. His observation taught him, that, in the eye, the evil was cured by combining together lenses composed of different substances, i. e. of substances which possessed different refracting powers. Our artist borrowed from thence his hint; and produced a correction of the defect by imitating, in glasses made from different materials, the effects of the different humours through which the rays of light pass before they reach the bottom of the eye. Could this be in the eye without purpose, which suggested to the optician the only effectual means of attaining that purpose?" (p. 22—24.)

One instance, amongst others, which proves the superiority of the eye over the telescope, rather than points out any strict resemblance between the two, is thus described. It relates to the exquisite contrivance by which the great author of nature has provided for the vast diversity of distance, at which objects are viewed by the naked eye.

"Can any thing," he justly argues, "be more decisive of contrivance than this is? The most secret laws of optics must have been known to the author of a structure endowed with such a capacity of change." (p. 29.)

The adaptation of the visual faculty to the circumstances and necessities of different species of animals, is next taken notice of and exemplified. We select the following observation respecting the eel.

"In the *eel*, which has to work its head through sand and gravel, the roughest and harshest substances, there is placed before the eye, and at some distance from it, a transparent, horny, convex case or covering, which, without obstructing the sight, defends the organ. To such an animal, could any thing be more wanted, or more useful?" (p. 33.)

After having paid a just tribute of admiration to the wonderful mechanism, by which a landscape of five or six square leagues is compressed into a space of half an inch diameter, Dr. Paley proceeds to notice the extraordinary care which is manifested for the preservation of the eye. The following extract affords a curious illustration of this point.

"In order to keep the eye moist and clean, which qualities are necessary to its brightness and its use, a wash is constantly supplied by a secretion for the purpose; and the superfluous brine is conveyed to the nose through a perforation in the bone as large as a goose quill. When once the fluid has entered the nose, it spreads itself upon the inside of the nostril, and is evaporated by the current of warm air, which, in the course of respiration, is continually passing over it. Can any pipe or outlet for carrying off the waste liquor from a dye-house or a distillery, be more mechanical than this is? It is easily perceived that the eye must want moisture; but could the want of the eye generate the gland which produces the tear, or bore the hole by which it is discharged—a hole through a bone?" (p. 36, 37.)

This part of the subject is closed by a minute account of what has been deservedly called, the marvellous mechanism of the *nictitating membrane*, found in the eyes of birds, and of many

quadrupeds, the use of which is to spread over the eye the lachrymal humour, and to defend it from sudden injuries.

Dr. Paley then states a doubt, which, he supposes, may have arisen in the mind of the reader during the perusal of his preceding observations.

"Why should not the deity have given to the animal the faculty of vision at once? Why this circuitous perception; the ministry of so many means? Why resort to contrivance where power is omnipotent? Contrivance, by its very definition and nature, is the refuge of imperfection. To have recourse to expedients implies difficulty, impediment, defect of power?"

"The question," Dr. Paley observes, "is of very wide extent, and, amongst other answers which may be given to it, beside reasons of which probably we are ignorant, one answer is this. It is only by the display of contrivance, that the existence, the agency, the wisdom of the Deity, *could* be testified to his rational creatures. This is the scale by which we ascend to all the knowledge of our Creator which we possess, so far as it depends upon the phenomena, or the works of nature. Take away this, and you take away from us every subject of observation, and ground of reasoning; I mean as our rational faculties are formed at present. Whatever is done, God could have done, without the intervention of instruments or means: but it is in the construction of instruments, in the choice and adaptation of means, that a creative intelligence is seen. It is this which constitutes the order and beauty of the universe. God, therefore, has been pleased to prescribe limits to his own power, and to work his ends within those limits. The general laws of matter have perhaps the nature of these limits." (p. 42, 43.)

With this reply, we are very far from being satisfied. We admit, that the display of contrivance affords satisfactory proof of the *existence, agency, and wisdom* of a supreme designer; but when Dr. Paley asserts, that in no other way *could* that truth be testified to us, we conceive that he hazards an assertion which is both untenable and unsafe. Was it, may we not ask, by the display of contrivance, that the existence, agency, and wisdom of the Deity were testified to our first parents? Cannot the Deity make himself known to man by direct communication? Has he not done so? And is not the knowledge of the existence, agency, and wisdom of the Deity, which we derive from revelation, perfectly satisfactory? It ought to be recollected, that while those men of science in ancient times, who were most deeply acquainted with the phenomena of nature, *did not like to retain God in their knowledge*, those only were acquainted with his existence, agency, and wisdom, who had received their knowledge of these truths immediately from God himself, and who perhaps were very inattentive observers of the wonders of creation. We are the more suspicious of the sentiment to which we now object, because we recollect that it was made the ground of the theological system of Thomas Paine; and to us its evident tendency appears to be, to promote the object which that arch infidel had in view, in writing his *Age of Reason*. But is it at all necessary to resort to so questionable an argument, in order to remove the difficulty which Dr. Paley has raised? We think not. It is admitted, that the existence, the agency, and the wisdom of the Deity, are satisfactorily proved by the display of contrivance: but then this very contrivance, it is supposed, furnishes an argument for the imperfection of the Deity. If this be a fair inference, we apprehend it is to be met on very different and far stronger grounds than Dr. Paley has chosen. It is to be fairly and satisfactorily obviated by a demonstration of the absurdity of supposing, that a supreme intelligence, the first cause of all things, himself self-existent, should not also be a perfect being, that is, infinite in his attributes of power and wisdom.

After proving, in the fourth chapter, that the succession of plants and animals no more accounts for the marks of contrivance and design, which are exhibited in the structure of both, than the production of a watch by the motion and mechanism of another watch, would account for the skill and intention evidenced in the watch so produced, Dr. Paley, in the fifth chapter, proceeds to consider, at some length, the various modes of reasoning adopted by Atheists, for the purpose of avoiding the force of his conclusion, which

he had already briefly touched upon in his first chapter.

We should have been glad, had our limits permitted us, to transcribe largely from this interesting chapter, but we must content ourselves with giving a very general view of its contents, referring our readers to the book itself for the particulars of those arguments by which Dr. Paley completely refutes the cavils of atheism. The attempt to account for the plain appearances of design in the works of nature, in the eye for instance, by attributing them to *chance*, is here happily exposed. Indeed the reasoning by which such an attempt is usually supported, is, as Dr. Paley observes, "too absurd to be made more so by any argumentation." The same may be said of all the hypotheses by which men labour to exclude the agency of a supreme intelligence from any share in the production of the works of nature, and which require only to be fairly and perspicuously stated, as they are in this chapter, in order to produce an instant conviction of their gross absurdity. Some, for instance, would persuade us to believe, that the organized bodies which we see, "are only so many out of the possible varieties and combinations of being, which the lapse of infinite ages has brought into existence; that the present world is the relict of that variety; millions of other bodily forms and other species having perished, being, by the defect of their constitution, incapable of preservation, or of continuance by generation;" a conjecture so extravagant, that one wonders it should ever have been made. Others refer every thing to *a principle of order* in nature, a word which can have no meaning except on the supposition of an intelligent creator adapting the means to the end. While a third class endeavour to evade the force of the arguments which prove design and a designing Creator, by affirming, "that the parts were not intended for the use, but that the use arose out of the parts." It is almost unnecessary to observe, that Dr. Paley has satisfactorily shewn, that none of these suppositions have even the shadow of a foundation.

After mentioning some other instances of weak and fallacious reasoning on the parts of Atheists, he proceeds in the sixth chapter to shew, that the argument he employs is cumulative.

"The proof is not a conclusion, which lies at the end of a chain of reasoning, of which chain each instance of contrivance is only a link, and of which, if one link fail, the whole falls; but it is an argument separately supplied by every separate example. An error in stating an example affects only that example. The argument is cumulative in the fullest sense of that term. The eye proves it without the ear; the ear without the eye. The proof in each example is complete; for when the design of the part, and the conduciveness of its structure to that design, is shewn, the mind may set itself at rest; no future consideration can detract any thing from the force of the example." (p. 83.)

(To be continued.)

LXXX. *Leslie's Short and easy Method with the Deists; wherein the Certainty of the Christian Religion is established by Four infallible marks. (In a Letter to a Friend.) To which are subjoined Four additional Marks from the same Author's subsequent Tract, entitled "The Truth of Christianity demonstrated." Compressed by* FRANCIS WRANGHAM, M. A. Wilson and Spence, York. Mawman, London.

It is not left for the theological critic of the present day, to determine the merits of Leslie. Some of the wisest and best of Christian scholars, long ago awarded him the tribute of exalted veneration and esteem, for having supported the credibility of the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, by arguments intelligible to all, and irrefragable by any; and for having therein advanced moral certainty to the verge of absolute demonstration.

The productions of such a writer deserve not to be buried in the mass of forgotten divinity, which slumbers in our antiquated libraries, or serves "to make up a shew" (and a mortifying shew it is) on our second-hand bookstalls. Since infidelity is continually reviving, and, though repeatedly laid prostrate by the weapons of truth, still rises, with unexhausted vigour, to the combat; the champion of Christianity will do well neither to disdain nor neglect such arms as Leslie has prepared for him; of which time has not

injured the temper, nor use taken off the edge.

The title page of the publication before us shews what Mr. Wrangham has done. It remains for us to add, that it is *well* done. In compressing the original work, he has judiciously rejected what could best be spared; omitted parenthetical and other clauses, not essential to the argument; and abbreviated the phraseology, without diminishing its perspicuity: so that, while he may say of his attempt, *brevis esse laboro*, he has no reason to complete the quotation, with reference to the result of his endeavours.

We very earnestly recommend to such of our readers as may have any acquaintance or intercourse with any one who disbelieves or doubts the truth of revelation, to put this pamphlet into his hands, with a solemn solicitation that he will read it. Short as Leslie's work is, in its original state, it is here rendered still shorter; so that it will not over-tax even the indolence and indifference of the maturest Sceptic to give it a serious perusal. In whatever instance our recommendation is pursued, we fervently wish, that the divine blessing may attend it.

LXXXI. *The unrivalled Felicity of the British Empire; a Sermon preached at Salters'-Hall, November 7, 1802, at the Commemoration of our great National Deliverance annually observed in that place.* By JAMES STEVEN, Minister of the Scotch Church, Crown-court, and one of the Lecturers at Salters'-Hall. Published at the Request of some of the Author's Friends. London, Ogle. 1802. Price 1s.

WE very gladly bear our testimony to the piety and loyalty of this discourse: the object of it is "to survey *the natural advantages, the civil liberties, the religious privileges*, and *the providential interpositions*, which have been enjoyed by our country, and have long crowned it with unrivalled felicity."—The text is Deut. xxxiii. 29.

In the progress of his sermon, the author successfully combats the mischievous attempt made by infidels and revolutionizing metaphysicians, to discredit *patriotism*, and degrade it from the rank of virtues.

"If by patriotism we were taught to think that others have no right to exist but ourselves, or to participate with us in those comforts which God has dispensed for the good of all; if by it we were taught to consider others as our natural enemies, merely because they happen to be separated from us by a channel, or a river, or because the sun has jetted their complexion; in this case, we should join in reprobating a principle so contracted in itself and so detrimental to the interests of religion and humanity. But if patriotism means (as it unquestionably means) a peculiar attachment to the land which gave us birth, and a warm predilection for its interests and prosperity; such a patriotic spirit we consider as highly honourable and defensible:—It is the suggestion of nature, the dictate of wisdom, the voice of God. While we plead for universal benevolence, and for the most enlarged philanthrophy, as well as they, we conceive it to be quite consistent, to maintain that our hearts must vibrate in nicer sympathies, and glow with warmer charities towards our fellow-countrymen, who are links in the chain that are nearest to us, and to whom consequently we must feel ourselves most closely united. It were easy to prove that revelation, as well as reason, sanctions the idea. The text proceeds upon it; for Moses exclaims with feelings of which the men who censure patriotism seem to be incapable, "Happy art thou, O Israel; who is like unto thee!"—(p. 8, 9.)

We shall make one more extract from this discourse. After descanting, with becoming exultation, on the blessings derived to us from our civil constitution, Mr. Steven adds,

"It were easy, by way of contrast, to paint the civil and social state of other countries, to impress us with the superior advantages of our own: but I forbear—If the picture were justly drawn, and fairly exhibited, the heart would sicken, and the eye turn away with disgust. In some parts of Europe, the name of Liberty is hardly known, far less the blessing enjoyed. In others, after running a long revolutionary career, under pretence of rearing a fair and well-proportioned fabric of freedom, we see its first principles perverted, the boasted structure deranged, and converted into a mis-shapen and monstrous pile of ambition, venality, and despotism! If we look across the channel, nothing shall we see to envy or to emulate; much to inspire contentment at home, and to excite devout gratitude to the Almighty Ruler of the world, "who hath done great things for us whereof we are glad." (p. 16, 17.)

LXXXII. *The Infidel and Christian Philosophers; or the last Hours of Voltaire and Addison contrasted: a Poem.* Kingston-upon-