

FRASER'S MAGAZINE

FOR

TOWN AND COUNTRY.

No. LXX.

OCTOBER, 1835.

VOL. XII.

LORD BROUGHAM ON NATURAL THEOLOGY.

IF, either to the noble author himself, or to any portion of his readers, we shall seem to have exercised undue delay in noticing Lord Brougham's first essay as a theologian, we beg to assure both parties that, as our silence has not been occasioned by any lack of reverence for the subject on which he has judged it expedient to enter, so neither has it arisen from the slightest difficulty on our parts to determine how far he has or has not proved himself qualified to deal with it in a becoming spirit. We are at least as much convinced as Lord Brougham, that, *with one solitary exception*, "Natural Theology stands far above all other sciences, from the sublime and elevating nature of its objects." We believe, likewise, with not less sincerity, that, *when rightly handled*, "Natural Theology is most serviceable to the support of revelation." But of the kind of support which, in Lord Brougham's hands, it is likely to give to the cause of revealed truth, we are free to confess that our opinion is not very exalted. Why should this be? Whence does it arise that, writing professedly in the best spirit, and taking care from time to time to pen some sentences expressive of unbounded reverence for the Bible, Lord Brougham should yet contrive to place Natural Theology in such a point of view as that it shall seem at least to supersede, or do away with, all necessity for direct revelation from God to man? We should be very sorry to accuse this

eccentric nobleman of any positive design against Christianity itself. His own creed may be a short one—we rather suspect that it is—but we give him credit for better intentions than would be implied in the wish to unsettle the faith of the million. Yet, if no such design have actuated him, then are we forced to acknowledge, that his *Treatise of Natural Theology* furnishes one more illustration of that peculiar derangement of mind, that total absence of judgment, and discretion, and common sense, which leads Lord Brougham, even when meaning well, to rush continually into error; and which, as a necessary consequence, renders him quite unfit to play a great or a commanding part as a statesman, as a lawyer, as a moralist, and, above all, as a divine. Such a man is never to be depended upon. The impulse of the moment is and must be, with him, the guiding principle of action: and there are at least as many chances that he will mar any project with which he is unfortunately connected, as that he will employ his undeniably brilliant talents to bring it to a fortunate issue.

If we were not thoroughly convinced that Lord Brougham is the vainest of living men, and therefore not willing, by taking him as a model, to place even Lord Bacon above himself, we should be apt to imagine that he had compiled his discourse in humble imitation of the greatest of all his predecessors on the woolsack. Lord

Bacon, while in the zenith of his power, composed the *Novum Organum*; Lord Brougham, as he takes care to inform us in his Preface, held the great seal when the *Discourse on Natural Theology* was begun. The design of Lord Bacon was to introduce a new system of ratiocination into the world, while he exposed the defects of that to which the learned had so long trusted. Lord Brougham wishes to place a still loftier science on its right basis, taking care to explain wherever he conceives that his predecessors in the same field of study have signally failed. Lord Bacon began his treatise by demonstrating that the mode of reasoning pursued in the schools, however effective in concealing error, could never lead to the discovery of truths not already known. Precisely similar are Lord Brougham's objections to the mode of inquiry heretofore pursued, in reference to the science of which he stands forward as the advocate. To be sure, Lord Bacon neither had nor pretended to have any associate or coadjutor in his mighty undertaking. His were not the days of Societies for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, nor, indeed, for the furtherance of any other object, except such as the order of domestic life is unable to accomplish. Lord Bacon did not, therefore, dedicate his treatise to a fellow-labourer in the vineyard; lamenting at the same time that another, still more esteemed and respected, should have been cut off by a premature death from receiving the compliment. But this latter discrepancy is, after all, the mere child of accident. The manners of the sixteenth and of the nineteenth centuries were, in many respects, very different, though the minds of Bacon and Brougham appear to be—at least, in the estimation of the latter—wonderfully akin.

It is very possible, however, that in forming this theory we have done Lord Brougham injustice. Perhaps he never really conceived the idea of rivalling Lord Bacon; perhaps his present attempt originates in nothing more than that strange, we had almost said that preternatural activity, which seems to pervade his individual mind at all seasons, rendering it incapable either of positive rest or of strong and continuous application to any single subject; or, perhaps, his lordship may have written because he was inspired

with a sincere desire to promote, to the utmost of his ability, the cause of truth, and in so doing, to benefit his fellow-creatures. Charity, or, to use a less equivocal term, candour, induces us to conclude that the last is the true origin of the *Discourse*. The questions, therefore, arise,—Has Lord Brougham succeeded in his design? Is the *Discourse* an improvement on the justly popular and approved work for which it is intended as a preface? Does it throw new light upon the subject of that work—not such light as shall dazzle and astonish, but which, supplying certain omissions into which Paley may have fallen, shall render clear and distinct the whole chain of inferences which guide the inquiring mind from Nature to Nature's God? Such, his lordship assures us, is the object of his treatise. "The composition of this discourse was undertaken in consequence of an observation which I had often made, that scientific men were apt to regard the study of natural religion as little connected with philosophical pursuits. Many of the persons to whom I allude were men of religious habits of thinking; others were free from any disposition towards scepticism, rather because they had not much discussed the subject, than because they had formed fixed opinions upon it after inquiry. But the bulk of them relied little upon natural theology, which they seemed to regard as a speculation built rather on fancy than on argument; or, at any rate, as a kind of knowledge quite different from either physical or moral science. It therefore appeared to me desirable to define, more precisely than had yet been done, the place and the claims of natural theology among the various branches of human knowledge." A noble design this, beyond all question; worthy of the genius and the learning of even a greater than Lord Brougham! Has it been accomplished? We shall be best able to come to a satisfactory conclusion on that head, by examining the process of argumentation which the learned reasoner has judged it expedient to pursue.

Lord Brougham, having determined, as he himself informs us, to render his work strictly "a logical one," sets out, in his introductory chapter, with giving to certain terms, of which he proposes to make use, a distinct definition. Holding that neither Paley, nor

Butler, nor Clarke, nor Priestley, nor Denham, have paid sufficient attention to this important matter, he begins his treatise by explaining that natural theology is not to be confounded with natural religion; theology being the science, and religion its subject. "This discourse," he continues, "is not a treatise of natural theology; it has not for its design an exposition of the doctrines whereof natural theology consists. But its object is first to explain the nature of the evidence upon which it rests—to shew that it is a science, the truths of which are discovered by induction, like the truths of natural and moral philosophy; that it is a branch of science partaking of each of those great divisions of human knowledge, and not merely closely allied to them both. Secondly, the object of the discourse is to explain the advantages attending this study." We having nothing to object to the noble author's distinctions, nor yet to the apparent paradox which is involved in the enunciation, that "*A Discourse of Natural Theology*" is not "*A Treatise of Natural Theology*," As little are we inclined to quarrel with him on account of the interpretation which he has chosen to affix to the terms *physical, psychological, ethical, ontology, deontology, &c.* Most men, indeed, would have been apt, in a treatise professedly popular, to avoid making use of words, to deal with which can hardly fail of giving double toil to the unlearned reader. But that is a mere matter of taste; and Lord Brougham's may, after all, be more correct than ours. At all events it is certain, that "in such discussions it is far more important to employ one uniform and previously explained language or arrangement, than to be very curious in adopting the best."

We take, then, Lord Brougham's definitions as he has given them; and, proceeding to examine his analysis, we find that he thus sets out "the order of the discourse." It is divided into two parts, of which the first treats of the nature of the subject, and the kind of evidence on which natural theology rests; the second, of the advantages derived from the study of the science. These two parts again are subdivided, the former into seven, the latter into three sections. We do not undertake, for our space will not permit it, to go through the whole of these

sections at length; but it shall be our business to state with candour the leading principles which the noble author seeks to establish in each—to give to him the poor tribute of our approval where we believe that he is right—to deal fairly by his arguments—and to controvert them wherever we feel that he is wrong.

Concerning the first section of the first part we have very little to say, either in praise or dispraise. It contains an introductory view of the method of investigation pursued in the physical and psychological sciences; by his mode of conducting which, Lord Brougham aims at establishing the position, that "the evidence on which our assent to both" classes of truths (namely, human and divine) is obtained is of the same kind; in other words, "that the inferences are drawn by reasoning from sensations or ideas, originally presented by the external senses, or by our inward consciousness." Now, if (in what we must be permitted to describe as a laboured and not very intelligible collection of aphorisms) it be Lord Brougham's intention to demonstrate, that whatever may be the subject of our investigation, whether things of the earth or things above the earth, whether matter or mind, we can attain to a knowledge of the truth only by the exercise of right reason, we perfectly agree with him; but if, as we suspect to be the case, he would have us believe that the process of reasoning is in all cases one and the same, then we are entirely at issue. In dealing with physical phenomena we have universal experience to fall back upon; in dealing with the phenomena of mind we can appeal only to individual experience, and not always to that. Moreover, when we go further, and attempt to institute a comparison between the processes, for example, by which we arrive at our belief in the doctrines of gravitation, and of the reality of a future state of rewards and punishments, how striking is the contrast between them! The former rests upon the sure ground of demonstration; the latter, as we shall take occasion by and by to shew, depends entirely on the weight which we may be willing to give to direct assertion. Yet to inquire into the one is a department of human science—to speculate concerning the other belongs to Divine science. We confess, therefore, that we cannot pass

any sentence upon Lord Brougham's opening section; because, to be honest, we neither understand its purport ourselves, nor do we believe that it is understood by the author. But the case is different with respect to Section II. That, containing a comparison between the physical branch of natural theology and physics, is, on the whole, excellent. The noble author, abandoning as it were his own position, is content to shew that "the two inquiries—that into the nature and constitution of the universe, and that into the evidence of design which it displays—in a word, physics and physiology, philosophy, whether natural or mental, and the fundamental branch of natural theology, are not only closely allied one to the other, but are, to a *very considerable extent*, identical." And he proves his case in a manner of which it is no slight praise to say, that Paley himself could not have done it better. We know that Lord Brougham will despise us for thus bringing him down to the level of Paley. But, after all, both writers follow precisely the same line of argument; and if the illustrations made use of by the one be here and there more striking than those employed by the other, it must be borne in mind that many branches of physical science, which were in Paley's days little prosecuted, have in ours been carried almost to their utmost limits.

We come now to Section III., which bears the following title: "Comparison of the Psychological Branch of Natural Theology with Psychology." A comparison, on his mode of dealing with which it is very evident that Lord Brougham intends his fame as a master in dialectics to depend. "Hitherto," says he, "our argument has rested upon a comparison of the truths of natural theology with those of physical science. But the evidences of design presented by the universe are not merely those which the material world affords; the intellectual system is equally fruitful in proofs of an intelligent cause, *although these have occupied little of the philosopher's attention, and may, indeed, be said never to have found a place among the speculations of the natural theologian.*" Nothing is more remarkable than the care with which all the writers upon this subject—at least, among the moderns—have confined themselves to the proofs afforded

by the visible and sensible works of nature, while the evidence furnished by the mind and its operations has been wholly neglected." Accordingly Ray, Denham, Paley, &c., are all censured, because, viewing the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, the structure of animals, the organisation of plants, and the various operations of the material world, as indicating the existence of design, and leading to a knowledge of the Creator, they yet "pass over in silence, unaccountably enough, by far the most singular work of Divine wisdom and power—the mind itself." "Is there any reason whatever to draw this line?" demands the ex-chancellor; "to narrow within these circles the field of natural theology? to draw from the constitution and habits of matter alone the proof that one Intelligent Cause formed and supports the universe? Ought we not rather to consider the phenomena of mind as more peculiarly adapted to help this inquiry, and as bearing a nearer relation to the Great Intelligence which created and which maintains the system?"

The answer which the noble writer gives to his own queries is so perfectly characteristic of the man, and involves so completely the question at issue between his lordship and ourselves, that we must be permitted to give it at length. It is this:

"There cannot be a doubt that this extraordinary omission had its origin in the doubts which men are prone to entertain of the mind's existence independent of matter. The eminent persons above named were not materialists; that is to say, if you had asked them the question they would have answered in the negative: they would have gone further, and asserted their belief in the separate existence of the soul, independent of the body. But they never felt this so strongly as they were persuaded of the natural world's existence; their habits of thinking led them to consider matter as the only certain existence—as that which composed the universe—as furnishing the only materials for our inquiries, whether respecting structure, or habits and operations. They had no firm, definite, abiding, precise idea, of any other existence, respecting which they could reason and speculate. They saw and they felt external objects; they could examine the lenses of the eye, the valves of the veins and arteries, the ligaments and the sockets of the joints, the bones and the drum of the ear; but, though they now and then made

mention of the mind, and, when forced to the point, would acknowledge a belief in it, they never were fully and intimately persuaded of its separate existence. They thought of it and of matter very differently; they gave *its* structure, and *its* habits, and *its* operations, no place in their inquiries; their contemplations never rested upon it with any steadiness, and, indeed, scarcely ever even glanced upon it at all. That this is a very great omission, proceeding, if not upon mere carelessness, upon a grievous fallacy, there can be no doubt whatever.

"The evidence for the existence of mind is to the full as complete as that upon which we believe in the existence of matter. Indeed it is more certain, and more irrefragable. The consciousness of existence, the perpetual sense that we are thinking, and that we are performing the operation quite independently of all material objects, proves to us the existence of a being different from our bodies, with a degree of evidence higher than any we can have for the existence of those bodies themselves, or of any other part of the material world. Some inferences which we draw respecting them are confounded with direct perception; for example, the idea of motion: other ideas, as those of hardness and solidity, are equally the result of reasoning, and often mislead. Thus we never doubt, on the testimony of our senses, that the parts of matter touch—that different bodies come in contact with one another, and with our organs of sense; and yet nothing is more certain than that there still is some small distance between the bodies which we think we perceive to touch. Indeed it is barely possible, that all the sensations and perceptions which we have of the material world may be only ideas in our own minds; it is barely possible, therefore, that matter should have no existence. But that *mind*, that the sentient principle, that the thing or the being which we call *I* and *we*, and which thinks, feels, reasons, should have no existence, is a contradiction in terms."

Had Lord Brougham stopped short here, or gone no further than to shew, that in the intellectual world there are at least as many proofs of design as in the physical world, we do not know that we should have experienced any reluctance to receive his doctrine as sound. Our own conviction is (though we should be puzzled to state the precise grounds on which we rest it), that mind is something totally distinct from body; that it is not a quality attendant on organisation, but a separate

entity; albeit, in our own individual case, and in the cases of the other living creatures with which we come in contact, mysteriously united with body. We are not therefore disposed to quarrel with his lordship's division of the universe into two worlds, far less to deny that the structure of the intellectual is even more wonderful, because indicative of more wisdom in the great Creator, than that of the physical world. But Lord Brougham does not stop short here. In his fifth section he boldly asserts, that "the immateriality of the soul is the foundation of all the doctrines relating to its future state;" and then, a little further down, reasons as follows:

"Our idea of annihilation is wholly derived from matter; and what we are wont to call destruction means only change of form and resolution into parts, or combination into new forms. But for the example of the changes undergone by matter, we should not even have any notion of destruction or annihilation. When we come to consider the thing itself, we cannot conceive it possible; we can well imagine a parcel of gunpowder, or any other combustible substance, ceasing to exist as such, by burning or exploding; but that its whole elements should not continue to exist in a different state, and in new combinations, appears inconceivable. We cannot follow the process so far; *we can form no conception of any one particle that once is ceasing to be*. How, then, can we form any conception of the mind, which we now know to exist, ceasing to be? It is an idea altogether above our comprehension. True, we no longer, after the body is dissolved, perceive the mind, because we never knew it by the senses; we only were aware of its existence in others by its effects upon matter, and had no experience of it unconnected with the body. But it by no means follows that it should not exist, merely because we have ceased to perceive its effects upon any portion of matter. It had connexion with the matter which it used to act upon, and by which it used to be acted on; when its entire severance took place that matter underwent a change, but a change arising from its being of a composite nature. The same separation cannot have effected the mind in the like manner, because its nature is simple and not composite. Our ceasing to perceive any effects produced on it by any portion of matter, the only means we can have of ascertaining its existence, is, therefore, no proof that it does not still exist; and even if we admit that it no longer does

produce any effect upon any portion of matter, still this will offer no proof that it has ceased to exist. Indeed, when we speak of its being annihilated, we may be said to use a word to which no precise meaning can be attached by our imaginations. At any rate, it is much more difficult to suppose that this annihilation has taken place, and to conceive in what way it is effected, than to suppose that the mind continues in mere state of separate existence, disencumbered of the body, or to conceive in what manner this separate existence is maintained."

We are willing to believe that, when Lord Brougham wrote these sentences, he did not perceive their inevitable tendency. It is, indeed, impossible to imagine, on any other grounds, that he is sincere when he asserts "that revelation" converts every inference of reason into certainty, and, above all, communicates the Divine Being's intentions respecting our own lot, with a degree of precision which the inferences of natural theology very imperfectly possess. For the doctrines taught above, if they be not a revival of the Epicurean theory of Pantheism, are nothing. "We can form no conception of any one particle that once is ceasing to be." Again, in the very next paragraph, it is asserted that "the material world affords no example of creation, any more than of annihilation." Now, really, if, because we have no direct specimen of creation before our eyes, we are to suppose that all things have been as they are from everlasting, and if, having no act of annihilation to bring forward, we are forced to conclude that all things will for ever continue, what becomes of the notion of a supreme First Cause, the author of all, the supporter of all, the master of all? Never, surely, did philosopher, in his idle strainings after singularity, fall into so many and such gross contradictions. Of what nature is the revelation that has been granted to Lord Brougham? The Bible tells us that "in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth;" and that "all things are upheld by the word of his power." But if we can form no idea of creation, nor yet of annihilation, all this, on his lordship's principles, must be a mistake. In such a case the universe, being self-existent, and necessarily existent, is, of course, the only God—and then what becomes of our revelation?

But is it true, in reference either to mind or to matter, both of which exist in time, that we have any difficulty in forming a notion, as well of creation as of total extinction? So far is this from being the fact, that, admitting the perfect justice of Lord Brougham's definition of time, *that it is a mere succession of ideas*, we cannot avoid being carried back, by reflection, to its commencement; out of which necessarily arises the conviction, that it must, if left to itself, have an end. A succession of units, whether these be ideas or substances, necessarily implies number. Our present idea, for example, adds by one to the number or quantity of ideas that went before it. Translate the figure of speech, however, into more intelligible language, and, instead of ideas, use the term *hours*, or *days*, or *years*. What, then? The present hour has made an addition to the number of hours that have run their course by one. But it is self-evident that a series which is capable of increase may also be diminished. Begin, then, to subtract and follow up your process; and, however remote the period may be, you must eventually arrive at the first hour. Where are we now? Launched into eternity, and thrown back upon the conviction that there must be some self-existent being, the *mode* of whose existence is, and probably will ever be, to us a mystery; but from whose will all the objects, be they corporeal or mental, with which we come into collision, had their origin. Now, what is this but the idea of creation? And then, as to annihilation, we are astonished that a metaphysician like Lord Brougham should quibble about the point. If there be one, and only one, self-existent being, and if from his volition all other beings arise, it is as clear as the sun at noonday that they must all, whether corporeal or spiritual, depend constantly upon his will for the continuance of their existence. So far is an exertion of power from being necessary to annihilate them, that their great supporter has only to cease the exercise of his sustaining power, and they fall, of their own accord, into the nothingness from which he raised them. We must say, that we never had the good fortune to follow a weaker or more untenable argument than this of Lord Brougham, set forth in language so grandiloquent.

But we have not yet done with the

ex-chancellor's metaphysics. Resolute as he is upon establishing the fact that the soul *must* endure, in a state separate from the body, for ever, he falls into a still more remarkable inconsistency. The Platonists of old had something to say for themselves, when they took up the ground which Lord Brougham seems anxious to maintain. They assumed that, as we have no instances before us either of creation or annihilation, each individual soul must have existed from everlasting, and would continue to exist throughout eternity. Not so Lord Brougham. Matter, for aught that he adduces, may be without a beginning; but "of mind this cannot be said: it is called into existence perpetually before our eyes." Nevertheless, though "in one respect this may weaken the argument for the continued existence of the soul, —because it may lead to the conclusion, that, as we see mind created, so may it be destroyed, while matter, which suffers no addition, is liable to no loss, —yet the argument seems to gain in another direction more force than it loses in this." Now, good reader, how do you suppose that the argument gains? Why, thus, to be sure: "Nothing can more strongly illustrate the diversity between mind and matter, or more strikingly shew that the one is independent of the other." Really, if this be not going round in a circle to beg the question, we do not know what is meant by the expression. We have no specimens of creation in matter; we are, therefore, justified in concluding that it will never be annihilated. We *have* specimens of creation in mind; but this only proves with double force that mind cannot be annihilated. Why? Because mind not being liable to annihilation, though palpably created every day, is shewn to be altogether independent of matter, and quite different from it!!!

Now pass we on to the illustrations, by means of which Lord Brougham proceeds to shew that the thing called mind — finite in duration, inasmuch as it began but yesterday; yet infinite in continuance, because it cannot be annihilated — is really distinct from matter, and independent of it.

"The mind's independence of matter, and capacity of existence without it, appears to be strongly illustrated by whatever shews the entire dissimilarity of its constitution. The inconceivable

rapidity of its operations is, perhaps, the most striking feature of the diversity; and there is no doubt that this rapidity increases in proportion as the interference of the senses — that is, the influence of the body — is withdrawn. A multitude of facts, chiefly drawn from and connected with the phenomena of dreams, throw a strong light upon this subject, and seem to demonstrate the possible disconnexion of mind and matter."

We cannot afford room for any one of the marvellous tales which Lord Brougham brings forward in support of his assertion, that "there is no doubt but the mind's activity increases in proportion as the influence of the senses is withdrawn." Enough is done when we state that the very first of these, relating to the effect which is produced upon the sleeper by applying a bottle of hot water to his feet, involves our reasoner in the most palpable self-contradiction. Let the bottle be applied, and behold "you instantly dream of walking over hot mould, or ashes, or streams of lava, or having your feet burned by coming too near the fire." Now, granting that such ideas do arise in your mind (which we exceedingly doubt), what is it that produces them — through what channel do they enter? Why, through the sense of touch, to be sure, — which creates in the mind irregular and false impressions, because one sense only has been appealed to, the rest being suspended by sleep. There may be great rapidity in the mind's operations in a dream — indeed, we are aware that there is. But is the rapidity less when, being wide awake, we exercise the faculty of imagination, or of memory. Cannot we compress the events of a lifetime into a moment's thought; and with all our senses alert, keep these events, too, arranged and in order? Whereas, having one sense only affected, as in a dream, all our images are wild and extravagant. So then, in the first place, we do not admit that the mind is more active in the dreamer than in the enthusiast; and, secondly, if it were, by what means are its ideas suggested? Even upon Lord Brougham's own shewing, by an appeal to one of the senses.

But this is not all. The same philosopher, who sets out with announcing that "there can be no doubt that the rapidity of the mind's operations increases in proportion as the interference of the senses is withdrawn,"

gravely asserts, what is perfectly true, a few pages forward, "that there seems every reason to conclude (from the very examples which he has been giving) that *we only dream during the instant of transition into and out of sleep.*" How is this to be accounted for? In sound sleep *all* the senses are suspended. During the transition into and out of sleep several of them, such as touch, smell, hearing, are partially active. Must not, therefore, the converse of Lord Brougham's assumption be the just one. And if we desire further proof, we have only to remember how it has fared with ourselves in a swoon. The writer of this paper received on one occasion a gun-shot wound. He was very much excited when the ball struck him; for the enemy had just given way, and he was pursuing. He followed them about a mile, when, from loss of blood, faintness came over him, and he sat down. There was a vague impression about him for a while of his actual situation; but it changed rapidly every instant. The noise of firing was heard like the roll of carriages; then it became like running water; then he saw a clear lake, which gradually darkened — and all was a blank. He understood, when he recovered his senses, that he had lain where he fell about half an hour; but not one idea passed through his mind during the whole of that time. Why? Because "the interference of the senses was entirely withdrawn, and the mind, so far from continuing rapid in its operations, ceased to work at all."

Once more we repeat, our own steady persuasion is that mind and matter are, and must be, essentially different. Still, as Lord Brougham has chosen to assume, that on the possibility of demonstrating that fact must depend all our expectations of a future state, and that such a state is assured to us, "*because the proof of the mind's separate existence is, at the least, as straight, plain, and direct, as that of the body,*" it becomes our duty, who believe that immortality is a free gift of grace, brought to light, as the Scriptures express it, by the Gospel, and by it alone, to sift his arguments to the utmost,—not in the spirit of cavil or hostility—not from the mere satisfaction we may derive from exposing sophistry; but because we are thoroughly convinced that his lordship has hit upon the right objection to

his theory, when he hints that natural theology, as decked out by him, must "prove dangerous to the acceptance of revealed religion." With this strong feeling in our minds, we proceed to notice some of the reasons which weigh most powerfully with the ex-chancellor, and which he presses with more than common eagerness on his readers.

In a former quotation we exhibited Lord Brougham as enouncing, "that the mind, that the sentient principle, that the thing or the being which we call *I* and *we*, and which thinks, feels, reasons, should have no existence, is a contradiction in terms." Undoubtedly it is; nor do we suppose that there ever lived the speculator so wild, perhaps not even Hume, as to assert the contrary. But what then? Because "the thing or being which we call *I* or *we* exists, does it necessarily follow that it has a separate existence from the body?" To be sure it does, replies Lord Brougham.

"The body is constantly undergoing change in all its parts. Probably no person at the age of twenty has one single particle in any part of his body which he had at ten; and still less does any portion of the body he was born with continue to exist in or with him. All that he before had has now entered into new combinations, forming parts of other men, or of animals, or of vegetable or mineral substances; exactly as the body he now has will afterwards be resolved into new combinations after his death. Yet the mind continues one and the same, 'without change or shadow of turning.' None of its parts can be resolved; for it is one and single, and it remains unchanged by the changes of the body. The argument would be quite as strong though the change undergone by the body were admitted not to be so complete, and though some small portion of its harder parts were supposed to continue with us through life.

"But observe how strong the inferences arising from these facts are, both to prove that the existence of the mind is entirely independent of the existence of the body, and to shew the probability of its surviving. If the mind continues the same, while all or nearly all the body is changed, it follows that the existence of the mind depends not in the least degree upon the existence of the body; for it has already survived a total change of, or, in the common use of the words, an entire destruction of that body. But again, if the strongest argument to shew that the mind perishes with the body—nay, the only argument

—he, as it indubitably is, derived from the phenomena of death, the fact to which we have been referring affords an answer to this. For the argument is, that we know of no instance in which the mind has been known to exist after the death of the body. Now here is exactly the instance desiderated; it being manifest that the same process which takes place on the body more suddenly at death is taking place more gradually, but as effectually in the result, during the whole of life; and that death itself does not more completely resolve the body into its elements, and form it into new combinations, than living fifteen or twenty years does destroy, by like resolution and combination, the self-same body. And yet after those years have elapsed, and the former body has been dissipated and formed into new combinations, the mind remains the same as before, exercising the same memory and consciousness, and so preserving the same personal identity as if the body had suffered no change at all. In short, it is not more correct to say that all of us who are now living have bodies formed of what were once the bodies of those that went before us, than it is to say that some of us who are now living at the age of fifty have bodies which in part belonged to others now living at that and other ages. The phenomena are precisely the same, and the operations are performed in like manner, though with different degrees of expedition. Now, all would believe in the separate existence of the soul, if they had experience of its existing apart from the body. But the facts referred to prove that it does exist apart from one body with which it once was united; and, though it is in union with another, yet, as it is not adherent to the same, it is shewn to have an existence separate from and independent of that body. So all would believe in the soul surviving the body, if after the body's death its existence were made manifest. But the facts referred to prove that, after the body's death—that is, after the chronic dissolution which the body undergoes during life—the mind continues to exist as before. Here, then, we have that proof so much desiderated,—the existence of the soul after the dissolution of the bodily frame with which it was connected. The two cases cannot, in any soundness of reasoning, be distinguished; and this argument, therefore, one of pure induction, derived partly from physical science, partly from psychological science by the testimony of our consciousness, appears to prove the possible immortality of the soul almost as vigorously as 'if one rose from the dead.'

We are not much disposed to dwell

upon lesser difficulties when greater present themselves in abundance; but it is impossible to avoid asking Lord Brougham the question, How he is able to reconcile this doctrine of the absolute unity of the mind, its unchangeableness, its being without a shadow of turning, with certain statements hazarded by himself in p. 72 of his Discourse?

“By availing ourselves of the properties of mind,” says he, “we can affect the intellectual faculties in exercising them, training them, improving them, producing, as it were, new forms of the understanding. Nor is there a greater difference between the mass of rude iron from which we make the steel, and the thousands of watch-springs into which that steel is cut, or the chronometer which we form of this and other masses equally inert, than there is between the untutored, indocile faculties of a rustic, who has grown up to manhood without education, and the skill of the artist who invented that chronometer, and of the mathematician who uses it to trace the motions of the heavenly bodies.”

Surely there is something like a contradiction here, which again becomes manifest when the noble writer speaks of mind as generally strengthening with the strength of the body, and, sometimes, decaying with its decay. Again, is not all this finely woven web about the continual changes which the body undergoes—its perpetual death, by which the mind is not affected, a mere begging of the question at issue, and nothing more? We grant, say the materialists, that the body does undergo continual change; in spite of which, our own consciousness assures us that our identity is preserved: but what then? We believe that the power which is capable of creating at all, is capable of superadding to matter, under certain peculiarities of organisation, the principle of vitality. And our ground for assuming that the Creator has done no more is this: that change alone, so long as the organisation continues perfect, in no way affects vitality; but the moment you interrupt or destroy that organisation, vitality ceases. How is Lord Brougham to escape from such an argument as this?

Oh! he will say, that which you call vitality is and must be something essentially distinct from matter. Moreover, it must be a separate existence; for volition, memory, reasoning, have

nothing to do with matter. "The more abstruse investigations of the mathematicians are conducted without any regard to sensible objects, and the helps he derives in his reasonings from material things at all, are absolutely insignificant, compared with the portion of his work which is altogether of an abstract kind; the aid of figures and letters being only to facilitate and abridge his labour, and not at all essential to his progress. Nay, strictly speaking, there are no truths in the whole range of pure mathematics which might not, by possibility, have been discovered and systematised by one deprived of sight and touch, or immured in a dark chamber without the use of a single material object."

We really wonder that a man of Lord Brougham's acuteness should have permitted such "a sentence against himself" to stand on record. In what is the mathematician employed? In calculations, dealing, of course, throughout with numbers or quantities. From what can his ideas of number and quantity be derived? From a process of reasoning, of which the ground-work is laid through the instrumentality of the senses; sight and touch alone enabling him to discriminate between numbers one and two. Nay, are not all his images tangible images? A triangle, a square, a parallelogram—is it possible to imagine the abstract idea of such things, apart from the idea of figure? We repeat, that the hardihood with which Lord Brougham advances assertions, is only to be equalled by the amazing self-complacence which can lead him to suppose that they will any where pass current in the room of arguments. But we have not yet done with our philosopher.

"The immateriality of the soul is the foundation of all the doctrines relating to its future state." Paraphrase this, and it becomes—the soul is immortal, because it is immaterial; convert the proposition, and we have—the soul being immaterial is immortal. Nay, Lord Brougham has laboured to prove that our ideas of annihilation are resolvable into an idea of the dissolution of a body into its constituent parts; and that, not being able to form any such idea in reference to a being which is immaterial, to believe that it will be immortal requires less exertion than to believe that it perishes. How he has illustrated his theorem, by

exhibiting the body as in a constant state of change, our last extract shews. Now let us entreat Lord Brougham to consider the lengths to which his doctrine, when legitimately followed up, must lead. If the living principle be immaterial in man, it must be immaterial in the dog and the horse also; for we know that the bodies of dogs and horses are continually undergoing the same change with our own, and by precisely the same process. Nay, the oak and the elm have each, over and over again, cast aside its old body, by means of the leaves, and put on a new body. Must we believe that the principle of life in the dog, and in the horse, and in the oak-tree, is necessarily incapable of annihilation? The ex-chancellor will reply no, in reference to the oak, which has neither volition, nor memory, nor any portion of reason; and, for the sake of brevity, we will give up that point to him, though we think that on his own ground we could fight even that battle. But the dog and the horse, have they no volition, have they no powers of reasoning? We beg Lord Brougham's especial attention to the following anecdote, for the truth of which, as our own dog was the actor and ourselves the witnesses, we can personally vouch.

We were busy writing in our study one morning, when the dog that had lain for a while under our table became restless. She laid her head upon our knee once or twice, but we were deeply engaged with our own subject, and paid no attention to her. At last she seized the bell-rope in her mouth, and pulled it. The servant came, of course; and the moment he opened the door, the dog walked out. We beg to ask Lord Brougham, whether he would deny to the mind, which led to the ringing of the bell, and to the consequences arising out of it, a very considerable share of reasoning? We must observe, that the animal would at any moment ring the bell, or shut the door, if desired; indeed she would carry a book or a letter to a friend of ours, whose rooms in college she was accustomed to frequent, and bring back the answer. But in the case above specified there must have been in her mind a regular process of induction, while, in the other cases, memory would be chiefly exercised. Was that animal's mind immaterial? and if it were, must it be immortal?

We have now pretty well examined the scope and tendency of that portion of the noble writer's philosophy, for which he claims credit to himself as having been the first to interweave it into a *Treatise of Natural Theology*; and before we go on to speak, either of the second part of his Discourse, or of the notes by which he endeavours to strengthen and support himself in his positions, he must pardon us if we make one or two general remarks. Why Lord Brougham, or any other writer on the subject of natural religion, should think it necessary to agitate the question of the soul's immateriality and immortality at all, is to us a mystery. The legitimate design of natural theology is, and must be, to furnish proofs, from the phenomena of nature, that a supreme First Cause, infinitely intelligent and infinitely good, exists. Neither may the importance of that design be lightly spoken of; for we have it on the highest authority, that "he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is the rewarder of them who diligently seek him." But whoso endeavours to go forth, whoso contends that the truth of the soul's immateriality, of its immortality, of its moral responsibility in a future state, are all discoverable by the light of nature, asserts that which is certainly not true, and which, if true, would render revelation unnecessary, and therefore improbable. See to what a conclusion this reasoning, on the principles advocated by Lord Brougham, unavoidably leads: You assure me that there is a great and good Being, the creator and the ruler of all, and that his excellence is boundless as his power. You demonstrate this by shewing that he has created my soul immaterial, and therefore necessarily immortal, though the body to which it is attached will perish. Now the first question which I put to you is, What proofs do you adduce of this? I have no experience of the soul operating without body; nay, my internal conviction is, that were not a body in some way necessary for the exercise of those powers which are inherent in the soul, a perfectly benevolent Being never would have encumbered it with the burden of a body at all. And I illustrate my theory thus: The power to make a watch is inherent in the watchmaker's mind; but if you deprive him of his tools, he cannot exercise that power.

So, though I am not going to assert that the soul cannot exist apart from the body, still all fair analogy, and all direct experience, go to shew that it will not be conscious of its own existence. For consciousness is a positive exercise of power; and, when my senses are closed up, when I am in a deep sleep or a swoon, I am not conscious. If, then, I am to look upon your theory as admissible, or inadmissible only as a whole, I shall reject it; because, though I may admit the force of the arguments which you have brought forward to prove that a good Providence governs the things of time, of the future I know nothing. I shall thus be tempted to fall back into the cold and unmeaning belief, that the universe is God, and God the universe.

We have said that natural theology, if rightly dealt with, is a science infinitely valuable; because, upon the proofs which nature can give of God's existence and power, must altogether rest our belief in the possibility of a revelation. This is a truth so self-evident, that we should conceive that we were offering an insult to our readers did we labour to prove it. He who says that he believes the Bible, because it is the word of God, and then again that he believes there is a God, because God is revealed in the Bible, commits just as gross a solecism in dialectics as that of which Lord Brougham is guilty in his demonstration of the soul's necessary immortality. But all beyond this must, according to our view, be the offspring of revelation. Nay, we are not sure that even the benevolence of the Deity, open as it is to be questioned by him who beholds so much of vice and misery in the world, can be fully established, except by the aid of revealed truths; and if we venture to proceed one step in advance, where are we? St. Paul speaks of the "mystery, which had been concealed for ages and for generations, being revealed in Christ." What was that mystery? We answer, the resurrection of the body; without being assured of which, all our notions of a future state must necessarily be vague, cheerless, indefinite, without attraction. Exist we might; but how, or in what condition? Whether in an individual and conscious state, or swallowed up, according to the Platonic notion, in the eternal mind from

which we were an emanation? These are questions which we should never be able to answer; and our vain efforts to answer which would but harass and destroy us. Why, then, Lord Brougham, condemning the wise and cautious course of his predecessors, should have plunged into such a field of speculation—unless, as we have expressed an unwillingness to believe, it be his intention to set revealed truth aside—we cannot imagine.

We proceed now to the second part of this Discourse; in reference to the two first sections of which we do not feel that we are called upon to say any thing. They are beautifully written: indeed, Lord Brougham's style is at all times very attractive, and were it not that here and there the same disposition is displayed, of attributing more to natural theology than the science can justly claim, we should not have the slightest fault to find with them. Neither is there in the concluding lecture any specific announcement, of which it is the tendency to startle or shock our moral sense. No doubt Lord Brougham goes further than the case will seem to warrant, when he says that, supposing a messenger were sent from God, he "might have power to work miracles without end, and yet it would remain unproved, either that God was omnipotent, and one, and benevolent, or that he destined his creatures to a future state, or that he had made them such as they are in their present state." We say, that this looks like a wanton fling at revelation; for, in the first place, constituted as the world *now* is, no one will deny that the inquiring mind must first of all learn from nature the phenomena that God is, and then seek in revelation to become acquainted with his attributes. But, if we exercise the imagination a little, and go back to the creation of the first pair, then are we bound to deny the justice of Lord Brougham's conclusion; for this reason: that, assuming it to be essential to the exercise of man's noblest faculties that he shall know God, and, of course, be a religious being, it would have been unworthy of supreme intelligence and supreme goodness to leave him, even for a single day, without such knowledge. Lord Brougham himself, however, will scarcely contend that a single pair of human creatures, or that several

pairs, starting all at once into existence, would think of studying the phenomena of nature for the purpose of finding out whence they came, or by what power they were supported. The wants of the body would be too pressing and too numerous for this; indeed, ages would probably pass away ere the mind could become sufficiently enlightened—supposing it possible that, of its own accord, it would ever become sufficiently enlightened—to take the slightest pleasure or interest in such researches. We have, therefore, every right to infer, that to the original family or families of mankind God made a direct revelation of himself; and the actual condition of almost all their descendants goes far to prove the fact. Do the Indian of North America and the savage of Timbuctoo come to the conclusion, after a long process of induction, that there is a God? They do not; for neither of them possesses powers sufficiently exercised to undergo the labour. But in the tribe, an indistinct recollection of the primitive revelation has survived from age to age; and hence, though grossly in error as to the object of their worship, they are still religious creatures. However, this is not worth dwelling upon. It exhibits a somewhat careless spirit, to be sure, but not a depraved one; and therefore we have no hesitation in saying, that the last part of Lord Brougham's treatise does him honour. How shall we estimate his Appendix? We answer, at a value infinitely less than that which the noble author evidently puts upon it, and our reasons are these.

To a discourse which extends through two hundred and thirteen loosely printed pages, the ex-chancellor has appended sixty-nine pages of closely printed notes. The object of these, of course, is to support the reasoning of the text, and they may be classed under three distinct heads; some being didactic, some metaphysical, some learned. We do not mean to meddle with the first class at all, which is neither very extended nor very important; but of the two last, which present metal much more attractive, we shall have something to say.

Nobody can deny, that whenever Lord Brougham has to deal with the opinions of avowed atheists he entirely overthrows them. His exposure of the sophistries contained in the famous

Système de la Nature is complete. No doubt he mixes up, even with that, more of his own peculiar notions touching the natures of mind and of matter than is called for; nevertheless the whole note, No. IV., is excellent, and deserves all the commendation that we can bestow upon it. We wish that we could say as much of No. V.; of which it is the professed design to confute and reply to Hume's celebrated Essays on Providence and a Future State, and on Miracles. Not that, as far as it goes, we have much to urge against Lord Brougham's mode of reasoning: that is well enough in its way; but, unfortunately, the noble reasoner stops short just where he might have been expected to touch upon the confines of revelation, and thus, by avoiding, as it were purposely, to point out the claims of the Scripture miracles to belief, he leaves his readers to infer that they have with him no weight. In justice to Lord Brougham, we feel ourselves called upon to quote his arguments:

"First," says he, "our belief in the uniformity of the laws of nature rests not altogether upon our own experience. We believe no man ever was raised from the dead, not merely because we ourselves never saw it, for, indeed, that would be a very limited ground of deduction; and our belief on the subject was fixed, long before we had any considerable experience — fixed, chiefly, by authority; that is, by deference to other men's experience. We found our confident belief in this negative position, partly, perhaps chiefly, upon the testimony of others; and, at all events, our belief that in times before our own the same position held good, must of necessity be drawn from our trusting the relations of other men. If, then, the existence of the law of nature is proved — in great part of it, at least — by such evidence, can we wholly reject the like evidence when it comes to prove an exception to the rule — a deviation from the law? The more numerous are the cases of the law being kept, the more rare those of its being broken, the more scrupulous certainly ought we to be in admitting the proofs of the breach. But that testimony is capable of making good the proof there seems no doubt: in truth, the degree of excellence and of strength to which testimony may rise seems almost indefinite. There is hardly any cogency which it is not capable, by possible supposition, of attaining. The endless multiplication of witnesses, the unbounded variety of their habits of thinking, their prejudices, their in-

terests, afford the means of conceiving the force of their testimony augmented *ad infinitum*; because these circumstances afford the means of diminishing indefinitely the chances of their being all mistaken, all misled, or all combining to deceive us. Let any man try to calculate the chances of a thousand persons, who come from different quarters, and never saw each other before, and who all vary in their stations, habits, opinions, interests, being mistaken, or combining to deceive us, when they give the same account of an event as having happened before their eyes: these chances are many hundreds to one. And yet we can conceive them multiplied indefinitely; for one hundred thousand such witnesses may all, in like manner, bear the same testimony, and they may all tell us their story within twenty-four hours after the transaction, and in the very next parish. And yet, according to Mr. Hume's argument, we are bound to disbelieve them all; because they speak to a thing contrary to our own experience, and to the accounts which other witnesses had formerly given us of the laws of nature, and which our forefathers had handed down to us, as derived from witnesses who lived in the old time before them. It is unnecessary to add, that no testimony of the witnesses whom we are supposing to concur in their relation, contradicts any testimony of our own senses. * * *

"Secondly, this leads us to the next objection to which Mr. Hume's argument is liable, and which we have in part anticipated, while illustrating the first. He requires us to withhold our belief in circumstances which would force every man of common understanding to lend his assent, and to act upon the supposition of the story told being true. For, suppose either such numbers of various witnesses as we have spoken of; or, what is perhaps stronger, suppose a miracle reported to us, first by a number of relaters, and then by three or four of the very soundest judges and most incorruptibly honest men we know — men noted for their difficult belief of wonders, and, above all, steady unbelievers in miracles, without any bias in favour of religion, but rather accustomed to doubt, if not disbelieve — most people would lend an easy belief to any miracle thus vouched. But let us add this circumstance, that a friend on his death-bed had been attended by us, and that we had told him a fact known only to ourselves — something that we had secretly done the very moment before we told it to the dying man, and which to no other being we had ever revealed, and that the credible witnesses we are sup-

posing inform us that the deceased appeared to them, conversed with them, remained with them a day or two, accompanied them, and, to vouch the fact of his reappearance on this earth, communicated to them the secret of which we had made him the sole depository the moment before his death; according to Mr. Hume, we are bound rather to believe, not only that those credible witnesses deceive us, or that those sound and unprejudiced men were themselves deceived, and fancied things without real existence, but further, that they all hit by chance upon the discovery of a real secret, known only to ourselves and the dead man. Mr. Hume's argument requires us to believe this, as the lesser improbability of the two; and yet every one must feel convinced, that, were he placed in the situation we have been figuring, he would not only lend his belief to the relation, but, if the relators accompanied it with a special warning from the deceased person to avoid a certain contemplated act, he would, acting upon the belief of their story, take the warning, and avoid doing the forbidden deed. Mr. Hume's argument makes no exception. This is its scope; and, whether he chooses to push it thus far or no, all miracles are of necessity denied by it, without the least regard to the kind or the quantity of the proof on which they are rested; and the testimony we have supposed, accompanied by the test or check we have supposed, would fall within the grasp of the argument just as much and as clearly as any other miracle avouched by more ordinary combinations of evidence."

A little further down, Lord Brougham, after observing, that "it is for those who maintain the truth of any revelation to shew in what manner the evidence suffices to prove the miracles on which that revelation rests," states frankly that his "treatise is not directed to that object." We are quite aware of the fact; neither should we have had any just cause to find fault with the author, had he avoided the subject of miracles altogether, as being something between which and the truths of natural religion, properly so called, there is no necessary connexion. But having stepped out of his way to refute Hume, it does indeed surprise us that he should have failed to vindicate the only miracles in which any rational man is now required to believe. What can his object be? Is it to shew that, though under certain circumstances, to which we are not

aware that any parallel can be traced in all history, the evidence of experience is to be postponed to that of testimony, even when the occurrence related is in violation of an acknowledged law of nature; still that, in every other case, we should be justified in preferring experience to testimony, or, rather, that we should not be justified were we to act otherwise? We hope that such is not the noble writer's design. But lest it should, we beg leave to specify two more cases; in which to reject the evidence of testimony, because it contradicts experience, would be just as much opposed to right reason as to act in a similar manner in either of the cases quoted by his lordship.

We ourselves have never been so fortunate as to witness the fall of even one meteoric stone. We have been assured, however, upon the testimony of credible witnesses, that such stones have fallen, both in ancient and modern times; and we believe these witnesses. Why? Because, though it be in direct opposition to the well-known laws of gravitation that stones should float in the atmosphere, and though nobody has been able to explain how they got there, or whence they came, we believe that for so many persons to combine for the purpose of circulating a gratuitous falsehood, would be a still greater miracle than the fall of the stones. Yet the gross obstacle opposed to this combination for false purposes is the innate propensity with which all men are endowed to speak the truth. Truth is continually on the door of the lips; falsehood is never uttered, except after a positive exertion.

Now if, in reference to such an event, which in its consequences seems incapable of affecting any human being, either for good or for evil, we are forced to confide in testimony rather than in experience, much more pressing is the demand on our faith in a case where it can be shewn that some great moral end is to be served, and benefits of an incalculable value bestowed upon the human race. Thus, we find a certain number of poor and unlearned men, the natives of the most despised province of a great empire, suddenly opposing themselves to the religions established throughout the empire, giving out that they have been divinely commissioned so to do, bearing testimony to certain miracles which a Divine

person had performed in their presence; as that he raised the dead to life, and fed five thousand men with five barley-loaves;—setting up no claim to worldly wealth, or rank, or distinction, but, while they propagate tenets, of which it is the tendency to render men just, and pure, and honest, and upright, declaring that the sole reward which their master had led them to expect was persecution and death in this world, followed by eternal happiness in the next: we find these persons all combining in the same story, of which the details never vary, no matter how they are affected by change of place, by change of time, by change of circumstances, by separation one from another, or by being confronted. We ask, whether we are bound to believe that all these men are themselves deceived, or wilfully seeking to deceive others; or that the tale which they tell, however marvellous, is true? If we believe the latter, we admit, indeed, that events must have befallen of which we have no experience, and against which the ordinary laws of nature are opposed; but we admit nothing more than in the case of the meteoric stones we had admitted already. If we believe the former, then we must conclude that upwards of one hundred persons were enabled, somehow or another, to obliterate from their own minds all the natural associations between external objects and the ideas which are their symbols; that, having done this, they deliberately agreed to choose evil for its own sake; that, when they sat down to fabricate their pretended revelation, and to contrive a series of miracles to which they were all to appeal for its truth, they were miraculously gifted with such a degree of foreknowledge as that they were able to prepare consistent answers to all the questions which their enemies might address to them, under all varieties of circumstances, and in every imaginable change of time and place. We put it to our readers to decide which kind of testimony they will receive—that of experience, which so far goes against the miracle of the barley-loaves, that in their own presence no such miracle was ever performed; or that of one hundred and twenty men, the falsehood of whose evidence (supposing it to be false) necessarily involves the working of miracles, at least as start-

ling as the matter of fact for which they are the vouchers.

We very much lament that Lord Brougham, vindicating as he does the credibility of miracles, should have omitted to take up this ground of argument, rather than the imaginary grounds which he has assumed. For we think too highly of his lordship's powers of discrimination to suppose that he is likely to be biassed by the theory which Laplace unfortunately adopted; namely, that the value of testimony becomes less and less, in proportion to the number of hands through which it passes. Of course, we speak now of evidence which is preserved in a *record*; not of evidence that has been transmitted from age to age by mere oral tradition. The latter is, indeed, lost, to all intents and purposes, as soon as the persons by whom it has been given die off; but the former is strengthened by distance. "Take," says an ingenious writer in the *Edinburgh Review*, "any ancient event that is well attested—such, for example, as the retreat of the ten thousand—and we are persuaded it will be generally admitted, that the certainty of that event having taken place is as great at this moment as it was on the return of the Greek army, or immediately after Xenophon published his narrative. The calculation of chances may indeed be brought to declare in favour of it; for Xenophon's narrative remains, and the probability will be found to be very small, that any considerable interpolation or change in that narrative could have taken place, without some historical document remaining to inform us of such change. The combination of chances necessary to produce and to conceal such an interpolation is in the highest degree improbable, and the authority of Xenophon on that account remains the same at this moment that it was originally." This is sound reasoning with respect to the *Anabasis*; and if so, it applies with tenfold force to the scriptures of the New Testament, to alter or corrupt which there were, in all ages, a thousand motives; and of the perfect freedom of which from any important interpolation we have the most conclusive proofs.

We come now to those portions of the Appendix in which Lord Brougham essays to set forth his intimate acquaintance with the writings of the

ancient philosophers, and to draw from them proofs, that the doctrine of the soul's individual immortality, and of its liability hereafter to rewards and punishments, is deducible from the inferences of unassisted reason. As we have already shewn, Lord Brougham is at issue in these respects with St. Paul; at all events, St. Paul, speaking of this very doctrine—a state of rewards and punishments beyond the grave—pronounces it to be the “mystery” which had been hidden from ages and from generations. It is, however, but justice to say, that Lord Brougham does not openly grapple St. Paul. He is content to measure himself with Warburton; and, truly, a more unequal match in dialectics cannot very well be conceived. Warburton, the giant in literature, who had drunk deep at the fountain-head of ancient lore—paradoxical, perhaps, but always able and always willing to defend his paradoxes by the application of a scholarship, to which we shall now vainly look for a specimen; and Lord Brougham, the smatterer in moral and physical science, the ready speaker, the patron of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, and the student of the classics *at second hand*! Alas, for the vanity which could hurry even Lord Brougham into such a combat! alas, for the pitiful plight in which he shews at its termination!

The ex-chancellor's learning is displayed in the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth notes, appended to his discourse. In these he treats of the *ancient doctrines respecting mind*; of the *ancient doctrines respecting the Deity and matter*; of the *ancient doctrine of the immortality of the soul*; and of *Bishop Warburton's theory concerning the ancient doctrine of a future state*. The first of these minor treatises scarcely affects to contain a single statement which is not familiar to every schoolboy; and goes no further than to shew that “the opinions of the ancient philosophers upon the nature of the soul were not very consistent with themselves.” The second assumes, that whatever might be the opinions of the ancients touching the nature of God, they all united in a belief of the eternity of matter. We might argue this point with him, but we will not. Enough is done when we state that the corollary derived from it is both self-contradictory and absurd—as any man may satisfy himself who is inclined to study the passage. Lord Brougham is exceedingly fond of asserting that, as we cannot form any idea of creation, so it is impossible to conceive how the act of annihilation can be performed. Now we flatter ourselves that we have shewn that the idea of creation arises from the very nature of the existence in which we ourselves participate; and we suspect that there are few indeed who will not be able to perceive that, when you once establish that fact, all difficulty ceases. Every hour in which the annihilation of the universe is deferred, must be an hour of continued exertion to the power by which the universe is upheld. But we must hurry on, as notes eight and nine are pressing for notice:

“That the ancient philosophers, for the most part, believed in the future existence of the soul after death is undeniable. It is equally certain that their opinions on this important subject varied exceedingly, and that the kind of immortality admitted by one class can hardly be allowed to deserve the name. Thus, they who considered it a portion of the Divine essence, severed for a time, in order to be united with a perishable body, believed in a future existence without memory or consciousness of personal identity, and merely as a reuniting it with the Divine mind. Such, however, was not the belief of the more pure and enlightened theists: and to their opinion, as approaching nearest to our own, it is proposed to confine the present notice.”

To support this opinion certain quotations are given from the *Phædo* and the *Timæus*, from Xenophon's *Cyropædia*, from Cicero's *De Senectute*, and from the *Tusculan Questions*. Moreover, Bishop Warburton is fiercely attacked, because he has ventured to deny that any of the ancients, except Socrates, really believed in a future state of the soul individually, and subject to reward or punishment. Now we are not going to take up the cudgels for Warburton. No abridgement, such as we could give, would do justice to the third book of his *Divine Legation*, whereas every scholar can consult it for himself; and we rather suspect that, having done so, he will think very lightly of its assailant. But we can put Lord Brougham's acquaintance with the ancient schools of philosophy

a little to the test, and, with God's blessing, we shall do so.

Lord Brougham asserts that it is "violent to suppose that those philosophers (the theists), for the purpose of deceiving the multitude, delivered opinions not held by themselves, and delivered them in profound philosophical treatises." His reason for asserting this is, that these treatises were never meant for the use of the vulgar—that they were not "poems and speeches read in the portico, or pronounced in the forum." True, they were neither speeches nor poems. But how does Lord Brougham imagine that the philosophers and historians of old obtained for their works any degree of *publicity*. There was then no printing-press to accumulate copies, and the task of transcription was both operose and slow. It could not, therefore, be as books are published now; but it was by getting their treatises recited by their pupils, by their friends, by their acquaintances, wherever they went; and thus obtaining for them precisely the same sort of publicity that would have been obtained for a speech spoken in the forum. What right, then, has Lord Brougham to assume that the particular passages in the writings of Plato and others, which pronounce peremptorily in favour of a future state of rewards and punishments, were not intended to serve the purposes of the civil magistrate?

The four schools of theistical philosophy known to the ancient world were the Pythagorean, the Platonic, the Peripatetic, and the Stoic. With the popular creed of Pythagoras—that of a metempsychosis—our readers are of course acquainted. By inculcating this, Pythagoras the sage professed to argue in favour of the endurance of the soul after the dissolution of the body, and its liability to reward or punishment by transference into a new body, either for better or for worse. Did he himself really credit this fable? From himself we know nothing; but his disciple, Timæus Locrus, utterly denies it. His expression is: "For, as we some-

times cure the body with unwholesome remedies, when such as are most wholesome have no effect, so we restrain those minds by false relations, which will not be persuaded by the truth. There is a necessity, therefore, of instilling the dread of those foreign torments,—as that the soul shifts and changes its habitations, that the coward is ignominiously thrust into the body of a woman," &c.*

Again, Ovid, who may be supposed to have understood the real sentiments of Pythagoras, and the true tendency of his doctrines, as well as Lord Brougham, makes Pythagoras, when addressing himself to the Crotoniates, reject a future state of rewards and punishments, on the very principle of his own metempsychosis.

"O genus attonitum gelidæ formidine
mortis!
Quid Styga, quid tenebras, et nomina
vana timetis,
Maledicum vatum, falsique piacula
mundi?
Corpora, sive rogos flammâ, seu tabe
vetustas
Abstulerit; mala posse pati non ulla
putetis,
Morte carent animæ; *semperque* priora
dilecta
Sede, novis domibus habitant, vivuntque
receptæ."—*Lib. XV.*

Empedocles, Sextius Empericus, and Tabes, all followers of Pythagoras, equally held that beyond the grave there was nothing either to hope or to fear. The words of the last, as given by Stobæus, when comforting a friend who mourned the decease of a beloved companion, are, "But he will not be again. Well, he had no existence ten thousand years ago, nor during the Trojan war, nor with your immediate forefathers. You are not grieved at these things; but you are concerned because he will not exist in the future."† Yet, all of the Pythagorean school were theists, and pure theists.‡

We come now to Plato, of whom Lord Brougham makes much use, quoting, of course, from the *Phædo*; and quoting, as it seems to us, in the

* Ως γὰρ τὰ σωματὰ νοσῶδες ποτὶ ὑγιασμοῖς, οἷα μὴ εἰκὴ τοῖς ὑγινοτάτοις, οὕτω τὰς ψυχὰς ἀπείργοις ψευδεσι λόγοις, οἷα μὴ ἀγῆται ἀληθεῖσι λεγομένοισι ἀναγκαιῶς καὶ τιμωρίαις ξίνοι, ὡς μετενδυσσομένην τὴν ψυχάν. κ. τ. λ.—*De Animâ Mundi.*

† Αλλ' οὐκ ἐστὶ· ἐστὶ οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡν μυριοστόν ἐτος, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῷ Τρωϊκῷ, οὐδὲ κατὰ τοὺς προπαπποὺς σου. Σὺ δ' ἐπὶ μὲν τούτων οὐκ ἀχθῇ, οὔτε δὲ εἰς ὑστέρων οὐκ ἐστὶ, δυσχεραίνεις.—*Stobæus Mon., E. c. 106.*

‡ See Jamblichus's *Life of Pythagoras*, and Alburus, as quoted by Warburton.

most happy state of ignorance, that the *Phædo* has been pronounced by the best authorities an exoterical production. Plato both was, and avowed himself to be, a scholar in the school of Pythagoras, and, like his master, taught the doctrine of the metempsychosis; though he so far spiritualised it, that, according to him, "the changes and transitions spoken of by Pythagoras signified the purgations of minds which, by reason of the pollutions they had contracted, were unfit to reascend to the place whence they came, and be absorbed in the mighty SUBSTANCE. Thus, in his *Georgia*, his *Phædo*, and his *Republic*, he speaks of the souls of the wicked descending into the bodies of asses and swine, and gravely makes reference to Styx, Cocytus, Acheron, &c.; but, in his *Epinomus*, where he speculates about the condition of a good man after death, his language is: "Of whom, both in JEST and in EARNEST, I constantly affirm, that when such a one shall have finished his destined course by death, he shall at his dissolution be stripped of those many senses which he enjoyed here, and then only participate of one simple lot or condition. And instead of *many*, as he was here, having become *one*, he shall be happy, wise, and blessed."* Now, though we do not deny that Plato believed in the immortality of the soul—which according to him had no beginning, and will have no end—we cannot allow Lord Brougham to rank him, after this, among the ancients who "believed in a future state of the soul individually, and subject to reward or punishment." When jesting—that is, when writing to deceive—he did hold this opinion; when delivering his own sentiments, he sent back the purified spirit into the great abyss, from which it had emanated, and in which individuality was lost for ever. In a word, Plato was one of those who held the very doctrine which Lord Brougham declines to treat as worthy of consideration. Yet it is to him that almost all his lordship's appeals are made, for proof that the belief of some of the most eminent of the philosophers in

a state of rewards and punishments is undeniable.

We will not pause to shew in what light Plato's philosophy was regarded by Chrysippus, by Strabo, and Celsus, all of whom represent his popular creed as an intentional deception. Neither is it necessary to appeal to the authority of the Emperor Julian, who, if we may trust Origen, considered Plato as putting on the character of a mere fabulist the moment he began to write about theology. For our quotations would be without end, were we to transcribe all the passages that occur to us. More to the purpose will it be if we shew that neither the Peripatetics nor the Stoics approached one whit nearer to the truth as it has been brought to light by the Gospel. Lord Brougham has extracted a sentence from Aristotle's *Ethics*, which will probably satisfy every inquirer, except himself, that that great man's belief in a future state of rewards and punishments was not very deep-seated. "Death," says Aristotle (we take Lord Brougham's own version; of which, by the way, the incorrectness is remarkable, inasmuch as the masculine *θανατος* is made to agree with the neuter *θανατον*), "is most terrible, for it is an end (of us); and there appears to be nothing further, good or bad, for the dead."† We need scarcely say that the meaning of the original is, "Death is the most terrible of all things—death is the thing, the most terrible of all things;" or, that one who could speak of death in such language could not believe that there was aught beyond it, either of good or evil.

It would be easy to demonstrate, that in the opinions of their great master all the philosophers of the Peripatetic school coincided. It would be just as easy to shew, by reference to particular passages, that the creed of the Stoics was, on this head, not very different. But, for brevity's sake, we are content to bring into the field an authority which even Lord Brougham will scarce venture to gainsay. Epictetus—a thorough Stoic, if ever Stoic existed—speaking of death, says, "But whither

* Ον και διίσχυριζομαι παιζων και σπουδαζων αμα οτε θανατω τις των τοιουτων την αυτου μοιραν αναπλησει, χεδον εαιπερ αποθανων η μετε μετεχειν ετι πολλων τοτε καθαπερ νυν αισθησεων, μιας τε μοιρας μετεκληροτα μονον, και εκ πολλων ενα γεγονοτα, ευδαιμονα τε εσεσθαι, και σοφωτατον αμα και μακαριον.

† Φοβερωτατον δε ο θανατος: περας γαρ και ουδεν ετι τω τεθνεωτι δοκει, ουτε αγαθον ουτε κακον ειναι.

do you go? Nowhere to your hurt. You return from whence you came; to a friendly consociation with your kindred elements. What there was of the nature of fire in your composition returns to the fire, what there was of earth to earth, what of air to air, what of water to water. There is no Hell, nor Acheron, nor Cocytus, nor Pyrephlegethon.*

There remains for us now only to notice Cicero, of whom the noble theologian asserts, that every attempt to describe him as entertaining so much as a doubt on the subject of the soul's immortality, involves such as make it in palpable absurdities and contradictions. Far be it from us to deny that, in several of his treatises, Cicero argues well in support of Lord Brougham's notion; but what then? Is he himself satisfied with his own reasonings? So far from it, that, in addition to such hesitating exclamations as he puts into the mouths of his interlocutors, we come continually to such passages as the following:

"Mortis enim metu, omnis quietæ vitæ status perturbatur."—*De Fin.*, lib. i.

"Quæ enim potest in vitâ esse jocunditas, cum dies et nocties cogitandum est, jam jamque esse moriendum?"—*Tusc.*, lib. i.

"Quis enim potest, mortem aut dolorem metuens, quorum alterum sæpe adest, alterum semper impendit, esse non tristis?"—*Ibid.*, lib. v.

And again:

"Natura sic se habet, ut, quomodo initium nobis, rerum omnium ortus noster afferat, sic exitum mors; ut nihil pertinuit ad nos ante ortum, sic nihil post mortem pertinebit; en quidquid potest esse mali, cum mors nec ad vivos pertineat, nec ad mortuos."—*Ibid.*, lib. i.

And now, having very far exceeded the space which it was our intention to occupy when we began to address ourselves to this subject, it only remains for us to explain why we have thus taken so much trouble to sift Lord Brougham's reasonings, and to weigh the true value of his scholarship.

In few words, then, our object has been to expose the sophistries of a treatise which—whether designedly or not the noble author best knows—appears to us as well calculated to shake the faith of the young and the unthinking in the great truths of revela-

tion, as if it had been written and published for no other purpose. If Lord Brougham's view of the case be adopted, there is nothing told us in the word of God that we are not able to discover by the exercise of our own reason. Not only the existence and moral attributes of the great Creator are abundantly demonstrated in his works; but, from a contemplation of these, we are enabled to arrive at a sure and steadfast belief of the immortality of our own souls, and of a future state of rewards and punishments. Now, if the case be so, if the necessity of all this can be proved by the very same process which impels us to believe that two and two are equal to four, and not to five, then is it as clear as the sun at noon-day, that of revelation mankind have never stood in need; and, as it would be derogatory to all our notions of supreme intelligence to imagine that God would unnecessarily interpose to accomplish, by supernatural means, an end which is perfectly within the reach of nature, then are we bound to reject as fabulous the religion which Christ has given. For the New Testament assumes throughout, that eternal life is not ours by right of nature—that it is a free gift from God to man, through the merits of Christ Jesus—and that to make clear to a benighted world so prodigious a mystery, as that man shall not perish when the soul quits the body, was one object which our Saviour came to effect, and which he has effected. Observe, we do not mean to bring so heavy a charge against Lord Brougham, as that he had deliberately framed this design when he sat down to write. All that we pretend to say is, that, if his arguments be accepted as conclusive, the result must be to overthrow our faith in the Gospel; but we flatter ourselves that we have shewn, not only that they do not deserve to be accepted as conclusive, but that they are throughout flimsy, superficial, and full of the most palpable contradictions.

Lord Brougham has added no fresh laurel to his wreath by his first appearing in the character of a theologian; and we strongly advise him, if he have any regard for reputation as a scholar and a metaphysician, not to try the experiment again.

* Που εις ουδεν δεινον, αλλ' οθεν εγενου, εις τα φιλα και συγγενη, εις τα στοιχεια, οσον ην σοι πυρος εις πυρ απεισιν, οσον ην γηδιον εις γηδιον, οσον πνευματιον εις πνευματιον, οσον υδατιον εις υδατιον ουδεις Αδης, ουδ' Αχερων, ουδ' Κωκυτος, ουδε Περεφλεγεθων.—*Apud Arrian.*, lib. iii.